Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Baroness Berridge

Tuesday 17th June 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, Amendment 131, in my name, appears in this group. I will not quite say that it is a pleasure to follow the contribution of the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, but it was a terribly important contribution, and I can only very much agree with what she said. The issues that she has outlined—about children as young as seven, with two-thirds continuing still at six months—are hugely disturbing.

My amendment seeks to address a particular issue concerning children subject to deprivation of liberty orders and children in care in general. As I said to the Ministers when they very kindly had a briefing on the Bill, this arises from a campaign that I encountered in 2023, called Hope Instead of Handcuffs. This campaign came from a small group of people—a single operator of the provision of secure transport for children—who were calling for a ban on the automatic use of handcuffs. Yes, I did say the automatic use of handcuffs, which some privatised providers of secure transport were using on children who were subject to deprivation of liberty orders—or who, as it was described, were on the edges of care. They were being put in handcuffs to be transported. These are not children who have been accused of any crime; these are simply children—very vulnerable children, obviously—who have been subjected to something that I think any of us would find traumatic and disturbing.

This reflects testimony that was given in 2021 to the inquiry of the Joint Committee on Human Rights on protecting rights in care settings. Serenity Welfare testified that, as I have just said, many providers of secure transportation services for children who were on the edge of care were using handcuffs as standard. I quote from its testimony:

“The practice is unregulated and unmonitored, as there is no obligation on these providers to report any instances of handcuffing to the appropriate authority”.


As a result of that campaign in 2023, I and a number of other Members of both Houses wrote to the Government inquiring what was happening. The response we got was, “We will look into it”. To the best of my knowledge, none of this has progressed since then, so I particularly wanted to put down this probing amendment to draw attention to the issue.

I have not addressed just transport, because I want to know what is happening in other settings for these children as well, which is why I have included them in the amendment. This is perhaps a much more limited issue than the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, was outlining, but I look forward to hearing from the Minister that the Government are planning to do something about it if, as I have no reason to doubt, it is still continuing, and to stop it.

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 126, in my name, is in this group. This amendment relates to a discreet issue for children who are under a High Court deprivation of liberty order but who are not also looked-after children under the Children Act. Approximately 96% of those children under a High Court deprivation of liberty order are also looked-after children under the Children Act, but then they end up at the High Court, as there is a shortage of Section 25 secure accommodation. Only in Section 25 accommodation under the Children Act can a looked-after child be restricted of their liberty—that currently means a secure children’s home—so they are also put under a High Court DoL so that the local authority can deprive them of their liberty in non-Section-25-type accommodation. It seems that by the move to the phrasing “relevant accommodation” the Bill will regularise in law their situation, which is that 96% of these young people are currently under that inherent jurisdiction deprivation of liberty order. However, there are currently 4% of children under a High Court deprivation of liberty order who are not also looked-after children under the Children Act.

I want to thank the President of the Family Division, Sir Andrew McFarlane. I believe that it was his work that brought in the Nuffield Family Justice Observatory, when High Court DoLS—as we would call them—began to be used as a jurisdiction. It is due only to that work that we know that, within that group, we have this little group—the 4%—who are not also looked-after children. Even an amended Section 25 of the Children Act refers only to looked-after children having their liberty being restricted in what would now be known as “relevant accommodation”. They would still be left under the High Court jurisdiction, with fewer safeguards. The whole purpose of Clause 11 is to bring from the inherent jurisdiction these children under a statutory system of protection, safeguards and reviews.

This 4% of around 1,280 children last year are often children coming out of the mental health estate. They have been taken into hospital for their own protection and for treatment; then they are discharged but, for health reasons, their home is no longer suitable. In my view, they are not going to pass the threshold test under the Children Act 1989 to be a looked-after child, because the threshold test—philosophically and in practice—is about harm by the care or neglect of the adult who should be caring for them or the fact of their being out of control. Neither of those circumstances seem in most cases to apply to a young person who has gone into the mental health estate and then been discharged.

