Shanghai Cooperation Organisation

Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle Excerpts

Thursday 16th October 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Hannan of Kingsclere (Con)]

My Lords, we often talk about the way in which liberal democracy is in retreat in the part of the world that we have just been hearing about, particularly in Russia. I wonder whether we have not put that question back to front. The Russian state was founded in 882. If we look at the period between its foundation and the present, we see that it has been an autocracy for 1,120 years. There was a little moment of constitutional monarchy in 1905; there was the period between February and October 1917; and then, if we very generously count the early Putin as well as the Yeltsin years, we can come up with 23 years in which Russia has adhered to something that we would recognise as the rule of law and representative government. That is not a whole lot of democratic muscle memory to fall back on.

The point I want to make is that this is very normal. One way of explaining the rise of Putin is to look at what happened in all the other ex-Soviet states—what happened when the USSR suddenly broke apart and, in almost every case outside the Baltics, went into some kind of autocracy. What was it that all those strongmen had in common—the Karimovs and Aliyevs and so on? Was it charisma? Was it some demotic connection with their people? Was it intelligence? No. They just happened to be the Soviet officials who were in charge of the Uzbek SSR—or whatever it was—at the time when the break-up came. They suddenly found themselves in charge of sovereign states and they very quickly set about ensuring that their grip on power would be unchallenged and there would be a kind of one-party state.

That is the norm. That is the sobering thought. We in anglophone western democracies are the exception. It is not the Putins and the Karimovs who are extraordinary but the Washingtons—the people who do not try to set up hereditary dictatorial power. That should make us aware of the fragility of our model and of the constant need to defend it, by being ready not only to deploy arms proportionately in defence of freedom but to defend it intellectually and culturally at home. This is where the challenge of the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation comes from. It is a fundamentally illiberal alternative model, and it is growing; it is popular. All these new countries are adhering to it because that autocratic way of government appeals to something very deep in the human psyche. It is how we administered ourselves for the 10,000 years between the discovery of agriculture and a couple of hundred years ago, at most—an eyeblink in evolutionary terms.

That is why this matters. It is not because of the strategic importance of the region—every region thinks it is strategically important, including central Asia. When I was a new MEP, my noble friend Lord Callanan and I were put on the central Asia delegation. As an MEP, if you were a goody-goody federalist they gave you the Caribbean or South Africa. We were critics of the single currency, so they gave us central Asia, and I am very glad they did. I got to know the region pretty well, and I loved it. I visit it still; I have friends there. But with the best will in the world, it is not of great strategic importance to us—not as a maritime country. Sir Halford Mackinder used to say that it was the inventor of geostrategy, the key region, the heartland:

“he who controls the heartland controls the world”.

Barely had he said that than the First World War came along and disproved him, as did the Second World War. It may have had some tangential strategic relevance to us at the height of the great game, when Stoddart and Conolly were murdered in Bukhara in 1842, but it is a stretch to say that it matters to us now, as an archipelago at the western tip of the Eurasian land mass.

This matters not for reasons of direct geostrategic interest but because there is this cultural challenge—this alternative way of running our affairs—which appeals to people, including in the west. The reason that India, Pakistan, Iran and all these places are adhering to organisations like the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation —the clue as to who runs it is in the name, by the way—is that they think that our system is in decline. One reason they think that is because we keep telling them. We have become so ready to dismiss and distance ourselves from our own past. We have this extraordinary lack of self-confidence. If our children get any history at all, we tend to present it as a hateful chronicle of racism and exploitation.

I would be prepared to defend the proposition —I cannot prove it—that almost any child in a primary school in this country would be much more familiar with the names of Rosa Parks and Martin Luther King than those of Lilburne, Locke, Wycliffe, Wilkes, Milton or Millar; and that is just the Johns. We are not teaching them our own history of freedom and personal responsibility, of the elevation of the individual above the collective and of the importance of the rule of law. That, it seems to me, is our challenge as legislators. We need to emphasise that we are inheritors of this sublime tradition, that it is better than the alternative and that it raised the human race to a pinnacle of wealth and freedom. Keeping that heritage going means teaching the next generation about why it is special, why they are lucky to be the guardians of this sublime patrimony, why they will hold it—as we do—on a repairing lease and why they, too, will have a commensurate obligation to pass it on intact to those who come after.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords—

[Lord Skidelsky (CB)]

My Lords—

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

No worries. My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Stuart of Edgbaston, for securing this important debate and for her clear introduction, which rightly highlighted Francis Fukuyama, who was always bizarrely hubristic with his end-of-history thesis and indeed now looks very far into the past.

