Draft Central Counterparties (amendment, etc., and Transitional Provision) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Monday 5th November 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to see you in the Chair, Mr Bailey, and to be opposite the Minister once again. I am grateful to him for his explanation of the SI.

As we know, the Government have taken the decision to undertake the bulk of preparation for our EU withdrawal through secondary legislation. The Opposition have voiced our concerns on many occasions about this unprecedented transfer of powers to our Executive. I appreciate the work of the Minister, his staff and the civil service, and their collective efforts to brief us on the process, but it is unquestionable that in a normal environment, a change of this magnitude would and should be treated as primary legislation and given the scrutiny that it demands. The number of Treasury SIs and the speed with which they are set to unfold is deeply concerning. The Opposition are committed to making every effort to ensure that the Government are held fully accountable, but this is a constitutionally unprecedented and enormously resource-intensive task that leaves room for error.

It is also disappointing that we have reached a stage at which such contingency measures, which occupy significant time and resource both for the Government and for the Opposition, must be brought before the Committee against the possibility of no deal. The UK is perilously close to the EU exit date, which is just five months away. Financial services firms lack the certainty they need about the shape of things to come; as a result, many have already adopted contingency plans, some of which are leading to jobs leaving our country.

As the Minister explained, the SI deals with an enormously important issue: the nature of our clearing arrangements if there is a no-deal Brexit. As colleagues will be aware, and as the Minister explained, clearing houses are the buyer to every seller and the seller to every buyer in a financial trade that is cleared. They protect trading parties from the risk of default by the other parties. CCP clearing significantly reduces the cost of having that security to the trading parties, because they can net off the cost of collateral between different trades. CCPs significantly increase the resilience of the financial system by de-risking trades for the parties involved.

More and more trades have come to be cleared in that manner, not least following the landmark EMIR legislation to which the Minister rightly referred. Of course, that forces over-the-counter derivatives to be cleared through CCPs. Lord Sassoon said in the other place when the UK’s resolution framework for CCPs was introduced back in 2012, in tandem with EMIR, that it was

“the previous Labour Government…who identified this general area as one that needed to be dealt with, particularly in the context of deposit takers, where the need was identified to put additional provisions in place for resolution regimes.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 15 October 2012; Vol. 739, c. 1266.]

That approach was then of course extended to other systemically important parts of the system, not least the trading operations of banks and other financial actors, which we are discussing.

Although introducing extensive requirements to clear through a CCP increased the overall resilience of the system, it concentrated default risk within CCPs, so disruption to their operation may have a significant impact. Indeed, Benoît Cœuré, an executive board member of the European Central Bank, indicated last year his concern that the failure of a CCP may have a destabilising impact, behoving very careful supervision. Ensuring that UK-based firms can continue to clear in a compliant and transparent manner is very important, but it is also important that UK-based CCPs can continue to clear EU27 trades. That point is not covered in the SI, but as I am sure the Minister anticipates, I will return to it.

I note that no fewer than 24 questions were posed during the discussion of the draft regulations in the other place. That is understandable given the significance of this area and the considerable uncertainty that persists as the SI is drafted. I am grateful to the Minister for his helpful explanation and clarification of exactly when CCPs will be expected and required to seek recognition, but there are still six outstanding questions to which I hope he can respond.

[Mr Mark Prisk (Hertford and Stortford) (Con)]

I am listening carefully to the hon. Lady, who cites the real dangers to the UK of having no deal. Will she explain why she and her colleagues have made it clear that they intend to vote down any deal the Government bring back?

[Anneliese Dodds]

The House voted to have a meaningful choice over the deal that was presented to us. Sadly, we have not yet been presented with such a choice. The deal the Government appear to be negotiating does not appear to the Opposition to protect jobs, the environment or workers’ rights, or to meet the other tests we set out, and all that has been set out thus far is a choice between that flawed deal and no deal. For a vote to be meaningful, we would need to be able to amend the deal, which possibility seems to have been removed from us, going against the undertaking that many people on both sides of the House thought we been given.

We are also not being given the additional option whereby the deal is remitted to Parliament to discuss a way forward, which most of us anticipate is what would make the choice meaningful. If a gun is held to one’s head and one is told, “You have to support this deal; otherwise it will be necessary to jump off a cliff,” that is not a meaningful choice. It is enormously disappointing that the Government have chosen to interpret that vote in that manner. Given the hon. Gentleman’s question, I hope he will work hard to persuade his Government colleagues of the need to offer the House a genuinely meaningful choice rather than what currently appears to be in front of us.

[Mr Prisk]

I certainly am doing that—

[The Chair]

Order. The question is rather wide of the core issue that we are debating. The hon. Gentleman did very well to slip it in, so I had to let the shadow Minister reply, but I will not allow the debate to continue.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Thank you, Mr Bailey. Perhaps the conversation can continue after the Committee, if the hon. Gentleman wishes to discuss it further.

My first question to the Minister relates to consultation about the provisions. I was grateful to him for holding what was described as a teach-in with his civil servants and the relevant regulators on the whole statutory instrument process. Obviously, the regulators were invited because potentially an enormous amount of power is being transferred to them through this and other secondary legislation.

Other Opposition Members and I were informed that we would be provided with an indication of the reasons for certain decisions being taken in individual statutory instruments and with details of the consultations that had been undertaken on them, but when my office asked about the consultation in relation to the draft regulations, it was informed that it had not been undertaken. When asked about that in the other place, the Minister answering the debate stated merely:

“The Treasury has continued to engage the financial services sector on issues relating to no-deal legislation and will continue to do so.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 30 October 2018; Vol. 793, c. GC127.]

As it happens, my contact with interested parties suggests that there are no major concerns about the Government’s approach in this statutory instrument, but there is a general question about the level and type of consultation that should occur in relation to financial services no-deal statutory instruments. Will there be any formal consultation or will it all be informal? Will it be in relation to the whole body of statutory instruments, which could be difficult, given that several have not been formulated? Will it be done case by case, and if so, how will we ensure that that happens appropriately for every statutory instrument? It would be helpful to hear the Minister’s thoughts on that.

My second question is about the Minister’s interesting remarks about why decisions have been taken to vest different aspects of regulatory responsibility in the Treasury as opposed to in the Bank. It was helpful to hear his explanation, which I had not been able to glean from the accompanying documents. As I understand it, the Bank will focus on individual CCPs for individual decisions about equivalence and the Treasury will look at the overall regulatory framework and attempt to have discussions with the EU27 and presumably ESMA for co-ordination purposes. Have I understood that correctly? That is a big departure from the existing EU system for looking at that and for its equivalence provisions, and from how the system works within the EU.

The Minister probably knows that, in relation to every CCP, there will be a regulatory college that includes representatives from the member states that have the biggest stake in the operation of that CCP, relevant central banks, the European Central Bank—where required—and ESMA. It would be helpful to know more about the rationale behind those regulatory decisions.

My third question is about an issue that came up in the other place, but which I want to press today. It is unclear why the affirmative procedure will not be used to extend the implied recognition provided by the statutory instrument. As was stated in the other place, a small number of CCPs are involved, and surely it would be appropriate for Parliament to be made aware of a situation where the Treasury had been unable to create an agreement for future regulatory co-ordination, despite having had several years to do so.

In my experience in the European Parliament of achieving equivalence decisions when it came to EMIR and in other fields, parliamentarians were informed when there had been problems and there was a debate about the timescale. It is not clear that that will occur in this Parliament. Perhaps we can get more background on that question. Related to that, the Minister will know that the scope of EMIR has been under discussion at EU level, including whether trades by pension funds should become subject to the clearing obligation as well. That would require some additional margin, which is why there has been controversy around it. It would be interesting to hear his thoughts about whether the UK would be likely to wait for EU agreement on this subject and whether it would feel that it was necessary to comply if the situation changed. The current approach appears to be to postpone that decision indefinitely.

I note that regulation 14(1) states

“The Treasury may before exit day by regulations specify that—

(a) the legal and supervisory arrangements of a third country ensure that central counterparties authorised in that country comply with legally binding requirements which are equivalent to the requirements laid down in Title IV of the EMIR Regulation, as it has effect in EU law as amended from time to time”.

That seems quite vague, for example, about whether we would always keep step with EMIR as it is amended. It is unclear to me what the process would be for ensuring that we comply with any amendments, if there is a time lag and so on.

Fifthly, the huge elephant in the room when it comes to this SI is not what happens to UK trades cleared through the EU27 and third-country-based CCPs, important though that issue is, but what happens to EU27 trades cleared through UK-based CCPs. Of course ESMA runs the third-country regime, as the Minister mentioned, and it is unclear—to me, anyway—where exactly that is headed at the moment. As I am sure the Minister is aware, London currently clears about 90% of euro interest rate swaps and about 40% of euro credit default swaps. It is surely essential that LCH.Clearnet and others remain as zero-risk counterparties in the eyes of the EU and are able to continue this type of clearing.

If there were to be a wholesale transfer of trades away from the UK CCPs, we would be talking about hundreds of thousands of trades worth trillions of euros that would have to be cleared elsewhere, which would lead to traders having to ensure sufficient margin for often smaller CCPs, thus reducing liquidity and increasing the overall cost because of the decreased scope for trades to be netted off against each other within smaller CCPs.

As I am sure the Minister is aware, in June 2017 the Commission proposed amendments to the EMIR and ESMA regulations that would have included a different regulatory regime for systemically important CCPs. That approach was reported on in the European Parliament before the summer. As I understand it—it would be interesting to hear whether the Minister shares my understanding—that approach is being reviewed by the Council. Therefore, my penultimate question is this: are our Government doing everything that they can to underline to the rest of the EU, and particularly to the Council, the potential for disruption and additional cost if an over-restrictive approach to clearing within the EU27 is adopted in the short, medium or long term? The Minister referred to financial stability risk; surely that applies in spades if we are talking about trades from the EU no longer being cleared through our very successful and high-quality CCPs here in the UK, just as much as in the opposite direction.

