The Minister for Europe (Mr David Lidington)
I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Maldon (Mr Whittingdale) on securing the debate and, indeed, on the commitment he has shown in this House for some time—and well before the current crisis arose—to understanding Ukraine, its people and its political priorities. I also thank all hon. Members who have taken part in today’s debate.
I want to start the substance of my remarks with Ukraine, because it seems to me that any fair appraisal of the diplomatic crisis we face needs to start with the truth that Ukraine today is an independent sovereign state with a democratically elected president and Parliament and internationally recognised borders, and is entitled, not only morally but in terms of international law, to take its own decisions about its national future.
Furthermore, that sovereignty, that independence and those borders were recognised by Russia itself in treaties that both accompanied and followed the break-up of the USSR. Those borders included Crimea within Ukraine, and until the armed intervention by Russia at the beginning of this year—an intervention, we should remind ourselves, that the Russians persistently denied almost to the day when they announced the award of medals to the soldiers who had served in Crimea—no territorial claim was made over the years since the independence of Ukraine.
The irony of the Russian intervention is that it has reinforced a sense of Ukrainian identity and Ukrainian nationalism not only, and most obviously, in the west of the country, but also in parts of eastern and southern Ukraine where those feelings were more muted. I saw something of that myself when I was in Dnipropetrovsk earlier this year.
Nor am I persuaded by the argument that Russia has somehow reacted to provocation by either the European Union or NATO. President Poroshenko has made it clear that he has no intention of even applying for membership of NATO, and his Foreign Minister Pavlo Klimkin made it clear at the most recent meeting of the NATO-Ukraine Council that, while Ukraine wished to move towards NATO standards in terms of the effectiveness of its armed forces, this was going to take Ukraine many, many years to accomplish.
As for the idea that there has somehow been EU provocation, let us remind ourselves that the negotiations for an association agreement started as far back as 2007, during the term of President Yushchenko. They were carried through by President Yanukovych, who is never normally accused of being a foe of Russia. When I was in Ukraine in October 2013, I talked to very senior members of the Yanukovych Administration who assured me that the President had decided that that association agreement was what he wanted to conclude.
We need to be clear about what Russia is attempting to do. It is now attempting to prevent Ukraine from successfully building a unified, democratic society based on the rule of law. Rather, its intention—to judge from its actions—appears to be to try to keep Ukraine weak, divided, corrupt and dependent on Russia to determine what its international alignments and mode of internal self-government should be.
Under successive British Governments, we have encouraged and supported Russia to move closer to the values that have underpinned peace and prosperity since the end of the cold war. That is why the United Kingdom has supported the admission of Russia to the G8 and the World Trade Organisation and looked forward to its admission to the OECD. But now, under President Putin, we have witnessed a severe decline in support for those values, a crackdown on civil society and other voices of freedom and independence inside Russia, and a rejection of that offer of partnership. There are clear signs, too, that Russia is not prepared to see its neighbours move in that direction either—and not just Ukraine.
Reference has been made during the debate to the events in Georgia in 2008, but in 2014 alone we have seen increased Russian meddling in the internal affairs of Moldova, the description by President Putin of Kazakhstan as “not a proper state”, the abduction by Russians of an Estonian official from inside Estonian territory—the man is still being detained in prison in Moscow—and the seizure on the high seas by Russia of a Lithuanian fishing vessel, which remains in Murmansk and has not been returned to its Lithuanian owners. We have also seen the interruption of gas supplies to Poland, Slovakia and Hungary. That has been attributed to technical problems, but I think it is a political signal that the Russian Government were unhappy with the reverse flow of gas supplies to—
Mr Lidington
I do not have time.
Those actions are based on a doctrine enunciated by the Kremlin: Russia has the right to intervene wherever it chooses when it claims that it is doing so in support of Russian speakers or ethnic Russians. Like hon. Members on both sides of the argument today, I believe strongly that there is a difference in terms of a defence commitment between NATO allies, where article 5 applies, and between friendly countries that are not part of the NATO alliance. Let us be in no doubt that the enunciation of that doctrine—of that right of intervention—was calculated to sow fear in the Baltic states, and it did so very successfully. Thankfully, it also resulted in a determined response from NATO and the deployment of additional NATO forces on exercises and patrols in the Baltic region.
