International Development Committee
Tuesday 14th July 2026
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14:09
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
This is the International Development Select Committee's one off session on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Um, we repeatedly, as a committee come back to this topic. This is the International Development Select Committee's one off session on the humanitarian situation in Yemen. Um, we repeatedly as a committee come back to this topic because the humanitarian situation out there is truly horrendous. Um, it's been going on for over a decade now. And unfortunately, it gets very, very little attention. Um, I think part of that is the short attention span of the media.
Um, they like a crisis and this is an ongoing protracted disaster. Um, but also it is literally hidden largely as this session will show, because it is very difficult to get current information out into the public domain.
Um, they like a crisis and this is an ongoing protracted disaster. Um, but also it is literally hidden largely as this session will show, because it is very difficult to get current information out into the public domain.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Okay. Thank you very much. Uh, honourable MP and honourable members of the International Development Committee. It is really a great honour and a privilege to stand today in front of you. Uh, I am, um. Uh, I am the representative of World Food Programme, uh, in Yemen. Uh, we are working in Yemen for the last over three decades. We are, uh. Honored also to have long lasting partnership with the UK government and the UK people.
And so thank you very much. And I'm really grateful to be here with you.
And so thank you very much. And I'm really grateful to be here with you.
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14:12
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
World Food Programme, established in 1963 and stand, uh, for um achieving. Zero hunger. Uh, as you know that the sustainable Development Goals have identified sustainable development goals. Number two, uh, achieving. Zero hunger and WFP stand for that. WFP is operational in 84 countries and it works in what we call it, uh, saving lives and saving lives is basically, uh, the humanitarian response where we are working with survival and feeding people and addressing hunger. And the worst outcome.
And at the same time, also we are working in the developmental side, which we call it changing life is about addressing the root causes of hunger. Uh, those root causes of hunger. We translate them into positive programs like resilience food systems, uh, school meals, uh, those types of programs. In addition to that, also WFP work in enabling, uh, the humanitarian space, especially in the enabling agencies to deliver humanitarian response in hard to reach areas where the access is limited. And therefore, we will find WFP is providing logistic support.
For example, the logistic cluster. Uh, we have on surface demand for agencies that are not able to deliver. And and so that is a cross across the, um, uh, the world. Um, as you know, that also WFP is a leading agency, uh, in trying to, uh. Use most of the famines that happen in the world, famine that happen as a result of climate or conflict, uh, or outbreak of diseases. So those are the main reasons that have resulted into, into the famines and, and crisis.
But one of the leading agencies, but I have to mention that many times WFP is being perceived because of the volume of the humanitarian response, that we are only humanitarian agency. And yes, we are the largest humanitarian agency in the world. However, we are also, uh, in the developmental side.
And at the same time, also we are working in the developmental side, which we call it changing life is about addressing the root causes of hunger. Uh, those root causes of hunger. We translate them into positive programs like resilience food systems, uh, school meals, uh, those types of programs. In addition to that, also WFP work in enabling, uh, the humanitarian space, especially in the enabling agencies to deliver humanitarian response in hard to reach areas where the access is limited. And therefore, we will find WFP is providing logistic support.
For example, the logistic cluster. Uh, we have on surface demand for agencies that are not able to deliver. And and so that is a cross across the, um, uh, the world. Um, as you know, that also WFP is a leading agency, uh, in trying to, uh. Use most of the famines that happen in the world, famine that happen as a result of climate or conflict, uh, or outbreak of diseases. So those are the main reasons that have resulted into, into the famines and, and crisis.
But one of the leading agencies, but I have to mention that many times WFP is being perceived because of the volume of the humanitarian response, that we are only humanitarian agency. And yes, we are the largest humanitarian agency in the world. However, we are also, uh, in the developmental side.
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14:14
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yes, definitely. We are. We are part of the of the United, the United Nation. And we are, uh. Uh, working with, uh, for example, we in any country, you will find agencies called resident agencies and non resident agencies. WFP continued to be a resident agency because of we are operational and also we are, uh, our footprint. We work deep in the we work deep in the field. So you will find us at the capitals, but also you will find us closer to the people we serve.
14:15
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And I mean on. Public record. You're one of the best value for money. Um, you're one of the leanest organizations and I've seen you on the ground. And what you're able to do is remarkable. So thank you for everything that you and your colleagues do. Um, if we can now turn specifically to Yemen. And Janet, you've got the first question.
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14:30
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I really want to start with how the trajectory when, uh, the honourable member should talk about the in the last decade, Yemen has gone through a very challenging moment. Um, until 2015, World Food Programme, our developmental programme is the major component and the humanitarian is the is the smaller one. But as a result of conflict, we have reached a situation where 50% of the total population of Yemen is food insecure. And that is that is constituted about 18.3 million people. Also.
5 million acutely malnourished 50. 5,000,055% of children chronically malnourished also. We have 5.2 internally displaced. As a result, either of war or climate crisis. And then this is also affected children, both boys and girls. About 3.2 million children at school age that are currently out of school. I recently I just started this role in the 5th of March this year, and I have traveled in the southern part where uh. Uh, under the control of uh.
National government. And I have met.
5 million acutely malnourished 50. 5,000,055% of children chronically malnourished also. We have 5.2 internally displaced. As a result, either of war or climate crisis. And then this is also affected children, both boys and girls. About 3.2 million children at school age that are currently out of school. I recently I just started this role in the 5th of March this year, and I have traveled in the southern part where uh. Uh, under the control of uh.
National government. And I have met.
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14:33
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Well, um, as you know, the problem in, um. Um, in Yemen is that in the South and the North, women, uh, protection or exposing women to violence used as a weapon with the two parties, actually, with the two in the north and in the south. And one of the biggest problems women and girls in Yemen is facing is our laws and institutions. It's absolutely give us no way to protect ourselves or to find the safety. No law in the country ban discrimination against women.
Rape is normalized and never considered as a crime. And even getting a basic legal right, like inheritance is a battle for women in Yemen. To make it worse, uh, there is, a adultery law or what we call it in Yemen. Uh, if a woman who exposed to rape, um. Try to report or try to, uh, file a case against the neighbor, uh, she might be considered as a she might be prosecuted for adultery. Actually, um, and she strictly prove that she was raped.
And this cannot happen in Yemen. Plus, if she is not present for adultery, she might expose to honor killing. And in the laws in Yemen, uh. If the male in the family killed his mother, sister or daughter for adultery, it's only one year in a prison or a fine. It's it's, uh, so this exposed women to a lot of, um, risks also, um. Total lack of accountability happening everywhere in Yemen and north and in South. Um, it's kept alive by the mahram rule recently, every women who need to travel either in north or south and north, it's more than south, but it's still the same in many areas in the south.
Um, she need mahram, which means that she need to be accompanied by a male. Or get a permission for a male to move from a place to another. And this is a kind of violence because women who is exposed to domestic violence or any kind of gender based violence, they cannot seek a services because they cannot go and seek a services. It's the same thing for all service providers. Most of the service providers for specialized services for gender based violence are women.
And if they cannot travel or if they cannot freely move to provide their services, this mean no, uh, services will be stopped and women will be exposed to more, um, violence. Uh, plus there's the stigma issue. Stigma issue is that women not always can speak out about violence or about that they exposed to violence by a male or by an abuser because it's known and normalized, normalized in the tradition that even if a male is an abuser, but he is still, uh, the protector as well. And she cannot speak about this, otherwise she will be considered disobedient.
Actually, a North and the South, uh, they have. Different dynamics. Look into the violence against women, it's hidden everywhere. And it's there, uh, equally in the north and in the south. Um. In the north, we have a big issue, uh, related to the security of women, which is very serious. It's a, a Zainab yet Zainab is a female force in the in the north. Uh, according to the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms, uh, they documented that between 1400 and 1655, 54 cases, uh, of violence against.
Uh, women was uh. Documented. Plus there's some testimonies for some prisoners who, freed from the prison recently. They say that Zainab is the one who facilitated all kind of violence in detention. Uh, against the woman. So, um, also, Zainab recently is the one who is monitoring women, who is working in the field, either in GBV or protection or in humanitarian field, uh, in general. And also they are the. Uh, so no one of our colleagues or our researchers can even speak about gender based violence.
And that's why some of our colleagues who are supposed to be here today could not join because they are based there. In a different dynamics. In the south there is um. A um a. Armed groups, the armed groups can do whatever they do, whatever they want to do to, uh, expose a woman, uh, to risk or to expose them to violence. And there is no, like, no clear mechanism or clear, um. Um, um. Way to, to, to, uh, appeal for any kind of support for a women because, um, it's also difficult because of the divided ministries there and a lot of armed groups, which is connected to the government and, uh, different political parties.
So it's a bit, uh, also chaotic. And, uh, in the north and the South.
Rape is normalized and never considered as a crime. And even getting a basic legal right, like inheritance is a battle for women in Yemen. To make it worse, uh, there is, a adultery law or what we call it in Yemen. Uh, if a woman who exposed to rape, um. Try to report or try to, uh, file a case against the neighbor, uh, she might be considered as a she might be prosecuted for adultery. Actually, um, and she strictly prove that she was raped.
And this cannot happen in Yemen. Plus, if she is not present for adultery, she might expose to honor killing. And in the laws in Yemen, uh. If the male in the family killed his mother, sister or daughter for adultery, it's only one year in a prison or a fine. It's it's, uh, so this exposed women to a lot of, um, risks also, um. Total lack of accountability happening everywhere in Yemen and north and in South. Um, it's kept alive by the mahram rule recently, every women who need to travel either in north or south and north, it's more than south, but it's still the same in many areas in the south.
