Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, this has been a short but very interesting debate. Amendments 449 and 454 concern the important and sensitive process by which organisations are proscribed under the 2000 Act.
Amendment 449 in the name of my noble friend Lord Hailsham raises a legitimate question about parliamentary involvement and scrutiny in the proscription process. As we have heard, the ISC has deep expertise, access to classified material and a well-established role in scrutinising national security matters. There is therefore an understandable attraction in ensuring that it has sight of and can report on the reasons for a proposed proscription before an order is made, except in cases of genuine urgency.
It may be, though, that the ISC would be receiving the same advice on issues of proscription from the same organisations, be they the police or the security services, as the Government, so there might be an issue of duplication. It is also important to recognise that proscription decisions often need to be taken swiftly in response to fast-moving threats. The Executive have to retain the operational flexibility to act decisively to protect public safety. I accept that the amendment recognises this through its “urgency” exception, but we need to consider very carefully where the balance should lie between enhanced parliamentary scrutiny and the need for speed and discretion in matters of national security. I genuinely look forward to hearing the Minister’s view on whether the existing framework already strikes the right balance. If there is scope for a greater formal role for the ISC, that cannot impede operational effectiveness.
Amendment 454, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, addresses another important aspect of the proscription regime. As we have heard, it would require each proscription order to relate to a single organisation only. It seeks to strengthen parliamentary scrutiny and accountability. I can understand the argument presented, as usual, so eloquently by the noble Baroness, but I also recognise that these are ultimately matters for the Executive and not the legislature. I await with anticipation the views of the Minister on both amendments.
The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)
I thank the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, for tabling Amendment 449 and my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti for tabling Amendment 454. I will try to answer the points raised on both those amendments.
The amendment from the noble Viscount would require engagement with the Intelligence and Security Committee in advance of proscription orders being made. As somebody who served on the Intelligence and Security Committee for five years, I know that it is a trustworthy vehicle which does not leak, and which deals with security service issues from both Houses in a responsible manner. In the light of that, the noble Viscount will be aware that my right honourable friend the Security Minister, following the Palestine Action discussion we had, has written to the Intelligence and Security Committee and expressed his intention to write to the committee ahead of future proscription orders being laid in Parliament and, if the committee wishes it, to give a privileged briefing on the reasons why the proscription is being laid so that the committee can, in confidence, have that detailed information before it. I think that meets the objectives of the noble Viscount’s amendment.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
I am grateful to the Minister. That is indeed a good step forward but it falls slightly short, in that I do not think he is telling your Lordships’ Committee that the committee will be making a report to Parliament.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The time gap between informing and debate would be for the Security Minister to determine. In most cases, I would expect—without wanting to put a burden on my noble friend Lord Beamish as the chair of the committee—that the chair would probably want to contribute to that debate and would be able to inform the House if they felt there were issues they wished to draw to the attention of the House. Although my noble friend Lord Beamish is the chair who sits in this House, there will be a senior Member from the House of Commons who would also be able to answer to the Commons on any issue. So the noble Viscount is right, but the spirit of his amendment is met—though obviously that is for him to make a judgment on.
Amendment 454 had support across the Committee from the noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti asked for proscription orders to include one single organisation at a time. Historically, proscription orders have come in groups on many occasions. At the beginning of 2001, some 20 groups were proscribed in one order that took effect under the first statutory instrument made under that order. Four more organisations were proscribed on 1 November 2002, 15 were prescribed on 14 October 2005, and so on. In the interests of parliamentary time and the speed and flexibility needed to put those orders down, that was the case then and it was the case when we tabled the order with three organisations in June and July last year in this House and, at the same time, in the House of Commons. Security issues sometimes require a speedy response, and those issues were dealt with in that way for that reason.
I will give my noble friend one more reason, which she may want to reflect on. There is a threshold for proscription under the 2000 Act. Whether noble Lords like it or not, the decision of the Government was that the three organisations bundled together in the debate in July of last year had all met that threshold. I was available, as was the Security Minister in the House of Commons, to answer questions about each and all those organisations. The advice from the security services and officials, and ministerial examination and judgment of that advice, was that all those organisations crossed the threshold. Individuals might have wanted to vote against each one individually, but if they had, they would have been voting against exactly the same principle in each case—that the organisation had crossed the threshold.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend the Minister as always for his patience, fortitude and engagement but, with respect, the historical precedent does not answer the constitutional question: would it not be better for Parliament to have an up-and-down vote? Given that Parliament has already decided that it has a role in approving these proscriptions, would it not be a more meaningful approval if it was one organisation per order? Multiple orders can be drafted and signed on the same day. I say this having worked as a Home Office lawyer, including on terrorism matters.
