Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Committee stage
Thursday 10th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Committee (3rd Day)

Scottish and Northern Ireland legislative consent granted, Welsh legislative consent sought.

12:29

Clause 28: Use and disclosure of information supplied under section 27

Amendment 95

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

95: Clause 28, page 21, line 14, leave out from “them” to end of line 15 and insert “only for those purposes”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is to probe under what further circumstances a person listed under section 27(3)(a) to (f) could use the information supplied to them by HMRC.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, Amendment 95 is about the use of information supplied by HMRC. I acknowledge that many—possibly most—people believe that if information is given to a government official in one part of government, the Government as a whole have it. That is not the case, and we do need to take care with protecting data. Clause 28(1) allows for the use of any of an organisation’s functions, and the amendment would limit it to the functions for which the information is supplied, it being for the purpose of any other functions of the persons in in subsection (3).

I have explained that extraordinarily badly. This comes of thinking that you can write brief notes instead of a complete speech, which I try and avoid for Committee. I refer noble Lords to the authority of the Bill. Basically, I want to limit the use of information provided under the Bill and to ask the Minister how this will work, how it will be policed and what sanctions, what remedies, there are if information is misused.

Amendment 190—in his absence, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Watson—raises again the issue of a firewall to protect vulnerable people. I am afraid that the noble Lord, Lord Katz, is going to hear a repetition of points that I made on the Employment Rights Bill, because they are relevant here too. The objective is to protect workers who are in particular need of protection because of the abuse, the exploitation, they are experiencing. The amendment would restrict the use of information disclosed for enforcement purposes—enforcement against abuse or exploitation—regarding a subject of abuse who is seeking support, and of information regarding a witness to that exploitation. I shall return to witnesses in a moment.

I became aware during the passage of the Modern Slavery Act 2015 of the conditions to which some overseas domestic workers were subject. Slavery was the right term for them, and a change in the rules was made. It was minor and, frankly, quite inadequate. Our law did not and does not protect migrant workers—not just domestic workers but those in agriculture, care, health and so on—as it should. They are particularly vulnerable to abuse, not just because of the consequences if their existence comes to the attention of immigration authorities, but because of their fear of the consequences. People who do not know their way around the system, who are in fear of any authority figure, are very open to unscrupulous employers who can make threats—the threats may have no foundation at all—that the person may be detained or deported, or that the person’s children will be taken away, so they cannot take the risk of reporting abuse and exploitation. I am told by the sector that this fear is not ill-founded. There is evidence that data is often shared between labour market enforcement agencies, the police and Immigration Enforcement.

The current situation has a widespread effect: mistrust by migrant communities prevents police and labour inspectors doing their job properly, which drives down conditions for all workers. It is not impossible to deal with this. Secure reporting has been implemented in the Netherlands and Spain. I understand that Surrey Police has implemented a firewall, and the Greater London Authority is undertaking a pilot. During Committee on the Employment Rights Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Grady, mentioned that the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration found that allegations raised during inspections were not investigated by the Home Office. As she said, the rights of all workers are only ever as strong as those of the most vulnerable.

One comment made during that debate was that nobody should fear. Another comment—with which, of course, I agree, and which came from the Conservative Benches—was that one of the gravest human rights abuses is modern slavery and human trafficking, and that vulnerable individuals risk slipping through the gaps. The Minister on that Bill argued that blocking information-sharing

“could have unintended consequences and make it harder for the vulnerable individuals concerned to get the help they need and deserve”,

and that the right balance was

“between protecting vulnerable workers and maintaining the integrity of our immigration system.” ”—[Official Report, 18/6/25; col. 2078.]

I would argue that the system actually deters those vulnerable workers from seeking protection, and the clear view of those working in the sector is that the current position is to their very considerable detriment.

The immigration White Paper states:

“We recognise the challenges migrant victims of domestic abuse can face”—


“domestic” is quite a wide term in this context—

“and we will strengthen the protections in place to support them to take action against their abusers, without fear of repercussion on their immigration status.”

This is an opportunity to make an adjustment that would make a very considerable difference to people who do not always get the help they deserve from those who are in a position to make that difference.

The Conservative Front Bench has tabled Amendment 188. I am really intrigued as to why it wants to amend the Data Protection Act, given paragraph 4 of Schedule 2, which we on these Benches have often opposed. We will see. I beg to move.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, I will be brief, because I agree wholeheartedly with the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, particularly about the position of domestic migrant workers. This is something we will come back to at later stages of the Bill, but as the noble Baroness has raised it now, I just put on record how much I agree with her. The noble Lord, Lord German, and I recently met with Kalayaan, which does so much extraordinary, wonderful work in this field. We were reviewing with it how things have changed—and what else needs to be changed—in the years that have passed since 2015. I have with me a publication it issued called 12 Years of Modern Slavery, the Smoke Screen Used to Deflect State Accountability for Migrant Domestic Workers.

I know that the Minister agrees with Kalayaan’s 2015 findings, because there is a photograph of the Minister and me, both of us looking considerably younger, alongside our redoubtable friend, now retired from this place, Lord Hylton. We were celebrating the passage of the 2015 legislation but recognising that more still needed to be done. I will not quote at length from the report. If the Minister has not seen it, I will be more than happy to share my copy with him, so that he can study the photographs and see the effects of too much engagement with Bills such as this.

The report says:

“Government data tells us that from 2005 to 2022, the number of visas issued to migrant domestic workers has remained consistent at around 20,000 per year”,


so this does affect a significant number of people doing significant work. Kalayaan urged the Government to take immediate steps to amend the Immigration Rules and reinstate the rights provided for under the pre-2012 visa regime. Among those is the right to renew a domestic worker visa annually, subject to ongoing employment. That is a reasonable demand. I hope that at some stage during the proceedings on the Bill, the Minister will see whether there is a way to address that issue. So I strongly support what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, has said.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on a couple of the amendments in this group.

I was listening very carefully to what the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said on the information-sharing provisions in Clauses 27 and 28, which her amendment refers to. It would be helpful, certainly for me, if the Minister when he responds could be clear about the scope of those two clauses. My reading of Clauses 27 and 28 is that the HMRC data that is allowed to be shared under those provisions is that gained purely through its customs functions, not through its other activities. I am unclear about how that would help—or not—in the very important issues that the noble Baroness raised about the protection of workers and, rightly, the need to crack down on those who abuse people’s immigration status and employ them when they have no right to work in this country.

I very much support strengthening the law in this area and sharing information to support that, but I am unclear on the customs function. The customs data helps strengthen the case about combating organised criminal groups and their transporting of funds and the supplies they use to do this trafficking. That seems to be the purpose of the clause, so it would be helpful if the Minister could flesh that out.

I strongly support my noble friend’s Amendment 188. Whether we support them or not, we should go back to the purposes of the GDPR and the human rights legislation, particularly the GDPR data. The intention of that legislation is absolutely right—that we protect the information of people who are legitimately in the country. However, we should not use that legislation to protect those who are here illegally or who are criminals trafficking in human beings and abusing our laws. It would be much more helpful if that legislation was not used to protect them. Therefore, I very much support my noble friend’s amendment. I know he will set it out in more detail; I just wanted to add my support and to raise the question that arose from the noble Baroness’s contribution.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I shall begin by speaking to my Amendment 188. I appreciate the support of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, and my noble friend Lord Harper. This amendment inserts a new clause to exclude illegal migrants and foreign criminals from GDPR provisions in relation to personal data processing by authorities carrying out immigration enforcement functions.

