Serious Crime Bill [Lords]
Debate between Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford and Robert Buckland(9 years, 2 months ago)
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The Solicitor-General
I hear what the hon. Lady says and take her remarks in the spirit that I know she intends. We are moving on these issues, and much has been achieved in the past few years in acknowledging that we are dealing with children and can no longer have a sort of double standard when it comes to their protection. In Committee we debated so-called “ostensible consent”, which at one time was in sentencing guidelines. That has gone from the law—indeed, a case I conducted in the Court of Appeal last week made it absolutely clear that for young children the concept of consent in sexual activity has no place in the law of England and Wales. Let me reiterate my point: we are making progress and there will be a consultation as soon as possible. I therefore urge the hon. Lady and Opposition Members not to divide the House on the new clause.
On new clause 2, I listened carefully to the impassioned speech of the hon. Member for Bassetlaw (John Mann). It was the sort of speech that we need to hear in this House because it reiterated not only his determination to uncover child abuse—whether historical or current—but the determination that we should all have to follow evidence wherever it may lead without fear or favour.
As we know, the Official Secrets Act is intended to protect certain classes of particularly sensitive information such as security and intelligence matters, and it provides for a number of offences that prevent current or former Crown servants or Government contractors from disclosing certain information without lawful authority. It does not prevent protected information from being disclosed to an officer of an official investigation or inquiry into historical child abuse. In particular, information may be disclosed where the disclosure is made in accordance with that person’s official duty or is otherwise authorised. Departments and Ministers can permit current and former civil servants and Government contractors to share knowledge and documentation with an inquiry. As my right hon. Friend the Home Secretary made clear in her statement to this House on 4 February, official authorisation would be given for the Goddard inquiry.
On the historical institutional abuse inquiry in Northern Island, the Attorney-General has already made a public undertaking that no evidence given by a person to the inquiry will be used as evidence against them in any criminal proceeding, including any offence under the Official Secrets Act. Indeed, the Attorney-General would be ready to consider any similar request from Justice Goddard if one were made. I assure the hon. Member for Bassetlaw that the Government are committed to assisting Justice Goddard’s inquiry and all other inquiries into child abuse. We are satisfied that the Official Secrets Act is not, will not, and should not be a bar to evidence being provided, but I am grateful to him for raising that important issue.
Let me turn to new clause 11, in the name of the right hon. Member for Dwyfor Meirionnydd (Mr Llwyd). As he said, this has been covered in Committee. I reiterate that anomalies will inevitably exist when it comes to how we classify children and young people in law. I am afraid there is no one age division to fit all circumstances. Despite the fact that, with his usual cunning, he has come up with a slightly different way of dealing with some of the mischiefs I mentioned in Committee, I am still concerned that, in genuinely attempting to correct one anomaly, we might end up creating another. We still believe that in this area of the law we need to focus on the protection of children and young persons under the age of 16.
In that spirit, I will come on to new clause 27, which was tabled by my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood). Her tenacity knows no bounds. She has done a lot of work to expose the scourge of child sexual exploitation in both her local area and nationally. I am grateful to her for once again raising this issue. We need to have the correct balance between additional protection, and recognition of the relevant rights and responsibilities of young people in this age group. We have given much thought to this matter. The key question for the Government is whether we think the police have sufficient powers to replace restrictions and prohibitions on people who pose a risk to vulnerable young adults aged 16 and 17. We think that the new sexual risk orders—I will come on to them in a moment—will provide the police with the powers to tackle predators. Breach of such an order will carry a sentence of up to five years’ imprisonment. We think the right balance is being struck with the combination of child abduction warning notices and sexual risk orders. We therefore do not think that we need to change the law on child abduction at this stage. That allows me neatly, I hope, to deal with new clause 19, tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham (Sarah Champion).
Nicola Blackwood
The Solicitor-General is aware that the combination of child abduction warning notices and risk of sexual harm orders leaves a gap for 16 to 17-year-olds where it is impossible to prove sexual risk and where there is a need for immediate action without going to court.
