Rearmament and Warfighting Readiness

Debate between Tom Hayes and Graeme Downie

Wednesday 8th July 2026 Commons Chamber

[Graeme Downie (Dunfermline and Dollar) (Lab)]

I congratulate the hon. Member for Tunbridge Wells (Mike Martin) on helping to secure this debate. Others have already spoken about rearmament and the focus on budgets, procurement and force structures, and while those things definitely matter, there is another question that I believe we must confront as well. As touched on briefly by the hon. Member for Harwich and North Essex (Sir Bernard Jenkin), it is the question of whether we are honest enough with the British public about the nature of the threat that we face.

I have repeatedly argued in this place that the United Kingdom should regard itself as already being in a sustained confrontation with the Russian state—not a conventional shooting war, but a prolonged campaign of hostile activity directed against our people, our infrastructure, our economy and our democratic institutions—and that raises a fundamental question. We often hear the term “sub-threshold”, but what exactly is the threshold, and when are we going to give an indication to the British people of where that threshold is? The answer to that question matters, because it is the hard line in deterrence and absolutely key when we are considering rearmament.

I would not expect the Government ever to provide a precise answer to the question, but in a written answer this week, the Minister for the Armed Forces, my hon. Friend the Member for North East Derbyshire (Louise Sandher-Jones), said:

“We cannot provide detail on how the MOD would respond to certain activities versus others as this would assist our adversaries.”

Rather than burden the Department with a load of additional written questions, can I ask the Minister some very specific questions? Is using a cyber-attack to steal the electoral register sub-threshold? Is stealing the email addresses of Foreign Office diplomats sub-threshold? Is using ransomware to disrupt NHS patient care, contributing to the deaths of UK citizens, sub-threshold? Is using lasers to threaten the safety of RAF pilots sub-threshold? Is targeting a major UK business with a cyber-attack costing hundreds of millions of pounds and meaningfully impacting Bank of England interest decisions sub-threshold? One has to assume that the Government consider all of these to be sub-threshold, because Russia has undertaken all of these activities.

Let me go further. Is poisoning UK citizens on UK soil sub-threshold? Is firing shots near a civilian yacht in the English channel sub-threshold? Is launching drones from a shadow fleet vessel to monitor UK air bases and critical national infrastructure sub-threshold? Is recruiting activists on Signal and having them commit arson attacks against property sub-threshold? Is endangering a UK aircraft carrier by dropping sonar buoys in its immediate vicinity sub-threshold? Is attempting an arson attack against the British Prime Minister sub-threshold? Once again, Russia has undertaken all of these activities. We are not alone, and for anyone who wants to track this activity across Europe, Emma Burrows from AP News has a fantastic website with up-to-date information.

At what point do Governments say enough is enough, and at what point, crucially, do they tell the British people that a line has been crossed? The Kremlin does not view these kinds of activities in isolation. It sees them as different tools being used in the pursuit of the same objectives: to weaken our democracy, undermine confidence, gather intelligence, create division and test our resolve. While we may not be the only country this is happening to, I am concerned that our public might be the least aware of these co-ordinated actions and the effects they have on their daily lives. This is why warfighting readiness is about much more than what sits in the inventory of our armed forces; it is about national capability and public awareness.

In a recent article written with my hon. Friend the Member for East Thanet (Ms Billington), we argued that politics too often becomes obsessed with targets instead of capabilities. We must show Russia that we have the capability to effectively respond and to deter these kinds of attacks. The Government must begin to attribute these attacks directly to the ultimate perpetrator in the Kremlin, to trust the British people with that information and to ask for their help in building the necessary capabilities to defend against it.

[Tom Hayes (Bournemouth East) (Lab)]

My hon. Friend is giving a superb speech, and it is an honour to listen to it. I was at Bournemouth War Memorial Homes on Friday helping to open the new bungalows for our veterans, which my hon. and gallant Friend the Member for Birmingham Selly Oak (Al Carns) had toured when he was in post as a Minister. I was speaking with the veterans there, and they are under no illusions. They are aware of the threat posed by Russia. In talking with constituents, however, I understand their concern that we have been on a rollercoaster as a country since 2008 at a minimum. There is a feeling that because our psyche is somewhat low and that, spiritually, we feel somewhat deflated, to talk about the threat from Russia is to add to that feeling, but actually, as a constituent said to me on the doorstep, “It is fine to talk about the fear and talk about the plan. Talk about how you will meet the fear, and then we will come with you.”

[Graeme Downie]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. One of the ways we can go about building trust in the Government and in how they respond to a crisis is by trusting the people with the information. The people will be the ones who can press us to take the action that they know requires to be taken, if we give them the information. We must use our secrets more effectively and bring the British people along with us.

The central question cannot just be whether we spend 3%, 3.5% or some other percentage of GDP. The real question must be: what capability are we creating? This is where I believe the Government deserve a lot of credit. Although the DIP was delayed, what we are seeing in it is a commitment to fighting the next war and not the last one. That includes the improvements in pay and support for serving personnel and their families and in housing, which is leading to increases in recruitment, retention and morale. That is all a vital part of rearmament and deterrence, showing our adversaries that our armed forces are ready to fight tonight, as was mentioned earlier.

Alongside the human infrastructure, the Government have also invested in physical infrastructure. I know that it is attracting some scepticism and questioning from across the House, but the leap to hybrid warfare is the right thing to do. That is why I welcome the decision to build six common combat vessels and ensure that we are building ships more quickly, to give us flexibility on the capabilities that we need. I hope we make progress on that very quickly indeed. It is something I have raised with the Department since the publication of the DIP.

On future infrastructure capability, I will be slightly parochial and ask the Minister to respond to a couple of questions around submarine infrastructure when he is winding up. First, we know that to bring Dreadnought into service as quickly as possible we need a contingent docking facility. The Royal Navy has said that that would have to be at Rosyth, and with time moving on to get that operational, can I ask the Minister for a progress update? Secondly, on the decommissioned nuclear-powered submarines that remain tied up at Devonport and Rosyth, occupying valuable dock space, can the Minister update the House on when the next part of this programme will commence, releasing capacity in both the dockyards and strengthening our sovereign capability?

Preparedness for war is not warmongering. Warfighting readiness begins long before the first shot is fired, but it must start with an honest assessment and acknowledgment of the threats that we face, and with making clear to the public and our adversaries what we mean by sub-threshold. Rearmament, preparedness and public clarity are the best way to ensure that Vladimir Putin and those around him never conclude that Britain lacks either the capability or the determination to defend itself.