Communications and Digital Committee
Tuesday 13th October 2026
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14:30
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Two children in their everyday lives. Once an act has come into effect. Came into effect. And it's an interesting question how rapidly one expects to see the benefit. So we we see a multiplicity of risks. Yes. Some of the risks are still are new and are still there. But so. Two children still report exposure to to inappropriate or sexual content. They still talk a lot about bullying and cyberbullying.
You know, the, the, the familiar problems don't go away as the, as the new ones arise. And indeed, they get increasingly interconnected. One way they get interconnected is that they especially focus on the children who are already vulnerable. So in surveys and in interviews, we can interview lots of children who say, I can cope. It's fine. I can kind of I've got a handle on it. But the children who are vulnerable or marginalized in some way will report a whole array of risks and harms, and the impact on them will be the longest lasting.
I think in in Europe, we just surveyed 19 children in 19 countries, unfortunately not this one, but it gives us a very good measure of how many of the risks have doubled in the children's reporting of risks, of seeing self-harm, of seeing violent content, of seeing inappropriate sexual content. Those are doubled in the last five years. And Ofcom's own statistics, and perhaps the last thing to say is that they show no difference in children's exposure to risk before and after the act.
You know, the, the, the familiar problems don't go away as the, as the new ones arise. And indeed, they get increasingly interconnected. One way they get interconnected is that they especially focus on the children who are already vulnerable. So in surveys and in interviews, we can interview lots of children who say, I can cope. It's fine. I can kind of I've got a handle on it. But the children who are vulnerable or marginalized in some way will report a whole array of risks and harms, and the impact on them will be the longest lasting.
I think in in Europe, we just surveyed 19 children in 19 countries, unfortunately not this one, but it gives us a very good measure of how many of the risks have doubled in the children's reporting of risks, of seeing self-harm, of seeing violent content, of seeing inappropriate sexual content. Those are doubled in the last five years. And Ofcom's own statistics, and perhaps the last thing to say is that they show no difference in children's exposure to risk before and after the act.
14:31
14:31
14:31
14:31
14:32
14:32
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Points around kind of harm remaining high, and I can talk about that a little bit later. But in terms of kind of harms that we're seeing. So I think one of the clear ones is AI chatbots. And they present some of the similar risks that we see on other services like surfacing harmful content, but also they how they work is fundamentally different. So how children engage with them. And that kind of responsive, conversational tone presents a new range of risks for children and young people.
They are going to them for advice, for emotional support. It is changing how young people think about relationships and where they go for reliable information. We did some research last year which showed that children in the UK are using them in this way, so around a quarter of children said they were already using them for advice. 40% of children trusted the advice that they were getting from AI chat bots, and a further 36% were unsure if they should be concerned about the advice that they were getting.
And this is really important. As we know, around two thirds of UK children aged 9 to 17 are already using AI chat bots, and I'm sure this figure has also grown in that time as well. Fortunately, some elements of AI chatbots do come in under the Online Safety Act, but not all elements. And as we know, that does focus more on that harmful content side rather than some of those other risks that AI chatbots can send that sort of relate to the design of the services themselves.
Another risk that is increasing as AI generated content. This comes with many different risks, but a particularly just wanted to focus on the creation or the use of it for the creation of new deepfakes or sexually explicit images. Our research is a little old on this, but two years ago we did research that showed around half a million UK children had encountered a new deepfake. Whether that was being shown one, whether that was an image being created of them or someone they knew.
The latest data from the Iwuf that was published last week shows that AI generated Csam is increasing, and I think most shockingly, it's being used more in sextortion cases as well. And I think this sort of intersects with existing risks. So for example, children's followers or friends less being visible, that can then be used alongside AI generated content to cause harm to a child through sextortion. And then alongside those kind of existing risks, I think something that's less well addressed in the current online safety framework is the design of platforms themselves.
So again, we focus on that harmful content, but we hear regularly from parents and children and young people that their top concern is the amount of time that children and young people are spending online and the impact that that is having on wellbeing, sleep, offline relationships as well.
They are going to them for advice, for emotional support. It is changing how young people think about relationships and where they go for reliable information. We did some research last year which showed that children in the UK are using them in this way, so around a quarter of children said they were already using them for advice. 40% of children trusted the advice that they were getting from AI chat bots, and a further 36% were unsure if they should be concerned about the advice that they were getting.
And this is really important. As we know, around two thirds of UK children aged 9 to 17 are already using AI chat bots, and I'm sure this figure has also grown in that time as well. Fortunately, some elements of AI chatbots do come in under the Online Safety Act, but not all elements. And as we know, that does focus more on that harmful content side rather than some of those other risks that AI chatbots can send that sort of relate to the design of the services themselves.
Another risk that is increasing as AI generated content. This comes with many different risks, but a particularly just wanted to focus on the creation or the use of it for the creation of new deepfakes or sexually explicit images. Our research is a little old on this, but two years ago we did research that showed around half a million UK children had encountered a new deepfake. Whether that was being shown one, whether that was an image being created of them or someone they knew.
The latest data from the Iwuf that was published last week shows that AI generated Csam is increasing, and I think most shockingly, it's being used more in sextortion cases as well. And I think this sort of intersects with existing risks. So for example, children's followers or friends less being visible, that can then be used alongside AI generated content to cause harm to a child through sextortion. And then alongside those kind of existing risks, I think something that's less well addressed in the current online safety framework is the design of platforms themselves.
So again, we focus on that harmful content, but we hear regularly from parents and children and young people that their top concern is the amount of time that children and young people are spending online and the impact that that is having on wellbeing, sleep, offline relationships as well.
14:34
Baroness Keeley
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Baroness Keeley
Okay. Thanks. You've been into quite some some detail there. I did have some follow up questions, which I think you've already touched on. So perhaps I'll, I'll, we can, we can just sort of summarize them. There were which of the new or emerging harms technologies or patterns of behaviour are the most concerning? And perhaps Andy, you might want to talk to us about the comm groups again in particular, if there's anything you wanted to say about how, how the Ofcom, how Ofcom has approached this and, and how what they could have done, if you like that might be helpful.
14:35
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Yeah, absolutely. Look, I think what the response to common groups has shown is really the the shortcomings in the way that Ofcom has implemented the act as well, as I mentioned earlier, some of the structural weaknesses that are inherent to it. If we go back to 2024. That's when we first started to see comm groups emerge as a significant threat. At that point, we had the first of two warnings from the FBI.
We've subsequently had warnings from the National Crime Agency, from Europol, from the Australian Federal Police and many others. During that time, we have seen a substantial lag before Ofcom updated its register of risks, we have seen measures being proposed in respect of live streaming in the Additional Measures consultation, which I think Ofcom will publish its final decisions on relatively shortly. But there is a really substantial gap between, you know, a rapidly growing problem and the codes of practice containing the measures that are needed and that are commensurate to deal with a problem of this magnitude.
I, I don't exaggerate when I say this is the worst threat that I have ever seen. It is effectively a melting pot of of some of the most egregious harms online, where we are seeing radicalised boys with, you know, kind of fluid ideologies, very much what we saw in Southport with Axel Cabana. But that is taking place online with organised groups every day, and the regulatory response is falling short. One of the areas that I think I mentioned about the hybrid nature of the threat, and we have a situation where the act deals with silos and it deals with a measures being built into codes of practice only, where there is evidence that measures will work.
Well. We have a situation where when new harms grow, there is a disincentive for platforms to be invested in safety by design to tackle them, because that will in turn add to the regulatory burden. With effectively doing this the wrong way round. We're also looking at a regime that fails to place duties on platforms to cooperate with each other on the on the nature of the threat. And when you think about common groups, you know, this is grooming that that starts on gaming platforms like Roblox very often in plain sight.
It will then move to the likes of discord, where the groups will operate, or on to the likes of telegram to encrypted sites. Now, the reality is that no one platform can see the jigsaw because they only have individual pieces of it. In the absence of clear duties on platforms to have to work together on the threat and being outcome focused. So the test is, is enough reasonably being done to tackle the threat.
Then we are seeing a regime that at best is introducing very belated, specific ad hoc measures rather than that comprehensive, cohesive set of duties that we really need.
We've subsequently had warnings from the National Crime Agency, from Europol, from the Australian Federal Police and many others. During that time, we have seen a substantial lag before Ofcom updated its register of risks, we have seen measures being proposed in respect of live streaming in the Additional Measures consultation, which I think Ofcom will publish its final decisions on relatively shortly. But there is a really substantial gap between, you know, a rapidly growing problem and the codes of practice containing the measures that are needed and that are commensurate to deal with a problem of this magnitude.
