Banking Act 2009 (Banking Group Companies) Order 2014
(9 years, 10 months ago)
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Lord Newby
That the Grand Committee do consider the Banking Act 2009 (Banking Group Companies) Order 2014.
Relevant document: 2nd Report from the Joint Committee on Statutory Instruments
Lord Newby (LD)
My Lords, I am also pleased to introduce the Banking Act 2009 (Exclusion of Investment Firms of a Specified Description) Order 2014, the Banking Act 2009 (Restriction of Partial Property Transfers) (Recognised Central Counterparties) Order 2014 and the Banking Act 2009 (Third Party Compensation Arrangements for Partial Property Transfers) (Amendment) Regulations 2014. I will refer to the statutory instruments respectively as the banking group companies order, investment firms order, partial property transfer order and third party compensation regulations.
The financial crisis of 2007 to 2009 highlighted the need for the government to resolve failing systemic financial institutions in an orderly manner to protect UK financial stability and the economy. Moreover, resolution should be achieved without recourse to public funds. Since the financial crisis, a wide programme of financial sector reform has been under way at domestic, European and G20 levels. The reform has focused not only on banks but on investment firms and central counterparties, which also have the potential to cause major widespread disruption to the financial system.
Since 2009 a special resolution regime has been in place to deal with the failure of deposit-taking institutions such as banks and building societies. The regime gives the UK authorities a permanent framework, providing tools for dealing with failing banks and building societies. It gives the Bank of England a key role in implementing a resolution using the statutory resolution tools. The Financial Services Act 2012 widens the special resolution regime to include banking group companies, investment firms and central counterparties.
The powers provided for within the regime will enable the Bank of England, as resolution authority, to use the following tools to deal with the failure of investment firms and banking group companies: to transfer some or all of the securities or business of a firm or its parent undertaking to a commercial purchaser; and to transfer some or all of a firm or its parent undertaking to a bridge bank—that is, a company owned and controlled by the Bank of England.
The powers provided for within the regime will enable the Bank of England, as resolution authority, to use the following tools to deal with the failure of central counterparties: to transfer some or all of a firm or its parent undertaking to a bridge central counterparty—that is, a company owned and controlled by the Bank of England—or commercial purchaser, and to transfer ownership of a CCP to any person.
The Financial Services Act 2012 also extends the bank administration procedure to investment firms and banking group companies. The bank administration procedure is applicable when, during the resolution of a bank, a partial transfer of property takes place and the “residual bank”—ie, the part left behind—is insolvent. This procedure ensures that the residual bank continues to provide services and facilities required to enable the transferred business to be operated effectively. The same procedure will be available for the residual part of an investment firm or banking group company. The instruments that I present today are required to underpin and bring into force the widened scope of the special resolution regime and bank administration procedure.
The EU’s bank recovery and resolution directive requires there to be resolution tools in place for investment firms and banking group companies, and the instruments presented today are consistent with this directive. There is widespread support for putting in place a resolution regime for investment firms, central counterparties and banking group companies. We first consulted at the end of 2012 on broad policy options, and subsequently took powers through primary legislation. Then, following extensive work on regime design with firms, the Government published detailed proposals on the secondary legislation in September last year.
The statutory instruments I am introducing today take into account the feedback we received from a wide range of stakeholders during the consultation period. These instruments put into place the necessary safeguards and definitions required before the special resolution regime can be extended to investment firms, central counterparties and banking group companies.
The first of these orders—the banking group companies order—specifies conditions which must be met by an undertaking to be considered a “banking group company” for the purposes of the special resolution regime. The aim of using resolution tools in respect of banking group companies is to ensure that resolution over a failing bank in the same group as the company is effective, and in particular to ensure that any intra-group service provision to the failing bank—for example, the provision of IT services—remains in place while in resolution. Subject to exceptions, the banking group companies which may be resolved under the special resolution powers are the subsidiary and parent companies of a bank, investment firm or central counterparty in resolution, and other subsidiaries of its parent companies.
The investment firms order excludes small investment firms from the scope of special resolution regime and bank administration procedure. Specifically, this instrument narrows the scope to investment firms of a type that is required under the capital requirements directive to hold initial capital of €730,000. Over 2,000 investment firms operate in the UK, of which 250 have capital above that threshold. The activities those firms are permitted to undertake, such as trading on their own account and underwriting financial instruments, taken together with the value of assets held on their balance sheet, means that a failure by such a firm could threaten financial stability in a way which the failure of a smaller firm would not. This order reflects that reality.
