Data Protection Act 2018 (Qualifying Competent Authorities) Regulations 2025
(3 days, 16 hours ago)
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Lord Hanson of Flint
That the Grand Committee do consider the Data Protection Act 2018 (Qualifying Competent Authorities) Regulations 2025.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, this instrument was laid before the House on 7 July. The then Home Secretary and the current Home Secretary have exercised powers under Section 82(2A) of the Data Protection Act 2018 to specify in this instrument the qualifying competent authorities that will be able to apply for a designation notice under Section 82(2A) of the DPA. During the passage of the Data (Use and Access) Bill, the House debated the parent provisions for this instrument; I hope that noble Lords will bear with me. Section 89 of the Data (Use and Access) Act will insert Sections 82A to 82E into the Data Protection Act 2018. I will briefly summarise those provisions so that noble Lords are reminded of the context.
Under the Data Protection Act, authorities processing for law enforcement purposes and intelligence services are subject to two separate legislative data-processing regimes for processing personal data. This precludes a joint controllership between both entities and makes working together much more difficult, especially in the context of public safety and national security.
Let me give noble Lords an example. An intelligence service and a police force working together on a joint investigation could not work from a single shared dataset setting out individuals of interest and related intelligence. Instead, each must have their own copy of the data, sharing data back and forth between one another and across data protection regimes in order to allow each other to update their intelligence. Self-evidently, this decreases efficiency and reduces joint-working capabilities. I suggest to noble Lords that there is a clear public interest in enabling closer joint working between law enforcement bodies and the intelligence services in matters of national security. I remind noble Lords that these issues were highlighted in the reports on the Fishmongers’ Hall and Manchester Arena terrorist attacks.
Once the provisions are in force, qualifying competent authorities will, together with at least one intelligence service, be able to apply for a designation notice from the Secretary of State under Section 82A of the Data Protection Act where it is required for the purposes of safeguarding national security. This designation notice will allow the intelligence services and qualifying competent authority in question to form a joint controllership for that processing activity. It does not mean that open sharing of all data between the organisations can take place. When applying for a notice, the organisations must set out the processing for which they are applying, and a designation notice will apply to that processing only. Prior to granting a notice, the Secretary of State must consult the ICO.
I turn to the instrument itself. The Data (Use and Access) Act inserted Section 82(2A) into the Data Protection Act 2018, allowing the Secretary of State to specify by regulations which competent authorities are able to apply for a designation notice alongside an intelligence service. Competent authorities are defined in Section 30(1) of the DPA 2018 as
“a person specified or described in Schedule 7”
to the DPA 2018 or any other person who
“has statutory functions for any of the law enforcement purposes”
and is, therefore, capable of processing data under the law enforcement regime.
Paragraph 5.2 of the Explanatory Memorandum lists the 23 qualifying competent authorities under the Data Protection Act 2018. The list includes, as noble Lords can see, police forces—including territorial police forces, military police and other policing organisations, such as counterterrorism police—and authorities with operational roles, such as the Prison and Probation Service. As noble Lords might be expected to understand, the regulations include competent authorities involved in areas where national security is a consideration. All 23 authorities are listed by name in paragraph 5.2.
These regulations have been drafted in consultation with the partners operating in the area of national security. I hope that noble Lords will understand that, given the sensitivities involved, the Government cannot go into detail publicly on the rationale behind individual authorities included on the list. However, the authorities that have been included are those where there is reasonable potential for a joint controllership to be formed for the purpose of safeguarding national security.
Finally, the Home Office consulted the Information Commissioner’s Office on the proposed qualified competent authorities and the ICO confirmed that it was content. There is no fixed review period for the list and competent authorities may be added to or removed from the regulations as the Secretary of State sees fit, but the legislation requires amending regulations be subject to the affirmative procedure, which I hope provides noble Lords with the appropriate safeguards.
I hope that noble Lords will understand the importance of this instrument and that the explanation will enable them to support this detailed legislation, which will strengthen the ability of our law enforcement and intelligence services to work closely to protect the UK and its citizens from the diverse threats that we face. I commend the instrument to the Committee.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this instrument is a welcome step in increasing the efficacy of our data sharing and protecting our national security interests. Until the enactment of this instrument, authorities processing information under the Data Protection Act 2018 have been subject to two separate legislative data-processing regimes for law enforcement and intelligence services respectively, as the Minister outlined. The previous Government recognised the unduly burdensome process of data processing between two bodies with no means of centralising multiple datasets for analysis and operation, which is why the previous Government put forward the Data Protection and Digital Information Bill. It is a welcome step that the current Government are now taking the same initiative.
There is an evident public interest in correcting the inertia. Data sharing between authorities has proved inefficient and bureaucratic at the expense of national security. In particular, reports into the Fishmongers’ Hall and Manchester Arena terror attacks highlighted the shortcomings in the current arrangements. As has been stated here and in the other place, we must heed the lessons learned from those tragedies and act on them.
As the Minister summarised, the instrument lays out the list of those entities or persons considered qualifying competent authorities that, once this measure is in place, will be able to apply for a designation notice from the Secretary of State alongside an intelligence service for the purpose of safeguarding national security, thereby allowing both parties to form a joint operational controllership.
