Question to the Department for Energy Security & Net Zero:

To ask the Secretary of State for Energy Security and Net Zero, what assessment he has made of the potential impact of the (a) cutting or damaging of subsea gas pipelines and electricity interconnectors and (b) time needed to repair them energy security; and what contingency plans are in place to maintain supply in that event.

Great Britain has a highly resilient energy network with diverse sources of supply, including the UK Continental Shelf, Norwegian Continental Shelf, liquefied natural gas imports and European interconnectors, alongside additional flexibility provided by gas storage.

The Government is confident that the gas and electricity system operators have the tools necessary to balance supply and demand across a wide range of scenarios, including following damage or disruption to infrastructure.

The Government works closely with industry, regulators and system operators to assess risks to critical energy infrastructure, including subsea gas pipelines and electricity interconnectors, and to maintain robust arrangements to respond to disruptive incidents.

Repair times depend on the nature and location of the damage, its complexity, vessel availability and permitting requirements.

Government plans for all eventualities and works with industry to prepare and exercise robust contingency plans. The National Emergency Plan for Downstream Gas and Electricity sets out the established arrangements between Government, industry and regulators for the safe and effective management of gas and electricity supply emergencies.