(1 day, 22 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, these amendments are tabled in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Younger of Leckie. I am also grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. The amendments concern the crucial questions of ministerial and parliamentary oversight of the extensive investigatory and enforcement powers granted under the Bill. The Bill sets out to create a powerful investigatory body with wide authority, but the lines of accountability are unclear.
The first of my amendments roots the exercise of the powers provided for in this part of the Bill firmly within the framework of the Act itself. It makes it clear that investigatory and enforcement powers under Clauses 3, 7, 17 and 38—covering information notices, entry and seizure powers, direct deduction orders and deduction from earnings orders—may not be exercised except as expressly provided for in this clause. This is a vital safeguard. It ensures that these powers cannot be used arbitrarily or for purposes beyond those envisaged by Parliament. In essence, it ties the use of such powers to the functions and objectives clearly defined elsewhere in the Bill, preventing mission creep, ensuring accountability and anchoring their use in clear statutory purpose.
The second amendment, which is closely related, builds on that principle of restraint by setting out a clear system of authorisation, accountability and record-keeping. It would require that the most serious powers—those involving access to personal financial information, entry and search of premises, or the recovery of large sums of money—can be exercised only with explicit ministerial approval. This is not just bureaucracy; it is responsibility. It makes Ministers answerable for the exercise of powers in their name.
Other powers of a lesser nature would require sign-off at senior Civil Service level or above, ensuring that every exercise of authority is subject to appropriate scrutiny and senior oversight. In addition, the PSFA would be required to maintain a register recording each use of these powers—the date and nature of the action, the official or Minister who authorised it, and the justification for doing so. That register would then be laid before Parliament annually.
If we are to give such considerable powers to civil servants acting on behalf of Ministers, we must be absolutely certain that there are clear lines of responsibility and clear records of decision-making. Without those, we risk creating a dangerous vacuum of accountability. Let us be clear: the significant new powers which the Bill grants to officials are not to be taken lightly. They go to the heart of personal privacy, financial autonomy and, potentially, due process.
Under this amendment, certain especially intrusive powers, such as requiring the disclosure of personal financial records, applying for search and seizure warrants or imposing deduction orders of over £10,000, would require explicit approval from a Minister of the Crown. This would ensure that decisions with the potential to impact individuals’ lives in a profound way are not taken in isolation by junior officials, because if something goes wrong or those powers are misused or abused, it will not be the officials who are hauled before Select Committees or public inquiries—it is the Minister for the Cabinet Office who will be called upon to account for actions taken in his or her name, of which they may have had absolutely no knowledge. It is therefore vital that the Minister is satisfied that the action is justified and is willing to stand behind that decision if challenged. This line of accountability is crucial for proper oversight; it also protects the Minister.
We have seen through painful and enduring examples such as the Horizon scandal what happens when the chain of accountability between operational decision-makers and Ministers is allowed to break down. Victims are left without recourse, officials retreat into anonymity and Ministers are left to apologise for decisions they did not make and could not have prevented. We should learn from that experience. We should ensure that the exercise of coercive state powers, particularly powers as sensitive as these, is traceable, reviewable and ultimately answerable to Parliament.
These amendments were well received and supported by noble Lords across the House in Committee. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for adding his name, and other noble Lords who supported these proposals. These amendments protect the Minister, the department and individuals who may be subject to these powers. They ensure that no power is used without proper authorisation, that every use is recorded, and that Parliament can see each year how these powers have been exercised and by whom. We support the Government’s ambition to tackle fraud and error in the public sector, but we must always remember that power without responsibility breeds mistrust. This is not an abstract constitutional point. It is a matter of basic fairness, good governance and trust in public administration.
For those reasons, this amendment is of vital importance. It provides the clear lines of authority and accountability that must underpin any responsible use of the significant powers in the Bill. The Government may say that safeguards already exist, but those safeguards are internal, opaque and unenforceable by Parliament. We are proposing a statutory framework for oversight that gives Ministers clarity, Parliament visibility and the public reassurance that power is being exercised carefully, lawfully and transparently. This amendment is not about obstructing the Government’s aims; it is about protecting them and protecting the integrity of the system we are building. I beg to move.
My Lords, the Bill creates a wide range of unprecedented and intrusive powers for both the Cabinet Office and the DWP. Throughout the course of the Bill—and in its previous incarnation under the last Government—my focus has been on trying to ensure that these powers are restricted to what is actually required for the purposes of dealing with fraud against the public sector and that there are appropriate and strong safeguards against overreach and overuse of these powers.
I recognise and acknowledge that the Government have introduced a lot of safeguards into the Bill compared to those we had when we were discussing similar measures under the aborted Data Protection and Digital Information Bill last year. This is a much better Bill, but it still introduces a wide range of new powers, and, while better, there are still areas where the safeguards should be improved. In particular, when creating powers of this nature, it is important that the safeguards should be in the Bill and not left to codes of practice or internal departmental rules, both of which can be changed without scrutiny. We will come back to that theme several times later today.
These two amendments cover the police powers that the Bill would give to the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority. I have serious doubts as to whether it is genuinely necessary to give search, entry and seizure police powers to civil servants anyway, but if we are to do so, it is essential that there are very robust safeguards around their use.
My Lords, the amendments, as has been clearly stated by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, concern ministerial and parliamentary oversight—it is the oversight that is important—or the powers granted to authorised officers for reclaiming finances under this Act.
As has been stated by other noble Lords, these amendments would require that a Minister of the Crown authorise the use of such powers where the amount involved exceeded £10,000. This would also oblige the Public Sector Fraud Authority to maintain a register of instances in which the powers were exercised, with a relevant Minister required to lay a copy of that register before Parliament.
On these Benches, we have been critical throughout the passage of the Bill of the broad powers—and in some cases inadequately checked powers, as described by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—granted to recover funds identified as perhaps fraudulent. We therefore support these amendments, as they would introduce additional senior authorisation for cases involving substantial sums and provide a necessary level of parliamentary oversight. If the noble Baroness pushes her amendment to a vote, we will support her.
My Lords, while I appreciate the intention behind these amendments, the reality of their drafting would give Ministers the ability to block politically inconvenient investigations. They would prevent counterfraud enforcement at any kind of scale, and they would expose the identities of civil servants investigating serious criminals. On that basis, we cannot accept them.
Although we cannot agree to the amendments, it might surprise the noble Baroness that I believe there is a lot that we agree on. We agree that the measures in the Bill are powerful and must be used with care; we agree that staff must be appropriately trained before they are able to use these powers; and we agree that robust oversight, both internal and external, is essential.
With regard to ministerial oversight, for as long as the powers sit in the Cabinet Office, they will be exercised in the name of the Minister for the Cabinet Office. However, the amendments go beyond accountability; they bring the Minister into specific operational decisions. It is not appropriate to mandate that the Minister for the Cabinet Office be brought into hundreds of operational decisions in the way that the amendments suggest.
First, Ministers must be free to delegate, or the work of government will grind to a halt. Your Lordships’ House would be rightly concerned if Cabinet Office Ministers, who need to make government more effective and efficient, were spending their days taking detailed counterfraud operational decisions.
Secondly, it would be inappropriate for Ministers—of whichever party happens to be in power—to take operational decisions on individual enforcement cases. That would make enforcement political. It would necessarily expose every case to charges of political interference; it would place honest Ministers in an invidious position; and it would give dishonest Ministers the power to block investigations that were politically inconvenient.
However, the noble Baroness is right that Ministers should know what is happening in their name. Ministers are accountable and must therefore choose how these powers should be delegated, not simply hand them over to civil servants and forget about them until a crisis occurs, which I know is a genuine concern. In response to the noble Baroness’s challenge, let me set out what Ministers will do before any of the powers are used.
Ministers will scrutinise the set-up of the PSFA, its plans to use the powers, the oversight arrangements in place, and the skills and experience of authorised officers and authorised investigators. They will also decide what thresholds they wish to set and what constraints they wish to place around the exercise of powers in their name. Ministers will decide what reports they want to receive and their frequency. They will also decide how they wish to appoint authorised officers and authorised investigators, and will take a strong interest in the training, experience and professionalism of those staff. Finally, Ministers will be accountable to your Lordships’ House and the other place to show that they have done that. I am happy to commit to Ministers bringing forward a statement before the powers are first used to demonstrate that these commitments have been fulfilled. Every time there is a change of Ministers, officials will ask for the new Minister’s view on these questions, and not silently continue out of sight, which I know is a genuine concern of the noble Baroness. She is absolutely right to draw attention to how delegation works in government; it is for Ministers who are accountable to decide on the appropriate delegation.
I turn to the seniority of civil servants provided for in proposed new subsection (1B) in Amendment 28. By requiring senior civil servant sign-off for every use of the powers in Part 1, the noble Baroness seeks to set the bar for internal authorisation too high. Currently, the PSFA’s enforcement unit is relatively small—I love using the word “relatively”; it is not large—so the number of information notices envisaged in a year, for example, could all be reviewed by a senior civil servant. However, we are making this legislation to last decades, and its operation cannot be contingent on keeping our capacity to pursue public sector fraudsters small. At any scale, requiring excessive civil servant grading in legislation is a strict operational limitation and unnecessarily expensive.
That is why those who use these powers successfully elsewhere in government, such as HMRC, do not have these requirements in either their legislation or their practice. It is not the grade that matters; it is skills, experience and professionalism. Authorised investigators and authorised officers in the PSFA will all be members of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. They will undergo bespoke training, on top of the previous knowledge, skills and experience they bring to the role. Current members of the PSFA’s enforcement unit bring a wealth of experience with them. They include former police officers, customs officers and other civil servants who have worked in investigatory roles across a number of departments.
Noble Lords have been clear in this debate that they are particularly concerned about the use of PACE powers. Let me remind your Lordships’ House that it is the courts that will authorise any application that the PSFA makes under PACE. No civil servant—of any grade—nor any Minister can authorise a search warrant or a production order under PACE. Only the courts can authorise such actions, each and every time we seek to use them.
That means that the PSFA must be able to demonstrate, to the court’s satisfaction, that there are reasonable grounds to believe that an offence of fraud has been committed against a public authority and, as set out in PACE, reasonable grounds to believe that the material sought is likely to be of substantial value to the investigation—I repeat: it must be of substantial value. This means that the subject of an application has the protection of a court’s scrutiny before authorised investigators can execute a warrant or production order.
Moreover, the powers in the Bill are subject to review by an independent person, as specified under Clause 65. I have committed to ensure that the independent person will be passed all the concerns raised by parliamentarians, including those we have heard today. The PSFA will be subject to inspections by His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services. Inspection reports will be made publicly available and will be laid before Parliament.
Finally, I turn to the question of maintaining a register that has to be laid before Parliament. We will of course keep meticulous records of how and when powers are used; that would be a bare minimum for good investigatory practice. Those records will be made available to the independent reviewer, who will report on the use of the powers to Parliament, ensuring democratic oversight. However, laying this register before Parliament carries significant risks; it may compromise ongoing cases and expose the identities of investigators to dangerous individuals, jeopardising their safety and the integrity of the justice system. We must remember that we are talking about people who undertake criminal activity—online in some cases—so publishing the names of the investigating officers could make them vulnerable.
On the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, and the appalling Horizon scandal, I want to take this opportunity to reassure and remind noble Lords that the scandal was based on private prosecutions that the PSFA will not undertake.
I understand the noble Baroness’s concerns and have set out how Ministers will act in an effort to assuage them, but the amendment cannot stand. It would allow dishonest Ministers to block politically inconvenient investigations, it would make counter-fraud enforcement at any scale impossible, and it would expose the names of officials to the fraudsters they are investigating. I urge the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.
My Lords, I thank the Minister for her reply, but I must be absolutely clear that we are not satisfied that the tests we have set out have been met, or with the responses received. The Government ask this House to confer upon the Public Sector Fraud Authority powers that are extraordinary in scope: powers to compel information, to enter premises, to seize property, and to reach directly into the private finances of individuals. Those are powers that, in any other context, would belong to the police. We have voiced, as has noble Lord, Lord Vaux, reservations about granting police powers to civil servants in this instance.