I am aware that the Government cannot divulge further information about their decisions as to which bodies are included in the list of qualifying competent authorities, but I am none the less aware of the challenges that come with data sharing across different entities and the variance of protection and sophistication that they may use. It is always worth being sceptical when it is announced that intelligence services will begin to share their data or at least permit others joint operational control. While I am sure that none of the competent authorities’ data systems is subpar and that the Secretary of State will thoroughly have vetted this, it is still worth asking the Minister for reassurance that the qualifying competent authorities are prepared to enter into joint controllership.
This also extends past security to efficiency. Can the Minister assure us that forthcoming partnerships between civil and intelligence bodies will not become some kind of bureaucratic battleground for control? The established legislation and these regulations exist to increase effectiveness and promote our national security interests. If there is insufficient integration following designation, they will be meaningless. I hope that the Minister will be able to assure us on this side that these hurdles have been foreseen. With those few questions, I advocate the support of these Benches for the instrument.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for his broad support for this instrument. As he mentioned, the competent authorities, which we have now specified as qualifying competent authorities, have been selected following consultation with partners operating in the area of national security. They include competent authorities involved in areas where national security is a consideration. The noble Lord is absolutely right that we cannot go publicly into the details of the rationale, and I do not wish to publicly comment on the differing preparedness of the bodies, but I can assure him that authorities have been included where there is a reasonable potential for joint controllership to be formed. There will be activity to make sure that that synergy occurs. It is done for a purpose.
The 23 authorities are clearly listed in the regulations before us today. They are all very competent authorities. They include chief constables and commissioners of police, the British Transport Police and the Civil Nuclear Constabulary, the Royal Navy Police and the Royal Air Force Police. They are very assured in dealing with security issues and having secure data control. The bodies include HM Revenue & Customs, the National Crime Agency, the Parole Board, the Parole Commissioners for Northern Ireland and the Probation Board for Northern Ireland. They are all public bodies that have great experience in managing, controlling and, where appropriate, sharing data.
The noble Lord is right to test that question, but I believe that the competent authorities can be trusted with the information that is there to be shared. Again, I confirm to him that these recommendations follow serious terrorist incidents that have taken place. The risk of not having that sharing capacity is much greater than the issues he mentioned. I am grateful for his support and for the work of the previous Government. Unless there are further comments, I commend this instrument to the Committee.
Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and the Terrorism Act 2000 (Port Examination Codes of Practice) Regulations 2025
(3 days, 16 hours ago)
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Lord Hanson of Flint
That the Grand Committee do consider the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019 and the Terrorism Act 2000 (Port Examination Codes of Practice) Regulations 2025.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
My Lords, this statutory instrument was laid before the House on 9 July. It brings forward revised codes of practice for the exercise of powers under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000 and Schedule 3 to the Counter-Terrorism and Border Security Act 2019. I contend to the Committee that the powers are vital tools in our national security framework. They allow a counterterrorism police officer to stop, question, search and detain a person at a port, or in the “border area” of Northern Ireland, to determine whether the person is or has been involved in terrorism or hostile activity.
These changes follow a widespread public consultation held earlier this year, which ran from 17 March to 27 April 2025. The consultation invited a wide range of views from stakeholders including legal experts, civil liberties organisations, operational partners and, indeed, members of the public, who also contributed. It focused on proposed updates to the codes of practice to ensure that they remain clear, proportionate and fit for purpose. The Government’s response was published on 23 June this year and I will take this opportunity to express my gratitude to everyone who engaged with the consultation.
The feedback from the consultation helped us shape the final versions of the codes, which now provide greater clarity on how these powers are to be exercised, thereby strengthening safeguards for individuals subject to examination. I thank, in particular, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation, Jonathan Hall KC, who, in expressing support for the proposed changes in discussions with the Home Office, was also a very strong advocate of this instrument. We are grateful to him for taking the time. I will briefly summarise the key changes the instrument makes.
Firstly, a minor element of how examining officers can use the powers in the border area of Northern Ireland will be clarified. The updated guidance makes it clear that officers can ask someone why they are in the border area, to help decide whether that person falls within the scope of the powers, before any formal examination begins. That is an important safeguard for an individual.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I rise again on behalf of the Official Opposition to speak to these regulations and again offer broad support to the Government for them.
The powers allowing individuals to be stopped, questioned, searched and detained without suspicion are among the most intrusive the state can exercise. As a result, they must be governed by clarity, oversight and restraint. Several changes in the revised codes are sensible: clarification around notification, consular access and the distinguishing of counterterrorism from public order policing are all welcome. But clarity must not be mistaken for accountability.
We particularly welcome the firm statement that Schedule 7 should not be used for public order policing: a point developed by the Minister just now. However, the distinction between protest and terrorism remains finely drawn and places significant judgment in the hands of front-line officers, so can the Minister confirm how updated guidance is being communicated to those officers? Can we have an assurance that previous instances of disproportionate use will not recur?
On the consultation itself, I will raise one concern: only one formal written response was received. While engagement with front-line officers is useful, it is not a substitute for wider consultation with civil society, legal experts and those most affected. Does the Minister agree that more could and should have been done to seek broader perspectives during the consultation?
I will ask about Northern Ireland. The revision clarifies the use of preparatory powers near the border, yet this sits awkwardly with the Independent Reviewer’s recommendation that Schedule 7 powers be abolished in that context. Will the Minister outline the Government’s current view on the necessity and proportionality of Schedule 7 in Northern Ireland and whether any future appeal remains under consideration?
Finally, the IOPC proposed several changes to improve transparency and clarity, some of which have not been accepted. Can the Minister explain why not? Will the Government take forward the IOPC’s recommendation to monitor and analyse the use of these powers to help identify any patterns of disproportionate impact?