Finally, we are told that the draft regulations will be put into practice if there is a no-deal Brexit, but the provisions are presumably in place pretty much as soon as this Committee has accepted them, and it is not clear to me that the SI includes a mechanism to switch off the extant provisions. If it does contain such a mechanism, can the Minister explain where it is, and if it does not, how will the provisions here be disapplied in the event of a deal covering financial services? I know that the Minister is a very honourable person and I would take his word on many things, but we need to know how a measure that is on the statute book can be switched off, as well as how it can be switched on, and it is not very obvious to me how the former can happen.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I shall do my best to answer the questions that have been raised. I think it would also be helpful if I were to set the context with respect to powers under the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. What is being done through the statutory instruments may be disputed by the Opposition, but it is ultimately a matter of the legislation that was passed. I am using the provisions to do everything I can to ensure that we have the right arrangements should there be a no-deal scenario. I recognise the points about the unusual nature of the process—the large number of statutory instruments. That is why I am committed to doing everything I can to facilitate meaningful scrutiny, dialogue and exchange of information in advance of Committee sittings.

The regulations are tightly constrained to fix deficiencies, not to make wider changes; this is not a power grab. The temporary recognition regime and other transitional arrangements are in line with the expectations of the industry, which needs certainty. It needs the contingency arrangements. I propose to go through the six questions and the additional points raised by the hon. Member for Glasgow Central and, I hope, answer them meaningfully.

First, as to the consultation, it is right to say that there has been long-standing engagement. It is done case by case, on the basis of the most appropriate mechanism. We announced it in December 2017 and published three letters over the course of this year. Engagement with relevant stakeholders in the industry has to vary according to different statutory instruments. In the case we are considering, I think it is fair to say that the arrangements we have undertaken have been well received by the industry, which welcomes the certainty we have given. Obviously there are a small number of players, and we have done what is necessary.

Secondly, the hon. Member for Oxford East is correct about the alignment of the Commission to the Treasury and the transmission of the ESMA powers to the Bank of England. The Treasury will make the equivalence decision, but the authorisation process will be carried out at a technical level with the appropriate skills in the Bank of England. That is purposefully aligned to the same distribution of roles from the Commission to ESMA.

Thirdly, on the question whether, if there were a need for an extension, it would be appropriate for the Treasury to make that provision using the negative procedure, that is an administrative, managerial decision. It is not based on any extension of the existing powers. It would be on the basis of a clear need to do so. The principle of what we are doing and the criteria for doing it are being discussed now; it is a translation of what already existed. The three years plus one arrangement is designed with industry convenience in mind.

Fourthly, as to the scope of EMIR and any changes, we are retaining most of EMIR as it currently applies in the EU and are unable to make significant policy changes, as I said, under the 2018 Act, so the legislation provides a good basis for discussions on equivalence with the EU. The hon. Lady raised the issue of regulation 14(1)(a) and the equivalence, as compared to EMIR,

“as it has effect in EU law as amended from time to time”.

Regulation 14 applies only before exit day. After exit day our approach to equivalence will be to compare third-country regimes to EMIR as onshored and part of domestic law. We will not necessarily as a matter of policy be following changes to EMIR in EU law; but equally it would not be our aspiration to deviate wilfully. There is obviously a lot of alignment. We start from a common starting point, and obviously we anticipate securing a deal on the basis of the alignment that currently exists.

Fifthly, the hon. Lady rightly pointed out the need for clarity the other way, in how the Commission deals with trades carried out through UK CCPs. It is welcome that, according to Tuesday’s Financial Times, Vice-President Dombrovskis has indicated a willingness to act to mitigate. That outcome is a function of the technical group dialogue that has been going on since April, and it has been welcomed in the City. More details are needed, but we have acted proactively to give as much assurance as we can, and that significant step forward is very welcome.

Sixthly, the hon. Lady asked about the mechanism to switch off the regulations. The SI itself does not include provision for switching itself off in the event of a deal, but the White Paper on the withdrawal agreement Bill confirmed that it would contain provisions to allow SIs like this one to be repealed, delayed or amended should a deal be secured. In the circumstances of a deal, we will do whatever is appropriate, and clearly this SI would not be necessary. The hon. Lady is looking at me quizzically.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for that explanation. Are we to understand that the decision whether to switch off any SI produced in the context of the withdrawal Act is ultimately in the gift of Ministers?

[John Glen]

To be honest, I will have to write to the hon. Lady to clarify that detail. The essential point is that the statutory instrument is for a no-deal scenario; if we get a deal, we will not need the SI because we will be in a close working partnership and we will have the implementation period. I will need to write to her about the precise mechanism that we would use to get rid of the SI or withdraw its provisions, but that is my attempt to answer her six questions.

The hon. Member for Glasgow Central asked about fees and, quite reasonably, echoed a number of other points. There has been dialogue with the industry on the fees, which will be proportionate to the process that the Bank of England will need to go through. In practice, these firms do not exist in massive numbers. I cannot give her the cost in pounds and pence, but it will be aligned to industry expectations and will not impede the choice to register.

Draft Financial Regulators' Powers (Technical Standards Etc.) (Amendment Etc.) (EU Exit) Regulations 2018

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Wednesday 10th October 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve on the Committee under your chairmanship, Sir David. I am grateful to the Minister for the explanation that he provided.

As the Minister mentioned, the SI is intended, as I understand it, to enable regulators, particularly the Bank of England, the Prudential Regulation Authority, the Payment Systems Regulator and the FCA, to remedy any deficiencies in binding technical standards, so that they can operate effectively from the point of the UK exiting the EU. The SI also, as I understand it, and as stated in the explanatory notes, but not necessarily reflected in the Minister’s remarks, enables authorities to have ongoing responsibility for making technical standards required under retained EU law in financial services and amending them so that they remain fit for purpose in the future. It is not just about exit day. As I understand it, it is about a potentially much longer period, at least as expressed in the explanatory notes and my reading of the SI.

The regulators’ powers are subject to the constraints in the European Union (Withdrawal) Act, as the Minister explained. They are limited to addressing deficiencies and dealing with any failure of UK law to operate effectively after exit, and that power is time limited under the withdrawal Act.

We first have to question why we have ended up here. It is deeply worrying that the Government feel that they have to go down this path because of the possibility of a no-deal Brexit, which the Brexit Secretary now recklessly describes as offering countervailing opportunities. I am not sure about the Minister, but I have yet to find somebody working in financial and related professional services who can find any countervailing opportunities from a no-deal Brexit. Maybe he has and it would be great to hear of it, if so.

[John Glen]

There are some.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Perhaps a couple of hedges but not many beyond that, I would expect. We could be pushed in this direction by the Government’s dogmatic rejection of a customs union with the EU and their inability to accept the reality.

As a result of that disturbing situation, it is right that those in Government who do want to act responsibly provide us with some kind of assurance of regulatory continuity, hence this SI, but I would say from the beginning that there is a misunderstanding in these proposals: the idea that technical, level 2, standards are non-political.

For two years I was a Member of the European Parliament and negotiated for the Socialists and Democrats a number of level 2 measures, relating to a raft of post-crisis financial services legislation: MAD/MAR, EMIR, CARRP, CSDR and last, but certainly not least, MiFID II. Parliamentarians were deeply involved in negotiations on those level 2 measures, which addressed a massive range of different issues. Of course, those negotiations were with the European Commission as well as regulators, mainly ESMA, in the case of the negotiations I was involved with.

The regulations seem to suggest that there would be public consultation only on changes and no more extensive engagements. That ignores the fact that so-called technical standards can emasculate the intent of legislative proposals at a stroke. One good example of that would be around the new regime in MiFID II for regulating commodities trading, where there is a lot of evidence, as Members will know, that having virtually non-regulated commodities markets had led to spikes in the cost of commodities, which had then led to serious problems in many countries in the global south, including potential famines.

Parliamentarians believed they had got to a situation and agreed at so-called level 1—primary legislation level—that we would have a new regulatory regime that would impose position limits on different types of commodities. That would mean we would not have that kind of speculation pushing up prices again, because we would not have individual traders controlling huge parts of these really important markets, and manipulating them just for financial gain. But the technical standards were really weak initially. We had a big fight and got them back to a much better position—that was through a political process, not a technical one. It would be interesting to hear the Minister’s thoughts on whether we are really considering these level 2 measures to the extent that they require. Of course, we as parliamentarians do not want to be poring over level 3, which is the real technical nitty-gritty. That would not be sensible but level 2 measures surely require more scrutiny than we are offered here.

I would like the Minister to respond to three questions. First, at EU level there is a strong institutional aid to the promotion of financial stability in the form of Finance Watch, which is funded by the EU. We lack any such body in the UK. That is significant, given where we are today, 10 years since the fall of Lehman Brothers. I hope the Minister can reflect on how the political imperative of ensuring financial stability will be ensured, or otherwise, by these arrangements.

It is interesting to look at the language and narrative that Government have given in relation to these proposals and contrast that with some of what has come from EU level. I quote from the report by Irish MEP Brian Hayes just before the summer in the European Parliament. It stated:

“In the absence of a transition period, the Commission and the European supervisory authorities must be prepared to protect financial stability.”

That was the first value that he isolated, yet we tend to find that a bit of an afterthought in Government communications on this topic.

