Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Report stage
Tuesday 28th October 2025 Lords Chamber

Report (1st Day)

Scottish, Northern Ireland and Welsh legislative consent granted. Relevant document: 10th Report from the Constitution Committee.

19:18

Clause 1: The Border Security Commander

Amendment 1

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

1: Clause 1, page 1, line 6, leave out “designate a civil servant as the” and insert “appoint a”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to open our first few hours of debate on Report. Noble Lords who have taken an interest in the Bill throughout our deliberations so far may recognise Amendments 1 and 2. At both Second Reading and in Committee, I said that this new commander was little more than a gimmick. I had hoped that, come Report, I would have heard more persuasive reasons to change my opinion of the Government’s policy. Unfortunately, I have not.

Since we finished Committee on the Bill, 589 people have entered the United Kingdom illegally via small boats. Since the start of this year, 36,954 migrants have crossed the channel. It does not take a genius to figure out that this Government’s policies are not working. The Government entered office with a promise to “smash the gangs”, end the use of hotel accommodation and prevent illegal crossings. They have done none of those things. In fact, the problems have exacerbated.

My Amendments 1 and 2 seek to make minor changes to the method of appointment of the commander. In my opinion, this is an important and strategic role. I will not pretend they are seismic alterations that will shift the dial demonstrably. They are, nevertheless, intended to make an important point that I genuinely hope the Government will take on board.

The point is that the whole of Chapter 1 of the Bill is essentially pointless. The commander is already in post and the Bill provides no substantive new powers. In Committee, when asked by my noble friend Lord Goschen what the commander will be able to do under the provisions of the Bill provisions that his office cannot do already, the Minister said:

“The clauses in Chapter 1—for example, ‘Duty to prepare annual reports’, ‘Duties of cooperation etc’ and ‘The Board’ overseeing all that—underpinned by statutory function give this House the confidence that there is a legislative background to those requirements”.—[Official Report, 26/6/25; col. 395.]


So it appears the Government believe that designating a civil servant as a commander and granting them the ability to prepare a report and to chair a board meeting every now and then is the solution to all our border security woes.

Noble Lords will be aware of the report into the operation of the Civil Service within the Home Office. How can we have faith that another civil servant in post as the commander would make any difference? Amendments 1 and 2 are intended to press the point that the commander, if their appointment is ever to be anything more than pure performance politics, needs to be more than simply a civil servant. It is wise, is it not, to have a guarantee in the Bill that the commander will be a senior law enforcement or military officer, so as to ensure the requisite competence, leadership and experience is brought to the role.

I have one question for the Minister. Earlier this year, the Independent Chief Inspector of Borders and Immigration investigated the Home Office’s operation to deter and detect clandestine entrance to the UK. The first recommendation of the independent inspector was to:

“Designate a Home Office-wide ‘owner’ for clandestine entry”.


In the Government’s response, the Home Office agreed with that recommendation and said that the

“Border Security Command … will ultimately provide the structure to support this role”.

However, it said that it will not implement that recommendation until October 2026. We have a Border Security Commander who the Government tell us is critical to co-ordinating our response to threats to border security, and yet they are not willing to make him responsible for tackling all methods of clandestine entry until next year. Why is this?

Does this not demonstrate the issue with this Government’s approach to the problem? Every can must be kicked down a very long and winding road. Why not designate the commander as the Home Office-wide “owner” for clandestine entry now? Why wait until next year? It is unfortunate, and we on these Benches will be pushing the Government to go much further over the course of Report. The British public want this border crisis solved, and they are watching. I beg to move.

[Lord Swire (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Davies in his amendments. They seem to me to be eminently sensible. I wholly concur with him, as do most people increasingly in the country, that there is no sense of urgency, no sense of grip and a total lack of confidence when it comes to the Government’s handling of the immigration crisis.

The appointment of a Border Security Commander, and limiting that appointment to a civil servant, is a mistake, particularly when we look at other civil servants. When I was a Minister, I had excellent civil servants, and I have nothing to say against them. The great majority of them do an extremely good job. But when we have Joanna Rowland, the Home Office’s director-general for customer services, in charge of accommodating asylum seekers, standing down because of the failure of that, why should we have faith that someone just selected from the Civil Service should be appropriate to fulfil this role?

We are missing a huge mistake in this whole immigration debate. There is a huge backlog in the processing of asylum cases. Why have the Government not come forward with an idea of having an equivalent to Nightingale hospitals, which is what we had during the Covid pandemic, to process this? In my opinion, there is a whole raft of professionals in this country who are retired far too early. We in this House are the last vestiges of people who never retire, but there are an awful lot of people in this House who have retired, or been forced to retire, from their professions—be they judges, solicitors, army officers from the military or magistrates—who would willingly serve, if encouraged to do so, on a series of tribunals up and down the country, so as to better process the backlog in immigration cases.

If you look at the appointment of this incredibly important role, the Border Security Commander is in charge of liaising with Border Force, the National Crime Agency, the Immigration Service and Immigration Enforcement, and the goal is to deliver a safe and effective border. That has not happened to date. I just do not understand the rationale behind why this legislation is limiting the appointment of such a person, with the very narrow criteria that it has, to a civil servant. There must be plenty of other people out there who would be qualified to do this job who are not necessarily from the Civil Service.

I urge the Government to underline the sense of crisis there is in this country. It is benefiting parties and groups in this country that we would rather it did not, because there is a feeling up and down the country that the Government simply have not got control of our borders. There are those who may argue that the appointment of this individual is totemic, that they do not have sufficient power and that the powers will not kick in until later. Those are other arguments. My argument is that, if we have a national crisis which is set to get only worse, we should look at the whole cadre of recently retired professionals who would step up to serve, right across the board, in dealing with the backlog and this immigration crisis. We should look at the best candidates available to fulfil this particular job and not limit it to somebody from the Civil Service.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I wish to speak to Amendment 26 in this group, in my name and that of my noble friend Lord German, on co-operation with Europol. I think the reason it has been grouped here is that it would help boost the effectiveness of the Border Security Commander.

The Government recently published the implementation report on the trade and co-operation agreement with the EU. It was implemented in 2023-24, so this was a bit out of date by the time it was published just last month. Under the section on

“Law enforcement and judicial cooperation in criminal matters”,


there is a paragraph that says that:

“Under the TCA, the UK continues to co-operate with Europol and it continues to have a strong multi-agency liaison bureau at The Hague delivering operational activity against the most significant crime groups”.


There is one interesting reference in the trade and co-operation agreement—for the nerds out there, it is at Article 568, paragraph 7. It says that:

“Liaison officers from the United Kingdom and representatives of the competent authorities of the United Kingdom may be invited to operational meetings”.


That sums up the challenge that we have outside the European Union. We only “may” be invited. We have no rights. It is all grace and favour.

I watched the recent session of the Home Affairs Committee in the other place with the Border Security Commander, Martin Hewitt, and the National Crime Agency’s director general for operations, Rob Jones. Asked about European co-operation, Mr Hewitt said,

“we retained really good … law enforcement co-operation”.

However, Mr Jones amplified that by saying,

“we have mitigated the impact”

of Brexit and

“we have recovered those relationships in terms of law enforcement”

and have positive joint operations. He also said:

“We have more people in Europol than we have ever had”.


I assume he was thinking that the committee would be impressed by that, but I believe he was making the best of a bad job. I imagine that we have more people at Europol than ever before because, whereas in the past British police officers could access European databases from their desks in the UK, now we need a host of liaison officers attached to Europol HQ to handle the red tape of individual information requests and to run around seeing whether we might be invited to meetings.

19:30

We lost access to the key database, SIS II. Although we have re-established some access to the so-called Prüm system of fingerprint and DNA data, access to its successor, Prüm II, is, as I understand it, not yet pinned down. Brexit cost us access to ECRIS, which carries criminal records in the EU of, among others, third-country nationals.

When Rob Jones gave evidence to the European Affairs Committee, he told us that it would also be useful to be able to exchange larger data sets with the EU more easily, in order to be better able to tackle criminal networks rather than merely individuals. That key point is relevant to this Bill because it would of course include organised immigration crime.

When the European Affairs Committee heard evidence from a range of witnesses from the criminal law enforcement sector, including Rob Jones, witnesses explained how new working arrangements in the post-Brexit environment were being developed. However, they told us that they were slower, more cumbersome and more in need of human input—in other words, more clunky—than those that applied when the UK was an EU member state.

At the moment, UK-EU co-operation on law enforcement depends on the pragmatism and good will of individual law enforcement professionals, which is not the best or most solid basis. Instead, we need formal UK-EU agreements on co-operation, in order to ensure legal certainty and consistency in the UK’s law enforcement relations with the EU. Since the reset has not so far produced much in the law enforcement field, the purpose of Amendment 26, which would require the production of an annual report on co-operation with Europol, is to encourage the Government to pursue a more formal relationship with Europol and to focus mind and effort in the years to come.

I shall highlight one point about Amendment 26. It asks not only for reporting on what co-operation with Europol has happened in the previous year but for

“planned activities for improving future cooperation with Europol”.

That is a key point. We want to know not only what has happened in the past year but what lessons have been learned and how to improve activities in the future. We cannot wave a magic wand and get back the days when, for 10 years, we had a British director of Europol—those were the good days—but we can at least do better than make the best of a bad job and try to make this a priority. By imposing a requirement on the Government to report, I hope that would provide an incentive to pursue a more structured and formalised relationship with Europe in order to catch more organised criminals.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I will start my remarks on this group where the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, finished, since that seems the most convenient way to do it. I will not rehearse my arguments on Amendment 26 at length because I spoke to it in Committee.

On co-operation with Europol, which is very important, I shall make two points. First, the Government’s motivation to co-operate with Europol is because they want to deal with the problem, and I do not believe that the necessity to produce a report will change that dynamic. If the Government did not want to co-operate with Europol because they did not think it was important, I do not believe that having to prepare a report would change their mind either. I do not think it will achieve very much.

Secondly, as I said in Committee, the danger is that this then skews attention towards Europol. We know that border security is not just a European problem. Obviously, the small boats issue—the visible bit of it—is a European problem, because that is where the boats are coming from, but the people in them are not all starting off from France. This is a global problem, and these organised crime groups are global in nature. If we start putting legislation in place that forces the department to start overly focusing on one area to do bureaucratic tasks, we will skew its resources. I want the Home Office and the Government to choose which agencies they partner with, and the work they do, based not on the need to produce bureaucratic documents but on the security threat to our border. That is best left to the judgment of Ministers and those in post, so I respectfully suggest that this is not a wise amendment.

I turn to Amendments 1 and 2 tabled my noble friend Lord Davies. Unfortunately, I was not in the Committee stage debate when the Minister put this forward, so I had a look at the arguments. I confess that I am not entirely clear how designating a civil servant—or, indeed, anyone with this title—makes a meaningful difference, other than perhaps presentationally, to our ability to secure the border.