In conclusion, these revisions are largely clarificatory, but the powers themselves remain expansive and their use must be continuously scrutinised. We support improvements that enhance transparency but urge the Government to remain vigilant, to engage widely and to ensure that the powers are exercised proportionately.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for the broad support he has given to the instrument. He asked a number of legitimate questions that I will try my best to answer.
The guidance that we are issuing and the instrument that amends this guidance is essentially the bible of guidance for those who have to exercise those powers. The purpose of the order is to codify and give strength to the powers that individuals who are exercising those powers have to refer to. As well as something for officers and others to have as their code of practice and guidance, it is also essentially a bible for those who wish to say, “I haven’t been treated well by the officers because they have contravened areas of this code of practice”. Further guidance on the guidance would I think confuse matters. This is the guidance. I appreciate that question but, essentially, I hope that we can judge those who exercise those powers against the guidance and those who feel aggrieved by any exercise of that power can also refer to the guidance.
The noble Lord mentioned the consultation. It was a full consultation. It ran from 17 March to 27 April. We invited views from stakeholders, legal experts, civil liberty organisations and operational partners, and members of the public responded. There was a consultation. Maybe not everybody who wanted to be consulted has responded, but it is a tried and tested method and it was a reasonable consultation. As ever, there are opportunities to submit any further views to Ministers, the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation and other organisations that are dealing with the code of practice. I hope that the noble Lord will be reassured that the consultation teased out a number of views and, as I said in my introductory comments, some changes were made as a result of that consultation.
Again, I am very aware of the sensitivities regarding the border area in Northern Ireland and I am grateful to the noble Lord for raising them. The Government recognise those sensitivities. The code provides greater clarity on the preparatory powers available to officers and explicitly addresses concerns that were put down by the Independent Reviewer of Terrorism Legislation in his 2022 report. The reviewer is supportive of the changes. They ensure that the powers will be used only for national security purposes.
On Northern Ireland engagement and consultation, we had considerable discussions internally in government with the Northern Ireland Office and the Police Service of Northern Ireland, and both were content with the changes. In relation to the Northern Ireland Assembly, as these are non-devolved matters, there was an opportunity for it to contribute to the consultation and again, as far as I am concerned, the powers appear to have broad support in Northern Ireland—but obviously I am especially sensitive to the challenges on the border.
I hope that I have reassured the noble Lord on the three points that he mentioned and, with those brief comments, I commend the instrument to the Committee.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Geddes) (Con)
My Lords, due to the present lack of the next Minister, the Grand Committee stands adjourned until such time as he comes.
Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025
Lord Lemos
That the Grand Committee do consider the Global Irregular Migration and Trafficking in Persons Sanctions Regulations 2025.
Relevant documents: 34th Report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. Special attention drawn to the instrument.
Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
Before I begin, I profusely apologise for making the Committee adjourn. I should have been here, and I was not. I have not got a good excuse, but I hope that everyone will accept my profuse apologies.
This instrument was laid on 22 July under powers in the Sanctions and Anti-Money Laundering Act 2018. The measures in the instrument, subject to the made affirmative parliamentary procedure, entered into force on 23 July.
The UK’s history of migration is a long and positive story—I am a migrant myself, so I know how positive it is—but today, we face a grave problem. Large numbers of individuals are undertaking dangerous journeys via irregular migration routes that risk their lives and undermine the rule of law. Irregular migration is a foreign policy issue as much as a domestic one. Smashing the gangs and addressing public concerns at home demands hard-headed action abroad. We are determined to confront this head-on, Defending human rights and protecting national and international security are our twin objectives.
People smuggling and trafficking are assaults on human dignity. These vile trades exploit the vulnerable, fuel organised crime and destabilise entire regions. As our national security strategy makes clear, they threaten peace, security and the very fabric of international co-operation. That is why irregular migration is a top priority for this department. Together with the Home Office, we have established a joint unit on international irregular migration to strengthen our efforts, deliver our strategy and drive results.
Sanctions are one of the most important foreign policy tools the UK uses to back our words with action. The UK now has 37 live sanctions regimes, with more than 4,000 individuals and entities designated. All designated individuals and entities appear on the UK sanctions list, which can be found on GOV.UK. We continue to use sanctions alongside all our other diplomatic tools to protect our citizens, uphold our values and defend international peace and security.
This particular sanctions regime is a landmark step, as it is the first dedicated regime of its kind anywhere in the world. It is designed to prevent and combat the networks that enable irregular migration and reflects deep collaboration across government from the Home Office to law enforcement and draws on the full breadth of our expertise. It enables us to strike at every link in the chain from source to destination. We can impose real costs on the callous groups and individuals who promote and profit from the inhuman trade in people’s lives. Sanctioned individuals will face serious consequences, including being banned from entering the UK, being disqualified from company directorships and having their assets frozen. The regime adds powerful new tools to our arsenal. It allows us to act against people smugglers and their enablers with the same force that we apply to terrorists, cybercriminals and kleptocrats. I hope that noble Lords will agree that that is evidence of how seriously we intend to tackle this problem.
This regime reflects our broader strategy, which is to use sanctions to deter and disrupt threats and malign behaviour, defend our values and protect our country. It will target individuals and entities wherever they are in the world, from operators in countries of origin to those who smuggle migrants across borders and those who enable, promote and profit from these dangerous journeys, including companies involved in small boat supply chains and organised immigration crime. No part of the smuggling infrastructure will be beyond our reach.