I, I don't exaggerate when I say this is the worst threat that I have ever seen. It is effectively a melting pot of of some of the most egregious harms online, where we are seeing radicalised boys with, you know, kind of fluid ideologies, very much what we saw in Southport with Axel Cabana. But that is taking place online with organised groups every day, and the regulatory response is falling short. One of the areas that I think I mentioned about the hybrid nature of the threat, and we have a situation where the act deals with silos and it deals with a measures being built into codes of practice only, where there is evidence that measures will work.
Well. We have a situation where when new harms grow, there is a disincentive for platforms to be invested in safety by design to tackle them, because that will in turn add to the regulatory burden. With effectively doing this the wrong way round. We're also looking at a regime that fails to place duties on platforms to cooperate with each other on the on the nature of the threat. And when you think about common groups, you know, this is grooming that that starts on gaming platforms like Roblox very often in plain sight.
It will then move to the likes of discord, where the groups will operate, or on to the likes of telegram to encrypted sites. Now, the reality is that no one platform can see the jigsaw because they only have individual pieces of it. In the absence of clear duties on platforms to have to work together on the threat and being outcome focused. So the test is, is enough reasonably being done to tackle the threat.
Then we are seeing a regime that at best is introducing very belated, specific ad hoc measures rather than that comprehensive, cohesive set of duties that we really need.
14:38
Baroness Keeley
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Baroness Keeley
Okay. Thank you. And Katie, Professor Livingstone, if I if I can come to you with another supplementary, really, which of the risks that children face today is the current regulatory framework least well equipped to address? And why? I mean, Andy, I think you've just given us one example. But Katie, you talked about chatbots. Do you want to to talk around that? So which of the risks the children face is our regulatory framework least well equipped to address and why?
14:39
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Yeah, I think it broadly comes back to the fact that the Isa, and particularly the protection of children's codes and illegal harms codes are focused around content and content that is harmful to children. But actually, that's not the only way that harm occurs. It can be down to the design of platforms and services. So we see that with AI chatbots , where it's harmful content, it's important consideration, but it's also about that continued use, those misplaced trusts, the kind of community sort of blurred lines between trusted source of information and online and offline relationships.
So I think in that circumstance, it's very much about the design of these platforms. And that's something that the Isa is least well equipped to address. And similarly, when it comes to kind of those impacts on children's wellbeing, we know that more time online does lead to higher rates of harm. But it also some of those impacts on how children feel after they've been online or impacts on sleep. Those, again, aren't necessarily because of the content that they're seeing, although that can contribute.
It's often down to those platforms that are keeping children engaged for longer through the mechanisms like recommender systems, notifications.
So I think in that circumstance, it's very much about the design of these platforms. And that's something that the Isa is least well equipped to address. And similarly, when it comes to kind of those impacts on children's wellbeing, we know that more time online does lead to higher rates of harm. But it also some of those impacts on how children feel after they've been online or impacts on sleep. Those, again, aren't necessarily because of the content that they're seeing, although that can contribute.
It's often down to those platforms that are keeping children engaged for longer through the mechanisms like recommender systems, notifications.
14:40
14:40
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
mean, perhaps to add on the chat bots, the the evidence is mounting now very fast. I think that the chatbots are kind of beyond regulation at the moment, or out of causing a whole range of problems for children, from misinformation to inappropriate advice, advice, not to tell their parents of a problem that they are worrying about, and indeed, building those relationships that can be themselves so dangerous. And because it's not user to user services, it's difficult for the act to address.
I was actually also going to say, I mean, perhaps a really crucial problem is, is the personalisation of the feed that children are getting. So, which is often kind of weaponized against them and tailored to their particular vulnerabilities. So it's very hard for anyone else to know what is being fed to an individual, because we all get this kind of very personal and very different. We can't, you know, we could look over the shoulder and we should probably do it more.
But some of the kind of avatar studies which just show what comes to a 13 year old girl, for example, are so different from anything that will ever come to me that it's, you know, it is a stretch and it's hard to, to measure and to get a, to get that broad picture. And last, just to echo something, Andy said, I hear from children over again that they know that they, they recommend that someone says, look at this YouTube.
But the YouTube is not the YouTube. It's the comments below, the YouTube and the comments below the YouTube take them to a discord server and the discord takes them somewhere and eventually they get a drop box and see something terrible. And it's not, you know, it is across the services that is falling through the gaps of the act at the moment.
I was actually also going to say, I mean, perhaps a really crucial problem is, is the personalisation of the feed that children are getting. So, which is often kind of weaponized against them and tailored to their particular vulnerabilities. So it's very hard for anyone else to know what is being fed to an individual, because we all get this kind of very personal and very different. We can't, you know, we could look over the shoulder and we should probably do it more.
But some of the kind of avatar studies which just show what comes to a 13 year old girl, for example, are so different from anything that will ever come to me that it's, you know, it is a stretch and it's hard to, to measure and to get a, to get that broad picture. And last, just to echo something, Andy said, I hear from children over again that they know that they, they recommend that someone says, look at this YouTube.
But the YouTube is not the YouTube. It's the comments below, the YouTube and the comments below the YouTube take them to a discord server and the discord takes them somewhere and eventually they get a drop box and see something terrible. And it's not, you know, it is across the services that is falling through the gaps of the act at the moment.
14:42
Lord Storey
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Lord Storey
Well, good afternoon. I find your answers very depressing, to be quite honest. And it's almost as though we're playing catch up. And I think my question now sounds a bit trite, to be quite honest. After what you've said in your opening comments to question one, we all hoped when the. We all thought and hoped that when we were dealing with the Online Safety Bill, that we were going to be able to make a real improvement in the safety of children online.
And that clearly isn't the case. From what you have been saying. So my question was that changes that. The Online Service Act now makes protect children. How effective has it been? It's almost like, you know, you cut off one head and another head grows up, another tentacle grows up. So I don't really know what I mean. What to say.
Sonya, perhaps you should.
And that clearly isn't the case. From what you have been saying. So my question was that changes that. The Online Service Act now makes protect children. How effective has it been? It's almost like, you know, you cut off one head and another head grows up, another tentacle grows up. So I don't really know what I mean. What to say.
Sonya, perhaps you should.
14:43
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I have have a go because I think the position is not entirely depressing. So, you know, we've been trying to track what changes platforms are making as a result of the act. Of course, the act came in at the same time, sort of hard on the heels of the age appropriate design code as part of our data protection regulation and a similar time to the Europe's Digital Services Act. So the platforms are responding to a number of different regulatory changes all at once.
When the when the Act first came in, we saw a number of efforts to change services by design and by default. So taking some steps towards the safety by design that I think many of us would want to advocate. But that tailing off. We see less of that in our last effort to look at this. My colleague Steve Wood has kind of looked at this, looked looked at 70 services and how they have responded to the act.
And what we see is increasing provision of user guidance, parental tools and age assurance. So some greater efforts to keep children away from services that the act says they should not be using, and some greater tools in the hands of parents and children. What we don't see so much is those efforts to stop the problem arising in the first place as a matter of by design and by default, provision.
When the when the Act first came in, we saw a number of efforts to change services by design and by default. So taking some steps towards the safety by design that I think many of us would want to advocate. But that tailing off. We see less of that in our last effort to look at this. My colleague Steve Wood has kind of looked at this, looked looked at 70 services and how they have responded to the act.
And what we see is increasing provision of user guidance, parental tools and age assurance. So some greater efforts to keep children away from services that the act says they should not be using, and some greater tools in the hands of parents and children. What we don't see so much is those efforts to stop the problem arising in the first place as a matter of by design and by default, provision.
14:45
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Sorry, just to build on that. So we did research with UK families after the Protection of Children codes came into force and found very similar children and young people and parents were reporting that there were more reporting tools and features on platforms, age checks, parental controls, and there were limitations on limitations on features, on platforms. However, unfortunately, this hasn't led to that step change in children's wellbeing and safety that we would have expected.
So in the same study, we asked children if they had experienced a list of harms in the months after the protection of children's codes came into force, and we found around 50% of children had experienced at least one type of harm. This included seeing violent content, content promoting unrealistic body types, hate speech, which are all should be prohibited under the protection of children's codes. Examples that were given in focus group included children seeing the video of the assassination of Charlie Kirk not seeking that out, but that just appearing in the newsfeed through to kind of localised examples of violence.