Secondly, I am very concerned whether the regulators, particularly the PRA and FCA, have the requisite capacity. That is related to the point made earlier about whether parliamentarians have the capacity to deal with the huge volume of SIs. Of course, it is the PRA and FCA that would have to deal with the arrangements for level 2 legislation. What assessment has been undertaken by the Government of their readiness to accomplish that task? I say that having looked at the document that has just been released by the FCA, snappily entitled “Brexit: proposed changes to the Handbook and Binding Technical Standards—first consultation”, which is 781 pages long. Admittedly, quite a lot of that is a new revised handbook, but it is a very big task that we are giving to our regulatory authorities. It is not clear that they really have the requisite capacity to deal with that task. For example, if we look at some of the new burdens that might be applied to the FCA, the document states that credit rating agencies that are currently registered with the European Securities and Markets Authority and that wish to register with the FCA will need to send the information by exit day—that is information on all credit ratings issued and not withdrawn. We are talking about a lot of information that will have to be transferred to the FCA. Will it be able to cope with that?

The last question I have is about regulatory co-ordination. From my reading of the SI and the explanatory memorandum, these arrangements are not just about the exit point but about ongoing arrangements that are intended to ensure that binding technical standards will remain effective. It is not clear how co-ordination will be ensured between what occurs on the UK side and on the EU side. We could say it would be a function of a no-deal Brexit, which the SI is intended to deal with, but I am concerned by some of the suggestions. For example, the FCA document suggests that we should just remove binding technical standards, such as requirements to co-operate in

“supervisory activities, for on-site verifications, and investigations and exchange of information between competent authorities”.

That seems to be the assumption underlying what a no-deal Brexit would look like. I hope the Government will further consider what future regulatory co-ordination could look like at the same time as we are staring down the barrel of no deal.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

I am happy to answer any parliamentary question. I think we said there are about 70 SIs, but that will not be fully accurate.

The hon. Member for Oxford East asked, at the macro level, whether financial stability will be protected. The statutory objectives of the regulators for financial stability will not change. They are enduring. A tripartite system was set up as a consequence of the crash. I think there is broad cross-party agreement on the need for that to continue, and it will.

The hon. Lady asked about holding regulators to account. Parliament will be involved in every aspect of the process to onshore EU financial services regulations, so all the changes the Treasury proposes to level 1 legislation and delegated Acts will be put before Parliament for it to approve. Any transfer of responsibility to the regulators, including any transfer of powers to make technical standards, will be put before Parliament for it to approve through affirmative-procedure SIs.

The Treasury is working closely with the Bank of England, the PRA, the FCA and the PSR on how to fix deficiencies, including in the technical standards that we propose should become the responsibility of regulators. As was said, the Treasury will be required to approve all the deficiency fixes proposed by the regulators to ensure they are consistent with the deficiency fixes that Parliament will be asked to approve in onshoring.

[Anneliese Dodds]

The Minister is saying that there will be a change, to the extent that level 2 arrangements will be determined by the regulators. That is a shift away from arrangements at EU level, where parliamentarians—albeit European parliamentarians—are involved in negotiations about level 2 arrangements with the Commission and the regulator. That is a change. As I understand it, we are shifting to level 2 arrangements being uniquely the preserve of regulators, albeit with oversight from the Treasury, compared with a process where there is negotiation, in which parliamentarians are involved.

[John Glen]

We are seeking to give responsibility to the most appropriate body. The regulators are doing what they do. Frankly, some binding technical standards will not be suitably scrutinised or carried out within the Treasury. I refer back to the point I made about tier 1—or tier 2. Binding technical standards are sort of tier 3 within tier 2—it is a bit complicated—but basically, Parliament will have scrutiny over fundamental change, and the consequential changes that flow from that will be delegated to the appropriate body.

I think the hon. Lady asked whether this is about more than fixing deficiencies for exit. The withdrawal Act provides for the transfer of functions where necessary. Binding technical standards will need to be maintained by an appropriate body. After exit, that will be the UK regulators.

On what the hon. Lady said about her role as a Member of the European Parliament, it is absolutely right to say that we will have more to do because we will not have that scrutiny. As I understand it, MEPs can veto some binding technical standards proposals, but the UK FSMA framework of 2000 does not work in that way. Parliament has delegated technical rules to UK regulators, which is a difference.

The draft regulations set out the procedure where responsibility for future binding technical standards is transferred to regulators by other SIs. All those SIs will be scrutinised individually by separate Committees—I will probably be sat here introducing them—and subject to approval by Parliament under the affirmative procedure.

I turn to the Treasury’s authority over regulatory changes. It is appropriate that the Treasury approves all the deficiency fixes that the regulators propose, and Ministers will be accountable to Parliament for that. On the responsibility for binding technical standards that regulators will take on post-exit, the Treasury will need to approve future changes to those technical standards and will be able to veto a proposal for the two reasons set out in the draft regulations: if it appears the proposal would

“have implications for public funds”,

or if it would

“prejudice…negotiations for an international agreement”.

I cannot anticipate what they are, but all I know is that I would be subject to parliamentary scrutiny on that.

--- Later in debate ---

[John Glen]

Candidly, at the level we are at at the moment, in seeking a strong bilateral arrangement to determine the future dynamics of dialogue between the EU and the UK supervisory bodies, I cannot answer with that degree of specificity. I take the point and will seek to come back to him as soon as I can.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way; he has been very generous. I have enormous respect for the hon. Member for Basildon and Billericay but, surely, it is important that whenever we talk about specific regulations we ground our discussion in an overall commitment not to seek to undercut EU-level regulation. Of course, there will be innovation and change, including at EU level. I would be surprised if these discussions are not happening in other European countries. I accept that the nature of the market is different in different European nations. But we have had this around many other regulations before. The danger is that we could end up with the mentality of a bonfire of regulation, which will overall have much more of an impact, because there are concerns that Brexit could be used as a means to undercut regulations generally. That is much more of a concern for industry than any specific regulation, in my experience anyway.

[John Glen]

I will take on that point, while also responding to the hon. Member for Glasgow Central, who made the same point about watering down of EU regulation. There is no provision to water down in the Act the regulations that we are seeking to onshore. The wider point has been made about the future direction. On that, again, I can be reassuring. We do not want to define ourselves as a nation by regulatory arbitrage.

I also acknowledge, as my hon. Friend the Member for Basildon and Billericay pointed out, that the financial services have ongoing issues with legislation that has been onshored while we have been members of the EU. They are not about reckless setting aside of prudential regulations. They are in areas, perhaps, on which there is greater emphasis in our UK financial services, as my hon. Friend mentioned, these are things that do not exist in other jurisdictions.

Those are matters that a future framework would at least give us a mechanism to examine and then there would be an understanding, if we achieve what we seek—reciprocal responses from both the sovereign regulatory supervisory bodies. But we are not starting from a point where we are seeking to deregulate.

On the point the hon. Member for Glasgow Central made about UK regulators losing influence, I visited Edinburgh and Glasgow over the recess and acknowledge the growing financial services hub that exists there. The UK is a major financial centre and UK regulators are major players in global forums for financial regulation. There are global colleges for supervision for banks, for example, where we are key players. Although I recognise that the context will be different, this is not the time for UK regulators to adopt a more detached role from international leadership in some of these areas.

Reference was made to the BBC report of the comment I made at the Lords Select Committee this morning about jobs. Throughout the last nine months that I have been doing this, I have been in frequent contact with firms about jobs lost. I was referring to a comment made by Sam Woods, the deputy governor of the Bank of England, about the contingency arrangements. In my opinion, it was not news; I was just reflecting what had been said by somebody else. Of course, contingency arrangements have been made, but I have seen no expectation or desire to move significant tranches of jobs to the EU beyond that. A deal would clearly arrest that fear. We have set out clear proposals on a future ambitious relationship with the EU. We hope that that will transpire, and we expect it to take place.

The other point was about rule-taking. We are not proposing that UK regulators will have to work within a framework, other than the UK Parliament framework. There would be parliamentary scrutiny of any significant changes that we wished to make, and we will set those changes in primary legislation.

The right hon. Member for North Durham made a point about the impact assessment. The regulations would have no cost to business, as they deal with the transfer of responsibility from the Treasury to the appropriate regulators. As a whole, the regulations will significantly reduce costs to business in a no-deal situation. That is the whole point--to ensure that the effects of the transition are minimised in an undesirable situation.

Through our dialogue with firms and trade bodies, we have attempted to minimise the disruption to firms, but it is inevitable that some preparation will be needed. The Government have committed to providing the UK regulators with the power to phase in regulatory requirements that will change as a result of exit, which will mitigate the cost to firms. Due to the wide scope of the changes needed and the broad set of firms affected, however, it has not been possible to accurately quantify the actual costs to firms—I concede that—but these regulations will reduce the cost to business in a no-deal scenario. That is undoubtedly their purpose.

[John Glen]

Because they will set a reliable regulatory framework that will mean that firms will not be at risk of defaulting or of not having the regulatory oversight that would not exist otherwise.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I would always hesitate to speak for my right hon. Friend the Member for North Durham, but I believe his question was actually about the cost to Government and the considerable amount of civil service time that is being eaten up by the process.

[John Glen]

With respect to that, we have prepared a narrative on the impact assessment, and I believe there is a conversation going on with the appropriate Committee to determine that, but we have not concluded that assessment. Obviously, it is necessary to move quickly to secure all these statutory instruments before the end of March. That has been our objective.

Oral Answers to Questions

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Tuesday 11th September 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mel Stride]

When it comes to business rates, which are the heart of the taxes that my right hon. Friend referred to, we have done a great deal since 2016. We will by 2023 have provided reliefs totalling some £10 billion, much of which will fall as relief to the high street. I take on board the comments he has made. As with all taxes, we will keep business rates under review.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Contrary to the comments of the Financial Secretary to the Treasury, international co-ordination on tax has frequently been blocked by the Government. We saw that particularly when it came to the taxation of trusts with both David Cameron and now the current Government arguing against more transparency. It is no surprise that, as a result, a director of Fidelity International and other experts are saying that the Amazon case shows

“how tax policy hasn’t moved on.”

Why are this Government letting giant multilaterals get away with it and letting everybody else down?