Our amendments seek to provide a clear statutory foundation for the exercise of those investigator enforcement powers, ensuring that they are explicitly bound by the structures and intentions set out by Parliament. They provide a clear chain of accountability: from the official who exercises the power, through to the Minister who authorises it, and to the Parliament that must ultimately answer for it.
I hear what the Minister says about dishonest Ministers choosing to block an investigation, but ultimately, if a Minister chooses to block an investigation, that is a decision for the Minister who is responsible for the public finances and who will be accountable in Parliament for his or her decision. It is not about putting Ministers in charge of operations. The clear purpose behind these amendments is to create a clear chain of accountability for great powers, because that clarity matters. That is how responsible government works, and that is how public confidence is earned and sustained. Instead, the Government’s proposal leaves the PSFA largely insulated from meaningful scrutiny. It gives immense authority to civil servants, while shielding their actions from the transparency and parliamentary visibility that such authority demands. That is not proportionate oversight.
The recent China espionage scandal has laid bare the dangers of confusion and obfuscation when questions of accountability and responsibility are left unresolved. These amendments would provide the structure and safeguards the Bill so plainly lacks. They do not remove powers, but they make those powers defensible. When we are dealing with an authority that will routinely exercise serious and far-reaching powers, there can be no room for ambiguity. We must have clarity about who is responsible, who is accountable and where the lines of authority lie. These amendments provide that certainty. They embody the minimum requirements for a just and serious law.
We have tried at every stage of the Bill to work constructively with the Government, and I appreciate the engagement we have been given, but the state must be equipped to confront fraud in a way that preserves trust. That trust is earned through transparency and accountability. These amendments offer a constructive and proportionate way to embed those principles into the Bill. We have a duty to ensure that power is never granted without accountability and that no one, however well-intentioned, operates beyond the reach of ministerial and parliamentary scrutiny. For that reason, I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I now turn to Amendments 34, 36, 37, 38, 39 and 40. This group of amendments addresses some concern we have heard throughout the passage of this Bill—most recently from the noble Baroness, Lady Finn, during Grand Committee—that the enforcement unit being part of the Cabinet Office means that there is limited oversight and accountability for the use of the powers in Part 1 of this Bill.
However, setting up the PSFA’s enforcement unit as a stand-alone statutory body would be disproportionate while it is still small. While I strongly believe that the PSFA has established a robust oversight provision and built a multitude of safeguards into this legislation, as well as into its processes and structures, I am aware of how complicated and contentious this space is, particularly in respect of protecting the public from the misuse or incorrect use of powers.
We have therefore tabled this group of amendments to enable the PSFA and the powers in this Bill to be merged with another statutory body, rather than necessarily being set up as a stand-alone statutory body, although the power to do that remains. This builds flexibility into the legislation to achieve the same aim, in terms of separation between investigators and Ministers in future, but avoids the need to set up an entirely new statutory body if it is not considered proportionate to do so.
Importantly, this would enable the PSFA’s enforcement unit to be moved at arm’s length from Ministers sooner, adopting the protections, governance and accountability set out in Schedule 2 to the Bill. As the Government have said during the passage of this Bill, it is not proportionate to set up a new stand-alone ALB for a small enforcement unit. These amendments allow for even a relatively small unit to be placed at arm’s length from Ministers, if desired, without incurring disproportionate overheads.
Ministers also have a responsibility to the taxpayer to ensure public money is spent judiciously and where it is most needed. It is counter to government policy to establish a new statutory body when its function could be undertaken by existing bodies. Building in this flexibility through these amendments enables us to achieve the same policy intent without necessarily adding to the proliferation of ALBs. When it is the right time to establish the PSFA’s enforcement unit at arm’s length from Ministers, that will happen only with engagement, debate and agreement with both Houses of Parliament.
Your Lordships’ House has spoken, and we have listened. I beg to move.
My Lords, we give this amendment a partial welcome. It speaks to a principle that we on these Benches have consistently raised in relation to the formation and constitution of the Public Sector Fraud Authority. The change proposed here—that the PSFA should be established through affirmative regulations rather than by simple commencement—is certainly a step in the right direction. It introduces an additional layer of parliamentary scrutiny and prevents the authority from being created entirely at the discretion of the Minister. That is an improvement, and we are pleased to see it reflected in this amendment.
My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness and the Opposition Front Bench for their support—not for concessions but for the commitments that I made on Amendment 35. I am pleased that we came to a level of agreement.
I am grateful for the level of support that is available for these government amendments. It would be helpful to confirm that, regardless of the statutory body where the PSFA ultimately ends up, the PSFA as an entity will publish public annual reports on its operations, including on the use of new powers in the Bill and the findings of reviews on the use of these powers. Should the PSFA either transition to a stand-alone statutory body or be merged with an existing arm’s-length body, it will be required by the Bill to produce an annual report for the relevant Minister, who would then lay it before Parliament.
We have put significant safeguards in this legislation, and listened to the debates both in Committee and on Report, to make sure that as many safeguards as can be have been added. These amendments will provide important flexibility regarding the future of the PSFA, when it is put on a statutory footing. They address concerns we have heard through the passage of this Bill about the oversight and accountability of the enforcement unit while in the Cabinet Office and the disproportionality of setting up a new ALB while the unit remains small. I therefore hope that noble Lords will support these amendments.
My Lords, in moving government Amendment 41, I will speak also to government Amendments 42, 43, 64, 80, 90 and 111.
Under current devolution arrangements, DWP administers certain devolved benefits on behalf of the Scottish Government through agency agreements. These amendments will ensure that the expanded information gathering powers introduced in this Bill will be available to Scottish Ministers, should they require them in the future. This follows confirmation from the Scottish Government that they would like the updates to these powers to apply to them too.
These amendments will ensure necessary changes are made to the DWP debt recovery powers in the Bill. As drafted in Clause 91, the UK Government are seeking powers to apply new recovery methods to debts of certain devolved benefits delivered under agency agreements. However, the Scottish Government have confirmed that they do not wish these new recovery methods to be applied to devolved benefits administered by DWP through agency arrangements.
Taking the amendments in turn, government Amendment 41 simplifies Clause 73, reflecting how it was originally introduced, with new Section 109BZA now containing the expanded power to issue information notices to any information holder as part of a DWP criminal fraud investigation and ensuring that Scottish Ministers will have access to these equivalent expanded powers in the event that Scottish Ministers deliver any benefits covered by the 1992 Act.
Government Amendments 42 and 43, made to Clause 74, update the Social Security Fraud Act 2001, aligning it with the new powers and ensuring that the requirement to issue a code of practice and the ability to make payments for information also apply properly to Scottish Ministers.
Government Amendment 90 to Clause 91 reflects the position of the Scottish Government on the DWP debt recovery powers. It ensures that the Scottish Government retain control over how debts relating to their devolved benefits are recovered. Once these agency agreements come to an end, it will be for the Scottish Government to determine their own approach to debt recovery, including establishing new powers if necessary.
Finally, government Amendment 111 to Clause 101 confirms that Clauses 73 and 74 are treated as pre-commencement enactments for the purposes of the Scotland Act 1998, enabling Scottish Ministers to use these updated powers for fraud investigations in relation to devolved benefits. It confirms that the provisions in Clauses 96 and 97 relating to cost recovery and data protection apply to Scottish Ministers’ existing debt recovery powers. Amendments 80 and 64 update the clause references in Clause 85 and Schedule 3 as a consequence of these changes.
Having outlined the case for these amendments, I hope noble Lords will accept them so that we can fulfil our agreements with the Scottish Government. I beg to move.
My Lords, on these Benches, we welcome the agreement reached with the devolved Administrations—may this be a lesson to people around the world on how to deal with them, at least in this case.
The amendments in this group relate to how the powers in the Bill refer to Scotland specifically. Amendment 41, together with related amendments to Clause 74, and the replacement of Clause 101 and others, reverses—I stress that—the changes made in the House of Commons. I gather that this follows confirmation from Scottish Ministers that they wish the changes to the Secretary of State’s functions regarding information notices to apply to them as well. This seems to me a positive movement of Administrations working together—long may it continue.
My Lords, as it is my first appearance at the opposition Dispatch Box on Report, I echo remarks made by my noble friend Lady Finn on the first day of Report, because I also appreciate the constructive approach that the Government have taken following Committee.
It is perhaps appropriate that, as a Scot, my first brief contribution relates to matters north of the border. It is our understanding that this amendment has been brought forward by the Government in order to apply to Scotland those provisions of the Bill which we have already debated in earlier clauses, in particular those concerning the new powers to issue information notices under the Social Security Administration Act 1992, and to clarify that the new methods of recovery introduced under the Bill will not apply to devolved benefits.
In that sense, these amendments are essentially technical in nature, as the Minister said, ensuring consistency across the United Kingdom and confirming that the devolved benefits system in Scotland remains outside the scope of the new recovery powers. We appreciate and support the clarification. However, while the amendments themselves are straightforward, they raise some wider questions about the relationship between the UK and the devolved Administrations in this area.
It is somewhat surprising that these changes have had to come forward as government amendments at this relatively late stage of the Bill, when one might have expected such matters to have been settled at the drafting stage through earlier consultation and agreement with Scottish Ministers. The Government have placed great store over the past year in stating that they seek to improve communications and trust between the UK Government and the devolved nations, so can the Minister give us an update on how they view progress on these changes and what has changed in the past year?
While we do not oppose these amendments—indeed, we welcome the fact that the necessary legislative consent has now been secured—they prompt reflection on the importance of ensuring that such engagement happens promptly and systematically in future. The relationship between the UK and the devolved Governments works best when issues of competence and application are identified and agreed well in advance, rather than being corrected through amendments on Report.
That said, I would be grateful if the Minister could take this opportunity to update the House on the Government’s current assessment of the risk of fraud in relation to devolved benefits and on what engagement has taken place with the devolved Administrations to address that risk. Can she tell us what steps she is aware of in those authorities to tackle fraud within their systems and how information sharing and co-ordination between the UK Government and the devolved Governments is being managed to ensure that fraud risks are tackled effectively across all jurisdictions?
We are content to support these amendments that bring Scotland into line with the rest of the UK where appropriate while respecting the devolution settlement and maintaining clarity over responsibilities in the fight against fraud.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for his kind words. I, too, have enjoyed the engagement we have had across the House. It shows how the Lords can make a constructive contribution to the scrutiny of legislation.
The noble Lord, Lord Palmer, is quite right that we have a developed and developing devolution situation in the UK, and are showing that it is possible for different jurisdictions to make different judgments and to find ways of coexisting peacefully. We are very glad to be able to do that, and I thank him for flagging that up.
On the timing, I am advised that it is routine for these matters to be resolved at this point in the process. I reassure the House that our officials have engaged with their Scottish counterparts throughout the policy development stage and the passage of the Bill. It was during Lords Committee that we received formal confirmation from the Scottish Government that they wished the updates to the information gathering powers in the Bill to apply to them too, hence we have brought forward appropriate amendments.
In response to the questions from the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, fundamentally—this stems from the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer—tackling fraud and error in devolved benefits must be the responsibility of the relevant devolved Government. That is the nature of devolution. However, we have engaged extensively with the devolved Governments throughout the passage of the Bill, and these amendments reflect that engagement. I reassure him that we routinely work closely with the Scottish Government to share information and good practice to support each other’s efforts to tackle fraud and error. That includes data-sharing agreements so that we can share information where necessary, which I suspect is the kind of assurance that he was hoping for.
I am grateful for those questions, and I hope that with those assurances noble Lords can accept these amendments.
My Lords, since we are moving on to discuss the eligibility verification measure, about which we had extensive discussions in Committee, I want to say a few words about the need for it and the intent behind it. This enables the Secretary of State to issue a bank or other financial institution with an eligibility verification notice—EVN—that will help the DWP identify incorrect payments in the social security system.
This measure has been misunderstood and occasionally misrepresented throughout the Bill’s passage. It is simply a measure that enables the DWP to ask for limited data from financial institutions that will help the department to identify incorrect payments and verify eligibility for specific benefits. It requires financial institutions to look within their own data and provide limited, relevant information on the accounts which match the specific eligibility indicators provided by the DWP. This limited information will help the DWP to identify where claimants do not meet the eligibility criteria for the benefit that they are receiving.