Finally, I say to my noble friend, who I respect so much: this is not about him and it is not about the current Home Secretary. This is about the future and about the checks and balances that noble Lords opposite spoke about so passionately.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I am grateful to my noble friend. I just say to her that the fact that there were three organisations bundled together in July last year did not stop a significant number of Members of Parliament, nor a significant number of Peers, voting against the order. They may have voted against it because they did not like Palestine Action, but I put to my noble friend again that Palestine Action had crossed exactly the same threshold as the two other organisations in that order. The judgment is not a judgment about Palestine Action. It is a judgment about the intents of Palestine Action, in line with the intents of the other two organisations in that order, which the noble Lord, Lord Marks, referred to, and which gave an explanation of their actions.
I was accountable at this Dispatch Box to say that those three organisations had crossed the threshold. Here was an order that we put together for speed and efficiency—accept my logic or do not. Both Houses accepted the logic. Some people voted against, maybe because of Palestine Action, but in voting against Palestine Action the logic was that they were voting against exactly the same tests that had been put against the other two organisations. That is the point. I give way.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
I ask the Minister to consider two points. First, the procedure that he has described involves an executive decision that the organisations had crossed the threshold and an executive decision that they ought to be proscribed. That is not a parliamentary decision; far from it. If you are going to give Members of Parliament a meaningful vote, they have to have an opportunity to express a view on each of those proscriptions. That is the first question.
The second question is rather simpler. We have a parliamentary service of unparalleled quality. It would not be beyond the wit of that service, or generally, to devise a system of degrouping whereby, if either one or a number of MPs or Peers wanted the orders to be drawn up separately, they could be drawn up separately. If everybody was content that a bundle of 24, 15 or three orders could be dealt with together, they could be dealt with together. That would involve minimal consultation and a slight procedural adjustment, but it would involve the importation of fairness and good sense into a procedure.
Certainly, those people I know who voted against the proscription of the three had nothing against the proscription of the other two but were concerned that they were being told they had to vote against all three if they wished to argue against the proscription of the Palestine Action group. I ask the Minister to accept that that is unfair and a denial of parliamentary democracy.
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
I give way also to the noble Lord, Lord Verdirame.
Lord Verdirame (Non-Afl)
Maybe the Minister can take all the questions in one go. The threshold may be the same, but there are three separate decisions and each decision is based on different evidence. We are dealing analytically with three distinct decisions, and that is the reason why there should be three different orders.
I suspect that the historical examples to which the Minister referred—I am not certain; perhaps he can explain—were cases in which all the various organisations were in the same context, whether it was organisations related to Afghanistan, ISIS or al-Qaeda. What we had in the case of Palestine Action was the lumping together of very different organisations: a British extreme movement and two white supremacist Russian movements. They have nothing to do with each other, and the evidence is different. Does the Minister accept that, in those circumstances in particular, where we are dealing with very different decisions based on different evidence, there should be an order per organisation?
Lord Hanson of Flint (Lab)
The noble Lords, Lord Marks and Lord Verdirame, have made fair and reasonable points. We group them for speed and efficiency, and historically they have been grouped because we want to clear a number of proscription orders at the same time. However, I put this point on the table for the Committee: if, in the light of the advice of the security services of officials, ministerial interrogation of that and, now, the added locus of the Intelligence and Security Committee having sight of and being able to be briefed on those orders, we brought three orders into one order, the threshold remains the same, and that threshold will have been crossed by those organisations. It might be that its members have a sympathy for the Palestinian cause rather than the Russian nationalist cause, but the threshold decided by ministerial jurisdiction, on advice from officials and the security services, is the same: they have crossed the threshold of the 2000 Act for a terrorist organisation. Making them separate orders would still mean that Members of both Houses would have to vote and say, “We do not accept that they have crossed the threshold”. That is a different decision.
I am conscious of time. Those points have been made. I hope I have put the Government’s case with the response I made to the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and with my “take it or leave it” explanation of the points on disambiguation of the orders. Members can reflect on it. In the meantime, I ask the noble Viscount to withdraw his amendment.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I am conscious that the Committee wants to make progress, so I will be brief. I hope the Minister realises that we are not revolutionaries here; we are all parliamentarians. He refers to the threshold, but the truth is that Parliament never knows the detailed reasons. It is because we do not know the detailed reasons that we want to involve the ISC to a greater extent than the Minister has suggested. I would like to push him to say that there will be a report whenever possible, more than just a statement from the chairman.
