Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness Brinton Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 5th February 2026 Lords Chamber

This Clause would remove the right to a retrial following a conviction in absentia where the person convicted is deemed to have been present, even if there has been no contact between the person and the court approved lawyer.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, my late friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness had originally laid this proposal that Clause 195 should not stand part. I had signed it to support him because of my interests in human rights. His untimely death last week means that I am now leading on something that he, as an excellent lawyer, really understood and cared about. We shall in this debate, when we get into the detail, miss his incisive legal mind, combined with a passion for fairness and the rule of law. We miss him so much already. I am not a lawyer, but I will do what I can. I thank the Defence Extradition Lawyers Forum, or DELF, for its help and advice in the last few days, as well as its excellent technical briefing, from which I shall quote.

The core of asking that Clause 195 not stand part is straightforward. It would remove the right for a retrial following a conviction in absentia where the person convicted is deemed to have been present, even if there has been no contact between that person and their court-approved lawyer. As ever, there is more in the detail. Clause 195 proposes to amend Sections 20 and 85 of the Extradition Act, governing extradition following convictions in absentia. Following a stakeholder symposium convened in January, DELF identified material inaccuracies in the Government’s stated justification for the clause. Unfortunately, there are consequences as a result of these inaccuracies that will have serious implications for individuals facing extradition in future.

In the Government’s justification for Clause 195, they said that the proposed amendments

“ensure compatibility between UK domestic legislation and the UK-EU Trade and Cooperation Agreement”.


Article 601(1)(i) of the TCA, which governs convictions in absentia, already aligns with Section 20 of the Extradition Act 2003. Those safeguards, grounded in fundamental rights, reflect the carefully calibrated EU extradition framework, strengthened in 2009 to enhance protections for convictions in absentia. It sought to promote legal certainty and mutual recognition while respecting differing national legal systems. The problem is that Clause 195 risks making UK legislation inconsistent with the TCA in two material respects, thereby undermining the reforms advanced by the UK in 2008-09.

First, Article 601(1)(i)(iii) of the TCA permits refusal of extradition where a person did not deliberately absent themselves for a trial in absentia unless they have a right

“to a retrial or appeal … which allows the merits of the case … to be re-examined”.

That standard is reflected in Section 20 of the Extradition Act, as interpreted by the Supreme Court, but Clause 195 would dilute this safeguard by reducing it to a mere “right to apply” for a retrial, thus weakening protections previously secured across Europe.

Secondly, Article 601(1)(i)(ii) of the TCA deems a person present at the trial only where they have

“given a mandate to a lawyer … to defend him or her at the trial, and was indeed defended by that lawyer at the trial”.

However, new subsection (7A) in Clause 195 will weaken this protection, treating a person as present solely by virtue of their legal representation, even where there has been no contact or instruction between lawyer and client.

There is further concern over the Government’s inaccurate statement that the

“interpretation … changed as a result of … Bertino and Merticariu”.

The Supreme Court did not create new law by distinguishing between a right to retrial and a mere right to apply for one. Rather, it affirmed the settled meaning of “entitled”, endorsing established authority, which made it clear that entitlement does not mean “perhaps” or “in certain circumstances”. In doing so, the court in that case overturned the conflicting decision in BP v Romania 2015, which had erroneously treated a discretionary right to apply for a retrial as sufficient, having misapplied case law on procedural requirements that do not undermine a genuine entitlement.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I begin by saying how sorry I am that it is the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, moving her proposition and not Lord Wallace of Tankerness, who we will greatly miss. As we all know, he was a staunch advocate for the people of Orkney and Shetland. I served nine years with him in Parliament, as we crossed over during that time, and found him to be an exemplary public servant as Deputy First Minister for Scotland and as a Member of Parliament. I had less contact with him in your Lordships’ House and I am genuinely sorry that I cannot have contact with him today. I pass my condolences to his family. I am also grateful to the noble Baroness Lady Brinton for taking up the cudgels on this specialist subject and doing it in a way that is professional. I promise that I will try to answer the questions and follow up on the points she has raised.

I am also grateful to the noble Baroness for reminding me of the constituency case of Paul Wright in Mold, which I dealt with in a former life as Paul Wright’s Member of Parliament, following the extradition case with Greece. I will have to google it to refresh all the details in my memory, but it was an important constituency case for me to take up as a Member of Parliament at that time. I am sorry that the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, feels that this did not receive sufficient scrutiny, but I take his point, and I hope I can answer his points today.