My Lords, I appreciate the reassurances given by the Minister—they are taken into account—but none the less I have two amendments that could go even further. I hope that the Minister can listen.
Amendment 50 seeks to ensure that affected parties are informed by their own bank when they are flagged following an eligibility verification notice. To note, the EVM will by design, as has been conceded, detect not only serious fraudsters but people who have been flagged because they have erroneously received an overpayment, possibly due to the DWP’s own mistakes—a possibility not acknowledged enough by measures in this Bill, in my opinion. Because of this, it is important that individuals identified by the power understand the basis on which they have been subjected to greater scrutiny and intrusion.
I stress that this amendment is not intended to compromise investigations or tip off fraudsters, as was implied in Committee. In fact, it would come into play only after an individual has been identified by the EVM. This matters because one principle of the rule of law, which I know this Government are very keen on, is that if you are accused of wrongdoing, you should be told the basis for that suspicion.
Being flagged by the EVM should not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion in and of itself, as dealt with in Amendment 52, which I will fully support when we get to it. There is even less reason for an individual who is not suspected of any criminal wrongdoing but who may be the victim of DWP administrative error to be subjected to further checks and requirements without even being told why. It is just not good enough for the DWP to warn people in the personal information charter that the bank account information for the recipients of benefits may be provided to the department. People need to be informed at the moment when the powers bite—that is, once they have been flagged. It is important to note that organisations such as the Public Law Project are keen on seeing this being made a reality.
To humanise why this amendment matters, last week several leading charities and advocacy groups, including Big Brother Watch, Age UK and Disability Rights UK, sent a joint letter to DWP Ministers, highlighting the potential human impact and real-life costs of this Bill’s powers. It included testimony from members of the public receiving pension credit, who told their stories to Silver Voices, the advocacy organisation for older people. I was particularly struck by the testimony of Sue from Manchester, who recounted her experience of having to clear her name due to a previous wrongful flag by the DWP, which accused her of having multiple undeclared bank accounts. Sue said,
“I had to get letters from each of those banks to clear my name as none of the banks answered the DWP. The mental anguish this has caused me is unbearable and nearly sent me under”.
I appreciate that the DWP has gone to great pains to emphasise that it does not consider the EVM to be a government surveillance power, but the idea that you could be flagged by an algorithm that has rifled through your private bank statements and reported you back to the department for further checks, all without you being informed, is—and I say this tentatively—Kafkaesque, so I would like Amendment 50 to correct that.
I have also tabled Amendment 62, which requires that the code of practice include scrutiny provisions about the algorithm used by banks—an issue I raised quite a lot in Committee, with some support from fellow Peers. The situation is that the bank accounts of millions of people will be scoured by third-party algorithms that neither the Government nor banks had any hand in creating. It is therefore essential that we be able to scrutinise exactly what these algorithms are doing. I know that the Minister understands the concerns; she has just explained and articulated that well. The Government have said that the code of practice is not the appropriate vehicle for such scrutiny, but we still have not been provided with any alternative. What is more, there has been ministerial opposition to amendments designed to provide greater transparency over the eligibility indicators, which I find worrying.
The Minister characterised the algorithm that will be deployed for the EVM as merely comprising two tests that must be met to determine whether an individual can be flagged: whether an account receives a relevant benefit, and whether the account meets the criteria set by the DWP and the EVM. The Minister also said in Committee, and again today, that it is the DWP that will review all the information received and DWP staff who will make any decisions about entitlement where potential fraud or error is identified. But—and it is a big but—that review will only take place on the basis of information returned from the EVM, meaning that we have to be able to scrutinise exactly what is being picked up by the algorithm. They may be simple tests, but they will be applying unpublished eligibility indicators that can complicate issues, depending on what those eligibility indicators require banks to search for.
There may be little to scrutinise in algorithms which simply detect whether someone has more than £16,000 in their bank account, or whether, for example, 50% of their transactions have occurred abroad over a period of four weeks. However, should the algorithms have to assess conditions that are more complicated, the algorithms deployed by banks will necessarily be more involved. For example, for relevant benefits currently in scope, such as pension credit, employment and support allowance, and universal credit, could the DWP require banks to find people who they suspect are claiming ESA when not actually suffering from a disability or health condition that affects how much they can work? Or could the DWP require banks to identify recipients of pension credit who live with a partner but claim to live alone?
That might be misplaced suspicion, but exactly how the algorithm determines this sort of complex information, and what information it extracts to reach its conclusions, requires oversight. People will otherwise be worried and paranoid; we otherwise risk them being identified for further scrutiny and investigation, potentially on the basis of flawed algorithmic logic. As I emphasised during Committee, determining whether bank accounts meet the eligibility criteria for an EVN requires judgment. It might not be human judgment but algorithmic judgment, yet the question is: what are those criteria? What will the algorithm be asked to search for?
My Lords, as we have heard, this group relates to the measures in the Bill which would give the DWP the ability to require banks and other financial institutions to trawl all accounts that they hold to identify and provide information on accounts that have received certain benefits and which meet certain criteria as defined by DWP, all without any suspicion of wrongdoing. This is done by means of an eligibility verification notice, which can require periodic reporting—the noble Baroness did not mention this when she described it. For example, it could be daily, although there has been no clarity from the department or the Minister yet as to the periods that are intended. I should reiterate at this point: this is a much better Bill, and the safeguards are much greater than the last time we saw these clauses, but there is more to go.
I would like to make one other little correction to the noble Baroness on her example of universal credit. Her example was that the eligibility criterion that would be provided by DWP to the banks would be £16,000, because that is the limit. In fact, it could be a much lower number, because under the Bill:
“The eligibility indicators may be criteria to be met by a single account or by”
a number of “accounts combined”. For the universal credit example it might be £10,000 or £8,000, or something of that nature. In that situation, it is even more likely that eligibility indicators would be flagged for innocent people, but that is just a wrinkle within the Bill.
I think many of us are nervous about the introduction of what is effectively the suspicionless trawling of benefit recipients’ accounts, even with the safeguards that are there. However, I understand and have an awful lot of sympathy for the need to reduce fraud and error, and the need for the department to have the tools to do that. Amendment 45A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and others, would—as I think we are about to hear—remove the provision altogether. My approach in this group and the next has been to seek to strengthen the safeguards that surround the use of the powers rather than to remove them altogether.
To that end, I have tabled one amendment in this group, Amendment 49, which the noble Baroness has already alluded to. I am grateful to both the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support. It is very simple: it requires that the Secretary of State may issue an eligibility verification notice only if satisfied that it is necessary and proportionate to do so for the purposes set out in the Bill. It was quite surprising that this basic safeguard was not already in the Bill, because the same wording already appears in relation to all the other powers it creates. I had assumed that this was a drafting error or oversight, as I cannot imagine any reason why it should not be there in relation to these powers.
I am very pleased to say that, since I tabled Amendment 49, the Minister has tabled Amendment 48, which she has mentioned. That amendment does much the same thing, although it does not restrict the necessity and proportionality to the purposes of the Bill. That is regrettable, but I can live with the Minister’s version and I am grateful to her for doing this following the constructive discussions we have had on a range of issues throughout the process, for which we are very grateful.
The Minister’s other amendments also introduce small but useful tweaks to the safeguards, although I am not sure I would go as far as she does on their effect. With thanks to the Minister for her engagement, I will not move Amendment 49, but I should be clear that I do not believe that Amendment 48 and the others she has tabled remove the need for the changes we will discuss in the next group. We will have those discussions then, and I will obviously reflect on what she has said in the meantime.
My Lords, I will be very brief. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has amendments in this and other groups, several of which I have signed, to try to ameliorate or provide safeguards for some of the most intrusive elements of the current draft of the Bill. I also have great sympathy with the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, around the issue of transparency, which is very evidently absent from most of the Bill. I will support those individuals if they press their amendments.
My Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A, in contrast to those of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, are not nuanced. They would simply remove Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3, in effect eliminating the requirement for banks to look into claimants’ bank accounts. They would destroy the principle that the Bill establishes: that a group of people, defined by the common characteristic that they are in receipt of benefits, should have a more limited right to privacy and data protection than the rest of the community.
I am also very concerned when banks become investigative agents of the state. I regard these as lines we simply should not cross. I know that the Minister does not share that view and is very content that those in receipt of benefits should be under a level of surveillance that is considered inappropriate for the rest of the community. To her credit, she has limited some of the most abusive features of the Bill that we received from the Commons, but she still asserts the underlying principle.
I also realise that this is very much a paving Bill for the intrusions that will follow the introduction of the digital ID. That scheme provides the tools that enable the state to carve out for surveillance any variety of groups of people whom it deems unworthy of sharing the general rights accorded under the law. I have tabled what are killer amendments, in effect, because the public need to know what exactly is at stake and what line has been crossed. I will not press my amendments, but I am also determined that the issues will not be quietly tidied away.
My Lords, I will say a few words about Amendment 60. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, for her support.
My concern is about justice. People on the receiving end of DWP penalties and accusations of fraud will predominantly be old, sick, disabled and the poor. Most would not be able to afford legal advice or qualify for legal aid, which is scarce in any case. DWP actions and penalties could arise because people have made errors in completing very long and complex forms. For example, the pension credit form is 24 pages long and has 243 questions on it. Errors can be made in completing the forms and interpreting the questions on them, and in the DWP’s assessment of the answers given to those questions.
There is a high probability that some people may eventually be unjustly accused of committing fraud and face the removal of money from their bank accounts without their express approval. It will be the might of the state on one hand and a poor person who does not have any legal advice on the other. We know from the Post Office scandal that innocent individuals can be pressurised into admitting fraud that they did not commit and into handing over money that they did not steal or do not owe. There is enormous scope for injustice in the Bill.
The 2023 High Court case of R v Secretary of State for Work and Pensions related to a single mother of two disabled adults who was receiving universal credit and was overpaid by £8,623, entirely due to the fault of the DWP. The DWP sought to recover the money. The High Court’s judgment said that, under certain circumstances, benefit claimants may be able to argue that recovering the debt would be an unlawful breach of their legitimate expectation and the debt need not actually be paid. Would many claimants who are accused of committing fraud or receiving overpayments be aware of these things?
Steve Webb, the former Pensions Minister, said:
“It can be difficult for people to understand whether the demands they are being sent for overpayments are a mistake, as benefits such as tax credits and pension credit are so complex”.
Without legal advice, these people become even more vulnerable.
Last year, a lot of press coverage was given to the plight of a 75 year-old pensioner who was chased by the DWP for pension credit fraud, adding up to £22,000. The Sun newspaper took up the case, and eventually the investigation showed that there was no fraud—it was all due to errors by the DWP. This case, obviously, is not unique; there are many others that do not get the publicity. I cannot help wondering how many people over the years have been pressurised into admitting guilt when they are not guilty. How many more will admit guilt when they are simply pressed into it?
Last year, data secured by Big Brother Watch showed that more than 200,000 people wrongly faced investigation for housing benefit fraud and error after the performance of the Government’s algorithm fell far short of expectations. Earlier this year, 30 charities wrote to the Government, pointing out the dangers of this legislation and previous legislation, and they identified 686,756 new official error overpayments on universal credit.
Eventually, at some point, people who are accused need some advice. Amendment 60 suggests that the Government ought to provide legal advice to people who may well qualify for it. On 9 October this year, the Government announced that all victims of the Post Office Horizon IT scandal who are claiming compensation will be entitled to free legal advice. Why wait until people suffer? Why not offer this advice up front to save anguish to millions of people? That is what a civilised society would do.
I am sure the Minister will not support this and will possibly refer to the cost associated with it, but the cost of injustice is even higher. I hope that the Minister will be able to offer some help with this.
My Lords, I take this opportunity to refer to the title of this Bill, which is not just “Fraud” but “Fraud, Error and Recovery”. What we are really dealing with is unintentional error. If you are at the bottom of the food chain, worrying how to pay for your food and all the other necessities of life, and you receive some money, you do not look too carefully at that in the real world; you are just grateful for all that you can receive. It then transpires that there has been an error, not really a fraud, and that is part of the title of this Bill. What the noble Lords, Lord Vaux and Lord Sikka, and my noble friend Lady Kramer have tried to explain is that these are errors, not frauds. These amendments reflect ongoing concerns that the Bill grants excessive powers that could intrude upon individuals’ financial privacy and be applied punitively to those receiving universal credit who are at the bottom of the food chain.
The amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, would align the safeguards that apply for the use of eligibility verification powers with those in other parts of the Bill, ensuring continuity in this legislation. My noble friend Lady Kramer’s amendments would remove the requirement for banks to examine the bank accounts of relevant claimants. I do not think we expect a Division on this, but I hope the Government will take account of the nervousness that many of us feel about excessive powers that could affect the people least able to defend themselves.
My Lords, there are a number of amendments in this group, each touching on different principles relating to the operation of and limits to the eligibility verification measure. I will address them all briefly. I appreciate the Minister’s full reminder of the intent of this and of some of the operational details behind the EVM, which was very helpful.
I am afraid that we cannot support Amendments 45A, 65 and 74A in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, as she may expect. As the noble Baroness herself iterated, these amendments would in practice remove one of the Bill’s core operational mechanisms: the framework that enables the detection and investigation of fraud and error in the welfare system. Taking out Clauses 75 and 76 and Schedule 3 would not simply adjust how the powers are used; it would dismantle the machinery that allows the system to function. We on these Benches support the principles behind the Bill and, broadly speaking, how it seeks to counter fraud and deter wrongdoing. As the Minister reminded us, it was a Conservative Government, up until the general election last year, who initiated the approach for the DWP to ask banks and financial institutions for their help in tackling welfare fraud. I also acknowledge that some improvements have been made in the past year.
Removing these clauses would, in effect, as the noble Baroness has admitted, be a wrecking amendment, denying the Department for Work and Pensions the tools it needs to identify and evidence cases of fraud. The real debate, which this House has been having constructively throughout Committee and again on Report, is about how those powers are exercised—proportionately, cost-effectively and with due regard to rights, safeguards and well-being. That is the discussion we should be having, not one that seeks to strike out the core of the Bill.
We broadly welcome the government amendments, which make sensible, constructive improvements to the operation of EVNs. The first, set out in Amendment 48, is the insertion of the “necessary and proportionate” test, which is a welcome safeguard that raises the standard for how these powers are applied. The second clarification, that EVNs may be used only for assisting in identifying incorrect payments, provides welcome precision and helps prevent any risk of mission creep.
Talking of precision, I thank the Minister and her team for producing a series of flow charts. As she knows, I was pressing for these in Committee because there is considerable complexity, including work in progress—I am not quite sure whether we now call it “test and learn” instead of proof of concept—for all those involved in understanding the processes and operations between the banks and the DWP, with the checks, balances and timeframes set out. I hope the Minister acknowledges that this is a help for the department and that it will be continuously updated and improved as the system evolves.
We believe, however, that there remains scope for further clarification, which is why I was glad to add my name to the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. This additional clarification through the language of his amendment is important. It would make it explicit that the exercise of this power is anchored to the purposes of the Bill rather than to any broader or more flexible administrative interpretation that might develop over time. In practical terms, it would ensure that the Secretary of State’s use of these powers cannot be varied or expanded except by returning to Parliament to amend the primary legislation; for example, were the Government at some future point to seek to extend these powers to cover other forms of welfare support.
We believe that this is an important safeguard. It ties the scope of the eligibility verification regime firmly to the text of the Bill, providing Parliament and the public with confidence that its use will remain confined to the limited, proportionate purposes that we have debated. For that reason, we consider this a sensible and necessary amendment and we are glad to support the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, in bringing it forward.
We are sorry to say that we cannot support Amendment 50, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley, although we entirely appreciate her engagement with us on this point and the spirit in which it was brought forward. The aim of improving transparency is understandable but requiring banks to inform account holders that they have been flagged following an eligibility verification notice risks undermining the integrity of ongoing investigations.
I listened carefully to the noble Baroness’s speech, and despite her explanation and the safeguard that she outlined, we remain worried that notifying a potentially liable person too early could allow them to conceal or move funds, frustrating the process. While the intention is fair, it could cause or create a serious loophole. Therefore, I am afraid we cannot support it.
However, one of the points on which I agree with the Government is that some of those seeking to defraud the state—after all, it is taxpayers’ money we are talking about—will stop at nothing to get their way to make money for themselves. There is a line to be drawn to ensure that transparency does not provide an open goal for fraudsters.
It appears that the drafting of Amendment 60, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, may not achieve what is intended. As it stands, it would seem, having read it, to place a duty on banks or institutions, rather than individuals, to receive legal advice before complying with a notice. The DWP, in any case, has access to legal advice intradepartmental, so it would be up to the department’s discretion to use this on a case-by-case basis and should not be statutory.
If, however, the noble Lord’s intent, which became clearer in his remarks, is to ensure that individuals affected by DWP actions can access advice or support, that is a broader and legitimate issue. However, this amendment does not appear to address it; therefore, we do not and cannot support it. Individuals might choose to consult a lawyer, but this would be up to them. Can the Minister confirm that no taxpayers’ funds would be used to fund this, if this was indeed the intention?
We welcome the Government’s change in Amendment 61 to extend the review period from seven to 14 days. This responds directly to concerns raised by these Benches and by other noble Lords in Committee that the original timeframe was too short for financial institutions to act upon. It is a practical and welcome step that reflects the realities of compliance, and we are glad that the Government have listened.
Finally, we have some sympathy with Amendment 62, also tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. I remember that the noble Baroness spoke to this in Committee. It is right that individuals should be able to understand, at least in part, the role of algorithms used in decisions that affect them, and being able to have sight of this as part of a review makes sense. However, transparency must not come at the cost of investigatory integrity. As I stated earlier, there is a delicate balance between fairness to individuals and protecting methods that could be exploited if disclosed.
The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, asked many questions, which I will certainly not repeat. I simply ask the Minister to clarify how these concerns might be addressed in practice, perhaps through the review or the appeal mechanism, while maintaining that balance.
Finally, we welcome that the amendments in this group provide us with an opportunity to have a further discussion on this important part of the Bill, the essence of its prime aim. We are grateful to the Government for listening to the concerns that were raised in Committee, as well as to other noble Lords for identifying areas about which they are concerned and offering the Government the chance to comment. We shall be listening with interest to the Minister’s response.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions today and, indeed, throughout Committee. We have a better Bill as a result, and I am grateful for that. I am grateful to the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for his support for the principle we are discussing here and for his gracious acknowledgement of the improvements to the Bill. I thank him for that; it was a kind and gracious comment, and I appreciate it.
In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I will not dwell on this matter, but I am grateful to him for accepting that, even if he came at the issue from a slightly different angle, he is happy with where we have ended up. I thank him again for pushing us, throughout the stages of the Bill, in various ways, and I am grateful that he has accepted where we have ended up with our amendment.
The noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is absolutely right that her amendment is not nuanced; it lands firmly in the court of whatever the opposite of nuance is. In a sense, it is straightforward: her party does not support these measures at all. I have no doubt that, were her party to form a Government, it would locate another place to find £1 billion to make up for this. However, our party is determined that, if we are to spend money on social security, it should go to the people who are entitled to it and the people who need it—it should not go to other people. We will take the necessary measures to make sure that that happens, and we are doing that in this Bill. We also want to make sure that it is done appropriately and with enough safeguards, and I hope that I have shown to the House my willingness to bend over backwards to provide those safeguards. The principle is that people should not get money to which they are not entitled; it should go to those who are entitled to it and who need it—and that is what we are doing here.
The noble Viscount, Lord Younger, is right that my noble friend Lord Sikka’s Amendment 60 applies to the section that covers penalties that may be issued to financial institutions that fail to comply with an EVN. Therefore, the effect of the amendment would be that the DWP would be required to ensure financial institutions had taken legal advice before issuing a penalty for failing to comply with an EVN. I think we would all agree that, if they need legal advice, they could probably afford it—and so we are okay on that front. However, I fully understand that it is very hard to table amendments outside government, so I take it that the intention of the amendment is as my noble friend made clear: that the DWP is required to ensure that claimants receive legal advice before the DWP can make any adjustments to a person’s claim. However, we do not regard that as either practical or necessary.
There are already existing protections for claimants whenever an overpayment is calculated, including the ability to request a mandatory reconsideration and/or appeal to tribunal. Where an individual is investigated on a suspicion of fraud, they may be interviewed under caution. In that situation, they will always be notified of their right to seek legal advice and provided information about applying for financial assistance with legal costs through legal aid. In response to the question from the noble Viscount, legal aid is funded from the public purse, so if somebody were to qualify for legal aid, it would be funded by the taxpayer in the appropriate way. I confess that that is about as much as I can offer on that front.
My noble friend Lord Sikka mentioned a range of difficult circumstances. A lot of the debate here tends to mix up fraud, error and all the other reasons for overpayments. There are different reasons why somebody may have been overpaid: it may have been a genuine error; they may have been careless; they may have forgotten or deliberately failed to tell us about some change to their circumstance that affects their entitlement; it may be fraud; or there may have been an error on the part of the state. Gathering data early minimises the extent of the build-up of any overpayment, whatever the reason. That has to be a good thing; it is what we found out elsewhere. I hope that my noble friend appreciates that that is at least part of our approach.
I turn to the amendments tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. As she said, Amendment 50 would require account holders to be informed. Even though I know that she does not intend the amendment to do this, the reality is that it could compromise the DWP’s ability to tackle fraud. In most cases where it is just an error that has been made, the DWP will contact claimants to give them the opportunity to explain potential incorrect payments, in which case the amendment would not be needed. However, in the cases where there is a suspicion of fraud, it would clearly undermine any criminal investigation to inform potential fraudsters that their information had been identified using an EVM or what the financial institution had identified. It might also cause unnecessary distress for those who are not guilty of fraud, such as account holders and claimants who, for example, may have a disregarded compensation payment and who otherwise would have been quite rightly left alone because they had not done anything wrong—there is no need to try to scare people into thinking that an issue will be coming down track. It would also impose further burdens on financial institutions, which would have to inform their customers about this.
Amendment 62 from the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, seeks scrutiny of the methods that a financial institution may use to identify relevant accounts. At the risk of boring the House, I note that the EVM asks banks to return specified data only where criteria, set out in the Bill, have been met. Financial institutions operate in many ways, and it is for each individual financial institution to work out how it identifies relevant accounts, rather than for the Government to set out potentially cumbersome processes.
Just to pick up on a couple of things that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, said, I want to make this really clear: we will not be asking banks, for example, to work out whether somebody is entitled to a health benefit, such as ESA. We may ask them to identify an account into which ESA is being paid. Health data will be special data and will therefore be expressly prohibited from being returned. The intention is very simple: to ask them to identify the kind of things I described earlier. In response to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, I was giving an example. There are many examples, but that was the one I chose.
To sum up, I have set out a clear case for the EVM and how our government amendments today and other changes that have been made address many of the areas of concern. I recognise that I have not persuaded the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, but I hope other noble Lords can see the point of this measure, can see the difference it would make and can understand that with the safeguards around, it is the right thing to do. The EVM will save an estimated £940 million by 2029-30. It will be a vital tool to help the DWP spot and detect errors quickly, while also assisting us in identifying fraud. I urge noble Lords to support this measure.
My Lords, during the debate on the previous group, I mentioned that the two amendments in this group are designed to strengthen the safeguards around the use of the eligibility verification powers that are created by the Bill. I am once again grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support.
Amendment 52 deals with how the bank account data that is provided by the banks may be used. The Bill requires banks to carry out a trawl of all accounts they hold to identify any that are in receipt of specified benefits and then to test those against criteria that will be provided by the DWP. If they meet those criteria, this raises a flag called an “eligibility indicator”, details of which must be provided to the DWP, along with certain other limited information, in a format to be decided by the DWP. The trawl can be required on a periodic basis. It could be, for example, daily—we do not yet know. No suspicion is required; this is simply a trawling operation of all bank accounts.
