Courts and Tribunals Bill
Tuesday 10th November 2026
(1 day, 13 hours ago)
Lords ChamberCourts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 View all Courts and Tribunals Bill 2024-26 Debates Read Hansard Text Watch Debate Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 57-I(b) Amendments for Committee (Supplementary to the Marshalled List) - (10 Nov 2026)
Lord Keen of Elie
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, I will move my Amendment 29 and address the question of whether Schedule 1 should stand part of the Bill. Amendment 29 seeks to remove the Henry VIII power to amend the list of offences considered complex and lengthy by only secondary legislation. To change the cases for which a “judge only” trial is permitted with a statutory instrument would, we suggest, be a completely unacceptable step and the Government have set out no reasoned basis for why such a step would be necessary.
The report from the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee was published last week. It described the power to amend part 1 of the new Schedule 3ZA as an “inappropriate delegation of power” and recommended its removal. Indeed, as evidenced by the number of Peers tabling amendments to that effect, there is cross-party consensus that this is not a good use of delegated powers. Allowing the Secretary of State to add any offences to this list and to broaden the list to include crimes beyond the current scope of fraud and financial crime is a significant power that requires more scrutiny than the affirmative procedure for secondary legislation would provide for. The fact that there are only very narrow exemptions for the offences that could be included is also highly concerning.
At Second Reading, my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne referred to this as “a Joseph Stalin clause”. He was certainly right to point out how far this power extends. I hope that the Minister will listen closely and take account of the concerns expressed by noble Lords on all Benches.
Even if we were to support removing juries from fraud cases, which we do not, your Lordships cannot be asked to effectively scrutinise such a significant provision when we have not been told of its scope. I beg to move.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I have two comments. I entirely agree with what my noble and learned friend said. Although I always welcome the affirmative procedure rather than the negative procedure, one has to recognise that the affirmative procedure does not provide proper parliamentary control for the fundamental reason that statutory instruments are not amendable. I have never, in 40 years, understood the reason of principle why statutory instruments are not amendable by the House. I recognise that it is for the Executive’s convenience, but that is not the same thing.
Baroness Chakrabarti (Lab)
Once more I find myself in unity with the Privy Council Bench opposite. My friend may be only a mere Viscount but I join him in his campaign against Henry VIII. I declare an interest as a council member of Justice and a member of your Lordships’ Delegated Powers Committee. In that committee, the spirit of the late, great and learned Lord Judge does not just sit but is always in the room. He would do this better, more swiftly and more powerfully, but the committee was in total unanimity when it found this to be a completely inappropriate delegation of power. The committee said:
“It confers on the Secretary of State a significant power to amend, by order, principal aspects of the policy contained in the Bill. We are unconvinced by the Government’s justification for the power in the Memorandum”.
It should be removed. It was not a debate about procedure but a unanimous assertion that the power should be removed.
I am conscious that, on an earlier group, my noble friend the Minister made an argument that is often made in relation to Henry VIII powers: “This is the 21st century. There is technology, there is AI, so further offences might be created that we might want to add to this list that would potentially be appropriate for a trial by judge alone”. With respect, those offences would likely be created, I hope, by new primary legislation. That legislation could deal with the appropriate mode of trial. This is a completely unacceptable power.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I added my name to Amendment 29, moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, and I am delighted to endorse everything that he and the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, have said about it. I am delighted to join the noble Baroness in her campaign against Henry VIII. I am bound to point out that he had six wives, so there is no reason why he should not have as many critics and more.
The amendment would leave out part 2 of new Schedule 3ZA and therefore remove the power to add or remove offences to the list by order of the Secretary of State. That amounts to a pernicious Henry VIII power to add any offence to the “judge alone” list. No one has read it out, but I remind the Committee that the “judge alone” list in the Bill as drafted is just financial crime: conspiracy to defraud and offences under the Fraud Act; tax and VAT evasion; false accounting; insider dealing; money laundering; terrorist funding; bribery; historic fraud offences under the Theft Acts, including deception and going equipped to cheat; and ancillary offences. Those are financial crime, and that is what we had all envisaged the judge-only provisions would be about. However, it is not what is now proposed when there is a power—fettered only by the need for a preparatory hearing, effectively—to add further offences of whatever sort, provided that they are not the offences, excluded by the primary legislation, of homicide and serious sexual offences.