Crucially, the regime will also allow us to target hostile state-backed actors who seek to weaponise migration in order to destabilise the UK or our allies. On 23 July, the UK took action. We sanctioned 25 individuals and entities involved in people smuggling, from small boat suppliers in Asia and hawala money movers in the Middle East to gang leaders in the Balkans and north Africa, individuals such as Bledar Lala, who leads a smuggling ring that moves people from Belgium across the English Channel to the UK, and Muhammed Pirot, a hawala banker who controls payments from people being smuggled from the Kurdistan region of Iraq to Europe via Turkey.
These designations cover a range of activities: supplying boats; forging documents; facilitating illicit payments; and orchestrating smuggling operations. Each one represents a blow to the business model of exploitation. We will continue to monitor the effectiveness of the designations imposed so far, as well as any future designations, to ensure that they demonstrate our ability to target individuals and entities anywhere in the world, disrupt the activities of criminal networks and deter others from engaging in this vile trade.
Although we are proud to lead, we do not stand alone. People smuggling and trafficking are global concerns, and we are working with international partners to confront them together. That includes strengthening sanctions co-ordination, sharing intelligence and building joint responses to dismantle criminal networks. We welcome the news from EU President von der Leyen that she intends to put forward a new system of sanctions, specifically targeted at people smugglers and traffickers, for EU member states. We look forward to working with the EU and other key partners to smash the gangs and tackle irregular migration.
Sanctions are a powerful tool of foreign and security policy. UK sanctions are built on a transparent and robust legal framework—it is important to emphasise that—which was confirmed by the Supreme Court in July this year. However, there may be instances where activity by a person falls within the scope of sanctions and other relevant law enforcement and criminal justice powers. In these instances, we work closely with colleagues across Whitehall and in law enforcement to deconflict and ensure that appropriate tools are used. The FCDO will continue to play its full part in delivering the Government’s plan for change. This legislation and the designations that follow are proof of that commitment.
I apologise again for not being present on time and forcing the Committee to wait. I beg to move.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for that introduction. I support the Government’s efforts in this area and appreciate the need for innovative policy solutions, but I have some questions about this statutory instrument.
To begin with, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee noted, the Explanatory Notes and the Explanatory Memorandum are rather thin. We are creating the world’s first sanctions regime on irregular migration with a substantive statutory instrument, as one would expect, but with rather short explanations and without an assessment of the impact. Can the Minister tell us a bit more about the practical impact that the Government expect this new instrument to have on the control of irregular migration? As the Minister noted, there were 25 designations a couple of months ago, so, by this stage, the Government will have probably carried out some assessment of the impact of this new tool.
The Explanatory Memorandum says that this will be a global regime that will allow the United Kingdom to
“target relevant persons and entities wherever they are in the world”.
In accordance with that, Regulation 4 defines both people smuggling and trafficking in persons in terms that are not limited to unlawful entry into the UK. But are we really going to designate persons who are involved in people smuggling anywhere in the world? The legal regime may be global, but the policy scope has to be more defined. Is there some connection with the UK that would be a trigger for designations in the policy?
I notice also the remark of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee on the criteria for involvement not being included in the Explanatory Memorandum. It is important, when this instrument is implemented, to know exactly what the criteria for involvement are, but perhaps that is a problem that can be remedied with guidance published online in due course.
The memorandum mentions that sanctions for human trafficking have been adopted under the global human rights sanctions regime, but that regime was deemed to be inadequate. Can the Minister tell us a bit more as to why that regime was not fit for this purpose and why it was necessary to create a wholly new sanctions regime?
One of the purposes of the regulations is to prevent and combat the instrumentalisation of migration by state actors—the Minister referred to that. This is an interesting and important development, and I am glad to hear that the European Union is keen on this. This is where it is likely that the sanctions will target the political level of certain states—for example, the situation at the border between Poland and Belarus—whereas the other sanctions are likely to target more ordinary criminals, so to speak. Does the Minister agree that it is particularly important for this aspect of the new sanctions regime to ensure that there is international action and co-operation?
I have a final, more technical point. Regulations 6 and 7, under the “urgent procedure”, contain a list of states—the US, the EU, Australia and Canada—where individuals might be designated under similar sanctions and where we would adopt an urgent designation, in part based on those other designations. I was a little confused because I understood that no other states had a sanctions regime like this one. So, in what circumstances would that urgent procedure come to fruition?
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the Minister should not be too upset about his late appearance on the Front Bench, with trumpets blaring outside. It is surprising, given the nature of this building and with the conditions outside that we are seeing today, that it does not happen more often.
From these Benches, I will not oppose the sanctioning of criminals who seek to abuse and profit from people smuggling and human trafficking. However, I confess to a degree of doubt as to how effective they will be, given the evasive skills of criminals and, bluntly, whether the sanctions will matter to many of them. That may, in part, depend on having a personal or business presence in the UK. I hope that having this ambitious regime does not mean the diversion of resources from actions that may be more effective.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank the Minister for moving this statutory instrument. It is part of an incredibly important discourse surrounding an extremely pressing issue, and any chance to debate how we might rectify the current immigration situation is welcome. Nations cannot survive without sovereign control of their borders; for that sovereignty, a nation needs the means to exact border control.