[Mel Stride]

Let me be extremely clear to the House: this Government have an exemplary record on clamping down on avoidance, evasion and non-compliance. We have one of the lowest tax gaps in the entire world, at 5.7%, far lower than was the case under the Labour party. We have brought in a number of rules under the base erosion and profit-shifting project—a project of which we were in the vanguard. For example, tax deductions for interest expense came in in 2016 and yielded £3.9 billion by 2021, and the diverted profits tax that we introduced in 2015 has already raised some £700 million.

Office for Budget Responsibility

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Tuesday 24th July 2018 Westminster Hall

[Lee Rowley (North East Derbyshire) (Con)]

It is a pleasure to serve under your chairmanship, Mr Gray. I congratulate my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Luke Graham) on securing this important debate; the relatively small number of Members in the Chamber is disproportionate to its impact, and I know our colleagues are desperate to be here and talk about these things. This is one of the most interesting and important debates the House has had in the last few weeks, in either Chamber, because underneath its surface is a series of questions that we as politicians, on both the Opposition and the Government Benches, have about what we want the debate to be around finance, fiscal policy and monetary policy in the coming years, and how we ensure that that is underpinned with a series of structures that make those debates useful and helpful for those who seek to understand and, eventually, vote on them.

I welcome the main thrust of what my hon. Friend talked about in trying to ensure that the Office for Budget Responsibility—the structure that we have in place already—could be expanded, so that it gave an understanding and indication of the costings of the myriad Bills that are introduced, whoever puts them forward, in the white heat of an election campaign, however difficult that is. That would give the electorate an opportunity to stand back—if done correctly and appropriately—and understand what people and parties were suggesting, and how responsible and, in some cases, irresponsible, those parties were being about our future financial and economic health. We have seen, over several decades, across the world, an increasing move to independent structures, whether independent central banks or independent fiscal watchdogs. I think this is a natural extension of that trend, which I would welcome.

I have both non-partisan and partisan points to make, so I will get the non-partisan ones out of the way first, before the hon. Member for Oxford East (Anneliese Dodds) intervenes on me, as I am sure she probably will. These things are important for having an educated democracy. To understand where we are going as a country, how much we are spending and the opportunities that we are putting forward for our communities, the public have to have the information so as to understand the different choices being placed before them. It is an excellent idea to give people the tools to understand the implications of the policies that are being made—with the caveats, which I will come to and which my hon. Friend has explained.

We have myriad policies that sound brilliant in isolation, and it seems they should have been implemented decades ago. In isolation, that makes the Government look as if they have been mean or not cared about certain areas. There are often reasons, however, why policies are not implemented. There are reasons things are not necessarily a good idea, even though they look good on paper. There are opportunity costs to decisions that are made. If we can have a discussion about economics and implications, we will be stronger as a democracy.

That discussion must necessarily accept that the world is complicated. In politics, there is a tendency to simplify discussions, particularly about finance and fiscal policy, to a point where they become meaningless. We talk about billions, gaps and black holes in finances without understanding the economic implications and realities of the assumptions underneath them. Wherever we are on the ideological spectrum, it is important to improve the quality of debate about our finances and about where the Government—whoever is in government—seek to take them in future.

I welcome the proposal from that non-partisan perspective and from a partisan perspective, because if it had been in place in 2017, it would have blown apart the Labour manifesto, which was the biggest work of political fiction and fantasy I have seen in my lifetime. I say that not to annoy the hon. Member for Oxford East, but on the basis that on 12 May 2017 the Institute for Fiscal Studies said:

“This manifesto cannot be summed up in mere numbers.”

It also said that the tax measures were “highly uncertain”, that key elements of it were not explained, and that there was an inherent contradiction in borrowing more and seeking to reduce debt. I know that there is a way to do that, but the quantum of debt that the Labour party manifesto suggested was entirely unrealistic. If the Labour party had got in, and if I were not here today as one of the six Members of Parliament who gained a seat from it, we would be in a problematic economic and fiscal position.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

I will do the large-scale demolition later, but I will ask the hon. Gentleman one question now: where were the costings in his party’s manifesto?

[Lee Rowley]

No one assumes that the 2017 election was perfect on both sides. I accept the principle of what the hon. Lady says to some extent: we did not have a good economic debate in the 2017 election, and I hope proposals such as this will improve the quality and standard of future debates.

My underlying point, which is partisan but not party political, is that I am extremely concerned about the level of debt that western democracies have taken on over several decades—that is one of the reasons I am in politics. That debt is storing up huge challenges for our children and grandchildren in the coming decades.

Speaking about debt has gone out of fashion in the last couple of years; it has not been a central part of our discourse, as it was when we had a large deficit several years ago. It is a credit to the Government that that deficit has been brought down, but it has not been eliminated. On a daily basis, we still add costs and create debt for our children and the people who will be here in 30 years’ time. Although debt is less than it was eight years ago, we should never forget that it is still significant. Between 2002 and 2014, debt as a proportion of GDP rose in every western democracy in the G7. In some cases, that rise was minimal, but in others it was extremely large. Western democracies have a debt addiction that will be problematic in the long term.

As a country, we have moved from paying £30 billion annually in interest payments to paying nearly £50 billion in recent years, and that will only increase. The problem with paying £50 billion is that some of the conversations that we have here every week—about how much money we should put into the health service, the education system or welfare—would be much easier if we were not spending 8% of our budget on debt repayments to financial institutions elsewhere in the world, just so we can hold money that we spent many years ago and that cannot have any benefit today.

That £50 billion is the equivalent of building a hospital every four days, of employing thousands of nurses, doctors and other people in the public sector, or of significant cuts to income tax. The problem is that if we, as a representative western democracy, do not arrest our continued debt addiction, in 20, 30 or 40 years’ time, the figure will be £75 billion or £80 billion in real terms.

Many people have suggested that extending the remit for independent fiscal watchdogs, as my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire has proposed, does not work, because it is ultimately impossible to model some of the underlying implications as there is an inevitable political bias in the assumptions that will be utilised to assess the activities, and because they might not be truly independent.

My hon. Friend also talked about the situation in 2014-2015, when the former shadow Chancellor suggested that the Office for Budget Responsibility look at Labour’s manifesto costings, but it did not have the capacity to do that. Those are all interesting points, and probably worthy of debates in themselves, but we have to decide whether we want to improve the quality of debate on financial and economic policies—and I do. The extension of the OBR’s remit would be a positive step in that direction.

Those watchdogs work and are useful, as my hon. Friend showed by talking about the Congressional Budget Office in America and institutions in several other countries around the world. I will point to two examples from Australia, where I have family; I am particularly interested in the political machinations there.

In 2007, the Liberal party, which I would closely ascribe to if I were in Australia, was moving out of office and the centre-left party was coming in under Kevin Rudd. In the heat of that election campaign, there was a big debate between John Howard, the Prime Minister, and Kevin Rudd, who would become Prime Minister, about financial and economic costings. The centre-right Government were trying to splurge to win an unprecedented fifth term in office, so they proposed approximately double the increase in spending that the centre left proposed.

I would naturally support my Liberal friends in Australia, but they were not proposing the right policies at the right time, and in doing so, they were not recognising the challenges of an overheating economy. Australia’s independent watchdog came along and said that the proposals would cause problems, which gave the mantle of economic credibility to the Labor party—something that is rarely done across the world.

Kevin Rudd is not a natural fellow traveller for me, but his biography says that

“barely 10 days out from voting day…we had won the all-important battle for fiscal credibility…the political dividends were reaped not only from a slew of Australian financial and economic commentators but from the international credit rating agencies too. Fitch stated that Australia would retain its AAA credit rating if Labor was elected”.

That is an example of why this kind of policy, and this kind of proposal, is really important.

If we fast-forward to the 2013 Australian election, Kevin Rudd was at the end of his second term as Prime Minister and was seeking to splurge to stay in office. In the white heat of the election campaign, his party put out a number of scare stories about why the incoming coalition Government were going to cut loads of things, cause huge economic problems and really affect the economy—the kind of thing that we hear quite regularly. The Australian published a book called “Triumph and Demise” by Paul Kelly, an eminent journalist in Australia, in which he said:

“In the second-last week of the campaign, the heads of Treasury and Finance issued a statement repudiating Labor’s claims”

on the costings of the coalition—the opposition. He continued:

“It was an unprecedented event, the biggest story of the campaign and a humiliation for Rudd as prime minister. Rudd had over-reached and been repudiated by his own advisers. The symbolism of a dying, dysfunctional and dishonest government was irresistible.”

I would not particularly like to have been in John Howard’s or Kevin Rudd’s shoes, but that demonstrates that if we get structures right and have an independent watchdog that can look and say, “This doesn’t work. This is wrong. These numbers are obscured,” that can improve the quality of debate and focus people on the underlying questions that are being asked.

However, that will only ever be useful if we, as politicians, and the country at large, recognise that statistics are not necessarily the be all and end all, that there is a wider context to be gained from them, and that we need to treat them with caution, as my hon. Friend outlined. But in principle, the extension of the OBR’s remit is extremely important. Although I recognise that there are challenges, if we are looking to take steps to improve the quality of debate—both within this place and without, in the wider community—we should seriously consider ideas such as this, which I welcome strongly.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Gray. I thank the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire (Luke Graham) for securing the debate, as well as the Backbench Business Committee.

I am delighted that we are talking about the remit of the Office for Budget Responsibility. I strongly agree with the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire (Lee Rowley) that it is an important issue. I regret that we do not have many Members thronging the Chamber; the last time but one I was here was for the debate about safe standing for football grounds, and it is a shame that we do not have the huge numbers we had then. It is incredibly important to talk about the robustness of figures when it comes to budgeting. I have to say, if you will permit me, Mr Gray, that it is also a delight for me to be able to talk about Labour’s manifesto and spending plans. It feels like summer has come slightly early for the Labour party—perhaps not quite as early as the Prime Minister had hoped. Still, I am pleased to be able to cover those subjects, but I will do so briefly, Chair, so as not to strain the patience of those in the Chamber.

