Separation Centres Review

Tuesday 10th February 2026 Lords Chamber

Statement

19:54

The following Statement was made in the House of Commons on Tuesday 3 February.

“With permission, Mr Speaker, I shall make a Statement on Jonathan Hall KC’s independent review of separation centres and the Government’s response to it.

On 12 April 2025, convicted terrorist Hashem Abedi brutally attacked three prison officers in the separation centre at His Majesty’s Prison Frankland. I have seen the CCTV footage of what happened, and it is truly horrifying. I pay tribute to the officers, who I know will continue to be deeply affected by the appalling attack that they suffered, simply for doing their jobs and keeping all of us safe.

As the House will know, separation centres are specialist, high-secure units in prisons, containing the most pernicious extremist and terrorist offenders, determined to spread hate and inspire violence. Extremism in the prison estate takes many forms, but to date, these units have only been used to contain Islamic extremists. They protect other prisoners, staff and the public.

Before responding to Jonathan Hall’s review, I visited HMP Frankland’s separation centre. I met the brave officers who serve there. They are dedicated professionals, doing an incredible and essential job—a public service carried out far from the public view. As the Abedi attack made devastatingly clear, extremism and violence in our prisons are real, present threats, and they must be dealt with decisively for the safety of the British public. The Government appointed Jonathan Hall KC to lead an independent review of separation centres so that we can learn lessons, strengthen our defences and reduce the risk of such an attack happening again.

Following this incident, the Government acted immediately to strengthen protections for front-line staff. One of my first acts as Deputy Prime Minister was to invest £15 million in prison security, increasing the number of stab-proof vests available for front-line officers from 750 to 10,000, with 5,000 specifically for officers working in long-term and high-security prisons, and providing training for up to 500 staff in the use of Tasers. I believe that Conservative Members welcomed these moves, but could not explain why they had never made such provision themselves when in government. Staff also have access to a range of protective equipment, including helmets, arm and leg protection, gloves, batons and shields, as well as body-worn cameras and PAVA—pelargonic acid vanillylamide, or pepper—spray, to help keep them safe.

The Government are grateful to Mr Hall for his forensic and thorough work. His findings are clear: the core principle behind separation centres remains sound. Small, specialist units are crucial for managing the most dangerous and influential offenders, not just because of the violent nature of the offending but because of the risk of radicalisation they pose to other prisoners. They must be kept away from the general prison population, but the system must improve. The report makes 13 recommendations for strengthening safety, sharpening accountability and modernising how separation centres operate. The Government accept all 13 in full, and in some areas will go further. Full details are in today’s government response, but I will now set out the key themes.

The first focuses on managing risk. When it comes to staff safety, Mr Hall finds that the most dangerous offenders actively seek out weaknesses to exploit, and the underlying risk posed by certain terrorist prisoners can never be entirely removed. The Government are clear that prison staff must be properly equipped to spot those risks and tackle them. Alongside our immediate protective measures, we will continue to invest in the tools, training and support that staff need to manage terrorist risk safely and confidently, including a comprehensive, expert-led review of training for separation centre staff, to ensure that it is tailored to the uniquely dangerous environments in which they work.

The second theme addresses how separation centres work in practice, and how they are led. Mr Hall identifies a clear need to transform the way in which separation centres are governed and operated. That is why we will explore all available options to overhaul the system, including, at the next spending review, the creation of new, tougher super-max-style units for the most violent and disruptive prisoners. This will be a tiered system, with movement between tiers permitted only following rigorous new risk assessments. We will begin designing that system immediately. We will also improve the quality of referrals into separation centres through a single, specialist team with the expertise to produce high-quality, defensible referrals.

The third theme focuses on reform of current policy and law. Mr Hall finds that outdated procedures and legal complexity constrain operational flexibility, undermine prison officers’ professional judgment and expose the system to unnecessary litigation. Conservative Members should pause to consider that they did nothing to fix this mess in order to support front-line staff in doing their job with certainty. This Government are clear that process and policy must support effective risk management, not obstruct it. We have already improved the defensibility of our separation centre policy framework, and we will go further to ensure that it is robust and grounded in operational reality.

The Government remain committed to the European Convention on Human Rights, but commitment does not mean complacency. We recognise the challenges that Article 8 can pose for separation centre decision-making, which Mr Hall highlighted, and the impact that litigation has on the ability to manage terrorists and other dangerous offenders. Again, unlike the Conservative Party, we think that that is wholly unacceptable, which is why we are strengthening internal processes so that they are clear and resilient to challenge, and allow staff to focus on managing risk and protecting the public. We will also consider whether new legislation is needed to protect decisions taken by experienced staff in separation centres from litigation on Article 8 grounds. We are exploring the full range of options to deliver that, while being clear that we will remain compliant with our obligations under the ECHR.