We need to be clear about the principles at stake here: security, accuracy and the rule of law. If we are serious about defending the integrity of our borders and our domestic security, we must ensure that those on the front line, our law enforcement agencies, have the full set of legal tools they need to do their jobs effectively. That is a thread that has run through many of our remarks from these Benches in Committee, for the important reason that we expect these organisations to protect us and to uphold the rule of law. We must do all we can to help them do that.

12:45

Amendment 188 is designed to enable targeted, lawful and proportionate access to information, so that decisions about an individual’s status can be made based on facts, not guesswork. That is in the interests of everyone: the public, the authorities and, indeed, the individuals concerned. Indeed, far from being a threat to their rights, this amendment would strengthen our ability to protect the most vulnerable. It is only by accessing the necessary data, whether digital records, communications or location information, that we can determine whether someone is, for instance, a victim of modern slavery or trafficking, as we have heard from my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. If we shackle our agencies with red tape, we risk missing that, and in so doing we deny people the very protections the system was designed to provide.

Of course, UK GDPR plays a vital role in safeguarding the data and privacy of law-abiding individuals, but we must also be honest. Those who break the law by entering this country illegally or who are convicted foreign criminals cannot expect the full suite of privacy rights to remain intact when they come under investigation—a point made very eloquently just now by my noble friend Lord Harper. Rights are not absolute, and privacy must give way where it conflicts with the greater public interest, the prevention of crime, the protection of our borders and the administration of justice, and this amendment reflects that principle. It would ensure that exemptions apply only in the context of specific immigration and border security functions, empowering our authorities as well as protecting our borders. In conclusion, it would enhance, not diminish, the fairness and credibility of our immigration system and I urge the Committee to support it.

Amendment 95 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, is, as the explanatory statement sets out, a probing amendment which asks when information provided under this clause should be used by the parties set out in the preceding clause, and I look forward to the Minister setting out the Government’s reasoning for and vision of how these processes should work and in what circumstances. Our reading of these clauses is that they are necessary, particularly if we are to tackle this problem alongside partners who we simply must have on board as part of a unified approach.

The third parties set out in Clause 27 include, among others,

“an immigration officer … a designated customs official … the Director of Border Revenue … the Border Security Commander … the government of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”.

Plainly, we need to have an arrangement in which information can be shared between these parties, and that is vital to tackling the issue of illegal immigration. It is particularly important that we have a system which pulls together agencies and organisations not only in this country but in other relevant third countries. I hope the Government will take this opportunity to set out how the system will work and how information will be shared both quickly and effectively.

Government Amendment 96 does not require much commentary from us, other than to say that we recognise this as an important part of the enforcement process. It now mandates consultation with the devolved Administrations. That is an important point. The Front Bench of my party has a certain Celtic flavour to it, as does the Government Bench. That is not a flippant point; it is a reminder that we have a UK-wide immigration system. It is often easy to focus simply on events in the south-east, but we have a UK-wide immigration system and involving the devolved Governments is intrinsic to that system.

Finally, I come to Amendment 190 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Unfortunately, this amendment may have serious and counterproductive consequences. It would place a blanket restriction on the use of vital information disclosed for the purposes of investigating or reporting labour abuse for immigration or nationality purposes under Section 40 of the 2007 Act. In doing so, it would create a legal firewall that would undermine the integrity of our enforcement agencies. It also raises a deeper question: how are we supposed to protect people from such abuse if we are prevented from identifying them in the first place?

There are practical implications to this. If an individual presents as a victim or witness of labour abuse but is in this country unlawfully, surely the state has an interest in understanding their immigration status, both for their own protection and for the broader integrity of our immigration system. It is vital for the well-being, safety and security of everyone involved that we understand who is here, on what basis, and whether they are at risk of further harm or criminal exploitation. This amendment would prevent that link being made. It would ask our agencies to act with one hand tied behind their back, able to hear a report of labour abuse but not allowed to use that information to cross-reference immigration records, not even for the purpose of assessing vulnerability risk or appropriate support routes. Paradoxically, this may make it harder, not easier, to protect those most at risk. Of course, there must be safeguards; of course we must build trust with those reporting exploitation, but trust cannot come at the cost of operational paralysis or the inability to detect abuse in the first place. I urge noble Lords to think carefully about supporting this amendment, which may feel principled but in practice may undermine our ability to enforce the law, support victims and secure our borders.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I need to declare my regular interest in the RAMP organisation, which provides support for me and for other Members of this House across all parties. I want to start by reflecting on Amendment 190, which is about protecting trafficked people and those coerced, in many cases, into coming into this country. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, just referred to the session a few weeks ago here in the Palace of Westminster where we heard testimonies from people and how they managed to get out of the modern slavery circumstance in which they found themselves. It is important that those migrant workers are able to report their abuse without fear of the other part of the system coming in and saying, “Well, you’re here illegally and we won’t deal with your case of being coerced to come here in the first place first”.

It is a matter of which part of the system you put first. The amendment tries to make sure that we can protect those being coerced and not subject them immediately to questions about their immigration status rather than about the coercion they have received. It would be good if these things could be worked together, but the harsh reality is that they are not. Migrant workers have heightened vulnerability to abuse and exploitation and are less likely to report it. In many of the cases that we heard of here in this Palace, people were literally running away with nothing, but they could not run away until they had someone they could run to. They feared that the authorities would prioritise their insecure immigration status over the harm that they had received. That is the balance this amendment is trying to correct.

This concern is well founded. Evidence indicates that individuals’ personal data is frequently shared between labour market enforcement agencies, the police and immigration enforcement. This occurs despite the absence of any legal obligation for labour market enforcement agencies or local authorities to verify workers’ immigration status or report those with insecure status to the Home Office. Unscrupulous employers are able to capitalise on this fear with impunity, and it pushes down wages and conditions right across the board. That is the purpose of this amendment, and I commend it to the Minister. In explanation at the end, perhaps he could say how we can deal with the issues of people trying to escape from coerced, abusive and exploitative labour and how that can be dealt with effectively when the other part of the system is working against it.

I want to refer to the amendment on which I pressed the Minister on Tuesday. I am grateful for him pointing out where it is, because the only point that I wanted to make on it was that the requirement now is for the Minister to consult the devolved Governments rather than simply to take note of them, which I thought perhaps was the indication we were getting from his earlier letter. I am pleased that the amendment requires that he should do so.

On GDPR, I understand why the Conservatives have come to this position, because they simply say that everybody coming to this country by irregular means is illegal. Of course, they do not want their cases to be heard; they just want to get rid of them again. Thankfully, in further amendments we are going to deal with today, we are going to remove that universality of approach, assuming that this House passes the Bill in the way that the Government have laid it before us. It is important that GDPR applies to everyone in the UK, including those in the criminal justice system undergoing investigations. Universality in that sense has been a principle of our law, and we should stick to it and not create illegality when it does not necessarily exist.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for commencing this afternoon’s consideration and for the amendments proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. Before addressing the points made by noble Lords on their own amendments, I just want to point out government Amendment 96 to Clause 33 in this group, which I will come back to in a moment.