The Delegated Powers Committee, on which I once served—I agree with the noble Baroness about the worth and value of the work that it does, if often unlauded—described those provisions in its report on the Bill as being concerned with
“offences of serious economic crime such as fraud, bribery and terrorist funding”.
The committee summed up the principle in the 2021-22 report Democracy Denied?, which the noble Baroness cited:
“The appropriate threshold between primary and secondary legislation should be founded on the overarching principle that the principal aspects of policy should be on the face of a bill and only its detailed implementation left to delegated legislation”.
That neatly and elegantly sums up one of the cardinal rules on which parliamentary democracy is based: that the Government are accountable to Parliament and Ministers introduce a programme of legislation, but it is for Parliament to pass or reject it as it determines.
Vesting a Minister with the power to enable trials without a jury of any offence triable on indictment other than excluded offences, provided only that a relevant preparatory hearing has been ordered, would be a radical departure from that principle of parliamentary sovereignty. We will oppose it and we will vote against it on Report. While we are prepared to give the Government time to consider their position between now and Report, Ministers should be in no doubt as to the seriousness with which we view this threatened abuse of constitutional principle.
On the merits of adding further offences to Clause 3, we see little reason, as I have explained, for judge-only trials as a matter of principle, unless applied for by a defendant. We see no reason whatever for them in other cases in the Crown Court, unless sought by the defendant, and will continue to oppose these provisions.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Ministry of Justice (Lord Lemos) (Lab)
My Lords, Schedule 1 is an inherent element of “judge alone” trials for complex or lengthy fraud and financial cases, as it stipulates those offences that are in scope of the measure, and therefore should stand part of the Bill. I have heard concerns that Part 2 of Schedule 1 could be used over time to expand broadly the scope of Clause 3 —noble Lords have spoken very clearly and firmly about that. Let me be clear: it is already the case that amendments to the schedule can be made only through the affirmative procedure—and I note the comments that have been made about that—which requires a successful vote in both Houses. Offences cannot be added to the schedule without Parliament’s consent.
Amendments 30, 63 and 64, tabled by the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, would prevent the addition of further offences to the schedule. Amendment 29, tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, would go further by preventing any changes to the schedules at all, whether additions or deletions. As I have said, the purpose of this provision is to allow the system to respond flexibly as fraud and financial offending evolve over time. Technology continues to evolve rapidly, including developments in artificial intelligence. Cases involving any added offences will always have to comply with the other statutory safeguards for an order under Clause 3: a preparatory hearing, a public interest test, exclusions for homicide and indictable-only sex offences, and judicial decision- making.
I have noted the comments of the Delegated Powers Committee, and I understand that we will return to this on Report. With those comments, I ask the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, it occurs to me that the Minister may have missed his vocation: he is able to advance an unstatable case with at least a scintilla of conviction. We cannot accept the explanation advanced. I note the support across the Committee for removing Part 2 of Schedule 1. The suggestion that it might be required to introduce further new laws unknown at the present time was met eloquently by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, who pointed out that such laws would almost certainly be introduced by way of primary legislation anyway. I make it clear that we will be returning to this on Report. Meanwhile, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment would remove the provision allowing the Secretary of State to change, by regulations, the general limit on custodial sentences in a magistrates’ court for either-way offences to 6, 12, 18 or 24 months.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I have Amendment 33 in this final group of the day. This amendment would remove the power of the Secretary of State to amend the Sentencing Code as proposed in Clause 5(1) of the Bill to substitute periods of 6, 12, 18 or 24 months as the general limit for magistrates’ court sentences for “either way” offences, currently with 12-month limits. Amendment 35, from the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and the clause stand part notice from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would have the same effect.
There are two broad headings for our objections to this proposal. The first is that it would hand to the Government another unacceptable Henry VIII power, giving the Secretary of State the power dramatically to increase by secondary legislation the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts. The use of Henry VIII powers for such a purpose is particularly egregious, because sentence lengths are concerned with the liberty of the subject and so are pre-eminently matters of policy for Parliament and not matters of implementation by Ministers.