So maybe a fight or weapons in their local area and that coming up on their feet as well. Similarly, in the same research, we heard children and young people talking about how much they were struggling with disengaging from online spaces as well and the impact that that was having on their wellbeing. And I think if we focus on kind of a szex as an example, or a microcosm of where maybe a change on a platform isn't delivering on that intended outcome.
So around 50% of children had been through an age check in the two months after the protection of children's codes came into force, and that might have been on an existing platform or a new platform. However, around the same number of children thought that age checks were easy to bypass, and a third of children had actually circumvented an age check. And obviously that is significant because if that is what is being used to protect children online, to reliably understand their age, then it can't deliver the protections that are needed for children and young people.
And we think we also see this with the fact that so many young people under the age 13 are on platforms, despite and many platforms, terms of service. They have 13 as the the minimum age. So children are also accessing platforms that aren't designed for them. And I think this kind of disconnect, I think we see not just in age checks, we see it with reporting. So more reporting features, but at the same levels of reporting.
So in the same study, we asked children if they had experienced a list of harms in the months after the protection of children's codes came into force, and we found around 50% of children had experienced at least one type of harm. This included seeing violent content, content promoting unrealistic body types, hate speech, which are all should be prohibited under the protection of children's codes. Examples that were given in focus group included children seeing the video of the assassination of Charlie Kirk not seeking that out, but that just appearing in the newsfeed through to kind of localised examples of violence.
So maybe a fight or weapons in their local area and that coming up on their feet as well. Similarly, in the same research, we heard children and young people talking about how much they were struggling with disengaging from online spaces as well and the impact that that was having on their wellbeing. And I think if we focus on kind of a szex as an example, or a microcosm of where maybe a change on a platform isn't delivering on that intended outcome.
So around 50% of children had been through an age check in the two months after the protection of children's codes came into force, and that might have been on an existing platform or a new platform. However, around the same number of children thought that age checks were easy to bypass, and a third of children had actually circumvented an age check. And obviously that is significant because if that is what is being used to protect children online, to reliably understand their age, then it can't deliver the protections that are needed for children and young people.
And we think we also see this with the fact that so many young people under the age 13 are on platforms, despite and many platforms, terms of service. They have 13 as the the minimum age. So children are also accessing platforms that aren't designed for them. And I think this kind of disconnect, I think we see not just in age checks, we see it with reporting. So more reporting features, but at the same levels of reporting.
14:47
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
And I think, you know, Katie teases out, I think a really important point, which is that so many of Ofcom's measures feel like they've been outputs rather than being rooted in delivering outcomes. So where measures have been adopted into codes of practice, they are not translating into the change that I think civil society and members of both houses would have expected when when the bill was when the bill was passed for the Molly Rose Foundation. I think we've always had a very simple yardstick for the act.
Would it do everything that was reasonably possible to prevent further deaths in circumstances like Molly's? And I think unambiguously, the act has so far failed in that regard. Our research that we undertook immediately prior to the act coming into force, and then earlier this year, shows that there has been really no change in the proportion of teenagers seeing harmful suicide, self-harm, intense depression and eating disorder content. 48% of girls had seen that content, which we would expect to be classified as either primary priority or priority content under the act, and therefore either restricted or throttled.
That has dropped by only one percentage point from the data before the act took effect. So really no change. 1 in 5 girls who see content that is actively promoting suicide see it ten times or more a week. So that is exactly the type of cumulative harm that led to Molly's death. If the algorithms recommending large volumes of, of, of content, about 60% of the occasions on each of the platforms that we surveyed where young people were seeing this content, it was because of algorithmic exposure.
So it is a failure to tackle those systems and processes. The measure that are built that are into Ofcom's codes are not translating into results. And I think probably for me, one of the things that is most frustrating is that that data has shown that on TikTok, young people are three times more likely than the next platform to see this type of content. And I think as a civil society organisation, I do not know what more evidence we could produce to prompt Ofcom to open an investigation into the algorithmic failings of a platform like TikTok.
It is frankly exasperating that we've seen the European Commission reach provisional findings on an investigation into the same thing, and Ofcom, with the evidence being provided to it, has still not acted.
Would it do everything that was reasonably possible to prevent further deaths in circumstances like Molly's? And I think unambiguously, the act has so far failed in that regard. Our research that we undertook immediately prior to the act coming into force, and then earlier this year, shows that there has been really no change in the proportion of teenagers seeing harmful suicide, self-harm, intense depression and eating disorder content. 48% of girls had seen that content, which we would expect to be classified as either primary priority or priority content under the act, and therefore either restricted or throttled.
That has dropped by only one percentage point from the data before the act took effect. So really no change. 1 in 5 girls who see content that is actively promoting suicide see it ten times or more a week. So that is exactly the type of cumulative harm that led to Molly's death. If the algorithms recommending large volumes of, of, of content, about 60% of the occasions on each of the platforms that we surveyed where young people were seeing this content, it was because of algorithmic exposure.
So it is a failure to tackle those systems and processes. The measure that are built that are into Ofcom's codes are not translating into results. And I think probably for me, one of the things that is most frustrating is that that data has shown that on TikTok, young people are three times more likely than the next platform to see this type of content. And I think as a civil society organisation, I do not know what more evidence we could produce to prompt Ofcom to open an investigation into the algorithmic failings of a platform like TikTok.
It is frankly exasperating that we've seen the European Commission reach provisional findings on an investigation into the same thing, and Ofcom, with the evidence being provided to it, has still not acted.
14:50
14:50
Lord Storey
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Lord Storey
Well, I mean. So it's almost like Ofcom are playing catch up all the time. And actually Ofcom themselves say that they see no significant reduction in overall exposure to harmful content of 11 to 17 year olds. And it reminds me of something that the child commissioner said when she came to speak to us, and she said they have a duty of care. The platforms themselves have a duty of care. Well, if they have a duty of care, you would expect them to be proactive, not waiting for the latest piece of legislation to come down the track.
You'd expect them to do something about it straight away, and I wonder whether perhaps we're not dealing with it in the right sort of way, that we're all the time going to be faced with the the new way of, of, of exposing young children to harmful content.
You'd expect them to do something about it straight away, and I wonder whether perhaps we're not dealing with it in the right sort of way, that we're all the time going to be faced with the the new way of, of, of exposing young children to harmful content.
14:51
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
And I think probably actually that, that, that is, you know, that that's one of the major structural issues with the act that, you know, what was originally intended as being an overarching duty of care, analogous perhaps to health and safety legislation, where the objective is you have to deliver outcomes and the defenses that, you know, you can reasonably point to having taken other steps to tackle identified risks. That is not what we've ended up with.
We've ended up instead with a set of safety duties that are operationalized by codes. And then, you know, the measures are set so low and in conjunction with the safe harbors, which I imagine we may go on to then. Then it means that we end up with a regime that is effectively capturing the status quo at best.
We've ended up instead with a set of safety duties that are operationalized by codes. And then, you know, the measures are set so low and in conjunction with the safe harbors, which I imagine we may go on to then. Then it means that we end up with a regime that is effectively capturing the status quo at best.
14:51
14:52
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate
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Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate
Well, thank you for coming. I want to ask you some specifics. In doing so, I just refer very quickly, though, to the reference that was made to the GDPR, which I had something to do with when I was in Brussels in preparing it and drafting it. And it was always going to be an umbrella, if you like, which was going to rely on further legislation of a more individualized nature, in particular on regulators who would have adequate powers to be able to find the redress and find the actions that were necessary.
So I in that context, let me just ask you, well, first, first specific point in the section one of the act, as you know, the whole point of regulated services must be safe by design. That is actually stated very clearly. And I know Molly Rose Foundation particularly has expressed concerns about that, about nebulous nature of it, I think, or, or the difficulty regarding it. I'd like to know really what your views are, whether you think in this context, the regulator, Ofcom has got enough.
What can I say, scope or powers to enforce changes in service design when it clearly is shown to be inappropriate or unhelpful? Could you answer that one for me first?
So I in that context, let me just ask you, well, first, first specific point in the section one of the act, as you know, the whole point of regulated services must be safe by design. That is actually stated very clearly. And I know Molly Rose Foundation particularly has expressed concerns about that, about nebulous nature of it, I think, or, or the difficulty regarding it. I'd like to know really what your views are, whether you think in this context, the regulator, Ofcom has got enough.
What can I say, scope or powers to enforce changes in service design when it clearly is shown to be inappropriate or unhelpful? Could you answer that one for me first?