I do not want to ventilate arguments that have already been made, most recently during the debates on the borders Bill in your Lordships’ House; they will be well known, as will the position of the Official Opposition. It is our view that the Government do not currently possess the correct policy for border control. As a result, the British public are now facing waves of illegal immigration on their shores.
Like much of the Government’s legislation on immigration, in particular illegal migration, we have grave doubts that this instrument will be effective in enabling the Government to sanction traffickers. However, although those facilitating illegal migration into our country should rightly be punished—for that reason, we will not oppose this Motion—I ask the Minister: does he really believe that this measure will assist in halting the growing crisis?
I want to make some very specific points; there will be some overlap with the pertinent points already made by the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. First, those who are trafficking migrants on to our shores often do not reside in the United Kingdom. They operate in a deeply underground and illicit trade. There is little to no chance of them seeking to join a legitimate company in this country, let alone set up or become a director of one—something that this instrument prevents.
Secondly, financial sanctions will have little effect on those operating illegally. They do not act through legitimate routes and, therefore, neither does a large proportion of their money. Does the Minister have an estimate on the extent to which these sanctions will deter people from migrating illegally? There is even a risk that measures such as these will not stop attempts to cross the channel and borders but will instead force the criminal gangs further underground into less safe routes; I am not saying that this will necessarily be the case, but it would be reassuring to hear from the Minister that the Government have at least accounted for that possibility.
I welcome the expansion of the criteria under which a person may be considered involved with illegal migration. We have, for too long, been too lax on those who aid and abet these crimes. An expansion of the scope of those considered accomplices is needed.
In conclusion, it is our belief that this issue needs far more thorough measures to be resolved. Attempting to punish those facilitating this crime may be an appropriate measure, but it is certainly not sufficient in and of itself.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. I will try to answer as many of their questions as I can; if I cannot answer any of them, I will be very happy to write, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, suggested. That said, I have an answer to her question—I have been briefed.
It is a moral and national imperative that we tackle this issue. Under these regulations, this Government have already sanctioned 25 individuals and entities at the heart of the people-smuggling networks driving irregular migration to the UK. The Government have acted to address the concerns of the British people to protect migrants from the dangers of organised crime and smash the gangs.
I shall now try to respond to some of the specific answers asked by noble Lords. The noble Lord, Lord Cameron, asked me how convinced we are that this measure will have a meaningful impact. As I said, this is the first regime of its kind in the world. To some extent, it is a model that we hope others will follow, but, of course, we do not know how effective it will be. We do not believe and are not suggesting that this is a silver bullet or a fix-it for the whole problem of human trafficking and irregular migration, but we are suggesting that it is part of the toolbox that we can use—and which we have already used, by sanctioning 25 people the day after the legislation was introduced.
The noble Lord asked about the impact that we expect this regime to have on preventing irregular migration and people smuggling. As I said, this is the first dedicated regime of its kind in the world, so we are breaking new ground by creating the ability to impose sanctions in this way. As I set out, we hope to be able to disrupt the activity of the criminal gangs and deter others from seeking to be involved in this evil trade. As noble Lords would expect, we will monitor the effect of our sanctions wherever possible, seeking to build on successes and learn from where they have been less effective. As I said, we do not assume that they will entirely fix the problem on their own.
We will also seek to use sanctions in conjunction with other measures to tackle irregular migration; we will work with international partners to do so. I stress the point about working with international partners. As I said, it is a key part of our objective that we lead the world, but we hope that others will follow. We will monitor the impact of the designation wherever possible, learning lessons from other sanction regimes.
All noble Lords, I think, asked why the Government think that this measure will be effective, given that many of the people who might be sanctioned will not be in the UK. That is, obviously, a concern. We believe that the measures we are proposing to use to target those involved should be taken in the round. They will encompass the travel ban, the asset freeze and the director disqualification. As well as the direct consequences of the sanctions on the designated person—such as preventing them travelling to the UK and, crucially, interacting with the UK’s economy—the designation also de-anonymises the individual; as I said, the names of all of the people who are sanctioned are published. Although we do not speculate on future designations, once the designation is made, it is public. Designation can both cause disruption to people smugglers’ operations and have a deterrent effect in terms of the willingness of others to work with them.
Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice (Alteration of Overall Compensation Limits) Order 2025
(3 days, 16 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Baroness Levitt
That the Grand Committee do consider the Compensation for Miscarriages of Justice (Alteration of Overall Compensation Limits) Order 2025
Relevant documents: 34th Report from the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, miscarriages of justice have a devastating impact on those who suffer them. It is no exaggeration to say that such people are in fact victims of the state, so it is right that the state should support those people in rebuilding their lives.
Although miscarriages of justices are, thankfully, rare, they do occur. When they do, it is vital that the criminal justice system learns lessons in order to minimise the risk of them happening again and that we support those people whose lives have been affected. Justice for the wrongly convicted is vital to the Government’s ambition to restore confidence in the criminal justice system as part of their Plan for Change: Milestones for Mission-led Government.
With the introduction of this instrument, we are taking action to ensure that victims of miscarriages of justice will continue to be appropriately compensated, while keeping in mind the wider financial context. There are two compensation schemes: one relates to convictions in the civilian justice system, while the other relates to convictions by a court martial. Both have caps on the maximum compensation that can be paid for a miscarriage of justice. They have not been changed since their introduction in the Criminal Justice and Immigration Act 2008.