Um, she need mahram, which means that she need to be accompanied by a male. Or get a permission for a male to move from a place to another. And this is a kind of violence because women who is exposed to domestic violence or any kind of gender based violence, they cannot seek a services because they cannot go and seek a services. It's the same thing for all service providers. Most of the service providers for specialized services for gender based violence are women.
And if they cannot travel or if they cannot freely move to provide their services, this mean no, uh, services will be stopped and women will be exposed to more, um, violence. Uh, plus there's the stigma issue. Stigma issue is that women not always can speak out about violence or about that they exposed to violence by a male or by an abuser because it's known and normalized, normalized in the tradition that even if a male is an abuser, but he is still, uh, the protector as well. And she cannot speak about this, otherwise she will be considered disobedient.
Actually, a North and the South, uh, they have. Different dynamics. Look into the violence against women, it's hidden everywhere. And it's there, uh, equally in the north and in the south. Um. In the north, we have a big issue, uh, related to the security of women, which is very serious. It's a, a Zainab yet Zainab is a female force in the in the north. Uh, according to the Yemeni Network for Rights and Freedoms, uh, they documented that between 1400 and 1655, 54 cases, uh, of violence against.
Uh, women was uh. Documented. Plus there's some testimonies for some prisoners who, freed from the prison recently. They say that Zainab is the one who facilitated all kind of violence in detention. Uh, against the woman. So, um, also, Zainab recently is the one who is monitoring women, who is working in the field, either in GBV or protection or in humanitarian field, uh, in general. And also they are the. Uh, so no one of our colleagues or our researchers can even speak about gender based violence.
And that's why some of our colleagues who are supposed to be here today could not join because they are based there. In a different dynamics. In the south there is um. A um a. Armed groups, the armed groups can do whatever they do, whatever they want to do to, uh, expose a woman, uh, to risk or to expose them to violence. And there is no, like, no clear mechanism or clear, um. Um, um. Way to, to, to, uh, appeal for any kind of support for a women because, um, it's also difficult because of the divided ministries there and a lot of armed groups, which is connected to the government and, uh, different political parties.
So it's a bit, uh, also chaotic. And, uh, in the north and the South.
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14:39
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Yeah. It's a police. Female police force that's formulated by Al Houthis in order to monitor women and to detain women. Uh, because, you know, the culture men cannot touch women. Men cannot monitor women. So they created this group in order to find a way to control women. So to make sure that women will keep their mouth shut, they cannot speak because they are reachable and they can be detained.
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14:41
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Look, before starting about dedicated programs to address those needs, we need to complement to what already my colleague Nuha have said, because in the north, especially in the north, where women are already deprived of access to health care, with a pause of the past months and the situation we have to face in the north of Yemen, those limited services are already extremely scarce. They are already hindered, and the access of it today, it contributes to put them more at risk as we speak. So where you had before a network of fqhcs that would be able to screen and identify women at risk and refer them to appropriate facilities, secondary health facilities that this service could have been, in the case of support and provide services.
Now they are even scarce. So women that have already barriers and issues of access at a local level, let alone when they have to cover further distances to reach that access of care. And keeping in mind that the context is the one, it is, of course, the restrictions are many, and in the past, a year ago or so, we were relying on other partners in the vicinity to be able to provide those services needed. Today, we are very worried and we raise the alarm that probably we might not be seeing majority of those cases accessing our facilities or getting access to those care that might need for the matter at hand.
Now they are even scarce. So women that have already barriers and issues of access at a local level, let alone when they have to cover further distances to reach that access of care. And keeping in mind that the context is the one, it is, of course, the restrictions are many, and in the past, a year ago or so, we were relying on other partners in the vicinity to be able to provide those services needed. Today, we are very worried and we raise the alarm that probably we might not be seeing majority of those cases accessing our facilities or getting access to those care that might need for the matter at hand.
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14:42
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
For the South, I think, as my colleague said, the North and the South are serving different reality because in the South, while you have availability of funds, it's more about feasibility and implementation on the ground. To what extent the efficiency of it it happens and applies. In the north. We're facing a more of a challenging environment where restrictions and barriers exist for different regions and let along. Although the funding has been scarce, even if it's available, it needs certain, let's say, help and support to be implemented on the ground.
And we can elaborate further on to this specific point.
And we can elaborate further on to this specific point.
14:42
14:42
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
While I was researching for this session, I was really shocked to discover that there are three women dying daily, which in June of this year is the highest maternal mortality rate in the Arab region. Sorry, dying in pregnancy or delivery. So I wondered, are there any specific programs to encourage training and to support midwives and doctors specifically around, um, sexual and reproductive health rights?
14:43
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
On that matter, I can tell you that there were a lot of activities, a lot of activities. They were activities at the primary health care level that would engage with the communities through the modalities of the Ministry of Health to train Tbas. In that sense, the traditional delivery system of the community in Yemen. And we were trying at least to train the communities when they identify early complications, to be referred to the SSC for stabilization and treatment if possible, or at least timely referral to a secondary health care facility where antenatal care could be followed alarmingly.
In 2025, you already mentioned the numbers on your own, and in 2026, we have a different kind of problem that insinuates that the situation has exacerbated on its own, which means we don't see so many cases anymore, which we can lead to a conclusion and keep following that trend that women have lost access because the support to the primary health care level has been reduced drastically due to the UN pause and other reasons. So those women don't have the means to access secondary health facilities. And the ones that we receive only 20, 25, 40% of the cases were late arrival to the hospital.
Hence complicated cases. While if there was an early system in place, we would be able to treat them much earlier and with much less complications in 2026. Those women and I can I can share this experience myself because I was in a two weeks ago and I was visiting one of the primary health care centers we are supporting to refer to another hospital in the cannabis, which offers maternal care as well, and sexual reproductive health activities. Was mentioning that while in 2025, they were seeing cases to be referred to al, they.
Until June 2026, we see far less cases. And I don't think we are in a situation where we have trained enough. The communities to be dealing with the complications at local level, with the means they have, rather, those people, those women have lost access or not lost has been severely hindered and probably will be hindered further in the future. The more we progress in this timeline.
In 2025, you already mentioned the numbers on your own, and in 2026, we have a different kind of problem that insinuates that the situation has exacerbated on its own, which means we don't see so many cases anymore, which we can lead to a conclusion and keep following that trend that women have lost access because the support to the primary health care level has been reduced drastically due to the UN pause and other reasons. So those women don't have the means to access secondary health facilities. And the ones that we receive only 20, 25, 40% of the cases were late arrival to the hospital.
Hence complicated cases. While if there was an early system in place, we would be able to treat them much earlier and with much less complications in 2026. Those women and I can I can share this experience myself because I was in a two weeks ago and I was visiting one of the primary health care centers we are supporting to refer to another hospital in the cannabis, which offers maternal care as well, and sexual reproductive health activities. Was mentioning that while in 2025, they were seeing cases to be referred to al, they.
Until June 2026, we see far less cases. And I don't think we are in a situation where we have trained enough. The communities to be dealing with the complications at local level, with the means they have, rather, those people, those women have lost access or not lost has been severely hindered and probably will be hindered further in the future. The more we progress in this timeline.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Okay. So, uh, you know, since the war started, the percentage of early marriage has been increased sharply. Also. Girls less than 18 years old is getting married, getting pregnancy before they are ready. This increase the mortality among children and also expose these women's. Health to to a lot of risks. Um UNFPA and some of the national through some national NGOs is running some of the health facilities. But due to the POWs in the north and due to the lack of the funds, uh.
Almost 70% of these services has been shut down, either protection or health services, which means that women is left behind. They cannot seek services and they cannot have access to case management, psychosocial support through the protection centers or the safe spaces. And they cannot also get health services needed. They are exposed to unsafe abortions, to unsafe childbirth, and this can cause, like a lot of issues, uh, for them. And this is one of the biggest challenges that we are facing, um, that many of the services has been shut down or at the edge of being shut down.
UNFPA is trying. They asked for 71 million this year to, to ensure that the services would be sustained and continued. But unfortunately, up to now it's only 9 million that was received and um, used with. The partners. Uh, for the. Implementation of, uh, sustaining some of these facilities, health facilities and safe spaces.
Almost 70% of these services has been shut down, either protection or health services, which means that women is left behind. They cannot seek services and they cannot have access to case management, psychosocial support through the protection centers or the safe spaces. And they cannot also get health services needed. They are exposed to unsafe abortions, to unsafe childbirth, and this can cause, like a lot of issues, uh, for them. And this is one of the biggest challenges that we are facing, um, that many of the services has been shut down or at the edge of being shut down.
UNFPA is trying. They asked for 71 million this year to, to ensure that the services would be sustained and continued. But unfortunately, up to now it's only 9 million that was received and um, used with. The partners. Uh, for the. Implementation of, uh, sustaining some of these facilities, health facilities and safe spaces.
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14:48
Speaker 9
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Speaker 9
Konstantinos. If I can go to you now and, um, I want to take a more sort of, uh. Higher level in a way, but I want you to, to, to dig down. So if I ask you, um, three, three, three questions in one, what is the current state of healthcare in Yemen?Uh, how does MSF meet those needs and what are the long term implications of, uh, those needs not being addressed?