Clause 195 standing part of the Bill means that, under the Extradition Act 2003, the UK may extradite individuals either to face trial or serve a sentence. Where a conviction occurred in absentia and the UK court finds the person did not deliberately absent themselves, the judge must determine whether they will be entitled to a retrial in the requesting state. This clause will amend Sections 20 and 85 of the 2003 Act to restore the original policy intention that the individual must have a right to apply for a retrial, not a guaranteed retrial, for extradition to proceed. The amendment is required, as the noble Baroness mentioned, following the Supreme Court’s judgment in Merticariu v Romania, which interpreted the current drafting of the 2003 Act as requiring a guaranteed retrial—something some states cannot offer. Without this fix, certain legitimate extradition requests could be blocked, undermining justice for victims.

I know the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, mentioned this, but the amendment itself does not change any existing safeguards or processes governing extradition. The full suite of safeguards in the 2003 Act, including judicial oversight and human rights protections, remains unchanged. This includes the UK court’s powers to consider and determine whether someone deliberately absented themselves. I hope that gives her some reassurance.

The small government Amendment 537 makes minor drafting changes. It simply provides that Clause 195 will be commenced by regulations, as opposed to automatically coming into force on Royal Assent, as was originally planned.

I have heard what the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, has said and I have heard the complex case that the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, has mentioned. The noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, asked whether she could have a meeting with appropriate supporters to discuss this and I would be happy to do so. For the purposes of confirming that, I would be grateful if she could email me the details of who she wishes to attend that meeting. It is entirely up to the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton, but I would be happy if the noble Lord, Lord Davies, wishes to attend—or I could offer him a separate meeting if he wants to have further discussions or representations. If that can be discussed outside Committee, I would be happy to do that.

In the meantime, I hope the reassurances I have given are sufficient for the moment. I would be happy if the noble Baroness would withdraw her opposition to the clause standing part, pending any discussion, which I will ensure takes place if possible—subject to our diaries—before Report, as appropriate. If not, we can still have the discussion, so that we can at least reflect on the points that have been made today.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, for speaking in support of the clause not standing part, particularly for speaking about the very short time that it had for debate in the Commons, which obviously did not have the chance to go through some of the detail that DELF has provided for us in this Committee.

I also thank the Minister. He is, as ever, courteous and thoughtful. I am not sure we have closed the gap between where I believe that there are problems and where he and his officials think that this is all resolved. Therefore, I am very grateful for the offer of a meeting. I would be delighted if the noble Lord, Lord Davies, wanted to join us. I will indeed email him names, but in the meantime I withdraw my opposition to the clause standing part.

Clause 195 agreed.

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[Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)]

We have indeed.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, as a former trustee of UNICEF, I rise to support Amendment 469, so clearly presented by the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, and signed and spoken to by the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Internationally, the minimum age of criminal responsibility is recognised as 12, and UNICEF has always been clear that it should be 14. I heard what the noble Lord, Lord Bailey of Paddington, said, and understand his concerns about the very large number of young people and children being groomed and pulled into criminal gangs. He is right to say that we need more concerted support in terms of police, education and youth work intervention, but it is not the children’s—younger children’s—fault that they have ended up there. The noble Lord, Lord Hacking, and the noble and right reverend Lord, Lord Sentamu, recognised that heinous crimes needed to be marked in a certain way, but both also commented on the fact that we needed to understand that these were children. I am really grateful for the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd.

Your Lordships’ House has been discussing this for many, many years and as the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, she was campaigning on this long before she came into Your Lordships’ House. Now is the time; we need change. We need to do that because there is so much evidence now.

In 2011, Nicholas Mackintosh, who chaired the Royal Society study on brain development, told the BBC then that there was

“incontrovertible evidence that the brain continues to develop throughout adolescence”,

and that some regions of the brain, responsible for decision-making and impulse control, do not mature fully

“until at least the age of 20”.

That Royal Society report cited the

“concern of some neuroscientists that the … age of criminal responsibility in the UK is set too low”.

We are still discussing it today.