I pick up the point that my noble friend made about the pace at which the Government are giving this individual powers. Having looked at the Bill again, it is noticeable that this person does not have the ability to co-ordinate. The ability to co-ordinate or direct members of the Armed Forces is excluded—that power effectively remains with Ministers. In addition, the intelligence agencies of our country are not counted as partner authorities for the purposes of the Border Security Commander either, so those responsibilities effectively remain with the Home Secretary and other Ministers.

In terms of the role, and this is why who gets the role matters, effectively strategic priorities for government departments are set not by officials—well, they should not be set by officials—but by Ministers. I understand in one way why the Government are making sure that this person is a civil servant, because they are therefore clearly being directed by Ministers, which is right. However, if they are a civil servant being directed by Ministers, giving them a fancy title is basically just window dressing; it does not have any meaningful effect. My noble friend is therefore right to argue that this does not really have a meaningful role.

If we take the Government at their word, from the way it is presented as the starting point of this Bill—in that they want this individual to have a powerful role where they can make a meaningful difference—then Amendment 2 asks some good questions about whether the type of person we want doing this role and their previous experience should be in the nature of law enforcement or military command in some way. It may be that, over time, the Government can build this role —as well as the board that the Border Security Commander would chair and the structure they will put around them—into a meaningful law enforcement and crime fighting capability.

That seems to be the Government’s ambition, in which case Amendment 2 has quite a lot of merit, but making the person a civil servant does not achieve that. Just for the avoidance of doubt, this is not in any way to denigrate civil servants; when I was in the Home Office, I was always very impressed by them. It is just making the point that in our democratic system, setting strategic priorities and co-ordinating between different agencies, some that are responsible to the Home Office and some that are not, is really a job for Ministers. In the end, the responsibility for securing the country’s border is the Home Secretary’s responsibility. You can appoint somebody with whatever title you like and whatever background you like, but, in the end, that is the fact. The strategic priorities for the department are set by the Home Secretary, and everything else flows from that.

It seems to me that the Border Security Commander as set out in the Bill is really neither one thing nor the other. Either the Border Security Commander is effectively the Home Secretary and sets clear priorities, setting a very clear direction in the department and delivering on what we are led to believe is the Government’s or the Home Secretary’s number one priority, or that is not the case, and you try to create a meaningful role that people understand has that important focus in the same way that people can see that the heads of the Armed Forces or Commissioners of the Metropolitan Police have a very important leadership role—but in which case that person probably should not be a civil servant and should come with a different type of command experience. So it seems to me that the role set out in the Bill is neither one thing or the other.

My noble friend’s amendments test that point, and I would certainly like to hear from the Minister about which direction this role is going to go in. Is it effectively just going to be working for the Home Secretary, which is perfectly fine, in which case a lot of this is just window dressing, or is it really intended to make it a meaningful, authoritative, powerful role in Whitehall, in which case the person’s qualities need to be somewhat different than is set out by making them a career civil servant?

[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I am not quite sure where the noble Lord, Lord Harper, is ending up in his consideration of Amendments 1 and 2. On any view, the crisis has got worse and worse with regard to the arrival of masses more immigrants coming across in small boats and the inability to identify and arrest these criminal people-smugglers. I am afraid I cannot give examples because I have not had time to think about it, but I do recognise one example: the modern slavery commissioner is completely free from the Civil Service, as indeed was her predecessor. This suggestion advanced by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, seems sensible, and therefore I want to hear what my noble friend the Minister has to say about it.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I will first address Amendment 26. In reply to the noble Lord, Lord Harper, I would say that the reason we have this particular amendment before us is because of the harness which was left by the Conservative Government in the arrangements that they made with Europe in the TCA relating to Europol. I do not want to go through the five or six pages in that heavy white tome—I photocopied those pages to make it lighter to carry—but in the whole remit of the way in which the relationship with Europol is stated it is quite clear that we “should” do something and the European Union, through Europol, “may” do something. I think we are trying to address that sort of relationship.

The core objective of the Bill, which I think unites the House, is clear. We must strengthen our borders and effectively identify, disrupt and dismantle the criminal gangs engaged in people-smuggling and human trafficking. To achieve this, international co-operation is paramount, especially in addressing the complex international and cross-border nature of these challenges.

19:45

I saw these challenges when I visited the French forces in Calais very recently. A vehicle from Germany had been caught with people carrying—underneath a blanket with children’s teddy bears on top—the dinghies which were going to be used to cross the channel. Those international boundaries are very important for what happens in Europe. They told us quite clearly what happens. These boats are produced in China, sent to somewhere in the Middle East, imported into one of the European Union countries and then transported. It is like a spider’s web around us. That is why relationships with European police and enforcement forces are so important.

In Committee, two important, intertwined issues emerged. First, across the House there is agreement on the need for effective co-operation. The Border Security Commander is explicitly tasked with working with a range of international bodies, including Europol, to deliver border security objectives. Europol is critical for disrupting trafficking operations, enhancing law enforcement capabilities and providing necessary specialised training to officials involved in enforcement. The Government’s approach, which is quite different from that of the previous Government, has been to encourage and engage in this co-operation—in Committee, the Minister described how important it was. That is why the UK, as I understand it, now maintains this significant permanent presence at the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. So this continued engagement is considered a key element for working across national boundaries and is vital for national security.

However, the TCA—this document negotiated by the previous Government—offered the opportunity for Europol offices to be embedded inside the UK. It says we “should” embed in Europol in The Hague, but it “may” embed in the UK, and obviously at this moment that has not happened. Will the Minister encourage Europol to embed officers inside the police services in this country as well? Largely, the reason is to do with transfer of information. Some of the things which we know about the people engaged in these criminal gangs are contained within databases to which we do not have access. But a Europol officer sitting alongside another officer may well have that access and, given sympathetic interpretation of the TCA, may well be able to get that information and move it forward.

Secondly, concerns were raised in this House that, while the Government undertake extensive European liaison, this arrangement remains operationally cumbersome. It was acknowledged that post-Brexit arrangements are sometimes viewed as more cumbersome, clunky and process-heavy, and commentators suggest that our current success amounts to merely mitigating the impact and recovering relationships. There is still a little too much at the level of pledges, aspiration and intent rather than demonstrable product.

Amendment 26 is not a bureaucratic nightmare; this report will help us to build that relationship and will help us in Parliament to be able to understand how that would move forward. It is designed to bridge the gap between assurances of co-operation and operational results on the ground. It is a necessary mechanism for parliamentary accountability given the frail harness which was provided by the previous Government. As noted in Committee, reliance solely on the word of Ministers or the discretion of operational leaders is not sufficient when addressing matters of such high public salience, which I think everyone in this Chamber agrees this is. So we need Parliament to have the duty to receive data and to show us the work that has been done to smash the gangs.

We are tying this requirement not merely to activity but to measured progress in the reduction of crime. Collaboration with our European partners is, as a result, rigorously monitored for its effectiveness in achieving the stated objectives of the Bill: to disrupt criminal networks and secure our borders. I am afraid that at this stage we on these Benches cannot support Amendments 1 and 2. Amendment 1 seeks to remove the requirement for the Border Security Commander to be a civil servant. The line of the Bill in question here is:

“Service as the Commander is service in the civil service of the State”.

Could anybody who is appointed to this post then, because of their function, become a member of the Civil Service? The operational advertisement and the search for the right candidate is one thing, but when you appoint someone, can that person then become a civil servant of the state on appointment?

The definitions which are listed in Amendment 2 are too precise. The role is much more one of strategic co-ordination than what I might call waving the rod to make things happen. These amendments introduce constraints, potentially compromising the flexibility that is required to appoint the best person to lead the strategic co-ordination efforts aimed at tackling border security threats and cracking down on illegal entry.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lords who have tabled these amendments to allow us to have this discussion again on the Border Security Commander. Let me lay to rest one allegation straight away. This is not a gimmick. This is a serious piece of government policy to put in place a co-ordinating Border Security Command designed to co-ordinate activity across the board, including relations with our security services.

In answer to the noble Lords, Lord Davies, Lord Harper and Lord Swire, and my noble friend Lord Hacking, to date it has secured £150 million of funding; has improved the number of Border Security Command officers to 227; has brought together world leaders from over 40 countries to mobilise the international fight on immigration crime; has disrupted criminal networks; has improved intelligence and strategic coherence; has led an international effort on an anti-smuggling action plan; has signed a proposal with Germany and the Calais Group in France; has launched a new sanctions regime focused on organised crime; and has supported the development of the plans that are being put into the Bill for the Home Secretary.

To answer the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Harper, on the functions of the commander, Clause 3(4)(b) states that the commander must

“obtain the consent of the Secretary of State to issue the document”.

There is obviously some discussion with the Secretary of State. Ministers set their priority. If the Secretary of State does not agree with the proposed plans, potentially that consent will be a matter of discussion and arrangement. The key point is that there is an official appointed by the UK Government to co-ordinate those important Border Force control issues on border security, to tackle organised immigration crime and to end the facilitation of dangerous small boat crossings.

Yes, it is a difficult task. As the noble Lord, Lord German, has said, it has been inherited from the previous Government. The noble Lord, Lord Swire, asked why we did not employ people to tackle the backlog. Well, let me inform him that we are: we have put about 1,000 extra staff into doing what he has suggested the House does today. The allegation that I want to nail down is that this is a gimmick. It is not a gimmick. It is a serious piece of work that requires an important role in government to secure that work.

Amendments 1 and 2 relate to the Border Security Commander and seek to remove the requirement that the Border Security Commander is a civil servant. With due respect to noble Lords, there is a slight misunderstanding. The noble Lord, Lord Swire, argued that we should potentially be drawing on somebody from a wider background. The current Border Security Commander was a senior police officer in the Metropolitan Police and, if this Bill is passed, he will be a member of the Civil Service. The Bill does not require that the post of Border Security Commander be reserved for existing civil servants. Indeed, the current officeholder was recruited externally.

Ultimately, given that the role sits within the Home Office and given that the commander leads a directorate in the department, the commander is a civil servant by that position: it does not mean that they have to be a civil servant by recruitment. There is no requirement that any future recruitment exercise would not seek to identify the most suitable candidate, irrespective of background. Therefore, the amendment is unnecessary.

Amendment 2 seeks to specify the prior experience required to be eligible to be appointed as Border Security Commander. It is important that we have the best talent. There are no limitations on that talent. In the event of a vacancy arising—at the moment, there is no vacancy—the Government have been clear that the Border Security Commander is responsible for requiring step change in the UK’s approach to border security, providing a long-term vision, bringing together those individuals, providing leadership and maintaining the integrity of our border and immigration systems, domestically and internationally. That role is reflected in the Bill. The Bill puts the commander on a statutory footing and gives that legal back-up. It has been crafted to ensure that we have the best possible candidate for the role.