14:48
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
Okay. What is the status of the current health state of Yemen in North and south?A bit of different situations and the same in. Parallel. What do I mean with that?In Yemen, North and South, people are in need. The Ministry of Health and the SSC level are in need of support, technical supervision, more knowledge on the ground and to support them to move forward on how to address those needs. The difference is that in the South, you have more resources available compared to what is the North.
Due to what has happened in the past year, where more funds have been concentrated to the south rather than the north?And that's the big difference when I say it's the same needs, but at the same time different, because in the north, the South has the funds and the tools and NGOs to operate and move ahead with whatever is needed to be addressed in the health level. The North has been defunded, isolated. The needs, though, are still the same, and they will celebrate the next months or years to come.
And that's a bit what we what we anticipate as of today. And just to connect the first point with the third point, what do we foresee in the long term if those needs remain Unattained I think in any given country that the health needs of the populations remain. Unattained we don't expect from this part of the population, the country, to be able to recover themselves or to enter to any other trajectory, rather, the one of the prolonged humanitarian disaster need prolonged management of outbreaks that are not any more outbreaks.
It's a regularized situation that we are just managing week after week, epidemiological week to be able to address those needs, but without being able to outpace this curve. As MSF, what we do today. Is that, first of all, when it comes to the North, we're trying to keep a modus operandi that can reflect to the needs of the population, but also to keeps us, in a way, versatile to address outbreaks and emergency response that may occur because the humanitarian landscape has changed and where we were before many other NGOs to be able to collaborate and coordinate our responses.
Now we need to keep a focus on how we can better address the needs in the areas we are keeping in mind that we have already reached our maximum capacity in terms of operations for the past years and our further growth. It's not a matter of financial support to be able to grow bigger and respond more needs, but it's actually a matter of feasibility of having a wider operation. In the meantime, we are collaborating with ICRC, the other actor in the country in the north part, to be able to have maximum efficiency and don't overlap in areas, geographical areas for the.
The South, we are attending different health needs in some areas because in the South we have also activities and programs that. Besides focusing on, uh, malnutrition or pediatrics, we are also focusing on, uh, activities for the migration population that cross from Horn of Africa to south of Yemen to reach the rest of Arabic Peninsula. And that's another topic of a population in need. That is not the Yemeni population, but yet with needs. And in the meantime, again, in the same modality, try to be engaging with the other actors to avoid duplication of activities and maximize the geographic, the geographical coverage.
Due to what has happened in the past year, where more funds have been concentrated to the south rather than the north?And that's the big difference when I say it's the same needs, but at the same time different, because in the north, the South has the funds and the tools and NGOs to operate and move ahead with whatever is needed to be addressed in the health level. The North has been defunded, isolated. The needs, though, are still the same, and they will celebrate the next months or years to come.
And that's a bit what we what we anticipate as of today. And just to connect the first point with the third point, what do we foresee in the long term if those needs remain Unattained I think in any given country that the health needs of the populations remain. Unattained we don't expect from this part of the population, the country, to be able to recover themselves or to enter to any other trajectory, rather, the one of the prolonged humanitarian disaster need prolonged management of outbreaks that are not any more outbreaks.
It's a regularized situation that we are just managing week after week, epidemiological week to be able to address those needs, but without being able to outpace this curve. As MSF, what we do today. Is that, first of all, when it comes to the North, we're trying to keep a modus operandi that can reflect to the needs of the population, but also to keeps us, in a way, versatile to address outbreaks and emergency response that may occur because the humanitarian landscape has changed and where we were before many other NGOs to be able to collaborate and coordinate our responses.
Now we need to keep a focus on how we can better address the needs in the areas we are keeping in mind that we have already reached our maximum capacity in terms of operations for the past years and our further growth. It's not a matter of financial support to be able to grow bigger and respond more needs, but it's actually a matter of feasibility of having a wider operation. In the meantime, we are collaborating with ICRC, the other actor in the country in the north part, to be able to have maximum efficiency and don't overlap in areas, geographical areas for the.
The South, we are attending different health needs in some areas because in the South we have also activities and programs that. Besides focusing on, uh, malnutrition or pediatrics, we are also focusing on, uh, activities for the migration population that cross from Horn of Africa to south of Yemen to reach the rest of Arabic Peninsula. And that's another topic of a population in need. That is not the Yemeni population, but yet with needs. And in the meantime, again, in the same modality, try to be engaging with the other actors to avoid duplication of activities and maximize the geographic, the geographical coverage.
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Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
That's the question. That's a question that if I had the answer today, I would be very lucky to be able to organize my operations for the next five years. But every year dictates the next one. But I think today in the North, you have a different kind of situation. It's not only the global funding cuts. That was, as you said, global. We experienced that in every country. It's not only a reality of Yemen itself, but what we see in north of Yemen is that it's not only the global funding cuts, it's also that decisions have been taken to restrict any funds that might have remained.
And any willingness for those funds to be injected in the North, there is no facilitations to those funds to find their way to the north of Yemen from. A lack of access from flights, importation to flagging a terrorist organization of Ansar Allah de facto authorities, which. For MSF or ICRC. It's something we can navigate as a system and be able to deliver activities and services to the people of the North. But other NGOs might not have the same capacity or might create an environment of fear for them to be able to operate in the north.
So it's not only a matter of global funding cuts that we see left services on its own, is that we see other effects, an extra pressure, additional pressure coming to the northern part in the south. Yes, it's as we said, but north and south are different realities in some ways.
And any willingness for those funds to be injected in the North, there is no facilitations to those funds to find their way to the north of Yemen from. A lack of access from flights, importation to flagging a terrorist organization of Ansar Allah de facto authorities, which. For MSF or ICRC. It's something we can navigate as a system and be able to deliver activities and services to the people of the North. But other NGOs might not have the same capacity or might create an environment of fear for them to be able to operate in the north.
So it's not only a matter of global funding cuts that we see left services on its own, is that we see other effects, an extra pressure, additional pressure coming to the northern part in the south. Yes, it's as we said, but north and south are different realities in some ways.
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Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Of course. My organization is one of the biggest organizations who is providing a gender based violence services and health services for the women and girls in Yemen. And by cutting the fund, uh, we, we are one of the biggest recipient from UNFPA. And some other few donors. But by cutting the fund of the UK, now we like 70% of our services shut it down. Either her services or swimming in safe spaces means women cannot reach these services means the consequences will be will last for generation.
Women are exposed to psychosocial. Uh. They are exposed to violence. This will be passed to the children. This will increase poverty. And the consequences will be, um. Will be difficult. Uh, means and cutting the funds now. It will not stop violence. It's only will stop the help for the women in Yemen. And this is what is going on now. We are trying with our resources to downsize the, the, the interventions or the services.
But that mean, I know we have a lot of women, like more than 6500 women are in the waiting list. In the north, it's 2300 on the waiting list for the safe spaces. To get some psychosocial psychosocial support. This is the only door open the open door for women to seek services. And if we shut it down, it will be like a no. We will. We will face a lot of, um, consequences. One of them is structured.
Violence will not be easy to be addressed later. And we are exposing. We are we are like, you know, we are destroying the structure of the community by leaving women exposed to these kind of violence. And, uh, do not provide any support for them. Girls will be deprived from schools. Poverty will will add stress to the women and to the families, which will increase domestic violence. So it's, it's like a cycle. If we did not find a way to restore the services, we are destroying a a community.
And after we will not be able to fix easily.
Women are exposed to psychosocial. Uh. They are exposed to violence. This will be passed to the children. This will increase poverty. And the consequences will be, um. Will be difficult. Uh, means and cutting the funds now. It will not stop violence. It's only will stop the help for the women in Yemen. And this is what is going on now. We are trying with our resources to downsize the, the, the interventions or the services.
But that mean, I know we have a lot of women, like more than 6500 women are in the waiting list. In the north, it's 2300 on the waiting list for the safe spaces. To get some psychosocial psychosocial support. This is the only door open the open door for women to seek services. And if we shut it down, it will be like a no. We will. We will face a lot of, um, consequences. One of them is structured.
Violence will not be easy to be addressed later. And we are exposing. We are we are like, you know, we are destroying the structure of the community by leaving women exposed to these kind of violence. And, uh, do not provide any support for them. Girls will be deprived from schools. Poverty will will add stress to the women and to the families, which will increase domestic violence. So it's, it's like a cycle. If we did not find a way to restore the services, we are destroying a a community.
And after we will not be able to fix easily.
14:56
14:56
14:57
14:57
14:57
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
If I can add something, if I can add something, actually what I see is that international community by cutting fund is adding another kind of violence against women in Yemen, especially in the north, because it's like we are punishing them for being in the places where Houthis is. So we don't give you money, we don't give you services because you are there. And this is heartbreaking. And this is, I'm sorry to say, it's humanitarian.
14:58
14:58
14:58
14:58
14:58
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Uh, there is a restriction of access, but, you know, for the national NGOs with the, uh, like, you know what we can say it's, um. Uh, we have our own way to find a way to provide the services for women. Experienced organization. And we have been there for decades. And we are using informal trust, personal relationships to ensure that we access to women and to provide the services in any way. We always find we are always sensitive to the situation and we know how to reach women.
So restrictions is difficult. It takes time. It exposed our team to the risk, but our team is, and I think that the teams, the national teams who is working in humanitarian, especially in GBV, is exposing themselves to a risk at a level that no humanitarian any other country would accept to, to, to, to do. Uh, though we don't have a state for any, uh, protection from the state or from the humanitarian actors, we don't even have a policy to protect our staff. We are implementing partners.