The purpose of this instrument is to increase the maximum amount under both schemes by 30%. This means that where an individual has spent at least 10 years in prison, the maximum amount that they can receive will increase from £1 million to £1.3 million. In all other cases, the maximum amount will increase from £500,000 to £650,000. The Government consider this a substantial increase. Of course, these compensation schemes are just one route by which an individual can receive compensation for a wrongful conviction; for example, applicants can also seek further compensation by bringing civil claims against public bodies if they have been at fault in such a way that it has caused the miscarriage of justice.
I am now going to deal with each scheme in a little more detail. For those who have suffered a qualifying miscarriage of justice in the civilian criminal justice system, the payment of compensation is governed by Section 133 of the Criminal Justice Act 1988. Applications for compensation under this scheme are determined and the compensation will be paid by the responsible devolved Government.
In practice, this means that the Secretary of State for Justice is responsible for cases in England and Wales, Scottish Ministers are responsible for cases in Scotland and the Department of Justice in Northern Ireland is responsible for cases in Northern Ireland. This reflects the position that miscarriages of justice compensation are a transferred matter. There is a small number of cases in Northern Ireland involving sensitive national security information for which the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland has responsibility.
For those who have suffered a qualifying miscarriage of justice following conviction by a court martial, Section 276 of the Armed Forces Act 2006 provides that applications are determined by, and that the compensation will be paid by, the Secretary of State for Defence. To be clear, compensation payable under this scheme is also subject to the caps.
The proposed instrument will increase the caps that apply to compensation payable by the Secretary of State—that is, eligible England and Wales cases, eligible Northern Ireland national security cases and eligible cases under the Armed Forces Act scheme. It will have no effect on the caps that apply to compensation payable by the Northern Ireland Department of Justice as it has a separate power to amend its caps.
The Government are aware that there are some aspects of the entire compensation scheme that remain controversial. However, the Law Commission is consulting on a wide range of changes to the laws relating to criminal appeals, including compensation for miscarriages of justice. We look forward to receiving its final report and remain committed to ensuring that any changes we make will promote fairness and justice for all involved in criminal justice proceedings.
I thank the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee for its consideration of this instrument and its report. We are laying the instrument now as part of our mission to improve the Government’s response to miscarriages of justice. We believe that it is crucial to ensure that victims of miscarriages of justice continue to be appropriately compensated, while being mindful of the Government’s wider financial context. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, it is an enormous privilege to welcome the Minister to the Dispatch Box on her first appearance. I welcome the fact that such an experienced lawyer now holds this position.
I turn now to the substance of the debate; the Minister has explained everything in such lucid detail that I can go straight to the two points that I want to raise, without going into the background. The limit was fixed in 2008 and, as the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, on which I sit, observed, the limit is being raised by only 30% whereas, unfortunately, inflation has been very much higher. We have the privilege of having the Financial Secretary to the Treasury here in the Room, and he will no doubt be very pleased to see that the Ministry of Justice is taking such good care of the scarce resources of the country.
When the previous Labour Administration were in power in 2008, they thought that the limits set out then were fair and reasonable and reflected the public position at the time. Is there a reason why we cannot have the same position today and therefore raise the amounts? As the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee was told, there has never been a payment of the maximum amount, and only very few payments of the lesser amount. Is there therefore a real difficulty in being parsimonious—which is no doubt appreciated by His Majesty’s Treasury—in relation to these amounts? Could this be looked at again?
That takes me to my second question. The Ministry of Justice is in the unfortunate position of having a number of instruments and other pieces of legislation where limits are set, and it is very important that these are kept under regular review. There have been occasions when the ministry has failed to do so. Does the ministry now have a proper schedule for reviewing this and making certain that we do not have a very long period of time, such as that which has elapsed since 2008, before this kind of limit is reviewed? It may be that the Minister will want to take some time to investigate this, but I hope that there is a system in place for such limits to be looked at.
Those are my two observations. I again express what a great pleasure it is to see the Minister in her place and dealing with such an important subject.
Lord Sandhurst (Con)
I join with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, in welcoming the Minister to the Dispatch Box.
Our legal system is based on the principle of fairness. This country prides itself on its judiciary. Trial for serious offences by judge and jury is a cornerstone of our criminal justice system. The law exists to right wrongs and to create and maintain a system in which honest subjects can live their lives under the even-handed protection of the law. However, those who suffer miscarriages of justice under the same system must be compensated fairly. A legal system without the means of self-correction is devoid of trust and justice.
We on this side of the Committee support the measures brought forward today. Compensation for those wronged by the system must be fair and proportionate. It is not just that those wrongly convicted and imprisoned have not had the maximum compensation increased for nearly 17 years; the onus is on the justice system to correct its mistakes and increase compensation payments as time passes. It was in the same spirit that, as my honourable friend in the other place the Shadow Minister for Justice noted, the former Lord Chancellor removed the compensation guidance that allowed deductions for living expenses saved while in prison. The justice system must be seen to correct its own mistakes, which is what this instrument aims to do. This is why we support it.
Baroness Levitt (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful for the contributions to this debate. I shall start with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. The last time that I was answering questions from the noble and learned Lord, I was in the Court of Appeal and he was the Lord Chief Justice, and I have to say that I rather quake at the sound of his voice. I am very grateful to him and I appreciate the importance of the points that he makes.
As to whether there is a proper schedule relating to reviews of this, I am afraid I am going to repeat what I said in my opening remarks about the fact that the Law Commission is looking at this and it would be unwise of the Government to commit themselves to anything, or indeed to start considering it, until they have seen what kind of a package the Law Commission suggests. If noble Lords will forgive me, that is going to be my answer at this stage.