The Solicitor-General
I remind my hon. Friend that other mechanisms and other types of order exist, and ask her to bear it in mind that the law was reformed by the Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Act 2014, which is just coming into force. There are other tools available to the police and enforcement authorities. We have to be careful not to seek to be over-reliant on one particular type of order. Reading carefully the recommendations and observations made by Louise Casey in the Rotherham report published only two weeks ago, there are certain concerns about an over-reliance on child abduction warning notices, as opposed to taking more direct action that has the force of statutory breach and criminal sanction on breach.
New clause 19 was tabled by the hon. Member for Rotherham. I am grateful to her for providing information she wished me to consider. I confirm that we plan to implement the new sexual risk orders before the end of this Parliament. As we all know, that is a very short space of time indeed. I reassure her that we will publish guidance on their use and we will work with the police to review their effectiveness, including in the context of how child abduction warning notices are used. As a result of our productive meeting, Barnardo’s will be consulted as a part of that process.
The hon. Member for Stockport (Ann Coffey) made a point about references to the phrase “child prostitution” in a number of other Acts and regulations. The Government’s amendments to schedule 4 pick up the references to child prostitution in primary legislation, and we have a power in clause 79(2) to amend secondary legislation. That should help to clean up and clear up references to child prostitution in a number of regulations.
Home Affairs
Debate between Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford and Robert Buckland(9 years, 11 months ago)
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Mr Buckland
My hon. Friend has made a fair point, but I am afraid that he is in error. The directive provides a power that allows member states to have a registration system for people who wish to stay here for longer than three months. Let us not propagate the myth that the directive is an open door. It is not, and, with domestic enforcement, it can be better managed.
My hon. Friend makes a proper point about planning and public services, but we must also remember that without some migration some of the jobs that need to be done in our economy are not going to be done, and the question we have to ask is, who will do that work?
I am a great campaigner for the rights of people with disabilities, and I passionately believe they have their role to play in our growing work force. I know that is what they want, and that is also what they deserve, but getting to that ideal stage takes time. It takes time for employers to start to understand the benefits of employing people who perhaps have more challenges than others. While I want to get there, I understand the pressure on employers who, for example, cannot collect their crop or who cannot find a suitable person to fulfil a care role. Working with employers to encourage more employment locally—more indigenous employment, as it were—is a laudable aspiration and is the right thing to do, but to try artificially to close a door is bad news for our country and our economy and is not a realistic approach to a problem that has deeply complex origins and should not be viewed through the prism of cheap headlines and political slogans. That is what happens far too often in the debate on migration, and it is time we stopped that misleading and unhelpful approach. Let us show leadership on that issue.
Turning to issues relating to the UK passport agency, may I thank it for having helped a constituent of mine reach the beaches of Normandy last week? Mr Harry Prescott is now 92 years of age. The last time he was in Normandy he was a 21-year-old Royal Marine in Operation Overlord. By an odd quirk, he was not classified as a British citizen. He was born in Canada to UK parents, and for various reasons never ended up with a British passport. He wanted to play his part in the 70th anniversary commemorations, however, but when the time came for him to apply for a passport, he encountered a number of blocks to his application—the sort of bureaucracy that I know drives Members of this House quietly round the bend and which was certainly causing him a degree of frustration. I was contacted by 47 Royal Marine Commando Association about his predicament, and together we were able to prevail on the passport service to pull its finger out and get on with the job of issuing him with a passport. He was therefore able to join his comrades and colleagues and play his part in commemorating the momentous events that took place in Normandy 70 years ago. I therefore offer my genuine thanks, via my hon. Friend the Minister, to those in the passport service who made that possible.
With the help of Action for Children, one of our leading children’s charities, and other parliamentarians, I have been campaigning for a number of years now for a reform to the criminal law of child neglect. Paul Goggins has been referred to in many other contexts, but it would be wholly wrong of me not to pay tribute to him for the work he did on this important issue. The Crime and Courts Act 2013 was in Bill form when Paul presented an amendment in his and my name which will, in effect, be the basis of a provision that will appear in the Serious Crime Bill. The argument is a simple one. The criminal law of child neglect was drafted way back in 1868—some 150 years ago. It served an important purpose in its time, but times move on. Just because a law is old does not mean it is a bad law—far from it—but with the knowledge and understanding we now have about the full effects of all types of abuse of children and young people, I think it was remiss, to say the least, that we had not before now updated the criminal law to keep pace not only with developments in science and understanding, but with the developing civil and family law that already recognises varying types of abuse, including emotional abuse, when considering issues of family protection and whether or not a child is at risk or has experienced significant harm.
