Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Wednesday 18th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to support the amendments so powerfully, and with considerable detail, explained by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I want to cross-reference a couple of things. I was unable to be here for the whole discussion on the last group in this Committee but I came in and heard the Minister reassuring us that there are layers of support in the DWP for identifying the vulnerable and that there is regular vulnerability training.

I have to contrast that with one of my last contributions in this Committee and this Room, talking about the horrendous case of Nicola Green. I try to share as much as I can of what I am doing in the Chamber so that it is available to the world. I have to say that the little parliamentary video of that exchange, with its less-than-ideal lighting—no offence to anyone who is doing their best they can with the television—has, you could reasonably say, gone viral, because there is a flood of comments of people saying what the DWP has done to them. I cannot attest, of course, to the truth of every one of those comments, but there is a profound problem of trust with the DWP.

I fully acknowledge that the Minister, when she was on the Opposition benches, and I have often spoken out strongly on this matter. The Government actually called an inquiry into the DWP’s treatment of disabled people after the EHRC expressed concern that equality had been breached. That is the context in which we are looking at these amendments.

The noble Baroness is calling for people to have a day in court—to be able to have a genuinely independent voice in our greatly respected courts and put the case. If they indeed have committed fraud and can afford the repayments, or it is not a complete error by the DWP, or the DWP is at fault or is not being realistic about how much people need to eat and live, the court will make a ruling. That, surely, is regarded as a basic principle and right in our law.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly to Amendments 102 and 122, which would require the Secretary of State to apply to the court for a direct deduction order—a DDO. I confess that I am struggling a bit to understand the circumstances in which the Secretary of State would be able to make a direct deduction order, as the Bill is drafted. I hope the Minister will be able to help me.

When we discussed the DDOs in relation to Part 1 of the Bill, the noble Baroness, Lady Anderson, correctly pointed out that a direct deduction order could be made only in circumstances where either there had been a final determination of the amount of the liability by a court or the person concerned had agreed that the amount was payable. I agreed then that that was an important safeguard, as it is a significant restriction on when the DDO process could be used under Part 1. I asked why, if the court was making the determination of liability, we did not just leave the court to determine the way in which it should be repaid, rather than requiring new powers for the Minister to make that decision. The noble Baroness was kind enough to offer to write to me on that, and I very much look forward to receiving her letter.

However, I think the same issue may arise here, except that I am struggling to find the definition of the amount recoverable described in paragraph 1(1) of new Schedule 3ZA, inserted by Schedule 5 to the Bill. Can the Minister please explain how the amount recoverable is determined, and by whom? Does this part have the same safeguard as Part 1, which is either final court determination or agreement by the person concerned, or is it at the discretion of the Secretary of State? I can see, in Clause 89, that the person must have been convicted of an offence or agreed to pay a penalty. That raises the question: does this DDO regime apply in cases or error, or not? Presumably, in cases of error there will not be a conviction or a penalty, so it does not apply in the case of error, but I am confused.

I cannot find anywhere the amount being determined by a court; that is where I am struggling a bit. If the recoverable amount has not been decided by the court, then the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, is likely to be necessary. That is particularly important because, just as it does in Part 1, for understandable reasons, the appeal process to the First-tier Tribunal against a DDO prevents a person appealing with respect to the amount that is recoverable. If that is the case, and the amount recoverable has not been determined by a court, I think there is an issue here.

Public Authorities (Fraud, Error and Recovery) Bill

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Wednesday 11th June 2025 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, we have been debating Part 1, which gives substantial powers to the Cabinet Office when the Minister has reasonable grounds to suspect fraud, and we are about to kick off on Part 2, which gives substantial powers to the DWP. Those include police-style powers to enter private premises, search them and seize property, as well as powers to demand information. Those are potentially very intrusive powers, so it is essential that they can be exercised only when it is genuinely appropriate to do so.

The two amendments in this group cover both Parts 1 and 2, and they provide essential clarification as to how the DWP and PSFA should interpret the legal threshold for most of the investigative powers in the Bill, which is the requirement to have “reasonable grounds” of suspicion of fraud.