I will begin by addressing the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, which have been reflected elsewhere. He may know that during the passage of what is now the Modern Slavery Act, we as the Official Opposition and I as the then shadow Immigration Minister moved amendments. I do not need to see—with due respect now—a 10-year-old photograph of us to reflect on that, but if he wishes to pass it to me, I may have to. In the immigration White Paper, we have made specific reference to Kalayaan and domestic workers, and I will reflect on those points as we go through. We want to look at the visa rules to ensure that they are operating fairly and properly. It is not related directly to the amendments before us today, but I just wanted to place that on the record again for the noble Lord.

Government Amendment 96 in my name does indeed, as the noble Lord, Lord German, said, amend the consultation requirements in relation to the Secretary of State’s powers to make regulations about the purposes related to policing in connection with the trailer registration data that may be used by the police and onwards shared by the police and the Home Office in accordance with the provisions of Clauses 30 and 31 of the Bill. Clause 33(8) creates a power to make police regulations to specify the purposes related to policing and, as currently drafted, the clause creates a duty to

“consult such of the following persons as the Secretary of State considers appropriate”,

and lists Scottish Ministers, the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland and police representatives.

13:00

Throughout the development of those clauses, we have worked closely with the Department for Transport, the DVLA, the police, the National Crime Agency and HMRC, along with the devolved Governments in Scotland and Northern Ireland. As a result of that engagement, it was clear that there was, however remote in practice, the opportunity that regulations could be made by the Secretary of State without first consulting the devolved Governments due to the discretion given her in the current draft. In order to change that, we have tabled the amendment about which I wrote to the noble Lord at the time and about which we had a bit of confusion on Tuesday, which I hope is now resolved. It was always the Government’s intention to consult devolved Administrations in Scotland and in Northern Ireland, and the government amendment makes sure that we enable just such an outcome by clarifying that the Secretary of State must consult with the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland and Scottish Ministers before making the regulations. I also make it clear that we are going to consult and keep in touch because we wanted to do that on a range of matters, and we will continue to do that with not just the devolved Administrations but police representatives too.

Several amendments have been tabled, about which comments have been made by noble Lords elsewhere. First—and this goes to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper—the purpose of Clauses 27 to 31 in this Bill is to empower HMRC to share the information that it holds in connection with its customs functions, and the DVLA to share the information it holds in connection with the registration of trailers, including entire datasets where appropriate, across government and with law enforcement bodies. Those clauses are there for a purpose. The purpose is to enable the Home Office and other partners to benefit from the use of modern big data tools and analytics to meet the key government objective for law enforcement, national security, customs and immigration issues.

The legislation permits the supply of data for legitimate purposes such as immigration, customs and law enforcement in order to tackle what the Bill is about. I say again to noble Lords, as we discussed on Tuesday, that the Bill is about tackling organised immigration crime and other offences while, I hope, giving the public the reassurance that such use will be subject—again, for the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—to proportionate safeguards.

The noble Baroness and the noble Lord, Lord German, spoke in support of Amendment 95 and Amendment 190, which probe the onward use of data and would bar information from being used for immigration purposes if that information was provided by victims or witnesses of labour abuse and in connection with substance abuse. I understand those provisions, but the HMRC customs data and the DVLA trailer registration datasets, as covered by Clauses 27 to 31, referenced in the amendments, are, by their very nature, collected for specific purposes, as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned. These do not include information provided by victims or witnesses of labour abuse or in connection to such abuse. While lawful data and intelligence are already a key part of operational practice through the clauses of the Bill, we are seeking to expand the use of data and enhance, using modern data analytics and big data tools, so that the Government’s ability to identify risks and threats is there. Doing so will improve the efficiency and effectiveness of our response to that very unlawful activity regarding the movement of people and the movement of goods across the border that the Bill seeks to address.

The HMRC data—again, I hope this is a reassurance to all noble Lords who have mentioned it—is solely used and held in connection with the HMRC’s customs function. This relates to the processes by which goods and cash cross the UK border—for example, information collected directly by HMRC when people and companies are importing or exporting goods. The DVLA trailer registration data is broadly limited to some basic details about UK registered trailers and the keepers of those trailers, so that sharing both datasets with the Home Office enables better identification and detection of broader criminality. I hope that is an objective that the Committee today will share. We do not want to lose that data and we do not want it to be analysed in isolation, and data sharing is key to that objective.

However, I hope to affirm for the Committee that serious labour abuse and exploitation are issues that this Government also take extremely seriously. That is why my noble friend Lord Katz has spent many a pleasant hour dealing with the Employment Rights Bill currently before this House, including significant provisions that strengthen employment rights and protect vulnerable workers, and which is committed to tackling exploitation wherever it occurs.

That feeds into the points mentioned by the noble Lord, Lord Alton, because the employment Bill is about employment rights. Overseas workers will still have those basic employment rights, and so should they. Nothing in the Bill will contravene the Employment Rights Bill or any other existing legal safeguards.

I know we discussed this on Tuesday with the noble Baroness, Lady May of Maidenhead, but the mechanisms are already there to support those with insecure immigration status who may be victims of abuse. The national referral mechanism is in place under the Modern Slavery Act to ensure that individuals can be properly identified and supported. That is a structured, compassionate route for potential victims of modern slavery to receive help without fear of intimidation and immediate immigration consequences. I hope that reassures the noble Baroness and the noble Lord. We will see in due course, but I hope it does.

I turn to Amendment 188. I hope, again in the spirit of friendship and co-operation, that I can also reassure the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, regarding their amendments, that using personal data for legitimate purposes such as immigration control is already permitted under data protection law. Disapplying data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups is therefore unnecessary. It could also disadvantage individuals who are the most vulnerable people in society, such as the victims of trafficking.

I take the issues in this grouping extremely seriously. I hope that, with the operation of the national referral mechanism, as well as the improvements in the Employment Rights Bill that was before the House recently—I think it is awaiting its Third Reading next week—we have sought to strike a balance between protecting the most vulnerable and ensuring that good interagency co-operation is maintained.

I come back to the basic principle of the Bill, which is the gangs. We are trying to secure action against criminal gangs that exploit vulnerable people in the first place, and the provisions of Clauses 27 to 31 in the Bill are designed to do just that in a data-sharing way.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can I probe the Minister on the point he made in response to my noble friend’s amendment on data sharing and the GDPR? The Minister said—and I understand why he said it—that he felt my noble friend’s amendment was unnecessary. Is he able, either today, in writing or on a future day, to reassure the House that there are not cases where we are dealing with foreign criminals or those who have entered the country illegally where either his department or relevant officials are stopped from dealing with them because of that? Is he basically saying that it is not a problem—that there are no cases of dealing with criminality or these gangs where there is an information-sharing problem? If he is happy to reassure us that there really is not a problem and the existing GDPR framework works effectively, then clearly that is very reassuring. Is he able to say that?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I will look in detail at the Hansard report of the contributions that have been made today and reflect on them, but my assessment is that I can give the noble Lord that assurance. If there is any difference in the detail that he has mentioned, I will double-check with officials to make sure that we are clear on that.