The Delegated Powers Committee expressed itself trenchantly on this issue, as it did on the issue in group 7, saying:
“‘Henry VIII powers are controversial, and for good reason. Every such power, and its scope, must always be fully justified’ … we consider that the Government has failed to justify the … power in clause 5(1) and we recommend that it is removed from the Bill”.
The Government seek to support the new power by reference to an alleged requirement that
“adjustments to magistrates’ sentencing limits can be made swiftly where operational pressures or changes in case volumes necessitate a rebalancing of work between the magistrates’ courts and the Crown Court”.
The Government referred then to responding
“flexibly to fluctuations in demand, ensuring that cases are allocated to the appropriate court without the delay that would result from requiring amendment via primary legislation”.
I have no wish to be flippant because this is a serious issue, but that attempt by the Government at a justification sounds more appropriate to a supermarket chain resolving its grocery distribution issues than to the impartial administration of justice where sentence lengths for individual offenders are at stake.
The nature of the Government’s attempted justification of these changes demonstrates just how important it is that Parliament should retain control of these significant policy questions and that they should not be subordinated to ephemeral, practical, operational difficulties. The extent of government overreach on this issue is accentuated by the Bill providing for the negative resolution procedure only. At least Amendment 34 from the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, would right that obvious wrong.
The second area of objection to the proposal to enable sentences to be increased by Ministers by regulations is both principled and practical. The combined effect of the proposals in this Bill would be to draw criminal cases into the magistrates’ court and away from the Crown Court. That would have the effect, as we have discussed, of depriving many defendants of a right to a jury trial. Indeed, that is the Government’s stated aim, expressed as directed towards reducing the appalling Crown Court backlog. However, as I said earlier today and as has been said by others, the evidence that this would actually be achieved is thin. The backlogs in the Crown Court are stabilising as measures have been introduced to address them. As I said at Second Reading, although we can argue about the exact figures, the Criminal Bar Association’s figures show that, over the first six months of this year, the Crown Court backlog rose by less than 0.5%. In the magistrates’ court, on the other hand, the backlog in June, excluding single justice procedure cases, was up 16% in a year to about 169,000. We have heard a great deal today about the magistrates’ courts being as clogged up as they are and the difficulties that this Bill could present, because those figures are before any of the proposals in this Bill have taken effect.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Barker) (LD)
I advise the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed to, I cannot call Amendment 34 because of pre-emption.
Viscount Hailsham (Con)
My Lords, I will speak very briefly to Amendments 69, 71 and 72. My concern is that already expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Marks. Once Clause 1 is enacted—if it is—and the sentencing powers of the magistrates’ courts are increased, there will be a very large increase in the business of magistrates’ courts and they will be overwhelmed. The effect of the amendments I have tabled in this context is to limit the ability of the Government to implement the clauses unless the magistrates’ courts have increased the number of magistrates to 21,000, which seems to be the figure generally accepted as sufficient to handle the increased business. My amendments also provide that, in the event of the number of magistrates falling below 21,000 for a sustained period of three months, the statutory instrument will lapse. The purpose is to try to ensure that there are sufficient magistrates. I have grave doubts that there will be, and that is why I tabled these amendments.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, I oppose Clause 5. It will allow the Government to increase the maximum custodial sentence that magistrates can impose from 12 months to 18 or 24 months. As we have heard, it will also give the Secretary of State the power to make that change through regulations rather than through Parliament, which would allow us to consider the matter through primary legislation. My concern is about not just the length of sentences but the combined effect of this clause and Clause 1. The Bar Council has warned that this is a “dangerous experiment”, particularly at a time when prisons are already at capacity and the backlog in magistrates’ courts is growing. Increasing magistrates’ sentencing powers does not address the underlying problems of an underresourced justice system.