This raises two important issues. First, the existence of an eligibility indicator will presumably trigger action by the DWP. At the moment, there is nothing in the Bill that decides what that action could be. Clause 73 creates a range of very intrusive investigatory powers to investigate if an authorised officer of the DWP has reasonable grounds to suspect wrongdoing. Reasonable grounds for suspicion are not defined. Could the mere existence of an eligibility indicator constitute such grounds? There is nothing in the Bill to say that it cannot. I do not think that the amendments that were referred to in the last group by the Minister and which say the eligibility indicator can be used only to assist in identifying fraud or error solve this issue.
Secondly, and similarly, there is nothing in the Bill to prevent action being taken to suspend or alter a benefit payment in the event that an eligibility indicator is flagged. As we have heard, there are many innocent reasons why an eligibility indicator may exist. Indeed, as I have said, the eligibility indicator can be set at a level which would not indicate fraud at all—for example, £8,000 for a universal credit situation. The existence of an eligibility indicator does not indicate any guilt.
The Minister has told us the department will not treat an eligibility indicator as reasonable grounds for suspicion, but there is nothing in the Bill to define that. The draft code of practice that we have been provided with says that a benefit cannot be altered just because of the existence of an eligibility indicator, but that is only a code, which can be changed at will by this or any future Government without scrutiny. Furthermore, it is not known how much data will be sent to the DWP by the banks under the EVM process but, presumably, it is going to be substantial. It is clear that it will be processed electronically, and there is nothing in the Bill to prevent this process from becoming fully automated, including the decision-making. The DWP has made it publicly very clear that it is rolling out AI processes generally, which may be more efficient, but, in my view, any decisions need to be subject to human review.
In Committee, we heard about the Netherlands child benefits scandal, which was caused by automated decision-making—and interestingly, it eventually led to a Government falling. The Minister has been clear, and the draft code is also fairly clear, that the information will be reviewed by a person before any action, such as an amendment to or suspension of benefits, can be taken. But it is only in the code, and this could be changed without scrutiny.
I think that all of us in this Chamber trust the Minister completely, but she will not always be the Minister, however much we might wish that were the case. Indeed, it is even possible that this Government will not always be the Government. But this law will remain the law. A future Government may be less scrupulous about how benefit recipients are treated. The Bill, left unamended, would open the possibility that eligibility indicators, regardless of innocence, could lead to deeply intrusive actions or unfair financial impacts, potentially on a fully automated basis.
All Amendment 52 does is to make it clear that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion, and it would make it a requirement that a suitably experienced person must have reviewed the information before any action to use intrusive powers against a benefit recipient or to amend or suspend payments is taken. I believe that is what the Government intend, so I really do not understand why there is a problem with accepting the amendment. It does not add any onerous obligations; it simply clarifies the situation that we are being told is the case.
Amendment 67 considers the impact and potential unintended consequences of these powers. The Government have included an independent review process in the use of the eligibility verification powers, which is a very welcome and important safeguard and a genuinely excellent addition since we last saw the Bill. But as it stands, the scope of that review is very limited. It covers only that the exercise of the powers has been in accordance with the Bill and the code of practice, that the persons who have been issued with eligibility notices have complied, and that it has been effective in identifying or assisting in identifying incorrect payments. The independent reviewer cannot look at any other impacts the policy might have.
In Committee, we spent a lot of time debating the costs that the Bill will impose on the banks, but no meaningful attempt has been made to quantify those yet. To quote from the impact assessment:
“At this stage we are unable to provide a robust assessment of business costs for validation because the operational solution for the measure is still being developed”.
We really need to make sure that the costs are proportional. All that Amendment 67 adds is a review of the costs of the policy to the scope of the independent review to ensure they are reasonable and proportional to the benefits.
We heard a lot about the fears of the impacts these new powers might have on disabled people and other vulnerable people, as well as the concern that imposing these onerous duties on the banks might reduce the willingness of the banks to provide banking services to those in receipt of benefits. As politically exposed persons, this is a subject that most of us here have personal experience of. We have seen how the banks behave when additional burdens are put on them in respect of a particular group of people. There is no reason to believe that that could not be the same in this situation. But the Bill includes nothing at all in relation to potential unintended consequences. Amendment 67 adds consideration of those potential unintended consequences to the scope of the independent review.
Finally, the amendment gives the independent reviewer the opportunity to confirm that they have received all the information that they require. This is now a bit of a formality, following the welcome government amendment that we debated last week, which changed “may provide information” to become “must”, but it was subject to a reasonably required caveat. There is still a possibility of disagreement between the reviewer and the department as to what information they might reasonably require. This just allows the reviewer to flag that they have not got what they think they need, which I think is a useful but not onerous safeguard.
These proposed eligibility verification powers are extremely intrusive, so they really must be subject to robust safeguards, which these two relatively simple amendments seek to strengthen. Unless I hear something unexpected from the Minister—and I shall listen to her very carefully—I am minded to seek the opinion of the House when the time comes. I beg to move.
My Lords, there are moments when you hear a speech on a subject of which you are in general support that brings home very clearly the key issues; I think that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, produced that speech just now.
It is extremely dangerous for us to put ourselves in the hands of AI. It is particularly dangerous to put those who are vulnerable into the hands of AI. Indeed, I find it offensive when people who are able to appreciate things particularly well think it all right for others to be subject to automatic operations. The point made by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux—the Government recognise this matter, which is why it is in the advice, though why is it not in the Bill?—is a very important issue for this House.
I do not think it acceptable to have circumstances increased where vulnerable people are subject to “the system”, which is why I want to say just a word about it. It seems to me that one reason why democracy is so much under threat is because so many people feel themselves to be under threat by the system. The system is an alien thing. Well, if you do not want it to be alien, you have to make sure that it is at least human and not merely a machine.
There is another reason; it is one that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, gave delicately and politely but effectively. There are some pretty nasty people in this country who are, at the moment, blaming most things on groups of people whom they dislike, whether it is because of their race, because of their position or, in a sense, because they think that they just do not matter. It is always possible that such people get into power. I do not want those people to have a chance to use legislation that we—we are decent people, I hope—have passed. That is why I have come to speak on this particular amendment: in these months and years, we have to stand up on every occasion and recognise the damage that is done in a system where people like that get power. You have only to look across the Atlantic to see what happens when those who build up antagonism against groups get power and use legislation that was meant to be different in order to ensure the ends that they have in mind.
I beg the Minister to recognise that all we want is the guidance in the law. If we have that, she need not worry. I say that as somebody who has a history, as a Minister of some 16 years, of always being very tough on fraud and always believing that people should not get what they do not deserve, do not need and should not have, because that is very damaging to those who do need it. That is why I do not like it: it puts them in so difficult a position. I beg her simply to make sure that, when we do not have Ministers of the standing and quality that she has shown, they cannot use the law for improper purposes.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, very much for that. The point I would like to make is that there are people who will perpetuate fraud but, if you try to close up every single channel, you will catch people who are innocent. I believe that all laws should allow for people to get away with fraud, perhaps, if it means that you are not accusing people unintentionally. These amendments are appropriate because, as has been said, who knows what Government will come along and what people will be in charge? If there is fraud, it has to be proved pretty conclusively, rather than, because we suspect fraud, us making it impossible for people who would otherwise be found innocent. We found that with the Horizon scandal: it looked all right but AI said that they were all guilty, though they were not guilty. When even speeches made in this House probably come from AI, we have to be increasingly careful about what we do. These amendments protect people; if they are pressed, we on these Benches will support them.
My Lords, I speak in support of these amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and I am pleased to have added my name to them, because both amendments make valuable and necessary clarifications to the operation and oversight of the eligibility verification mechanism—EVM—and they do so in a way that strengthens, rather than weakens, the Government’s objectives under this Bill.
Amendment 52 makes a particularly important clarification. As the Government have repeatedly described their approach to the EVM as a test and learn process, it is vital that we make clear in the Bill that the mere existence of an eligibility indicator does not in itself constitute reasonable grounds for suspicion. That may sound like a technical point, but it has real-world implications. When a system is still developing, when its data sources are still being refined and when human understanding of how it operates is still evolving, there is a very real risk of false positives and unintended consequences.
The Government have said that there is some clarification within the process of an investigation that would help to clarify that persons subject to an EVM are not guilty, and that there are not, therefore, necessarily reasonable grounds for suspicion. However, putting this clarification in the Bill would be a really valuable step in making this absolutely clear, in black and white, to everyone involved. This amendment removes ambiguity and ensures that this point is not in question.
We have already discussed throughout this Bill the importance of safeguards and clarity when new investigative systems are created, particularly where multiple third parties are involved in data sharing and enforcement, which is paramount. This amendment provides exactly that and sets out this lack of reasonable suspicion in the Bill so that we avoid the potentially harmful ambiguity.
Moreover, this amendment ensures that, before any intrusive action is taken—in other words, before any benefit is amended, suspended or investigated—a person of appropriate seniority and experience must review the information and confirm that there are genuine reasonable grounds for suspicion. This aspect of the amendment places human oversight where it belongs: between the algorithm and the citizen. This matters all the more because, as many noble Lords will have seen, the Government themselves are moving rapidly to expand the use of AI in fraud detection and enforcement. Only a couple of weeks ago, civil servants across Whitehall received an internal update about the significant expansion of AI use within the Public Sector Fraud Authority in an article titled:
“Behind the Scenes: Building the AI Tool that is Revolutionising Fraud Prevention”.
I listened very carefully to the passionate speech from the noble Lord, Lord Deben, added to by the noble Lord, Lord Palmer. We believe that this makes these safeguards an urgent necessity. As we rightly modernise our defences against fraud, we must also modernise our protections against error, bias and overreach. Ensuring human involvement in that process in the way it has been set out in this Bill is fundamentally important, and this amendment provides that assurance.
Amendment 67 complements the first one by broadening the remit of the independent review of the EVM powers. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, eloquently laid out his reasoning here. It makes sure that the reviewer looks at not just operational effectiveness but proportionality, costs, unintended consequences and how these powers affect vulnerable people and those interacting with the banking system. These are precisely the areas where well-intentioned powers can have unintended harm if they are not closely monitored.
We on these Benches raised these concerns in Committee and do so again on Report. There is the potential for disproportionate costs on financial institutions, the potential chilling effect on access to basic banking services for those already on the margins and, above all, the potential for harm to vulnerable people who find themselves caught up in complex enforcement processes. It is right that the independent reviewer should have these matters placed explicitly within their remit. I am therefore glad that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has framed his amendment to achieve exactly that. We need to recover public money which has been overpaid—we are in no doubt on that point—but doing so in a way that causes more harm than good benefits no one. The reviewer must have regard to this, not as a suggested area of review but as a statutory duty.
These are measured, practical amendments that I believe carry broad support across the House. They are not about blocking the Bill or frustrating its purpose: they are about ensuring that the new systems it creates are used wisely, fairly and proportionately. We therefore hope that the Government will listen and take these proposals seriously, recognise their constructive intent and accept them as a genuine improvement to the Bill. If the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, decides to test the opinion of the House, we on these Benches will be supporting him.
My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords for their contributions. My response to these amendments builds on the arguments I made at greater length in the last group.
Amendment 52, from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, states that the existence of an eligibility indicator alone does not constitute reasonable grounds for the suspicion of fraud under Section 109BZB of the Social Security Administration Act. I have sought to assure noble Lords already today that a conclusion will never be drawn from EVM information. At the point the information is shared, no one is suspected of having done anything wrong and therefore, by definition, no action could be taken to correct the thing that could have been done wrong because no one is suspected of having done anything wrong. I could not be clearer on that.
I think it is worth reminding the House that there are two different things happening here. This measure allows DWP to ask banks to flag up accounts that may on the face of it have received a benefit to which someone is not entitled. That is a piece of information that comes into the department. Along with other pieces of information, it will be sifted and examined, and decisions will be made through the usual processes. DWP does this all the time, with all kinds of information. Those decisions are made. Pursuing fraud is something that is done day to day. Whenever DWP receives data in response to an EVM, the data will be matched with information that DWP holds, so it can identify the claimant and any inconsistencies between the information received from the financial institution and the information provided by the claimant over the life of their claim. It will also look at any possible disregards and any other relevant information, as I explained on the last group.
It is only then, as with our current practice, when a possible inconsistency is identified, that steps will be taken to determine how or even whether a claim needs to be reviewed. In some cases, it will be clear that no further action is required and the data from the EVM will be used no further. In cases of potential error, DWP may contact the customer to discuss the claim or ask for further information. In cases where potential fraud is then suspected, the case may be passed to an authorised officer, who will consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed.