The noble Lord, Lord Swire—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I have a very short question. I have listened very carefully and the Minister has been very clear about the nature of the role. What powers will the Border Security Commander have when this Bill becomes law that they do not already have by virtue of being a civil servant reporting to the Home Secretary?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Again, I think the noble Lord misunderstands the focus of the Bill. The Bill is giving statutory footing to what is now happening. There is a Border Security Commander in post. That Border Security Commander has the roles that we have outlined here, but this puts the post on a statutory footing.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Can the Minister just set out clearly what difference that makes in the real world to dealing with any of these problems? Otherwise, it is just a piece of window dressing.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Let me just say to the noble Lord that I have been through a list of things that the Border Security Commander is doing now—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

Without legislation.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Without legislation, but the statutory footing is there to put that position on a statutory footing and to put in place the statutory requirements to produce an annual report, to have the consent of the Home Secretary and to have some accountability to this House. The noble Lord can press the Minister as much as he wishes. I have set out the concrete things that this Border Security Commander has done in the 15 or 16 months that we have been in office and since we appointed Martin Hewitt to the post. It is a good record. These things would not have been done without his activity. The French agreement, the German agreement and the work in Iraq have been done because the Home Secretary enabled them. This was done without statutory backing, but it will be stronger with that statutory backing on the issues of the report, et cetera, to allow the Border Security Commander to do those things. I hope the noble Lord welcomes that but, if he does not, he can vote accordingly, as I always say. Vote accordingly and we will see what happens with those issues. But, ultimately, that is what we are trying to achieve.

The noble Lord, Lord Swire, made an important point about Jo Rowland. I place on record my thanks to Jo for the work that she has done. She has left not through the factual issues that the noble Lord, Lord Swire, mentioned, of failure, but through personal choice to pursue another job outside the Civil Service. That happens all the time with individuals. She has chosen to do that. The Home Office thanks her for her contribution during her time as a civil servant. She was not a civil servant before she came to the Home Office: she worked in the private sector. It is a perfectly legitimate thing to do and we should not let it lie that she has left because of any failure in that position.

[Lord Swire (Con)]

I am reflecting on the Minister’s remarks in answer to my noble friend Lord Harper’s earlier point. If the current situation is that the border commander is operating anyway, without the statutory footing, under whose authority is he currently acting?

20:00

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

He is acting under the authority of the Home Secretary. If the noble Lord looks at the Bill, he will see that the statutory functions that it provides set out the terms of appointment and designation, as well as the functions, reporting mechanisms and responsibilities of the commander in relation to things such as the intelligence services—which, just for the record, are themselves employing world-class capabilities. Those capabilities, and the people behind them and their operations, are necessarily secret. However, I can confirm that, where it is appropriate, the agencies will be supporting the Border Security Commander in their work, and that they will be subject to the same authorisations that exist currently within a robust oversight regime. There is a whole range of things going on. The Bill is a focus to put them on a statutory basis. I do not think that the amendments, helpful though they are to tease out this discussion, are necessary for us to achieve our objective.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

The Minister just said something that I do not think is in the Bill. He talked about the security services. In Clause 3(3), on the functions of the commander, the Bill says:

“A partner authority must have regard to the strategic priority document in exercising its functions”.


Later, in Clause 3(6), the Bill specifically says that the Security Service, the Secret Intelligence Service and GCHQ are “not partner authorities”, so they are not obligated to follow the strategic priorities set out by the Border Security Commander. That is correct, because they should be following the strategic priorities set out by the Home Secretary and the Foreign Secretary respectively. I am not sure that what he said about their working together is quite right.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

By his own admission, the noble Lord did not attend Committee. It is the pity that he did not, because he could have raised some of these questions then. If he chooses to raise them now, on Report, I will give him the same answer. The Border Security Commander is working closely with the security services, and they have authorisation directly from the Foreign Secretary and the Home Secretary. Quite evidently, when they—or in this case he—are drawing up a plan to examine what needs to be done to solve the common issue of reducing small boat crossings, bringing criminals to justice and helping to speed up the asylum removals that the noble Lord, Lord Swire, referred to, then they are going to discuss and work with the security services. I am straying into a Committee-type session, which the noble Lord did not attend. I would rather stick to Report, which the noble Lord has attended. I think I have answered the questions that he has put before the House.

Turning to Amendment 26, if we return to the position we were in in 2016—which the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and noble Lord, Lord German, would have wished we maintained—we would still be a member of Europol. On a personal note, when I was a Member of the House of Commons, in 2016, 2017, 2018 and 2019 I argued that we retain the capability of Europol and CIS as part of the EU-UK withdrawal agreement. That did not happen. But it is important that we ensure, post-Brexit agreement, that we have as close co-operation as possible with Europol on information gathering and criminal justice delivery capabilities—which the noble Lord and the noble Baroness mentioned. That is important. As we said in Committee, we have a strong existing relationship with Europol. We have around 20 permanent members of staff who work at the multi-agency liaison bureau at the agency’s headquarters in The Hague. The noble Lord asked whether we should have some Europol people here. We currently do not. That is a matter for discussion. Where we are now may be a matter for regret. I voted to remain, but we are where we are. Europol remains an independent organisation. It is accountable to the members of the European Union, and it produces its report to the European Union.

I say to the noble Baroness, and to the noble Lord who supports her, that the proposed new clause in her amendment would require reporting on all aspects of our co-operation with Europol. Ministers, including me, will regularly update Parliament on international law enforcement co-operation, including with Europol. We publish annual minutes of UK-EU specialised committees that monitor and review our trade agreements, including with Europol.

I am mindful that Europol is not a UK body. It answers to the European Commission and its member states, so bilateral co-operation may sometimes be something that we cannot publicly report on. It is not for us to report on some of the issues with Europol, because that is what Europol does. As the noble Baroness mentioned, once upon a time, in days gone by, we did have a British senior official leading Europol. That has changed; we are in a different world now. I assure her that the focus remains on disrupting organised crime, protecting vulnerable people, securing our borders and working in co-operation with Europol to achieve those objectives. To go back to the role of the Border Security Commander, one of his key roles is to oil the machinery of that operation, and work with colleagues who are directly operationally responsible, to make sure that we engender co-operation at a European level.

I therefore respectfully say to the noble Lord, Lord Davies, that Amendments 1 and 2 are not necessary, and I ask him not to press them. Amendment 26, from the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, is asking for things that we do not need to do, because we in this House are, in a sense, accountable for that relationship. I cannot report on all matters, but I get the spirit of what she is trying to say. On behalf of the UK Government, I want to have the closest co-operation possible with Europol and the European agencies, because we have a joint interest in tackling the criminal gangs and stopping individuals being exploited in those crossings.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a short but useful debate. I thank all those who have participated.

I will say a few words on Amendment 26, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford. In addition to the noble Baroness’s comments, I would say that we should be co-ordinating with our European allies on tackling the border crisis in any case. We need to stem the flow of illegal migration through Europe and across the channel, and to disrupt the criminal gangs that operate the smuggling network. However, we should be careful not to see this as some form of silver bullet. The problem cannot be solved simply by striking agreements with other European countries. We know the limited impact that the Government’s so-called “one in, one out” deal has had.

There is so much more that the Government could and should be doing to tackle the fully blown crisis at our border. They need to eliminate the pull factors and implement an effective deterrent. We had hoped the Government would take a long, hard look at their current policy, implement a serious and credible deterrent to prevent people crossing the channel in small boats, and present us with a commander with authority, rather than a commander with nothing to command. Evidently, that is not the case. We will watch very carefully and scrutinise the role of the commander. For now, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 1 withdrawn.

Amendment 2 not moved.

Clause 13: Supplying articles for use in immigration crime

Amendment 3

Moved by

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel]

3: Clause 13, page 7, line 8, after “supply” insert “or has in their possession with intent to supply”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would also include possession with intent to supply in the offence of supplying articles for use in immigration crime.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, the Minister knows that the new offences in Clauses 13 and 14 are ones that I support, and he will remember my defence of them in Committee. During our Committee proceedings, I raised two important issues relating to what I consider to be gaps in these two new offences.

The first was the omission of “possession with intent to supply” from the offence of supplying an article for use in immigration crime. My argument here is that the possession of sufficient quantities of such an article is not an innocent act; it is a precursor to the commission of the offence. By failing to criminalise the preparatory acts, I feared that we would not be including within the offence everyone that we wish to capture.

The second gap I identified is that the offence in Clause 14 does not include a person who arranges for two third parties to exchange articles for use in immigration crime. Once again, this is an essential preparatory act whereby one person is facilitating the exchange of goods that will later be used in the commission of the new offence. The problem here is that we know that organised crime gangs are always concocting ever more ingenious methods of circumventing the law, often by removing themselves from the criminal acts and organising exchanges.

In this regard, I am very pleased that the Government have listened and tabled Amendments 4 and 8. It is genuinely welcome that they have listened to the concerns that I raised in Committee, taken those suggestions away and come back to this House with a solution.

The Minister’s amendments would create two further offences within Clauses 13 and 14; in effect, by expanding their reach. Included within the scope of these offences is a person who is concerned in the supplying or the receiving of an article. The second aspect of these new offences is that the person has to know that the relevant article is to be used in connection with an offence, under the relevant sections in the Immigration Act 1971. It is my understanding that those two aspects of the new offences in Amendments 4 and 8, tabled by the Government, would cover possession with intent to supply and the arranging of the exchange of an article between two third parties. I ask the Minister to give me his cast-iron assurance that the Government’s amendments include the gaps that I have identified. With that, I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I start from the position of being very unhappy with Clause 13 in any event. The term “intent” in Amendment 3 is certainly familiar, but it is really quite hard to prove. We should not be in the business of creating offences where it would not generally be realistic to prosecute.

On government Amendments 4 and 8, the term “concerned” is very broad. I think it is used in the Misuse of Drugs Act 1971; I do not know how that came into my mind, but I found it. In any event, it is so broad as to be questionable. This clause would criminalise people and, as we said many times in Committee, we see a danger of criminalising asylum seekers by regarding them as doing things that we do not want smugglers to do. We do not want smugglers, but we are sweeping them up in that net.

I have rather the same point about new subsection (1A)(b) in Amendment 4 and the term “in connection with”, which again is very wide. Surely the criminal law covers being an accessory, aiding and abetting, and so on, so I am also concerned about that.

Amendment 6 includes the term “arranges”. How is this not covered by Clause 14(1)(c), which uses the term “assists”?

Overall, we are concerned about the breadth of these amendments. The extension of the offences concerns us—if I can use that word without punning—in any event.

20:15

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend in his Amendment 3 and the amendments that the Government have brought forward to try to make Clause 13 more effective and appropriate.

I have a broader question for the Minister. I suspect that many of the people who may be caught by this are already committing all sorts of other offences, either provisions within the scope of the Bill or those under some other relevant legislation, such as the Immigration Act 1971. My question to the Government is: how effective do they believe Clause 13 will be? What sort of a difference do they believe it will make? They have brought forward legislation and asked this House to pass a Bill containing Clause 13; they must have a view, whether from the police, the Crown Prosecution Service or other arms of government, on how effective they believe this measure will be, given that many, perhaps even the majority, of people committing these offences will not be resident in the United Kingdom, but will be elsewhere as part of the broader supply chain.

Therefore, I am broadly supportive, but I would appreciate the Minister answering my question when he sums up the debate.