On why a decision was not made to increase the amount by the rate of inflation, I shall deal with that in answer to the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, in a moment. I am afraid I am going to disappoint him in relation to his first point about the test, as it were, the gateway for eligibility, and say to him again that the Law Commission is looking at it, and I am not going to pre-empt what it is going to say. We are very much looking forward to its report. It has asked for views on compensation for those who have had their convictions quashed. It will be interesting to see what it says. Its initial findings are due in 2026.
On the point about inflation made by the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, and I have known each other for a very long time and therefore I am going to make this point in as gentle a way as I can. He made the point that for 17 years, there has been no increase in payments for miscarriages of justice. I think he knows what I am going to say. For 14 of those years, the party opposite was in power, and it did not raise them by any per cent, far less the rate of inflation. We have done so, and we say that it is a substantial increase.
It says in my brief to make the point that we inherited a broken criminal justice system, but because of my great respect for the noble Lord, I am going to put it this way: it is a system that is under great stress. I do not think that anybody would disagree with that. The fact is that this Government have to consider our obligation to limit the financial exposure that we take on, certainly before the Law Commission reports. This instrument is an important part of Government’s work to ensure that people are appropriately compensated following a miscarriage of justice, and I commend it to the Committee.
Financial Services (Overseas Recognition Regime Designations) Regulations 2025
(3 days, 16 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeRead Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
Lord Livermore
That the Grand Committee do consider the Financial Services (Overseas Recognition Regime Designations) Regulations 2025.
The Financial Secretary to the Treasury (Lord Livermore) (Lab)
My Lords, the regulations before the Committee today will help ensure the effective operation of overseas recognition regimes. Specifically, they provide the Treasury with the powers needed to ensure that designations of individual jurisdictions are assessed and implemented in a manner that is compatible with our existing regulatory regime.
I will briefly set out the context in which these regulations are being introduced. The UK’s historic strength in global financial markets is built upon its international openness and reach. Our ability to provide unilateral recognition where the regulatory framework in an overseas jurisdiction provides for similar outcomes to the UK’s is an important tool to support cross-border financial services. Recognition can provide a range of regulatory benefits. These include enabling overseas firms to provide services directly into the UK, aligning requirements on UK-authorised firms whether they are engaging with UK or overseas markets or counterparties and providing regulatory relief by removing duplicative requirements on cross-border business.
Other jurisdictions also maintain provisions that allow them to recognise overseas regulatory frameworks. For example, the European Union maintains equivalence regimes; the United States makes comparability determinations in respect of other jurisdictions; and Australia operates a system that allows it to judge foreign regulatory regimes as sufficiently equivalent. These provisions promote consistent regulatory standards, provide the foundation for long-term regulatory co-operation between jurisdictions and support financial stability.
The regulations today were first published in draft form to coincide with the Chancellor’s Mansion House speech in July, alongside a guidance document that outlines the principles and processes governing overseas recognition regimes and a memorandum of understanding signed by the financial services regulators. As noble Lords will be aware, overseas recognition regimes are a new approach through which the UK will recognise overseas jurisdictions’ financial services regulation and supervision. The regulations support the effective operation of these regimes, specifically in relation to the designation of individual jurisdictions. They will ensure that designations are assessed and implemented in a manner that is compatible with our existing regulatory regime and thereby safeguard financial stability, market integrity, consumer protection and competition.
I turn to how the regulations will work in practice. They have three main functions. The first is in relation to information and advice. The decision to designate an overseas jurisdiction is taken by Treasury Ministers on the basis of an assessment undertaken by officials with technical advice from our expert regulators and made by statutory instrument laid before Parliament. The regulations give the Treasury the power to request information and advice from the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority as part of the process of assessing and then designating an overseas jurisdiction. A memorandum of understanding is established between the Treasury and the UK financial services regulators in accordance with these regulations.
The second function relates to conditions. The regulations give the Treasury the power to impose conditions on the application of an overseas recognition regime designation. These conditions are specific changes to the effect of a designation, for example, limiting the effect to a given size of firm, so ensuring that we are able to support cross-border financial services while addressing any areas of risk. This change will help to maintain consistency with the regulatory and supervisory standards that we expect in our markets.
The third function is to make amendments to two existing overseas recognition regimes. The Government previously established two overseas recognition regimes covering insurance and short selling under the powers afforded by the Financial Services and Markets Act 2023. No new designations have been made under either of these two new regimes, meaning that, as yet, there has been no need to use the powers in the regulations we are introducing today. The amendments to these regimes are simply to make the definition of “overseas jurisdiction” consistent across all overseas recognition regimes, including those already introduced, ensuring that there is a single approach across financial services regulation that is easily understood by firms and our international partners.
These regulations are clearly defined and limited in scope. Their sole purpose is to provide the Treasury with the powers needed to ensure that designations of individual jurisdictions are assessed and implemented in a manner that is compatible with our existing regulatory regime. They will ensure that we can operate overseas recognition regimes effectively and thereby support the global competitiveness of the UK’s financial sector, facilitate cross-border financial services and provide a consistent approach across financial services legislation. I beg to move.