14:53
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I mean, I think many of us anticipated, as you say, the, the, the, the, the online safety objectives are there right at the beginning of the act. And the, the wording around safety by design is unambiguously clear. But I think Ofcom has expressed that it does not feel that it then has the powers to then be able to operationalize that in the act. I'm not sure that I understand that those arguments. So I won't try and explain it on their behalf, but I think there is a substantial gap between what we thought the act would do and the way in which Ofcom's lawyers have interpreted it.
But I think the other part of this is that where Ofcom does has the scope, have have the scope in its codes of practice to introduce safety by design measures. So, for example, relating to, you know, the algorithmic recommendation of, of, of, of content, those are then developed in a way that then really hamstrung. They're hamstrung their overall effectiveness. So the way that Ofcom has interpreted the provisions have to be clear and detailed. They have to be technically feasible.
There has to be an evidentiary threshold to show that they are proportionate. When those things are built in. It means that even where measures are being built into codes, their potential efficacy is likely to be very low because they're just being constantly chipped away at to the point that then, you know, it becomes effectively a tick box exercise.
But I think the other part of this is that where Ofcom does has the scope, have have the scope in its codes of practice to introduce safety by design measures. So, for example, relating to, you know, the algorithmic recommendation of, of, of, of content, those are then developed in a way that then really hamstrung. They're hamstrung their overall effectiveness. So the way that Ofcom has interpreted the provisions have to be clear and detailed. They have to be technically feasible.
There has to be an evidentiary threshold to show that they are proportionate. When those things are built in. It means that even where measures are being built into codes, their potential efficacy is likely to be very low because they're just being constantly chipped away at to the point that then, you know, it becomes effectively a tick box exercise.
14:55
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I've been also thinking about what it is that Ofcom has been doing, and I know there's considerable frustration, as you'll have heard among kind of civil society, about the kind of piecemeal and the one by one ways in which it takes some actions. So this year, Ofcom found looked into how snap had allocated its risk levels for Snapchat and found that it hadn't identified as high risk. The fact that adult strangers are able to contact children.
Ofcom intervened here, got Snapchat or Snap to agree that it would now stop adult adult strangers contacting children. I think it, you know, to many sitting outside , it's just mind blowing that this wasn't done the minute the act came into force and indeed wasn't done under the 20 years of self-regulation that we've all kind of lived through at, which probably the public's number one anxiety is adult strangers can contact children. And yet just this year and then, you know, we go back into the waiting game.
Will it happen? Will will it be followed through? How will it be checked? How will be sure they don't roll back on this promise, given that their business model is expanding content and contacts, and how will we be sure that children are safe as a result? I think a lot of the the questions about evidence kind of cut both ways. It's very hard in in civil society to see what would be the indicators we can get from how platforms operate, to see if they are indeed acting as they said they would or as they should, and to see that those improvements, if they exist, continue.
Ofcom intervened here, got Snapchat or Snap to agree that it would now stop adult adult strangers contacting children. I think it, you know, to many sitting outside , it's just mind blowing that this wasn't done the minute the act came into force and indeed wasn't done under the 20 years of self-regulation that we've all kind of lived through at, which probably the public's number one anxiety is adult strangers can contact children. And yet just this year and then, you know, we go back into the waiting game.
Will it happen? Will will it be followed through? How will it be checked? How will be sure they don't roll back on this promise, given that their business model is expanding content and contacts, and how will we be sure that children are safe as a result? I think a lot of the the questions about evidence kind of cut both ways. It's very hard in in civil society to see what would be the indicators we can get from how platforms operate, to see if they are indeed acting as they said they would or as they should, and to see that those improvements, if they exist, continue.
14:56
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
I think the only thing I would add in is often the pace of of change as well, or sort of recognition of challenges. So platforms continue to roll out new features. They add in things like AI or new types of messaging or image sharing. And for some reason that isn't being picked up before it's released. So there's none of that safety by design from the beginning. I think an example of that is the new feature that's been added to one of Meta's platforms, and investigation has been opened into that.
But that is after that, I think has been out for around six months. So I think there's also a question around why Ofcom isn't addressing these safety by design issues at the outset.
But that is after that, I think has been out for around six months. So I think there's also a question around why Ofcom isn't addressing these safety by design issues at the outset.
14:57
Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate
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Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate
I just put two things to you now together, if I may, in your comments on them. One is Safe Harbour, which in itself I think some people have suggested should be done away with. And there are criticisms of Ofcom in terms of a tick box mentality regarding it. I'd like your comments on that. And also the other thing is the question of proactive technologies. Oh, it's another question.
I'm so sorry. I shall leave that to my colleague. In which case I'd like your comments on on Safe Harbour please. Sorry.
I'm so sorry. I shall leave that to my colleague. In which case I'd like your comments on on Safe Harbour please. Sorry.
14:57
14:57
14:58
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Yeah. I mean, I think we would support the removal of safe harbors. Safe harbors, you know, can can be an effective part of a regulatory regime. But the, you know, kind of in, in reality, the way that Ofcom has developed the codes means that then, you know, the, the, the total measures that platforms have to deliver are, you know, really barely capturing the status quo. And then the safe harbor means that platforms don't have to go any further.
So they should go. And I think even if we were to, you know, wave a magic wand and Ofcom were suddenly, you know, much more ambitious and assertive than they have been to date. We obviously have thousands of pages of Ofcom decisions saying it is not proportionate to do X, Y and Z. So I'm not sure that, you know, kind of this is merely just a change in a step change in ambition.
Now the safe harbors need to go.
So they should go. And I think even if we were to, you know, wave a magic wand and Ofcom were suddenly, you know, much more ambitious and assertive than they have been to date. We obviously have thousands of pages of Ofcom decisions saying it is not proportionate to do X, Y and Z. So I'm not sure that, you know, kind of this is merely just a change in a step change in ambition.
Now the safe harbors need to go.
14:59
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And I think it was plausible at the time when the act came into force, that there would be the safe harbor to get the platforms to play ball and to make the steps that they could. And then there would be a further assessment and we'd see, was that sufficient, and should the expectations be raised, since the platforms have not done, you know, what was kind of expected at the start? And the sense is that the safe harbor is setting a kind of ceiling for what is what they might do, rather than a floor from which they would progress and do more to keep children safe.
I, I then I would agree, and I think it's striking the comparison with Europe's Digital Services Act, which does not offer that safe harbour and where they are really now pushing for safety by design in a more ambitious way.
I, I then I would agree, and I think it's striking the comparison with Europe's Digital Services Act, which does not offer that safe harbour and where they are really now pushing for safety by design in a more ambitious way.
14:59
14:59
Lord Tarassenko
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Lord Tarassenko
Lord Kirkhope has been proactive in flagging my my question, which I welcome. Thank you very much. Now, the word proactive appears very often in your submissions. I want to focus on proactive technologies. So, for example, tools that analyze the content, such as hash matching tools or even automated classifiers, AI could really have a role to play in that before it even reaches the children. And interestingly, when Ofcom came to see us, they said that they would want to see wider use of these technologies to to protect children.
But it did also say in their in their evidence, this was the written evidence that the OSA actually limits their ability to require the use of these proactive technologies. Now, if we had OSA 2.0, would you welcome that? You know, legislation that would make it easier for Ofcom to require the use of these proactive technologies? Or can you think of anything else in terms of these tools or similar tools that would make a real difference? We go left to right then.
Professor Livingston.
But it did also say in their in their evidence, this was the written evidence that the OSA actually limits their ability to require the use of these proactive technologies. Now, if we had OSA 2.0, would you welcome that? You know, legislation that would make it easier for Ofcom to require the use of these proactive technologies? Or can you think of anything else in terms of these tools or similar tools that would make a real difference? We go left to right then.
Professor Livingston.
15:01
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
So I'm thinking about reference to GDPR and wondering what the what the the barrier might be and assuming it's going to be something about data and data protection and privacy. I do think there is a very serious issue in the way in which that kind of proactive, AI led analysis could involve privacy risks if it were done in a way that was not transparent and not open to scrutiny by independent researchers or civil society or indeed the regulator.
So we so we would be, as it were, allowing the platforms to conduct all kinds of analysis. At the moment, data protection precisely restricts on the grounds of privacy. I think it's a really. We would need to be convinced of the benefits that it is proportionate and that people's data protection rights are also protected in the process. At the moment. That would take a lot of trust in the way platforms operate, and they are so black boxed and giving us so little in terms of their risk assessments and their mode of operation.