UNICEF’s view is that 14 should be the minimum age, using scientific research as a base, but it is very specific that no country should have the age below 12. This places England, Wales and Northern Ireland in breach of the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, which is bad enough, but the real problem is a court system that assumes that children have capacity to make decisions when all the research shows that that is not reliable. It is wrong for a Government to assert that any interference with a child’s human rights can be justified.

UNICEF says in its excellent guidance note on youth offending published in 2022, that children under the minimum age of criminal responsibility,

“should not be considered (alleged) child offenders but, first and foremost, children in need of special protection”.

It says that offending behaviour by such children

“is often the result of poverty, family violence and/or homelessness … their involvement in offending behaviour is an indicator of potential vulnerability that has to be addressed by the social welfare system. Special protection measures for children … should address the root causes of their behaviour and support their parents/caregivers. The measures should be tailored to the child’s needs and circumstances and based on a comprehensive and interdisciplinary assessment of the child’s familial, educational and social circumstances”.

That matches the advice of the medical specialists too. Frankly, it is time that the Government stepped up and took the brave decision that we need to recognise that we are out of kilter with the rest of Europe and, frankly, most of the world.

Prosecuting children and holding them in young offender institutions does not give them the time and space to learn how to live their lives differently. We have heard from both the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, about how the arrangements work for children in specialist secure accommodation. We can still use those systems but without giving children the label of being a criminal when, clearly, they are not capable of making the right decisions.

I am really grateful to my noble friend Lord Dholakia, who has been campaigning on this particular issue for decades before he came into your Lordships’ House in 1997. His Private Member’s Bill in 2017 resulted in a wide public discussion. It is a shame that, nine years on, we have not progressed further. Let us do so now.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, this has been a genuinely interesting debate. The amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, would raise the age of criminal responsibility in England and Wales from 10 to 14. For the reasons I will set out below, I am unable to support it.

First, the purpose of the age of criminal responsibility has not been designed to criminalise children unnecessarily. Rather, it is to ensure that the state can intervene early and proportionately when a child’s behaviour causes serious harm. As the noble Baroness, Baroness Levitt, the Minister, stated in this House, setting the age at 10 allows the justice system to step in at a point where intervention can prevent further offending and protect both the child and the wider public, and, crucially, children are not treated as adults. They are dealt with through youth courts under a distinct sentencing framework with rehabilitation as the central aim.

The evidence shows that the system already uses this power sparingly. We are told that, in 2024, only 13% of all children sentenced were aged between 10 and 14, and that proportion has been falling year on year. Of the 1,687 sentences imposed on children in that age group, just 23 resulted in custody. Those figures matter. They demonstrate that the age of criminal responsibility being set at 10 does not mean routine criminalisation of children. It means retaining a backstop for the most serious and persistent cases while diversion remains the norm.

Raising the age to 14 would create a dangerous gap. It would mean that children aged 10 to 13 who commit grave offences—including serious violence, sexual offences or sustained harassment—could not be held criminally responsible. This would limit the state’s ability to manage risk, protect victims and, in some cases, protect the child. There are rare but tragic cases—

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[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

My Lords, I oppose this amendment. I have to concede that, as usual, the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, made a beguilingly attractive case for the amendment, but in essence this would be a legislative overreach. This activity is not being undertaken with impunity. We have checks and balances, although I accept they can be improved. I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, that children are used because of county lines, where children are used to move weapons and drugs.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

Will the noble Lord give way?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I will give way a little later as I want to develop my point, if the noble Baroness will be so kind as to allow me.

I think there are two sides to every story. When I was first a candidate and then Member of Parliament for Peterborough, I remember the sight every week of animal rights activists at Huntingdon Life Sciences. I do not support the activities of rogue police officers, as enunciated in what the noble Baroness said about spy cops, but we must not conflate separate phenomena: a full public inquiry—albeit in camera, which I do not agree with, as there should be openness and transparency—and specific criminal cases. One can also make the case that those police officers and others who were doxed by animal rights activists have suffered a huge degree of harassment and violent intimidation since the allegations arose, without having the opportunity to clear their names in a court of law. I give way to the noble Baroness.

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

I give way.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

I am grateful. The noble Lord referred earlier to children and county lines. The problem with this case is that relationships were formed under lies by police officers and children were born of those relationships, whose fathers then disappeared. It is nothing to do with the criminalised activity of children. Will he please reconsider his comments with that relevance?