While I recognise the imperfections of the current drafting of Amendment 126—for instance, it might trigger other provisions of the Children Act if we deem these children to be looked after-children—I chose that mechanism to try to bring them under the safeguards that we will have for children under Section 25 who are looked-after children, and not leave them still to be under the inherent jurisdiction of the High Court. I hope that that serves to be a mechanism for the Minister to explain what the situation is for that small group of children.

I imagine it was envisaged by Sir Andrew McFarlane that he would get the data through the Nuffield work, so that we would come to Parliament, legislate and take this into statute law, out of the inherent jurisdiction. It seems to me, from Amendment 126, that unless we do something for this small group of children, he is going to have to continue needing Nuffield, because there will be a need for this type of deprivation of liberty order under the inherent jurisdiction for the group of children I have just outlined.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Baroness Berridge

Committee stage
Wednesday 22nd January 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Berridge (Con)]

My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 147. I find myself in agreement with much that has been said. It has been a consistent recommendation to His Majesty’s Government since the independent review that there should be a statutory test of competence or capacity for those aged under 16. Of course, that means it should be in the Bill. This has been supported by the Children’s Commissioner of late and by the Children and Young People’s Mental Health Alliance.

Therefore, I was disappointed to see the code of practice solution outlined in the Minister’s policy paper that we received yesterday. As the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, outlined, in the Mental Capacity Act, which applies to over-16s, there is a functional capacity test followed by the secondary mental impairment test. I also agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler, that under-16s are presumed to lack capacity, so you start from the opposite premise of the Mental Capacity Act for over-16s, who are presumed to have capacity. That puts them at an advantage: it has to be taken from them, rather than being given to under-16s.

I agree with the comments of the noble Lord, Lord Meston. Great work is being done by clinicians up and down the country to apply Gillick competence tests, but throughout my time on the Joint Committee we did not seem to know whether there was any review or assessment as to how and when it is applied in hospitals and healthcare settings up and down the country. I fail to understand the Government’s reluctance to put this test in the Bill. How is such a reluctance compatible with one of the four guiding principles—to treat the person as an individual? Perhaps the Minister could outline the reasoning for this omission.

I also want to point to the problem of relying on the code of practice made under Section 118 of the Mental Health Act. On page 13 of the code of practice, there is a very clear description of the code and its legislative function:

“Whilst the whole of the Code should be followed, please note that where ‘must’ is used, it reflects legal obligations in legislation, (including other legislation such as the Human Rights Act 1998) or case law, and must be followed. Where the Code uses the term ‘should’ then departures should be documented and recorded”.


It then refers to explanatory paragraphs and continues:

“Where the Code gives guidance using the terms ‘may’, ‘can’ or ‘could’ then the guidance in the Code is to be followed wherever possible”.


In the Minister’s policy statements, there is often the use of “will”, which, as far as I understand, is a “must”. Bearing in mind what I just read, unless something is in the Bill then even putting this test into the Bill will mean that it is only, at the very best, a “should” and can be departed from. Obviously, that applies across all of the places in which the Minister relies on the defence of, “We’re going to put it in a code”. I note that it is a code that we have not seen and will be consulted on only after the passing of the legislation.

Dealing again with the amendment, it is important to determine capacity and, as Mind has said in its excellent briefing, the question of whether a person has capacity or competence to make the relevant decision is fundamental to the operation of key rights and safeguards. To build on the point from the noble Lord, Lord Meston, as I understand it the Bill contains 13 references to competence. It deals with such important matters as the appointment of their nominated person and, if you are under the age of 16, your freedom to choose someone other than the person with parental responsibility depends on your having competence. There is also the ability to refuse medication. To deal with the point made, I think, by the noble Lord, Lord Stevens, who was concerned about leakage across, this is a very particular piece of legislation with such coercive power, as I am sure he is aware, that the case for putting the test in the Bill to open up those safeguards for young people is very important.

The Government’s response to the consultation stated:

“We are committed to ensuring that children and young people benefit from the reforms we plan to introduce”.


Will the Minister therefore explain again how the lack of a statutory test is consistent with maximising that choice and autonomy?

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly having attached my name to Amendment 147, to which the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, was just speaking so powerfully. I will not repeat anything that people far more expert legally than me have already said, but will just make a couple of small points.