And the data that was always offered to independent researchers has never materialised. It's very hard to know. In short, how would we have any checks and balances that what they were doing is appropriate and effective?
So we so we would be, as it were, allowing the platforms to conduct all kinds of analysis. At the moment, data protection precisely restricts on the grounds of privacy. I think it's a really. We would need to be convinced of the benefits that it is proportionate and that people's data protection rights are also protected in the process. At the moment. That would take a lot of trust in the way platforms operate, and they are so black boxed and giving us so little in terms of their risk assessments and their mode of operation.
And the data that was always offered to independent researchers has never materialised. It's very hard to know. In short, how would we have any checks and balances that what they were doing is appropriate and effective?
15:02
15:02
15:02
15:02
15:02
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Legal well, well, well, well, look crudely. If we rely only on content moderation, then we are acting after the event and after harmful content has already started to be distributed. And we know that it can be distributed at scale very quickly. So proactive technologies absolutely do play a role. What the regime does not do right now is incentivise the use of proactive technology. And it comes back to what, as Sonya described it a moment ago, about the Ofcom developing codes of practice that act as a flaw rather than a ceiling.
So there is much more, for example, that we could do around proactive technology to be able to identify and remove or prevent the distribution of harmful content, to be able to do that to a high standard, to be able to share signals between platforms of harmful content, that is, that is being shared and in respect of common groups and the kind of the behavioural nature of, of, of risks. That is something that we absolutely should see. What we see right now, though, is that actually industry is doing this themselves on a voluntary basis, albeit with no meaningful transparency about whether those measures are effective.
And that is over and above what Ofcom as the regulator is requiring. So I think there absolutely is a role for proactive technology. And I think Ofcom's remarks were very, very interesting. What I would just say, though, is that my fear is that, you know, if we had a clause added into the act that, you know, broadly allowed for proactive technology, we could find ourselves in the same situation where, regardless of the policy intent, Ofcom's lawyers then chip away at its usefulness until we end up with measures that, you know, kind of are there, but not terrifically effective, I think we should be looking much more structurally at how we can have an outcome based regime with an overarching duty of care that says, your job is to make sure that the platform is safe.
And then by implication, proactive technologies are one route to achieve that. I think, you know, we've been badly burnt by, you know, kind of Ofcom's risk aversion and frankly, the lawyers chipping away at something until there's not much left.
So there is much more, for example, that we could do around proactive technology to be able to identify and remove or prevent the distribution of harmful content, to be able to do that to a high standard, to be able to share signals between platforms of harmful content, that is, that is being shared and in respect of common groups and the kind of the behavioural nature of, of, of risks. That is something that we absolutely should see. What we see right now, though, is that actually industry is doing this themselves on a voluntary basis, albeit with no meaningful transparency about whether those measures are effective.
And that is over and above what Ofcom as the regulator is requiring. So I think there absolutely is a role for proactive technology. And I think Ofcom's remarks were very, very interesting. What I would just say, though, is that my fear is that, you know, if we had a clause added into the act that, you know, broadly allowed for proactive technology, we could find ourselves in the same situation where, regardless of the policy intent, Ofcom's lawyers then chip away at its usefulness until we end up with measures that, you know, kind of are there, but not terrifically effective, I think we should be looking much more structurally at how we can have an outcome based regime with an overarching duty of care that says, your job is to make sure that the platform is safe.
And then by implication, proactive technologies are one route to achieve that. I think, you know, we've been badly burnt by, you know, kind of Ofcom's risk aversion and frankly, the lawyers chipping away at something until there's not much left.
15:05
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
And then we would support the proactive use of technology, obviously, if it was effective and privacy preserving. I think what I worry about , or what I'm cautious about, is that it couldn't be. It might be an either or or, well, we're using this measure now, so we don't have to do these measures. And I think children's online safety is always going to be a layered approach. You need a number of different measures working on top of each other to produce good outcomes.
And I think that needs to be kept in mind that, okay, if we're putting this technology and we don't now need to be regularly looking at how recommender feeds surface content, for example. So that would be my only caution.
And I think that needs to be kept in mind that, okay, if we're putting this technology and we don't now need to be regularly looking at how recommender feeds surface content, for example. So that would be my only caution.
15:05
Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
My turn next. I think I know what your answers are on this by all of your comments on Ofcom, but I'd like to ask the question in any case to get a very clear, straightforward answer to it. So Ofcom's described its approach to supervision and enforcement to date as strategic, saying that it's learning to walk before it runs. Is is that a fair characterization of what it said? And has it set the right threshold about when to take formal action? I'll come to Andy first, then Sonya, then Katie.
15:06
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
I think the regulator has been far too risk averse, and it has been far too slow to act against the largest companies. And I think Ofcom has set out that it has chosen to focus on certain harms. So particularly around pornography and and and. Section five of of of the act. But that has been at the expense of, of, of, of the focus on large tech companies.
And it is striking that, you know, we are now seeing investigations being opened into TikTok, into meta. The investigation into meta, for example, is very welcome, but it is essentially a procedural slap. A slap on the wrist. We have not seen the investigations that are really going for the high risk design features, the the algorithms, the fundamental design choices that we know are the are the drivers of harm and that result in problematic use and problematic experiences.
And I would just make the comparison between Ofcom's approach and that of the European Commission, which came out of the blocks very quickly to enforce the DSA by opening investigations into TikTok, into into Instagram, into meta, and made very clear that it had the powers and it intended to use them. And I would say in my engagement with the companies, you know, if you are if you are sitting and talking about are they complying with the OSA, you generally get a bit of a shrug.
If you are talking about the DSA, then they will sit up and take notice. And I think there are lessons to be learned there.
And it is striking that, you know, we are now seeing investigations being opened into TikTok, into meta. The investigation into meta, for example, is very welcome, but it is essentially a procedural slap. A slap on the wrist. We have not seen the investigations that are really going for the high risk design features, the the algorithms, the fundamental design choices that we know are the are the drivers of harm and that result in problematic use and problematic experiences.
And I would just make the comparison between Ofcom's approach and that of the European Commission, which came out of the blocks very quickly to enforce the DSA by opening investigations into TikTok, into into Instagram, into meta, and made very clear that it had the powers and it intended to use them. And I would say in my engagement with the companies, you know, if you are if you are sitting and talking about are they complying with the OSA, you generally get a bit of a shrug.
If you are talking about the DSA, then they will sit up and take notice. And I think there are lessons to be learned there.
15:08
15:08
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
The other striking example that we've all been paying attention to this year is the litigation that's happening in the US, especially in California, but also from the attorneys general, particularly against meta, but also others. So there again, we see a focus which is especially concerned with safety by design, with advance warning, with kind of knowing what the risks are on a platform and then being held to account for not having informed children and parents that the risks exist.
And, and we see a focus on the features. And I think that's where the both in Europe and in the US, this kind of move away from not saying move away from saying, you know, a platform is good or bad, but it's the design where it's designed with particular features that are available and carry a high risk. Live streaming might be a good example, or having open profiles that strangers can contact. You know, I think it's not hard.
And a list of features is now emerging. This is not coming from here. It's not coming from the actions of Ofcom and the OSA, but it has become now a kind of international consensus that that is the direction of travel. And, you know, we we really hope to see that happening here as well. And just a rider maybe this is this is more of a political point. But, you know, if we were if we were thinking from a platform perspective, clearly the kind of the power of numbers of hearing the same message coming from multiple states and big markets would have power.
And, you know, so in that sense, it feels to me it would be effective if Ofcom would act in tandem with what's happening in other countries so that the big companies get the idea. You know, the consensus is, you know, change is expected now.
And, and we see a focus on the features. And I think that's where the both in Europe and in the US, this kind of move away from not saying move away from saying, you know, a platform is good or bad, but it's the design where it's designed with particular features that are available and carry a high risk. Live streaming might be a good example, or having open profiles that strangers can contact. You know, I think it's not hard.
And a list of features is now emerging. This is not coming from here. It's not coming from the actions of Ofcom and the OSA, but it has become now a kind of international consensus that that is the direction of travel. And, you know, we we really hope to see that happening here as well. And just a rider maybe this is this is more of a political point. But, you know, if we were if we were thinking from a platform perspective, clearly the kind of the power of numbers of hearing the same message coming from multiple states and big markets would have power.
And, you know, so in that sense, it feels to me it would be effective if Ofcom would act in tandem with what's happening in other countries so that the big companies get the idea. You know, the consensus is, you know, change is expected now.