The noble Lord should know, and I think he does know, that one of the Government’s objectives is to turbocharge the removal of foreign national criminals with no right to stay in the United Kingdom after their sentence, and indeed during it, and to ensure that those with offences that are a bar to their entry to the United Kingdom are monitored and acted on accordingly. That is an important principle. Without rehearsing the arguments around that with him now, I can say that the past year has shown that we have had an increase in the number of foreign nationals who have been removed, and it is our objective to try to do that.

To give the noble Lord reassurance, I will ensure that my officials and I examine the Hansard report, and, if the reassurances I have given are not sufficient for him, he has the opportunity to revisit this issue on Report, as does the noble Lord, Lord Cameron. In the light of that, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment, and that she and the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, do not press their other amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, it might help the noble Lord, Lord Harper, to know that, in the paragraph in the Data Protection Act that sets out an exemption to data sharing, the wide phrase,

“for the purposes of immigration enforcement”,

is one that these Benches have opposed. Given our relative positions, that might be a pretty good reassurance for him.

I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for extending the debate a little. The pre-2012 visa regime was more realistic—if I can put it like that—as to the position of domestic workers. Restricting the period that they could remain in this country after an incident to six months is frankly insufficient to help them recover. You would not employ somebody for six months as, for example, a nanny, if you can find somebody who is able to do the job for longer. I am of course disappointed, but not surprised, by the Minister’s response to Amendment 190.

With regard to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, while I was listening to him, I was struck that we should recognise the agency of people who are affected or abused. The Employment Rights Bill has a clause that raises a very interesting situation: the state can take enforcement action on behalf, and without the consent, of an affected individual. That raises some very interesting and frankly rather troubling issues. However, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 95.

Amendment 95 withdrawn.

Clause 28 agreed.

Clauses 29 to 32 agreed.

Clause 33: Sections 27 to 31: interpretation

Amendment 96

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

96: Clause 33, page 28, line 37, leave out from “consult” to end of line 1 on page 29 and insert “—
(a) the Scottish Ministers,(b) the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland, and(c) such persons appearing to the Secretary of State to represent the views of a body of constables in the United Kingdom as the Secretary of State considers appropriate.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment changes the consultation requirements in relation to the Secretary of State’s power to make regulations about the purposes related to policing in connection with which trailer registration data may be disclosed.

Amendment 96 agreed.

Clause 33, as amended, agreed.

Clause 34: Provision of biometric information by evacuees etc

Amendment 97

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

97: Clause 34, page 29, line 12, at end insert—
“(c) the person is applying for refugee family reunion.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment, together with Baroness Hamwee’s amendment to page 29, line 27 aims to reduce the risks families encounter to reach a visa centre during the family reunion process.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I beg to move Amendment 97 and will also speak to Amendment 98. I am grateful to the right reverend Prelate for signing these amendments. They would add to the applicability of Clause 34 by increasing the flexibility of arrangements for taking biometric information—I think the Minister needs to send around the photos mentioned earlier so that we can all share the fun. Given my criticism of quite a lot of this Bill, I want to acknowledge that Clause 34 is welcome, but there is always a “but”.

The clause is limited to situations where the Government are facilitating the departure of what the clause’s title refers to as “evacuees etc”. People who, under the UK’s own rules, are entitled to a family reunion—and whom these amendments would extend the clause to include—are often unable to exercise that right because they are not able to get to where they can provide biometric information which is required for a visa. The Government, by definition, recognise that, because that is what the clause is about. I have not heard any news emanating from Downing Street this morning, and I think that these could be issues that we will be discussing fairly soon. I look forward to the Minister explaining how they might work, because a lot of issues have been raised as to the operation as well as policy.

13:15

Some people manage to get to a centre; others do not. I have heard quite hair-raising descriptions of the risks undertaken, quite often by a woman by herself without the protection of the male accompaniment that is necessary in some of the regions concerned and sometimes with children—more than half of the visas granted for family reunion are for children. People using the “services” of smugglers to cross borders to get to a visa centre often have to go more than once. They go once to provide the biometrics, and then again to collect a visa. I recall meeting a mother and daughter who had to make a second trip because the first time they went there was an error collecting the information at the visa centre, so they had to go again and then again. The physical and mental toll that this takes is considerable. The Red Cross has provided a couple of examples. It found that almost 60% of families displaced during the application process were affected and has long called for a change in the process so that biometrics can be collected when a positive decision on a visa has been made. This should be made easier for those encountering appallingly difficult situations.

These amendments would not solve everything, but they would be something. I give the example of a husband who was accepted as a refugee from Afghanistan but found that the only way he could help his wife achieve a visa was for him to go to Iran, so that he could take his wife to a visa centre. Another example is that of a two year-old child living with his grandmother who was displaced from Sudan to Chad. With the nearest visa centre being in Cameroon, he and his grandmother could not get there. Happily, he was helped by the UNHCR, which took his passport backwards and forwards, taking over 11 months to do it. It is very sad to think that that is a positive position. The amendments would give some practical meaning to the right to family reunion. I beg to move.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

My Lords, I support these two amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for the very reasons she gives. Clause 34 is very welcome and I am very glad that the Government have put it in, but it is very narrow. There is a considerable overlap between family reunion cases and evacuees, and this is about evacuees. I would like to bring the two together, as the noble Baroness said. The top five countries from which family reunion cases come are Syria, Sudan, Iran, Eritrea and Afghanistan, so we are in exactly the same territory of facilitating evacuation. It does not work very well at the moment, for the reasons that the noble Baroness spelled out.

The double journeys point is really worrying. To collect the visa, you have to go to a visa centre. In the top five countries I have listed, there are no visa centres, for obvious reasons—in most of them, there is no embassy—so you have to cross a frontier. When we are talking family reunions, more than 50% of those involved are children. Are we asking them to cross a frontier and go somewhere that could be a very long way away to get their visa? No, we are not; it is worse than that. We are asking them to go twice: once to give their biometric details and, secondly, to collect the visa—they cannot get it the first time. Could they not have the biometric details taken when they pick up the visa, when the family reunion case has been established and they are going to be let in? They would then need to make only one journey. It seems to me that this simple improvement to the process would save a lot of heartache and probably a lot of lives, in cases where it has been decided by the system that family reunion is appropriate and should be facilitated.

I support the two amendments ably moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, but I hope that the Government will go a little further and think hard about changing the procedure for the collection of the visa so that the biometric details could be given at the time the visa is picked up and thus the double journeys could be avoided.

[Baroness Lister of Burtersett (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly in support. I, too, am supported by RAMP, and that is in the register—that is done for Committee now. I warmly welcome Clause 34 as well, but the amendment being proposed is a very modest one, which would not be difficult for the Government to accept. The case has already been well made and I will not reiterate it, but I will give an example from the British Red Cross, which I think has made a very persuasive case to Members of the Committee. It gives the current example of Iran:

“The visa centre in Tehran has been temporarily closed since 15 July 2025. This visa centre was the base for many Afghans and Iranians to submit their family reunion applications. Now families are unable to access the centre and will need to take a dangerous journey to a neighbouring country just to submit their biometrics and have their application processed … This amendment would allow biometrics to be taken at different locations within Iran where people could travel to safely rather than crossing borders”.


