Baroness Benjamin (LD)
My Lords, I, too, support this amendment, and I want to make a case for qualified play therapists to be involved in this issue. Play therapists can play an important role with children and their parents, both in schools and in children’s centres, in breaking the cycle of continual problems within families, helping them fully to understand the importance of parenting and family bonding, and about relationships and responsibilities. Where play therapists have been allowed to carry out this type of work, there has been much success in keeping families living happily together. I know this because I am the patron of the British Association of Play Therapists, for which I declare an interest.
For many years I have spoken up about the need for parenting and relationships to be taught in schools. I have seen what this can do. I have even been into prisons, talking to men, in particular, about parenting and the importance of learning to live with their children, to love them and to bond with them. Many of them do not know how to do that and have never received the investment of time and effort in their lives that would make them understand the importance of this parenting and bonding. I hope that the Government will give this serious consideration and look favourably on the amendment.
The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord McNally) (LD)
My Lords, as I have come to expect with this Bill, the amendments are thoroughly debated and raise some fundamental problems, which I promise to take on board as the Bill progresses.
My response gives me the opportunity to explain a number of measures aimed at promoting the positive involvement of both parents in their children’s lives. In many ways, I am sympathetic to the noble Lord’s intentions in tabling this amendment. When we come to make decisions on this Bill, we will all have to consider deeply whether some of the responsibilities that have been raised in this debate are most sensibly written into this legislation, or elsewhere, or addressed by other means. However, I certainly do not doubt that there is an issue—which the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has rightly raised—about how we get the required level of parental responsibility. The noble Earl, Lord Listowel, referred to the knock-on effects of the problems of single parents, particularly in families without fathers. The noble Baroness, Lady Massey, emphasised the importance of early intervention, while the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, lent her support to the idea that it is sensible to set out those responsibilities in the Bill.
Baroness Howe of Idlicote
My Lords, I was intending to support Amendment 57 when we spoke earlier on Amendment 56. However, it is clearly essential that governors, sponsors, head teachers—those responsible for what goes on in the school—are alert to what is set out here. The point I make about this—others have made it too —is that there are a lot of amendments dotted all over this paper referring to different aspects of what we are discussing, so we are going to come back to this again and again. The ear-bashing and encouragement that the Minister has had will help to indicate the right way of making these important issues completely plain. It is crucial that what the school stands for is made clear to the pupils. I could not be more supportive of the importance of getting that principle across.
Lord McNally
My Lords, I again thank all contributors to this debate. As the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, said, we will return to some of the issues in different guises during the passage of the Bill. That is partly what Committee stage is for: to look at these issues and see where we can clean up the Bill.
Since 1998, all schools have been required to provide a balanced and broadly based curriculum which prepares pupils for the opportunities, responsibilities and experiences of later life. This includes academy schools by virtue of Section 1A of the Academies Act 2010, which is reflected in their funding agreements.
Baroness Massey of Darwen
I am sorry to interrupt but is the Minister aware that the recent Ofsted report on personal, social and health education indicates that many schools are not carrying out their duties in that regard?
Lord McNally
Yes, I am aware of that. Our PSHE review concluded in March 2013 and found that the existing guidance offers a sound framework for sex and relationship education in schools. Sex and relationship education is a sensitive area in which expert organisations and professionals have an essential role to play, but this does not require the Government to revise the existing guidance. However, I agree with the noble Baroness that there are problems from school to school and this is an issue that we must continue to pursue. As the noble Baroness, Lady Howe, said in the previous debate and on other occasions, the media do not always give the most constructive and positive support for this aspect of education.
As I say, the guidance makes clear that all SRE should be age appropriate and that schools should ensure that young people,
“develop positive values and a moral framework that will guide their decisions, judgements and behaviour”.
In particular, paragraph 1.18 states that secondary schools should, among other issues, teach about,
“relationships, love and care and the responsibilities of parenthood as well as sex”,
and,
“taking on of responsibility and the consequences of one’s actions in relation to sexual activity and parenthood”.
The point that the noble Baroness, Lady Massey, made is also relevant in relation to writing things into legislation. There is a gap—you can write the most careful guidance, but how it is practised and carried out at the sharp end is another task, and one that we should address.