Very often, emotional abuse does not come alone. It will be accompanied, sadly, by physical and sexual abuse. Daniel Pelka is one of many well-known cases in which the signs of emotional abuse were emerging before the physical abuse took its toll on that poor young lad. It pains me to think that the police, the prosecuting authorities and all those with responsibility for child protection did not have that extra tool in the box when it came to dealing with emotional abuse. I am not saying that it might have changed the course of young Daniel’s life, but it could have made a difference to his life and it certainly will make a difference to the lives of hundreds of children and young people in this country if and when we amend the law to include emotional abuse. The criminal law is an interesting thing for those who have been imbued with it for the past 20 years, as I have. I believe that a lot of people would have been shocked to realise that section 1 of the Children and Young Persons Act 1933 covered only physical harm, but it was made crystal clear in a House of Lords case back in 1981 that that section was limited to the
“physical needs of the child and does not cover other aspects such as moral and educational”.
That meant that the door was firmly shut on emotional abuse.
A lot of people have asked me in the past few months how one defines emotional abuse and whether the new measure will not be a problem when it comes to parenting. Are we in danger of criminalising the firm but fair parent who deprives their child of an Xbox if there has been a misdemeanour in the household? Not a bit of it. It is not about firm but fair parenting. It is not about people who administer reasonable chastisement on their children. It is not about the millions of decent men and women who, like many of us in this Chamber, learn every day what it is to bring up a child. It is about the systematic abuse of children by people who either should know better or in some sad cases do not know better.
Nicola Blackwood (Oxford West and Abingdon) (Con)
My hon. Friend has touched on an important point about this measure to protect children from neglect. Does he agree that it will be exceptionally important that the guidelines for the Serious Crime Bill define emotional abuse carefully so that statutory agencies are able to understand what they will be enforcing and parents understand the new legislation? Safeguarding sections on school websites will be a valuable resource to help parents to understand exactly what it is intended to protect against.
Mr Buckland
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. Her point about guidance will be key to all this. While we may be good at passing a law, it is for the prosecuting authorities and child protection agencies to enforce it, so we would be failing in our duty if we did not explain through debates in the House what we mean.
Empirical research shows that emotional abuse may be the most damaging form of child maltreatment because those who are responsible for administering it almost invariably are those responsible for enabling children to fulfil their developmental milestones. What do I mean by emotional neglect? It can include forcing a child to witness domestic violence, scapegoating a child, inflicting systematic humiliation and enforcing degrading punishments.
The effects of emotional neglect have been shown to be potentially lifelong and as profound, if not more so, than some of the physical effects on children. They can include depression, post-traumatic stress disorder, personality disorder, aggression, dissociation, mental illness and even suicide. Children who experience rejection or neglect are less able to learn and achieve good educational outcomes than their peers, so in addition to the psychiatric evidence that we have of the harm caused by emotional neglect, there is growing evidence from neuroscience that brain development is inhibited as a result, which itself leads to significant harm. We cannot ignore the developing science; we would be failing in our duty if we did.
The language of section 1 of the 1933 Act is antiquated. It uses words such as “wilful”, which has been defined by the courts as meaning “reckless”. Well, why does the Act not say that? It would be so much easier if we amended the law to make sure that people given the task of interpreting it did not misunderstand “wilful” as requiring specific intent or as being more intentional than the law requires. Why should we put people through their paces in that way by relying on archaic language?
Similarly, terms such as “unnecessary suffering” were good for the time of Dickens, but are not necessarily appropriate now. The term “significant harm” is the one that I strongly advocate. It replicates the term already used in civil law and it is the threshold test used when child protection issues are dealt with. Why not just streamline the system by bringing the language into line with that already used? The term “significant harm” can be understood but still sets a high threshold, and it goes a long way towards allaying some of the concerns of those who say that this will open the floodgates to prosecutions of the firm but fair parents about whom I was talking earlier.
