Draft Judicial Appointments Commission (Amendment) Regulations 2025
(1 day, 6 hours ago)
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Sir John Hayes (South Holland and The Deepings) (Con)
I beg to move,
That the Committee has considered the draft Judicial Appointments Commission (Amendment) Regulations 2025.
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairship, Sir John.
The draft statutory instrument amends the Judicial Appointments Commission Regulations 2013, which outline the composition of the Judicial Appointments Commission’s board of commissioners and the eligibility criteria for the commissioners. I will refer to the Judicial Appointments Commission as the JAC.
The 2013 regulations are being updated to strengthen the JAC’s capacity and to ensure its continued effectiveness in judicial recruitment. The amendments in this draft statutory instrument will change the total number of JAC commissioners from 15 to 16 by increasing the number of persons practising or employed as lawyers, referred to as professional commissioners, from two to three. It also expands the eligibility criteria for the senior tribunal commissioner by including a wider range of senior salaried tribunal officers.
As the draft statutory instrument relates to the composition of the JAC board, it may be helpful to outline briefly the role of the JAC and its board. The JAC is the independent body established under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to select candidates for judicial office in England and Wales, and for some tribunals with UK-wide powers.
The JAC is governed by an independent board of commissioners appointed by His Majesty the King on the recommendation of the Lord Chancellor. There are currently 15 commissioners, including the lay chairman; the other 14 are drawn from the judiciary, the legal professions, non-legally qualified judicial office holders and the public. Twelve are recruited and appointed through open competition, while three senior judicial members, including the senior tribunal commissioner, are selected by the Judges’ Council or the Tribunals Judges’ Council.
A key objective of the board is to ensure that the JAC is upholding its statutory functions and duties, which include ensuring that judicial appointments are made solely on merit, through fair and open competition, and with regard to diversity and good character. Commissioners oversee the selection processes, review recruitment strategies, and make final recommendations for judicial appointments to the appointing authority.
The proposed amendments relate to the number of commissioners and the eligibility criteria for the senior tribunal commissioner. I will address each in turn. On the number of commissioners, as noted, under the existing statutory provisions there are 15 commissioners, including the lay chair. That includes two professional commissioners, who must hold different qualifications, being a barrister, a solicitor or a fellow of the Chartered Institute of Legal Executives or CILEX. Currently, as only two of the legal professions can be represented at any one time, there is a barrister commissioner and a solicitor commissioner. The draft instrument increases the number of commissioners to 16 by adding a third professional commissioner and retaining the requirement that they be from different professions.
The purpose of that is twofold. First, it will strengthen the JAC’s capacity to efficiently manage high levels of judicial recruitment. Secondly, it will ensure all three main legal professions—barrister, solicitor and CILEX fellow—are represented simultaneously on the board. Creating a more certain route for the appointment of a CILEX fellow will support the JAC in its duty to promote diversity in judicial appointments. The approach will bring an additional sector perspective to the board and a commissioner to lead on outreach in the field. That is important because CILEX membership is generally more diverse on two characteristics than the other legal professions: 78% of CILEX fellows are women; and, as CILEX provides a non-graduate route to become a lawyer, its members are from more diverse socioeconomic backgrounds.
Under the statutory provisions for eligibility to be the senior tribunal commissioner, this role is open to upper tribunal judges, chamber presidents of the first-tier tribunal, chamber presidents of the upper tribunal, and presidents of employment tribunals for England and Wales, and Scotland. That means that not all senior salaried members within the unified tribunal structure are eligible. To address the inconsistency, an amendment expands eligibility to include all salaried members of the upper tribunal, certain judges of the employment appeal tribunal and deputy chamber presidents of the first-tier tribunal and deputy chamber presidents of the upper tribunal. The extent of this statutory instrument is UK-wide, as is its territorial application.