It is vital that schools prepare young people for later life, and especially the responsibilities of parenthood. However, the Government strongly believe that teachers need flexibility to use their professional judgment to decide when and how to provide SRE in their particular local circumstances, and to do so in an appropriate manner. We believe that it would be inappropriate to introduce a requirement for pupils in key stage 3, including those as young as 11, to be taught about parenting and sexual relationships. Teachers should retain discretion about whether to do so, while having regard to the Secretary of State’s guidance. Publishing the information set out in the current school information regulations is the best way for parents to have access to information; teachers should be given more freedoms, not fewer, to decide the contents of the school curriculum and how it is taught.
I hope that I have covered most of noble Lords’ concerns in that reply. The noble Lord, Lord Ramsbotham, talked about the need for this kind of education in young offender institutions. I agree that it is absolutely essential that it should be provided there. The noble Baronesses, Lady Tyler and Lady Massey, referred to the use of outside experts. Again, schools are free to use outside experts, and some to very good effect. But the head teacher should have final responsibility for which outside experts are brought in, and that is important. The noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin, made the valid point that it is about teaching wider life skills and relationships. But this is not something that schools alone should do. The media, particularly television, have a responsibility. I sometimes sit with my daughter watching very funny sitcoms, whose messages about sexual relationships are easy, to put it mildly. I often say to her, “That’s comedy—that ain’t reality”. I think that by the time they reached 40 and called it a day, all the members of “Friends” had slept with each other several times—but they all lived happily ever after. Perhaps that is one of the dangers of that kind of media.
I cannot really comment on the hostel closure mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, without knowing all the facts, but I fully endorse what she said about making sure that there is a joined-up policy.
As with the previous debate, I have been impressed by the breadth of opinion in support of what the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, has done.
As I said, the Government are cautious about trying to write piety into legislation rather than ensuring that what is happening on the ground is effective, but we will be taking this further as the Bill progresses. In response to what the noble Lord, Lord Northbourne, said at the end of the previous debate, if he and a number of colleagues would like to meet me separately to discuss these issues between now and Report, I would be glad to do so. In the mean time, I hope that he will withdraw the amendment.
Lord Northbourne
I am most grateful to the Minister and his advisers for all that information, particularly because most of it supports my amendment. My amendment is not about dictating what schools should teach; it is simply saying, “You decide what you should teach but then you must report on what that is and allow an inspection to see whether you are actually doing it”. Whether some schools will then have to have a rap over the knuckles is a second stage; I certainly have not suggested that.
I suggest that every noble Lord here does what I did, which is to take the names of six secondary schools in their neighbourhood and get the Library to find out what they say in their curricula. I think your Lordships will find, as I did, that five out of six of them either have nothing at all or are absolute rubbish. It is no good prescribing what schools should do. We have to encourage them and make them declare what they are doing, which may be a source of embarrassment to them if they are not doing frightfully well. A great many are not doing frightfully well and Ofsted absolutely confirms that. On that note, I am certainly going to bring this amendment back in some form, but for the time being I beg leave to withdraw it.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
My Lords, I entirely support what lies behind what the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has said. Amendments 58 and 59 may go most of the way. Amendment 60, to which I speak, was proposed by the Bar, which is why I have put it forward. It is important that the Government understand that there are difficulties. The Child Abduction and Custody Act 1985 incorporates the Hague convention of 1980. I have spent a great amount of time as a High Court judge and in the Court of Appeal on the Hague convention. Under Article 5,
“‘rights of custody’ shall include rights relating to the care of … the child and, in particular, the right to determine the child’s place of residence”.
I congratulate the Government on their bravery as regards arrangements. Having tried cases with mothers and fathers, I do not believe that the proposal will work any better than custody and access or residence and contact. It is not the words but what happens to the child who gets one or other parent, or sometimes both parents, absolutely up in arms.
The difficulty is that the decision under the Hague convention is not made in England if an English child has been abducted. There has been a particular decision, with which I will not bore the House, except to say that where the applicant’s right of custody is an issue the question should not be determined by the English court unless it is unavoidable. It is a matter for the court where the child is taken to, where the other parent goes to that court through the arrangements in this country and says that this parent has lost the child because the child, in respect of which he or she has a right of custody, has been removed from this jurisdiction. The court of the jurisdiction where the child is found makes the decision on whether the right of custody has been breached.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, has said, these are complicated cases. It is very often difficult in some countries to get that country to accept that nationals of that country were resident in this country. Therefore, while they may have been in Germany, they may not particularly want to send their children back although they had been resident here. Guatemala is a country that I particularly have in mind. Under the Hague convention, they should come back but if there is some uneasiness about what is meant by “arrangements”, it is a marvellous opportunity for the foreign court to say, “We are not satisfied on rights of custody, so we will keep the child here”. That is exactly what the amendments of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, and my amendments are intended to deal with.