The police and those involved in social work welcome the proposed reform. As I said, there was concern about the inability of the police to intervene in cases of non-physical harm, and the dislocation between criminal and civil law was leading to problems in enforcement and in interpreting the role of the police. We are making the law clear not only for members of the public but for those in the law enforcement agencies who have to do this difficult and sensitive work.
We should look at what is happening overseas. Action for Children commissioned research from 31 jurisdictions across Europe, Asia, north America, Africa and Australia, including common law jurisdictions with which we can draw direct parallels. In 25 of those 31 jurisdictions, the criminal law explicitly encompasses emotional abuse. We can see from that trawl of other countries’ legislation that emotional abuse is already recognised in other parts of the world.
How emotional abuse is defined will obviously be important when it comes to presenting evidence in court, and assistance will be gained, as it is now, from experts in the field who are trained in understanding the intellectual and psychological capacity of children. There is concern in the community of expert witnesses that, with pressure on resources, their job will become more difficult. I understand that, and it will be important to acknowledge that during our debates and to work out ways in which the criminal justice system can accommodate expert testimony. It must do so in a way that is fair to all parties while serving the interests of justice and allowing objective expert evidence to be relied on by juries when discharging their duties and applying the high test of the criminal standard of proof. The combination of significant harm and the criminal standard of proof is protection enough for those who say they are worried that the floodgates will be opened upon responsible heads.
We therefore move away from words and phrases such as “neglect”, “wilful” and “unnecessary suffering” to the term “maltreatment”, which covers the gamut of different types of harm that are caused, sadly, to our children. At a stroke it makes clear the options available to the courts. It allows sentencers the ability properly to reflect criminality by those responsible for the care of children in sentencing them appropriately. Finally, it deals with a long-standing anomaly that I am surprised we allowed to continue for so long.
This law will not apply retrospectively. We cannot, and it is right that we do not, make something criminal that was not criminal at the time it happened. I know that for those people who contacted me and other colleagues in recent months about the enduring effects of the emotional abuse that they suffered that may come as a bitter pill, but it would not be right to try to change a well known and well respected principle of law, a principle that is recognised internationally. We have to look to the future, but in doing so we should not forget the victims of the past who until now have had to suffer in silence and who have not had the justice that they deserve.
I am proud to support a Government who listened to a consultation that was conducted in recent months and who listened to the calls from my hon. Friend the Member for Ceredigion (Mr Williams), who had a private Member’s Bill in the last Session, to my hon. Friend the Member for Erewash (Jessica Lee), to me and to Members of the Opposition and former Members, such as the late Paul Goggins. Let this stand as one of his epitaphs. Let it stand as an acknowledgement of the power of politics when people come together, recognise a wrong and seek to make it good.
I have said a lot about child neglect. It is something that I saw in my own working life, and I found those cases some of the most difficult to deal with. Hon. Members who have been in practice well understand what I say. However, I do not stand here on an emotional basis; I stand here on the basis of evidence, a sense of responsibility that we as legislators must always do what is right in terms of developments in science, and a genuine and steadfast belief that when it comes to the criminal law, not only must we try to keep pace with developments, but—to use the phrase that I used earlier in another context—we must do everything we can to future-proof it. I thank my hon. Friends on the Front Bench for listening and taking appropriate action.
I have mentioned human trafficking and slavery, but I want to finish on a positive note. Unless every town, city and village in this country wakes up to the reality of human trafficking and slavery in its midst, we are not going to solve the problem. We have an increasingly aware police force, which increasingly understands the challenge and is sourcing important training and support.