The noble Lord, Lord Deben, made a passionate speech, and he is someone for whom I have a great deal of respect. If what he suspected was happening, his passion would be justified, but I want to persuade him that it is misplaced. The decision to judge that someone has been guilty of fraud and to take action is not an automatic process. It is also not a determination that can be made by just anyone. It can be made only by an authorised officer in the DWP. If there are no reasonable grounds to suspect that a DWP offence has been committed, the case is passed back to the relevant benefit team or compliance team. At all times during that process, as is the case now, DWP will ensure that any next steps are reasonable and proportionate. There are no immediate suspensions of benefits during the process and, where appropriate, DWP will always endeavour to work with the customer to establish the facts around a benefit claim and identify any possible vulnerabilities. I hope that my position on that is clear and is made even clearer by the government amendments—
If that is so, what is wrong with making it statutory? The issue is that what the Minister says is what now happens. We are concerned about what could happen if it is not in the Bill.
My Lords, it is in the Bill. The requirement for reasonable suspicion for exercising powers under Clause 109BZB is set out in that clause. The fact that an account meets an eligibility indicator does not necessarily mean that there are any grounds for suspicion of fraud or other offences. It does not even necessarily mean that a benefit has been overpaid. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 3B on eligibility verification makes clear that eligibility indicators only indicate that a benefit
“may have been, or may be, incorrectly paid”.
The eligibility indicators in an eligibility verification notice must be criteria which indicate that the specified relevant benefit may have been or may be incorrectly paid.
The legislation therefore clearly reflects that EVM information will have to be considered alongside all other relevant information before further steps are taken. As I have said, DWP is required to consider all relevant information to determine whether there are reasonable grounds to suspect an offence. This is about not just this but about existing legislation and powers. I hope that my position on that is clear and that the government amendments in the previous group have helped to make it clearer.
Amendment 52 also requires that the information be reviewed by an appropriately senior person. We do not know exactly what the definition is of a senior person. However, it is an established legal principle that the Secretary of State must be satisfied that officials are suitably trained and experienced to take decisions on their behalf. The amendment is therefore unnecessary. I hope that the noble Lord will not feel the need to press it.
Amendment 67 would add three additional requirements to the role that the EVM independent reviewer will be required to undertake. Government Amendments 68 and 69, spoken to in an early group by my noble friend Lady Anderson, addressed paragraph (f) of that requirement by requiring the Secretary of State to provide information to the independent reviewer where it is “reasonably required”. In case there are any concerns about that, we foresee a close working relationship between DWP and the independent EVM reviewer, where DWP gives the reviewer the information that it needs.
However, the government amendment makes it even clearer that we are committed to providing necessary information. If necessary, DWP could ask the reviewer to demonstrate why a certain piece of information is necessary for the purposes of their review, by reference to the scope of the review and the matter that it has to cover, as set out in legislation. If the independent reviewer then demonstrates that the information is necessary for them to carry out their review, the legislation is clear that DWP must provide it.
On paragraph (d) of this amendment regarding costs incurred by business, this is a matter the Government take seriously. We are committed to keeping costs associated with this measure proportionate and to a minimum. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, is well aware, over the passage of the Bill we have worked very closely with UK Finance to improve the Bill and our draft codes of practice. At a recent meeting with Ministers, UK Finance welcomed this extensive engagement, which it feels has significantly strengthened the Bill. It indicated that it was not calling for further legislative change.
Crucially, I do not regard this amendment as necessary because the independent reviewer must already assess the measure’s effectiveness. Financial institutions receiving an EVN have the right to appeal a notice that is unduly onerous. We have committed to provide a further impact assessment 12 months after Royal Assent.
Paragraph (e) of the amendment would require the independent reviewer to include within their annual report any adverse effect that the EVN may have on vulnerable persons’ or benefit claimants’ access to banking services. I assure the noble Lord and the House that protecting DWP customers, especially those who are vulnerable, is very much a priority for this Government. However, we do not believe that this amendment is necessary.
First, there is no reason for individuals to lose access to banking services solely because of information shared under EVM. We have been clear that information does not imply any wrongdoing. The Bill makes provision to exempt financial institutions from returning suspicious activity reports in certain circumstances if the information that they have is only the result of an EVM match. We are working with the FCA to prevent any unintended consequences. Secondly, as I have indicated, this measure simply provides a source of data that feeds into the long-standing processes in DWP, where layers of support and specialist staff already exist to ensure that those who are vulnerable or have complex needs get the right support. Thirdly, this measure will help our customers, including those who are vulnerable. It will help us to spot genuine errors in claims early, help us to take steps to correct these and prevent large overpayments and debts building up that are recoverable.
I hope that the arguments which I have put out there have been enough to persuade the House on why we should move ahead. I beg the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank every noble Lord who has taken part in this debate. I particularly thank the noble Lord, Lord Deben, for his generous words, and the Minister for her fulsome response. On the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Palmer, about allowing people to get away with fraud, I want to make it really clear that I do not want people to get away with fraud. I am as keen as anyone to make sure that fraud and error are reduced. Please do not take away from this that I am soft on fraud. I hope my track record on fraud is well known within this House.
My Lords, I listened carefully to what the noble Baroness had to say on Amendment 67. All it would do is add scope to the independent reviewer to cover the costs of this policy, to make sure that they are reasonable and proportionate and that any unintended consequences are identified.
I will make just a couple of points. The noble Baroness mentioned UK Finance. I acknowledge that she and the department have had a lot of constructive discussions with UK Finance during this process, and that it is broadly happy with the Bill. However, it is not at all sure what the costs are, because we still do not know exactly what it is being asked to do. So UK Finance supports including a review of the costs in the Bill.
The debanking point is not to do with an eligibility indicator causing someone to be debanked; it is because the Bill creates onerous obligations that relate to benefit providers. As I have said before, as we know as PEPs ourselves, where banks have to follow onerous rules or suffer onerous provisions, there is a risk that they decide not to provide services to people related to those onerous activities. We have seen that with the PEP situation; I know myself that it has been very difficult. This point is slightly different from the one the noble Baroness described, but it is important that the costs be reviewed to make sure they are proportionate and reasonable and that any unintended consequences are identified by the independent reviewer. So I wish to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I apologise: noble Lords are going to get fed up with hearing me, but this is the last of it. Amendments 75 to 77 relate to the new police powers that the Bill confers on DWP staff. Once again, I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, and the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, for their support on this. I am also very grateful to the organisation Justice for its help and briefings on this matter.
Chapter 2 of Part 2 creates powers of search, entry and seizure by authorised DWP staff, effectively giving civil servants the same powers as police officers. This is similar to the powers conferred on the Cabinet Office and the Public Sector Fraud Authority that we have debated previously, but with one very important difference: unlike the PSFA powers, these DWP powers would allow DWP-authorised officers to use reasonable force against benefit claimants when exercising their new entry, search and seizure powers. This would make it lawful for a DWP officer—not a police officer, but a civil servant—to enter your home, seize your belongings and forcibly hold you down while doing so. Let us be clear: this power of force is being sought to be used against benefit recipients, a section of the population, as we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, that is recognised to be more vulnerable and to live with disabilities at a higher rate than the population at large.
My Lords, I strongly support the case that has been made by the noble Lord for a number of reasons. I strongly agree with his opening proposition that the Government should take only powers that are absolutely necessary, and I will listen, as he will, to the Minister, when she sets that out.
I come at this from previous experience. When I became Immigration Minister, it was in the wake of a tragedy that had occurred when force had been used to deport somebody from the United Kingdom who sadly, in the process, lost their life. As a result, we set up an independent inquiry. We took these matters very seriously. That inquiry reported and set out very clear steps and processes that should take place when the state uses force, as is sometimes necessary, to carry out policy. One of the things that came through very clearly was about the high standards of training and oversight that are necessary before reasonable force is used. Otherwise, the result can be people losing their lives. As a result, that was something that we took very seriously. The Home Office now puts a lot of effort into training officers who carry out deportation work to make sure that that work is properly authorised, training takes place, and it is done in a safe and reasonable way.
That experience then came to the fore during the Covid pandemic, when the Department for Housing, Communities and Local Government attempted to give similar powers to use reasonable force to local government officials to enforce some of the Covid regulations. My party was in power at that time, and I had private conversations and some conversations in the other place about the unwiseness of giving those powers to officers of the state who were not properly trained to use them and where there was not the proper safeguard of oversight. I am happy to say that, in that particular case, I persuaded the Minister, who then brought forward a revised set of regulations that no longer gave local government officers the power to use reasonable force.
I made the case, as the noble Lord has, that if there are cases where reasonable force should be used, it should be used by a constable—somebody who is properly trained to use reasonable force, and where there is proper oversight from a command and control system that means that, first, it is used properly, and that if something goes wrong, there is a proper process to scrutinise and to learn from mistakes that are made.
From what the noble Lord said about what the Minister said in Committee, and from what the Explanatory Notes say, the intention is that the power will be limited to being used against things, not people. It seems to me that the legislation should reflect the policy intent and we should not just rely on Ministers telling us what the power is going to be used for.
I should say that I am a bit reluctant even to accept the compromise that the noble Lord has put forward. The danger is this: what if the officer of the DWP is using reasonable force to deal with things and the person concerned tries to intervene to stop the reasonable force being used? You do not have to think very far forward to see that you could end up with a very difficult situation, potentially with vulnerable people, where the result is that somebody is injured or tragically loses their life.
I say to the Minister—I felt this very keenly when I was Immigration Minister, even though this particular loss of life happened before I came into post—that if this legislation was passed and a DWP official used reasonable force and the consequence was that someone was injured or sadly lost their life, it is the Minister who would be held to account at that Dispatch Box. People would want to know why that power was given to that official and to understand in incredible detail, possibly in a public inquiry, what steps had taken place about that use of force being authorised and what training had taken place. I can tell her that it is a very uncomfortable experience when there have been failings and you have to set up an independent inquiry and say the result has been that somebody has lost their life.
In the case that we were talking about, it was somebody who should not have been in the United Kingdom and who had committed an offence but, even so, it should not have resulted in that person losing their life. That was a failing of the state, and it was something that we took very seriously.
I would say to the Minister, when she comes to the Dispatch Box to justify the legislation as it is drafted, that, unless I have missed something, it does not correctly set out the policy intent. Even if she thinks that the amendments that have been tabled are defective, I think it would be wise to accept them and then for the Government to come forward and tidy them up during ping-pong. Also, we should not just rely on the Minister saying how the powers are to be used. Even if that is the Minister’s intent, there are many thousands of officials in the department. With the best will in the world, if the powers are there and somebody attempts to use them, this will end very badly.
In Section 117 of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which is referred to—and I have checked it—there is not a limitation on the power to be used just “against things”. The “reasonable force” power is available to a constable for the full breadth of the thing that they are trying to do. So far as I can see, the legislation as drafted does not deliver the policy intent that is set out in the Explanatory Notes. I may have got that wrong. If I have, I will be delighted for the Minister to point it out, but I would urge her, for her own sake and that of her successors: do not give power to use reasonable force to people who are not trained to use it and do not have proper oversight.
There is a perfectly reasonable compromise in Amendment 76, although, personally, I would be more comfortable if the power was just taken out completely, even if you have to beef up the ability of the DWP officials to work with the police. I am not saying that there are never errors or tragedies with the police’s use of powers, but the police are properly trained and they have a proper structure of oversight. There is also a proper, independent complaints process and mechanism to account for the use of that power—as the noble Lord said, it was set up recognising that the use of force against citizens is a power of last resort for the state.
As this debate progresses, I would urge the Minister to think carefully about whether, at the end of it, she should, in effect, force the noble Lord—without putting words into his mouth—to test the opinion of the House. On reflection, could the Minister perhaps accept one of these amendments or offer to come back herself with something that the House will be more comfortable with? As drafted, the Bill gives too much power to Ministers and goes far further than the Minister herself has said previously is the policy intent of the Government. If the noble Lord were to test the opinion of the House, I would be happy to support any or all of his amendments.