Like many other noble Lords, I am also concerned about the delegated powers in this clause. The House of Lords Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee has specifically recommended that Clause 5(1) be removed. Its chair warned that the clause oversteps the proper limits of ministerial discretion. We should not hand the Government such a significant power to change sentencing limits without proper parliamentary scrutiny. The Government have not made a convincing case for this change. If they think magistrates should have greater sentencing powers, why will they not justify that proposal to Parliament instead of leaving the decision to future regulations? I told the Minister that I would not say this, but, while he is extremely emollient in trying to calm our fears, I am afraid he has not done so. The Government are faced with opposition from all around the Chamber. The Greens are linking with the Conservatives, Labour and the Lib Dems. Might that give the Government pause to think that perhaps they have got it wrong?
Amendment 35 and my consequential Amendments 58, 70 and 71 would replace Clause 5 with a single, simple provision. It removes the Henry VIII power of the Secretary of State to change by regulations how long a magistrates’ court can send someone to prison for, for an “either way” offence. At Second Reading, I said that I could not support expanding magistrates’ sentencing powers. This amendment offers the Government a constructive alternative, taken directly from the review on which this Bill is built.
Paragraph 14A of Schedule 23 to the Sentencing Act 2020 is a Henry VIII power. It allows a Minister to rewrite an Act of Parliament by statutory instrument, subject only to a negative procedure. That is appalling. We are not a democracy when that sort of action gets taken. Since 2022, the limit has been raised from six to 12 months, cut back to six months in March 2023 and raised to 12 months again in November 2024. That is three changes in under three years, driven by Crown Court backlogs one year and prison capacity the next. Clause 5 widens this even further. It allows the Secretary of State to set the limit at 18 or 24 months, up to double today’s maximum—again, by regulations.
The Minister told your Lordships’ House at Second Reading that the Government intend to raise the limit to 18 months next year, depending on Royal Assent. That is not what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Leveson, recommended. In recommendation 15 of Part 1 of his independent review of the criminal courts, he recommended that the power to change magistrates’ sentencing powers by statutory instrument be repealed and that the 12-month maximum should be made permanent. My amendment, therefore, does exactly what recommendation 15 asks.
I absolutely despair of this Government, in the sense that they seem to be backtracking on all the democratic ideas they had when they were in Opposition. I sat here and listened to all the colleagues here on the Labour Benches when they were in Opposition, saying wonderful things that I could agree with. Now, I just see the other Tory party sitting over there. It is very depressing to sit over here these days.
Baroness Sater (Con)
I rise to speak to Amendments 36 and 68 in my name, which seek to ensure that magistrates’ courts are properly prepared for the extension of their sentencing powers and that the impact of these reforms is reviewed within 12 months of the Bill coming into force, and annually thereafter. I am grateful to the Minister for meeting with me, together with his officials, and for the constructive discussion and helpful follow-up information.
The Government’s intention is to relieve pressure on the Crown Court. However, we need to be confident that the magistrates’ court will have sufficient capacity to absorb the additional work that noble Lords have discussed today. Amendment 68, which would extend the commencement period from two months to six months, seeks to probe whether the proposed timetable allows sufficient time to ensure that all necessary preparations are in place.
There are several areas I would like to explore with the Minister. First, on recruitment and retention, I welcome the fact that recruitment has almost doubled. In the year to March 2026 1,663 magistrates were appointed, compared with 898 the previous year. However, as mentioned at Second Reading, 988 magistrates also left during that period, which was a 20% increase on the previous year. In August the Magistrates’ Association highlighted that at this rate it would take a further 9.2 years to reach the Government’s target of 21,000 magistrates in post, which they aim to achieve by 2028-29. This really concerns me. Given the assessment, can the Minister give us the confidence and reassurance that the Government will be able to meet their targets?
We must also ensure that progress on diversity is maintained and strengthened along the way. The Government’s own figures show that 17% of new appointments in 2025-26 were from ethnic minority backgrounds, compared with 14% of serving magistrates. Can the Minister assure me that this is being closely monitored and that the Government remain focused on continuing to improve the diversity of the magistracy? Increasing numbers must go hand in hand with ensuring that the Bench reflects the community it serves, and does not get left behind.