I do not mind whether the amendment drafted for me by the Bar or any other amendment is preferable. I would like to see an interpretation of the words “rights of custody”. It should be stated that arrangements made in respect of either parent equal—but put, obviously, in more legalistic language—a right of custody. I hope that the Government will accept that both the noble Baroness and I have got a really important, highly technical point that may have an adverse, practical effect on English and Welsh children being taken unlawfully out of the jurisdiction.
Lord McNally
If there is anything likely to chill the marrow of a non-lawyer Minister, it is the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, saying that the amendment that she is proposing is highly technical and important. I have no doubt about that and will try to deal with it with due thoroughness, well aware that the noble and learned Baroness is far more well read in the Hague convention than me.
I am advised that the Hague convention gives a wide interpretation. It is intended to predict all the ways in which custody of a child can be exercised. It is not just orders concerning residence that count; it is also rights arising from the operation of law and agreements between parents which have legal effect under our law. The child arrangements order will make it clear that other jurisdictions will consider where a child lives and has contact as evidence in determining whether an individual has rights of custody.
I welcome the support expressed by the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, for the government amendment, which is purely consequential. Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 includes a reference to contact and residence orders. The amendment simply updates that to refer instead to child arrangements orders.
The remaining amendments relate to the recognition of the child arrangements order at international level. I agree with noble Lords that we must ensure that the order is recognised and enforced at international level in the same way as existing contact and residence orders. I welcome the thought which has been given to this issue.
The introduction of the child arrangements order stems from a recommendation of the family justice review. It seeks to move away from language which reinforces the perception that one parent is more important than the other. In terms of content, the court will, as now, be able to set out clearly in an order the person or persons with whom a child lives, spends time or has other types of contact, and when.
While the amendments which have been tabled do not change the scope of the child arrangements order, Amendment 58 would increases the focus on its distinct elements. In doing so, it risks undermining one of the key aims of the order, which is to shift the focus away from parents’ perceived rights on to the rights and needs of the child.
Amendments 59 and 60 relate more explicitly to the recognition of the order under the 1980 Hague convention. “Rights of custody” are a key concept under the convention and include rights relating to the care of a child, in particular the right to determine a child’s place of residence.
In considering whether there has been an unlawful removal for the purposes of the convention, a court will first establish what rights the applicant had under the domestic law of the state in which the child was habitually resident. What matters is what rights are recognised by that law, not how those rights are characterised.
The specific content of relevant decisions and orders, such as child arrangements orders that specify with whom a child is to live, will provide evidence as to the rights that a person has in respect of a child. However, the question as to whether those rights are properly characterised as “rights of custody” is a matter of international law. The phrase “rights of custody” is not confined to any national meaning, and it would not be appropriate to try to dictate the meaning of an international concept such as this in our law. I assure the Committee that we will be making full use of existing international groups and channels to raise awareness of the new order and ensure that it is properly understood. For that reason, I urge noble Lords to accept the Government’s amendment.
I say again that what I say here is not plucked out of the air; it is the result of considerable thought and advice from government lawyers and is on the basis of advice from the Norgrove studies. The noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, suggested that we might possibly be causing confusion by what we are doing. I suggest that we meet between now and Report—I am getting a long list of engagements now, but it is important to get this right—and discuss this. If the Government’s expert lawyers persuade me that noble Lords are wrong, then on Report I shall try to persuade the House that they are wrong. However, if noble Lords convince them that there is confusion here, that is the last thing that the Government want out of this legislation. In that spirit, I hope that the noble Baroness will agree to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Butler-Sloss
I do not believe that I have the right now to withdraw my amendment because it was grouped with the earlier amendment. I make one point: it is not the sophisticated countries that have signed the Hague convention about which I am concerned but the unsophisticated countries, some of which are in South America, the Far East, parts of the Indian subcontinent and the Middle East. Those are countries where it may not be as easy to explain to them what “arrangements” means as it would be to France or Germany.
Lord McNally
“Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (c. 10)70 In paragraph 13(1)(c) of Schedule 1 to the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012 (civil legal services: orders mentioned in section 8(1) of the Children Act 1989) for “residence, contact” substitute “child arrangements orders”.”