[Lord German (LD)]

I support my noble friend Lady Hamwee and will ask a couple of questions about the “concerned in” area. The Government’s Amendments 4 and 8 further expand the scope of offences in Clauses 13 and 14 by introducing this liability to be “concerned in” the supply or handling of articles. I understand that some of this phraseology is also in some of our counterterrorism laws, and I wonder whether it has been drawn from those very serious laws and just put in this in the moment.

The original intention of Clauses 13 to 17 was to target the activities of facilitators and organised criminal gangs. As my noble friend says, the worry is that the expansion of the offences risks inadvertently criminalising people who should be protected and providing unintended harms to those who are most vulnerable.

I have one other point about criminalising non-criminal actors. Perhaps the Minister could say a little word about legal practitioners. There is a certain ambiguity created by these broad offences which might risk affecting legal practitioners who provide legitimate services. Perhaps he could tell us whether that can be explicitly put into the Bill or explicitly ruled out of the amendments that the Government have put before us today.

In summary, these government amendments are seeking to widen further the extraterritorial counterterror-style offences. In turn, that requires statutory guardrails to prevent them targeting vulnerable individuals, and legal representation and legal practitioners, instead of solely the organised crime networks. I hope the Minister can put that matter to rest.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to all noble Lords who have participated in this short but worthwhile debate. I am particularly grateful to the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord Cameron of Lochiel, for tabling Amendments 3 and 6, and to the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, for speaking to them. These seek to criminalise possession with intent to supply and to ensure that those who arrange for a relevant item to be received by a third party fall into the scope of the offence.

As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, acknowledged, in response to the debate that we had in Committee on these amendments, the Government have tabled Amendments 4, 5, 8, 9, 16 and 17. These build on proposals advanced by the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, in Committee and, indeed, this evening on Report.

In refining the approach, we have tabled amendments that ensure that individuals who are concerned in the supply chain can be held accountable where they know that their actions are enabling criminal activity, and that those who are knowingly concerned in supplying articles for use in immigration crime fall in scope. As the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, noted, criminals are always developing new ways to pursue organised immigration crime, and we have to stay on top of them. These amendments are part of the package of measures in the Bill, and that is why we have tabled these government amendments, to address the concerns around third-party supply that were noted in Committee.

I believe that this matches the intent in the noble Lords’ amendments, both on Report and in Committee, by ensuring that those who are concerned in the supply of, or the making of an offer to supply, a relevant article for use in immigration crime, and those who are concerned in the handling of a relevant article for use in immigration crime, are in scope of this offence. As such, I hope that noble Lords are content with the government amendments and will not press theirs.

This is a proportionate and necessary step, one that targets the infrastructure behind the wicked trade of organised immigration crime. It allows us to disrupt the actions of not only those who commit offences directly but those who facilitate them through the provision of tools, materials or services. As we have already heard tonight, organised immigration crime works internationally, through networks of facilitators and organisers. This new offence, strengthened by this amendment, is about acting before the facilitation offences have happened, to prevent crossings and the risking of life, and everything that goes with it.

These amendments have safeguards in place, reflecting our wider discussion on this aspect, in that the individual must be knowingly engaged in facilitation to fall into scope, and law enforcement must be able to prove that knowledge, protecting those who act in good faith from these offences.

I turn to some of the questions and points raised. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and, from the Front Bench, the noble Lord, Lord German, raised concerns about the language in the Bill and its precision.

First, on how “concerned in” is any different from the “handling” wording in the Bill—as Lord German asked—the Bill equips law enforcement with counter- terror-style powers to disrupt and dismantle smuggling operations far earlier, well before a boat is launched from the French coast and lives are put at risk. The amendment strengthens these powers, setting out that someone does not need to smuggle people into the UK themselves to face jail time. Law enforcement can also use these powers to go after people playing other roles in smuggling operations. This may include, for instance, providing a lorry to try smuggling people into the UK, sending money to buy small boat parts, or storing dinghies in warehouses knowing full well that they are being used for channel crossings.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, talked about the breadth and vagueness of the use of “concerned in”. Would it, for instance, capture those who are selling boat equipment to sailors? To be clear, that is not the intention here. All that is changing with this amendment is setting out that someone involved in people-smuggling operations can face jail time, not just those smuggling people into the UK themselves.

To go to the heart of whether this is an overreach, which I think is the concern coming from the Liberal Democrat Benches, let us be absolutely clear, and I think we can all agree on this: vile people smugglers are wreaking havoc on our borders and are putting lives at risk to line their own pockets. None the less, law enforcement must follow a strict legal test and prove that someone knew the activity was part of smuggling operations. As with any criminal offence, independent prosecutors will look at all factors when considering prosecution and judge every case on its merits. Indeed, the officers who are carrying out potential seizures and applying for arrest warrants will bear in mind the usual high bar of evidential standards that prosecutors require for a successful prosecution. Nothing changes there.

The noble Lord, Lord German, asked about the impact on legal practitioners. To be clear, this is about supplying goods, not services. There is a clear difference between people who want to supply dinghies to get people across the channel and those who are supplying people with legal services to defend an appeal claim for asylum, for instance.

Lastly, I turn to the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, who asked for the bigger picture. This Bill is about making it harder for vile smugglers to operate. The new counterterror-style powers equip law enforcement with the tools that it needs to act earlier against the smugglers. I would say to the noble Lord that even one prosecution that stops a smuggler in their tracks could save countless lives. We have seen over many summers the number of people who are crammed on to those boats. If we can stop any single boat launching, through getting those dinghies seized earlier, that will have a material impact in saving lives.

This is tough legislation that builds upon the surge in operational action against people-smuggling networks. The National Crime Agency carried out around 350 disruptions on organised immigration crime networks—its highest level on record and a 40% increase on the previous year. Through these amendments, we send a clear and unequivocal message: those who enable immigration crime, whether through direct action or indirect facilitation, will face consequences. This aligns with the Government’s broader commitment to stop the boats and dismantle the nefarious networks that profit from the evil of human exploitation, and reinforces our resolve to tackle every link in the chain of illegal migration.

The Government’s approach has been clear from taking office: to go after the gangs. We need these offences enacted to allow operational colleagues to do their jobs. They will strengthen our ability to prosecute facilitators and reinforce our stance that nobody concerned in the supply of articles for use in such offences should be beyond the reach of the law.

Having said that, I ask the noble Lord, Lord Cameron, to withdraw his amendment. We shall then formally move the government amendments in this group.

[Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to all noble Lords who have spoken in this short group. I have just one observation on the comments from the noble Lord, Lord German, around the phrase “concerned in”, which appears in the amendments. He stated that it appears in counterterrorism law. It also appears frequently in the criminal law around misuse of drugs. I would suggest that the criminal courts are well used to both interpreting and applying that phrase; there is a wealth of case law on it. I would also suggest that it is not unusual, difficult or exceptional phraseology.

I am very grateful for the assurances from the Minister. It is very welcome that the Government have listened to our concerns and addressed them with these amendments. Therefore, I beg leave to withdraw Amendment 3.

Amendment 3 withdrawn.

Amendments 4 and 5

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

4: Clause 13, page 7, line 12, at end insert—
“(1A) A person (“P”) commits an offence if—(a) P is concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, a relevant article to another person, and(b) at any time when P is concerned in that act, P knows that the relevant article is to be used by any person in connection with an offence under section 24 or 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the offence in clause 13 to cover being concerned in the supplying of, or the making of an offer to supply, a relevant article for use in immigration crime.

5: Clause 13, page 7, line 15, leave out “(1)” and insert “(1)(a) or (1A)(a) (as the case may be)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 13 at page 7, line 12.

Amendments 4 and 5 agreed.

Clause 14: Handling articles for use in immigration crime

Amendment 6 not moved.

Amendment 7

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

7: Clause 14, page 8, line 10, leave out “by P or another person” and insert “by a person other than P or a member of P’s immediate family”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to ensure that the new criminal offence is targeted at people smugglers rather than those seeking asylum.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, before we get going on Amendment 7, I want to comment on government Amendments 10 and 11. I thank the Minister for responding not only to the amendments in Committee but to my request for a meeting, and holding that meeting during a week when he had so many—I think he can barely have had time to breathe. It was extremely pleasing to be able to pursue a matter on which we both understood what we were aiming for, even though we could not quite find the words in Committee.

My amendment then was about hygiene kits. From the slightly delicate terminology used by some noble Lords in Committee, I think we had different ideas in our minds. I understand that the Government’s approach to items to assist with cleanliness and hygiene is to take care not to enable items that could be weaponised; hence the different approach to this, which I think is quite ingenious. However, I am left with a question and a bit of a concern about shaving items. I could not come up with an alternative way of expressing it, which would have met the Government’s point, but underlying my concern at the last stage was allowing asylum seekers in a very difficult situation a degree of dignity.

I confess that I asked the Red Cross, from which I received a list of the items that it normally supplies to refugees, and it could not come up with an alternative way of expressing it. I have its crisis and emergency response team’s list, which includes razors and shaving lubricant, while the standard hygiene items that the Red Cross Hackney destitution centre gives out include shaving kits. However, we are where we are. Unless the Minister has anything more that he can explain to me in responding, I want to put my thanks on record.

20:30

My Amendments 7 and 12 in this group would not challenge Clauses 13 and 14 but would ensure that we do not sweep up people who are not smugglers along with the smugglers at whom the clauses are aimed. Clause 14(2) makes it an offence where there is knowledge or suspicion that items are to be used in connection with an immigration offence.

With regard to my drafting, I am sure that other noble Lords have experienced this: on the day when you are about to debate something that you drafted a few days ago, you think, “I could have done that better” —I say that to pre-empt critics. We are not going to divide on the amendment anyway, but I want the Minister’s comments on the position of asylum seekers, which is, frankly, precarious in many ways, especially given the limitations of the reasonable excuse defence that we debated in Committee, which pretty much amounts to proving that you are not a criminal.

An example that has been given to me is of a mother handing a mobile phone, a SIM card or a battery pack to her daughter in France. The mother may be prosecuted for having supplied a relevant item under Clause 13 which does not come within any of the exemptions. That mother and daughter would both be exposed to a possible 17 years of imprisonment if convicted on indictment, even if they claimed and were granted asylum in the UK. It is not only the smuggling gangs who may be caught by the breadth of the offences.

The Law Society has pointed out that the clause may criminalise victims of modern slavery and human trafficking, or asylum seekers who are forced to help smugglers. It is concerned that the provision risks incompatibility with Article 31 of the refugee convention, which prohibits penalties being imposed on refugees who enter or are present in a country without authorisation for the purpose of seeking asylum.

I turn to Amendment 12. Clause 16(8) provides reasonable excuses, including some connected with a person’s occupation and the objective of his or her activity. My point concerns legal advice. I take the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Katz, that the previous clause that we were debating was about articles. If it is not too flippant, it could be said that lawyers sometimes provide lifeboats for their clients.