[Lord Jackson of Peterborough (Con)]

The noble Baroness makes a very fair point. I was referring to the issue of county lines and why children may be used. I deprecate the unacceptable activity to which she refers; none of us would support the fathering of children in a pretended relationship, so she makes a very fair point.

I was talking about Huntingdon Life Sciences and animal rights activists. That violence escalated to a significant level over a number of years, which culminated in the violent attack on and near-death experience of the then chief executive of Huntingdon Life Sciences. It was a very unpleasant period. Therefore, there was a reasonable case to be made that the Metropolitan Police, Cambridgeshire Constabulary and others needed to embed officers and intelligence assets within the animal rights movement to alleviate the risk of further serious criminal activity. That was an animal rights issue, but it could easily not have been.

The noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, concedes very fairly that she does not want to circumscribe cases where you have to do long-term surveillance of, say, a terrorist plot which might be carried out were it not for police activity and long-term embedding of people. That is separate to cases where there has not been an operational rationale for preventing criminal activity, so I accept that there is a difference.

That is why this amendment is rather heavy-handed. No doubt the Minister will refer to the commissioner, who will look at whether these activities are timely and appropriate, but words matter. Incidentally, when the noble Baroness mentioned the Covert Human Intelligence Sources (Criminal Conduct) Act 2021, I think she made an unusual inference that it was to facilitate criminal activity. I may have been mistaken in hearing that and she may want to intervene.

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[Lord Hacking (Lab)]

My Lords, I am so glad that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, and the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, have participated in this debate. Like myself, they attended the recent meeting chaired by my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. It was very nice to hear from the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, the admiration for the courage of the witnesses who came to speak to us at that meeting.

In any form of covert human intelligence, there has to be deception. It is the only way that the officer of the state, whoever he or she may be, can penetrate through to get the confidence of the criminals who they are there to investigate. But there should be, as my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti says in her amendment, some restraint in what they get up to.

When the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, got up, he started by saying that he opposed this amendment, but it was pleasing that, by the end of his speech, he was quite neutral. That was very reassuring.

My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti referred to the 2011 case of R v Barkshire, which concerned an undercover police officer infiltrating a group of climate change activists. The police officer, who I will not name, indulged in a sexual relationship, for about seven years, with one of the ladies involved. It also involved the birth of a child. This police officer, according to my brief, had as many as 10 other sexual relationships during the course of his activity as an undercover officer. When it came to the court, it was said that he went “much further” than the authorisation given to him, and that he played

“a significant role in assisting, advising and supporting … the very activity for which these appellants were prosecuted”.

That is why my noble friend—I hope she notes that I am giving her full support in this amendment—is absolutely right to suggest that there should be restraint. I accept entirely the restraint which is contained in Amendment 470.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I thank JUSTICE and the group Police Spies Out of Lives, particularly the women who were on the receiving end of the treatment by the CHISs. I declare an interest as a director of the Joseph Rowntree Reform Trust, which has given grants to Police Spies Out of Lives for well over a decade, in the run-up to the beginning of the inquiry.

The noble Baroness, Lady Jones, talked about how long it has taken to get the abuses taken seriously, and it really has. The inquiry itself took many years to be established, and there was damage to those women’s lives in the aftermath every time they went to people in the establishment to ask them to please take their concerns seriously. There was stunning silence.

The trust had a chance to meet and hear from these extraordinary women, who were seeking justice for many decades. Without their determination there would be no inquiry, no TV documentaries and no newspaper articles. I salute them all for their refusal to be cowed and their strength of character, even in the face of repeated setbacks from the establishment, including the extremely slow inquiry—which is not expected to conclude before 2030, and quite possibly later—at an enormous cost to the public purse and, above all, to these victims of the police spies.

The glacial speed of the public inquiry into undercover policing is on a par with the long delays of other historic scandals including infected blood, Post Office Horizon and the Independent Inquiry into Child Sex Abuse. As young girls and women who were taken advantage of in the 1970s head towards getting their pensions, it is vital to ensure that there are no further delays.