Mr Lidington
I am sorry, but time is very short indeed.
We know that Ukraine needs support, and the United Kingdom has already spent money on a range of technical assistance programmes to support reforms of financial and economic governance, including tackling corruption. Through our conflict pool, we are also providing a range of programmes, including support for the reform of the Ukrainian armed forces and the supply of non-lethal equipment, as well as support for the OSCE special monitoring mission.
To answer the question from the right hon. Member for Wolverhampton South East (Mr McFadden), under the conflict security and stability fund we will improve on our record next year with a particular focus on defence and security reform and constitutional and public sector reform, and on the battle against organised crime and corruption in Ukraine. In my meetings this week with the Deputy Foreign Minister of Ukraine and with Mayor Klitschko, I made it clear that we welcomed an approach from the Ukrainian authorities in relation to other areas in which they might welcome United Kingdom know-how and technical assistance.
I want to return briefly to the subject of Ukraine’s Euro-integration aspirations and the need for reform. We have a substantial stake, as do other European countries, in Ukraine’s future, through €11 billion in the EU assistance package and a $17 billion International Monetary Fund loan. The EU-Ukraine association agreement represents a clear public commitment by both the EU and Ukraine to a deep relationship and close co-operation. It would be a great mistake for President Putin to see that agreement as a threat. A strong and prosperous Ukraine can only be in Russia’s interest, just as a strong and prosperous Poland has proved to be since the recovery of democracy in that country.
I was asked about sanctions. The answer is that our judgment about sanctions will depend upon Russia’s actions. If the Minsk agreement is implemented in full—if we see an end to the Russian reinforcements of the separatists, we start to see the withdrawal of Russian forces, we see Ukraine getting back control of its borders and the OSCE monitors able to deploy, and we see a genuine ceasefire—at that point perhaps we should consider whether any relaxation of sanctions might be appropriate. But, equally, if we see further military aggression, the EU has done a fair amount of contingency planning for the possibility of further sectoral economic sanctions. The Prime Minister personally and Ministers and officials at all levels are engaged with that work and in work to try to make sure that, despite different systems on the two sides of the Atlantic, there is coherence between the sanctions policy of the United States and that of the EU. I believe we have been able to deliver on that.
I wish to make it clear that our aim is not to cripple the Russian economy—the structural challenges that the Russian economy faces will do that. Russia needs to address those rather than focus on military intervention in its southern neighbour. Our aim is to exert a proportionate and reversible cost for Russia’s illegal actions and to persuade the Russian leadership that this crisis is better resolved through diplomatic means. I agree with those who have said that isolation is also not the answer either; we need dialogue with Russia to resolve this crisis. That is why the Prime Minister and my right hon. Friend the Foreign Secretary have continued to engage with their counterparts in Russia, and are committed to doing so.
Going forward, we will offer our support to the new coalition Government in Ukraine, both bilaterally and multilaterally, as they need all the support they can get. We will help them with their reform programme and will monitor progress on their commitments and obligations tied to the association agreement, the related EU assistance package and the IMF loan. We will help to strengthen Ukraine’s economy, through technical assistance, to allow for better economic management and we will help Ukraine to address its energy security, through its need to modernise its systems and become more efficient and self sustainable.
We do not seek a hostile relationship with Russia. Indeed, for 23 years the United Kingdom has tried to build a constructive and mutually beneficial relationship with Moscow, and we do not give up on that aim. But, equally, we have to be clear-headed about the actions that we have seen Russia take, particularly in the past 12 months, and act upon the basis of what Russia has actually done rather than upon promises that, so far, have not been implemented in practice. We will support Ukraine, we hope for a better relationship with Russia, but we must be realistic in preparing ourselves for a relationship with Moscow that, I fear, is going to be more difficult and more fractious than we had hoped. That is the choice of Russia’s leaders, who at the moment have chosen to treat Europe and the transatlantic alliance as a strategic adversary, rather than, as we had hoped, a potential partner for the future.