There is a framework for lawful immigration advice provided by authorised professionals. It is hard enough to practise in this field—or indeed to become a client, because you cannot find anyone to act for you on legal aid terms. Adding a risk for lawyers is surely not the sort of deterrent that the Home Office has in mind, especially when it affects access to justice and therefore the rule of law. I know the Minister will say that the Government are not going to target individuals who act professionally, as he did in Committee. This Government will not, but another Government might, as I am sure he said in the years when he was in opposition. I beg to move.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I wish to speak briefly to support government Amendments 10 and 11 and pick up a couple of the points that the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made. I think we kicked the first point around a bit in Committee so I will not overly repeat my points from then. We said then, and I think it has come out in the debate so far, that the point of this legislation, which I strongly agree with, is very important. The substance of a lot of the Bill is about increasing the deterrent effect of the law, although I may not have agreed with what I continue to think is the rather cosmetic Border Security Commander.

We want the offence here. I want it to be quite broad because I want it to put off people helping to facilitate offences and then pretending that they are not. I think the noble Baroness or somebody else gave a similar example in Committee. I do not want people assisting people to commit immigration offences. In this case, it is helpful for it to be a broad offence. We are trying to deter people from helping people.

My reading of the case that the noble Baroness set out is that an offence would be committed only if the person supplying the article, the phone in this case, had a reasonable suspicion that an immigration offence was going to be committed. If they did, then I want them to be concerned that they would be committing an offence and therefore not supply the device. That is the point of the exercise. If it is not going to do that, there is really no point in passing this legislation. It is supposed to be setting out tough offences that deter people from such activity.

I would make a similar point on Amendment 12, about lawyers. First, I do not know whether the position has changed enormously—I suspect not given some of the other things the Minister has said—but I had not noticed any shortage of people providing immigration advice when I was Immigration Minister. There seemed to be a never-ending supply of people who would assist people to breach our immigration rules and outwit our Home Office lawyers and so forth. There may have been a massive drying up of such people, but, based on the number of cases and the battles that the Home Office undertakes, that is highly unlikely. I do not think there is a shortage of lawyers who provide advice for people in this area.

Secondly, if someone is providing legal advice about what somebody has done and their legal position, then they are not going to be caught by this offence. This offence is about people providing advice that will facilitate immigration crime. It is not the function of a lawyer following the professional standards that lawyers are supposed to operate under to provide legal advice that enables people to commit crimes. If this clause as drafted by Minister’s officials and draftsmen stops a lawyer providing advice about how to commit a crime, I am very pleased, because they should not be doing it.

I do not see any legitimate legal service that a lawyer should professionally be providing that will be caught by this clause. It seems to me that it will catch only people operating on the margins and pushing the envelope about what they are doing and what they are facilitating. It is not the lawyer’s job to help people commit criminal offences. That is absolutely not what lawyers are supposed to be doing, so the clause as drafted in the legislation is fine as it is with its breadth. I know that the noble Baroness said she would not press them, but I would oppose the two amendments from her and think the Bill is better without them.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, I rise to defend lawyers. I do not why I should be doing this, but it struck me to do so here, as it did on the previous set of amendments.

In Committee, the Minister assured us that

“the list of reasonable excuses in this clause is non-exhaustive””—[Official Report, 8/7/25; col. 1287.]

and that legitimate activity should not be captured. However, relying on ministerial assurances of the good sense and discretion of the CPS is insufficient when it comes to framing criminal law. That is why it has to be represented in the Bill or by regulation, or some other way, that we are not talking about that here.

I advise the noble Lord, Lord Harper, that it is very difficult to find sufficient lawyers to deal with the case load that is before us, which is affecting the backlog as well, of course. I will not go into the reasons why that has happened, but it is certainly not easy. The actual penalty would be 14 years’ imprisonment, if a lawyer was caught in it, so it is a very serious matter. If we fail to include explicit protection, we risk imposing deterrents on the exercising of proper legal practice in this field of the law. I support my noble friend Lady Hamwee in that objective in her amendments.

I want to speak to government Amendment 11 because while we may have had a different agenda of items, which my noble friend was talking about, at least I think I know what I am talking about here. I know that razor blades on safety razors are particularly dangerous. There are ways in which you can deal with that matter but there is also the alternative of some form of electric device, which can do the job as well, as we know. You might need a wire, but you can also operate them by battery; those ones are much cheaper. I can assure the House that that is my personal experience in this Palace, when you come from a different part of the country from London. However, I would like to know what explanation there will be for how people can shave. The Red Cross has raised that issue and I am sure that the Government have an answer.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the Minister for tabling these amendments. I say at the outset that I am content with the government amendments in this group, but perhaps a little less so with the noble Baroness’s.

Amendments 7 and 12 would create gaps in the new offences that would be susceptible to abuse. Those who enter the United Kingdom without valid leave to enter are committing an offence. Those who handle articles which are to be used to facilitate a person’s unlawful entry, contrary to Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971, will be committing an offence. That is right, but the exception created by Amendment 7 would mean that a person entering the country illegally could not themselves be found criminally liable for the handling of such articles. If that person intends to use that article themselves to enter illegally, I cannot possibly see why they should be excluded from the commission of the new offence in Clause 14.

Amendment 12 raises a question about the “reasonable excuse” defence under Clause 16 and whether it would extend to those carrying out legitimate legal services. I am sure that the Government have no intention of criminalising legitimate legal activity but, at the same time, we know all too well that there is an army of lawyers working for so-called human rights charities and non-governmental organisations who indeed seek to use ever more ingenious legal methods to circumvent legitimate deportations and removals.

Amendments 10 and 11 concern the offences relating to prohibited items in accommodation or transport facilities. Government Amendment 10 proposes to exempt items

“designed for use for the purposes of personal cleanliness or personal hygiene”

from the relevant offences, and Amendment 11 sensibly limits that exemption so that dangerous articles, such as blades, glass or aerosols, are not inadvertently permitted.

These amendments appear to be a reasonable and pragmatic attempt to ensure that the legislation does not extend beyond its intended purpose. We do not want to see a situation in which a detainee or asylum seeker could be criminalised for possessing a bar of soap or toothpaste, and the carve-outs in Amendment 11 should ensure that safety is not compromised.

20:45

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, for her Amendment 7, and I shall speak to it in a moment. First, I shall speak to Amendments 10 and 11 in my name. I hope, for all the difficulties about some of the issues that the noble Lord, Lord German, has raised in relation to shaving, it is an attempt by the Government to meet the objectives of the noble Baroness’s original amendment in Committee as well as the report on the Bill from the Joint Committee on Human Rights, which raised this as a matter of some importance.

I reflected on it after Committee and asked officials to draw up amendments, and amendments have been drawn up that allow essential items such as soap, tooth- paste and sanitary products to be used. Amendment 11 is there because there are things such as razor blades, or things such as a glass container that could be broken and be available as a weapon, and things such as aerosol cans that can be sprayed in people’s faces, which have to be exempted.

I confess that the question of shaving is one that might be worthy of further reflection and discussion, but we are where we are. This is not a pejorative statement, but some people who arrive will have beards; the ones who do not can wash with soap, use toothpaste and do all those things. Potentially, at some point, they can shave in a more controlled circumstance at a later date. Let us just reflect on that. It is an interesting point for debate but, ultimately, we have tried to settle on a reasonable compromise to meet the objectives of the Committee’s pressure on the Government and the Joint Committee report. I commend Amendments 10 and 11 to the House as they stand.

I have more difficulty with the noble Baroness’s Amendments 7 and 12. I appreciate that the intent of Amendment 12 is to safeguard legitimate legal professionals. I stress that the clause already provides a “reasonable excuse” defence, as she knows. The amendment, by explicitly referencing Section 12(3) of the Legal Services Act 2007, on the very points that the noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned—as indeed did the noble Lord, Lord Davies—narrows that defence rather than strengthening it.

Clause 16 is designed to target those who collect sensitive information for the purpose of facilitating immigration crime. It is not in any way, shape or form aimed at those who want to provide bona fide legal advice who are acting within the law. The offences will be intelligence-led and focused on organised criminal activity, not on those providing lawful counsel. For legal advisers to fall into scope of this clause, they would have to be, for example, gathering or providing information or advice to clients on how to make a clandestine crossing to the UK. That is not what legal advice is supposed to be in this circumstance. For once, I find myself in compadre with the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Harper, on that point, and I respectfully ask the noble Baroness not to press that amendment.

Amendment 7, moved by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, seeks to exclude from liability those who handle articles likely to be used in immigration crime, if the intended user is themselves or a member of their immediate family. If I wanted to help to support somebody, I might well claim that I am a member of the immediate family and have an immediate family member supplying me with information—and there might well be organised criminal gangs which exploit family ties by pressure or other means to ensure that they mask that facilitation.

Clause 14 already requires that the article is “likely to be used in the course of immigration crime”. This threshold ensures that only those knowingly contributing to criminal activity are captured. I reassure the noble Baroness that I have been clear throughout the Bill’s progress that this House has a reasonable excuse on the face of the Bill, which is non exhaustive. Given the intention of this offence, and while respecting that the decision to prosecute is made entirely independently of government, I would expect that it would not generally be an operational or public interest matter to pursue people handling items in genuine pursuit of asylum or on behalf of family members. The CPS or any other legal entity that wishes to examine this matter would look at the intent behind the clause. The reasonable defence we have in Clause 14 is one I would refer the noble Baroness to and would hope to have her support on.

The law must remain clear and enforceable. The current drafting provides flexibility and discretion without compromising the clause’s intent. Therefore, I hope that the noble Baroness will both withdraw Amendment 7 and not move Amendment 12 when it is reached. I commend Amendments 10 and 11 to the House as meeting the objectives the House ordered me to look at—in a nice, friendly way—in Committee.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I do not want to go over points that have already been made and which were made in Committee at greater length. However, I think it notable that work done by lawyers cannot, in the Government’s mind, be explicitly referred to. Perhaps I am particularly influenced by the work the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, is doing on the rule of law, or maybe not.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, said that a lawyer should not set out—I am paraphrasing—to support a criminal activity by his client. I do not think things are that black and white. Everyone is entitled to a defence. With items such as the documents and information referred to in Clause 16, the client is entitled to have the reason for having those argued, or to argue whether they fall within Clause 16(1). It is a case of blame the lawyers again—“let’s kill all the lawyers”. It is a point of considerable principle to me that the rule of law should be upheld, and that includes citizens being entitled to be supported by lawyers. However, I beg leave to withdraw—

[Lord Harper (Con)]

The noble Baroness implied that I am being pejorative about lawyers; I am not. If lawyers are doing what they are supposed to do, there is no problem at all. This clause specifically states that the person would be committing an offence only if they were collecting the information or using it in order to prepare for an offence. Somebody doing legitimate legal activity is not committing an offence. I strongly support the rule of law and lawyers doing legal work, just not lawyers who think their job is to facilitate immigration crime. I think the clause is therefore very well drafted.

[Lord Katz (Lab)]

I remind noble Lords that concluding speeches to press or withdraw an amendment should be brief and should not be subject to intervention. That is a normal courtesy of the House, according to the Companion.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

If I may stand up, not having sat down, I do not think the noble Lord would argue that somebody who has beaten a person up, for example, should not be entitled to a defence because it is an offence. We do not know the position until that person has been through the process. However, we should not weary the House—I do not want to imply that the noble Lord is wearying the House—by taking this further, so I again beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 7 withdrawn.