One area I did not mention at Second Reading was my concern about whether there would be sufficient experienced magistrates to act as presiding judges. The Government’s own figures indicate that around a third of serving magistrates are currently presiding judges. Have the Government assessed whether this proportion will be sufficient to meet the additional demands arising from these reforms, in particular taking into account the expected departures and retirements? What steps are being taken to ensure that there are enough experienced presiding judges as the magistracy expands?
Secondly, the Lady Chief Justice raised concerns about the additional need for training, following the previous extension of magistrates’ sentencing powers, describing it as
“a huge amount of additional … need”.
As many noble Lords raised at Second Reading, the extension of these powers will create further demands. I understand that the Judicial College has already begun planning for the additional training requirements and that further funding has been made available. What assessment have the Government made of the Judicial College’s capacity to deliver this training alongside the ongoing training needs of the existing magistracy? Is there contingency funding available should demand exceed the college’s current estimates?
The Government have said that the extended sentencing powers will not come into force until sufficient magistrates, legal advisers and district judges have completed the necessary training. How will the Government determine whether this requirement has been met and what do they consider to be sufficient?
Thirdly, as we already know, legal advisers and court staff play a vital role in the effective running of magistrates’ courts. The Government have highlighted that they have appointed additional legal advisers and are recruiting further staff. However, how many additional legal advisers do the Government estimate they will need to support the increased case load, while trying to take into account the numbers that will leave?
I understand that HMCTS is still developing its package of pay, progression and career development reforms to address retention challenges. When do the Government expect this work to be completed and are they confident that these measures will be in place in time to support the additional demands?
Finally, I welcome the Government’s investment in additional sitting days, but these can be delivered only if there are sufficient magistrates, presiding judges, legal advisers and court staff. Taken together, these are significant practical challenges. While I recognise the steps the Government have outlined, I question whether two months will be sufficient to complete the necessary preparations. What assessment have the Government made of the preparations still required and what evidence supports their decision that a two-month commencement period is sufficient when there are so many variables and unknowns? I am not suggesting that six months is necessarily the only possible timetable, nor am I seeking to delay these reforms unnecessarily. The central issue is that these reforms must not come into force before the magistrates’ courts are ready to deliver them effectively, or we risk creating an even bigger problem.
Briefly, Amendment 36 would require the Government to publish a review within 12 months of the Bill coming into force and annually thereafter. Even with the necessary preparation, the practical realities of implementation may differ from the Government’s projections. Having this review and annually thereafter would allow us to assess how successfully magistrates’ courts are managing the additional case load, identify any challenges arising from the reforms and consider whether further support is needed.
Having served as a magistrate, I know that greater powers bring greater responsibility. We must ensure that magistrates’ courts are properly equipped to exercise these powers, and I look forward to hearing the Minister’s response.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
My Lords, the noble Baroness has raised so many variables and unknowns—a term that she used—and I am very glad she did so. She speaks from experience, which I cannot, but I have been very uneasy about almost everything she has mentioned and I have some amendments which we will come to next week on the same subject. So I am generally supportive of what she is saying.
My name is on Amendment 69. I will not say I added my name because it got added by the Public Bill Office disaggregating one of my amendments and adding my name to that of the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham. This is a bit of a stretch. I do not know whether you would call the noble Viscount, the noble and learned Lord and me an unholy alliance but, on the subject of collective nouns, I have had an email from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Burnett, saying that the term coined by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, of an “exquisite quartet”—this is for future reference, your Lordships understand—is one that he can live with.
Lord Keen of Elie (Con)
My Lords, the Clause 5 stand part notice is in my name. We have a number of diverse amendments in this group, but they all direct attention at the same issues, they are all sounding the same warnings, and they come from across the Committee.
There are two essential elements. The first, as remarked upon by the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames, is the improper constitutional mechanism of Henry VIII powers being exercised by the negative procedure, with the result that the length of imprisonment that can be imposed upon those citizens who appear before the magistrates’ court may be increased. The second is the unrealistic assumptions that are being made about the ability of the magistrates’ courts to cope with the increased pressure that is going to be placed upon them, not only in regard to their ability to accommodate “each way” cases but by the transfer of further cases, which will be listed as and when sentencing powers are extended.