The amendments are intended to ensure that, when the DWP and PSFA are exercising their investigative powers under this Bill, reasonable grounds do not include generalisations or stereotypes of certain categories of people—for example, that members of a particular social group are more likely to be involved in fraudulent activity than others. Investment in data analytics and other emerging technologies, such as AI, for fraud risk detection is inevitably, and probably rightly, increasing. The Government have signalled their intention to turbocharge AI and to mainline AI into the veins of the nation, including the public sector.

The Government are, as we speak, trying to pass the Data (Use and Access) Bill, which would repeal the current ban on automated decision-making and profiling of individuals. The DWP has invested heavily in artificial intelligence, widening its scope last year to include use of a machine-learning tool to identify fraud in universal credit advances applications, and it intends to develop further models. This is despite a warning from the Auditor-General in 2023 of

“an inherent risk that the algorithms are biased towards selecting claims for review from certain vulnerable people or groups with protected characteristics”.

The DWP admitted that its,

“ability to test for unfair impacts across protected characteristics is currently limited”.

There are real concerns about the inaccuracy of algorithms, particularly when such inaccuracy is discriminatory, when mistakes disproportionately impact a certain group of people. It is well evidenced that machine-learning algorithms can learn to discriminate in a way that no democratic society would wish to incorporate into any reasonable decision-making process about individuals. An internal DWP fairness analysis of the universal credit payments algorithm, which was published only due to a freedom of information request, has revealed a “statistical significant outcome disparity” according to people’s age, disability, marital status and nationality.

This is not just a theoretical concern. Recent real-life experiences in both the Netherlands and Sweden should provide a real warning for us, and are clear evidence that we must have robust safeguards in place. Machine-learning algorithms used in the Netherlands’ child tax credit scandal learned to profile those with dual nationality and low income as being suspects for fraud. From 2015 to 2019, the authorities penalised families over suspicion of fraud based on the system’s risk indicators. Tens of thousands of families, often with lower incomes or belonging to ethnic minorities, were pushed into poverty. Some victims committed suicide. More than a thousand children were taken into foster care. The scandal ultimately led to the resignation of the then Prime Minister, Mark Rutte.

In Sweden in 2024, an investigation found that the machine-learning system used by the country’s social insurance agency is disproportionately flagging certain groups for further investigation over social benefits fraud, including women, individuals with foreign backgrounds, low-income earners and people without university degrees. Once cases are flagged, fraud investigators have the power to trawl through a person’s social media accounts, obtain data from institutions and even interview an individual’s neighbours as part of their investigations.

The two amendments that I have tabled are based on paragraph 2.2 of Code A to the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984, in relation to police stop and search powers, which states that:

“Reasonable suspicion cannot be based on generalisations or stereotypical images of certain groups or categories of people as more likely to be involved in criminal activity”.


These amendments would not reduce the ability of departments to go after fraud. Indeed, I argue that by ensuring that the reasonable suspicion is genuine, rather than based on stereotypes, they should improve the targeting of investigations and therefore make the investigations more effective, not less so.

The Bill extends substantial intrusive powers to the Cabinet Office, the PFSA and the DWP, and those powers must be subject to robust safeguards in the Bill. The use of “generalisations or stereotypes”, whether through automated systems or otherwise, should never be seen as grounds for reasonable suspicion. I hope the Minister will see the need for these safeguards in that context, just as they are needed and exist in relation to stop and search powers. I beg to move.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux of Harrowden, and to speak in favour of Amendments 75A and 79A, to which I have attached my name and which noble Lords will see have rather broad support in political terms—perhaps not the broadest I have ever seen but it is certainly up there. I must also pay tribute to Justice, a cross-party law reform and human rights organisation that is the UK section of the International Commission of Jurists, which has been most determined in ensuring that these issues are raised in this Bill, in this context.

I have already addressed these issues in the Chamber in a number of amendments to the Employment Rights Bill that I tabled and spoke to. I am not going to repeat all that I said there, but I cross-reference those amendments. If noble Lords want to find out more about this issue, there is an excellent book by the researcher Shannon Vallor, The AI Mirror, which is a useful metaphor for understanding the risks whereby we live in a biased society in which those biases risk being reflected back to us and magnified by the use of artificial intelligence and algorithms. That is very much what these two amendments seek to address.