Amendments 8 and 9

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

8: Clause 14, page 8, line 11, at end insert—
“(2A) A person (“P”) commits an offence if, in the circumstances mentioned in subsection (2B), P is concerned in—(a) the receipt of, or the arranging to receive, a relevant article from another person, or(b) the removal or disposal of a relevant article for the benefit of another person.(2B) Those circumstances are where, at any time when P is concerned in an act as mentioned in subsection (2A), P knows that the relevant article has been, is being, or is to be used by P or any other person in connection with an offence under section 24 or 25 of the Immigration Act 1971.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would expand the offence in clause 14 to cover being concerned in the handling of a relevant article for use in immigration crime.

9: Clause 14, page 8, line 14, after “(1)” insert “or (2A) (as the case may be)”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 14 at page 8, line 11.

Amendments 8 and 9 agreed.

Clause 15: Sections 13 and 14: meaning of “relevant article”

Amendments 10 and 11

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

10: Clause 15, page 8, line 35, at end insert—
“(ca) any thing or substance designed for use for the purposes of personal cleanliness or personal hygiene,”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would exempt products designed for use for the purposes of personal cleanliness or hygiene from the offences in clauses 13 and 14.

11: Clause 15, page 9, line 3, after “(1)” insert “—
(a) paragraph (ca) does not include—(i) anything which is or includes a blade or sharp point,(ii) any thing or substance in a glass container, or(iii) any thing or substance in an aerosol container;”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment would exclude certain articles from the exemption in my amendment to clause 15 at page 8, line 35, so that these articles are covered by the offences in clauses 13 and 14.

Amendments 10 and 11 agreed.

Clause 16: Collecting information for use in immigration crime

Amendment 12 not moved.

Amendment 13

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

13: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Online advertising of unlawful immigration services(1) A person commits an offence if— (a) the person creates, or causes the creation of, material whose purpose is, or effect will be, to promote an unlawful immigration service, and(b) the person knows or has reason to suspect—(i) that the material will be published on an internet service, and(ii) that the material has that purpose or will have that effect.(2) A person commits an offence if—(a) the person publishes material on an internet service or causes the publication of material on such a service,(b) the purpose of the material is, or the effect of the material will be, to promote an unlawful immigration service, and(c) the person knows or has reason to suspect—(i) that they are publishing the material or (as the case may be) that they are causing its publication, and(ii) that the material has that purpose or will have that effect.(3) It is a defence for a person charged with an offence under this section to prove that the person’s action was for the purposes of—(a) carrying out, or facilitating the carrying out of, work as a journalist, or(b) the publication of academic research.(4) A person who commits an offence under this section is liable—(a) on summary conviction in England and Wales, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding the general limit in a magistrates’ court or a fine (or both);(b) on summary conviction in Scotland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 12 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(c) on summary conviction in Northern Ireland, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 6 months or a fine not exceeding the statutory maximum (or both);(d) on conviction on indictment, to imprisonment for a term not exceeding 5 years or a fine (or both).(5) In this section “material” means anything which consists of or includes—(a) text or moving or still images, or(b) speech or music.(6) In this section—(a) “unlawful immigration service” means a service whose purpose is to facilitate the commission of—(i) an offence under any of the Immigration Acts,(ii) a breach of immigration law (other than such an offence), or(iii) an offence under section 4, 5 or 6 of the Identity Documents Act 2010 in relation to an identity document within any of paragraphs (a) to (c) of section 7(1) of that Act,whether by providing goods or services, or both, or anything else;(b) “immigration law” has the meaning given by section 25(2) of the Immigration Act 1971.(7) In this section “publish” means make available to the public at large or any section of the public, whether or not in return for payment or any other form of consideration.(8) In this section “internet service” means a service that is made available by means of—(a) the internet, or (b) a combination of the internet and an electronic communications service (as defined by section 32(2) of the Communications Act 2003).(9) This section is subject to section (Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers).”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause creates offences relating to the creation and publication of material promoting unlawful immigration services.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

My Lords, I think it is important to outline to noble Lords the policy objective underpinning this measure, which is essentially to give us a further measure to tackle the facilitation of organised immigration crime online and to ensure that law enforcement agencies have appropriate tools to break down organised crime groups’ exploitation of the online market, including social media.

Online platforms are exploited at scale to promote unlawful immigration services such as small boat crossings and the provision of fraudulent travel documents, and they allow organised crime groups to generate significant profits at the expense of vulnerable migrants. Approximately 80% of migrants arriving via small boats who have been debriefed by Home Office officials have stated that they used social media at a point in their irregular migration journey to either locate or communicate with an organised crime group or its agent. It is therefore essential that we take steps to put pressure on this by providing legislative back-up to the objective of reducing migrant crossings facilitated by social media.

Amendment 13 introduces an offence that criminalises the creation or publication, or indeed causing the creation or publication, of material whose purpose is or has the effect of promoting an unlawful immigration service. Such material will be considered criminal where the person knows or suspects that the material will be published on the internet, or that it has the purpose or will have the effect of promoting unlawful immigration services. There is a clear difference, if we look at the matters before the House today, between legitimate immigration and advice services, and those which offer unlawful services that facilitate breaches in the law of this land and risk our border security. Only online material that clearly has the purpose and intended effect of promoting unlawful immigration is in the scope of this offence, and I think it right that it should be. Exploitation of the online environment is something that organised crime groups are very familiar with and use to promote their services. I think it is widely known and discussed in the public domain, and this Government intend to do something about it.

The amendment will provide law enforcement with another offence to prosecute this type of online activity and will enable easier intervention compared to existing legislation. Under this offence, online material will not need to be linked to a specific instance or attempt of unlawful immigration, as is the case with existing legislation such as Section 5 of the Immigration Act 1971. Specifically criminalising the promotion of unlawful immigration services may lead to better prosecution outcomes, potentially including additional counts on indictment and longer sentences for facilitation of organised immigration crime. I think the whole House will welcome that.

Facilitation tactics have evolved, and it is right that we evolve in response. This complements illegal content duties for online companies under the Online Safety Act—which had its genesis under the previous Government, with opposition support, and the passage of which was completed by this Government—by explicitly criminalising the act of creating or publishing this type of content. Our determination to disrupt organised crime groups is clear, and that is why we are looking at this offence on Report today.

There are intermediate liability protections in place for online platforms, including social media, under Amendment 15, to emphasise that the focus is on those who are creating and publishing the content. Platforms will remain subject to existing duties relating to the management of illegal content, including that relating to organised immigration crime.

Online facilitation or organisation of immigration crime has no borders and therefore the majority of related online material identified is assessed—sadly—as posted overseas. It is therefore important that, through Amendment 18, the offence has extraterritorial effect and can be applied to online material created or published anywhere in the world, or by a person of any nationality. That is an important safeguard; again, it will take some work, but it is important that we put that down as an appropriate tool for those who operate from abroad. When we have those arrangements, we can in some cases extradite individuals to face justice in the United Kingdom if we have the relevant agreements.

21:00

Amendments 16 and 17 are consequential and minor and technical in nature but necessary to ensure legal coherence and consistency across the Bill.

I invite the House to accept that we live in a world where social media generates crime. This series of amendments is brought specifically in relation to the field of immigration—I admit, late in the day—but it is an important vehicle. I hope the House will support these measures. I beg to move.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly support what the Minister said and this group of amendments. I have a couple of questions, but he set out clearly for your Lordships’ House the scope of the use of online tools by organised crime groups to facilitate these offences.

I think that the Minister touched on the gaps in the law around having to be specific about certain offences. It would be helpful—either when he sums up, or perhaps he could write to us—to give us one piece of data on the interviewing of those who committed offences in scope. It would be useful to know about the existing scale of the use of this type of material, or the extent to which it facilitates immigration crime. I do not know whether it is that easy to set it out, but I am keen to understand, when these offences become law, the potential reduction in the crime committed as a result of it. He may be able to help us now.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

As I said in my introductory remarks, from debriefing, around 80% of people say they had an initial contact, inquiry or facilitation via social media. In essence, that means that potentially 80% of initial migrant crossings are generated through contact via social media. As with any crime, it is difficult to say what the target for reducing that would be, but the point is that it is not currently an offence. If this legislation is passed, it will be, and that gives us scope, in co-operation with partners, to go upstream. If those individuals are abroad, as the amendments later in the group suggest, then in countries where we have extradition agreements, and if we can find the individuals, we can bring them to justice.

[Lord Harper (Con)]

I am grateful to the Minister. I did listen and—he should not worry—I am not trying to pretend that he thinks that therefore we can reduce offences by 80% overnight. It would just be helpful to have a sense of what impact this might have. I also welcome the extraterritoriality clauses, because he is right that it means that we can use extradition offences, but we can also use some of the other tools that we have at our disposal once we can demonstrate that there are offences.

My specific question picks up Amendment 14. I agree with the Minister that there should be defences, or carve-outs, for internet service providers that are carrying out their lawful activities. I want to probe him specifically on subsection (1)(b)(ii) of the new clause inserted by the amendment, which states:

“An internet service provider does not commit an offence … if the provider does not … select the recipient of the transmission”.


I want to probe this a bit. If the algorithms or techniques used by service providers or social media to push messages at people are set up so they push some of these unlawful messages, is that activity—because they are in effect selecting the recipient of those messages—potentially an offence? By the way, for the avoidance of doubt, if their algorithms are pushing messages that facilitate crime at people, then, arguably, they probably should be falling foul of this, because we want them to then take steps to make sure that their algorithms are not pushing these messages at people. I just wanted to test the extent to which they would be liable.

I have a final comment. The noble Lord is right to distinguish between those creating this material that is facilitating offences, but what liability is there if those providing those internet services are involved in this activity? The offences at the moment include imprisonment, which can be used on people but not on corporate bodies. There are also fines involved in this.

One of the debates we had on what became the Online Safety Act, which the noble Lord mentioned, is that, to get these offences to bite on large global corporations with turnovers and profits of many billions of pounds, there must be quite draconian financial penalties to get them to sit up and take notice. There was a big debate about that when the Government of which I was a Member, and the subsequent Government, were passing the Online Safety Act and the subsequent legislation.

I therefore want to understand this: if there were social media or internet service providers who were helping this, or not taking steps to mitigate this, what offences would they potentially be guilty of? Does the Minister think the potential sanctions are sufficient that those organisations, particularly those based overseas and not easily reachable by our legislative tools, would be sufficiently able to be reached by them?

Just so the House is not in any doubt, I say that I strongly support this range of amendments to create these offences. It is quite clear that, in all the coverage you see of all the people coming into the United Kingdom illegally, they all have phones and electronic communication devices: it is a key part of how these crimes are committed. I strongly support the law being strengthened to deal with it and the Minister has my support.

[Viscount Goschen (Con)]

My Lords, I also commend the Government on bringing forward this suite of amendments. My remarks will follow and parallel quite closely those of my noble friend Lord Harper.