Not all the donors or not all the organizations that can provide us with this kind of protection. So we we know our ways and we are. For years, we have been working. Restrictions is there, but that doesn't mean because of the restriction, we will not find a way to do our job.
So restrictions is difficult. It takes time. It exposed our team to the risk, but our team is, and I think that the teams, the national teams who is working in humanitarian, especially in GBV, is exposing themselves to a risk at a level that no humanitarian any other country would accept to, to, to, to do. Uh, though we don't have a state for any, uh, protection from the state or from the humanitarian actors, we don't even have a policy to protect our staff. We are implementing partners.
Not all the donors or not all the organizations that can provide us with this kind of protection. So we we know our ways and we are. For years, we have been working. Restrictions is there, but that doesn't mean because of the restriction, we will not find a way to do our job.
15:00
15:00
Speaker 11
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Speaker 11
Can I just ask one question that's off script. Um, and Noah, thank you for talking with such candor about some of the really challenging situations people are facing. You've you've talked about some of the services that are being provided to women, uh, to, to relieve some of the suffering. But I wonder if there are also any civil society level forms of resistance. Like to what extent is it possible for women to, to organize and challenge government around their rights in this space?
15:00
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Well, it's not easy. It's exposed them to different kind of risk. I'm telling you, you cannot consider me an example because of. Uh, an online meeting and because I was talking about so many issues, I'm out of my country under stress, cannot go back away from my family. So this kind of risks that we are facing, if we speak out. But that doesn't mean that women will stop speaking out. We will find a way. Things will change.
We will keep negotiating. Despite all the poses in problems that we are facing. And despite a situation, we managed to negotiate with the Houthis. They. Yanni, we find a way. For example, they don't want anyone to talk about GBV. We can talk about economic empowerment though. We can provide the services for LGBT. So it's a matter of knowing the context, having the language that you talk with the government and with the authorities, the trust level between the civil society and, uh.
The authorities. It takes a long time to get approvals, but at the end, we get the approvals.
We will keep negotiating. Despite all the poses in problems that we are facing. And despite a situation, we managed to negotiate with the Houthis. They. Yanni, we find a way. For example, they don't want anyone to talk about GBV. We can talk about economic empowerment though. We can provide the services for LGBT. So it's a matter of knowing the context, having the language that you talk with the government and with the authorities, the trust level between the civil society and, uh.
The authorities. It takes a long time to get approvals, but at the end, we get the approvals.
15:02
15:02
15:02
15:03
15:03
15:03
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Okay. So a general, um, you know, an access, as I told you, there is different dynamics in north and in the south and north. We have the Houthis and we need to have a lot of, um, like approvals. Uh, they ask for a details and sometimes we are forced, we don't do, but they try to force us to provide the name of the staff with their addresses and with their, uh, mobile number, private information in order to give us a permissions to implement. So this is a problem that might delay our implementation for some activities, uh, in the field for a physical movement, as I mentioned earlier, for the access to the women and girls.
Um, now we need Mahram. And this is one of the biggest challenge. Women cannot move around either to get service or to provide service unless she is accompanied by a man or a GitHub permission, written permission by a man, uh, that she can move freely or go and provide services at the country level for other humanitarian, um, actors. Usually they are requested to provide the list of the beneficiaries, which is against humanitarian principles. And no one can provide this kind of information.
Also, there is um, sensitive areas in Yemen, either north or south, which. They can give you the permission to work there, but you will be monitored. You can forced to hire among your team a people that you know, they are monitoring your work.
Um, now we need Mahram. And this is one of the biggest challenge. Women cannot move around either to get service or to provide service unless she is accompanied by a man or a GitHub permission, written permission by a man, uh, that she can move freely or go and provide services at the country level for other humanitarian, um, actors. Usually they are requested to provide the list of the beneficiaries, which is against humanitarian principles. And no one can provide this kind of information.
Also, there is um, sensitive areas in Yemen, either north or south, which. They can give you the permission to work there, but you will be monitored. You can forced to hire among your team a people that you know, they are monitoring your work.
15:04
15:04
15:04
15:05
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
As I told you, we are all monitored. All the women are monitored. Who is working in protection and, and GBV, but it's. A matter of how clear you are with the authorities. If you are providing full details about what you are planning to do. If you are providing necessary information. It may take long. It may take a lot of mutual trust. It might take. Need a lot of personal, you know.
Uh, relations like between, uh, any. With some of the authorities in order to manage and to get permissions to implement. But that it's not easy way, but this is the only way that many of the NGOs had to, uh, implement. That doesn't mean that we compromise the humanitarian principle. That doesn't mean that we are, uh, trying to, to, to, uh, work. Against these principles. A nationals, we always find a way to negotiate it.
Uh, relations like between, uh, any. With some of the authorities in order to manage and to get permissions to implement. But that it's not easy way, but this is the only way that many of the NGOs had to, uh, implement. That doesn't mean that we compromise the humanitarian principle. That doesn't mean that we are, uh, trying to, to, to, uh, work. Against these principles. A nationals, we always find a way to negotiate it.
15:06
15:06
15:06
15:07
Speaker 10
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Speaker 10
Thank you. Um, no, just to come back briefly to the question of the UK's impact, um, you obviously mentioned your your program is, is one of the main, um, implementations of the, of the FPA. And I just wondered to what extent you believe the UK is. Responsible. Um, versus the kind of broader cuts globally, uh, to that program. It does the UK have a very specific role and contribution that it is failing to meet their.
15:07
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Actually, UK has like a on Yemen and they can advocate, they can provide the fund, they can support a diplomatic process for peace building. They can do a lot by providing funds for us. I will talk about women and girls. You are helping the community in other way. You are helping the peace building process because, you know, without women empowerment and without an inclusion of women, we cannot talk.
15:08
Speaker 7
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Speaker 7
Of women. We cannot talk, we cannot, you know, speak about genuine peace building. There is no real peace building because women, if we want a real peace building, we need women to be part of the transitional justice. And if women is excluded because of this kind of violence and they cannot get services, they cannot be empowered, they cannot be included. Um, this will not help the stability in Yemen. So UK and Fcdo have a lot of things that they can do to support, uh.
To support Yemen and also. Um, yeah, when we talk about localization now, as you see, majority of the people of the organization that work in the North is national NGOs. UN has post, they are forced to, to move their operation to the south. Only national NGOs are there left behind trying to uh. Fight not to collapse because of the lack of funding. So by negotiating like, you know, um. The free or any by returning the operations of the UN.
Uh, to the north. This will help the national NGOs also to respond. And this will do any will, will improve a situation, funding situation will improve in the North.
To support Yemen and also. Um, yeah, when we talk about localization now, as you see, majority of the people of the organization that work in the North is national NGOs. UN has post, they are forced to, to move their operation to the south. Only national NGOs are there left behind trying to uh. Fight not to collapse because of the lack of funding. So by negotiating like, you know, um. The free or any by returning the operations of the UN.
Uh, to the north. This will help the national NGOs also to respond. And this will do any will, will improve a situation, funding situation will improve in the North.
15:09
15:09
15:10
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
But no, no, thank you very much for those responses. I'm conscious of the time and what we still need to to get through. So just a question really that I'm going to pose to both of our other participants. It's just about protections in place for, um, for aid workers. Um, if I come, first of all, to, um, to, if you could maybe share your experience of, um, of what sort of protections in place and then also, um. Konstantinos.
If there's anything that you'd like to add on this topic before coming back to the chair and move on?
If there's anything that you'd like to add on this topic before coming back to the chair and move on?
15:10
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
No, thank you. Thank you very much. I think, um, for protection of aid workers, as you know, that, uh, aid workers are at the front line and they are always there and we are trying to do everything to make a duty of care towards the people who are, who serve and the people we serve, because also we are very conscious about transfers of risk, including transfer of risk to cooperating partners. So even when we are working with international NGOs or national NGOs or civil societies, we are trying to do our best level.
However, whether they are non-state actors or government, we are expecting them to observe the humanitarian imperative and to respect the humanitarian law. And based on that, to work so that this is one of the biggest issue. And as you know, that WFP and other agencies, we are even lost lives in the front line. But I just also want to you ask a question about the about the, the, the, the humanitarian space and the, the monitoring and the and the is it because of the cut or because of the, uh, of the access for access?I just want to say to you that when access is not there, access is not there, and therefore it will compromise the integrity of the response.
But when you have limited. Access, for example, WFP has four ways of monitoring. The first one, we do it ourselves in person. The second one, we do it through mobile, through the mobile, and the third one we do through the cooperating partners. And the fourth one we do through third party monitors, which is like a private company submit for that, but also the for the funding side, uh, the Yemen is being placed in the, in the hot spot map as number four in terms of affected, but also in the funding has been affected severely.
And for example, WFP last year in 2025, we are reaching 8 million. This year. We have done a brutal, um, prioritization, as I call it, brutal prioritization to go for 3.4.
However, whether they are non-state actors or government, we are expecting them to observe the humanitarian imperative and to respect the humanitarian law. And based on that, to work so that this is one of the biggest issue. And as you know, that WFP and other agencies, we are even lost lives in the front line. But I just also want to you ask a question about the about the, the, the, the humanitarian space and the, the monitoring and the and the is it because of the cut or because of the, uh, of the access for access?I just want to say to you that when access is not there, access is not there, and therefore it will compromise the integrity of the response.