I will turn now to the consultation that we have undertaken on these amendments. The 2013 regulations were the result of public consultation completed in 2012. A further public consultation for these amendments was not considered necessary, given that the changes increase the number of commissioners, strengthening the JAC’s capacity for judicial recruitment, and address anomalies in the senior tribunal commissioner eligibility criteria. We formally consulted the Lady Chief Justice of England and Wales, the JAC chair, the Bar Council, the Law Society, CILEX, the Legal Services Board, the Senior President of Tribunals, the Lady Chief Justice of Northern Ireland and the Lord President of Scotland. All were supportive of the changes.
I assure the Committee that the amendments set out in this statutory instrument are necessary to strengthen the JAC’s capacity, provider greater equality of opportunity for those applying to be commissioners, and support the JAC’s commitment to encouraging judicial diversity.
Dr Kieran Mullan (Bexhill and Battle) (Con)
It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Sir John. As the Minister outlined, these regulations make modest and technical changes to the Judicial Appointments Commission—an additional professional commissioner and some tidying up of the eligibility for the senior tribunal commissioner.
Even technical changes, however, sit within a wider landscape. We now have a judicial system in which unelected bodies have accumulated significant power, but without the accountability to Parliament or to the public that should accompany it. We saw that clearly with the recent controversy of the Sentencing Council’s two-tier sentencing guidelines, which would have meant different punishments for the same crime depending on ethnicity, faith background or immigration status. That represents a profound departure from the basic Conservative principle of equality before the law, and is every bit as much a departure from what the public instinctively and rightly expect: that sentencing should be based on the offence committed, not the personal characteristics of the offender.
Although the Government now claim to oppose two tier-justice, they continue to defend and even expand the structures created under the last Labour Government —the very architecture that allowed these distortions to emerge in the first place. The JAC is one such body. It was created in the Blair era as a part of a constitutional re-engineering that removed power from elected Ministers and transferred it into arm’s length structures. What was marketed as modernising the constitution has instead weakened accountability, fractured responsibility and left Ministers able to duck the consequences of poor appointments or failing standards.
That is why we set out our intention to replace the JAC with a judicial vetting committee within the Lord Chancellor’s office, bringing real transparency and accountability back into judicial appointments, while maintaining judicial independence in the courtroom. We do not believe that layering more commissioners on top of an outdated structure will restore public trust, nor do we believe that expanding the body responsible for judicial appointments without addressing the structural weaknesses that I have outlined will deliver the fairness and impartiality that people expect. We want a system where the Lord Chancellor, answerable to Parliament and the public, has proper responsibility for judicial appointments, supported by a transparent judicial vetting committee to ensure that appointments are made on merit but with clear accountability. That is how we restore trust—not by expanding arm’s length bodies, but by ensuring clear democratic lines of accountability. The public want a justice system that is more accountable, and we will continue in the months and years ahead to make the case for that.
Sarah Sackman
I thank the shadow Minister for his contribution. He will know that the JAC was created under the Constitutional Reform Act 2005 to be an independent body to ensure that judicial appointments are made solely on merit, thereby preserving the judiciary’s quality, impartiality and, crucially, independence from political influence. It is disappointing to hear the shadow Minister talk about two-tier justice and the sort of model that would lead to the politicisation of our judiciary, which I do not think anyone on the Committee would want to see. We can see where that would lead.
It is ironic, perhaps, to talk about how we restore public trust in what is actually one of the prides of this country—an independent judiciary that makes its judgments without fear or favour. It is one of the reasons why our legal services industry is so successful, because people can count on the independence of our judiciary and courts, whether in commercial, family, crime or civil law. Indeed, to try to inject political influence into that process would be inimical to the rule of law. Unfortunately, the Conservative party cares little about that, and is quite prepared not just to lambast judges but to undermine their reputation and the confidence that the public can have in them. That is regrettable. We stand by the independence of the JAC. We stand by an independent body that ensures that appointments are made solely on merit and free from political influence. It is unsurprising, therefore, that these modest but important changes have the support of our independent judiciary. I think that tells us everything we need to know about them. With that, I commend the draft regulations to the Committee.
Question put and agreed to.