15:10
Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
So I think the slow enforcement has created a gap between expectations and reality. And that's what's led for, particularly in the public, a push for more protections for children online, because parents didn't think the online world was getting safer, they weren't seeing differences. And that was sort of driving for more changes. And I think we'll continue to see that unless we do focus, as Andy and Sonya have both pointed out, on that kind of outcomes, what is it that we're trying to achieve? Compliance is only useful if it drives those outcomes.
It's not useful for compliance sake. Thank you.
It's not useful for compliance sake. Thank you.
15:10
15:10
15:11
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
I think I'm probably I'm going to defer to Andy on this one, but I think, you know, generally what we see is a kind of difficulty in transparency and understanding how platforms are operating, lack of public risk assessments, so that it's very hard to know about what is happening. But I think on this particular case, yes. Do you want to. Sure. Because it was.
15:11
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Look, this, this, this forum is absolutely appalling. We know that more than 160 lives have been lost because of this forum, and the true figure is likely to be substantially greater. This is a forum that exists to promote and encourage suicide, and in particular to promote a suicide method, which is then sold through through the site and through related marketplaces. And it has been allowed to exist in plain sight for far too long. There are limitations in the act, but this has also not been an example where Ofcom has covered itself in glory.
The Lords amended the act to give Ofcom powers specifically to regulate small but high harm sites, which Ofcom then recommended to the Secretary of State should not be enacted, a decision I find inexplicable to this to to to this day. And then it has taken Ofcom a tortuously long amount of time to determine that this forum was breaching a whole catalogue of safety duties that, frankly, I think many of us could have taken a look and decided that in the course of an afternoon and arrived at a watertight set of set of conclusions, I would say that has been incredibly retraumatising for bereaved families who have been campaigning for Ofcom to take action on on this and have been desperately affected by the failure to grasp the urgency of this.
And certainly we know of lives that were lost. While Ofcom's investigation interminably dragged on. But on the point about the limits of Ofcom's powers, I think I think there have been surfaced there are three that I think I would really highlight. One is around issues of scope and jurisdiction. This is a forum that has played a cat and mouse game of voluntarily geoblocking itself when the heat comes on it . In jurisdictions. That voluntary geo block means that.
Then Ofcom has said that no further action can be taken against it. We should instead be amending the act so that action can be taken where there is a risk to UK users, a significant risk to UK users. So we can just short, short, short cut this, this this kind of complicated issue around around scope if it can be accessed in the UK. And we know that it can and it is causing harm, then Ofcom should be able to intervene.
Secondly, the issue of service disruption orders, I think Ofcom has felt it was not possible to apply for an interim service disruption order. Ideally it could do that where there, you know, kind of is an imminent risk as this case has clearly demonstrated whilst an investigation is ongoing. If there is a public safety risk that justifies an immediate service disruption order, Ofcom should have the ability to then go to the courts and apply to that.
And I think there's also a case for service disruption orders where, for example, a platform does not pay a fine. You have a situation right now where you know the fine that has been levied against this forum is, is, is there with very little chance that it will be recovered. And I think the third gap is around criminal sanctions. And I think we should be looking at how they play a much more expansive role in the regime broadly, but specifically in terms of this forum, if we had criminal sanctions on the operators of that forum, we know who they are.
They operate this forum. They also operate, you know, the world's largest incel forum. They are fundamentally bad actors responsible for truly appalling, egregious harm. Then we should have criminal sanctions that could apply. So look, in practice, what does that mean? I guess if they want to try and leave the United States, then, you know, kind of there's an Interpol notice on them. So there's a range of ways that the act could be amended so that we really start to bite on, you know, some truly appalling individuals and the truly appalling harm that they cause.
The Lords amended the act to give Ofcom powers specifically to regulate small but high harm sites, which Ofcom then recommended to the Secretary of State should not be enacted, a decision I find inexplicable to this to to to this day. And then it has taken Ofcom a tortuously long amount of time to determine that this forum was breaching a whole catalogue of safety duties that, frankly, I think many of us could have taken a look and decided that in the course of an afternoon and arrived at a watertight set of set of conclusions, I would say that has been incredibly retraumatising for bereaved families who have been campaigning for Ofcom to take action on on this and have been desperately affected by the failure to grasp the urgency of this.
And certainly we know of lives that were lost. While Ofcom's investigation interminably dragged on. But on the point about the limits of Ofcom's powers, I think I think there have been surfaced there are three that I think I would really highlight. One is around issues of scope and jurisdiction. This is a forum that has played a cat and mouse game of voluntarily geoblocking itself when the heat comes on it . In jurisdictions. That voluntary geo block means that.
Then Ofcom has said that no further action can be taken against it. We should instead be amending the act so that action can be taken where there is a risk to UK users, a significant risk to UK users. So we can just short, short, short cut this, this this kind of complicated issue around around scope if it can be accessed in the UK. And we know that it can and it is causing harm, then Ofcom should be able to intervene.
Secondly, the issue of service disruption orders, I think Ofcom has felt it was not possible to apply for an interim service disruption order. Ideally it could do that where there, you know, kind of is an imminent risk as this case has clearly demonstrated whilst an investigation is ongoing. If there is a public safety risk that justifies an immediate service disruption order, Ofcom should have the ability to then go to the courts and apply to that.
And I think there's also a case for service disruption orders where, for example, a platform does not pay a fine. You have a situation right now where you know the fine that has been levied against this forum is, is, is there with very little chance that it will be recovered. And I think the third gap is around criminal sanctions. And I think we should be looking at how they play a much more expansive role in the regime broadly, but specifically in terms of this forum, if we had criminal sanctions on the operators of that forum, we know who they are.
They operate this forum. They also operate, you know, the world's largest incel forum. They are fundamentally bad actors responsible for truly appalling, egregious harm. Then we should have criminal sanctions that could apply. So look, in practice, what does that mean? I guess if they want to try and leave the United States, then, you know, kind of there's an Interpol notice on them. So there's a range of ways that the act could be amended so that we really start to bite on, you know, some truly appalling individuals and the truly appalling harm that they cause.
15:15
Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge
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Baroness Owen of Alderley Edge
Thank you, Andy. So just to because we've touched on the second part of my question. So just to conclude it nicely, before moving on to Katie, would you say that that would make the biggest practical difference in this case in any future cases to ensure that we capture services that refuse to comply?
15:16
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Yeah, absolutely. And I would really encourage Ofcom to be working with the Secretary of State at pace to identify what lessons need to be to be learned here, because I think the reality is that if other similar sites appear, which they will, then right now the act has, you know, proven that it is limited in its scope to protect some of our most vulnerable.
15:16
15:16
15:16
Baroness Keeley
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Baroness Keeley
Thanks. Thanks, Ellen. Just just to complete a question that Timothy asked you earlier, Lord Kirkhope, you all said I think that Safe harbour should go. Is there something that it should be replaced with, or should it be, as I think Professor Livingstone was saying, you know, maybe it was needed to start with, but, you know, let's let's look at the situation and say it hasn't worked. You know, it hasn't worked. Having safe harbour, it's getting in the way is the.
15:17
Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Well, I think the alternative would be to have a much more articulated and developed code around safety by design, which actually is now emerging in a number of countries. And to be crystal clear, what that includes and the standards that we would expect it to live up to. So, for example, age assurance would be part of a safety by design, but a lot of age assurance as it's being implemented is not privacy respecting and doesn't draw on the existing standards that are being used.
The same, I could say, for parental control tools, for example. But I think in terms of preemptive actions that I'll go back to that list of in the sense of features and functionalities of platforms, having those a risk assessment attached to those, and then ensuring that those are embedded in a code, which is then mandatory for platforms to live to, which is probably where the European EU Kids Act is, is also going to go and building on the DSA.
The same, I could say, for parental control tools, for example. But I think in terms of preemptive actions that I'll go back to that list of in the sense of features and functionalities of platforms, having those a risk assessment attached to those, and then ensuring that those are embedded in a code, which is then mandatory for platforms to live to, which is probably where the European EU Kids Act is, is also going to go and building on the DSA.
15:18
15:18
Baroness Keeley
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Baroness Keeley
Okay, I'll move on then. Next question is about the potential benefits and risks of preventing under 16 from using social media, and how those restrictions would interact with the Online Safety Act. So a ban effectively, how would that how do you see that interacting with the Online Safety Act? Andy, can I start with you?
15:18
Speaker 3
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Speaker 3
Look, I think, you know, Molly Rose Foundation has been concerned that a ban means that we move from an online safety act that has not worked effectively to a measure that is well intentioned, but that we have question marks about whether it will work as intended and as designed to. I think, you know, I spoke earlier about how we've not seen the Online Safety Act deliver a meaningful change in platforms. They are simply not complying.