But when you have limited. Access, for example, WFP has four ways of monitoring. The first one, we do it ourselves in person. The second one, we do it through mobile, through the mobile, and the third one we do through the cooperating partners. And the fourth one we do through third party monitors, which is like a private company submit for that, but also the for the funding side, uh, the Yemen is being placed in the, in the hot spot map as number four in terms of affected, but also in the funding has been affected severely.
And for example, WFP last year in 2025, we are reaching 8 million. This year. We have done a brutal, um, prioritization, as I call it, brutal prioritization to go for 3.4.
15:12
15:12
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
From even. But even the 3.4 million, as you speak right now, we have only reached 2 million UK. Um, the US has done a big cut, but also the UK, for example from last year they we got like 54 million from the UK. This year we got only 17 million from the, from the UK. But I have, I have to commend your team. For example, the your the ambassador, the the Fcdo team. They also try to leverage their funding with the Kuwaiti, with the Saudis.
So they try to like to invest. If UK put this amount of money, how much you you put ahead of it and then you go, but I will appeal to the committee that if I will say that for. For the food security and man and malnutrition, if we are not securing 180 million. Until the end of this year, we will be we will not be able to provide service in the South. I'm talking here about in the South, where we have access.
So the access is not an issue for us.
So they try to like to invest. If UK put this amount of money, how much you you put ahead of it and then you go, but I will appeal to the committee that if I will say that for. For the food security and man and malnutrition, if we are not securing 180 million. Until the end of this year, we will be we will not be able to provide service in the South. I'm talking here about in the South, where we have access.
So the access is not an issue for us.
15:13
15:14
Speaker 4
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Speaker 4
No. We we have access in the South for every place in the South except the areas except three places where we call them a hot hot spots where the between the Houthis and the and the ERG internationally recognized government. But in the North, as I mentioned to you earlier, we have two reasons. One is the detainees. And secondly, is the humanitarian imperative, as you know, that our offices were being taken, our assets will be taken and everything and those those humanitarian imperatives are not there.
If those issues were addressed, we are more than happy to go back to the to the north and respond to the needs because, as I mentioned, needs our needs for us. No matter who they are, we will respond to that. But the situation in the North now is not conducive enough for us to go there. And and, and respond.
If those issues were addressed, we are more than happy to go back to the to the north and respond to the needs because, as I mentioned, needs our needs for us. No matter who they are, we will respond to that. But the situation in the North now is not conducive enough for us to go there. And and, and respond.
15:14
15:15
15:15
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
The barriers of protection. Look, I will not stress too much my answer because it's what already my colleagues have said engagement with the authorities, engagement with the local actors, engagement with the communities, being clear on what we do, what we deliver, and what is the purpose of that delivery of services towards the people. And that brings the mitigation to the risk. If there is a risk of exposure, that brings a barrier of protection. If we want to talk about barriers of protection, and when it comes to the north, because in the South, access is easier in different ways and again, different environments.
So again, engagement strategy with authorities, non-state armed groups and so on, always brings the safety you need and the guarantees on the ground when it comes to the north, that is. A complex operating environment. It's not be treated as an excuse to withdraw or not to deliver services on the ground. Remember that this discussion about barriers or issues of access in the North. They are affecting people on the ground and patients who are not related to those discussions. Not always so.
They are being affected and they will keep being affected. While today, as MSF, we are operating in ten different governorates only in the north with international teams, with national colleagues. And I'm not saying it's easy. I don't want to. To tone down any of the issues we have discussed so far. But it's not impossible. It's still feasible. And I know if we ask other operating partners in the North, they will tell you the same.
Yes, it's not easy, but is it feasible?Yes. Can we keep doing it?I want to believe that yes, we can keep doing it. And others would be able to do it as well if they had the support to regain that access. But it should not be used as an excuse. The complexity of the North not to have services. That would be my main point here.
So again, engagement strategy with authorities, non-state armed groups and so on, always brings the safety you need and the guarantees on the ground when it comes to the north, that is. A complex operating environment. It's not be treated as an excuse to withdraw or not to deliver services on the ground. Remember that this discussion about barriers or issues of access in the North. They are affecting people on the ground and patients who are not related to those discussions. Not always so.
They are being affected and they will keep being affected. While today, as MSF, we are operating in ten different governorates only in the north with international teams, with national colleagues. And I'm not saying it's easy. I don't want to. To tone down any of the issues we have discussed so far. But it's not impossible. It's still feasible. And I know if we ask other operating partners in the North, they will tell you the same.
Yes, it's not easy, but is it feasible?Yes. Can we keep doing it?I want to believe that yes, we can keep doing it. And others would be able to do it as well if they had the support to regain that access. But it should not be used as an excuse. The complexity of the North not to have services. That would be my main point here.
15:18
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Thank you. Um, you've made that point very powerfully, as have all of the witnesses. We're really, really grateful for you joining us today to tell us the reality on the ground. As I said at the beginning, it's incredibly difficult for us to get that reality. So thank you for sharing your experiences. And please do pass on our gratitude to all of your colleagues and volunteers for what they're doing day in, day out. We admire them enormously, and we've heard your call and we will keep on pushing the international community to step up and do more and know her.
As you said, it's absolutely morally the right thing to do. Um, particularly with the landscape of horror that you've painted for today. So thank you all very, very much for your time today. Um, if I could ask the second panel to, uh, step forward and, um, obviously first panel, you're very welcome to, uh, join us, uh, if you want to keep on listening, but if not, thank you very much for your time today. Thank you. Thank you very much.
So we are very fortunate to have a second panel. My apologies that we're running a little bit later than planned. Um, it's always a challenge when we try and get first hand testimony. Uh, not least because, um, the internet doesn't always want to assist us in getting that evidence. So thank you both very much for being here in the room. Helen. I wonder if I could start by asking you to introduce yourself and your vast experience in this field.
As you said, it's absolutely morally the right thing to do. Um, particularly with the landscape of horror that you've painted for today. So thank you all very, very much for your time today. Um, if I could ask the second panel to, uh, step forward and, um, obviously first panel, you're very welcome to, uh, join us, uh, if you want to keep on listening, but if not, thank you very much for your time today. Thank you. Thank you very much.
So we are very fortunate to have a second panel. My apologies that we're running a little bit later than planned. Um, it's always a challenge when we try and get first hand testimony. Uh, not least because, um, the internet doesn't always want to assist us in getting that evidence. So thank you both very much for being here in the room. Helen. I wonder if I could start by asking you to introduce yourself and your vast experience in this field.
15:19
Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Okay. My name is Helen Lackner. I've been involved with Yemen in for 53 years. This year. I've worked mainly in rural development, and I've held a number of other jobs in Yemen. I've lived in the three Yemeni states which have existed during that period. I might possibly get to see another one or not, as the case may be. And basically, yes, and I've worked mostly in rural development activities. And in recent years I've largely recycled as an analyst and author and writing about politics, economy, society, and anything, and not leaving all the peace stuff to Richard.
Thank you.
Thank you.
15:20
15:21
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
Thank you. Um, yeah, my name is Richard Barltrop. I'm a visiting senior fellow at the London School of Economics, Middle East Centre. I research international and local approaches to peacemaking. I have a background of academic research on peace processes and professional work for the United Nations and peace building NGOs in the Middle East and the Horn of Africa. And I've also worked for the UN in Yemen, in particular, being based in Sana'a, the capital, in 2020, and 22 to 23, working for UN mediation efforts.
But I'm speaking in an independent, independent capacity here. And as a researcher on questions about what determines failure and success in peace processes.
But I'm speaking in an independent, independent capacity here. And as a researcher on questions about what determines failure and success in peace processes.
15:21
15:21
15:22
15:22
15:22
Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Um, okay. Well, basically you can say that since 2022, there's been an unofficial truce between the Houthis and the internationally recognized government. And let me take this opportunity to just say very quickly that there is it is a problem when people talk about north and south, both. It's geographically not technically correct, but politically it's very, very weighted. And so it tends to imply, you know, the there are people who might choose to talk about later who want to recreate a pre 1990 borders.
So when one talks about north and south, it really does present a problem. I personally use, you know, internationally recognized government or ERG. And otherwise officially people use DFA de facto authority when referring to sorry to the Houthis in Sana'a, if they don't want to use the word Houthis or Ansar Allah as they choose to call themselves. So basically, until 2022, the war was the main actors in the war where the Saudis and the then internationally recognized government. In April 2022, two major things happened.
One was the truce was declared thanks to the United Nations and the special envoy who played a role in that. However, I think the main reason the truce happened is because both sides wanted it. Primarily, the Saudis felt that they wanted to get out. I mean, the Saudi regime has very much changed between 2015, when the new king and his son took over, and they were very enthused. At least the son was very enthusiastic about this war in Yemen, thinking he could win it in a few weeks.
By 2022, it had become quite apparent this was not the case. So you had the truce. And the other thing that happened was that the ex President Hadi, who died a couple of months ago, was replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council. So that's the political side militarily since 2022. In fact, since well before 2022, since 20 early 2021, there are a number of fronts which have remained unchanged, largely. I mean, I think, you know, if there's there's basically been a static static situation in terms of the of military control, um, through basically since 2021.
And it's not that different, in fact, from 2016. Um, the main political developments, I think in the last 3 or 4 years have been a basic absence of change, a basic absence of improvement. The main things that have happened since this Presidential Leadership Council took over is this council is really it has eight members, all of them men, of course. Um, and they are not you couldn't really say they were united. They are extremely divided and they spend more time in internal rivalry and fighting.
