Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Richard Thomson and Sammy Wilson

Committee stage
Wednesday 13th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Richard Thomson]

I rise to speak to amendments 15 to 18 and new clause 5. I will just have a quick canter through them, because they are quite technical.

Amendment 15 would apply House of Commons draft affirmative procedure in place of regulations on tax or customs matters being subject to annulment. Amendment 16 would prevent Henry VIII powers from being made on tax or customs matters using the made affirmative procedure. Amendment 17 would introduce the super-affirmative procedure set out in SNP new clause 5. Amendment 18 would remove the made affirmative procedure for tax and customs matters.

The SNP is proposing the super-affirmative procedure on what we regard as a point of principle: the Bill gives Ministers far, far, far too much power. Notwithstanding any of the unlawfulness inherent in it, it simply gives Ministers far too much power to act without reference back to elected Members. We think that that needs to be remedied, so under new clause 5, the super-affirmative procedure would ensure that the Treasury and Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs

“must have regard to…any representations…any resolution of the House of Commons, and…any recommendations of a committee of the House of Commons charged with reporting on the draft regulations”

and must give details of any representations made. The new clause would ensure that approval for the draft regulations is given by Members of this House, rather than by Ministers. There are some important issues at stake.

I turn to the House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s seventh report of this Session. I have to say that the Committee’s publications are very worthy, although they are not exactly on my bedtime reading list every night. I am sure that the shadow Secretary of State, the hon. Member for Hove (Peter Kyle), would agree; his highlighter pen has clearly been over exactly the same sections of the report as mine. What it says early on bears repetition:

“The Northern Ireland Protocol Bill…confers on Ministers a licence to legislate in the widest possible terms…The Bill represents as stark a transfer of power from Parliament to the Executive as we have seen throughout the Brexit process. The Bill is unprecedented in its cavalier treatment of Parliament, the EU and the Government’s international obligations.”

Quite apart from the unlawful nature of what is being proposed, it seems undesirable, if not improper, to vest quite so much power in the hands of Ministers.

I will keep my remarks brief, but I will just briefly touch on Opposition amendments 34 and 35, which appear to have a similar ethos to ours: they would remove Ministers’ ability to act on a subjective rather than objective basis. I also commend new clause 4 and amendment 24; the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) spoke very eloquently about the benefits that could come from taking a UK-wide approach once again on these matters.

I have certainly been doing my bit, in every forum to which I have had access, to make the case for putting a sanitary and phytosanitary deal in place. Not only would that solve many of the problems inherent in the protocol, but it would make things much better for my constituents in the north-east of Scotland, the seed potato growers and those who are involved in the food and drink industry more generally. It seems such a pragmatic thing to do that it beggars belief that we have come so far down the road of the Government saying that they wish to negotiate without anything like it being concluded. It seems to me that Ministers would be knocking on an open door if they went to Brussels with it.

[Sammy Wilson]

The DUP has not tabled any amendments to the Bill. We do have some reservations, especially about the regulations that Ministers may introduce to give effect to measures set out in the Bill. Nevertheless, we want the Bill to go through the House intact.

Having listened to the hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry), I could have understood it if his amendment had come from the Labour party. After all, we know that the Labour party really wanted to remain in the EU and would love to get back in the EU; it is pushing to keep Northern Ireland as close as possible to the EU so that it could eventually be a foot in the door for the rest of the United Kingdom. I could also have understood it if it had been a Liberal Democrat amendment. The hon. Member’s amendment, which would be similar in effect to new clause 4, tears at the very heart of the problem. Rather than addressing the problem of the protocol, it seeks to ensure that that problem remains.

The protocol has caused two issues in Northern Ireland. The first is the democratic deficit. As a result of the protocol, Northern Ireland is subject to a list of EU measures which—in annex 2 of the protocol—goes on for 82 pages. Those 82 pages do not contain the details of the law; they are merely a list of the EU laws, directives and regulations that apply to Northern Ireland. Moreover, not only the historic regulations themselves but any changes in those regulations apply, and there will be no opportunity for politicians in Northern Ireland to have any say on them. They will have no opportunity to amend them; they will not even have any say in whether they are enacted, no matter how damaging they may be to the Northern Ireland economy. That is what causes the democratic deficit, and the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for North Down is intended to ensure that that situation remains.