Baroness Howarth of Breckland
My Lords, the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, have put this very precisely. I was the chair of CAFCASS when the problem significantly arose and began the work to tackle the issue, together with the chief executive and the board. The real issue was the length of time that children were waiting for decisions in their cases, and every day for a child is vital. Experts were called to verify what another expert was saying or to give another opinion, and there has been a great improvement in the time taken to reach a decision in these cases since we have streamlined that.
I declare an interest as vice-president of the Lucy Faithfull Foundation, which prepares extremely complex expert witness reports in cases of very serious child sexual abuse. I think the Minister is well aware of its work. In those cases there have been real difficulties in getting the right expert to the right place because, as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, mentioned, local authorities themselves have called the experts in to add to the decision.
All I want to say in this debate is: let us keep the focus on the child and make decisions as quickly as possible, but in complex cases let us make sure that those decisions are based on the right information.
Lord McNally
My Lords, perhaps I should make it clear from the start to the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, that we will resist this stand part Motion, and I am sure that he will withdraw it at the appropriate time. We want this change in the Bill. Let me be clear: experts play a vital role in many care proceedings. Their evidence can be necessary to assist the court in resolving a case justly and in a child’s best interests. It is the Government’s intention to ensure that where the court considers that expert evidence is necessary to assist it to resolve the proceedings justly, including evidence provided by independent social workers, that evidence should be used.
The reason for the measures in Clause 13 is simple: the family justice review found that, too often, expert reports were being commissioned in care proceedings when they added little real value to the decision-making process and contributed to delays. In many cases, expert evidence was provided where the evidence could be obtained from a party already involved in the proceedings. The Government believe that most social care evidence in cases could and should be supplied by local authorities and CAFCASS guardians, and I know that that view is strongly held by the present president of the Family Division, Sir James Munby. However, where a judge considers that it is necessary to have expert evidence, including an independent social work report, to resolve the proceedings justly, then that evidence will still be permitted.
We know that improvements to social work practice will be needed to deliver these changes. That is why the Children’s Improvement Board, together with Research in Practice, delivered a series of regional family justice training seminars to local authorities to highlight good practice in this area and how it may be replicated. In addition, CIB and RiP also recently ran a series of “train the trainer” workshops aimed at those responsible for training within local authorities. The workshops focused on the practical skills that social workers need to progress cases without delay. We have also funded new research distillations to assist social workers when assessing children on the edge of care, and continue to work with the College of Social Work to ensure that social workers receive training in the specific competencies required.
With regard to legal aid fees, which the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, raised, the hourly rate for independent social workers was introduced in May 2011 following consultation. As the response to that consultation recognised, independent social workers undertake a variety of work for different organisations but the qualifications and experience of those undertaking that work, plus similarities in the work undertaken, meant that it was not considered an effective use of public money for the Legal Services Commission, as it was then, to pay higher rates than those payable by CAFCASS for similar services.
The Government have met organisations representing independent social workers on several occasions, but we have no evidence to suggest that the majority of work undertaken by this group should attract a higher rate than is paid to other social workers. However, where independent social workers provide services that are significantly different from those normally expected of other social workers, significantly higher rates are payable—for example, when acting as an expert risk assessor in cases where there is a substantiated relevant criminal allegation in the immediate background of the case, or where a finding of sexual abuse relevant to the case has been made by a court and the report is specifically required to address this risk.
As I have said, I believe that what we are doing meets the requirements that Dr Brophy set out, as the noble Earl, Lord Listowel, asked me. We understand the concerns that expert witnesses should be used when necessary, and I hope that I made it clear that that will continue to be the case. However, when the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, tells me that in one of her cases she had 11 expert witnesses, that almost makes me think that that is what we are facing, and indeed what Norgrove identified. As I said before to the noble Earl, although I take note of what he has said, this is something that I cannot offer a meeting on because we will continue to resist.
Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede (Lab)
My Lords, I am not briefed by the NSPCC but I have a brief from the Magistrates’ Association, which makes it clear that it also supports the 26-week time limit but also agrees that there should be specific extensions for eight weeks where people can apply to the court. It would probably be most helpful if I raised the questions that the Magistrates’ Association has raised in the brief that it sent me. Before I do so, though, I want to make the point that the examples of exceptions that my noble friend Lady Jones gave are very far from theoretical, because two of those examples I personally dealt with in the past month. They were very real examples of something that I understood very clearly.