As to the noble Baroness’s amendment, it is difficult to see any disadvantage to what she suggests. All in or all out is not a good way forward. The Minister talks about efficiency and speed, in his charming way. However, the truth is that we could lay three orders in one day, each with a separate object; that would be a proper way forward. That said, with your Lordships’ permission, I withdraw Amendment 449.
Lord Hanson of Flint
“Prevention and investigation measures: online information(1) Paragraph 7 of Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 (terrorism prevention and investigation measures: electronic communication devices) is amended as follows.(2) In sub-paragraph (4), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) the inspection of any online account accessed by means of a device;”. (3) After sub-paragraph (4) insert—“(4A) The “inspection” of a device, or an online account accessed by means of a device, includes—(a) accessing the device or the online account,(b) examining information held on the device or accessed by means of the online account, and(c) extracting such information.”.(4) After sub-paragraph (6) insert—“(7) An “online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible.(8) The reference in this paragraph to “extracting” information includes reproducing it in any form.”.(5) Paragraph 8 of Schedule 7 to the National Security Act 2023 (prevention and investigation measures: electronic communication devices) is amended as follows.(6) In sub-paragraph (4), after paragraph (e) insert—“(ea) the inspection of any online account accessed by means of a device;”.(7) After sub-paragraph (4) insert—“(4A) The “inspection” of a device, or an online account accessed by means of a device, includes—(a) accessing the device or the online account,(b) examining information held on the device or accessed by means of the online account, and(c) extracting such information.”.(8) After sub-paragraph (6)—“(7) An “online account” means an account by means of which information held on a service provided by means of the internet is made accessible.(8) The reference in this paragraph to “extracting” information includes reproducing it in any form.”.”Member's explanatory statement
This amendment provides that a measure imposed under Schedule 1 to the Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Act 2011 or Schedule 7 to National Security Act 2023 may include conditions relating to the inspection of an online account accessed by means of an electronic communication device the use of which is restricted under the measure.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe
“Submarine Telegraph Act 1885: amendmentIn section 3(2)(a) of the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885 (punishment for violation of Article 2 of Convention), omit from “penal” to the second “imprisonment” and insert “imprisonment for a term not exceeding 15 years and to a fine at level 5 on the standard scale”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment seeks to increase the punishment for sabotaging an undersea cable to a 15-year prison sentence, in addition to an unlimited fine, in the light of their status as critical national infrastructure.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, Amendment 454C seeks to increase the punishment for sabotaging an undersea cable to a 15-year prison sentence and an unlimited fine. This constitutes critical national infrastructure and we need a stronger deterrent, I believe—as do one or two others from the Back Benches who have probably been caught out by the loss of the previous amendment.
Interestingly, one of Rishi Sunak’s early successes was a pamphlet on the subject for Policy Exchange, which he wrote with Admiral James Stavridis of the US Navy, a former NATO Supreme Allied Commander. Written in 2017, it helped to propel him into office and to his extraordinarily rapid advancement. As he said:
“While few realise it, our ability to transmit confidential information, to conduct financial transactions and to communicate internationally all depend upon a global network of physical cables lying under the sea”.
The admiral said that
“we have allowed this vital infrastructure of undersea cables to grow increasingly vulnerable”.
A severe attack by a hostile actor
“is potentially catastrophic, but even relatively limited sabotage has the potential to cause significant economic disruption and damage military communications”.
Fast forward to last year, when I took a renewed interest in the subject with the release of a report by the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy. It found, as the Minister concerned said in reply to a question I asked last year, that:
“The UK has plenty of cable routes and good repair processes for business-as-usual breakages”.
However, it also found “particular vulnerabilities” around the UK’s outlying islands, military cables and the financial sector, with a small set of “high-value targets”. Onshore infrastructure was also a concern, with links to data centres creating worrying levels of concentration. All this infrastructure could also be targeted in a crisis.
It noted that there were various laws around telecommunications, notably the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885. These have low penalties—£100 for damaging a cable by culpable negligence—with only modest increases possible via secondary legislation. The report concluded that updated and
“tougher criminal liability provisions might also help”.