The noble Lord has already given us two international examples of where using AI, algorithms, stereotypes and generalisations in investigations has gone horribly wrong. I have to add a third example, which is the infamous case in Australia of “Robodebt”. That was an automated debt recovery and assessment programme, from the rough equivalent of the DWP, that was exercised in Australia. There was controversy before and through its implementation, and it was an unmitigated disaster. I point the Minister and others to the fact that there was a Royal Commission in Australia which said the programme had been

“a costly failure of public administration in both human and economic terms”.

I note that the House of Representatives in Australia passed a public apology to the huge number of people who were affected.

In a way, I argue that these amendments are a protection for the Government, that this will be written into law: there is a stop that says, “No, we cannot allow things to run out of control in the way we have seen in so many international examples”. I think these are truly important amendments. I hope we might hear positive things from the Minister but, if not, we are going to have to keep pursuing these issues, right across the spectrum. I was very taken: Hansard will not record the tone of voice in which the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, said that the Government wish “to mainline AI”, but it is important to note that a concerning approach is being taken by the Government to the whole issue of artificial so-called intelligence.

Data Protection and Digital Information Bill

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Wednesday 17th April 2024 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for his answer. This has been a fairly short but fruitful debate. We can perhaps commend the Minister for his resilience, although it feels like he was pounded back on the ropes a few times along the way.

I will briefly run through the amendments. I listened carefully to the Minister, although I will have to read it back in Hansard. I think he was trying to say that my Amendment 195A, which adds energy and carbon intensity to this list, is already covered. However, I really cannot see how that can be claimed to be the case. The one that appears to be closest is sub-paragraph (iv), which refers to “performance or quality”, but surely that does not include energy and carbon intensity. I will consider whether to come back to this issue.

The noble Baroness, Lady Young of Old Scone, presented a wonderfully clear explanation of why Amendment 218 is needed. I particularly welcome the comments from the noble Lord, Lord Bassam, expressing strong Labour support for this. Even if the Government do not see the light and include it in the Bill, I hope that the noble Lord’s support can be taken as a commitment that a future Labour Government intend to follow that practice in all their approaches.

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

Good try.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

It was worth a try.

Economic Crime and Corporate Transparency

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage
Thursday 27th April 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, who so ably chaired the Fraud Act 2006 and Digital Fraud Committee of which I was also a member. She has given a lot of detail, so I will try to slash out bits of my speech that she has already covered and not repeat too much—I apologise if I fail slightly in that.

I think that we all know about the scale of fraud in this country. However, I think it is worth repeating what the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, said about the impact that fraud has on the victims. This is not just a financial crime and “Oh, I’ve lost some money”. We heard stories about mental health issues, even suicide, arising from frauds. It is a really serious matter. Losing your life savings is serious but it goes way beyond that.

Yet we do not seem to have taken much action. We have heard several times about the 1% of law enforcement resources that are focused on it. The government response has been fragmented—we refer in our report to an “alphabet soup” of bodies dealing with it. Our report referred to this creating

“a permissive culture across Government and law enforcement agencies towards fraud and the criminals who perpetrate it”.

At the risk of sounding like a stuck record, we have been waiting for months for the national fraud strategy—I think I detect that the Minister is as frustrated as we are about the delay. I am pleased that it has moved from “shortly”, as he said on 15 November last year, to “genuinely imminent” today. We look forward to it. However, the delay does not inspire huge confidence in how seriously the Government are taking this.

The noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, described what we called the “fraud chain” in our report. It is sometimes known as the “kill chain”; we decided that that was not a particularly pleasant phrase, but it again conveys the seriousness of it. Some parts of the chain are, at last, taking action. In particular, the banking sector has taken a number of actions that have had a positive impact; the introduction of the confirmation of payee process is a good example. But why has that sector in particular taken action? I would argue it is because it has had, almost alone in the chain, a real financial incentive to do so with the voluntary reimbursement code. It has been on the hook for paying back and reimbursing, therefore it is trying to do something to stop it. The voluntary code is now becoming mandatory under the Financial Services and Markets Bill, which is welcome.

It is also interesting to see, in the financial services and banking area, some competitive elements creeping in. The TSB uses the fact that it now reimburses all APP fraud losses as a selling point, which is encouraging. On the other hand, those banks that did not sign up to the voluntary reimbursement code are often cited as being more likely to see greater fraud levels on their customers; with less incentive to take action, they have taken less action. Making the code mandatory will, I hope, force them to start to do so.