Baroness Kramer (LD)
My Lords, I fully understand that this statutory instrument updates the basis on which the UK grants equivalence to the financial law and market practice of overseas jurisdictions. The Treasury obviously needs the powers to designate, limit or revoke equivalence. I am rather bemused that the Treasury seems to need new powers to get advice and information from the relevant regulators, but so be it, if that has previously been omitted.
However, I have some sense of caution around all this. As I read the Treasury’s guidance document, it seemed very weighted to change the decision-making process away from looking at the appropriateness of rules and regulations in overseas jurisdictions through the lens of whether they could contribute to financial instability in the relationship generated in the UK and much more towards whether they are compatible with the Government’s policy outcomes.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for introducing the statutory instrument crisply and clearly. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, for her usual well-informed comments, including those on the digital aspects of this proposal. I think that I am, however, more in favour of growth and competition than she is.
I start by saying how important secondary legislation of this nature is. The topic of debate today is the modified reinstatement of legislation that we as a Parliament passed during the process of exiting the European Union. Now that we are able to table such legislation on our own terms, we can bring it fully in line with domestic regulations, to the benefit of British services.
Cross-border financial services must be both secure and effective. This is why having similar regulatory frameworks to collaborative countries is so important. It is all well and good having an efficient domestic system, but if that system is not aligned with foreign trading partners, markets are likely to be boxed in and limited. Some form of alignment criteria must therefore be established to allow cross-border services to function. The outline measures aims to define the parameters within which an overseas jurisdiction may be recognised as equivalent to that of the United Kingdom.
It is also welcome that His Majesty’s Treasury, in addition to the described powers of imposition or limitation of conditions on an overseas recognition regime, will now have the powers to require regulators to provide relevant information to support equivalence decisions, and will be required to co-ordinate with the relevant bodies when processing overseas recognition regime designation cases. This will help speed up and standardise the decision-making of such cases.
Although the Minister said that these powers may not be used very often, I have two questions. First, the Treasury requires either information or advice from a regulator. If it needs that, it must, by notice,
“specify a reasonable period within which the information or advice must be provided”.
What would be considered “a reasonable period”? Perhaps the Minister could clarify the timescales. We want to see efficiency in the interests of stakeholders, and we sometimes seem to be rather slow in the financial services sector. That is one of the reasons I have four Questions for Written Answer tabled today about the progress of the post-Brexit changes in financial regulation, which we initiated and would like to see the Government complete. I would be very happy to hear today how the Treasury is getting on.
Secondly, the Explanatory Memorandum states that the
“advice that the Financial Services Regulators will be asked to provide”
by the Treasury
“will be agreed on a case-by-case basis”.
The scope for this seems too wide. I am aware that it is specified in the legislation that advice may be given only in relation to an overseas recognition regime designation, or a proposal for one, but the breadth of these designations seems wide. Will the Minister consider issuing some further guidance on the extent of the information that the Treasury is able to ask for in the name of ORR designations?
I look forward to the Minister’s response. In closing, I say that the Official Opposition support the statutory instrument and the measures to encourage a growing, healthy, open—in the Minister’s words—and competitive UK financial sector.
Lord Livermore (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to both noble Baronesses for their detailed comments and scrutiny, as well as for their support for this secondary legislation.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked a number of questions, which I will seek to address. First, she initially expressed her surprise that the Treasury required these new powers. I am told that this instrument replaces a similar instrument: the Equivalence Determinations for Financial Services and Miscellaneous Provisions (Amendment etc) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019, which gave the Treasury the power to request information from the regulators when considering decisions under assimilated equivalence regimes. The Treasury has exercised the powers contained in the 2019 regulations in support of equivalence decisions made since our EU exit. To date, no new decisions have been taken under any ORR, meaning that the powers in this instrument being introduced today have not yet been required.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also spoke about her concerns—we have discussed them before in the main Chamber—around the Government’s overall agenda of rebalancing from risk towards growth and competitiveness. As the noble Baroness knows, the Chancellor has expressed her clear view that she wants to see greater emphasis on growth and competitiveness, but she has absolutely discussed how central the financial services sector is to the Government’s modern industrial strategy and the key role that it plays in financing growth across the economy. She remains committed to the highest standards of regulation and does not see those things as being in tension—the noble Baroness knows that; we have discussed it before. I do not necessarily agree with the noble Baroness’s concerns, in that there is absolutely no question of a race to the bottom on regulation. The UK will remain a global leader in promoting the highest standards that deliver for businesses and consumers across the UK.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked a specific question about how the process will work and whether it is becoming too politicised. I do not think that that is the case. Many other countries have similar regimes; for example, the US makes comparability assessments. As I said in my opening remarks, the EU has equivalence, and our recognition process is consistent with international norms. Our guidance document sets out our approach. We have been clear that robust standards, safeguarding outcomes and technical advice from our expert regulators are all key factors in decisions on whether to designate another jurisdiction.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, also asked about publishing regulator advice. The Treasury will always, as part of its designation process, summarise the evidence that it has received and considered in relation to the other jurisdictions’ regulatory frameworks.
I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for her support for this statutory instrument. The drive towards growth and competitiveness, and the importance of this sector in doing that, is one of the rare areas on which we agree. I am also grateful for the noble Baroness’s support for the Mansion House announcements that the Chancellor made, building, as all Chancellors do, on the previous Chancellor’s work in this area.
The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, she asked two questions: one about timescales and another about speed. Unfortunately, I cannot read the answer that has been given to me. I will ask my team whether we have an answer on the scope of the designations. I will write to the noble Baroness on the two points that she made, if she does not mind.