Anti-social Behaviour, Crime and Policing Bill
Debate between Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford and Robert Buckland(10 years, 7 months ago)
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Nicola Blackwood (Oxford West and Abingdon) (Con)
I thank the Minister and the shadow Minister for their opening remarks. I will speak to new clause 5 and the Government amendments relating to prevention orders. I think that by now colleagues will be familiar with my reasons for tabling the new clause. The vast majority of children in this country grow up free from fear, but a vulnerable minority never know a safe or happy childhood. I will never forget sitting in the Old Bailey and listening to truly harrowing evidence of how a violent organised crime gang systematically groomed girls on Oxford’s streets to sell them for sex from as young as 11, plying them with hard drugs to make them more compliant to being repeatedly raped by strangers and conditioning them to believe that that was what real relationships were like. Too many colleagues in this House have had the same experience as me, as cases have emerged across the country. Every police force and local authority needs to take positive and proactive preventive action to root out this vile crime.
Patterns of grooming behaviour are now much better understood. We should be aiming to disrupt the process before it progresses to systematic sexual abuse, because the consequences of failing to intervene are both well documented and appallingly destructive. However, over the past few years case after case has emerged in which child protection agencies in possession of detailed intelligence have seemed unable to intervene.
In our inquiry into child sexual exploitation, the Home Affairs Committee came to a number of conclusions on why it was happening. The wider conclusions are for another day, but even leading forces, such as Lancashire police, who are proactive not only in innovative investigative techniques, but in disrupting grooming behaviour using methods such as abduction notices, licensing enforcement and dispersal orders, found that a key tool—civil prevention orders—just was not working. They have been on the statute book since 2003, as we have heard, and should be at the forefront of the fight against grooming, but instead they were found to be fundamentally flawed by a 2012 review commissioned by the Association of Chief Police Officers and written independently by Hugh Davies QC and a team of experts.
Since 2003 our understanding of patterns of sex offending and disruption techniques has progressed significantly. The purpose of new clause 5 is to reflect that progress and resolve the flaws in the existing orders. I welcome the fact that the Government have accepted the case for reform and tabled amendments today. Put simply, the reformed orders will protect more vulnerable children from sexual exploitation. That could not be more urgent, because the Children’s Commissioner estimated only this year that 16,500 children are at risk of sexual exploitation, but the prevention orders are still failing to protect them.
Before explaining how the proposed reforms will address that, let me explain why the current orders are not working. Three orders were legislated for in the Sexual Offences Act 2003: the sexual offences prevention order, the foreign travel order and the risk of sexual harm order. A SOPO can be sought on conviction, or on proof of relevant offending behaviour subsequent to that conviction, to protect a UK adult or child. An FTO can be sought on proof of offending behaviour subsequent to previous sexual conviction and can be sought to protect non-UK children. Despite some misleading coverage of this campaign, the ROSHO is already a pre-conviction order, and it can be sought on proof of two contact offences to prevent serious sexual harm to children under the age of 16. Neither new clause 5 nor the Government’s amendments would create a revolutionary pre-conviction order today. That has been an accepted necessity since 2003.
No one in this House would disagree with the principle that a person is innocent until proven guilty, which is a fundamental principle of the rule of law, but in no way would that be compromised by these amendments. The case against a defendant would have to be proved to the criminal standard, and a defendant’s procedural rights under the proposals would be identical to those in place under the current provisions. The fact is that a criminal prosecution is not the only mechanism that is necessary to achieve an acceptable level of protection against the sexual abuse of children.
Criminal prosecution is not always possible. In some situations a prosecution is found not to be in the interests of a child victim, and therefore not in the public interest. In other situations there might be compelling evidence or some technical reason why the evidence is not found to be admissible. In other cases, as we have seen recently, a vulnerable witness might simply find the court process too traumatic and so the case collapses. Anyone who follows the progress of policing and the criminal justice system will recognise that uncomfortable reality. That is why this year there were more than 23,000 reported sexual crimes against children but only 4,051 of them were prosecuted.
Mr Buckland
I pay warm tribute to my hon. Friend for the outstanding work she is doing on this issue. I echo her point about the sometimes sad limitations of the criminal justice system, which I have worked in over many years, including dealing with this type of case. I support her case about the criminal standard of proof needed for obtaining the orders and then, if the order is breached, a further criminal procedure in which the criminal standard of proof would apply, so the necessary balances and safeguards are in place.