Labour, of course, supports the OBR. We have had a good summary and discussion here of its origins and its work, and Members have usefully referred to how it follows on from similar independent fiscal institutions in other countries, not least those in the Netherlands and the US. The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon), who is no longer in his place, rightly mentioned the significant expertise we have in our OBR, how it compares favourably with other parts of Government and how we need to ensure that we support the people who work there. I very much want to pay tribute to all their hard work.

The OBR’s analysis, particularly in recently years, has been enormously helpful, especially in performing the task—referred to briefly by some Members—of having a long-term perspective on Government spending and its potential impact on economic sustainability. Of course, it was the OBR that pointed out, at the time of the last spring statement, how projections for both GDP and productivity and investment growth are set to be lower than anticipated, thus counteracting, perhaps, some of the media coverage that has suggested that as a country we are out of the woods in some way. On the long-range issues, the OBR has suggested that much work needs to be done if we are to get our economy on to a more sustainable basis. I very much agree with the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire’s praise for the OBR’s accuracy in that regard, even though the office sometimes has negative, or at least concerning, lessons to impart about the long-term economic sustainability of our country.

The OBR has been unafraid to speak some perhaps uncomfortable truths when necessary. There was much discussion of its role around the time of the last Budget, when the new stamp duty holiday policy was being introduced. The OBR was concerned to look at its potential impact on house prices. It was criticised for doing so, but it was absolutely right that it did.

The hon. Member for North East Derbyshire helpfully mentioned some of the trade-offs involved in policy making and suggested that we need more of a focus on those, particularly when assessing the economic impact of Government policies. I strongly agree that that issue needs to be much more explicit. We need a far better quality of debate in that regard, and the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) gave us some very good examples of where short-term savings appear to have been made in Government budgets but have long-term impacts, often not for central Government but for local government. In practice, debt has been transferred over recent central Governments to local governments, foundation trusts and other bodies. In many cases, the debt has not gone away; it is just in a different place, and we need a greater focus on that.

Above all, we need a far greater focus on our long-term productivity problems and the OBR has played an important part in encouraging evidence-based debate on the topic. In the long run, if we do not deal with our investment gap, which in Britain is far larger than in many comparable countries—our investment has not gone back to pre-crisis levels at the same speed as elsewhere—we will not have the capacity to raise sufficient Government revenue in the future. We have to deal with those issues quickly, and bodies such as the OBR help us to do that and perhaps to move beyond some of the sterile debates about making short-term savings that do not promote long-term sustainability.

Labour is such a strong supporter of the OBR that we agree with the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire about an extended remit. The OBR has helpfully raised the salience of long-term challenges for the UK’s public finances due to demographic change—something the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell) usefully mentioned—but Labour Members feel that it could have a more expansive role when it comes to a long-term threat that is not sufficiently considered by the Government, that of climate change and environmental degradation, to which many experts, not least Lord Stern, have drawn attention. We ask the OBR to report in particular on the fiscal risks of climate change, which could include the impact of raised food costs, the costs of flooding, and lost productivity caused by extreme weather events.

The current Government may be sanguine about lost revenue; we saw just last week another Treasury Minister talking about the potential trade-offs between being able to move goods across borders in the event of a no-deal Brexit and potentially losing revenue by not being able to collect VAT. No study has been done on the potential impact of that. We have had nothing from the Government that spells that out, but we should have. We need transparency on such issues and on the short and long-term risks to the public finances, particularly in relation to, as I said, environmental damage.

Widening the OBR’s remit would go with the grain of developments in many other countries. The hon. Member for Aberdeen North rightly referred to the fact that we always need to look at international examples. She helpfully referred to some of the thinking that was done about the Scottish Fiscal Commission; other Members referred to that as well. I agree with her that negative lessons can often be particularly important—learning from what has not worked as well as what has. Certainly we can learn from the EU’s fiscal forecast and the countries that look more expansively at environmental matters.

Adding more of a focus on environmental matters to the OBR’s remit would go with the grain of what the Bank of England has been doing by incorporating a consideration of banks’ exposure to climate change-related risks and stranded assets as it regulates banks. It would echo the approach of many long-term investors who are increasingly considering environmental matters when it comes to assessing the promise of different investment opportunities. The OBR would probably be willing and happy to do something that would usefully build on its existing activity.

We also want to strengthen the independence of the OBR, requiring it to report to Parliament rather than merely to the Executive, as was helpfully mentioned by the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire. That is the approach of the CBO in the US, and it could be usefully adopted here. It is not unusual for an independent fiscal institution to report to the legislature rather than the Executive, and it would aid the OBR to show that it is a truly independent evidence-based body that can have a real impact on policy making. It might also then lead to a greater salience of its reports at a political level and at the level of public discourse and debate as well, which would be a good thing.

There are many other areas where we need more data and analysis to truly assess the impact of economic decision making. One area that has come up frequently in recent Budgets concerns the lack of distributional analysis of Government economic decisions. I am pleased to see support for that from the hon. Members for Ochil and South Perthshire and for North East Derbyshire, who are nodding. The Department for Work and Pensions carries out such analyses frequently. The Treasury appears to do such analyses, but it does not report them publicly very often, which is a problem. The Government have a duty under the public sector equality duty to consider how their decisions affect people with protected characteristics, but at the time of a Budget, for example, we do not have that analysis in front of us, so we cannot examine the impact of policies on different groups, and it is very difficult for members of the public to assess the impact on them.

Recent policies have had very different impacts on different groups of people. If we look at changes to social security, the incomes of lone parents, particularly black and minority ethnic lone parents, have dropped substantially by up to around £9,000 in some cases, and that has not been made clear from Treasury analyses before Budgets. It is important to have a clearer handle on such impacts at the time when we actually vote on such measures.

On the point about greater evidence and analysis before economic decision making, the hon. Member for Aberdeen North rightly referred to the need for greater post hoc evaluation of economic decisions. She referred to the case of tax reliefs, which is something that I have worked on for some time. We rarely have post hoc evaluation of the impact of tax reliefs in the UK, which contrasts with the situation in many other countries. India has an annex to the Government Budget that covers tax reliefs, but we do not have that in the UK. There is a real contrast with how we assess spending decisions in terms of direct spending programmes as against foregone income in the form of tax expenditure. There is a huge gulf there and we need to deal with that. The OBR could play a part in that, and we should think about that for the future.

The Labour party’s position remains that the core role of the OBR should be to scrutinise the Government’s fiscal and economic plans, but it should do so in a more expansive and open manner than previously, as I have explained. An extension of its remit to cover party manifesto pledges might be warranted, but if it occurs it must be in concert with an extended remit to examine governmental spending commitments and it must be adequately resourced to enable it to fulfil that task. I am aware of the Dutch example that the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire referred to. I was pleased to see him inter alia praising the role of trade unions in decision making, which was slightly unexpected but good to hear. We can usefully learn from the Dutch example and the extended remit to look at Government spending plans. We had an interesting discussion about the Australian situation that the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire mentioned.

The hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire referred to the CBO and its more extensive role in ongoing policy making—not just at Budget time; it looks at discrete policies on an ongoing basis. Before we talk about potentially extending the OBR’s remit in that manner, it is important to focus on the activities of the Treasury first. In many cases the Treasury should carry out analyses, anyway. There is the question of independence; I do not take that for granted. But in many policy areas we do not even get to the level of understanding what the Treasury analysis is, let alone then having that independent analysis as a guarantor.

I do not agree with the hon. Member for Aberdeen North on everything, but I did agree with her on Brexit. Internal analysis has been conducted within the Treasury, but it has been like trying to get blood out of a stone to allow Members, let alone the public, to see that analysis. If the Treasury were a little more open about its processes, we would be in a different situation and we could then consider whether there should be additional independent analysis, but let us have more open analysis from the Treasury first.

Some Members referred to Labour’s spending plans. I regret that the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire tried to wriggle out of my question about where his party’s spending plans were set out in pounds and pence. He spoke elegantly and eloquently, but he managed to wriggle out of it because his party failed to include any costings anywhere in its manifesto at the general election. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) has commented, the only numbers in the Conservative manifesto that we have been able to see are the page numbers. We have seen nothing about how different approaches to spending would be carried out. We have seen a similar approach continuing in Government. The huge elephant in the room in this discussion concerns plans for NHS spending. A commitment has been made to a huge boost to NHS spending, but we have no idea where the additional funding will come from. Initially there was a suggestion that it would come from a so-called Brexit dividend, but it does not appear from the current approach to Brexit that there will be any such dividend. We heard whispers about where the funding will come from, but they are just whispers.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

In the context of the OBR.

[Anneliese Dodds]

In the context of the OBR, the problem is that we have just heard from some Members that the OBR’s remit should be extended to cover party political manifestos, and we have the Government making a huge spending commitment during its period in office, and yet no details have been provided for how the spending will arise. Many public servants are reading the tea leaves, not least those in the police, and assuming that the spending will come from cuts elsewhere. They are probably not wrong to do so.

Some Members referred to the discussion of Labour’s spending plans at the general election. It was possible to have that discussion because Labour had set out its spending plans in our grey book. I can see the hon. Member for North East Derbyshire smiling. He will smile even more when I provide him with some summer reading: Labour’s grey book, “Funding Britain’s Future”. It is very simple to read. I am sure other Members who are former accountants will find its layout very simple because it sets out on one side where more revenue will be derived and on the other side where expenditure will go. It is enormously simple to understand.

[Luke Graham]

Will the hon. Lady give way?

[Anneliese Dodds]

I would be very happy to do so.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

To intervene only about the OBR, I call Luke Graham.