In response to the report in December, the Government argued that the National Security Act 2023 could be used, with a maximum penalty of life imprisonment, but only if the activity was carried out by a foreign state or at the direction of a foreign state. Where this was not possible, it would be necessary to rely on the 1885 Act.
That Act is plainly inadequate for today’s dangerous situation. As the time is late, I would like to cut to the chase and hope that the Minister might look positively at my simple amendment in these dangerous times. I beg to move.
Lord Cameron of Lochiel (Con)
My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe for tabling this amendment and all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate. I also express my thanks for the diligent work of the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy. Its report into the vulnerabilities of our undersea cables is a brilliant piece of work and makes for sobering reading.
As the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, said, these are perilous times and there never has been a more important time to consider the measure proposed, given that cables are the invisible backbone of much of our economy, security and everyday life. As we have heard, they carry the vast majority of international data traffic, underpin financial transactions, connect critical services and link the UK to our international partners.
The committee’s report underlined that while the UK has plenty of cable routes and good repair processes for what it phrased as “business-as-usual breakages”, there are distinct vulnerabilities particularly where multiple cables cluster, or connect to key landing stations, and in the links servicing our outlying islands. I represented the Highlands and Islands region in the Scottish Parliament for eight years or so, and that last point is very real to me on a personal level because these are not abstract concerns. They are very real. Damage to a cable connecting the Shetland Islands in 2022 disrupted mobile, landline and payment services for days.
As we have heard, despite these vulnerabilities, the legal framework has not kept pace with the security environment. The principal instrument remains the Submarine Telegraph Act 1885. The deterrent effect of criminal sanctions matters. As the committee observed, the UK cannot simply assume that hostile actors would refrain from targeting these cables in a future crisis, and the Government have to be prepared for the reality that hostile states or proxy actors may exploit these vulnerabilities deliberately.
In conclusion, I add that increasing penalties is certainly not the only measure the Government should be taking. The threats we face are far more wide ranging than simple criminality. There is a need for a whole of government approach to protecting critical infrastructure such as submarine telecommunications—that would involve the MoD, DBT, DESNZ and the Home Office. But this amendment is a start, and I hope that the Minister will listen and take action.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Baroness Levitt) (Lab)
My Lords, this Government take the security of our subsea cables extremely seriously. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, for raising this issue. It is crucially important and right that it is debated and achieves the attention it deserves.
As the noble Baroness said, the Joint Committee on the National Security Strategy recently conducted a public inquiry into the security of the UK’s subsea cables, and it shone a spotlight on this issue. Following that inquiry, in November 2025 the Government formally committed to increasing penalties for those who damage subsea cables where the activity cannot be linked to a hostile state. As the noble Baroness rightly says, where it can be linked to a hostile state, a life sentence is available through the National Security Act.
I hope that the noble Baroness, for whom I have a great deal of respect, will understand why the Government are not able to support her amendment today. I am sure she will readily agree that penalties are not the only issue here. It is essential that any strengthening of the law is done carefully and not piecemeal, with full consideration for our fishing and wider maritime sectors. Any potential changes would need to be proportionate and workable for those sectors, and that requires proper consultation.
One further aspect about the non-criminal elements of this that may reassure your Lordships’ Committee is that cable breaks happen regularly in UK waters, given the busy nature of our shallow seas. But the UK’s international connectivity is highly resilient, and we have a well-developed system of civil litigation that ensures that cable owners are reimbursed when a break occurs. I hope that, for all these reasons, the noble Baroness will be content to withdraw her amendment.
Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)
My Lords, it is late, but I am grateful for the support of the noble Lord, Lord Cromwell, the noble Earl, Lord Russell, and my noble friend the opposition spokesman Lord Cameron of Lochiel, with his compelling Scottish perspective.
Given the vulnerabilities that have been identified, and identified successively, most recently by the Joint Committee on National Security Strategy’s report—which nobody is disagreeing with—it is important that something is done. The Minister rightly refers to the possibility of civil litigation. However, for something of this seriousness, given the scale of the threat that we now have in the waters around our country, that is not good enough.
I will reflect, but I hope the Government will take this away and perhaps come forward with their own amendment. That would obviously be ideal. Perhaps we can have some further discussions about how we solve this problem sooner rather than later. I note the point that the Minister made about fisheries and so on, but that feels like an excuse. I have been a Security Minister and, normally, when you have a big security issue, you try to take steps to mend matters as quickly as you can, as has been done with previous legislation. For today, I will beg leave to withdraw the amendment, but I might come back to this on Report.