Safety must be one of the criteria that we use in thinking about displaced people. It is a very modest amendment and I hope that my noble friend will be able to look kindly on it.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I will say a couple of words in support of these amendments from my noble friend. As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, just remarked, it is not as if these changes would be difficult to make: the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, referred to them as simple improvements to the process. My noble friend referred to the current summit: to be honest, I have not seen the results, as I was in meetings all morning. Are there any yet? It has obviously been widely trailed that President Macron will talk about improving the reception by this country of applicants for family reunion. It would be perhaps a little ironic—well, there would be a nice coincidence of efforts—if, from this side, we are proposing simple improvements in process and we also have an ally in President Macron, who is saying, “Please simplify and streamline your family reunion efforts”. That would be a nice entente amicale.

I will make a point that I am not sure any of the other speakers have, which is made in our briefings. Families often become separated, so not only does a family together have to make possible multiple journeys but dispersed members of a family, including children, might have to make multiple trips from different locations. So you are multiplying the risks and the possibility of violence and distress. I think my noble friend referred to one in five families saying they had to resort to using smugglers to reach the visa centre. Well, surely one of the major purposes of the Bill, which we all support, is to try to put the smugglers and people traffickers out of business. Here is a government policy that is helping to give people smugglers more business—we regret it, but it is the reality—which you could avoid by the simple shortcut of making biometrics collectable other than at visa centres and not requiring at least two journeys. The thought of a lone woman or a family with children having to expose themselves to all the threats to safety that we can imagine and are told about is really unconscionable, when it really would not take a great deal of effort by the Home Office to keep people safer, streamline the process and satisfy President Macron, as well as us, all at the same time.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

My Lords, whether or not President Macron is tuned into our debate today and supportive of what noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, has just said, she will be glad to know, as I was, that the British Red Cross says:

“Extending the relevant clause to include refugee family reunion would ensure families, including children, were able to provide biometrics outside a visa centre and significantly reduce the risks encountered to reach visa centres”.


That was the point that my noble friend Lord Kerr was making during his very good speech—his remarks were eminently sensible, as always—and the invitation to try to extend that provision is long overdue.

The Red Cross interviewed 215 people—100 families. I will summarise just three things that it found:

“Just under half of the people found the journey difficult … 1 in 5 families said they had to resort to using smugglers to reach the visa centre … Just under 60 percent of families were displaced before or during the application process.”


The noble Baroness, Lady Lister, gave an example from Iran. I will give an example, if I may, from the Red Cross, from Sudan. Between 2003 and 2005, I travelled to Darfur. During that genocide, 300,000 people were killed there and 2 million people were displaced. Here we are in 2025 with the war in Sudan, which is often overlooked because events in the Middle East and in Ukraine are so high on our agendas. It has been appalling to see the horrific number of deaths and displacements again in Sudan. It is not surprising, therefore, that Sudan is probably top of the list of those who end up in the small boats trying to cross the English Channel.

13:30

This comes back to what I said on Tuesday, and what I say too regularly: we have to tackle root causes and, until we do, this problem will not go away. The Red Cross gives this example from Sudan. A two year-old Sudanese child, Ahmed, who was displaced in Chad due to the conflict in Sudan, was living with his grandmother and seven other younger children under her care. As Ahmed was under five, he was required to provide a facial photograph and passport check at the visa centre before his application could be processed. There was no visa centre in Chad, of course, and—to reinforce what my noble friend was saying—the nearest one was in Cameroon. The grandmother and child were unable to travel to Cameroon due to the dangers of travelling across borders and their inability to meet entry requirements. So the Red Cross made representations to the Home Office to consider Ahmed’s application without attendance at the visa centre. It agreed, as UNHCR was able to check the identity of the child and his passport. UNHCR also agreed to securely transport Ahmed’s passport back and forth to Cameroon to affix the visa into it. It took 11 months for the child to be reunited with his parents because of all the challenges outlined. The Red Cross argues that an amendment to this clause to include family reunion would have reduced the waiting time and would ensure that all families could get access to this application process without requiring interventions and legal support from its services. I hope we will take the opportunity, perhaps between now and Report, to see whether we can do that.

I was pleased to hear what the noble Lord said about biometrics on the previous group of amendments. He specifically said that we have no intention of disapplying any of the protections in the GDPR guidelines of 2021—the ones issued post Brexit. I simply draw the noble Lord’s attention to two things in that regard. The Open Rights Group notes that collecting biometric data from children over 16 without consent could violate child protection standards. It says:

“According to the guidance of the Information Commissioner’s Office (ICO) on processing sensitive personal data under the UK GDPR, biometric data is categorised as special category data and requires explicit consent. The guidance stresses that when dealing with minors’ data, additional safeguards must be implemented to protect their rights. Therefore, collecting biometric data from children over 16 without proper consent could breach child protection standards, as it fails to meet the stringent consent requirements and the enhanced safeguards necessary for processing such sensitive information”.

I hope the noble Lord will say something about the protections we will give to children—to minors—as part of that process.

Clauses 34 and 35 pertain to the provision of biometrics, and Amendment 98—which the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, tabled and which I support—backs up observations made by the Joint Committee on Human Rights in paragraphs 82 to 89 of its report. I say in parentheses to the Minister that I reported back to the committee, in its proceedings yesterday, the commitment that he gave to us on Tuesday that there will be a response to the committee’s report between now and Report, and it was delighted to hear that. The Minister may be less delighted that we approved another 100-page report yesterday—but on the police and crime Bill. It will be winging its way to him soon, and he will be able to read it during the Recess.

As the Committee knows, under the Bill’s provisions an authorised person may extract biometric information from anyone, including a child—although, as I have just said, a responsible adult should be present in the case of an under 16 year-old—if the Government are facilitating their exit to a third country and that person would need leave to enter the UK. That might include facial scans and fingerprints, which can be kept for five years. I note that national security, as well as immigration, nationality and law enforcement, is cited as the justification for this. It may well be that in some cases that is legitimate—I have a completely open mind about that. But the Government must bear in mind their convention duties to collect and retain such information in a proportionate and foreseeable manner. What safeguards are being put in place to ensure that it will not be misused? Are the Government truly confident that, with the use of automatic processing, the safeguards are actually adequate? Our obligations are clear: blanket and indiscriminate retention is not acceptable under the international commitments to which we have committed ourselves, and we have obligations under Article 49 of the UK GDPR.

Clause 35(7) gives power to transfer personal data to a third country or international organisation without a court or the Secretary of State needing to consider whether such transfers are

“necessary for important reasons of public interest”.

The Joint Committee on Human Rights has recommended that the normal safeguards should apply and should not be disapplied or relaxed.

I conclude by reminding the Committee of the conclusion of the Immigration Law Practitioners’ Association, ILPA, that our obligations mean we must act

“if there a real risk that, as a result of such a transfer, the data subject might be subjected to torture, inhuman and degrading treatment or punishment or any other violation of his or her fundamental rights”.