The partial property order places restrictions on the making of partial property transfers made in respect of central counterparties. This order provides legislative safeguards for the benefit of direct and indirect users of clearing services provided by CCPs. Those safeguards will provide them with greater certainty as to how a partial property transfer might affect their contractual rights, and ensure that there are appropriate restrictions and limitations on the making of a partial property transfer.
Finally, the third party compensation regulations put in place third party compensation arrangements in the event that some but not all of an investment firm has been transferred during resolution. This statutory instrument ensures that creditors are no worse off as a result of resolution action taken by authorities with respect to a failing investment firm which results in the transfer of part of the failing entity than they would have been if the entire entity had entered resolution.
I hope that I have assured the Committee that these statutory instruments represent a necessary step forward in putting an effective resolution regime in place for investment banks, central counterparties and banking group companies.
Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for introducing the statutory instruments, all of which relate to the special resolution regime. I have spent an enjoyable weekend trying to understand them, but it is clear that enthusiasm for such an exercise has not been widespread. Nevertheless, my understanding of them is much as the Minister has described them. The first, on banking group companies, seems to fill a hole whereby service-giving subsidiaries may fall out of scope during the resolution process. The order makes sure that they remain in scope and that the resolution does not end up being tool-less in that area.
I admit that I failed on the second order. Its general intent to exclude small companies is pretty clear, but why it defines small companies as those with initial capital of less than €730,000 in one part and then uses €125,000 as the threshold in another I cannot understand. If the Minister could enlighten me, I would be delighted by the depth of his briefing, but in all probability I shall receive another letter.
As the Minister said, the third order relates to recognised central counterparties. As he well described, if there is a resolution process with a central counterparty, it is possible that some parts of the central counterparty will be an ongoing concern while others will not. There may be differential equity between creditors. The rules seek to make sure that creditors are treated fairly in that situation—I think that that is roughly what the order says. The fourth statutory instrument is on the general rule on partial transfers: creditors are no worse off than if there had been a full bankruptcy or administration. Faced with orders of such stunning reasonableness, I can say no other than that we have no objection to them and wish them luck.
However, learning from the Minister at our previous outing together, I shall stray into the general area of the special resolution regime, as he did into that of mutuals when we were discussing a stunningly small order that we together approved. This has been a very fruitful exercise, because the importance of the special resolution regime is totally misunderstood. The special resolution regime happens only in dire circumstances. If a major firm is failing—let us say, a large bank such as Barclays—and approaching being not viable, we have dire circumstances. The regime set up for such circumstances is illustrated in a document that I have from May 2011, but I believe that it remains just as applicable today. It sets out the extent to which, in a recovering regime, the PRA would seriously interfere with the way in which such a failing firm would work. It would demand changes in management and the composition of the board. It would talk about capital distribution and limiting planned business activities. There would have been a massive amount of activity from the PRA before one approached the situation where the special resolution regime was going to happen.
Essentially, with a large firm—one of the big six, eight or whatever banks—the PRA would have been devoting a large part of its resources to making sure this failure did not happen. We are now facing a situation, where, despite all that effort—the stress test, all the new rules and so on—a firm is either no longer viable or likely to become so, and is put into the special resolution regime. It is put into the special resolution regime— if I have read the supporting paperwork correctly—by the PRA. The PRA, in consultation with the Treasury and the rest of the Bank, takes the view that this failure mode is likely to happen.
The Treasury is involved because one of the ways out of the mess is the way out we used last time. I think Alistair Darling and his people did a brilliant job, frankly, because they were faced with a catastrophic situation, with—as far as one can say—no real prior thinking-through by the regulatory authorities of what the right mechanisms would be. Indeed, as we know from later analysis, there was not even a lot of thinking about who was responsible and so on. They did a brilliant job with a very crude tool— essentially they nationalised the banks. This has the significant downside that the taxpayer ended up footing the bill. The whole objective of the special resolution regime is to create a series of more complex tools which allows resolution to take place without the taxpayer picking up the bill. The most recent part of that has been the extension to central counterparties, which have clearly emerged in analysis, and the bailing provisions, which move the problem to the creditors—to the industry—as opposed to the taxpayers.