In our earlier debate, we talked about the need for consent and the need for accountability. In fact, in his own speech the hon. Gentleman talked about how terrible it would be for Ministers to take on the powers in the Bill, because that would take away the right of this Parliament to make any decisions and have any say. Yet he was quite happy to move an amendment that would remove the powers in the Bill to ensure that that list of EU regulations—82 pages of them—should no longer apply to Northern Ireland unless it is deemed necessary. He is quite happy for the Bill to be amended to leave those in place. We have elected an Assembly in Stormont. I know that people complain about the fact that it is not sitting, and of course it is not sitting because of the protocol; but even if it were up and running, it could not do anything to deal with the problems caused by the protocol, because it does not have a say on them.

That is the first problem, and stemming from it is the second: the range of issues contained in article 5, which the amendment tabled by the hon. Member for North Down seeks to keep in place. What is article 5 all about? It is all about the fact that laws in Northern Ireland are different from, and will become more different from, laws in the rest of the United Kingdom. Goods coming to Northern Ireland from Great Britain will have to be subject to checks either if they are made in Great Britain under different rules and regulations, or if they come from third countries into Great Britain and then into Northern Ireland, and maybe go into the Republic. If passed, the amendment would leave unaddressed both the issue of the democratic deficit and the problem of EU checks, with all the impact that that has on businesses in Northern Ireland.

It has been claimed—we have heard much about this today—that what we should be doing, instead of acting unilaterally, is negotiating. Why do the Government not negotiate on all the things that they wish to do in the Bill? Why, for example, do we not secure a veterinary agreement with the EU? Well, we have been trying to do that. Indeed, Lord Frost told the House of Lords last year:

“On the question of a SPS or veterinary agreement, we proposed in the TCA negotiations last year that there could be an equivalence arrangement between us and the EU. Unfortunately, the EU was not open to that. We continue to be open to such an equivalence arrangement, if the EU is interested in it.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 25 March 2021; Vol. 811, c. 970.]

The EU has not shown any interest.

Northern Ireland Troubles (Legacy and Reconciliation) Bill

Debate between Richard Thomson and Sammy Wilson

Committee stage
Monday 4th July 2022 Commons Chamber

[Richard Thomson]

I thank the hon. Gentleman for that intervention. To speak to his wider point, the right of access to judicial review is a fundamental right for any individual against an overreaching Executive or Government. It is only right that that route should remain open to people, notwithstanding the Bill. To incorporate that right in the Bill would provide a very important safeguard for people. I urge the Minister to ensure it is there, so that that right is not in question at any stage after the Bill is passed.

[Sammy Wilson]

First of all, we understand how sensitive the whole issue of legacy is: we live with it every day in Northern Ireland. We get representations from our constituents about it and there are varying views, but the one thing the Government have to be aware of is just how much opposition there is to the proposals on the table tonight. We have tabled amendments that we believe would improve the Bill. Would they make us vote for the Bill? No, they would not. But at least they would improve the way the Bill operates for victims and how it addresses the unfairness that those who involved themselves in terrorism will now be able to walk away free.

If we look at the terms of the Bill and what victims get out of it, we can see why there is so much opposition to it. We welcome the fact that the Government have now accepted the proposals put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) on ensuring that those who were involved in sexual crimes do not use the cover of the troubles and their involvement in paramilitaries to be granted immunity, but there are other proposals that I believe are equally compelling, and the Government ought to look at them. First of all, from the victims’ point of view—this was mentioned in the last point made by the SNP spokesman, the hon. Member for Gordon (Richard Thomson)—those who want to take civil actions can now no longer do so. Those were the only avenue open to many people. Indeed, in the case of the Omagh bomb and others, we saw how people were able to at least try to overcome the deficiencies in the police investigation. What is on offer for those who are victims?

Terrorists who co-operate and tell the truth, at the end of the day, after they have admitted their role, will walk away with no sentence at all—no time in jail. They are free; they are immune. Those who do not co-operate can still be subject to an investigation, but there will be no outcome at the end of it, other than if they are successfully prosecuted. Their crime will be highlighted but they will not pay any price for it.

For those who, laughingly, go into the process and tell lies, and hurt the victims more, there will be no sanction either. One amendment we have tabled will ensure, if the Government accept it, that those who knowingly lie in the process at least know there will be a sanction on them. It is a reasonable amendment, and the Government should accept it. Otherwise, there is no incentive for people to go into the process and tell the truth. The Government may well argue, “Why would you go into the process if you don’t intend to tell the truth?” The fact of the matter is that here are people who engaged in murder and terror for so many years. It may well be that simply to avoid the prosecution process, they are prepared to go in, hoping that nobody actually knows and has sufficient information to expose the lies they are telling. But if they knew there was always the chance that, having been caught in those lies, some sanction or penalty would be imposed on them, then we may well get at least some indication. They would know there was some penalty involved at the end of the day.