Does the Minister concur with and endorse that view? If so, will he give some further consideration to whether any disapplication might occur that would not be in accordance with the commitments that we have entered into?

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

My Lords, my Amendment 99 is not directly related to the previous amendments other than by the connection of biometric data. My question is about which database the biometric data is being checked against. The question comes from the briefing that was helpfully provided by the Minister and his advisers prior to the Bill being laid. At that briefing, I asked whether the databases were being checked for particular purposes, and the advice we received was that they could not be used by the police. I found that confusing when I re-read the Bill and saw that there is a law enforcement clause. The questions today are about whether the databases are being checked for these particular reasons.

If the people you are checking are entering for the first time, they should never have their data in these databases because they have never been to the UK. But, of course, many of the people who arrive, sometimes illegally, have been here before, have left and now are returning—so it is important to establish their identity first, obviously.

The databases that I am interested in are, first, the unsolved crime scene database. Crimes happen every day, samples are taken—DNA, fingerprints and sometimes photographs now—and, of course, not all crimes are solved. A database is kept of those crimes that are not solved, so is the biometric data of the people who are entering being checked against that?

The second group I am interested in is people who are wanted. They might be wanted in this country or in other countries. It may be that we choose not to let the third country know that this person has arrived, but at least we should know whether we are at risk of importing someone who is wanted somewhere else. This is probably quite important, given the group of countries that many of the people who are coming to our country are linked to. When many of our soldiers in Afghanistan were murdered and badly maimed by IEDs, we collected an awful lot of forensic material, which is now stored in this country in case we ever discover the people who carried out those crimes. It would certainly be ironic if somebody claimed to want to come to this country legally and had previously killed or maimed one of our soldiers—we should at least be aware of that. Are we checking this against that database?

This is quite a specific set of questions, but it relies on the data being checked. The advice we received at the briefing was that it was not. The purpose of this amendment is to get on record exactly what it is being checked against.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

My Lords, I support the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, which have been so ably supported across the Committee—pretty much every voice so far has been in support of them. They are a very useful humanitarian mirror to arguments that have been made on the previous group about the importance of data sharing for law enforcement purposes.

Amendments 97 and 98, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, very much endorse the views of the noble Lords, Lord Kerr and Lord Alton, on the need for even more breadth and possibly a government amendment. These amendments are very sympathetic to the Government’s stated policy of smashing the gangs et cetera. It is a perverse outcome to hear that people who were trying to satisfy the Government’s legal and practical requirements for family reunion are having to resort to people smugglers. So, with respect, I hope that the Minister will see that this is a no brainer in terms of the practical facilitation of government policy.

Finally, I talked about these amendments being very much the humanitarian mirror of the need sometimes to share data—in this case, biometric information—for the purpose of giving effect to lawful family reunion. Please do not shoot the messenger, but I want to reassure the noble Lord, Lord Harper, that the Data Protection Act and the UK GDPR contain very broad law enforcement exemptions, but broad is not blanket. I hope I can say to Conservative noble Lords that it is one thing to have a broad law enforcement exemption, but another to have blanket immunity from data protection. I am sure that noble Lords opposite would not want, for example, data controllers to be negligent or not to maintain a secure system so that sensitive information, even about potential criminals, was dumped on the internet, easily hacked or simply negligently maintained. Data controllers, particularly public authority data controllers, and especially of sensitive information, should at least have to maintain a proper, secure system. Yes, data should be shared for law enforcement purposes where that is necessary and proportionate, but they should not be totally negligent with this information.

I hope that provides some reassurance on that issue. In any event, if it does not, the Minister has already said that he can write.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I thank all those who have spoken. The amendments in my noble friend’s name, which I have signed, are, I think, well received across the Committee as a whole. On top of that, I must repeat the welcome for Clauses 34 and 35, which seek to increase flexibility when taking biometric information. I do not want to repeat the cases that have been talked about during this debate but shall simply speak about the practicalities of how this change might take place.

I have had experience of bringing people here for a short time and requiring their biometric information, which was sent from one country to another. Very helpfully, British Foreign Office officials in one country put the machine in the boot of their car and drove it to the other country—I am not going to give the details because otherwise they might get into trouble. Regularly, they have taken the biometric information of people who have visited the noble Lord’s part of Wales, among others; that that might give him a clue. I read today in the newspapers that the Government are to provide Home Office officials with portable biometric equipment. In my day, these things were small enough to go in the boot, but they are obviously going to be even smaller. So, in practical terms, taking biometric information is no longer a matter of using a large machine. Similarly, when you go to hospital for a scan, it is no longer done by big machines. This machinery is getting smaller, and we are now talking about portable methods. Clearly, that can be done, and it makes it more straightforward to take the machinery closer to people who are fulfilling the legal route that the Government have set in front of them. Of course, we should remember that, in 2024, 10,000 of those who came on family reunion were children.

The second thing is whether the Government are interested in using other bodies to take the biometric information. I do not know what the Government have already done on this matter—I saw the Minister checking his phone—but, clearly, if we are to have family reunion, and if President Macron has decided that biometrics can be taken in France, at least that might give some of the information we will need to know anyway about these matters.

13:45

It strikes me that, often, where we have no embassies, we rely on the embassies of other, friendly countries. We also rely a lot on United Nations personnel to do the tasks for us in a joint way with the Government, as I observed in Cairo, when literally hundreds of thousands of people escaped from Sudan and turned up at the doors of the United Nations. This seems a very practical option now. My question is whether the Government are mindful that there are people who can deliver this on their behalf. When you take biometric information, it is transmitted electronically anyway, so it can be checked anywhere in the world. The biometric information is being brought closer, which means that people will no longer have to cross borders not just once but twice—from one country to another, or perhaps from a nearby country—without their documentation, or without being able to fulfil all the requirements that make matters so difficult for them. It is not about increasing the number of people who come into this country; it is about making it safer. I hope the Minister will see that and will give us some indication as to whether the Government are prepared to take this matter forward or even to accept my noble friend’s amendment.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I just have a few points to make on the amendments and the contributions that have been made, which I hope means that the Minister can make sure he covers them when he responds.

On the first two amendments, on family reunion, I support the concept and did a lot to support it when I was Immigration Minister. Just to give a balanced argument, though, it is important that we collect biometric information to make sure that the people who are applying are who they say they are. That is of course the reason why—the Minister will confirm this—it is important to get the biometric information before the application is submitted, so that you know that the person making the application is indeed entitled to do so. Clearly, it would be helpful to make it easier to collect that biometric information.

Of course, one challenge with the list of countries read out earlier by noble Lords is that we often do not have our own personnel in those countries, for very sensible reasons. In making it safer for those applying for family reunion, we must obviously be mindful of the risks that might be run by British officials in collecting the biometric information. There are some countries where it would be problematic to do so, because we simply do not have people. I am therefore not sure that it is quite as straightforward as some noble Lords have suggested, but I suspect that, given the progress of technology and the point made by the noble Lord, Lord German—that a lot of this equipment is now much more advanced, portable and transportable—we can make some improvements. I will therefore listen carefully to what the Minister has to say about how we can make things easier for people with a legitimate family reunion claim, while also maintaining our border security.