The first of the questions that the Magistrates’ Association raised in its brief to me is really a concern that an application for an eight-week extension should resist that extension being a contested hearing, and obviously the decision of the court should be final. If there is to be a contested hearing on an eight-week extension, though, it should be as short and focused as possible. The second point that the Magistrates’ Association made was that it is not clear, from the association’s understanding, that there is any limit to the maximum number of successive extensions. The association’s final point is to ask whether there is any right of appeal if a lower court—although perhaps “lower court” is not the right expression—decides not to grant an extension. Is there any right of appeal to a higher jurisdiction?
Lord McNally
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, for her intervention in support of these proposals—I am also grateful for my momentary promotion. It gives me an opportunity to pay tribute to the work of Lord Justice Ryder when he was with the Family Division. He did a lot of ground-clearing in this area, not least bringing in some very useful comparative statistics which allowed us to see the variety in performance of courts, which was affecting children at a vulnerable time of their lives. When this exercise started, it took more than 60 weeks in some cases to come to a decision. The tri-borough project also demonstrated in advance of this legislation that this could be done more quickly. Certainly, the robust leadership that Sir James Munby has given in implementing the Norgrove proposals has meant that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, said, a culture of delay has been replaced by a culture of urgency. That is much to the credit of what we are proposing.
We all agree that delays in decision-making, whether by local authorities or in courts, can be very damaging. They can add to emotional insecurity and affect children’s prospects for returning to or finding a permanent loving home. Introducing a 26-week time limit for care and supervision cases will send a clear and unambiguous statement to all parts of the family justice system about the need to reduce delay. Removing certain cases from the ambit of the 26-week time limit at the outset, as proposed by Amendment 62, would undermine this effort.
I recognise that these cases deal with important and complex issues and not all will be able to be completed within this timeframe. The court will therefore have the discretion to extend the time limit in a particular case beyond 26 weeks if that is necessary to resolve the proceedings justly. The clause carefully strikes the necessary balance between putting in place a maximum 26-week time limit to tackle delay in all cases and allowing sufficient judicial discretion to extend time where necessary to resolve the case justly, having explicit regard to the child’s welfare.
Requiring extensions to last for a maximum of eight weeks at a time will help ensure that the court is focused on resolving cases as quickly as possible. To allow the court to grant an extension without imposing any limit as to the length of the extension, as proposed by Amendment 63, would potentially allow cases to drift. This could undermine the aim that we all share, of reducing unnecessary delay. There will always be some very complex cases which it may not be possible to complete within 26 weeks. Where that is the case, the court will be able to extend time, where necessary, to resolve proceedings justly. It is important, however, that we keep a clear focus on resolving cases as quickly as possible, and specifying a maximum eight-week limit on the length of extensions will ensure that this happens. There is, however, no limit on the number of extensions that can be sought.
I recognise the concerns of the noble Baronesses and have seen how successful intervention models such as the Family Drug and Alcohol Court approach can be. That is why I am very pleased that the Government are continuing to provide funding of £150,000 in each year of 2013-14 and 2014-15 to continue the development and rollout of the FDAC. As part of our funding of FDAC, we are proposing to continue work that will enable this model to meet the 26-week time limit in most cases. Proceedings in the FDAC model currently take the same time on average as standard care proceedings, and we believe that the 26-week time limit can be applied successfully in most cases.
I think I have just answered the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, asked about the Family Procedure Rule Committee. On the basis of its specific expertise, the committee has been invited to consider whether to further elaborate on the matter to which the court is to have regard in order to support Clause 14, and we await its response. The court rules may set out the matters to which the court must, may or may not have regard when making the decision whether to grant an extension to the time limit. It is, rightly, the remit of the FPRC to consider whether to make court rules under the clause; it is a statutory independent non-departmental public body responsible for making these rules of the court. Before making the rules, the FPRC must consult such persons as it considers appropriate, and we will update the Committee on the FPRC’s work before Report.
I am not sure whether there were any other matters that were specific to this; the questions come thick and fast. Yes, there was one: the noble Baronesses, Lady Jones and Lady Benjamin, raised the question of whether the 26-week time limit would impact on kinship care and whether it would be shoehorned into a one-size-fits-all solution. We are aware that, in spite of everyone’s best efforts, occasionally relatives are not identified until late in the proceedings. However, the 26-week time limit should not impact on kinship care. It is not for the courts to decide whether it is Granny who the child goes to; rather, it relates to the choice of the permanence plan being a relative if possible, followed by adoption or long-term foster care. After all, the court does not decide which adopters the child goes to when it agrees to a plan for adoption. We are continuing to use programmes such as family group conferences before proceedings start in order to identify family members from the onset of cases. In addition, we are working in partnership with the Children’s Improvement Board and the College of Social Work to support the continuing improvement of social work practice. Of course, the court retains the power to extend the case for longer consideration if necessary.