We have heard about the other players in the fraud chain, those who make it possible for the fraudster to carry out the fraud—the enablers, if you like. They have no such incentive to act at the moment and, as a result, they have not acted, or not in any meaningful way. These enablers are players such as social media companies, search engines, online dating companies, the telecoms industry, website hosting companies, email platforms, ISPs, online gaming platforms, intermediary platforms and those selling bulk SIM cards or SIM farms, which the fraudsters use—and many more. I am sure that, as this area moves and changes, as it does very rapidly, we will see fraudsters constantly jumping into new areas and doing new things. They will react; there will be plenty more that we have not thought about.

From speaking to a major UK fintech, I know that around half the frauds it sees start from platforms operated by Meta, and more than half arise on just four platforms. In a debate on protecting vulnerable people from fraud on 2 December 2021, the noble Baroness, Lady Williams of Trafford, answering for the Government, said:

“As for discussions with Facebook, I have lost count of the number of discussions that I have had. One thing that we said way back in the day was, ‘Look, if you don’t sort some of these problems out, we’re going to legislate to sort them out’—and this is where we are now”.—[Official Report, 2/12/21; col. 316GC.]


A year and half later, we are still there.

As we have heard, we were particularly unimpressed with the telecoms industry, which was at best depressingly complacent. Who in this Room has not received a fraudulent SMS message or phone call appearing to come from a UK number such as HMRC or Royal Mail? I guarantee that nobody in this Room has not. To be fair, some telecoms companies are now taking action. EE, for example, flags suspicious calls, which proves that it can be done. But most have not taken action. They are paid for all these calls and texts, as the noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, has said but, because there is no come-back on them at all, they have taken little or no action to stop them. I have not been able to find reliable data as to what proportion of scams originate from telecoms companies; rough data seems to indicate that it is somewhere around 20% to 25%.

Amendment 94 aims to create an incentive for all players in the fraud chain to take action. Effectively, it creates an offence of failing to take reasonable steps to prevent the use of a company’s services for the purpose of committing fraud—by a third party; it does not have to be related to the company. The amendment is deliberately scoped widely, rather than industry by industry; it tries to make it so that anyone providing a service that could reasonably be expected to be used by fraudsters should have to take reasonable steps to detect and prevent that use. That does not seem particularly extreme. It creates a defence that the company had in place such procedures as it was reasonable, in all the circumstances, to expect to detect and prevent the use of its services for the purposes of committing fraud, or that it could not reasonably have known that they were being used for such purposes.

When we get to the discussion that we will no doubt have about this being disproportionate, I will disagree. Any court is going to look at a small company, and that is one of all the circumstances that it will take into account when deciding what would be reasonable for detecting and preventing fraud. It cannot be too much to ask that companies should have to put reasonable procedures in place. I think that it is a pretty low bar, but I am sure that we would all be very happy to discuss how the amendment might be tweaked or changed to ensure that it does not have a disproportionate impact on businesses. But it would be good to hear whether, first, the Minister agrees that there is genuinely a problem in this area and, secondly, whether he agrees conceptually that creating a real incentive for companies to take more care to ensure that their services are not being used by criminals is necessary.

The Online Safety Bill goes some way to achieving this in some respects—and I thank the Minister for arranging for me to meet officials yesterday, who were extremely helpful in getting me up to speed on what that Bill does. It does that especially in relation to fraudulent advertising, and that is very welcome, but it does not cover all the enabling industries, even the ones we know about now, let alone those in future. It does not cover telecoms, email providers or web-hosting companies, for example, and is more focused on the large players. It also does not cover all the activities. Previously I mentioned people selling SIM farms or other tools used by fraudsters. They would not be caught by it. It will not catch the SMS with a link to a fake Royal Mail site, for example.

What worries me is that the approach of using lots of different pieces of legislation to deal with this problem, such as the Online Safety Bill and the others that the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, mentioned, leaves us in danger of creating a piecemeal approach, mirroring the alphabet soup of responsible bodies that I mentioned. This amendment would create an overarching obligation on any business to take reasonable steps to prevent the use of its services by fraudsters, whether on or offline.