I want to pick up on one point that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, made—I understand why he made it—about data protection and protecting the rights of children. I think there is a bit of a danger here of focusing on the process and forgetting what the point is. If a child, someone over 16 but under 18, is coming to the United Kingdom in order to get to a safer location, we obviously need to be satisfied that they do not present a risk and are not a criminal or a terrorist from abroad—we know, of course, that in many countries, you can be those things while still being a child. If we are not careful and we overdo the GDPR aspect, for example, the danger is that we will not take the biometric data from the child, or that the circumstances will be such that doing so is problematic. In not doing so, we would not then be able sensibly to give that child safe protection in the United Kingdom—we would be cutting off our nose to spite our face.

There is a balance to strike here. If the point of the exercise is that that child is able to get a successful asylum claim and come to the United Kingdom and be safe, we should not let what are otherwise sensible information protections get in the way. There is a risk of missing the point, and there needs to be a bit of proportionality and balance here.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I agree with the general thrust of the argument the noble Lord, Lord Harper, is putting to the Committee. He talked about getting the balance right, and that is really what I was arguing. However, we must not lose sight of the fact that these are children or young people, and we owe them a duty of care. We should get the balance right and not categorise them all as potential criminals or as having been involved in acts of terror or criminality. However, I recognise that there is that potential, and therefore, as he says, we have to get the balance right. We do not want a general disapplication of protections. We want to know that they are going to be used in a measured and sane way.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

As a supplement to that, I add that the balance is already there in the international standards, in things such as making sure there is an appropriate adult present. That does not harm any of the ambitions of the noble Lord. It is just what we would normally expect for minors.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful for both of those interventions. In the clause as set out there are provisions to make sure there is an appropriate person who is not a representative of the government present. All I was saying is that it is important we do not lose sight of the purpose of this exercise, which is to enable people to come to Britain, where they are legally qualified to do so and do not present a risk to us. That is an important balance to strike.

I strongly support the thrust of the questions from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, about the use to which this information should be put. In the modern world, with the way we can process data, my experience of how we use it is that it is done in a proportionate way. Checking information against databases protects people. Our security agencies are not interested in, and do not have the resources to spend their time worrying about, people who do not present a threat to the country. The big challenge is dealing with those who do. The noble Lord set out some very important questions, which I hope the Minister can deal with when he closes. I wanted to put that in context, so that the Minister covers it when he responds.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken. At present, we are not minded to support Amendments 97 and 98. I entirely understand the rationale behind them and many noble Lords have spoken powerfully in support of them. The concern we have is simply an operational one, which was hinted at by my noble friend Lord Harper.

The operational implications of these amendments may be very broad and far reaching. It seems to me that they would create a practical obligation for the UK Government to deploy biometric collection facilities or personnel across multiple jurisdictions, regardless of cost or feasibility.

Clause 34 applies specifically to authorised persons, who are, in the definition of the clause,

“a person authorised by the Secretary of State”.

That could come at an unknown and potentially significant cost. Are we to set up biometric processing hubs in every conflict-adjacent state? The noble Lord, Lord German, stated that that could easily be done, but I remain to be convinced. My noble friend Lord Harper was very pertinent about this. If the Government are to support this, I look forward to hearing from the Minister what the logistical burden on government would be?

Amendment 99, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, is a probing amendment designed to understand which organisations will have access to biometric information for the purposes of exercising a function relating to law enforcement. It brings with it the noble Lord’s customary focus and expertise in this area. It is very welcome, and I hope the Minister will take the opportunity to set out which agencies will have access to this information to fulfil the demands set out in Clause 35.

I once again reiterate that we need to make sure that, in the technical solutions we are discussing on this fundamental issue, we are firm and robust in taking steps to mitigate and ultimately end the crisis of illegal migration, not exacerbate it.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to noble Lords for their contributions and echo the point that the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, has just made. There is a common interest between His Majesty’s Opposition and us on that issue.

The important point about Clause 34 is that biometrics are required as part of an immigration or nationality application to conduct checks on the person’s identity and suitability before they come to the UK. That is a perfectly legitimate government objective and the purpose of the clause is to establish it in relation to the powers in the Bill, which aim to strengthen the Government’s ability to respond flexibly in crisis situations in particular, as noble Lords across the Committee have mentioned. The Bill provides the power to take biometrics—fingerprints or facial images of the applicant—without the need for an application to be submitted. That has had a generally positive welcome from a number of noble Lords, including the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the signatories of the amendments, the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German. It is important to recognise that.

The proposals in the Bill will enable the Secretary of State to determine whether the person poses a security threat—this goes to the point from the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, which I will come back to in a moment—before facilitating their exit from another country. The Bill will ensure that the power to collect biometrics outside of a visa application process will take place only in tightly defined circumstances where individuals are seeking to leave a particular country due to a crisis or any other situation where this Government facilitate their exit.

Before I move on to the amendments from the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German, I hope I can reassure the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, on the matter that he raised. Where biometrics are collected in connection with immigration or nationality applications, the police will be able to conduct their own checks against the biometrics captured under the clauses in this Bill. For example, the police currently have access to this data when the biometrics are enrolled into the immigration and asylum biometric system. They can then be washed against a series of police fingerprint databases, which include unified collection captured at police stations and other sets of images, including from scenes of crime and special collections, used to identify high-risk individuals. The noble Lord made this very point. This could be particularly important with individuals who have been involved in terrorism activity and appear on counterterrorism databases. The police make checks against the Home Office fingerprint database to help identify a person they have arrested and assess whether they might also be a foreign national offender. I hope the fact that those checks are undertaken will enable him to withdraw his amendment, based on that assurance. I look forward to hearing what he has to say in due course.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, supported by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, the noble Lord, Lord Kerr of Kinlochard, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, raised important issues and tabled amendments which aim to defer or excuse the request for biometrics from overseas applicants. As I have said, biometrics are normally required to be taken as part of an application to conduct checks on the person’s identity. As the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Cameron, said, that is important for security.

In all cases, it is the responsibility of the applicant to satisfy the decision-maker about their identity. A decision-maker may decide it is appropriate for an application to be made at a visa application centre, or to enrol the biometrics to be deferred or waived.

14:00

I recognise that there is never a circumstance in which that is ideal. I understand the difficulties that applicants may face in reaching a visa application centre when crossing a border or fleeing terror, persecution or war. However, the purpose of the Bill and its powers is to strengthen the Government’s ability to respond flexibly in these areas.

The Bill does not extend this flexibility to family reunion, but there are alternative solutions, such as working with international partners like the International Organization for Migration, where that has been used in exceptional circumstances. My colleagues at the Home Office and I continue to assess whether broader policy changes are needed to balance that genuine humanitarian requirement with the genuine security concern and genuine need to ensure that those who need that flexibility have it.

A number of points were made by noble Lords on this issue. There is an absolute understanding that the challenges faced by some refugee families are very difficult, and we are trying to work to make this much more accessible. The noble Lord, Lord German, referred to the introduction of e-visas by the end of 2025, which will reduce the need for physical travel and to collect visas, which is the other aspect he mentioned. We understand that applicants will face difficulties and that we need to work with partners, so we will continue to assess whether that broader policy change is needed. The debate we have had today is helpful in pushing that assessment, so that we examine those areas as a whole.