I am struck by the observation made by my noble friend Lady Sater, repeated by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, about the reference to variables and unknowns. There is a complete lack of evidence from the Government as to how these changes will impact upon the present capacity of the magistrates’ courts to accommodate the increased load that is being placed upon them.
It is in these circumstances that we will return to this on Report and we will support those further amendments that seek to challenge the Government’s ability to circumvent Parliament—because, in essence, that is what is being done here—by way of the negative procedure to increase sentencing powers.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
My Lords, Clause 5 provides powers to increase magistrates’ court sentencing powers to 18 or 24 months should future circumstances require it. These powers provide important flexibility to respond to changing pressures across the justice system and to ensure that court resources are deployed proportionately. Drawing on the experience of the past few years, responding to changing pressures across the justice system, including in the prison system, is a very high priority for the efficient management of justice which commands public confidence.
The Crown Court continues to face significant pressures, and many cases sent there for sentence can be dealt with fairly and effectively in the magistrates’ courts, as I have said in earlier groups. Extending magistrates’ court sentencing powers will allow more cases to be appropriately retained in the magistrates’ courts, freeing Crown Court capacity for the most serious and complex cases.
Reducing delay is not simply a matter of efficiency. Timeliness is an essential ingredient of fairness and justice, and freeing Crown Court capacity is critical if victims are to receive justice within a reasonable timeframe. The backlog is one question, and noble Lords have cited various statistics about the backlog in both the Crown Court and the magistrates’ court, but the backlog in the magistrates’ court is dealt with much more quickly than the backlog in the Crown Court, for all the reasons that are obvious. The waiting times in the magistrates’ court are less than half the waiting times for the Crown Court. That matters to victims in particular.
Amendments 69, 71 and 72 from the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, and Amendment 34 from my noble friend Lady Goudie seek to make these reforms subject to the affirmative procedure and prevent them taking effect unless a prescribed number of magistrates is maintained. The Government do not consider this additional procedure necessary. Parliament is already being asked by this Bill to take the substantive policy decisions, including approving the full range of magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers that may be exercised in future. Once Parliament has established that framework, it is proportionate and consistent with existing practice for changes within those limits to be made by regulations. I know that is not what many noble Lords wanted to hear, but it is our view. The negative procedure is the established approach and has been used previously, both to reduce and to increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers in response to the changing pressures across the justice system, which have been vividly recounted in recent months.
Nor do we believe that the implementation or continuation of these reforms should be made contingent on a single workforce metric. The Government fully recognise the importance of magistrates’ courts’ capacity, which is why we are increasing sitting days and undertaking a national recruitment campaign with the aim of increasing the size of the magistracy to around 21,000, as the noble Viscount, Lord Hailsham, noted, by 2028-29. However, operational readiness cannot be reduced to a single numerical threshold. It depends on court capacity, workforce deployment, case volumes and wider pressures across the criminal justice system. Amendment 72 would make commencement and continued operation dependent on a prescribed number of magistrates being maintained, regardless of the wider operational position of the justice system. The Government’s view is that such decisions should be guided by evidence and operational need rather than a single workforce measure.
Amendments 36 and 68 were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Sater—I thank her for meeting me in such a constructive spirit, and we have provided her with more information since. I take seriously all the points that she made about the things that needed to be true, if I can put it like that, for these reforms to succeed. I pay tribute to her experience and collaborative spirit. The Government have already committed in Clause 20 to post-implementation monitoring and review of the reforms, and therefore we do not consider that a further statutory review requirement is necessary. Amendment 68 would delay commencement beyond two months after Royal Assent. We do not consider that necessary either. The Bill does not increase magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers. Magistrates will continue to operate at their current sentencing limits unless and until a future decision is taken to exercise the power. Any future decision to increase sentencing powers will be informed by operational data and engagement with key partners across the criminal justice system, including HMCTS, prisons and probation, the CPS and the judiciary.