Amendment 91, in the name of Baroness Bowles, attacks the problem from the point of view of regulators, conferring a duty on them, or giving them the option, to create a duty to prevent or facilitate crime regulation. It names a number of regulators, including Ofcom in respect of telecoms and other communications platforms. It mentions the ICAEW, so I should remind the Committee of my interest as a member of that body—I keep doing that, I am very boring. Personally, I think these two amendments would actually work quite well together. If Ofcom, for example, set out a code of conduct for telecoms companies to follow, that could work as the defence mentioned in Amendment 94.

However we do it, we must incentivise all enablers in the fraud chain to do the right thing. There is an excellent opportunity in this Bill to do it now. Further delay will lead to countless more innocent people losing their savings and being traumatised. I very much hope the Minister will be willing to approach this constructively, even if he does not like some of the specifics in the amendments. I support the noble Baroness’s suggestion about the analysis of how all these Bills work together, which would be very helpful.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord, Lord Vaux, and everyone who has contributed to this crucial debate. I feel I should begin with an apology for not taking part in the debate on the failure to prevent in the first group, but that is because I was in the debate on the Online Safety Bill, with an amendment to which I had attached my name. It is a grave pity that we are debating two such important and closely linked Bills on a Thursday, with the pressures that is putting on your Lordships’ House, but in this group we have seen that we are overcoming those challenges and doing a great job of scrutiny, as we should be doing.

I will be quite brief and again try not to go over any of the same ground as others, but something that struck me when I looked at the Online Safety Bill was that action against fraud and other crime was utterly missing from it. In fact, I considered tabling amendments, but the drafting job was, frankly, beyond the capabilities available to me. The way it has worked out fits very well with this Bill and draws on the capacity of people involved with this Bill, whereas the other Bill has been taken in a somewhat different direction. It is worth noting that this is a safety issue—the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, referred to this. The noble Baroness said that it does not only affect older people, but it is worth noting that it is particularly an issue for them. If you are hit by a fraud when working in a system that you already found challenging and difficult to engage with, you lose confidence in your ability to operate in the world. We have a loneliness epidemic, with many people struggling to survive, with the Government stressing digital first, digital first. The impact on older people in particular is an earthquake through their lives, and that needs to be noted.

Lots of people talked about the scale of that problem, but I do not think anyone has mentioned that UK Finance, the trade association for the UK banking and financial sectors, said that financial fraud is now a national security threat. That ties in with the earlier amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Alton. In the first half of 2021, more than £750 million was stolen, and that was a 30% increase on the same period from the previous year, so we are looking at something that is escalating and absolutely demands action.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Consideration of Commons amendments
Tuesday 14th March 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I join in the congratulations to the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman, who is both a force for nature and a force of nature in your Lordships’ House. I thank everyone else who has joined in getting this progress on nature-based solutions, although we should not look at those solutions as an alternative to cutting our carbon emissions. Both those things have to be done.

I was not going to speak but, given something the Minister said in her introduction, I feel forced to ask her a question. In justifying the exclusion of “circular economy” in the Commons amendment, she said that it was “not a precise term”. Does the Treasury understand the term “circular economy” and its essential nature in delivering the sustainable society we need? If the Minister wants a source for this, I point to a government paper entitled, Circular Economy Package policy statement, from 30 July 2020, which was put out jointly with Wales, Scotland and Northern Ireland and which defined “circular economy” as

“keeping resources in use as long as possible, extracting maximum value from them, minimizing waste and promoting resource efficiency”.

Will the Minister confirm that the Treasury recognises that the circular economy is an acknowledged term and is urgently needed?

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I wanted to thank the Government and to associate myself with the words of the noble Baroness, Lady Hayman. I thank them for their constructive engagement, which has allowed us to reach a satisfactory conclusion.

However, I thank the Government for listening in relation to a couple of other places. First, during the progress of the Bill through this House we had a lot of discussions about the position of the devolved Administrations and how they should be involved. While they have not gone as far as I should have liked, I welcome the amendments that have now been included and the constructive engagement that has obviously taken place with the devolved Administrations. That is a nice change from some of the things that we have seen with other legislation in the past.