Nicola Blackwood
Absolutely. To answer the shadow Minister’s question about whether a civil standard would be appropriate, I think that it is important to ensure that we maintain the balance. The reason it was not possible to achieve ROSHOs previously was the combination of two contact offences plus a standard of serious sexual harm. I do not think that the necessary approach now is to lower that standard of proof.
Some have expressed concern that these orders are intended as an alternative to prosecution, but that is not the case; they are simply a practical necessity alongside prosecution. As a civil order they are no different in nature from other civil orders designed to protect children, such as injunctions or restraining orders in a family court or a barring order in respect of regulated activity.
If we fail to intervene and protect vulnerable people from foreseeable harm, even if prosecution is not possible, we are failing in our duty of care. The current orders are failing. The requirement to prove two contact offences for the ROSHO produces the absurd result that an offender who sexually touched a 15-year-old twice would be eligible for an order but an offender who raped a four-year-old once would not be—the police would have to wait for the offender to do it again. That is not a sensible way to assess risk.
Furthermore, given the existence of a specific form of order to prevent foreign travel, ROSHOs have never been used in practice to protect children abroad. The outcome is that non-UK children enjoy a materially lower level of protection than an equivalent child in the UK. I hope that the House will agree that there is absolutely no defence for that disparity. Today’s proposals put an end to that inequality, which must be welcomed.
There are other basic flaws in the existing regime. Application for all three orders can be made only by the local chief of police, but all too often an offender travels ahead of the evidence between force areas, especially in grooming and trafficking cases. The ROSHO applies only in relation to children up to the age of 16, meaning that 16 to 18-year-olds, who might have been caught up in abuse from a much younger age, can only be protected by a SOPO with a much higher threshold.
Meanwhile, the sexual abuse of children is big business in many destination countries. Hundreds of thousands of children are routinely trafficked for that purpose. Although offenders often have a clear record of offending in different jurisdictions, they can still escape prosecution in each, as many jurisdictions simply fail to prosecute due to different standards of children’s rights or pure corruption. In that context, the FTO threshold for offending behaviour subsequent to a conviction is entirely unworkable. It is unsurprising that since 2005 only 50 FTOs have been granted. In 2007, a year in which 70 British citizens sought consular assistance for child sexual offence arrests, not a single FTO was granted.
New clause 5 applies solely to children because that is the focus of my campaign, and it is intended to remedy these shortcomings: it abolishes the arbitrary requirement to prove two contact offences; it includes UK and foreign children, offering them equal protection; it allows a senior specialist officer from the National Crime Agency to apply for an order to plug the gap of itinerant offenders travelling ahead of the evidence and it raises the age limit to 18; and it introduces an interim provision to prevent itinerant offenders from fleeing the jurisdiction.
Mobile Homes Bill
Debate between Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford and Robert Buckland(11 years, 6 months ago)
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Mr Buckland
I entirely take on board my hon. Friend’s point. This is a plea not for more work for lawyers—I declare my interest as a lawyer—but for all residents to ensure that they are fully and properly advised about their rights in the purchase of park homes, as well as their rights pursuant to any sale of them and their rights when it comes to the enforcement of an existing licence.
I know from my own discussions with residents how frustrated they feel when the local authority says, “It will be very difficult for us to do anything, because we do not have enough resources to mount a full prosecution.” If, for instance, a private building has become so dilapidated and dangerous that it poses a health and safety problem or a threat to the environment, the local authority can issue an enforcement notice, but it has no power to do so in the case of park homes. The Bill deals with that very effectively.
At long last, local authorities can take advantage of further stages before prosecution to enforce licence agreements. The issuing of a notice will often do the trick. It will place the onus on the site owner to make good any dilapidation, or to deal with a problem caused by a poor access road, a dangerous tree or an item on the site that is causing a potential or real nuisance to park home owners. It will give the site owner an incentive to get on with the job and ensure that the wrong is righted. The increase in the armoury available to local authorities is an essential part of the Bill.
As other Members have pointed out, this Bill is not the consequence of a headline or a knee-jerk reaction to a single isolated case. It is the product of many months, if not years, of careful evidence-gathering, consideration of the technicalities of the existing law, and testimony from thousands of our constituents whose stories of suffering have not only moved us all, but demonstrated to us the deficiencies of the existing legislation.