On the amendment on the glorification of terrorism, this is a big danger. We have seen it already with members of the IRA, some of whom are now MLAs in Northern Ireland. They committed crimes, escaped from prison with a prison officer killed and now go around boasting about it. It is how they pack people into their dinners for fundraising. They write about it in books and make money out of it. The real danger of the Bill is that once they have been granted immunity, they will be totally free to do that without any comeback at all and with no sanction imposed on them.

Northern Ireland Protocol Bill

Debate between Richard Thomson and Sammy Wilson

2nd reading
Monday 27th June 2022 Commons Chamber

[Richard Thomson]

The hon. Gentleman seems to be confusing me with a representative of the Government of Ireland; that is an interesting historical diversion that I would be more than happy to discuss with him later, but I am not exactly certain how germane it is to this particular discussion. It seems a little bit recondite to say the least.

The Government have presented a precis of the legal advice. The Law Society of Scotland has identified a number of provisions in the Bill that it believes to be inconsistent with the UK’s international law obligations. Because of the amount of time available and the fact that we are only on Second Reading, I do not intend to go into those points in any great depth or delve unnecessarily into the horrors of the empowerment of Ministers that the Bill represents—the Henry VIII powers. However, I just specifically highlight the issues that the Bill creates given that article 4 of the withdrawal agreement states expressly that the UK cannot legislate contrarily to its commitments through primary legislation.

We now get on to necessity, which is ultimately the justification that the Government are using. As I understand it, that rests on two key points: first, that there is effectively, when viewed from London, no detriment to the single market from these measures; and secondly, that this underwrites the Government’s wishes to protect the UK single market and the Good Friday agreement. That argument was neatly eviscerated by my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) in an earlier intervention, but there are three points that instantly leap out at me. First, as I have said, whether or not there is detriment is a largely subjective measure. Whatever unilateral assertions might be made on this, whether or not there is detriment requires to be determined in another manner.

Secondly, making an invocation of necessity must not seriously impair an essential interest of another party, and it is quite hard to argue that this could not at least be at risk of happening. Thirdly, it is not particularly credible now to cite the protocol as harming the single market or the Good Friday agreement when it was cited by HM Government as a means of protecting both those things. The Prime Minister wanting to override a deal that he himself was happy to claim credit for, in terms of having got Brexit done, during his 2019 election campaign is not the strongest basis for sustaining that argument.

With regard to the economic effect, Northern Ireland has clearly lagged behind the rest of the UK in economic performance in recent decades. For some reason, it is currently outpacing every other part of the UK, except, perhaps predictably, London. There must be some reason why that might be, and I do not know whether anyone can help me with it, but perhaps there is a clue—

[Sammy Wilson]

If the hon. Gentleman were to examine the economic performance in Northern Ireland, he might find that, surprisingly, it is the service sector that has increased, by seven times more than the manufacturing sector, and of course the service sector is not covered by the protocol at all.

[Richard Thomson]

Manufacturing also seems to be doing quite well, as I recall. Perhaps having a foot in both markets and easier access to both, in contrast to counterparts on the other side of the north channel, might also be a reason for that.

A survey by the Northern Ireland Chamber of Commerce shows that 70% of businesses now believe that that unique trading position with preferential access to both the EU and UK single markets presents opportunities for Northern Ireland, with the number of businesses reporting a significant problem dropping from 15% to 8%. While I would not seek to diminish in any way the problems that those 8% feel, that is perhaps an indication that many of the problems, at least initially, were because of the short lead-in time that was given and the lack of preparation and clarity ahead of the big changes that came in January 2021.

To come back to my fundamental point, we need a protocol. The nature of Brexit means that there needs to be a protocol. It does not need to be exactly the same as this version, but what we absolutely do not need, in the middle of a cost of living crisis, is the prospect of increased trade frictions through needless conflict and a developing trade war with our largest and closest overseas market. That is what I very much fear this legislation, if enacted and utilised, would do.

I believe that the way forward is through negotiations. Like the man asked to give directions, I would not be starting from this point, for a variety of reasons, and I need not detain the House on that. We need negotiations based on trust, good faith and co-operation. The UK Government would stand a much better chance of success if they were driven by that, instead of by this piece of legislative brinkmanship, and if they were to pursue measures that for once were motivated by a genuine desire to deliver the best possible outcomes out of this mess for all peoples on these islands, rather than simply pandering to the agendas of those in the tiny subset of the population who might have an influence over who the next leader of the Conservative and Unionist party might happen to be—a party that no longer seems to be very certain what it is here to conserve or to unify.