Not, not military fighting except on one occasion, but certainly disagreements. Rivalry. Then they spend thinking or worrying about how to solve the problem with the Houthis. And the more recently, the most important thing that happened is that there was this big division between the group members of the PLC. Sorry. Very quickly. The PLC was formed in April 2022, basically by agreement between the Saudis and the Emiratis, who each had four members on the of our supporters on the on this PLC.
And so the big change that has happened is related to a much wider change, which is not of your topic here, but that is of the Emirati Saudi rivalry, which is growing and is one of the topics I can go on about. And what happened is that in December, possibly as a result of something that the Saudis had said to Trump about Sudan, or maybe not, um, the. The Southern Transitional Council, who are one of many southern separatist factions, which is why I'm not into talking Southerners decided to.
To basically take over the two eastern governorates or northeastern governorates of Yemen, of Hadhramaut and Mahra, which are on the border of Oman and Saudi Arabia, which they did extremely quickly and without any major fighting. But. But they were told to withdraw and they refused to. As a result, for the first time, the Saudis actually bombed two ships in Mukalla airport of Emirati ships carrying military equipment.
So when one talks about north and south, it really does present a problem. I personally use, you know, internationally recognized government or ERG. And otherwise officially people use DFA de facto authority when referring to sorry to the Houthis in Sana'a, if they don't want to use the word Houthis or Ansar Allah as they choose to call themselves. So basically, until 2022, the war was the main actors in the war where the Saudis and the then internationally recognized government. In April 2022, two major things happened.
One was the truce was declared thanks to the United Nations and the special envoy who played a role in that. However, I think the main reason the truce happened is because both sides wanted it. Primarily, the Saudis felt that they wanted to get out. I mean, the Saudi regime has very much changed between 2015, when the new king and his son took over, and they were very enthused. At least the son was very enthusiastic about this war in Yemen, thinking he could win it in a few weeks.
By 2022, it had become quite apparent this was not the case. So you had the truce. And the other thing that happened was that the ex President Hadi, who died a couple of months ago, was replaced by a Presidential Leadership Council. So that's the political side militarily since 2022. In fact, since well before 2022, since 20 early 2021, there are a number of fronts which have remained unchanged, largely. I mean, I think, you know, if there's there's basically been a static static situation in terms of the of military control, um, through basically since 2021.
And it's not that different, in fact, from 2016. Um, the main political developments, I think in the last 3 or 4 years have been a basic absence of change, a basic absence of improvement. The main things that have happened since this Presidential Leadership Council took over is this council is really it has eight members, all of them men, of course. Um, and they are not you couldn't really say they were united. They are extremely divided and they spend more time in internal rivalry and fighting.
Not, not military fighting except on one occasion, but certainly disagreements. Rivalry. Then they spend thinking or worrying about how to solve the problem with the Houthis. And the more recently, the most important thing that happened is that there was this big division between the group members of the PLC. Sorry. Very quickly. The PLC was formed in April 2022, basically by agreement between the Saudis and the Emiratis, who each had four members on the of our supporters on the on this PLC.
And so the big change that has happened is related to a much wider change, which is not of your topic here, but that is of the Emirati Saudi rivalry, which is growing and is one of the topics I can go on about. And what happened is that in December, possibly as a result of something that the Saudis had said to Trump about Sudan, or maybe not, um, the. The Southern Transitional Council, who are one of many southern separatist factions, which is why I'm not into talking Southerners decided to.
To basically take over the two eastern governorates or northeastern governorates of Yemen, of Hadhramaut and Mahra, which are on the border of Oman and Saudi Arabia, which they did extremely quickly and without any major fighting. But. But they were told to withdraw and they refused to. As a result, for the first time, the Saudis actually bombed two ships in Mukalla airport of Emirati ships carrying military equipment.
15:26
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Helen, I'm going to interrupt you because we're straying into both the Foreign Affairs Committee and the Defense Committee with your comprehensive answer. Um, if we can focus the answers on this, more on the humanitarian situation, the development situation. Um, so I'm going to pass to Monica for the next question.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
If I could just finish with one sentence. Yeah. You know, which is that in January, the internationally recognized government and the PLC ousted the Emiratis and the Southern Transitional Council. And so the PLC has now been reformed with a different membership, or at least two different members. They're still divided. But that issue is kind of solved or not solved. But that would take another sentence.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Oh, it's for me. Okay. I'm confused. Uh, well, the Saudis basically. Now they have two options. And one of them is they do what they were planning to do in 2023, which is make a deal with the Houthis and then force the internationally recognized government to accept that. And the other option is to go with the internationally recognized government, which is now basically 99% under their authority and fight the Houthis to recreate the united Yemen.
Now, my understanding from the past is that they were quite in favor of option number one, but they haven't taken it. I think, for basically for international reasons. If at the moment they signed a deal with the Houthis, you can imagine the international outcry in relation to the Iran war. It would just be impossible. But on the other hand, the operating with the internationally recognized government, although that government in the last six months has been very, very active in in military restructuring, military reorganization.
Etc., etc., it has not yet reached a stage where most people who know more about military things than I do would say that it's actually capable of fighting back. So the Saudis at the moment are just sitting there trying to control the IRG. They're not putting in enough money to finance the salaries, to finance all the needs and to finance the fuel. You have major electricity problems, etc. they are not putting in enough funds to do to finance all these things. And that would be important in in strengthening the internationally recognized government.
But at the same time, they are not letting it go. So they're basically, as far as I can tell, hedging their situation.
Now, my understanding from the past is that they were quite in favor of option number one, but they haven't taken it. I think, for basically for international reasons. If at the moment they signed a deal with the Houthis, you can imagine the international outcry in relation to the Iran war. It would just be impossible. But on the other hand, the operating with the internationally recognized government, although that government in the last six months has been very, very active in in military restructuring, military reorganization.
Etc., etc., it has not yet reached a stage where most people who know more about military things than I do would say that it's actually capable of fighting back. So the Saudis at the moment are just sitting there trying to control the IRG. They're not putting in enough money to finance the salaries, to finance all the needs and to finance the fuel. You have major electricity problems, etc. they are not putting in enough funds to do to finance all these things. And that would be important in in strengthening the internationally recognized government.
But at the same time, they are not letting it go. So they're basically, as far as I can tell, hedging their situation.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
Well, it has an impact within the South at the moment, and it has a political impact that on the Presidential Leadership Council, as the PLC, as Helen explained. It does not mean a transformation in the governance situation in southern Yemen, southern and eastern Yemen. Um. The aspirations of the Southern Transitional Council will remain intact or do remain intact, even though the the party has taken a hit. And and that aspirations greater and smaller of wider sections or some sections of the population will also remain there.
So um. I think the events early this year will have had a ripples on, on local governance. But, but they're not going to lastingly alter the situation.
So um. I think the events early this year will have had a ripples on, on local governance. But, but they're not going to lastingly alter the situation.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
There's about 4.5 million people displaced, a lot of them are in. Communities with relatives or friends, or have moved from one village to another. There's a lot of very small displacement camps, mainly in Ma'rib governorate. Ma'rib governorate population has risen from whatever, 300,000 to 3 million in the course of this last ten years. So there's very large numbers of displaced in Ma'rib, and they are mostly in kind of a very large number of small camps. I thinkpolitically, I don't think the displacement issue is making much difference to the Yemeni situation.
I think the main aspect it has is humanitarian. And in the case of Marib, where you have this very large number of displaced, another an important factor is the impact on the water supply. I mean, water is a very fundamental issue, which again, is something one could talk about. Um, and I think the supply of water and the potential for economic activities, etc., in Marib is very much affected. So indirect indirectly insofar as, you know, availability of water has an impact, indirect impact on stability at that level.
I think you have you have a connection. I don't know if you want to add something on displacement.
I think the main aspect it has is humanitarian. And in the case of Marib, where you have this very large number of displaced, another an important factor is the impact on the water supply. I mean, water is a very fundamental issue, which again, is something one could talk about. Um, and I think the supply of water and the potential for economic activities, etc., in Marib is very much affected. So indirect indirectly insofar as, you know, availability of water has an impact, indirect impact on stability at that level.
I think you have you have a connection. I don't know if you want to add something on displacement.
15:33
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
I would add that. Relative to conflicts elsewhere in the world, there haven't been large population displacements in the past year or two or 3 or 4. As Helen mentioned, there has been an informal truce since the official renewable two month truce in 2022. Since that expired in October 2022, there's remained an informal truce, and that has meant there has been only low level, limited skirmishing or fighting within the country. And there have been no major cross-border hostilities with Saudi Arabia and, um, from the Who.
Side. Um, so there haven't been significant population displacements in the way that there have obviously been in conflicts such as in Sudan, dynamic conflicts. The conflict in Yemen is very much not it's not dynamic. It's much more static.
Side. Um, so there haven't been significant population displacements in the way that there have obviously been in conflicts such as in Sudan, dynamic conflicts. The conflict in Yemen is very much not it's not dynamic. It's much more static.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
That's interesting. Um, so a few years ago, a witness said to us to always follow the movement of people to see what's going on in the country. So whilst the conflict isn't happening, you're seeing environmental movement. But I also wonder, is it that um, people have given up hope. So. So there isn't anywhere for them to move to.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Um, no, I don't think. I mean people move when they're desperate. I mean that's quite straightforward. And they move when they're pushed. So either they're pushed by some fighting or they're pushed by a flood or they're pushed by on a lower basis. By flood, I mean, at another level, you've got a general level of displacement which has been going on, which started before the fighting and is going to go on, you know, in areas where, for example, the water has completely run out, people have had to move, their villages have been abandoned, they've moved to the cities, which creates another whole set of tensions at that level.