And I do not see if we are going to introduce a ban with the same incentive structure in place as with the act, that we should expect materially different results. And if that is the case, then my fear is that we will be looking at compliance. That is broadly similar to what we've seen in Australia, in Indonesia, in other countries that have brought in a ban so far. And our big fear there is that in that situation, and this is being borne out by the data that we've seen from the Esafety commissioner in Australia.
We are seeing a disconnect between parents who think that their children are no longer on these platforms, while the children themselves are in very significant numbers. And in that case, you know, I think our fear is about the safeguarding risks. And I think, you know, we've spent 10 or 15 years trying to build an approach to online safety that is based on relationships of trust between parents and professionals and children, and we risk putting a barrier in the way whilst the harms are still there and are being tackled.
And that is, I think, the real risk that now we are moving forward with a ban has to be thought about very, very carefully to ensure that we do not see unintended consequences. But I think there's also one more point, which is and you mentioned about the interplay with the act. I think there are some very big unresolved questions about the interplay between a social media ban and the and and the children's codes under the Online Safety Act.
And, you know, essentially this is whether a form of double jeopardy can apply. So if the ban is introduced to a similar level of compliance as we've seen in Australia, where, you know, somewhere between 60 and 85% of children are still viewing content on these platforms, then can a platform be allowed to roll back its measures under the children's code for under 16? Can it be held accountable? If children are then navigating the ban and then going on and accessing content with perhaps even less protections than now? I've not heard a clear position yet about what that interplay looks like, and I think the fear would be that we could end up with a situation where we have a ban in name only, and then children continuing to use services with even less protections than now.
So there is the opportunity to surface what that interplay looks like, so we can draft the regulations to avoid that risk, because clearly it is not what anybody, whether they were pro or for pro or against the ban, want to see. But I think we still have that ambiguity. And that ambiguity is worrying me. And I think we need to understand that to then make sure that the regulations that are brought forward in what a matter of weeks can adequately deal with those dynamics.
And I do not see if we are going to introduce a ban with the same incentive structure in place as with the act, that we should expect materially different results. And if that is the case, then my fear is that we will be looking at compliance. That is broadly similar to what we've seen in Australia, in Indonesia, in other countries that have brought in a ban so far. And our big fear there is that in that situation, and this is being borne out by the data that we've seen from the Esafety commissioner in Australia.
We are seeing a disconnect between parents who think that their children are no longer on these platforms, while the children themselves are in very significant numbers. And in that case, you know, I think our fear is about the safeguarding risks. And I think, you know, we've spent 10 or 15 years trying to build an approach to online safety that is based on relationships of trust between parents and professionals and children, and we risk putting a barrier in the way whilst the harms are still there and are being tackled.
And that is, I think, the real risk that now we are moving forward with a ban has to be thought about very, very carefully to ensure that we do not see unintended consequences. But I think there's also one more point, which is and you mentioned about the interplay with the act. I think there are some very big unresolved questions about the interplay between a social media ban and the and and the children's codes under the Online Safety Act.
And, you know, essentially this is whether a form of double jeopardy can apply. So if the ban is introduced to a similar level of compliance as we've seen in Australia, where, you know, somewhere between 60 and 85% of children are still viewing content on these platforms, then can a platform be allowed to roll back its measures under the children's code for under 16? Can it be held accountable? If children are then navigating the ban and then going on and accessing content with perhaps even less protections than now? I've not heard a clear position yet about what that interplay looks like, and I think the fear would be that we could end up with a situation where we have a ban in name only, and then children continuing to use services with even less protections than now.
So there is the opportunity to surface what that interplay looks like, so we can draft the regulations to avoid that risk, because clearly it is not what anybody, whether they were pro or for pro or against the ban, want to see. But I think we still have that ambiguity. And that ambiguity is worrying me. And I think we need to understand that to then make sure that the regulations that are brought forward in what a matter of weeks can adequately deal with those dynamics.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Yes. So I absolutely agree about the uncertainty of what it will mean for the implementation of the act and indeed what it will mean for the actions of platforms. If children are banned below a certain age, how will the platforms then provide on the assumption that everyone there is an adult. And how will we and Ofcom respond when it turns out, of course, that children will still be using those services, but the platforms will have been given a license to kind of withdraw their safety efforts because they would have been told there won't be children there.
The Australian ban, as I understand one key reason that it's failing, is that the platforms are not implementing age assurance effectively. And there is, of course, a wider debate to be had about whether age assurance can be implemented effectively in a way that is privacy preserving and will get the trust of the population. It's not that there's a simple technology they are failing to use, but there is a, I think, a genuine debate, especially in the in the privacy community about whether there can be such.
So so we need to find that solution. We need to find a good age assurance solution, whether we want to ban or whether we want age appropriate safety by design. Do we have it today? Not necessarily, but just just I mean, I think one really crucial point, one might begin to wonder in this conversation, why on earth children want to go on social media at all, given all the horrors that we have been elaborating.
And of course, nobody wants children to be in a deeply unsafe space. Children themselves do not want to be in a deeply unsafe space, but they do want to be part of a digital world. They do want to have the opportunity to chat with their friends and to meet others, and to participate and to express their views and to join and groups and share culture and so forth. And those are all of their rights. And that is, you know, in the in the holistic sense of how we are bringing up children to, to live in, in this digital world, our task is to enable those rights safely rather than, as it were, put them up, wrap them up in cotton wool and keep them away from everything.
So that's why I think, you know, there are some very real concerns about a high age limit that is too high, if I may suggest, for the children who need to be in touch with people, need to get help, go online as the sources of help , support , belonging, information, action that that Action that that that is what they tell us about so often. Thank you sir. I do think there are some positives to a ban.
So we find that.
The Australian ban, as I understand one key reason that it's failing, is that the platforms are not implementing age assurance effectively. And there is, of course, a wider debate to be had about whether age assurance can be implemented effectively in a way that is privacy preserving and will get the trust of the population. It's not that there's a simple technology they are failing to use, but there is a, I think, a genuine debate, especially in the in the privacy community about whether there can be such.
So so we need to find that solution. We need to find a good age assurance solution, whether we want to ban or whether we want age appropriate safety by design. Do we have it today? Not necessarily, but just just I mean, I think one really crucial point, one might begin to wonder in this conversation, why on earth children want to go on social media at all, given all the horrors that we have been elaborating.
And of course, nobody wants children to be in a deeply unsafe space. Children themselves do not want to be in a deeply unsafe space, but they do want to be part of a digital world. They do want to have the opportunity to chat with their friends and to meet others, and to participate and to express their views and to join and groups and share culture and so forth. And those are all of their rights. And that is, you know, in the in the holistic sense of how we are bringing up children to, to live in, in this digital world, our task is to enable those rights safely rather than, as it were, put them up, wrap them up in cotton wool and keep them away from everything.
So that's why I think, you know, there are some very real concerns about a high age limit that is too high, if I may suggest, for the children who need to be in touch with people, need to get help, go online as the sources of help , support , belonging, information, action that that Action that that that is what they tell us about so often. Thank you sir. I do think there are some positives to a ban.
So we find that.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
Of the harms that children experience do happen on social media, according to our data. We also, of course, see that some of these platforms that have personalised feeds that sort of are based around the child, that they can have really negative impacts on children's wellbeing as well. So obviously, the potential of the ban is that we reduce the amount of harm that children experience and improve their wellbeing, but these opportunities can only be.
realised if age. assurances implemented effectively. I think, as both other witnesses have touched on and what we've seen in Australia is that to date that hasn't been the case. And we also need to look at how children may circumvent some of these measures as well. And unless that kind of piece of the puzzle is solved, then it's unlikely to deliver those positive outcomes. There are, of course, a lot of risks that come with this as well.
Harm doesn't just occur on social media. It happens across a range of platforms messaging services, gaming platforms, AI chatbots, smaller platforms that we might not think about just yet. And so it's unlikely that that harm will just disappear. It will probably be displaced to other platforms. So we need to be really. cognizant of that. As Andy touched on, it's about creating that kind of false sense of security for families as well.
The online safety landscape is really difficult already for parents. There are a number of age checks, and that's only going to become a more. complicated with a ban as well. And it's likely that children may fall through the gaps. They might parents may think they're safe, but they're not. Children of different ages will have different protections. So I think it's really important that we support families and that period as well to understand how children are safe online and with the media and digital literacy skills and guidance around that.