My contribution will have two foci. The first is to urge that we consider the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation in the context of the behaviour of its second-most powerful member, Russia, and its allies in the continuing attack on Ukraine, and of other organisation members, including Iran and Belarus and, of course, China. My other focus will be somewhat in disagreement with the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, on one aspect of what has been described as the “Shanghai spirit” and one particular part of it: the so-called respect for the diversity of civilisations.

To return to my first focus, I wish to report to the Committee a little of my experiences last week when I travelled with fellow parliamentarians—with financial support from British companies, which I will be appropriately declaring in due course—to Ukraine as part of a delegation from the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Explosive Weapons and their Impact. The focus was on the clearing of mines and unexploded ordnance, something that the Ukrainians have to deal with at a totally unprecedented scale, at least in the form of risk. Some 29% of their nation, or 174,000 square kilometres, is at risk of being affected by mines and unexploded ordnance. We visited the State Emergency Service of Ukraine and the Mines Advisory Group and Halo Trust projects.

We also saw the crucial efforts to treat those who have fallen victim to the mines at the charities Superhumans and Unbroken. We saw the human cost of the continuing Russian assault. We also saw close up the vicious, and sometimes internationally illegal, weapons that the Russians and their allies are using against civilian populations. Holding a submunition, a cluster bomb—obviously, once it had been rendered safe—and seeing a children’s storybook booby-trapped with explosives was an acute demonstration of the sheer difficulties that the Ukrainians face and the nature of the actions of the Russian-led alliance, many of whose members were in Tianjin.

Understandably, in the face of the horrors of the Israeli assault on Gaza and the desperate desire to get the Israeli hostages home, the media and even the political focus have not always been on Ukraine. However, I want to stress the importance of continuing to provide the Ukrainians with practical support and moral support, both directly and through projects such as that of BBC Media Action, which is assisting in the vital task of explosive ordnance risk education. Behind that must be a strong, determined delivery of the message from the international community—or as much of it as we can bring together—that there is a principle that larger countries cannot simply decide to take chunks out of their neighbours. Further, that there are rules of war and breaking these must not just be called out, but must have genuine, long-term, serious consequences for the regimes responsible. The human race has a long way to go. It was back in 697 that the law of innocence was promulgated by Gaelic and Pictish nobles at the Synod of Birr. It extended what had been protection for monks and religious male figures to women and other non-combatants. That is a very long time ago and we still have failed to deliver that, as I saw in Ukraine.

I come now to the to the second part of my contribution today, which is around the term “civilisations”, which, as I noted, is described as part of the Shanghai spirit. This language is increasingly penetrating many international settings, frequently from the influence of China. I note, for example, that on 7 June 2024 the UN General Assembly adopted 10 June as the international day for dialogue among civilisations. I agree with the words of the US representative during that debate that we should instead be talking about cultures. The US representative then urged vigilance over how words such as “civilisation” are used.

This is a term in the form of western civilisation that we are hearing increasingly in your Lordships’ House, and I would ask those who are increasingly using it to consider how they are playing into the hands of dangerous forces which are using it in places such Xinjiang. Making claims of exceptionalism, of the purity of one historical cultural formulation over another, is playing into the hands of the narrative that we are hearing from China and other countries that needs to be challenged, not accepted.

I am pleased to say that there a growing reaction against that, against the idea of discrete, distinct civilisations, an international shedding of civilizational thinking. I note that on display today in your Lordships’ Library is the cover of Josephine Quinn’s excellent book How the World Made the West which addresses this issue. She notes Polybius’s remark that the Romans were a multicultural melting pot willing to substitute their customs for better practices from elsewhere. There is no such thing as pure Roman civilisation or indeed western civilisation. This book explicitly takes aim at Samuel P Huntington’s influential 1996 clash of civilisations thesis, which is effectively being adopted in this debate. It is deeply dangerous and a framing for a great deal of Islamophobic and other xenophobic rhetoric and action. Challenging this claim is an urgent task.

Responding to the noble Lord, Lord Hannan, I point out that democracy and democratic elements have a very long history going back, of course, as is often cited, to ancient Greece, but much further than that to a millennia before in ancient Assyria.