It creates instability because, you know, you suddenly have thousands of people coming from villages, moving into a town, into a city where there's also a shortage of water, shortage of schools, shortage of, of, of medical service, shortage of everything, you know, so that that creates social tension, which can become political tension. But I think a lot of the, of the military displaced are the ones who, you know, who are going to, to the camps. They end up more or less in, in empty areas. I mean, I think on this point, you know, referring to what you were asking earlier about agriculture and development, it's only 3% of Yemen's land is is suitable for agriculture.
So there's plenty of of desert spaces in which to create a refugee camp.
It creates instability because, you know, you suddenly have thousands of people coming from villages, moving into a town, into a city where there's also a shortage of water, shortage of schools, shortage of, of, of medical service, shortage of everything, you know, so that that creates social tension, which can become political tension. But I think a lot of the, of the military displaced are the ones who, you know, who are going to, to the camps. They end up more or less in, in empty areas. I mean, I think on this point, you know, referring to what you were asking earlier about agriculture and development, it's only 3% of Yemen's land is is suitable for agriculture.
So there's plenty of of desert spaces in which to create a refugee camp.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
It's a long way away. It's isolated. It does control the Bab el Mandeb. That's one, you know, up point to get get the international community interested. It's got a large population. It's poor, doesn't have. Any significant oil or other goodies, unless they discover some rare earths, in which case, maybe they'll get excited and start trying to get things out. I don't really know, to be honest. I'm somebody who's been involved for 50 years.
I love the place. I know lots of people who love the place. I'm not really the best person to say why.
I love the place. I know lots of people who love the place. I'm not really the best person to say why.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
Yes they do. If their mandate to for the UN special envoy, it's the mandate to to use their good offices to to mediate, um, you. Asked why?Is. Why is the situation static?And if one's asking that also about the peace process or peace efforts, they are static or they're stagnant. One illustration of that being that a two month. Truce was renewed only twice in 2022, and then there's been no subsequent agreement. There was a prisoners exchange agreement this year.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
And that builds on previous prisoner exchange agreements. But but that's not core peace process. The core peace process is static as like the conflict is. Why is it static?Helen mentioned. In effect, that Yemen perhaps doesn't matter enough to, uh, to some international actors, um, another part of the answer would be that the International vision and framework for the peace process is static. It's rigid, it's fixed by. A UN Security Council resolution. And the interpretation of that resolution 2216, which dates from April 2015, 11 years ago, and that resolution has been adhered to or is being adhered to by those who talk about, or those international actors who talk about and try to involve themselves or give diplomatic support to a peace process for Yemen, that resolution does not fit with the realities of the country.
It is, um, it is obsolete in many respects.
It is, um, it is obsolete in many respects.
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Speaker 17
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Speaker 17
So but I mean, in discussion with other. Conflicts that we've, you know, we, we've considered and taken evidence on, for example, in Sudan, you know, that's a hugely complex conflict where even if there was a will to resolve it, it would be incredibly difficult. Do you think that if there was a will to resolve the. The conflict that that that it could be done.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
Yes. Yes. Yeah. The what is at the moment, the configuration of peace process for Yemen is it's an international vision and framework. Um, part of the, the terms part of the framework and going included in Security Council resolution two, 216 is envisaging. Eventually a Yemeni led political process. That process, that element has never been reached in the past 11 years. Um, but as peace processes elsewhere in the world show, it's ultimately for people, the people whose country it is to, to shape and lead a peace process and who can do it best.
But I.
But I.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Think, I think that's where you notice basically that in amongst the Yemeni leaders of the conflict on both sides, there is no will to bring an end to this. They are profiting massively, some of them from this war situation on both sides. Um, and on the IRG side, again, they're divided slightly differently this year from last year, but they're still divided and competing with each other. But the leaders are profiting from this war and they do not particularly want to solve it. So my view is, you know, mediators can do and say what they want, but unless the parties concerned don't want to solve it, they won't solve it.
Now that I'm not saying that, you know, the 35 million or so Yemenis, most of them do want to solve it. They don't want to live in this war. They don't want to suffer all the things we've talked about and haven't talked about, but they don't have any control over the basically, the military in the in the Houthi area. You know, they're running a very efficient and effective. And, you know, very unpleasant repressive regime. And you had some examples earlier.
And on the IRG area, they have different factions who run their own little unpleasant regimes and who are, you know, and who also fighting each other. So partly, I mean, in that sense, the Saudis now being in a position to really try and dictate something, they're not dictating something. They're not, you know, they're not trying to solve this rivalry.
Now that I'm not saying that, you know, the 35 million or so Yemenis, most of them do want to solve it. They don't want to live in this war. They don't want to suffer all the things we've talked about and haven't talked about, but they don't have any control over the basically, the military in the in the Houthi area. You know, they're running a very efficient and effective. And, you know, very unpleasant repressive regime. And you had some examples earlier.
And on the IRG area, they have different factions who run their own little unpleasant regimes and who are, you know, and who also fighting each other. So partly, I mean, in that sense, the Saudis now being in a position to really try and dictate something, they're not dictating something. They're not, you know, they're not trying to solve this rivalry.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Yeah, it lasted from 1990 to 1992, or just about 93, I think was the best time. It was just after unification. Everybody was very enthusiastic about unification at that time. You suddenly had this freedom of expression, you multiplication of of newspapers and media and everything all over the place. Everybody was really enthusiastic about elections, about progress, about how we're going to get democracy and development. Sorry, you shouldn't have asked that question. You know, and everybody was really hopeful.
And yes, you know, Ali Abdullah Saleh was murdering a whole load of socialists on the quiet, but kind of thought, okay, that won't last, you know, we'll sort it. And, uh. And yes, people were really hopeful until, until the 1993 elections. That was a time when, you know, I mean, everywhere you went, people were enthusiastic. I remember at one point, sitting with some guys trying to count the number of new political parties, and we gave up when we got to about 40, you know, it was just people were really hopeful, really hopeful that there would be development, that people that things like education and health and development and activities were going to be the thing and that there would be democracy, you know, all these things that people really hoped for.
As I said, it didn't last.
And yes, you know, Ali Abdullah Saleh was murdering a whole load of socialists on the quiet, but kind of thought, okay, that won't last, you know, we'll sort it. And, uh. And yes, people were really hopeful until, until the 1993 elections. That was a time when, you know, I mean, everywhere you went, people were enthusiastic. I remember at one point, sitting with some guys trying to count the number of new political parties, and we gave up when we got to about 40, you know, it was just people were really hopeful, really hopeful that there would be development, that people that things like education and health and development and activities were going to be the thing and that there would be democracy, you know, all these things that people really hoped for.
As I said, it didn't last.
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15:46
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
Thank you chair. So we want to get back to that effective, great, good governance. And you sort of answered my question already. So don't feel you need to to repeat things you've said, but I just want to get a sense of what the biggest barriers are to restoring good governance in Yemen. How would you see the biggest barriers to restoring effective governance in Yemen?
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Well, I think obviously the war in the and the, you know, the divisions. But I mean, I think, you know, maybe one can move on, which is say, you know, I think the way to solve the problems in the long run is to have federalism. I think that is the only thing that would work in Yemen, partly because there are long lasting and long standing divisions, both political ones of the states, but also of, you know, socially and politically between tribal groups and other groups and different regions.
And so a well-designed federalist federal, state would make a lot of sense. But, you know, there was discussion of a federal state, and it was decided to have one in the National Dialogue conference, but that was done, sorry. After the National Dialogue conference, it wasn't the details, and it was decided a completely bureaucratic manner. You know, X, Y, z governorate here X, Y, Z governorate there. And that makes it together. That's not the basis on which you create a federal state.
You know, you have to look at the at the social, social, social structure balances that the social groups at the natural available resources, you know, so you don't end up with a place that's got loads of stuff. And the next one that has nothing. So all kinds of water. I mean, in Yemen, water is absolutely fundamental. Um, you know, so that that's the basis on which one could plan or one could hope for. And, and that's, and people are still talking about it, but, you know, not with interest because they don't really want to solve the problem.
And so a well-designed federalist federal, state would make a lot of sense. But, you know, there was discussion of a federal state, and it was decided to have one in the National Dialogue conference, but that was done, sorry. After the National Dialogue conference, it wasn't the details, and it was decided a completely bureaucratic manner. You know, X, Y, z governorate here X, Y, Z governorate there. And that makes it together. That's not the basis on which you create a federal state.
You know, you have to look at the at the social, social, social structure balances that the social groups at the natural available resources, you know, so you don't end up with a place that's got loads of stuff. And the next one that has nothing. So all kinds of water. I mean, in Yemen, water is absolutely fundamental. Um, you know, so that that's the basis on which one could plan or one could hope for. And, and that's, and people are still talking about it, but, you know, not with interest because they don't really want to solve the problem.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
I think there's still people talking about it, but, you know, most people who most of the people I know who are who are hopeful or interested in politics are pretty. Depressed. They're not. They're a bit lacking in thinking. You know, I was talking to somebody yesterday saying, you know, what's the future?He said, oh, I've got my vision, but nobody wants to listen. And I said, well, I'll listen. He said, yes, but nobody listens to you either.