The fourth theme focuses on intelligence. Mr Hall finds that current intelligence practices are too bureaucratic and insufficiently focused. The Government have already improved how intelligence is used across the prison estate. The new counterterrorism training package, which was launched last year, supports staff to identify and act on terrorist-risk behaviour. That is another example of how this Government support front-line workers in a way in which they were not supported previously. We will go further by improving collection practices so that higher-quality and more relevant intelligence is gathered. That will be supported by further training for specialist staff, through work with the Security Service, to ensure that the most serious risks are managed using the full range of available tools, and that high-quality intelligence directly informs operational decisions.

The attack at HMP Frankland was a stark reminder of the dangers that prison staff face every day. Our response will be decisive and determined. We will strengthen security, better protect staff, and reinforce the resilience of our counterterrorism infrastructure. We cannot accept the situation that we inherited, in which front-line staff who dealt with the most dangerous offenders had to second-guess their actions. This Government will always stand behind those who stand between the public and danger. We will not shy away from reform in this area, and we will never lose sight of our first duty: to keep the British public safe. I commend this Statement to the House”.

[Lord Keen of Elie (Con)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to respond to the Government’s Statement on separation centres and the independent review by Jonathan Hall KC. While the review itself contains important material, we must be frank about several critical issues that have been raised both in and out of Parliament.

First, on the fundamental question of what threat we are talking about when discussing the need for separation centres, the reality is clear. Islamist extremism remains the predominant form of extremist offending within our prison estate. As the shadow Justice Secretary pointed out in the other place, Security Service statistics show that Islamist-related threats form the majority of the counterterrorism focus, and most terrorist prisoners in custody are convicted on Islamist-related charges. This is not a matter of debate but an acknowledgement of the practical threat that separation centres are designed to contain, and it must inform both policy and parliamentary scrutiny.

Secondly, we have concerns about the Government’s stated intention to look at litigation based on Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights. While that may offer superficial reassurance, it is in fact Article 3 of the convention that is the real legal barrier. Article 3 is absolute. There are no exceptions, no public order or national security carve-outs and no limited derogations. It prohibits inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment in the strongest terms, as that may be interpreted.

We have already seen its damaging consequences in our own courts. In the case of Abu v Secretary of State for Justice, the High Court found that prolonged segregation of a convicted terrorist, who was already in a separation centre, amounted to inhuman or degrading treatment, in breach of Article 3. It was found that Ministers had failed to account for his mental health needs adequately before imposing those conditions. This was a binding judicial judgment, applying the European convention directly to the operation of separation regimes in England and Wales.

Let us be clear: Article 3 cannot be overridden or restricted by statute or ministerial policy; it is absolute. No amount of legislative tweaking proposed by the Justice Secretary will permit separation conditions that our courts find contravene Article 3. If the Government’s strong desire is to insulate separation centre management from litigation, they will find that Article 3 presents the true legal limit, far beyond anything provided by Article 8, which is a qualified act. I therefore ask the Minister to confirm precisely what steps the Government intend to take in relation to Article 3. How, in practical and legal terms, do they plan to deal with the fact that the law, as it stands, prohibits what is interpreted to be inhuman or degrading treatment, even in the face of compelling public safety arguments?

In these circumstances, while we want to ensure that our prisons are safe, that our staff are protected and that dangerous offenders cannot radicalise others or cause greater mayhem, clearly there is a fundamental problem with the legal constraints imposed by the convention, and the Government need to address these.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

My Lords, when it comes to the basic question that has already been raised today—the European Convention on Human Rights—I am afraid that my Benches very much disagree with the noble and learned Lord who has just spoken. It was Churchill who said that it is the way you treat your prisoners that defines you as civilised. So are we going to make sure that we define their rights? If we look at this in practical terms, how are we going to balance this out?

If we are going to make sure that the prison officers in charge of this are safe—that is surely one of the most important parts here—when will the Minister be able to tell us whether we have gone through the improved training programmes that have been suggested and when they will have the equipment they need? These are two fundamental things.

The secure centres mean that we are not going to allow this highly dangerous section of prisoners into the main prison population, which is right; radicalisation has always been a problem in prisons, and we are doing something to stop it here. It is not only Islamic terrorists but far-right extremists—I think it was 60%, 30% and then 10% of other groups, if I understood the figures right. What are we doing to make sure these people are isolated and do not make the situation worse, and are we going to make sure that those who are containing it are properly equipped? That is the basic question here.

I appreciate that the Government have moved and have accepted Jonathan Hall’s recommendations. The timeframe is very important, as then we will know what we are going to expect from the Government and will be able to judge how it has succeeded. I hope that the Minister will be able to answer these basic questions in fairly short order.