[James Gray (in the Chair)]

To speak only about the OBR, I call Anneliese Dodds.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I absolutely will, Mr Gray. The hon. Gentleman suggested that the OBR’s remit could be extended to look at such figures. As I said, Labour is not against that. We might be interested in looking at that, but the figures have to be provided in the first place. Sadly that was not the case for his party at the last general election. I humbly suggest that as a first step towards that outcome, his party might follow mine and set out some of its spending. That would mean that we could have a discussion with other independent bodies in advance of an election, as occurred with Labour’s spending plans.

We had a useful, productive discussion with the Institute for Fiscal Studies, which looked into our assumptions. There were differences of view in relation to some areas of spending. For example, Labour suggested that it should not be assumed that removing the pay cap, which is something that we have committed to do for public sector workers, will be only a cost, because revenue would be positively affected by the additional national insurance that would arise from slightly higher wages. The IFS does not take that into account, so we had different assumptions on that. However, Labour wants to have that debate and discussion. To do that, we need to have the figures out there in the first place.

I thank the hon. Member for Ochil and South Perthshire again for securing the debate. I also thank all those in the Chamber and, particularly, those who work so hard for the OBR to ensure that we have an independent, unbiased assessment of our public finances. Finally, I wish everyone a very enjoyable summer.

--- Later in debate ---

[Anneliese Dodds]

May I briefly ask whether the British economy was growing when Labour left office?

[Robert Jenrick]

The British economy had just suffered a severe recession, and we inherited the largest peacetime deficit since the end of the second world war. Nothing exemplifies the situation with the public finances more than the note that was left on the desk in the Treasury office down the road saying that there was no money left.

The OBR produces the official economic and fiscal forecasts for the UK. It does not cost Government policies, but scrutinises and certifies costings initially prepared by the Treasury and other Departments to estimate their impact. That is an important point, to which I will return in a few moments. The OBR also provides detailed public reports, including the fiscal risk report every two years, which we have heard about, and the fiscal sustainability report, which was published last week and which keeps us at the frontier of fiscal management internationally and demonstrates our commitment to fiscal transparency and accountability. I am pleased that, as we heard in the debate, Scotland has followed suit and, since 2014, the role of the Scottish Fiscal Commission has been strengthening. That institution is in its relative infancy, but it appears to be building credibility and working to help keep Scottish finances in check.

The OBR has won international acclaim. Earlier this year, Kevin Page, in a paper for the Centre for Economic Policy Research, said:

“The OBR’s commitment to transparency is likely the gold standard in the IFI community.”

He added:

“The OBR deserves to be considered a leader among”

independent fiscal institutions

“for the transparency of its work and the credibility it derives”,

as we have heard from hon. Members. Protecting that credibility should be as much a priority for Parliament as it is for Government.

Since 2010, there have been a number of calls to expand the OBR’s remit, including proposals, as we have heard today, to report on distributional analysis, performance against child poverty targets, environmental matters and living standards. Each has merits, and deserves discussion and further thought. The OBR was deliberately set up to report on the sustainability of the public finances, and to date that is where we have let the matter settle. Asking the OBR to expand into areas beyond its core expertise and experience carries with it risks to its credibility. We need to consider that carefully before taking any such steps.

The OBR has also been called on to produce costings of policy proposals for Opposition parties. Again, we have heard about that today, and it has been raised by successive shadow Chancellors, including Ed Balls before the 2015 general election. Respected institutions such as the Institute for Fiscal Studies already perform that function well, and we should bear that in mind as we consider such proposals. As we heard from my hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire, the IFS recently exposed the folly of some of Labour’s proposed tax increases.

[Anneliese Dodds]

indicated dissent.

[Robert Jenrick]

The hon. Lady shakes her head, but the IFS said that those would lead to taxes being raised to their highest in peacetime history. The IFS also questioned whether they would raise as much as the shadow Chancellor claimed, and said that they would hit working families hardest. We do not always need to rely on the OBR to twist the knife, as the IFS has certainly done so repeatedly.

[Anneliese Dodds]

May I respectfully ask how exactly the IFS was able to analyse the Conservative party’s policies, when there was no indication in its manifesto of how any of them would be funded? It appears slightly peculiar to pick on the small number of criticisms made by the IFS of some elements of Labour’s assumptions when no information whatever was provided by the Minister’s party.

[Robert Jenrick]

I would not characterise the IFS’s criticisms of the Labour party’s manifesto as “small”. They were pretty fundamental; the remarks I have just described speak for themselves. The IFS did analyse the policies of the Conservative party in the lead-up to the last manifesto, but let us stick to the question before us today, and apologies to you, Mr Gray, for deviating from it.

A number of arguments have been made today for widening the remit of the OBR. Over previous years, such arguments have been looked at in some detail. Back in 2014, Robert Chote wrote in response to Andrew Tyrie, now Lord Tyrie, who at the time was Chair of the Treasury Committee, setting out his views on the matter. He said that, while some of those arguments undoubtedly had merit and deserved proper consideration by the Government and by Parliament, it was important that we consider

“the significant practical issues that would need to be addressed”.

Let me briefly set out some of those, which we would all need to consider.

My hon. Friend the Member for Ochil and South Perthshire referred to the US Congressional Budget Office. That is a good comparison, although the US system varies from our ours in a number of ways—in particular, Congressmen, Congresswomen and Senators have a much greater ability than Members of the House to initiate legislation that carries with it significant financial implications. However, it is worth considering the remit of the CBO, and its capacity.

The CBO undertakes analytical work in-house and has around 235 members of staff, with an annual budget of around $50 million. In comparison, the Office for Budget Responsibility has just 27 members of staff and costs us around £2.5 million. The OBR is clearly dwarfed in comparison. Although that is not in itself a reason not to proceed, we would have to consider the financial consequences of doing so.

The CBO is required by law to produce cost estimates for nearly every Bill approved by a full budget committee of either the House or the Senate, and produced 740 such formal costings last year, so a significant amount of work would be required. It is worth pointing out that the CBO does not—this is perhaps a more relevant comparison for some of the issues we have discussed this morning—evaluate the costings of candidates for Congress, or indeed of presidential candidates. Clearly, to increase the remit of the OBR would require it to have a significantly larger operation.

Undertaking Opposition costings as part of the parliamentary process would have important implications for the OBR and departmental resources in all Departments, including the Treasury, but the greatest impact would be felt were it to be involved in manifesto costings. The time that the OBR and Departments needed to produce costings would pose very particular difficulties during general elections, some of which are unplanned. It is difficult to see how parties could be afforded the customary flexibility in developing their manifestos until a relatively late stage in the election process, to reflect the public debate in the run-up to the election. Instead, they might have to submit detailed proposals two or three months ahead of a general election. Of course, we could consider that, but we would have to consider carefully the implications for the general election process and the way we have traditionally approached that.

The policies in scope for OBR costings also differ in type from the policies that have dominated the political debate. The detailed costing process at fiscal events covers only tax and welfare policies, which are clearly very important and a significant element of general elections, but are not all the issues reflected in a general election or all the policies in manifestos.

The other point to note is that the OBR does not produce the work in-house. It relies on detailed data produced for it by Departments, including the Treasury, which are then submitted to the OBR for scrutiny and analysis. As the hon. Member for Aberdeen North (Kirsty Blackman) said, the quality of the information is extremely important. Civil servants in Departments would be required to work through political parties’ manifestos and then provide high-quality approved data to the OBR, with which it could do its usual costings.

Air Passenger Duty

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Tuesday 10th July 2018 Westminster Hall

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to speak in this debate with you in the Chair, Sir David. I congratulate the hon. Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) on securing the debate, which has been very inclusive and interesting, and on his illuminating speech.

Many of these issues have been discussed before, as the hon. Gentleman mentioned. They were foreshadowed in our debates about recent Finance Bills, in which I spoke on behalf of the Opposition. Labour argued in those debates that the Government need to be clearer about their long-term plan for APD. There have been a number of reviews of APD’s efficacy, proportionality and impact on competitiveness since its introduction in 1994, and we need to situate this debate in that context. However, despite those reviews, a number of questions still have not been answered, so I hope the Minister provides some indication of the Government’s thinking.

As has been indicated in previous debates on this topic, the Government estimate that APD contributes about £3.1 billion to general taxation. I am well aware that the hon. Gentleman and others suggest that, if one takes a holistic view of its fiscal impact, APD may be fiscally positive on the ledger. It would be helpful to hear from the Minister whether the Treasury is conducting a 360° review of APD’s fiscal impact. I understand that PwC has carried out research, but it would help if the Treasury were focused on this issue, too.

In response to the comments by the hon. Member for Shannon, I cannot resist—

[Jim Shannon]

For Strangford—that’s a step too far!

[Anneliese Dodds]

I beg the hon. Gentleman’s pardon. I am very sorry about that. He will perhaps be even more perplexed when I mention that, rather than pound pinching, my family talked about looking after the pennies and the pounds looking after themselves. Perhaps that reveals a psychological difference between lowland and Ulster Scots. Of course, we need to look after the pennies and the pounds—that is the whole point. We need to trace exactly the impact of APD.

Studies suggest that the evidence about APD’s impact on passenger numbers is mixed. As many Members said, such a duty is unusual in the international context, but the number of passengers using UK airports has increased by 15%—a substantial increase—in the past five years. Of course, APD needs to be considered in the context of there being no tax on aviation fuel and no VAT on domestic or international flights. There are also different levels of APD for different kinds of flights, and exemptions for children were introduced in 2015 and extended in March 2016.

I will focus on four issues: the long-term viability of APD, regional competitiveness, the unequal impact of APD on different groups of Britons, and environmental issues. From a revenue point of view, there are clearly significant concerns about APD’s long-term viability. The Government have moved to provide industry with earlier notice of APD changes. The rates for next year were announced last autumn. That is surely positive for industry but, as I mentioned, we have had no indication of the Government’s view of the long-term trajectory of the tax, particularly in the context of the race to the bottom occasioned by internal competition in the UK. The tenor of this debate demonstrates that the starting gun has been fired on that race—it has begun, and we need to know the Government’s response.