Secondly, Amendment 8 is identical to an amendment that I tabled on Report, which shortens the reporting cycle to five years. My amendment was not accepted by the Government at that time. When I tabled it, it led to what I think was a unique achievement of being co-signed by both the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, and the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle. That has not been achieved before or since. I said at the time that such a unique and powerful alliance should make the Government take that amendment seriously, so I am delighted and grateful that they have done so.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Report stage
Monday 4th July 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, briefly, I support Amendment 20 in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas. It is self-evident that the bank’s board should have the experience and skills that the noble and learned Lord proposes in his amendment, rather than just being Treasury placemen. The success or failure of the bank in achieving its objectives will depend entirely on the experience of the people running it, so I urge the Minister to accept this very common-sense amendment.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I offer Green group support for Amendment 20, to which we would have attached our name had there been space.

In Committee, I suggested that the bank should not be in the hands of the Treasury at all. I got some expressions of interest but not enough support to bring it back on Report. However, it is clear that we need systems thinking, as I often say in your Lordships’ House. We need an approach that looks beyond the narrow growth in GDP to something broader and more holistic. This amendment is a step towards achieving that.

UK Infrastructure Bank Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle and Lord Vaux of Harrowden

Committee stage & Lords Hansard - Part 2
Tuesday 14th June 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Vaux of Harrowden (CB)]

My Lords, I will be very brief in speaking to my Amendment 46, but first, let me say that I support the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer. Frankly, they seem like normal, good practice and it is almost surprising that they are not already in the Bill.

Amendment 46 is very simple. The bank’s activities will cover the whole of the UK, including the devolved nations. I welcome that—it is a really good thing—but while allowing the bank to operate in the devolved nations, the Bill gives absolutely no right at all to the devolved Governments to have any say in how it operates. I would be completely opposed to giving veto rights or anything of that nature, but I do think it would be appropriate to allow them at least some input into the bank’s direction. As someone who lives in Scotland, I am not the world’s greatest fan of the Scottish Government, but devolution is a fact and we have to live with it and work with it. The devolved Governments have perfectly reasonable interests in how investment is directed in their countries.

It seems to me that the easiest way to achieve this is just to allow the devolved Governments to be represented on the board of the bank. Amendment 46 would simply allow the devolved Governments each to appoint a director to the board. That way, they would have the ability to represent their legitimate interests without introducing any veto rights or anything of that nature, which, obviously, we should avoid.

If we want to keep this union together, we need to recognise that the devolved Governments have legitimate interests, and we need to try to work together.

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, and to find myself in broad agreement with him on a number of areas of this Bill, if not always on the details—as with our views on the Scottish Government, which, of course, has Green Ministers among its members.

My amendment is rather similar to his, although perhaps not quite so expansive on the devolved Administrations. It says that

“a director must be appointed”

jointly by

“the governments of Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland”.

It specifies two other directors, one of which would be appointed by the Climate Change Committee. I am a little disappointed that the noble Lord, Lord Deben, is not in his place, as I would be interested in his view on that. The third director—there is a deep irony here, and I should point out that I tabled this amendment some 10 days ago—would jointly represent Natural England, Nature Scotland and Natural Resources Wales.

In a sense, this is another way of getting at the issue I was trying to get at earlier. The Treasury does not really have expertise on environmental and social issues and devolution, and the same can be said, often, of bankers. This is an attempt to ensure that the directors really do have that expertise.

However, events have forced me to reflect at this point on the fact that a lot of our earlier discussions were about the operational independence of the bank. It is rather telling that Natural England was, of course, an independent body, and over the last decade it has gradually lost its independence under the hold of Defra. It was deprived of its independent online presence and its own press office in 2012, and in 2018 its former chair, Andrew Sells, confirmed that the body is no longer independent.

It has emerged in the last week—buried deep in a consultative proposal that campaigners have only just uncovered—that the Government are consulting on dismantling Natural England. That has caused a great deal of concern but it is a real demonstration of so many points that noble Lords have been making about how Governments can have structures that are supposed to hold them to account and somehow, through a process over a decade or so, effectively dissolve those structures.

This is an attempt to deal with the issues that the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, has already covered well. I also point to the Second Reading speech from the noble Lord, Lord Wigley. I will not go through it in detail but what he said there was that the bank needs to work with the grain of devolved Governments, regional and local government. Looking at this amendment now, I wonder if I should not also have put “a representative of local government” in it, but that is something to think about for Report.