Nicola Blackwood
Many of us have spoken of the vulnerability of park home residents, but we should also note that their advocacy has been incredibly effective. They have been not just victims but very effective campaigners for legislation, and they should take some credit for the Bill.
Mr Buckland
I entirely agree with my hon. Friend. I think that she speaks for us all in expressing admiration for the fortitude of the constituents whom we have the honour of representing.
The issue of commencement has been mentioned. I think that if the Bill is to become law, it should become law towards the end of the current Session. Waiting until 2014 would mean a lengthy further delay, and I urge Ministers to ensure it comes into force as early as possible in order to alleviate the problems that we are discussing.
Rather than making glib generalisations about what the Bill can do, we should be realistic about what it cannot do. It is important for all of us, as parliamentarians, to get to grips with the detail, ensure that the Bill’s provisions are as strong as possible, and use the opportunity that we have in the current Session to ensure that it is future-proof, so that we do not have to keep returning to tweak it as we have been forced to do with legislation in the past.
Today is a good day for residents and an encouraging day for park home owners everywhere, and for that reason I am delighted to commend the Bill to the House.
Police (Detention and Bail) Bill
Debate between Baroness Blackwood of North Oxford and Robert Buckland(12 years, 10 months ago)
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Mr Robert Buckland (South Swindon) (Con)
The liberty of the individual should be a matter for this place first and foremost, so the fact that this is emergency legislation should not be a cause of embarrassment or shame—it should be welcomed. Judges have an important role in interpreting the law. Their role is primarily to interpret rather than to enact. That is why I am entirely content that it is this place that will make the important decision about the ambit of police bail. It is not a matter for shame, but nor is it quite a matter for celebration, bearing in mind the fact this House is a busy place and we have a lot of work to do.
It should perhaps be a matter for quiet reflection that it is the primacy of the legislature that matters when it comes to fundamental issues of liberty—that is what we are dealing with today—and the constant balance that we have to maintain between liberty and the public interest in being protected from crime and its consequences, however minor or serious. I was glad to be reminded by the right hon. Member for Holborn and St Pancras (Frank Dobson) about the sad anniversary that we have reached today.
My hon. Friend the Member for Dartford (Gareth Johnson), in his excellent contribution drawn from years of experience as a criminal practitioner, made some important practical points about the problems that would quickly come about if the House did not take swift action. The examples that he gave—including the identification procedure problem—were well made and do not need repeating by me. However, on a more fundamental level, one aspect that perhaps we have not emphasised today is the interests of the victims and witnesses of crime. In many cases, they give the police statements and then have to wait an inordinate length of time before they know the outcome of the case or are called to court to give evidence. That is one of the main problems encountered day in, day out by courts across the land when dealing with some of the delays caused by readmission to police bail by suspects, sometimes for an inordinate length of time.
The debate comes at an opportune moment because it gives us a chance to look at the whole ambit or spectrum of police bail, not only from the point of view of the suspect or the defence lawyer, but from the point of view of the victim of crime, the complainant or witness, waiting anxiously. In many cases, I have seen the frustration of judges when they hear that decisions about charge have been put off time and again, causing witnesses to lose heart or to lose interest. Sometimes cases fail at that final stage in court, and that is unforgiveable from a variety of perspectives, but most of all from the public interest perspective. That is why the points made today about limits on police bail were well made and deserve serious consideration as we proceed.
The challenge facing the court in Salford was one that the learned judge himself described in paragraphs 18 and 19 of his judgment as being of “limited application”. That was the view of the learned High Court judge, and it was a view that, on examination by Professor Zander, was challenged. A debate then began. Professor Zander is an eminent academic and has enjoyed a peon of praise today from hon. Members on both sides of the House—I am sure that he is enjoying every minute of it. It is thoroughly deserved, but I think that he would agree that to elevate his article to advice status would overplay it. In my view, he opened a welcome debate on the effects of the judgment. It is a debate that Mr Justice McCombe put himself on the other side of by dint of his remarks in paragraph 18 and 19. With respect to the right hon. Member for Normanton, Pontefract and Castleford (Yvette Cooper), it is a little trite to suggest that the consequences of the decision were set in stone some weeks ago. The position only became clear when that debate was initiated, and I think that the Government are to be congratulated on taking effective action.