To date, the collection of biometrics during evacuations has happened; it is not an unusual circumstance. During Operation Pitting in Afghanistan in 2021, initial biometric collection was done on arrival in the UK. In Sudan in 2023, biometric checks were undertaken in third countries such as Saudi Arabia before onward travel to the UK. In Gaza in 2023, following the disgraceful Hamas attacks in Israel, the FCDO facilitated the exit of British nationals and other eligible persons from Gaza into either Egypt or Jordan. In some instances, this included individuals who had never previously submitted biometric information as part of a visa application.

There are ways around that challenge which we are trying to examine, to see where they can be approved. However, in the context of family migration reunion today, I respectfully hope that noble Lords will reflect on what I have said, as we will reflect on what they have said. For the moment, I hope they feel able not to press their amendments. I give way to the noble Lord.

[Lord Alton of Liverpool (CB)]

I am grateful to the Minister. He will recall the example I gave of a two year-old boy in Sudan wanting to be reunited with his grandmother. It took 11 months to do that, and it required the transportation of information half-way across Africa in order to achieve it.

Will the Minister look at the countries generating the largest number of migrants who end up in boats in the channel, on irregular journeys, as some would put it—we all know that Sudan is one of the foremost of those countries—and see if we can do more to prevent people leaving in the first place by dealing with issues like family reunion in a more expeditious manner? I am not asking him necessarily to come forward with amendments to that effect, but even if he were to facilitate further discussions between his department and particularly the FCDO to see how that might be generated, that would be helpful to the Committee.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am very grateful to the noble Lord. I will let my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti speak and then respond.

[Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)]

I am sorry to come in on the coat-tails of the noble Lord, Lord Alton, again. My noble friend the Minister discussed the need for flexibility. Surely the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, would extend governmental flexibility to facilitate biometrics being taken in more places for family reunion cases. The noble Lord opposite was concerned that this would put an onerous obligation on the Secretary of State. However, the Secretary of State is the person who will authorise people, and he will not make these authorisations if he thinks they are impracticable or overly burdensome. Can my noble friend the Minister reflect on that in future and see this as providing additional flexibility and not an additional burden?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

In response to both the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti, I will repeat what I said in my preamble today: the Home Office is continuing to assess whether broader policy changes are needed to balance that humanitarian concern. The noble Lord made a very strong point about a child aged two and the length of time for a reunion—that will fall within our assessment of the broader humanitarian concern. We need to balance that with security requirements; however, in the case he put to us, a two-year old child would self-evidently not pose that type of threat.

This is important. I say to the noble Lords who tabled the amendments that the purpose of the clause is to provide the assurances that we have. I accept that noble Lords are testing that; however, while we will examine the points that have been made, I believe that there are alternative ways to achieve that objective. Therefore, I ask the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, not to press her amendments. I also hope that I have satisfied the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe.

[Lord Kerr of Kinlochard (CB)]

We are all on the same side here, and I appreciate the spirit of the Minister’s remarks. I appreciate that he stated that he will reflect on what we have said from all sides of the House.

It is true that there are alternative ways and that the UNHCR and the IOM can help. However, if you are in Afghanistan, there is no way that those organisations can help you until you have reached Pakistan. Getting across the Khyber these days is not easy, particularly if you are a child—and children make up more than 50% of the family reunion cases. While I appreciate the spirit of the Minister’s answer, I do not believe that it is a complete answer. I therefore press him to go on thinking about the points that have been made today.

I will cheat very slightly by saying that there is also a very direct way in which one could make on-site, in-country visa centres available—to reopen embassies. I am talking about Syria. I do not know why we do not have an embassy in Damascus now for all sorts of political reasons. Given its significance to the whole of the Arab world, we should have an embassy in Damascus. If we had an embassy, we would of course have a visa centre there. I hope that a wish to avoid paying for a visa centre in Syria is not causing the Foreign Office not to reopen the embassy in Damascus.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

The noble Lord brings great experience of the Foreign Office. He will know about this better than I do; I am a Home Office person rather than a Foreign Office person. I am trying to assure the House that, while the points that have been made are a fair challenge to the Government, we believe that the clause meets those obligations, providing flexibility and engagement with the International Organization for Migration, the UNHCR and others.

I mentioned Operation Pitting in Afghanistan in 2021. Some 15,000 people were evacuated and biometrics were collected post arrival in the United Kingdom. In the Sudan evacuation, just under 2,500 individuals were evacuated, with biometric checks taken in third-party countries such as Saudi Arabia. In Gaza, 250 British nationals were supported to exit and biometric checks were taken. The mechanism is there. I have had strong representations from across the Committee on this issue, but I am trying to explain the position of Clause 34. I hope that, with my comments, the noble Baroness can withdraw her amendment.

I have not forgotten the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, who may want to intervene—he does want to, so I shall allow him to before I finally, I hope, wind up.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

I thank the Minister. First, I am broadly reassured. There is just one area where I hope he might reassure himself and therefore me. I mentioned the Afghanistan IED material. It is probably difficult to talk about publicly, but if he could reassure himself that this biometric data had been checked against that database, I would be very reassured and that might help him too.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I have given a broad description. The police have access to terrorist databases with information and biometrics generally. I think it best not to talk, at the moment, about specific databases. I believe the IED database that he mentioned is covered by the proposals, but I will check with my colleagues who have a responsibility for that, rather than inadvertently give the Committee information that proves subsequently not to be as accurate as I would wish.

With that, I would very much welcome the noble Baroness responding and withdrawing the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I think that is the third time the Minister has asked me to do so, and I will—but not quite yet. I say to those waiting for the next business that I will not be going down the side roads of the summit, what might happen on the northern shores of France or in Syria—much as I would like to, given my own heritage—or my noble friend Lord German’s escapades with portable biometric equipment.

A number of noble Lords, including me, have referred to the reliance on smugglers, which is ironic in the circumstances. I say again to the Committee—to the noble Lords, Lord Harper and Lord Cameron—that we are not opposing Clause 34. In fact, we are positively supporting it. We are not challenging the use of biometrics; we are looking at procedures and the candidates for the application of Clause 34.

The Minister referred to the possibilities of what can be done in exceptional circumstances. That is a term that I always find quite difficult; it seems to me that a family disunited in extreme circumstances should be regarded as exceptional. I understand that, from his point of view, that may be different. Frankly, to travel from Sudan to Saudi Arabia twice would be very exceptional in itself.

Given the support across the Committee for the concept of what is incorporated in these amendments, as the Minister said, I wonder whether this is something we might find a moment to discuss after Committee and before Report. There should be a way of taking forward how the procedures can be used, without disrupting the Government’s concerns. With that, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 97.

Amendment 97 withdrawn.

Amendment 98 not moved.

Clause 34 agreed.

Clause 35: Use and retention of information taken under section 34

Amendment 99 not moved.

Clause 35 agreed.

Clause 36 agreed.

House resumed. Committee to begin again not before 2.54 pm.