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15:49
Speaker 5
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Speaker 5
I was going to say that we're listening. We're listening, Helen and Richard, if I could just, uh, move to you, please. In terms of the role of, um, local actors and civil society in Yemen, what role do you think civil society in Yemen will be able to play to help stabilize. the country to. Richard, please.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
What role can local actors and civil society play to stabilize?Certainly. Freedoms are lacking and. But that's a reality in many countries in the Middle East and more widely. The desire among civil society and civil. Groups and NGOs, the desire to be more influential is there. As indicated in the previous witnesses statements or responses. Um. The enabling environment will will come when. Uh. As and when there there is sort of.
A more easing for into Yemeni dialogue a facilitation of Yemeni dialogue, a creation of space for it. Um, and as, as I said earlier, one fundamental problem is that the. Prevailing framework for peace in Yemen, for peace process. Is in inappropriate. And it doesn't. And it. It doesn't foster growth in the space for civil society activity. And so those civil society groups who want to act, do local peace building or, or. Uh, engage in track three, track two initiatives in support of high level peace mediation or to engage in, uh, areas of developmental work, which are, which have, uh, terms involved that some governing authorities dislike at the moment.
It's difficult for them. And as Nora said, where they have to struggle and find ways to work around and re relabel things they want to do. Um, but the desire is there without doubt and the capability is there. The skills and capability of Yemeni civil society groups and NGOs should not be doubted.
A more easing for into Yemeni dialogue a facilitation of Yemeni dialogue, a creation of space for it. Um, and as, as I said earlier, one fundamental problem is that the. Prevailing framework for peace in Yemen, for peace process. Is in inappropriate. And it doesn't. And it. It doesn't foster growth in the space for civil society activity. And so those civil society groups who want to act, do local peace building or, or. Uh, engage in track three, track two initiatives in support of high level peace mediation or to engage in, uh, areas of developmental work, which are, which have, uh, terms involved that some governing authorities dislike at the moment.
It's difficult for them. And as Nora said, where they have to struggle and find ways to work around and re relabel things they want to do. Um, but the desire is there without doubt and the capability is there. The skills and capability of Yemeni civil society groups and NGOs should not be doubted.
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15:52
Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Thanks, Richard. Obviously, the UK is the penholder for Yemen, as we are for many of the difficult conflicts at the moment. But what leverage do you feel the UK has and and actually sort of a second sort of follow up to that question is how can we be more effective in our role as penholder?So so what leverage do we have and how can we be more effective?
15:52
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
Well, as, as a. Pen holder, you have that leverage of drafting resolutions or opening the way for, uh, for discussions in around the Security Council for, for potential resolutions and. That leverage has not been used. Well, um. I'm not the only person who would say that there are researchers, uh. Who. And people who have worked on peace processes, who have written on this from as long ago as some eight years ago, remarking that the, uh.
Acidity, uh, and in inflexibility and the refusal to reconsider resolution two, two, one six and was unhelpful was limiting mediation, limiting peace processes, the potential for peace process to make make gains. So for the UK, a question is, as penholder has it used that pen holding?Well, um. I think my my.
Acidity, uh, and in inflexibility and the refusal to reconsider resolution two, two, one six and was unhelpful was limiting mediation, limiting peace processes, the potential for peace process to make make gains. So for the UK, a question is, as penholder has it used that pen holding?Well, um. I think my my.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
It will. Be welcome. It it will be welcome. And it's not just Ansar Allah in Sana'a that would welcome, uh. An easing in the International framework for peace process and and the picking up of a pen for drafting, uh, new a new resolution addressing peace process. And there are other, there are other Yemeni parties that will welcome that, um. Another part of your question. Sorry.
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15:55
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
The UK is very limited in in what leverage it can have there. It can can facilitate in that capacity as penholder. But but subsequent leverage is limited because, for example, partly because of the lack of diplomatic or very limited diplomatic engagement with, uh, with some parties in Yemen, um, the absence of foreign diplomatic missions, largely speaking from Sana'a, from northern Yemen, that has consequences for limiting their diplomatic leverage.
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Speaker 16
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Speaker 16
And so, um, just to so more diplomatic engagement with Yemen would unlock this inflexibility, maybe and rigidity of the framework. Um. From a British taxpayer point of view, that that is a country that's surrounded by very, very wealthy other countries who are. Absolutely involved in Yemen. Why, from your point of view, should the UK get involved in this?I.
15:59
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
I don't think actually the UK has um. Has a lot to offer necessarily. The neighboring countries are much more important. Um um and, and the UK is the UK and Yemen is at least with some Yemenis is to some extent tarnished by its um. History. Uh, and, and its role in the Saudi led military intervention since 2015.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
I think the the pen holding role is can be quite flattering to countries can feel flattered by it as a as though it's a testimony to their diplomatic finesse and skill at drafting. Um. There are 15 countries in the Security Council. There are, um, and even in. The Security Council discussions yesterday about Yemen, um, the issue of um resolution two. 212216 was raised. Um and the question of its age or obsolescence.
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Speaker 12
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Speaker 12
Think so. I feel like we're struggling to, to answer this question, which is no criticism of you. But, but but and I wasn't asking it as a challenge so much as I'm trying to think through what would be the most meaningful action diplomatically that the UK could take. So I suppose if you maybe want to take 30s on that, if you do have a thought, sort of one meaningful action that we should take.
16:02
Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Diplomatically, I'd say to try and push the neighbouring countries to be more involved and possibly, possibly talk to the Yemeni different politicians if they are interested in listening and try and persuade them to change their views. I mean, to not to change their views, but to, you know, to start thinking about the millions of people who are suffering because of that.
16:02
Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
And I'd say agree with that and add. Um, do more to. Uh, acknowledge. The realities of, of governance and, um, within the. Country in Yemen. Do more to engage with those realities that there is an administration, a government in Sana'a led by Ansar Allah and, and minority partners. It shouldn't be a complete taboo to, uh, to, to acknowledge that, um. And. I'd. Yeah. Let's stop there.
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Speaker 14
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Speaker 14
Um it's, it's a groupthink. Um uh, among a diplomatic community engaging with, with Yemen, uh, who. I. AM it's my observation. Um, I haven't been part of it, but who are based outside the country in Riyadh to a lesser extent in Amman, in Jordan, interacting with other, um, out of country embassies to Yemen and interacting with, um, a limited section of the internationally recognized government of Yemen. Um, and their embassies abroad, um, and staying within the sort of comfortable space of, of a discourse about, um, about a political path for Yemen, not, not questioning that.
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Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Where you can also say it goes back to the Friends of Yemen, which was set up in 22009, if I remember rightly. And and that that developed into the Group of ten ambassadors who then developed into the what created the GCC initiative and agreement. So so there's this kind of corpus. I mean, obviously, the individuals have changed in there, but that that's been operating now for. We're now into well into its second decade. I mean, I think that may play an element, be an element of that.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Don't we go there, Helen, so that the last two hours have been pretty bleak about the humanitarian situation, the life for a civilian. The development situation hasn't even been touched upon because it doesn't seem to be the ability to operate in that space. So let's try and end with something hopeful and something to aim for. So let's say that there is a, um, a lasting or a foreseeably lasting, uh, peace. Uh, an opportunity to stabilize and rebuild Yemen. You said that you could offer a development solution.
So what would be the priorities and how would that come into reality?So is that international money?Is that private money?How what would you foresee?
So what would be the priorities and how would that come into reality?So is that international money?Is that private money?How what would you foresee?
16:07
Speaker 13
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Speaker 13
Well, when people I mean, I think, you know, Yemen's crisis is very, very deep and goes way beyond before the war started. And but there are incredible basic fundamental things that need to be done. And some of the one them can start now. You don't have not only do you not have to wait. You mustn't wait. And the two major sectors that I my view need to be addressed are water and environmental issues on the one hand. And the second one is education.
To start with education, the Yemeni education system is not appropriate to the 21st century. The population of Yemen is still growing at almost 3% a year. Absolute desperate need. If people. People in the new generation to fit into a modern economy, which means. And education system, even when it works, is, you know, crudely, very, very, not more 19th century than 21st. So what is needed, in my view, is, and that is something that really cannot wait and doesn't have to wait, because you don't need to wait till you have peace to do things like, you know, develop appropriate syllabi, train potential teachers, prepare and design an education system that will provide that will create a labour force that is able to survive and be operative.
And that takes about 15 years to get it going. So, you know, the later you start, the worse you are.
To start with education, the Yemeni education system is not appropriate to the 21st century. The population of Yemen is still growing at almost 3% a year. Absolute desperate need. If people. People in the new generation to fit into a modern economy, which means. And education system, even when it works, is, you know, crudely, very, very, not more 19th century than 21st. So what is needed, in my view, is, and that is something that really cannot wait and doesn't have to wait, because you don't need to wait till you have peace to do things like, you know, develop appropriate syllabi, train potential teachers, prepare and design an education system that will provide that will create a labour force that is able to survive and be operative.
And that takes about 15 years to get it going. So, you know, the later you start, the worse you are.
16:09
Speaker 6
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Speaker 6
Be led. And and in that hypothetical or hoped for future of greater peace widening peace be led by Yemenis on it. Um, regarding development and the economy should shouldn't be underestimated at all. Internationally regarding its economy and humanitarian conditions for, for long. There are economic strengths. Um, and then and then among Yemenis outside the country remitting to the country that large Yemeni populations, large numbers of Yemenis working in the neighboring countries and further afield, remitting. As far as I know.
16:09