My Lords, I want to speak to Amendment 75. There is a lot of wisdom in what the noble Lord has said. What happens when this reasonable force is being exercised by members of the DWP? On the way there, everything looks okay, but you get into the house and, before you know where you are, fighting breaks out. In that house, there is a criminal gang, which is part of the fraud. What will happen? What number will they ring to ask for reinforcement?
Of course, it will be 999. The police get up there and they realise that the case has already been messed up. It is not very easy to clear things up when people think, “These could be robbers”. Whatever force and power you thought you had given to these DWP officials, you could end up with a very awkward, difficult situation.
In some places such as London, the police may get a very bad report, but generally, throughout England and Wales, people know that the police have authority. The uniform has given them something very definite. In most cases, apart from where organised crime is pretty furious, when they turn up they get good entry, they get people talking to them, because they are there to keep the King’s peace.
My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, for tabling these amendments. I think they are genuinely key, and very important to resolve before we pass this Bill. I do not think they are minor or unimportant at all. Throughout the debates in Committee, and continuing here, concerns have been raised by some of us about the enormous state power created by the Bill. Largely, we have focused on things such as privacy rights and so on, and these are very important, but this actually gives draconian powers of force to a new body in a way that should make us gulp, in my opinion.
In earlier groups today, people have been very keen to say that the problem is not that this Government will misuse the powers but that we have to worry about future Governments. It is a kind of lurking spectre. Everybody knows who they are referring to. There is a notion that there will be future nasty Governments out there who might misuse the powers but that this Government are absolutely well intentioned. I think that is a little bit of a cop-out because it is this Government who are creating an enormous new set of state powers, and this Government have to answer to why they want these particular powers of force.
I think that is important, not because I have any suspicion about the intentions of the noble Baronesses who are our Ministers here—obviously not—but, none the less, what are the Government doing accruing this force?
I was squeamish about the PFSA having police powers to search, enter and seize, but it did not have the reasonable force clause. The thing I find most difficult to understand is the idea that the sort of major fraudsters that the first half of the Bill deals with are somehow subject to only half the force, but, suddenly, we get on to the people on benefits and physical force is justified. What does that say about our set of priorities? I am not being paranoid to go, “What? You actually think those people are the enemy, so you need to use physical force?” That is one thing.
The second thing on that, by the way, is the idea of physical force against the body versus physical force against property. Of course, there is a distinction, but I do not know if noble Lords have ever been there when somebody has come in and started booting your furniture round or kicking down the doors—I have; it was not the DWP or, indeed, the police. Anyone who has been on the receiving end of somebody destroying property around them will know that it is intimidating, frightening and scary, so I am worried not just about the bodily force but about having the right to do that to your property.
To return to our discussion on an earlier amendment, these are DWP officers. What? I do not want DWP civil servants, who might have been on a minor training course, to have that power. I think it is wrong. For them to have that power of physical force aimed at people on benefits seems wholly wrong and morally dubious.
I note that a number of times the Minister has emphasised the importance of this Bill being hard on fraud. I just want to reiterate a point that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, made earlier, which is that worrying about some of the aspects of this Bill does not make you soft on fraud. As far as I am concerned, when public money is fraudulently obtained by criminals or malign forces, or just by people on benefits acquiring money they do not deserve, I consider that to be an attack on the public, and I think we should be hard on it. But the way that you demonstrate you are hard is not by playing the hard man. It is not about throwing your weight around; it is about having the appropriate form of state legislation to deal with it. I am afraid this part of the Bill really gives me pause about what is driving this, and I do not even think it will get us anywhere in resolving the problem of people malignly stealing public money.
I would just like to ask the Minister three direct questions. First, why are people in England and Wales so much nastier that they need this force, whereas the Scots do not? That is not, it seems to me, a very sensible distinction. It should be either all of us or none of us.
Secondly—because I think it should be none of us —can the Minister explain why it is suitable for DWP officers to do something against individuals who are thought to be fraudulent, while officers of a similar kind do not have the power to do it if it is organised crime? Can she explain why that is?
My third question is extremely simple. Everybody who has ever had a ministerial job that involves this kind of thing knows, as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, said so clearly, that you absolutely need to be trained to do this. Can the Minister say who is trained, how much training they have and whether there is a budget for that training? If her answer is not satisfactory on any of those, I suggest she accepts the amendment which gets rid of this entirely.
Let us get to a sensible world in which the police have powers—for which, in most places, people trust them—and civil people do not have powers. We should remember the comment from the noble and right reverend Lord that was very simple: you know when a policeman is there, but how do you really know that this is a DWP individual? You have to look at some piece of paper, perhaps, but you do not know that. I think this is a very dangerous proposal.
My Lords, I support this amendment because any exercise of physical powers must surely rest with the police. Are we going to train a new breed of DWP officers who have to be tough and able to act as police? It is quite nonsensical.
The one thing that worries me about this amendment is that it is quite easy on violent filing cabinets. You can attack a filing cabinet, apparently, because that is all right. I think this division between property and individuals is a very strange line to draw. Do you hide in a filing cabinet because you think that would be safer? No, you must not hide in a filing cabinet because, under this legislation, even under the amendment, you can attack a filing cabinet because it might hit back. I think the whole thing, when you read it carefully, is quite nonsensical. We have to get back to the crux of the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, which is that if there is going to be physical restraint, it has to be from the police and from no one else.
My Lords, I am very glad to have added my name to this series of amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden. They go to the heart of one of the most serious concerns that we have raised repeatedly with the Government, both inside this Chamber and beyond. I am very pleased that my noble friend Lord Harper spoke from his personal experiences where the state has found itself having to use force, and I will revert to that in a moment.
We are deeply concerned by the powers being granted to DWP investigators under this Bill, particularly the authorisation to use reasonable force against both property and people when exercising powers of entry, search or seizure under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984—I believe that my noble friend Lord Harper referenced 2017, but I will need to check my facts on that. These are, in both name and substance, police powers. The idea that civil servants—officials who are not police officers—should be able, in law, to use physical force against members of the public is one that should give this House real pause. It raises profound questions about the limits of state power and the safeguards that ought to accompany it.
The Government have said that they cannot carve out these powers from PACE because it is separate Home Office legislation, but that simply does not stand up to scrutiny. We will hear later from the Minister, but they have already carved out the power of arrest for both the DWP and the Cabinet Office and they have explicitly carved out the use of reasonable force from the Cabinet Office’s own PACE powers under this Bill. It is, therefore, perfectly possible to do so; the Bill itself provides the precedent.
Given that, we struggle to understand why the Government are unwilling to make a simple, sensible and proportionate distinction that reasonable force may be used only against property and not against people. As it stands, the provision creates an unnecessary and troubling loophole, and one that we doubt will withstand the realities of operational use. On that basis, I had formed my own questions and, funnily enough, they chime with many of the points raised by my noble friend Lord Harper and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, and, indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, so there is support around the House.
Let us kick off. First, assuming that the DWP visits a property with a view to seizing property only and people there threaten violence or are violent but the police are not there, what are DWP officials expected to do there and then? Secondly, what training would DWP officials be given to deal with any potential violence? How far would this training go? This point was raised by the noble Lord, Lord Deben. Is it clear what is expected of them? What are the limits? What might be given to these officials for defence against physical force? Thirdly, what equipment would DWP officials be provided with to assist with restraining individuals if this arose in a scenario where only assets were being seized? Fourthly, and perhaps the biggest question of all, what happens if matters get out of hand, the police are not there, or they have been called but they are not there yet, and an individual is injured? The individual could be a DWP official or an individual within whose house the property is being seized. The police can be referred to the Independent Police Complaints Commission, but what redress or investigations are in place for DWP officials, given this scenario? I am referring to legal protections.
My Lords, a lot of questions have been asked and I will do my best to answer them all. I will start by making clear what we are seeking to do. These powers would give authorised and trained DWP officers the ability to use reasonable force. We want them to be able to use that against property, not against people. Making a distinction in the way that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, does in one of his amendments is not straightforward, despite the wishes of the noble Viscount, Lord Younger.
A number of noble Lords have said that they would be horrified to see civil servants using powers meant for the police. I am sure that members of the previous Government will be aware that HMRC, Border Force and the Gangmasters Licensing Authority already have these powers. This is not unprecedented.
My Lords, I have not spoken on this Bill before, and I was genuinely trying to be helpful to the Minister. She has just said that you cannot make an easy distinction between the use of force against things and people. That is exactly the point. If you give powers to be used against things, you will get drawn into using them against people. I am well aware that Border Force has these powers, but if she talks to her noble friend sitting next to her she will find out that, as a result of the independent inquiry we had, there is extensive training for Border Force and for immigration enforcement officers before they are allowed use that force. That is my counsel; I urge her to be cautious.
My Lords, I will come on to answer all the noble Lord’s questions if he will give me a moment to do so. I have not got there. That was my opening paragraph. I will answer the points one by one, so I hope he will be patient with me.
I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, did not mean to do this, but the impression he and some other speakers gave is that the DWP will seek to use these powers against an average benefit claimant who has accidentally overclaimed by £20. I make it clear that this power cannot be used in those circumstances. It will be used where the DWP has a reasonable belief that someone has intentionally committed sophisticated, often high-value fraud against the DWP. These operations seek to find evidence of criminality that is not obtainable through the DWP’s other criminal investigation powers, such as its information-gathering powers, which would be the normal route for obtaining evidence in investigations. To use these powers, we have to seek a warrant from the court. The warrant application will go to the court, which will be the ultimate arbiter of whether a warrant is approved, based on a relevant justification. Those warrants have to be used for investigating serious organised criminality, and those offences tend to be high-value and complex. For that to happen, there would need to be reasonable suspicion related to indictable offences. We are not talking about individuals who have accidentally been overpaid a small amount of money.
I will go through the specifics that have been raised. I understand what the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, wants to do with his amendments and his desire to limit the use of reasonable force to property and not people. However, the use of reasonable force is set out in the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 198, which, as he pointed out, does not distinguish between the use of force on items and persons. There is no precedent for breaking down the PACE power of reasonable force to restrict it to people or items. As I will go on to explain in a moment, to do so could result in unintended consequences.
The DWP has been clear from the outset that its intention is that reasonable force will be used only against things, not people. That will be made clear in guidance and training. The power will enable DWP-authorised investigators to use reasonable force to access locked cabinets and digital devices once they are lawfully on a premises. Without that ability to secure evidence, the DWP would have to continue to be reliant on the police, who would need to remain on the premises for the duration of the search activity. Imagine a situation where, for example, a significant universal credit fraud has taken place. There are potentially a lot of papers, either in filing cabinets in a premises or on devices. The police effect entry to a premises and secure them. The police stay there, and we ask them to carry on picking up every single file so that DWP officials can tell them if it is right or not. The police could be out on the streets tackling real crime and protecting people or they could spend that time in the premises while the DWP searches devices.
I understand the intention behind the amendments—
I know, but I am trying to ask some sensible questions. The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, will have to decide whether to press Amendment 76. I encourage him to press Amendment 75 and take this out completely. The Minister just talked about the police having to stay there to pick up files and devices. Why would they need to use force to do that? That is an administrative exercise. She is in danger of defending the indefensible in an unnecessarily complicated way. We are trying to be helpful.
I am grateful to the noble Lord for his help but I will try to manage for now. To open a filing cabinet or to open a device without the consent of the owner requires using reasonable force. I fully accept that he does not think that the DWP should have any of those powers. I hope he will bear with me and allow me to move through the arguments to make a case as to why I think it is necessary. If I cannot persuade him then I accept that, and he will go into the other Division Lobby, but I hope he will allow me to explain why I think this is necessary and proportionate.
One of the risks of the approach that has been taken to try to limit the use of reasonable force as set out by PACE is that it could have the unintended consequence of removing an authorised investigator’s common-law right to self-defence—for example, if they were physically threatened during a search and seizure activity. Clearly, the safety of our authorised investigators is paramount and they, like anyone else, must have the right to defend themselves if threatened. We will of course take a number of steps to ensure staff members’ safety. That includes conducting risk assessments on application for the warrant and during the search and seizure activity itself, and equipping staff with critical safety equipment and protective clothing.