And then I think just touching on Sonya's point at the end, you know, children want to be in their spaces. It creates community connection. It helps them learn, stay informed. And some children rely on these spaces more than others, particularly those with additional needs. So I think they will acutely feel that loss as well. So how do we support their wellbeing from that.
realised if age. assurances implemented effectively. I think, as both other witnesses have touched on and what we've seen in Australia is that to date that hasn't been the case. And we also need to look at how children may circumvent some of these measures as well. And unless that kind of piece of the puzzle is solved, then it's unlikely to deliver those positive outcomes. There are, of course, a lot of risks that come with this as well.
Harm doesn't just occur on social media. It happens across a range of platforms messaging services, gaming platforms, AI chatbots, smaller platforms that we might not think about just yet. And so it's unlikely that that harm will just disappear. It will probably be displaced to other platforms. So we need to be really. cognizant of that. As Andy touched on, it's about creating that kind of false sense of security for families as well.
The online safety landscape is really difficult already for parents. There are a number of age checks, and that's only going to become a more. complicated with a ban as well. And it's likely that children may fall through the gaps. They might parents may think they're safe, but they're not. Children of different ages will have different protections. So I think it's really important that we support families and that period as well to understand how children are safe online and with the media and digital literacy skills and guidance around that.
And then I think just touching on Sonya's point at the end, you know, children want to be in their spaces. It creates community connection. It helps them learn, stay informed. And some children rely on these spaces more than others, particularly those with additional needs. So I think they will acutely feel that loss as well. So how do we support their wellbeing from that.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
In terms of how it kind of intersects with the Online Safety Act? You know, one of the strengths of the Online Safety Act is that it's platform agnostic. So I think we need to not let it take kind of a back foot. We need to continue to keep pressure on, on the Online Safety Act to keep children safe in those spaces, like gaming platforms, for example. And of course, it also covers 16 and 17 year olds.
One of the. criticisms has been that it might create a cliff edge for children . And young
One of the. criticisms has been that it might create a cliff edge for children . And young
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Baroness Keeley
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Baroness Keeley
people, not preparing them for a digital world. Okay. I mean, I think I think you've touched on this in earlier responses, but with the approaches being considered in Canada and the EU, which place more responsibility on services to demonstrate they're safe for children, actually address all those . Drawbacks
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
around around the ban, the under 16 band, do you think? I think that would be an improved approach as that safety by design element, it would serve some of those benefits that we just talked about. It would probably be less complicated for families. Hopefully it would stop that cliff edge. And also, I think most importantly, when we ask parents about whether they supported a ban or other.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Alternatives than a ban itself in our research. Yeah, I think I think both Canada and the EU have very strong outline approaches. And looking in particular at Canada, you know, that effectively is, is, is viewing a ban as a means to an end. So it is a means to. incentivize safety by design requirements. That's an approach that I know ministers have signalled in recent weeks.
They are looking at in terms of whether there should be off ramps. I think that does address some of the strong. disincentives to comply with an out with an outright platform ban. It means that we could be looking at a model where there are, you know. stretching targets. So they are not fixed in aspic, but they can be stretching, they can be amended. So if a platform earns an.
They are looking at in terms of whether there should be off ramps. I think that does address some of the strong. disincentives to comply with an out with an outright platform ban. It means that we could be looking at a model where there are, you know. stretching targets. So they are not fixed in aspic, but they can be stretching, they can be amended. So if a platform earns an.
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
than it did just a few months ago. Yeah, okay. I think the. principle sounds great, and it resonates with many people that you don't let a product onto the market, especially for children, until you've proven it safe. I think there are some serious. practical problems. The I can imagine the law fair that is going to result as companies start suing because they're not allowed into the marketplace.
So we're going to need some very strong regulation if that's the direction. And one reason is one, one difficulty that we're currently facing is that we have had a kind of race to the bottom in the way in which social media platforms have provided for the public. So we don't have that. diversified market in which we can already say, well, this one is safe and this one is child friendly, and this one is aspiring to do the right thing.
We, you know, we. And that's so that does come back in a way to the question of. incentives and how do we get a more diversified market so that parents and children can make more sensible, can make. choices and know what to avoid and know . What could
So we're going to need some very strong regulation if that's the direction. And one reason is one, one difficulty that we're currently facing is that we have had a kind of race to the bottom in the way in which social media platforms have provided for the public. So we don't have that. diversified market in which we can already say, well, this one is safe and this one is child friendly, and this one is aspiring to do the right thing.
We, you know, we. And that's so that does come back in a way to the question of. incentives and how do we get a more diversified market so that parents and children can make more sensible, can make. choices and know what to avoid and know . What could
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
Things each. And I'm going to start with you, Sonia. Oh dear. That's that's a zero sum game isn't it. Well I, I might start with making age assurance. effective because until we know who as a child online, we cannot treat them as a child. And so finding a trusted mechanism that meets privacy, preserving standards and so forth, I think is actually critical. And then what might my second be? Well, I'll mention something that hasn't really come up yet, but something about.
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
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Baroness Elliott of Whitburn Bay
You know, it's a child. I work with a child rights approach and children need remedy. When something goes wrong, nothing works for children. So can can we make something that works? Can we really put some effort into the reporting services that platforms operate, which don't work, and which children don't trust, or other services can they report to Ofcom? That could be a helpful change,
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
But also education and supporting media. literacy and supporting parents. Just last week, the Molly Rose Foundation and Internet Matters wrote a joint letter signed by 70. organisations calling on the government to make media literacy a national priority. And that's not just around protecting children and young people online, and particularly from numerous. But it's also a really important for democracy, social.
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Speaker 1
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Speaker 1
And as this committee knows more than anyone, it's a shared. responsibility as well. You know, there needs to be action at the government level, but platforms can be made safe by design. We need support for teachers to be able to teach media. literacy confidently in the classroom, and then also support for parents who we know are children's main source of information about online safety. So that would be my first one. And then I think my second one would be that focus on outcomes.
We can't just be thinking about compliance. We have to be thinking about what is the outcome and vision that we want for children and young people in the UK. How do we want them to benefit . From
We can't just be thinking about compliance. We have to be thinking about what is the outcome and vision that we want for children and young people in the UK. How do we want them to benefit . From
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
think will be something we'll be looking at. So, Andy yeah, I'm conscious. I've been very. pessimistic in my answer. So let me say we are dealing with preventable harm here. And we are dealing with issues of product safety. And we should not accept that that that tech products are somehow exceptional and different. We know how to do this in every other part of the economy. So it is just a matter of of will and fixing the things that haven't been learned.
I would like to see the government commit to a third session bill, and for that to be ambitious in its scope, to fix and build on the act that we have right now, the two key things in that moving back towards an overarching duty of care, which is what many of us. envisaged when discussions around online safety. legislation first .
I would like to see the government commit to a third session bill, and for that to be ambitious in its scope, to fix and build on the act that we have right now, the two key things in that moving back towards an overarching duty of care, which is what many of us. envisaged when discussions around online safety. legislation first .
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Very clear outcomes. And, you know, we are learning the lessons of what has worked with. I mentioned health and safety legislation, you know, that went on to the statute book in. 1974 and is as good today as it was back then, and secondly, a focus on incentives. So I would look at what has worked so well in financial services.
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
But with a focus on criminal sanctions and a focus on conduct measures, which we know has brought about fundamental change in, for example, retail banking. We should be looking at those. lessons because, frankly, you know, some of the richest, most cash rich companies in the world, we've seen that fines will not work. We've seen that there are strong incentives . Not to
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Speaker 2
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Speaker 2
Whether this is then showing that you have discharged a duty of care, this is then. recognising that there are harms that just do not exist in silos. And so you should be you should be. cooperating with other platforms to understand the threat. You should be developing appropriate structures that we see in respect of child sexual abuse that we see in respect of.
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Baroness Keeley
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Baroness Keeley
Thank you very much for you. I think yeah, we do need to finish now actually because because we've run a little bit. Thank you for sticking with us for a slightly longer session. Can I just say, on behalf of the committee, thanks for all the work that you do, not just your presentations to us today, which have been very helpful , but difficult work you do navigating all of this. It's we know it's difficult, we know it's horrible.
And, you know, it's vital work, absolutely vital work. We all want to protect children, but you're in the front line of doing it. So thank you, thank . You,
And, you know, it's vital work, absolutely vital work. We all want to protect children, but you're in the front line of doing it. So thank you, thank . You,
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