We must view increases or reductions in APD in the context of taxation generally across income levels. It is notable that, given the increasing popularity and accessibility of air travel, many more people pay APD. As my hon. Friend the Member for North Tyneside (Mary Glindon) said, many more people enjoy hard-earned holidays abroad, and there are also people who need to travel abroad for family or work reasons.

Equally, APD is far less significant for household incomes than VAT, another transaction-based tax, which Members touched on. We would be in a different situation if the potentially regressive impacts of consumption taxes as a whole were cancelled out by progressive income taxes, for example, but of course the Government reduced the top rate of income tax. The latest Office for National Statistics figures suggest that overall, unusually in Britain’s history—at least in recent times—people in the least well-off decile pay a greater proportion of their income in tax than those in the most well-off decile. That is a peculiar situation.

Another concern we must note is about APD’s impact on regional competitiveness, which has been a focus of the debate and was perhaps its motivation. As we have discussed, APD levels were devolved to the Scottish Government in the Scotland Act 2016 and initial suggestions were that it would be halved and then potentially removed altogether.

We have discussed at length changes mooted in Northern Ireland, where there has been a call for evidence. We got useful detail about the operation of that from the hon. Member for Belfast East. As I understand it, the Government stated in February 2015 that they would also consider the case for devolving APD to the Welsh Assembly. We have therefore seen much change in relation to this duty.

All those changes naturally raise questions for airports contiguous to other airports not subject to the same APD levels, whether they are contiguous to Scotland or to the Republic of Ireland. We heard interesting thoughts on that from the right hon. Member for Belfast North (Nigel Dodds) and the hon. Members for Upper Bann (David Simpson) and for East Londonderry (Mr Campbell). Of course, the hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) —I have got it right this time—gave us a typically passionate and inclusive speech and a glimmer of his holiday plans. I hope they are more sedate and relaxing than those of the hon. Member for Henley (John Howell), whose itinerary of recent movements sent my head into a bit of a spin.

We also heard from my hon. Friend the Member for North Tyneside, who pointed out research suggesting that the duty has a significant impact on people living in her area. She is always a doughty supporter of their interests.

The Treasury published a discussion paper on options to support English regional airports in July 2015, but it is difficult to find out what concrete steps have occurred since then. Furthermore, the Government have said they will look at the matter once legislation concerning state aid changes is produced. An indication from the Minister of the Government’s thinking on that would be helpful; it is particularly important, given the points made by the hon. Member for Inverness, Nairn, Badenoch and Strathspey (Drew Hendry) about the situation for the highlands and islands.

There is often confusion in this place, though certainly not on the hon. Gentleman’s part, about the impact of EU state aid provisions in general. Of course, they prevent the provision of arbitrary support, but, as he suggested, low levels of population could be a feasible basis for such an exemption.

[Drew Hendry]

The hon. Lady makes the point well. This is an exemption based on population density and the regional difficulties in the highlands and islands. Indeed, it should be possible—I hope it is—for the Scottish and UK Governments to work together to solve that problem.

[The Exchequer Secretary to the Treasury (Robert Jenrick)]

We are.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I was pleased to hear the Minister say from a sedentary position that they are working on that. I hope the UK Government will do so with rather more application than they did on support for the steel sector, of which I had an inside view as a Member of the European Parliament: they made no attempt to secure clearance for the kind of support we saw applied in countries such as Romania, which had been okayed by the European Commission; they asked the Competition Commissioner for exemption only from environmental measures. There was not much application around steel, so I hope we will see a different approach to these matters.

Another concern is the impact of APD on Britons who have family living outside the British Isles. The previous four-banding system meant that such individuals could end up paying more APD than those travelling to the US, for example. None the less, the division in the calculation between short and long-haul travel continues to be criticised by some who feel that that disadvantages Brits with families in, for example, the Caribbean, India, Pakistan or Bangladesh, who need to fly long haul to visit them. One could argue that other, lower carbon alternatives are available to flying for short-haul journeys, which do not apply for travelling long distances. An indication of the Government’s thinking on that would be helpful.

Our final concern is about APD’s impact, or otherwise, on environmental outcomes. In response to a question posed by the hon. Member for Henley, the hon. Member for Belfast East maintained that APD does not have a positive environmental impact. However, we must look at it in the context of enormous public concern around climate change and the increasing significance of emissions from aviation. At APD’s introduction in 1994 and, following that, the Labour Government’s focus on it, there was an attempt to ensure that its design would have a green impact. For example, during the 2007 Budget process it was stated that APD

“plays a valuable role in ensuring that passengers understand and acknowledge the environmental costs of their actions. The resultant behaviour change can deliver significant climate change benefits”.

Those believed benefits were then detailed.

[Gavin Robinson]

I hope that the hon. Lady does not misconstrue what I said as a suggestion that we are not interested in climate change. The Library briefing is helpful, talking about the Labour Government in 2006 and a Department for Transport recalibration of emissions, which were to increase and not decrease until 2030. I do not think consumers realise that the contribution is made for environmental benefit or that it is having any tangible impact. The growth of aviation technology will have a much bigger impact on environmental benefits than an APD charge.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for those comments. I acknowledge that there is not necessarily the awareness to ensure that it does have such an impact. Some of the matters he just raised have led to calls for a redesign of the duty, which some believe could lead to a greater environmental impact. One suggestion, which was examined in 1998, was whether it would be better to levy the duty on planes rather than passengers to reduce under-occupancy and lessen emissions. However, the then Government suggested that a restructuring of APD would be more appropriate and the four bands were introduced. Of course, since then we have gone down to two bands.

It is interesting to note that the highly interventionist right hon. Member for Wokingham (John Redwood)—he is not often described as that—argued that, on reducing under-occupancy through such a measure,

“there is a green case to be made there.”—[Official Report, 23 April 2007; Vol. 459, c. 729.]

However, the practicalities of doing so are highly complex, which may be why that did not develop at that time. In particular, it is difficult to exempt transit and transfer passengers from the calculation, which led Alistair Darling away from initial moves in that direction.

The taxation of aircraft fuel has been mentioned as an alternative, but that is prevented by the network of bilateral air service agreements under the principles of the Chicago convention. It would be helpful to hear whether the Minister has been involved in attempts afoot internationally to alter that agreement to provide more flexibility.

[Drew Hendry]

I am grateful to the hon. Lady for giving way yet again. She is talking about alternatives for taxation. Does she agree that had APD been used directly for environmental measures, it would have had a huge impact? For example, it could have been involved in the creation of alternative biofuels and other incentives and operations to reduce dramatically the environmental impact, yet it has not been spent in that way at all.

[Anneliese Dodds]

I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for that interesting point. Hypothecation of tax is relatively unusual in the UK. My party believes—he will expect me to say this—that there needs to be much more investment in those technologies. That would be positive for our country, whether funds are hypothecated from a particular area or found through other mechanisms.

One other aspect of the international context—this was mentioned to me by a Minister—is the ICAOs agreement on the carbon offsetting and reduction scheme for international aviation, which was introduced in October 2016. Members have referred to the EU’s emissions trading scheme in that context, but we have not yet heard from the Government about whether we will remain part of the ETS beyond 2020. If we follow existing patterns for APD, Parliament will set the rate for 2021 next autumn. It would be helpful to get a clearer idea about how the Government view international schemes such as that of the ICAO interacting with multilateral mechanisms such as the ETS. The general lack of clarity on environmental matters amplifies the fact that the UK Government seem to lack any long-term vision about what constitutes green taxation in the first place, let alone how it should develop in future. This is a bit of a cheesy point, but I contrast that with the shadow Treasury team, which includes a shadow Minister who is focused exactly on such matters, and on the link between environmental and Treasury issues.

In conclusion, I am afraid that I lack the poetic sensibilities and contacts of the hon. Member for Belfast East, but I congratulate him again on securing this debate. I look forward to hearing from the Minister about the five issues I raised: whether there will be a 360° review of APD; whether there is a long-term plan for it; what the Government’s view is about the substitutability of short-term flights, and whether that should be taken into account; whether the Government are participating in international attempts to reform the Chicago convention; and what their view is of the interaction between the ICAO scheme and the ETS, and what the future will hold for carbon trading for the UK beyond 2020—that point is very germane to this debate.

Oral Answers to Questions

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Tuesday 3rd July 2018 Commons Chamber

[Mel Stride]

I slightly detected from the hon. Gentleman’s question the suggestion that that meeting between HMRC and the EBT did not take place, and it most certainly did. He and I have discussed this matter, both formally in a meeting and informally, and we have debated it in the House. I have always stressed that there is a dividing line between HMRC and Treasury Ministers: we cannot intervene in the tax affairs of individuals or organisations. I am confident that HMRC is progressing in an appropriate manner.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

Eight years of economic failure from this Government have been exacerbated—[Interruption.] I suggest that it is economic failure, with productivity growth down, GDP growth down and investment growth down, and in comparison with our comparators. Economic failure: if it smells like it and looks like it, that is what it is. Let me finish my question. That failure has been exacerbated by the Government’s reorganisation of HMRC, with cuts in our country deeper than in any other, outside Greece. Will they abandon this failing reorganisation, which also means that there will not be a single customs hub anywhere along the south coast or north of the central belt?

[Mel Stride]

The simple fact is that we need an HMRC that is fit for the 21st century, for the new digital ways in which we are working, and for our targeted approach on clamping down on avoidance, evasion and non-compliance, for example. That requires these sophisticated hubs that have the right skills to do that job, so I defend our reorganisation entirely.