If the Treasury decides that it does not want to go down that route, the Bank—no longer the PRA—is in charge of the special resolution regime. Its objectives, as far as I can see, are to maintain all the key functions as going concerns. That does not mean keeping the business alive as a going concern—that was the PRA’s task. The Government are clear that it is not a no-failure situation—they want failure to occur if that is the proper thing to happen. Nevertheless, the resolution regime provides a way of taking the activities forward in such a way that the public, the trading communities and society in general carry on having the banking facilities they need to survive.
The more you think about it, and about our experience of the last crash, the more frightening this scenario is. This looks as though it is a 60-hour exercise—when we have got to this situation we are thinking about close-of-play Friday and having it sorted out by Monday morning. That is a pretty challenging world to live in. I may have called it wrong; it may be being thought of as a more gentle process. However, one has to remember that we are contemplating using this process only in a situation which, at the moment, we cannot contemplate. Broadly, we are trying to put right all the things that typically lead to bank failure—through various ratios, protections and so on. From having read other bits of this stuff, I think that the thing that mitigates this mess is the extent to which the PRA will have amassed a lot of previously unavailable information, including specific information to help the bank in the resolution situation. This will mean that the bank will start with some information. I accept that most of this is about central counterparties, but given banks’ behaviour and the irregularities we have seen, one fears that in such a catastrophic situation it would be even worse than expected; in other words, despite all that information, when you dig into it you have got a real crisis.
Failure would be catastrophic. The impact assessment that accompanies the orders quotes the banking commission as saying that a failure could have net present value of 63% of GDP. That is an enormous impact and would be one of the most catastrophic events that could hit the United Kingdom, short of war. It is difficult to think of anything worse than the financial services of this country in collapse.
Who is actually going to do this resolution exercise? The situation is better than previously because the Bank now has a series of tools, but it is more complex because of the complexity of the tools. The answer is: the Bank of England special resolution unit, headed by Andrew Gracie, who reports to a deputy governor, Sir Jon Cunliffe. I have looked briefly at the CVs of those two men and they are successful and respected public servants. But the questions I have for the Government are: how big is their support? How big is this unit? How prepared is it? How developed are its systems?
Looking through the reports, both of the PRA and of the Bank, it is difficult to see. We can see one or two favourable things and one or two slightly worrying things. The favourable thing is the point I raised more than two years ago about the quality of staff of the regulator and the Bank of England. Mark Carney has made a big point of making the development of people one of his key aims. I am really pleased to see that sense of the value of people, and great chunks of his report are about that resolution. What is less happy is the level of staff turnover. There is 8.1% staff turnover at the Bank and 11.6% at the PRA. The thing that worries me most in the reports is the relative lack of saliency about the special resolution regime and the resources needed to support it.
I have spent most of my career in environments where one faces catastrophic low-incidence events. I started as an aeroplane driver—getting that wrong can be pretty catastrophic—and moved into the rail industry, where, sadly, we did have catastrophic events that killed large numbers of people; I ended it in the nuclear industry. What you learn from those industries is that if you are facing a low-incidence high-consequence event, it is not natural to worry about it and therefore you have to put in place special regimes that focus on it; it has to become almost obsessive.
My questions for the Government are: how are they assuring themselves that the Bank is up to this massive challenge? How does the special resolution unit train and practise for this challenge? That is how other industries I have been involved in face up to these things; they specifically train for them. In 3,500 hours, one engine stopped and that was not very exciting; every simulator detail, engines were stopping all over the place. That is how you do it: you practise for the catastrophic. What exercises have been conducted to test the unit and its systems? You can learn an enormous amount from the conducting of exercises and simulations, which, instead of being a theoretical exercise, come much closer to reality as you play out the events in a real-time way.
What pan-government exercises have been conducted? One of the problems of high-level emergencies is that senior people in government are introduced into the emergency, usually with absolutely no understanding of the series of decisions that they are going to face. You can get into that situation if you do not have a system of pan-government exercises to ensure that everyone knows what they are doing.
Lastly, what mechanisms have been put in place to work with our US and European partners in such an emergency? I gave the Minister a brief overview of the questions that I would be working through but I do not expect detailed answers to all of them. Still, after he has given his general reassuring reply—that is what he is paid for, really, so I expect nothing less—I would value it if he read the report of this session, looked at the questions, talked to people in the Treasury and at the Bank and produced a more researched, thoughtful reply. I cannot stress enough that you have to put the systems in place to assure yourself that, in the unlikely event that a low-incidence high-consequence event actually happens, you will be prepared for it.