The public law measures in the Bill will tackle the damaging delays that exist throughout the system. These delays can deny children the chance of a permanent home and have a harmful long-term effect on a child’s development. The measures will also refocus the system so that the child’s best interests are part of the process. Our measures strike the necessary balance between tackling delay and allowing sufficient judicial discretion to resolve proceedings justly, and I hope that noble Lords will agree to withdraw these amendments.
The Earl of Listowel
My Lords, I briefly pay tribute to the Government. In the past week I met District Judge Crichton and his team from the NHS Portman trust. District Judge Crichton set up the Family Drug and Alcohol Court five or six years ago and has had great success, with about one-third of families coming through the court keeping their children, and the best evidence so far is that those children continue to do well and thrive with those families, so the family stays off drugs and alcohol. I pay tribute to the Government for their support of FDAC from the beginning and for their continuing support. I express the hope that perhaps in future FDAC might be made even more widely available across the country, always bearing in mind the heavy burden that local authorities are continually faced with as more and more children each year come into care and the challenges that that poses to all of us. Once again, I pay tribute to the Government for their support of FDAC, if I may.
Baroness Jones of Whitchurch
My Lords, I welcome the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Benjamin. I do not want anyone to be under any illusions: of course it is imperative that we tackle the court delays that have occurred in the system. We absolutely start from that point of view. We welcome all the steps that have been taken to modernise the family court system, including those to cut the time that is taken to deal with cases in the court. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that it is a cultural issue as much as anything and we need to tackle that culture.
Our amendments were never intended to be an open door for judges just to sit on their hands and delay decisions. The intention was that in very particular cases, which people could see from the outset were going to take longer than 26 weeks, they would be able to make a decision and spell out and justify that decision at the time. It was not just an opportunity for a delay for the sake of it.
I am slightly concerned about how these eight-week extensions are going to work. For example, if a family is going through an intensive period of therapy, knowing that the case is going back to be reviewed every eight weeks is fantastically stressful and disruptive to them when they feel that they are making progress. The evidence shows that a lot of court decisions were delayed because the processes were not in place, reports were not received in time or the evidence was not there at the time. If you are then going to deal with a rolling eight-week review, there are all sorts of opportunities for things to go wrong and for the evidence simply not to be before the court at the right time. I would be interested to know how these eight-week extensions work in practice. We may well need to have a review of them in the short term.
My noble friend Lord Ponsonby said that my examples were not theoretical, and I thank him for confirming that. The point is that the families that we are talking about know from the outset that it is going to take time to turn their lives around. They know they are going on quite a long journey. To feel that that there is this time pressure hanging over them will have a negative impact on the whole process.
Lord McNally
The noble Baroness was asking about how the extensions would work in practice. The request to extend the timetable for proceedings will be considered during the proceedings, as far as possible, and should not result in additional hearings. I should also explain to the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, that there could be further extensions. On the right of appeal, I have an explanation in my brief but I would rather write to him to make sure that I get it right. There is a limited right of appeal. I am sorry for interrupting the noble Baroness.
Lord Storey (LD)
My Lords, I was not going to speak to this amendment. I have followed the debate with great interest. I am probably out of my depth in this discussion. I want to look at it from a different point of view.
I have heard about “likely”, “possible” and “thresholds”. I am always concerned about the protection and well-being of the child. In recent years we have seen children who have been physically and mentally abused at home, and no one has been able to help them. They have seen the abuse but they have not been able to go and do anything about it. Recently, there was a little boy who was emaciated; he was scrabbling around for food in the gutter and was allowed to be ill treated by his parents. If this discussion means that a social worker can knock on the door, get into the house and provide welfare and, presumably, safety for the child—not necessarily taking the child away—then that must be the right thing to do. It must not always be about a legal interpretation or a legal battle between two sides. We must always focus on what is the best for an individual child. Recently society has let those children down. We have to remember the case of Baby P to see where that happened.