Northern Ireland Protocol

Debate between Richard Thomson and Sammy Wilson

Thursday 15th July 2021 Commons Chamber

[Richard Thomson (Gordon) (SNP)]

It is a pleasure indeed to speak in this debate. I begin, as other speakers have done, by congratulating the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin) on securing it, although I am bound to point out that it is no surprise that we are here debating the subject—in many ways it was an inevitability. The hon. Member said that he wants us to look forward rather than back; I can certainly understand that sentiment, but I hope he will forgive me if I take an inevitable look backwards as well, to get the waypoints and to get some bearing on how we go forward.

We are here because of the way Brexit was won in the referendum and then negotiated—if that is the word—in the years that followed. Perhaps through necessity, it had to be all things to all people; that was the only way that it could secure the narrow margin it secured. Since then, whether they are in favour or, like myself, very strongly against it, people have had to watch as one by one the promises made to secure it turned to dust—promises to the fishing industry, promises to the farming sector, promises to maintain freedom of movement and even a promise that we would maintain our membership of the single market once we were out of the European Union, as I believe the Chancellor of the Duchy of Lancaster once claimed.

We are here today to discuss the impact of Brexit in Northern Ireland. All of it was predicted and predictable, foreseen and foreseeable. What makes it so disappointing that we have reached this juncture is that those in the UK Government who have taken us to this point have twisted, obfuscated and misrepresented at every stage to persuade the population to believe that the consequences that we now face would simply not arise.



Throughout that period a profound British exceptionalism has been on display, with the UK Government and their supporters noisily asserting their own sovereignty and expressing a wounded surprise that any other EU state that also still had sovereignty should not only have that sovereignty but have a willingness to use it to defend their own interests, including the integrity of the single market. Part of the problem was that the UK Government spent considerably more time negotiating among themselves than they did with European partners, and that allowed a fundamental set of questions to go unanswered for political convenience for too long. Those questions were: what kind of Brexit exactly, specifically, is it that we want? How are we going to get it? What implications will arise from that once we get it?

It was quite possible to leave the European Union and remain in the single market and the customs union. We would have become a coastal state with control over our fisheries, and we could have withdrawn from the political project of ever closer union that seems to cause such existential angst on the Conservative Benches. We could have left in a way that would have not created the present issues in Northern Ireland. Any form of Brexit that went beyond that made the risk of creating trade and regulatory borders a very live one indeed, with any such border having to fall either in the Irish sea or across the island of Ireland itself. After the unceremonious defenestration of the backstop and its political architect, the cry of the current Prime Minister to “get Brexit done” and the ensuing undignified stagger towards an agreement have left us with the protocol in its current form.

Part of the problem we have with that results from the philosophy that the Prime Minister and his advisers at the time had, which was to move fast and break things. There can be no doubt that the protocol was agreed simply to get the Government out of a big political hole at the time, and to allow them to say in Great Britain that they had got Brexit done and worry about the consequences for Northern Ireland after the event. This demonstrated cynicism and short-sightedness in equal measure. Nevertheless, it is an agreement that resulted from the negotiating objectives that Her Majesty’s Government held at the time. It was entered into freely, and if it is not to be implemented fully in its current form, it has to be renegotiated in good faith and in the proper way. The hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex observed in his contribution that the world was watching. I agree: the world was watching during the G7 conference and the world will still be watching to see how the protocol is implemented, whether in its present form or in an amended and agreed form.

The hon. Member for North Down (Stephen Farry) pointed out that Northern Ireland did not vote for Brexit, and it would be remiss of me not to point out that Scotland also did not vote for Brexit. Allow me to be the one to point out—I hope other Members will appreciate this—the great irony in the fact that if Scotland were to become independent and join the European Union, it would once again enjoy free unfettered trade with Northern Ireland. Our businesses would enjoy that in a way that they simply no longer have under the terms of the protocol.

[Sammy Wilson]

Scotland might have free unfettered trade with Northern Ireland, but does the hon. Gentleman not think it would be a far bigger problem that it would not have free unfettered trade with its biggest market, England?

[Richard Thomson]

I think there is a shared interest in making sure that there is as close to seamless trade as can possibly exist across these islands, within these islands and with the European Union. In that sense, the right hon. Gentleman and I are on the same page.

An agreement on animal welfare, sanitary and phytosanitary standards would eliminate the need for very many of the checks and reopen that trade. It is that sort of pragmatic renegotiation of the protocol, in the light of experience and of everything that has come from the nature of Brexit, that would be desirable in order to remove not just the barriers but the symbolism that the frictions that are being felt so keenly in Northern Ireland represent.