Lord Newby
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord for having taken so much time to grapple with these extremely technical orders. On the difference between €730,000 of capital and the €125,000 of capital, the reference in the order to €730,000 refers to initial capital while the €125,000 is operating capital. However, the €730,000 figure is accepted across the EU as the slightly arbitrary point at which a firm is potentially significantly important. If I have got that wrong, I will write to him. He raised a bigger point, of course: how can we be sure that, if we are faced with a catastrophic event, we deal with it in a competent manner? One of the challenges here is that, slightly differently from when the noble Lord was an airline pilot or indeed running the Underground, the number of variables that can go wrong or interact with each other in a banking crisis is very high. It is not as though you can plan for 10 eventualities; there will be many more variables than that.
We have tried to put in place a legislative framework that gives us the powers we need; you cannot deal with these crises if you do not have the powers, and that is what the plethora of legislation over the past few years seeks to do. We think that we have an adequate infrastructure—or, rather, a superstructure—in place, with the PRA and the other changes at the Bank and the greater responsibilities that it now has. Secondly, we think that under the governor’s stewardship, as the noble Lord said, the quality of staff of the bank is very high.
The noble Lord pointed to the level of turnover. I think that that is a general concern in the public sector more generally, and has been in the Treasury as well as the Bank. It is fair to say that as far as the Treasury is concerned—I do not know about the Bank—the level of turnover has reduced somewhat over recent years, but it is still pretty high. In reality, that is in the nature of these institutions: there will be quite a lot of churn among people who are coming into and going out of the public and private sectors in the banking world. However, we think that we have a very high quality of staff.
Of course, one of the challenges which the noble Lord referred to is that although there is a special resolution unit, fewer people work in this area outside a crisis than when there is a crisis, otherwise you would have a huge number of people sitting around doing nothing for a very long time. Therefore the way the Bank and Treasury seek to deal with that problem is, of course, that other people in the institution would be brought in—just as they were at the time of the RBS and Lloyds crisis—to help on resolution.
There is a recent example of where it was not in the end necessary to have the full resolution procedure because the PRA and the Treasury—and in particular the Bank—had worked so closely with the relevant institution. That was the case with the Co-op, which last autumn faced quite severe problems. In the end, it was possible for those problems to be resolved by the Co-op without recourse to the provisions in the Banking Act or the Financial Services Act. However, that was possible in part because it was working with the Bank very closely over a period, and as a result of that it came up with an effective solution.
The noble Lord quite rightly referred to the fact that when you get to a crisis, sometimes you have to act very quickly, which is what happened with RBS. I hope that in future most cases such as that would be more analogous to the Co-op case than to RBS. In the Co-op case, it was clear for a while that there was a difficulty, and over a period of months—not a huge number, but over a period of weeks and a small number of months—options were identified and implemented. If the PRA is doing its work, it will not be taken completely by surprise in the way we were with the banking crisis. Of course, that does not mean that nothing will happen as a surprise. As the noble Lord pointed out, while we hope that the degree of information the PRA gets from the banks is always perfect, it will sometimes be less than perfect. One thinks of crises in the past that have occurred because the bank’s senior management and the compliance people did not know what a rogue member of staff was doing. As we know, that brought the bank down, for example, in the case of Barings. Therefore there will always be a risk.
The noble Lord asked specifically about training and practice exercises, and about how we work with our EU and American partners. There have been a number of training exercises to look at such situations. Scenario planning is obviously part of the role of the special resolution unit, and it does that. We work very closely with our American and European partners to see what lessons we can learn, and to have in place good working relationships and mechanisms to activate if we find that a bank is in real difficulty and that we might need to use the resolution procedures.
If I can say anything about that more formally, I will write to the noble Lord. However, both the Treasury and the Bank are acutely aware of the need to be able to use the powers they now have in an effective and timely way, and they are working very hard to make sure that they are up to snuff as regards doing that. As I said, the Government have considerable confidence that we have put a legislative process and structure in place that give the Treasury and the Bank the powers that they need and the people and structures internally to ensure that they are properly exercised. This is some way from the extremely important but rather technical amendments that we have been discussing today. I hope that all noble Lords in the Committee will feel that the statutory instruments are necessary and proportionate, and I commend them to the Committee.