This is a very difficult area of the law. Social media and the internet are very fast-evolving and extremely difficult to define. So the approach that the Government have taken recognises that this is essentially criminals advertising criminal services—theirs over the next gang’s—and it ought to be addressed. We ought to focus on it, for two reasons. The first is to try to tackle the individuals and organisations behind these activities. The second is to try to get them taken down as soon as possible. We know that is extremely tough to achieve—we have seen it in other pieces of legislation—but that does not mean that we should not try. I certainly think we should.

I am also with my noble friend Lord Harper on his applying a modicum of pressure on the Government by asking how effective they believe these provisions would be. When I asked that very question on a previous amendment, I was given an answer which essentially said, “Well, even if they save one crime, that’s good enough”. The Government should really come forward with a slightly more comprehensive argument. Although, on this suite of amendments, I am less bothered by that, because it is perfectly obvious that what we are talking about here is a large-scale, international, very sophisticated criminal enterprise.

One of the things we have not talked about that much in the House during the passage of this important Bill is the fact that people coming here through these means are very often paying very considerable sums of money indeed: these are not trivial sums. We tend to lump people into groups or buckets and forget that they are often making a very conscious choice, looking at the price and the chance of being either diverted or sent back when they arrive in the UK. From the information that the Minister provided to me by way of a letter, we know that the chances of being removed are around 4%— there is a 96% chance of being successful in remaining—so we have a huge prize for people who wish to come to the country through illegal means and we need to do everything possible to disrupt that. So I hope the Government have got more or less the right approach and I wish them every good fortune in the effectiveness of those amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, the noble Viscount has just referred to illegal means, so let me just get into Hansard “safe routes”, if they are needed.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, presents a very intriguing scenario. If he or I went on to the internet to look up information about any of these issues, would we find an algorithm identifying us as being interested and trying to push unwanted information at us, in rather the same way as, if you buy a lawn-mower, algorithms seem to think that you might want to buy further lawn-mowers, and so on? I had not really thought of that, but I take the point.

On Amendment 14, perhaps I can ask the Minister a couple of questions. New subsection (2)(a) uses the terms “automatic, intermediate and transient”. In the next subsection, the words are “automatic, intermediate and temporary”. Are they different? If they are not different, why is the same term not used?

On Amendment 13, on the underlying offence, it is a very broad offence with a very narrow defence. Of course, I understand why the Government are looking at this. I do not suppose there is any way of not being left with a feeling that, in this area, one is always playing catch-up. I said it is a “broad offence” because

“the person knows or has reason to suspect”.

That is pretty difficult. It is certainly something that might be the case without reaching “recklessness”, for instance. It is another of these offences where there is a defence to prove the purposes of your action. I do not know what the standard of proof is for that. The purposes referred to include work as a journalist, which is not just carrying out work but facilitating it, and the publication of academic research. Why is “facilitating research” not included as well, replicating the first paragraph?

It has been put to me that the proposed offence will place a real burden on small organisations, which will have continuously to investigate the activities of their staff and members to ensure that, through the organisation, material is not posted online that might be construed as having the effect of promoting these services—I am sure that would be a dismissible offence, but even so.

21:15

On the other side of this, as it were, I wish to ask about the narrow purposes that that are referred to in the provision that I have just mentioned. If someone puts in an online blog or website an account of their experience of being trafficked or smuggled—and this happens, as a lot of the organisations in the sector report publicly on their clients’ experiences—is that promoting the targeted services? I am sorry that I am raising questions, but I suppose that is what happens with a difficult proposition and arrangement such as this.

[Lord German (LD)]

I shall add one more difficult question to the lump sum of woes that the Minister has just received, and that is in respect of the most used platform in this area, which is Telegram. Telegram is a company based in the British Virgin Islands, but the people behind it are a moveable feast and very secretive. As the Minister will know, of course, formerly VK sprang out of Russian influence, but Telegram is the biggest alt messaging platform in the world and the one that is more frequently used by people in the world in the area that these clauses are meant to deal with.

Having spent the best part of two years in developing the Online Safety Bill, we know that the question is how you make sure you get at a body such as the people who own Telegram, who will obviously be among the most important people in respect of these new clauses. It is not that it is not worth trying, but I query how easy it is going to be and whether there is—I do not expect a detailed answer because otherwise that will be giving away the processes—a way in which this particular platform would be caught by this and would be able to be tracked down and held to account.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, the Government have tabled a raft of amendments criminalising the online advertisement of unlawful immigration services. We know that this is a major source of business for the trafficking gangs and, as such, if the advertising methods can be targeted and disrupted then this should go some way to removing a key part of the business model.

The Government’s impact assessment on this new policy acknowledges that

“it is expected that there will be a small number of arrests under this offence, as the majority of activity is assessed to take place overseas”

The key to the success here will, therefore, lie in enforcement and international compliance, so what steps have the Government taken to push other countries to take action and remove online posts and sites that publish this sort of material? How are they supporting the National Crime Agency to go further with its investigations and campaigns? I look forward to what the Minister has to say on that.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I hope that I can try to reflect on the serious questions posed about the implications of the legislation proposed before the House today on Report. I will try to answer as best I can, but I hope that the broad thrust of what we are trying to achieve, which is to make life harder for criminals to use social media to recruit migrants to cross the channel on dangerous journeys, is accepted by the House as a whole.

The noble Lord, Lord Harper, mentioned a number of points that we would like to reflect on before giving him a definitive answer. He supports the broad purpose of the legislation, but I will make sure that we write to him to cover some of those points.

The noble Viscount and the noble Lord, Lord Harper, raised legitimate issues—supported by the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, from the Front Bench—about the difference that the offence will make, its impact and how we deal with people to ensure that it is put in place overseas. The noble Viscount said that if it helps one person, it would be a good thing to do. That remains true. We hope it will disrupt significantly more than that. We have not put a figure on that, but the principle is that it is an additional tool for police and enforcement agencies to take criminal action where other areas are potentially not currently open.

The enforcement of that means that, for countries with which we have extradition agreements, if we identify someone and they are arrested, they can be brought back to the UK for justice. Alternatively, an individual who is resident in the UK could be arrested once our intelligence services and others—including the National Crime Agency—track them down. Alternately, they could be individuals of a foreign nationality who are behind some of these websites or social media channels and visit the UK, and who might accordingly find themselves arrested in the UK for those crimes. So we have a range of extra tools.

With due respect to the noble Viscount, I cannot quantify that in a way that says we will reduce it by 10% or arrest 50 people on the back of that. What we can do is to put another tool in place to help disrupt those criminals. This goes to the point that the noble Lord Davies of Gower mentioned. The Home Office is working closely with the National Crime Agency and other law enforcement partners to ensure that they focus their funding on some of the new tools that they need to use in order to help crack down on this type of crime.

I know from talking to the National Crime Agency—without putting in the public domain confidences that would help criminals—that it is looking at how we can support more officers while also using smarter intelligence gathering and utilising different skills in officers to focus on this emerging market for immigration and migration crimes. All those things are important.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made a number of points about Amendment 14. I draw her attention to the opening line of the proposed new clause in that amendment:

“Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers”.


The key point I want to put to the noble Baroness is about “unlawful immigration services”. She asked whether people would be hit by this proposed new clause in the event of them writing about their experiences. No, they would not, because they are not advertising unlawful immigration services. The purpose of this provision is to focus specifically on the criminals who are organising immigration crime. It will not be used in isolation; it will be part of the measures both inside and outside of the Bill, and we are looking to criminalise the critical component of the people-smuggling gangs’ business model.

The noble Baroness also pointed to a number of parts in the legislation. She asked whether Section 2 automatic, intermediate or transient and whether Section 14(3) is automatic, immediate or temporary? I can say to her only that I have described the policy objective that we have set, and the wording we have is the wording that the Office of the Parliamentary Counsel has brought forward to help us achieve that policy objective.

I will reflect on what she said—if there are areas of interest, I will write to her—but I hope that she can look at the bigger picture, which is that is not about criminalising people who do not deserve to be criminalised. It is about criminalising people who are using social media platforms, such as Google, Facebook, Twitter or X—whatever you want to call it these days—to promote their business and to encourage people to undertake illegal crossings. I go back to the initial point in my opening speech: 80% of individuals debriefed by us who have crossed said that their initial contact was via social media. That is the key point that Clause 14 intends to grasp, so I commend it, as well as Clause 13, to the House.

[Lord German (LD)]

Before the Minister sits down, is it possible, whether by letter or verbally, to know whether this clause will affect the biggest online platform—the one which is doing all the damage that this refers to?

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

This is the guarantee that I give all noble Lords. It is right that I am questioned on these matters. It is right that we poke around and look at the detail in the woods—the big picture that I have established. But, ultimately, this is legislation. I have given the assurances that I can. I will look at the comments from all noble Lords, including the noble Viscount, Lord Goschen, who have spoken in this debate. If there are point on which they are not satisfied, I will write to them in due course.

The noble Lord, Lord German, mentioned internet service providers and a number of the bigger players, such as Facebook, TikTok and Telegram. The clause expressly provides intermediate liability protections for internet services such as social media companies, meaning that they will not be impacted by this offence. It will be the individuals who are promoting unlawful immigration services online who are targeted. I will look again at the noble Lord’s comments in the cold light of day. If I need to write to reassure him, or to provide clarification, or because he has suggested items that we should look at further on another occasion, it will be important to do so.

I hope that, with the assurances that I have given and the case I have made, the House can agree to the new clauses before us today.

Amendment 13 agreed.

Amendments 14 and 15

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

14: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Application of section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) to internet service providers(1) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) by—(a) providing access to a communication network, or(b) transmitting, in a communication network, information provided by a user, if the provider does not—(i) initiate the transmission,(ii) select the recipient of the transmission, or(iii) select or modify the information contained in the transmission.(2) The references in subsection (1) to providing access to, or transmitting information in, a communication network include storing the information transmitted so far as the storage—(a) is automatic, intermediate and transient,(b) is solely for the purpose of carrying out the transmission in the network, and(c) is for no longer than is reasonably necessary for the transmission.(3) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) by storing information provided by a user for transmission in a communication network if— (a) the storage of the information—(i) is automatic, intermediate and temporary, and(ii) is solely for the purpose of making more efficient the onward transmission of the information to other users at their request, and(b) the internet service provider—(i) does not modify the information,(ii) complies with any conditions attached to having access to the information, and(iii) on obtaining actual knowledge of a matter within subsection (4), promptly removes the information or disables access to it.(4) The matters within this subsection are that—(a) the information at the initial source of the transmission has been removed from the network,(b) access to it has been disabled, or(c) a court or administrative authority has ordered the removal from the network of, or the disablement of access to, the information.(5) An internet service provider does not commit an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) by storing information provided by a user who is not acting under the authority or control of the provider if—(a) the provider had no actual knowledge when the information was provided that it was, or contained, material whose purpose was, or effect would be, to promote an unlawful immigration service, and(b) on obtaining actual knowledge that the information was, or contained, such material, the provider promptly removed the information or disabled access to it.(6) Section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services)(5) and (6) applies for the purposes of this section.(7) In this section—“internet service provider” means a provider of—(a) a service that is made available by means of the internet, or(b) a service that provides access to the internet;“user” , in relation to an internet service provider, means a user of a service provided by the internet service provider.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision about the liability of internet service providers under my first new clause to be inserted after clause 16.