Since sentencing powers were increased to 12 months in November 2024, fewer cases are being committed to the Crown Court for sentence, and magistrates are retaining more cases to hear. I reject entirely the comment by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, that the Government have provided no evidence. We have published a magistrates’ capacity plan; I have commissioned a fact sheet that I think the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, has seen, and we have published our modelling. There is a good deal of data out there already. I have spent a good deal of time, including this morning, going over progress on magistrates’ courts’ capacity, recruitment and retention, so I am afraid I simply do not accept that characterisation.
We are going to increase sittings days to 131,000 in 2028-29. A national recruitment campaign is under way to increase the number of magistrates and recruit additional legal advisers and district judges. We are committed to rebuilding the magistracy. We have already made 1,500 new appointments across England and Wales since April. In 2025-26, as the noble Baroness, Lady Sater, noted, 17% of new appointments were from an ethnic minority and more than a third of new recruits were under 50. Women account for 55% of the new appointments.
I heard the concerns from the noble Baroness about the capacity and funding of the Judicial College. We will monitor those carefully but, as I told her when we met, we have significantly increased the funding to the Judicial College. That is an important aspect of making a success of these things—as is the need for new magistrates to have the mentoring and support of more experienced magistrates, as we have discussed. We have a detailed implementation plan. I would be very grateful if the noble Baroness, given her experience, would continue to work with us on making sure that is a reality. We all have the same ambitions here. I have a good deal of confidence in our efforts to expand the capacity of the magistracy. I am happy to share that with the noble Baronesses, Lady Sater and Lady Hamwee, and others.
Baroness Hamwee (LD)
The Minister referred to Clause 20, which talks about a review of equalities issues and, regarding the appointment of reviewers,
“any other matter specified in the appointment that relates to the effect of the relevant criminal justice provisions”.
It would be helpful to know what other matters the Government have in mind. We have been talking about some quite specific issues. I would be glad of a reassurance that that is what the Government intend to look at in a specific and detailed way to report to Parliament.
Lord Lemos (Lab)
The review that is promised is specifically on the question of disproportionality as it affects Black and minority-ethnic people. The provisions that we have made for the appointment and so on of the reviewer relate to that. That said, we also intend to review and publish progress on magistrates’ capacity, because we see that as central. It is not the same review, but both of those things are in play.
Of course, the readiness of the magistrates’ courts would be assessed before any decision to increase sentencing powers is taken. The decision would be informed by operational data and engagement. A fixed statutory delay would, therefore, reduce our flexibility without providing realistic additional assurance on operational readiness. It would also delay commencement of the statutory independent review of the structural reforms—just mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee—and provisions for when the Crown Court sits in the City of London, despite there being no equivalent operational rationale for doing so.
Amendment 33 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Marks, together with Amendment 35, and consequential Amendments 58 and 70 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, would either restrict the sentencing powers of magistrates’ courts to the current possible limits of six or 12 months, variable by regulations, or remove altogether those existing powers to vary their sentencing powers by regulations. The Government do not believe that would be the right approach. Parliament is being asked through this Bill to decide whether magistrates’ courts’ sentencing powers may in future be increased to 18 or 24 months. Clause 5 does not itself increase those powers. Parliament is taking the substantive policy decision about those limits through this piece of primary legislation and setting the limits within which any future regulations may operate. The purpose of Clause 5 is to continue to enable flexibility and any future decision to exercise the power would be informed by that evidence.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I do not share the despair of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, at everything that this Government do. They have done some good and brave things, not least in the area of criminal justice, many of which we have welcomed. However, they have shown themselves to be capable of serious misjudgments. The power to extend magistrates’ sentencing powers—doubling them—by regulation, by a Henry VIII power, subject to the negative procedure only and on minimal evidence, is a radical misstep.
I note the Minister’s reliance on government modelling as providing the necessary evidence. However, that modelling depends on a number of imponderables and unprovable predictions about the future. With only the negative resolution procedure available to air the issue, the problems with this provision remain unsolved. The Government are right that the position that I and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, take means that primary legislation would be required to increase sentencing powers. We say that that is right. Parliamentary scrutiny in Committee is intended to enable the Government to step back before such missteps, as I characterise them, cause serious danger.
In the hope that the Government will withdraw from this misstep before its consequences may be felt, I beg leave to withdraw this amendment—but I too expect the matter to return.