On the portrayal of the economy that the hon. Lady has just given, we have the highest level of employment in our history, more women in work than at almost any time in our history and unemployment lower than at any time in the past 45 years. We are bearing down on the deficit and have debt falling as a percentage of GDP.

Draft Double Taxation Relief (Mauritius) Order 2018 Draft Doubt Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (Cyprus) Order 2018

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Robertson, and to hear again from the Minister, with his explanation of the two double taxation agreements. It is of course not so long ago that we were talking about other agreements, particularly those covering Belarus and Ukraine. I am grateful to the Minister for writing to me on 13 June, after that exchange, to cover some issues that are relevant to these treaties as well. With your permission, Mr Robertson, I might delve into some of those briefly.

I am pleased to hear that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is considering the case for further reviews of the treaty network. That would be very helpful because we, as parliamentarians, currently do not have a clear idea of which treaties are being negotiated with which countries, when, with which actors and according to which principles. It would be enormously useful to have that timetable in front of us. Surely it is also necessary to conduct a review, given that we recently debated and agreed in this place that the UK will follow the OECD’s multilateral instrument for the reform of double taxation agreements. It seems to be a useful time to review the agreements.

I was grateful to the Minister for stating in his letter that it would be helpful to know what kinds of additional information it would be useful for Committee members to have before debating such treaties. The first kind—this was revealed a bit in the exchange that we just had—is a clear indication of why new treaties or agreements might shift away from previous ones. Currently, the way that we parliamentarians normally notice that is through the explanatory note that comes with the agreement, which sometimes flags up particular issues. For example, it usefully flagged up the treatment of property investment vehicles for Cyprus. However, explanatory notes do not go through systematically and say, “Here’s every difference compared with the existing agreement.” We have to do that ourselves and look at them in parallel to work out what the differences are. Of course, some of them might not be important, but we cannot really judge that, so it is quite time consuming.

Secondly, we do not have an indication of why certain choices have been made. The potential impact of the new regime on British servicemen and women, and others who might be living in Cyprus, was a useful example. It would be helpful to know whether there had been consultation with people who might be affected by the new agreement. Above all, it would be useful to know why both the UK Government and the Governments of the countries with which we are negotiating treaties have taken certain decisions to move away from an existing regime. The OECD’s approach—I know the Minister is very much on top of the detail of this—gives us many choices about how we can contract with other countries through such agreements. It does not often specify an exact way forward. In fact, one particularly contentious matter, which I think we have debated in this room before, is the use of different forms of arbitration. Countries might have very different views on that, and very different interests.

Finally, the other area where it would be helpful for us, as parliamentarians, to have information about such treaties, when we are talking about developing countries or countries in the global south—a category that Mauritius would probably fall into—is whether any formal assessment, or even informal discussion, had been undertaken by the Government about whether the agreements cohere with the principle of policy coherence for development.

We would all support the tightening-up of the regime, which the Minister mentioned, although it is not something that will particularly benefit Mauritius financially. Such schemes do not tend to have much of a trickle-down impact—quite the opposite—and often create problems for the countries in which they are based, so when we are talking about developing countries, it would be helpful to have a systematic analysis of whether policy coherence for development has been considered in decision making.

Draft Double Taxation Relief (Mauritius) Order 2018 Draft Double Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (Cyprus) Order 2018

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Monday 18th June 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Robertson, and to hear again from the Minister, with his explanation of the two double taxation agreements. It is of course not so long ago that we were talking about other agreements, particularly those covering Belarus and Ukraine. I am grateful to the Minister for writing to me on 13 June, after that exchange, to cover some issues that are relevant to these treaties as well. With your permission, Mr Robertson, I might delve into some of those briefly.

I am pleased to hear that Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs is considering the case for further reviews of the treaty network. That would be very helpful because we, as parliamentarians, currently do not have a clear idea of which treaties are being negotiated with which countries, when, with which actors and according to which principles. It would be enormously useful to have that timetable in front of us. Surely it is also necessary to conduct a review, given that we recently debated and agreed in this place that the UK will follow the OECD’s multilateral instrument for the reform of double taxation agreements. It seems to be a useful time to review the agreements.

I was grateful to the Minister for stating in his letter that it would be helpful to know what kinds of additional information it would be useful for Committee members to have before debating such treaties. The first kind—this was revealed a bit in the exchange that we just had—is a clear indication of why new treaties or agreements might shift away from previous ones. Currently, the way that we parliamentarians normally notice that is through the explanatory note that comes with the agreement, which sometimes flags up particular issues. For example, it usefully flagged up the treatment of property investment vehicles for Cyprus. However, explanatory notes do not go through systematically and say, “Here’s every difference compared with the existing agreement.” We have to do that ourselves and look at them in parallel to work out what the differences are. Of course, some of them might not be important, but we cannot really judge that, so it is quite time consuming.

Secondly, we do not have an indication of why certain choices have been made. The potential impact of the new regime on British servicemen and women, and others who might be living in Cyprus, was a useful example. It would be helpful to know whether there had been consultation with people who might be affected by the new agreement. Above all, it would be useful to know why both the UK Government and the Governments of the countries with which we are negotiating treaties have taken certain decisions to move away from an existing regime. The OECD’s approach—I know the Minister is very much on top of the detail of this—gives us many choices about how we can contract with other countries through such agreements. It does not often specify an exact way forward. In fact, one particularly contentious matter, which I think we have debated in this room before, is the use of different forms of arbitration. Countries might have very different views on that, and very different interests.

Finally, the other area where it would be helpful for us, as parliamentarians, to have information about such treaties, when we are talking about developing countries or countries in the global south—a category that Mauritius would probably fall into—is whether any formal assessment, or even informal discussion, had been undertaken by the Government about whether the agreements cohere with the principle of policy coherence for development.

We would all support the tightening-up of the regime, which the Minister mentioned, although it is not something that will particularly benefit Mauritius financially. Such schemes do not tend to have much of a trickle-down impact—quite the opposite—and often create problems for the countries in which they are based, so when we are talking about developing countries, it would be helpful to have a systematic analysis of whether policy coherence for development has been considered in decision making.

Draft Double Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (Belarus) Order 2018 Draft Double Taxation Relief and International Tax Enforcement (Ukraine) Order 2018

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Monday 4th June 2018 General Committees

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

It is a pleasure to serve with you in the Chair, Mr Robertson. It was very helpful to have the Minister’s explanation of the two orders. It would also be helpful if we could have some of this information in advance—in the notes that are produced alongside orders—because the Minister just answered some of the questions that came to my mind when I looked at the orders. It would be useful if the Government were a little fuller in their introductions to these kinds of order when they are presented to the House.

My first question relates to the overall structure for these kinds of protocol. I expect a number of other protocols will come now that we have agreement on the model tax convention—the OECD instrument that we discussed at length in the House. In November 2015, Her Majesty’s Revenue and Customs published its programme for future negotiations on double tax agreements. That mentioned some of the tax agreements that we have had the pleasure of discussing, but not all of them. It would be helpful to know when HMRC will produce its forward plan, so that the whole House, or at least the Members interested in this area, can scrutinise it.

It was helpful to have the Minister’s explanation on some aspects of the Belarusian agreement. The Belarus economy is quite different from that of neighbouring countries, because of the larger extent of state ownership than in many other nations, and that is reflected in the character of the agreement. However, I have a question about the rules on permanent establishment—a topic that comes up frequently in double tax agreements. Different nations and their companies have often attempted to ensure that profit is taxed in their jurisdiction or not taxed at all, rather than in the area where it is generated. In the Belarus agreement there is a temporal threshold of 12 months to determine the permanent establishment for construction sites. Why was that inserted? I cannot remember that exact threshold from previous discussions, but perhaps the Minister will enlighten us.

Again, I am grateful for the Minister’s explanatory remarks on the Ukraine agreement. The amending protocol was signed by both nations on 9 October. It has been quite a long time between it being signed and it coming in front of the House. It would be helpful to know why it has taken more than six months for it to come to Parliament. There may be legitimate reasons for that, but the process of making these agreements is something of a black box for many parliamentarians. Perhaps that issue is not for this moment, but in future the Government could be open about what the process is between an amending protocol being signed and it coming in front of us. It would be useful to have that information.

The Minister stated that most of the changes in the amending protocol are consistent with the OECD’s model approach. They seem to simplify a situation where, from what I could see, many transactions were exempted from withholding tax. Instead, a reduced rate of tax is now applied more generically across different activities—royalties, for example—which seems sensible.

The Minister answered my question about why withholding tax rates have gone up to 15%, having previously been 10% for dividends where there is not a very large beneficial holding in the paying entity. However, again, it would be useful if, with these agreements, we could have a little more information about these topics so that, as a House, we are not scrabbling around before we come to these Committees, trying to work out why certain decisions have been taken.

Oral Answers to Questions

Anneliese Dodds Excerpts

Tuesday 22nd May 2018 Commons Chamber

[Robert Jenrick]

My hon. Friend is absolutely right. The initial intention of PFI was to transfer risk, when appropriate, to the private sector, and to drive up innovation and quality in a very small number of selective cases. That was perverted under the last Labour Government by Gordon Brown.

[Anneliese Dodds (Oxford East) (Lab/Co-op)]

We have learned from the experience of PFI; this Government—[Interruption.]

[Mr Speaker]

Order.

[Anneliese Dodds]

Thank you, Mr Speaker.

This Government have not. In the light of last week’s report on Carillion, we want to know whether the Minister can indicate which PFI contracts are being delivered by contractors that are deemed to be actually or potentially high risk. Following last week’s reports that failed bidders for PFI contracts will be compensated, can he rule out bailing out firms that fail even to win contracts? We need answers on these questions now, not a history lesson.

[Robert Jenrick]

As I have indicated, this Government’s approach to PFI is entirely different from that of the last Labour Government. The hon. Lady says that she has learnt the lessons. Well, it is a pity for the taxpayer, and for our children and grandchildren, that they were learnt so late.