15: After Clause 16, insert the following new Clause—
“Liability for offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) committed by a body(1) This section applies where an offence under section (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services) is committed by a body.(2) If the offence is committed with the consent or connivance of a person (“P”) who is—(a) a relevant person in relation to the body, or(b) a person purporting to act in the capacity of a relevant person in relation to the body,P (as well as the body) commits the offence and is liable to be proceeded against and punished accordingly.(3) In this section—“body” means a body corporate, a partnership or an unincorporated association other than a partnership;“relevant person” , in relation to a body, means— (a) in the case of a body corporate other than one whose affairs are managed by its members, a director, manager, secretary or other similar officer of the body;(b) in the case of a limited liability partnership or other body corporate whose affairs are managed by its members, a member who exercises functions of management with respect to it;(c) in the case of a limited partnership, a general partner (within the meaning given by section 3 of the Limited Partnerships Act 1907);(d) in the case of any other partnership, a partner;(e) in the case of an unincorporated association other than a partnership, a person who exercises functions of management with respect to it.”Member's explanatory statement
This new clause makes provision about the liability of individuals for offences committed by bodies under my first new clause to be inserted after clause 16.

Amendments 14 and 15 agreed.

Clause 17: Offences committed outside the United Kingdom

Amendments 16 to 21

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

16: Clause 17, page 10, line 33, after “13(1)” insert “or (1A)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 13 at page 7, line 12.

17: Clause 17, page 10, line 33, after “14(1)” insert “or (2A)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 14 at page 8, line 11.

18: Clause 17, page 10, line 33, leave out “or 16(1)” and insert “, 16(1) or (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services)(1) or (2)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that the offences under my first new clause to be inserted after clause 16 apply to things done anywhere in the world, by a person of any nationality.

19: Clause 17, page 10, line 34, at end insert “, or
(b) whether they are done by a body formed under the law of any part of the United Kingdom or the law of any other country or territory.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment has the effect that an offence under clause 13, 14, 16 or my first new clause to be inserted after clause 16 apply to things done by a body regardless of the country or territory under whose law the body is formed.

20: Clause 17, page 10, line 35, leave out “or 16” and insert “, 16 or (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services)”
Member's explanatory statement
This is amendment is consequential on my amendment to clause 17 at page 10, line 33.

21: Clause 17, page 11, line 11, leave out “or 16” and insert “, 16 or (Online advertising of unlawful immigration services)”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment disapplies the requirement, imposed by section 3 of the Territorial Waters Jurisdiction Act 1878, for Secretary of State consent for certain prosecutions under my first new clause to be inserted after clause 16.

Amendments 16 to 21 agreed.

Clause 18: Endangering another during sea crossing to United Kingdom

Amendment 22

Moved by

[Lord Davies of Gower]

22: Clause 18, page 11, leave out lines 24 to 26 and insert—
“(c) the vessel in which the person travelled could not reasonably have been thought to be safe for the purposes of reaching the United Kingdom.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would apply the new offence of endangering another during a sea crossing to the UK to any individual who tries to enter the UK illegally and makes their journey in an unseaworthy vessel, removing the requirement for the individual to have done an act to cause or create a risk of death or serious injury.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this is a short and simple group with one simple amendment, so I will speak briefly. I moved this amendment in Committee to highlight that, as drafted, I suspect that the offence might not be utilised as much as it could be. This amendment is intended to apply the new offence of endangering another to any individual who makes a sea crossing with the intent of gaining unlawful entry in an unseaworthy vessel. This would remove the requirement for an individual to have done a particular act to create risk of death or serious injury.

The principle here is that if a person has crossed the channel in a small boat or dinghy then they have, by definition, created a risk of death or injury. No small boat packed with a large number of people can be considered safe to cross the busiest shipping lane in the world. By being in that boat, you are endangering the lives of all others in that boat. The Minister said in Committee that the reality is that none of the vessels can reasonably be considered safe, which means that the amendment would capture all those making a journey. I agree with the Minister that these journeys cannot be considered safe. Surely if this clause is to have any meaning at all, it must be expounded to capture those who are making these journeys unsafe. This amendment seeks to make that completely clear and, as such, ensure that the offence in Clause 18 can be applied to those it is intended to target. I beg to move.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment would significantly alter Clause 18 and capture all people in these boats. Every one of them would come under the power of this clause. It treats the vulnerable asylum seekers as criminals and is inconsistent with targeting specific criminal behaviour.

[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Lemos) (Lab)]

My Lords, as I hope everyone in your Lordships’ House knows, the Government are absolutely committed to action to prevent illegal migration, dangerous crossings and—specifically in relation to this amendment—fatalities at sea.

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, who also proposed this in Committee. The noble Lord has been consistent in wanting to ensure that the scope of these provisions does the job of breaking up these criminal gangs, and the smuggling. I think we are all on the same page on that.

21:30

The endangerment offence is a tangible measure to address dangerous acts during crossings—not just the act of coming on the crossing—that cause serious injury or death. It goes beyond the existing offences of illegal entry and arrival under Section 24 of the Immigration Act 1971 and specifically targets these dangerous acts.

Amendment 22, tabled by the noble Lords, Lord Cameron and Lord Davies, would significantly change the focus of the new offence, targeting any person boarding an unsafe vessel to come to the UK illegally, instead of targeting the specific dangerous acts that might occur. As the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, said in reference to comments made in Committee, these small boats are inherently unsafe. As the noble Lord, Lord German, noted, the amendment means that the offence would likely apply to all the individuals making the journey by small boat. That is not the specific intention of this power.

These dangerous crossings must come to an end and we do not in any sense underestimate the need to take enforcement action in relation to the act of the crossing itself, but existing offences are already in place to cover illegal entry and arrival to the UK. I want to be completely clear with the House that, as I have said, this new offence is to counter dangerous actions that put lives at risk and may cause serious injury or death.

Ultimately, the Government feel that this amendment would fail to address those specific dangerous acts and might create some dilution of the sorts of offences that we want to address here, such as physical violence or causing a crush, which cause or risk the serious injury or death of another person.

For the reasons I have given—that illegal entry is already covered and that, through this power, we want to address the specific dangerous acts that I have described —the Government cannot accept this amendment. I therefore ask the noble Lord to withdraw it.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the Minister’s comments. This is about preventing fatalities at sea and, as I said in my opening remarks, no boat packed with a large number of people can be considered safe to cross the busiest shipping lane in the world. However, I hear what the Minister says, so for now I will withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 22 withdrawn.

Clause 32: Sections 27 to 31: general provision about disclosure

Amendment 23

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

23: Clause 32, page 26, line 38, leave out “the data protection legislation or”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes a specific data protection legislation override which has become redundant as a result of the enactment of the general data protection legislation override by section 106 of the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

Amendments 23, 24 and 25 in my name amend the text of Clause 32, which relates to general provision about disclosure with respect to Clauses 27 to 31, and the specific application of the data protection legislation in the Data Protection Act 2018.

I hope that noble Lords will recollect that it was but a few months ago when we considered the Bill that went on to become the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. Section 106 of that Act came into force on 20 August 2025. From that date, provisions in Acts that require or authorise the processing of personal data are automatically read as being subject to data protection law.

In practice, this makes express reference to data protection legislation unnecessary in statutes subsequently enacted in Parliament. That means that, in effect, the protections afforded by the Data Protection Act 2018 continue to apply to these clauses, which relate to the disclosure and sharing of HMRC’s customs and the DVLA’s trailer registration information.

It is not necessary or good lawmaking to duplicate these protections by placing unnecessary words on the statute book. These three amendments ensure that we are tying up and tidying up the issue. Amendment 23, and the two consequential Amendments 24 and 25, are technical in nature.

I want to listen to what the noble Lord, Lord Davies, has to say on Amendment 62, which he will address very shortly, but, while I am speaking—potentially to save the House time—I will reiterate my previous reassurances to the noble Lords, Lord Davies and Lord Cameron, that using personal data for legitimate purposes such as immigration control is already permitted under data protection law. It would therefore be not only disproportionate but unnecessary to disapply data protection rules in a blanket fashion for certain groups that include some of the most vulnerable people in our society, including victims of trafficking. I will listen to what the noble Lord says, but I gave reassurances in Committee and now is an opportunity to repeat them. Obviously, the noble Lord will speak to his amendment and, if he wishes to discuss it further, we can, but I ultimately hope that he will not move it.

[Lord German (LD)]

Just before the noble Lord speaks to Amendment 62, I want to say that these Benches support the Minister.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 62 was also tabled in Committee. Its intent is to disapply data protection laws and regulations for a data subject who has entered the UK illegally or who is a foreign national offender.

The purpose here is, in essence, the same as in Clauses 27 to 31: it is intended to reduce the barriers to data sharing between the relevant law enforcement and immigration services. We feel that data protection legislation should not stand in the way of our ability to protect our borders; it should act as a block on action, not as a shield behind which those who have committed immigration offences can hide. In the same manner as human rights legislation, data protection legislation is not meant to be used to protect those who have broken the law, who have entered illegally or who are trying to prevent their lawful deportation. I will not be pressing this amendment to a Division, obviously, but I hope the Minister has listened to what I have to say.

I understand the purpose of the government amendments in this group, which are removing provisions that are now redundant due to the Data (Use and Access) Act 2025. As such, I take no issue with them.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, I was glad to hear the Minister use the phrases “vulnerable group” and “blanket fashion”. I think I have quoted him more or less correctly. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, seeks to alter the Data Protection Act by creating the possibility of the Secretary of State making an immigration exception decision. The noble Lord would take out of the list of circumstances to which the Act requires the Secretary of State to have regard all the rights and freedoms of the data subject, including the subject’s convention rights, and the UK’s obligations under the refugee and trafficking conventions. We are not on the same page.

[Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Baroness and, again, think we are on the same page on this point. As I have indicated already, the key thing about the amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Davies, is that it would disapply data protection rules in, as I was quoted, a blanket fashion for certain groups that include some of the most vulnerable people in our society, such as the victims of trafficking. Therefore, it is too wide, and I ask him not to move it.

However, I am grateful for the noble Lord’s support for the changes in these technical amendments to the legislation, which needs updating since it began its passage in the House of Commons some time ago. I beg to move Amendment 23.

Amendment 23 agreed.

Amendments 24 and 25

Moved by

[Lord Hanson of Flint]

24: Clause 32, page 26, line 39, leave out from “legislation” to end of line 40
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my first amendment to clause 32.

25: Clause 32, page 27, leave out lines 2 and 3
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on my first amendment to clause 32.

Amendments 24 and 25 agreed.

Amendment 26 not moved.

Consideration on Report adjourned.

House adjourned at 9.41 pm.