The noble Lord, Lord Harper, asked about training. All DWP-authorised investigators will be required to complete training to the equivalent standard of the police before they can use these PACE powers. I assure the noble Lord, Lord Deben, that money will be made available to pay for that. We will not expect people to use these powers if they have not had appropriate training. That was a good question and I am pleased to answer it. In addition, DWP criminal investigators undertake investigative training as part of the Government Counter Fraud Profession. All staff must have training to industry standards before they can be considered even for authorised investigator status. That will ensure that staff are benchmarked to the same standard.
The DWP will not have the power of arrest. I remind the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, that the previous Government’s fraud plan, including the version put out in 2024, when he was standing where I am, proposed not only the powers we have here but that DWP staff should have the powers of arrest. We decided that was not appropriate but, as I have said, we do think that the power to have reasonable force against property is reasonable. We have taken what I think is a proportionate view. In the situation described, where the DWP arrives at premises but the police are not there and its staff find their entry is obstructed, the policy will be that they should remove themselves from any potential danger and request police presence.
The noble Lord, Lord Vaux, also mentioned oversight. We will be commissioning His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire & Rescue Services to inspect the use and effectiveness of these powers in England and Wales and His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland to do so there. These inspections can focus on any part of the end-to-end criminal investigation and their reports will be published by the Secretary of State. In addition, the Independent Office for Police Conduct will be responsible for reviewing any serious incidents or complaints in relation to these powers in England and Wales, with the Police Investigations & Review Commissioner responsible in Scotland.
While I am here, two other questions were asked on the IOPC. In one, I think the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the IOPC regs were a Henry VIII power. I am advised that they are not, because they do not seek to amend or repeal primary legislation. The proposed amendments to Part 2 of the Police Reform Act are contained in the Bill itself. On the question of funding, the DWP has secured the necessary agreements with the IOPC and will continue to work closely and in partnership with it to ensure that its needs are considered, including financial arrangements. The regulations will make provision as to payment for this service and permit the lawful disclosure of sensitive files and information relating to the exercise of the functions and powers. I hope that reassures the noble Lord on that point.
On the other questions that have been mentioned, just to be clear, the drafting in Schedule 4 for Scotland is intended to clarify that force cannot be used to compel individuals to provide information when required to do so by a court protection order. This mirrors PACE as it applies in England and Wales. On the exercise of reasonable force when executing search warrants, the provisions in the Bill both in Scotland and in England and Wales are comparable. I hope that reassures noble Lords who think that we think that people in Scotland are less dangerous than people in England and Wales. I can assure them that is not the case.
Noble Lords asked about the difference between the PSFA and the DWP. Primarily, this is a matter of scale. A tailored approach has been adopted by the DWP and the PSFA. The PSFA is likely to do a smaller number of investigations; the scale at which the DWP operates would be a very different use of police resource than it would be in the case of the PSFA. Therefore, we think it is appropriate.
Finally, I think somebody—I am sorry, I have forgotten which noble Lord this was—asked whether we would use this provision against vulnerable people, benefit claimants being vulnerable. Again, another form of reassurance is that the law requires any warrant application to include information about any vulnerable individuals who may be present on the premises. As a result, the DWP has to conduct risk assessments before even applying to the court.
I understand the comments that have been made. I hope that I have been able to reassure noble Lords that our proposals are proportionate. On that basis, I urge the noble Lord to withdraw his amendment.
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have taken part in this debate. In particular, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Harper, for giving us the benefit of his real-life experience on this and the very powerful example of how this can go wrong.
I confess that I am not persuaded of the need for DWP officers to have the ability to use reasonable force and I am tempted to go down the route the noble Lord, Lord Harper, suggests of removing it altogether. However, I want to be constructive. I do not want to ruin the Bill, so I think I can live with a situation where the Bill tries to mirror what the Minister has said the powers will be used for and limit it to that. If she thinks there are unintended consequences from that, those can be fixed at a later stage, at Third Reading. I make the point now that it is outrageous that Third Reading is in less than two days’ time from now, on Thursday. That is not the way we do things in this House. It does not give us time to sit down and try to work things out. I put it on record that it is just wrong.
I was slightly confused by one thing the Minister said. She described a situation where the police are there throughout as a waste of police time, when they could be off dealing with real crime, but just the sentence before she told us that this will be used only in cases of sophisticated high-value fraud. Is that not real crime? I confess that I am a bit confused by that.
Anyway, nothing I have heard has changed my view about the ability to use reasonable force against people being appropriate for DWP officials, particularly if the police are likely to be there all along anyway. I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 75, but I will, when the time comes, test the opinion of the House on Amendment 76.
My Lords, Amendments 86, 87 and 88 in my name and that of my noble friend Lady Finn concern the independence and effectiveness of the independent reviewer established under Clause 89. They are what we might call bite- size amendments, but they go to the heart of what independence and accountability mean in practice.
Amendment 86 would remove the power of the Secretary of State to direct the independent person to review only certain timeframes. Amendment 87 would change the wording of Clause 89 so that the Secretary of State “must”, rather than “may”, provide information to that independent person for the purposes of their review.
We bring these amendments forward in the spirit of consistency and fairness. We welcome the Government’s amendments to Clauses 66 and 76, both of which change the wording from “may” to “must” when referring to the Minister’s duty to provide information to independent reviewers. Those are important and positive changes.
The Government have rightly recognised that independent scrutiny cannot be meaningful unless reviewers have the information they need, and that Ministers must therefore be under an obligation and not merely a discretion to provide it. We entirely agree with that principle, one we championed consistently throughout Committee, and which garnered the support of many noble Lords present. However, we are concerned that, having been adopted in Clauses 66 and 76, it has not been applied consistently across the Bill.
Clause 89, which deals with the independent review of powers exercised under Sections 109A to 109H of the Social Security Administration Act 1992—including, among other things, the power to enter and inspect premises under Section 109C—still uses the weaker “may” formulation. This means that the Secretary of State is not required to share information with the independent reviewer and can determine which periods or activities the reviewer is permitted to examine. When we are talking about an independent review mechanism, we do not believe that this is good enough.
If the Government accept, as they now have, that independent reviewers examining the Cabinet Office’s functions under Clause 65 and the DWP eligibility verification mechanism set out in Clause 76 should have an enforceable right to the information they need, then surely the same must apply to those reviewing the DWP’s use of these further powers under the Social Security Administration Act 1992. There is no justification for having one standard of transparency for one and not the other.
The Government amendments on their own subject the PSFA and the Minister for the Cabinet Office to different standards to the DWP, which surely cannot be right. Based on the Government’s amendments, the Minister for the Cabinet Office must provide information to the independent reviewer for the purposes of an investigation into the exercise of the Minister’s functions under this part. However, it is different for the DWP, which must provide this information to the independent reviewer only when it comes to the EVM. For other independent reviews under this part, the Secretary of State still “may” only provide this information.
I rise very briefly to support these three amendments, particularly Amendment 87, which relates to whether the independent reviewer “may” or “must” be given information. I thought we had that debate some time ago. The Minister tabled amendments for other parts of the Bill which reflected that, saying that they “must” be given information they reasonably require. I was not terribly happy with “reasonably require”; none the less, it seems very odd that this one is different and remains a “may”. My first reaction was that this must be an oversight, but apparently it may not be. I would love to understand why this is different for this clause, but not for the rest of it.
Amendment 86 is also important because, while the Bill creates the independent review process, it does not include when and over what period—that is to be added later, which somewhat undermines the independent review. It is rather unusual; I do not think I have ever seen a Bill which does not establish, on the face of it, when a review must be, or at least the latest time it can be issued. I really think it ought to. With that, I support these amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the noble Viscount for explaining his amendment. I will start by gently reminding him of something. He said that we should not avoid oversight because it is inconvenient. Does he remember that when his Government, led and represented by him, introduced equivalent powers to many of these in the DPDI Bill, there was literally no independent oversight at all anywhere in that Bill? So, I am very happy to respond on the way we are putting it in, but I hope the House will give us credit for having actually put in significant independent oversight, and I would encourage him to remember that.
Having said that, while I understand the rationale for Amendments 86 to 88, we do not believe that they are appropriate or necessary. DWP’s intention for Clause 89 is to appoint an independent, external inspectorate body to inspect DWP’s end-to-end criminal investigations. His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary and Fire and Rescue Services has provided this function for public services for over 160 years. DWP has committed to commissioning HMICFRS as the body best placed to provide an independent inspection role in England and Wales and, similarly, His Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary in Scotland, for Scotland. I can assure the House that DWP are committed to ensuring the right level of scrutiny for these powers and will follow existing HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland’s processes and guidance, which requires transparency and accountability.
These inspectorate bodies bring huge experience of working in this area, providing robust inspections to other similar bodies. That is why DWP will work with them to agree mutually that each inspection takes place over a suitable period, so that they are assessing and reporting on a period which realistically reflects DWP’s use of search and seizure powers. DWP has worked closely with both HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland, and we understand that sharing information is an integral part of the inspection process. That is why the department is committed to providing all relevant information, so that meaningful inspections can be carried out.
It is important to highlight the unnecessary risk Amendments 86 and 87 create. These amendments could result in sharing information with the inspectorate that could then become disclosable material in a live investigation, potentially jeopardising the outcome. Because of the range of investigatory techniques used during DWP criminal investigations, it is important that the Secretary of State retains discretion not to provide information when the consequences of sharing that information outweigh the benefit to an inspection—for instance, to protect customers or prevent compromising future prosecutions. Depending on the circumstances, examples of such sensitive material not suitable for sharing might include material given in confidence, details about witnesses or other persons who may be in danger if their identities are revealed, material revealing the location of any premises or other place used for surveillance, and material relating to the private life of a witness. I hope that explains why I cannot accept these amendments.
Amendment 88 seeks to extend the remit and scope of an independent person appointed under Clause 89. We have already confirmed that this will be HMICFRS and HMIC Scotland. They will provide an additional safeguard to ensure that the DWP is using these powers proportionally and in line with their intended purpose. However, although the inspectorates are very impressive in their fields, it is clearly not within their remit to assess expenditure or amounts recovered and conduct cost-benefit assessments of the various measures in the Bill. But the Office for Budget Responsibility has certified the estimated £1.5 billion of benefits contained in this Bill and, separately, our impact assessment clearly outlines the estimated costs and how we will scale up our rollout to deliver the savings and commits to monitoring and evaluation of Part 2 of the Bill.
I also remind the House of the existing reporting mechanisms for the DWP’s fraud and error activities that make this amendment unnecessary. In the DWP’s annual report and accounts, the department reports on the savings made from our fraud and error activities, including savings made from activity across our counterfraud and targeted case review teams. In addition, we also report on our debt recovery totals and debt stock. The departmental annual report and accounts are reviewed and scrutinised by the National Audit Office, which publishes a report on the accounts and provides independent assurance to Parliament on the proper use of public funds.
Finally, a question was asked about what is different between the DWP and the PSFA. The type and nature of DWP and PSFA criminal investigations are likely to be very different. That means the risks and decisions involved in disclosing sensitive material are different for each organisation. Due to the function it plays, the DWP is likely to have significantly more individuals who may be vulnerable, and it considers that disclosing sensitive material relating to those persons is not an appropriate approach for it to adopt. For that reason, the DWP must be able to withhold material in such cases to ensure that there is no detriment or risk to vulnerable persons who may be placed at risk.
To conclude, the DWP is committed to transparency and to delivering this Bill and its savings, but I do not think it is helpful or necessary to ask the inspectorates to step outside their existing remit given the routes already in place. I therefore urge the noble Viscount not to press his amendments.
My Lords, I am grateful to the Minister for her response, but I am afraid we are still not persuaded on the point we raised around the powers of the independent reviewer to be provided with information. I certainly do not want to repeat what I said in opening but, in response to her earlier remarks, I want her to be clear that we recognise that some progress has been made on the Bill after a year. Without further ado, I have listened very carefully and heard her responses to Amendments 86 to 88, and I will test the opinion of the House on Amendment 87. I beg leave to withdraw.
My Lords, there being an equality of votes, in accordance with Standing Order 55, which provides that no proposal to amend a Bill in the form in which it is before the House shall be agreed to unless there is a majority in favour of such amendment, I declare the amendment disagreed to.