[The Minister of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Timpson) (Lab)]

My Lords, I welcome the opportunity to discuss with your Lordships this evening Jonathan Hall KC’s independent review of separation centres and the Government’s response to it. I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, and the noble Lord, Lord Addington, for their contributions.

On 12 April 2025, three prison officers in the separation centre at HMP Frankland were brutally attacked. I want first to pay tribute to those brave officers, and I am sure noble Lords will join me in wishing them well in their continued recovery. I have visited separation centres and seen the brilliant work our staff do first hand. These are specialist, high-control units located within three high security prisons which hold the most pernicious extremist and terrorist offenders. They are designed to protect other prisoners, staff and the public. I also visited HMP Frankland shortly after the attack last April and met the brave officers who serve there. I will say it again because it cannot be said enough times: these are dedicated professionals carrying out an absolutely essential public service.

Following the attack at HMP Frankland, the Government acted immediately to strengthen protections for front-line staff. We also invested £15 million in prison security straightaway, increasing the number of stab-proof vests available for front-line officers from 750 to 10,000, as well as providing training for up to 500 staff in the use of Tasers. The Government also appointed Jonathan Hall KC to lead an independent review into separation centres in order to learn from his findings and to reduce the risk of such an incident ever happening again. We are grateful to Jonathan for his work.

The findings are clear. The core principle behind separation centres remains sound but the system must improve. Jonathan’s report, which was published on 3 February, makes 13 recommendations to strengthen safety, sharpen accountability and modernise how separation centres operate. The Government have accepted all 13 recommendations, and in some areas have committed to going even further. Full details can be found in the published government response; however, I would like to highlight some specific issues raised by Jonathan, and the Government’s action in response to them.

First, the review identifies that some terrorist offenders present what are described as latent risks: a threat that may not always be visible but is no less dangerous to other prisoners, staff and the broader public. In response, we will continue to invest in the tools, training and support staff need to manage terrorist risk safely and confidently.

To give a bit more granular detail on that for the noble Lord, all staff already receive counterterrorism training; they will now receive more as per our response to the review, and separation centre staff will receive specific modules on terrorist risk. The Home Office runs desistance and disengagement programmes, which operate in the prisons and help individuals move away from terrorist ideology. Stab-proof vests have been mandatory in high-risk areas from June last year. As I said, we are training up to 500 staff to carry these Tasers, and staff can access helmets, batons and shields.

[Lord Addington (LD)]

Things such as de-escalation training might keep officers safer in conflicts. If the Minister has any figures on that, can he let us know here, or later on by letter?

[Lord Timpson (Lab)]

I would be delighted to write to the noble Lord about the de-escalation training. He is right that human relationships are important in these closed environments. In fact, in all prison and probation environments, human relationships are what matters in turning what can be very difficult situations into safer situations. We are launching a comprehensive, expert-level review of training for separation centre staff, tailored specifically to the uniquely dangerous environments in which they work.

Secondly, the review identifies a clear need to transform the way separation centres are governed and operated. That is why at the next spending review we will explore the creation of tougher, supermax-style units for the most violent and disruptive prisoners. These units would provide the highest level of control within a new tiered separation centre system, with movement between tiers permitted only following rigorous new risk assessments. We have already started preliminary work on that.

Thirdly, the review found that outdated procedures and legal complexity have constrained the system. We have already improved the defensibility of our separation centre policy framework, and we will go further to ensure that it is robust and grounded in operational reality.

The Government remain committed to the European Convention on Human Rights. However, we recognise, as Jonathan highlights within his report, the challenges Article 8 can pose for separation centre decision-making. That is why we are strengthening internal processes, developing a robust litigation strategy, and will consider whether new legislation is needed to better protect decisions taken by experienced staff in separation centres from legal challenge. We will explore the full range of options to deliver this, while being clear that we remain compliant with our obligations under the ECHR. To be clear to the noble and learned Lord, we are appealing the Abu judgment. Jonathan Hall did not find that separation centres contravened Article 3; he found that our process had failed, and we are reforming it.

Fourthly, the review found that current intelligence practices in separation centres are too bureaucratic and insufficiently focused. We will improve collection practices so that higher-quality, more relevant intelligence is gathered. This will be supported by further training for specialist staff. Working with the security service, we will ensure that the most serious risks are managed using the full range of available tools, and that high-quality intelligence directly informs operational decisions.

Our response to terror and extremism is decisive and determined. The Government will always stand with those who protect the public from danger. We will not shy away from reform, and we will never lose sight of our first duty: to keep the British public safe.

House adjourned at 8.06 pm.