Negotiating Objectives for a Free Trade Agreement with India
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Lord Frost (Con)
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, for securing this debate, as well as for her broader work in chairing this important committee and producing this report. I assure her that she will be hearing more from me in this capacity and that no valedictory is due—for the time being, anyway.
I go back some way in my interest and involvement in trade issues with India. Ten years or so ago, when I was the UK’s representative on the EU’s Trade Policy Committee—also known the Article 133 committee—I spent a lot of my time promoting the UK’s interests in what we hoped at that time would be a free trade agreement between the European Union and India. Even then, it was clear to me that the task was an almost impossible one. Coupled with the Indians’ reluctance to make major concessions, the fact that the EU Commission had to promote so many interests, both offensive and defensive, and approached the task in such a mercantilist way—as trade negotiators tend to do—made it always seem unlikely that the right balance would ever be found. Indeed, so it proved when the EU suspended the talks in 2013.
Luckily, we in the UK have been given another opportunity to reach an agreement with India thanks to the fact that we no longer have a trade policy in which we are a minority share participant. We are now in a position to prioritise our own objectives, determine our own trade-offs and, let us not forget, conduct a negotiation in which UK officials are actually in the room and negotiating directly rather than having to rely on accounts from a third party.
Moreover, as the committee’s report makes clear, the time is propitious, with India, I hope, taking a more positive attitude to trade agreements and with the strategic case for an agreement with India ever more important. Indeed, this more positive environment is why the EU too resumed negotiations in June, although I suspect it will find the task of balancing its different interests as difficult as ever.
We now have a new Prime Minister, one who was formerly Secretary of State for International Trade and one who I know to be an economic liberal and believer in the merits of openness and competition. I express the hope to my noble friend the Minister that this attitude will feed through to a new government approach to this negotiation.
The committee’s report endorses the observation of the current Secretary of State for International Trade—at least I think she still is—my right honourable friend Anne-Marie Trevelyan that the Government will sign a deal by Diwali only if it is “good for UK businesses”. Of course, what is good for existing UK businesses is not necessarily the same as what is good for the UK economy overall. This is particularly true when looking at trade liberalisation. We cannot determine whether an agreement is beneficial to us purely by looking at one test: whether it reduces barriers, tariff and non-tariff, for our exports. That is a very important test, but not the only test.
The important judgment to make is whether, taking one thing with another, the agreement is beneficial to our country overall. That requires a broader assessment. It requires looking at the benefits of increased competition to our economy through more openness to Indian exports, notably but not only in agriculture, even if that might make life tougher for some existing businesses. It requires looking at the broader national economic and security interest we have in rebalancing our trade policy away from the current arrangements, which, in effect, are a giant preference scheme for the European Union. And it requires looking at the strategic case for a trade agreement with India, in the context of our broader aspiration to join the CPTPP, which is in many ways complementary, and our aspiration for a broader strategic and defence political involvement in the Indo-Pacific.
That is why, with the greatest respect, I disagree with the committee’s judgment that there is only questionable value in setting deadlines for the conclusion of negotiations. The noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, alluded to this. I know, perhaps better than anyone, how much a deadline focuses minds on both sides, but I draw different conclusions. Without a deadline, we will always be prey to the wishes of our domestic lobbies; there will always be the wish to take a bit longer and to push negotiations that one step further. Like the tortoise in Zeno’s paradox, the perfect moment for concluding talks will always seem a little way in the future. This approach risks us never getting any agreement at all.
It may be that, given events, the Diwali deadline is a bit too soon, although I note that, strictly speaking, it was a deadline
“to conclude the majority of talks”,
not to have a completed agreement. Be that as it may, we should set a credible deadline soon, seek to reach the best agreement we can and reach a judgment on whether it is in our interests overall. If that agreement looks more like an interim than a comprehensive agreement, and it can be harvested so further talks continue, we should be very open to that.
I will briefly make two other points—one on which I agree with the committee and one on which I do not. On the first, I agree that it is time we had a broader UK trade strategy—one that sits within and is consistent with the revised and updated integrated review, which I hope we will see shortly. That strategy should also include some proposals and ideas for the greater involvement of Parliament in signing off agreements, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, noted. I hope that the new Secretary of State for International Trade will take this forward.
My second point is on the committee’s comment that the devolved Administrations have concerns regarding the sharing of information pertaining to areas of reserved competence in the negotiations. The noble Lord, Lord Grimstone, the previous Trade Minister, is quoted as justifying the current arrangements on the grounds of confidentiality. That is all well and good, but there is a clue in the words “reserved competence”. Information need not be shared with the devolved Administrations in areas of reserved competence because, to put it bluntly, it is not their business. Where competence is reserved, it is for the DAs to implement decisions taken by the national Government in the negotiations. I urge the Government and the Minister to be more robust in policing these boundaries; we have seen a tendency for the boundaries to move, and in only one direction.
I conclude by once again thanking the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, and the committee and by expressing my best wishes and support for their further work in this important area.