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 was seminal legislation. It was not drafted on the hoof, but put together after many months of careful work and input from all sections of those interested in the criminal justice system. It was a game-changer in so many important ways. It was progressive legislation that, at a stroke, made clear and transparent certain procedures that had often seemed in the police station obscure and frankly worrying not only to suspects but to police officers themselves. It was a Conservative Government—the noble Lord Brittan was Home Secretary and his Minister of State was the noble Lord Hurd—who steered that excellent legislation through the House. It has stood the test of time admirably.
As with all legislation scrutinised by the House, however, the 1984 Act might be found to be only human. I am reminded of the remarks of my hon. Friend the Member for Oxford West and Abingdon (Nicola Blackwood). She was right to say that the Act was silent on the effect of section 44. We all have to concede that. After Royal Assent, however, practitioners and everybody concerned with the process came to the assumption—the right assumption, I think—that the clock would stop and start as long as the suspect was in police detention, and that the concept of time was not absolute but relative to the time spent in detention. That was well understood by everybody in the system. For 25 years that assumption will have been made by practitioners from the humblest junior solicitor to the highest of High Court judges. They need make no apology for having done so.
Nicola Blackwood
To be clear, is it not the case that that assumption arose not out of thin air or a desire for convenience, but out of the fact that that was the intention made clear in parliamentary debates at the time?
Mr Buckland
That is indeed the case, as was helpfully set out in Professor Zander’s article, where he took the trouble to remind himself of the case of Pepper v. Hart, which allows judges to look at Hansard if there is any ambiguity about the intention of the legislature. Unlike the judge in the decision in question, he examined Hansard and found buried in the debates in what were then called Standing Committees—the predecessor title, as it were, of Public Bill Committees—a clear understanding on the part of all parties. It was the former Member for Birmingham, Ladywood, Miss Short, who tabled an amendment designed to ensure that the suspect would be detained for no more than 96 hours, and the then Minister of State, now the noble Lord Hurd, who responded. It was quite clear from that debate that there was an understanding that time would stop and start according to when the suspect was in detention.
With respect to the learned High Court judge, that debate would have assisted him in his deliberations and given him great comfort and support in coming to what we would all have regarded as a purposive decision—that is, a decision that would have given purpose to the intention of the legislators and reinforced a quarter of a century of practice. Sadly, we know that that was not the case, although we should hesitate before rushing to criticism of our judges. They have a tough job to do. They have to make decisions day in, day out. They are presented with a range of different scenarios and cases. I do not think that anyone should rush to criticise the judiciary in that respect because of one difficult case. However, I return to the point that I made at the beginning of my speech. I am glad that it is this place—this House—that is reinforcing and reiterating the law as we have all understood it to be, and which will now, in my submission, be put beyond any doubt whatever.
I know that voices outside this place have urged caution on us in rushing this legislation through, although a lot of their concerns have been addressed in the remarks made by other Members today, which I will not repeat. I have made some suggestions about the potential limitations on police bail—for example, in cases that do not involve a large amount of documentation or serious fraud—but I want to return to straightforward examples of cases involving violence or assault, where far too often, over-cautious lawyers have waited before charge for all the evidence to be gathered, including medical evidence. Frankly, my suggestion to them is to remember how we used to do it. We would charge and then gather the evidence as quickly as possible, to ensure that we did not lose the interest, enthusiasm and participation of prosecution witnesses along the way.
The coalition Government quite rightly restored the decision-making power for certain offences to the police. That was a wise decision, which I believe will allow minds to be focused in the police station when dealing with a range of less serious offences. That will leave more serious offences to be dealt with by the Crown Prosecution Service as part of the advice-before-charge procedure. At that stage, everybody needs to remember what we have said today in this House and elsewhere about the need for expedition and the need for good judgment to be exercised, even though all the evidence might not have been gathered.
I will draw my remarks to a close. I support giving the Bill its Second Reading, and I think that we as a House should be glad that such decisions are falling to us.