Lord McNally
My Lords, perhaps I may follow my noble friend Lord Storey because he encapsulates a lot of why this is a very difficult debate. Earlier today we heard strong appeals to ensure that local authorities did not rush to judgment and deprive a child of staying at home and being brought up by their natural family. I have colleagues in the other place who are extremely critical of what they think is a tendency by authorities in Britain to too readily take children from their natural parents and from their kinship carers and family. Yet, as my noble friend says, every so often we get these horrific cases, and not just the media but everyone asks, “How could it happen? Where were the teachers, the social workers and the neighbours? How was it allowed to happen?”. The question of that balance has kept on coming up throughout the debate—the importance of the threshold that has to be cleared before we can intervene.
Again, I am not pretending to the Committee that these things are coming from the top of my head, but I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Howarth, that I am told Section 47 would allow statutory intervention in a child’s life if the child’s life warranted it. Under that section the local authority has a duty to investigate and can gain access to the child’s home if it deems the child to be at risk of significant harm, and then move for an emergency protection order. It may not be the barrier that the noble Baroness was suggesting.
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Lloyd of Berwick, for raising this important issue and for meeting me and my officials last week to explain his concerns in more detail. This is clearly a complicated issue, and I welcome the opportunity to hear the views of noble Lords who have such expertise and experience in these difficult matters, even if that expertise causes them to come to different conclusions.
As noble Lords will appreciate, Section 31(2) of the Children Act, which the noble and learned Lord proposes to amend, has to balance the need to protect children from harm with the need to protect the child and family from unwarranted state intrusion—the balance that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, the author of that Act, has explained to us. Any amendment to this carefully worded section, which has stood the test of time, therefore should not be taken lightly.
The amendment would allow a court to infer that the threshold for making a full care or supervision order has been met solely on the basis that someone living with a child might—but was not proven to—have significantly harmed a child previously. This is a departure from the current balance in the Act. Currently there must be a factual foundation for the state’s removal of a child. Reasonable suspicion is a sufficient basis for authorities to investigate and even take interim protective measures in order to gather evidence, but case law has outlined that it cannot be a sufficient basis for long-term intervention.
The threshold for being able to intervene under Section 31 is there not only to protect the family but to protect the child, as unjustified removal can in itself result in significant harm to the child. This is the very reason why Section 31 was included in the Children Act 1989. It is possible that such protection would be eroded if it could be inferred on the basis of unsubstantiated suspicion that there was a basis for making a final order such as a care or supervision order.
I know that the noble and learned Lord has tabled this amendment following concerns about some specific judgments. But it is important to note that in most cases the court would be unlikely to a make a decision based on the sole fact that a person might—but was not proven to—have significantly harmed a child previously, as was the case in re J. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay, made the point that it was a unique case.
It is important to bear in mind what happens in the build-up to care proceedings. Where there are child protection concerns, the local authority is under a duty under Section 47 of the Children Act 1989 to make inquiries and decide whether any action must be taken to enable the local authority to safeguard the child’s welfare. A Section 47 inquiry should assess the needs of the individual child. The statutory safeguarding guidance, Working Together to Safeguard Children, issued in 2013, is clear that assessment is,
“a dynamic and continuous process which should build on the history of every individual case”.
A good assessment investigates,
“the child’s developmental needs … parents’ or carers’ capacity to respond to those needs; and the impact and influence of wider family and community and environmental factors”.
Research shows that taking a systematic approach,
“is the best way to deliver a comprehensive assessment for all children”.
This should mean that, when the court hears an application for a care order, the court is presented with a full range of factors and evidence for it to consider. For example, the court may consider the child’s assessed development and needs, whether drink and drugs were present in the previous household and whether they are a factor in the new relationship, along with the factors surrounding any previous incident that may have occurred.
The judgment of the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, has been quoted a number of times. What she actually said is:
“There are usually many readily provable facts upon which an authority can rely to satisfy the court that a child is likely to suffer significant harm unless something is done to protect him. Cases in which the only thing upon which the authority can rely is the possibility that this parent has harmed another child in the past are very rare. As the Court of Appeal pointed out, this case has itself been artificially constructed by the decision to treat the issue as a preliminary question of law”.
A real possibility of harm having taken place in the past will not be ignored by the local authority carrying out the investigation and would form the body of evidence presented to the court as part of care proceedings. We are therefore satisfied that the court would give appropriate consideration to those matters related to the child’s history that are relevant to whether the threshold test has been met.