As we heard from the noble Baronesses, Lady Chakrabarti and Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, and my noble friend Lady Miller of Chilthorne Domer, Amendment 470 would replace provisions in the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000, as amended by the CHIS Act 2021, which grants complete advanced criminal and civil immunity for authorised operatives and agents with public interest offences, as long as they did not act as agents provocateurs.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, helpfully made clear her experience in Northern Ireland and the shortcomings of the CHIS legislation. The contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas, also confirmed that we must continue to learn lessons from the new system. Amendment 470 would correct the law to ensure that, in future, those using CHISs must have a high standard of regulation and accountability. We, as a country, need more oversight of CHISs’ criminal activity and the mechanism to ensure that officers and their superiors meet these high standards and make decisions in light of the law.

From these Benches, we welcome Amendment 470 and the safeguard that it offers to the victims. I say this to the noble Lord, Lord Jackson, but the officers too, because it would give them a framework and responsibility to think about any actions, whether they need permission for them and, if so, whether they should really be thinking about doing it at all, which is long overdue.

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[Lord Katz (Lab)]

My Lords, I apologise, but the noble Baroness has just said that she was not in her place at the start of the group. Really, she should not be speaking to the group if she was not in her place. That is the usual convention and courtesy of the House and is set out in the Companion as well.

[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, Amendments 472 and 473 from the noble Lord, Lord Alton, add a series of small but vital issues that would ensure that the UK can play its part in holding to account perpetrators of the most serious international crimes of genocide, crimes against humanity and war crimes. Above all, these amendments would give victims and their families the opportunity to achieve the justice that they deserve. I thank the British Institute of Human Rights, Genocide Response and Redress for their very helpful briefing.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, and the signatories to his amendments have set out in detail the legal reasons why the current laws in relation to these international crimes need to have certain loopholes closed ,and other noble Lords have spoken to them as well.

As chair of human rights at Liberal International, I attend the annual Geneva summit on human rights. Last February, I met people who had fled from Sudan, Iran, Cuba, Russia and Tibet, and Uyghurs from China, who had been on the receiving end of the most appalling crimes, from genocide to crimes against humanity, including torture and war crimes. All of them look to countries such as the United Kingdom to uphold the standards of universal jurisdiction. Sadly, as outlined by the noble Baroness, Lady Kennedy, we do not do that fully and, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, put it, we need to share the burden.

By not being prepared to empower our courts to act where alleged perpetrators of international crimes are present in the UK, we let people down. Without the changes proposed in Amendments 472 and 473, the British courts lack jurisdiction over alleged perpetrators of international crimes—including leaders of the Iranian regime who may travel to the UK for medical treatment, despite there being credible allegations of their involvement in international crimes against humanity, and the alleged perpetrators of genocide in Darfur—because the alleged conduct falls under the Rome statute crimes but does not trigger universal jurisdiction under UK law.

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[Baroness Brinton (LD)]

My Lords, I support Amendment 486 and thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, for his excellent introduction to it, which was very clear to follow.

Over the decades, thousands of people have been wrongly jailed for life in appalling miscarriages of justice because of the use of joint enterprise to charge those present with the commission of a serious crime. Sometimes that might be someone who was present and thought they were going to be involved in a low-level crime, whereas they had no involvement at all in the actual violence or murder committed by another but were still charged under joint enterprise as if they had also committed the act of violence or murder. That is very similar to the example that the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, gave us.

Even worse, there are those who have been jailed for murder simply because they were present at the act of murder, although they had not been members of the gang involved. Over the last 15 years, this House has seen various amendments and had debates and questions trying to correct and clarify when charges should or should not be used for those who did not commit serious acts of violence. As has already been mentioned, a decade ago the Supreme Court recognised that joint enterprise had been used repeatedly and incorrectly in many cases, but nothing has really changed since then. I am grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, for quoting the figures for the three years before and after 2016, because that judgment has not changed the numbers either.

The key questions addressed by the Supreme Court, including what qualifies as assistance and encouragement, remain obfuscatory. It is still not clear whether presence at a serious crime is in itself enough. I will not repeat the data that the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and others have mentioned in the briefing we got from Joint Enterprise Not Guilty by Association. I differ slightly from the view of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox. It is quite notable that over 50% of those prosecuted are not just young Black men and women, but there is also substantial overrepresentation of disabled and neurodivergent people, as well as many under 25. I might understand the last, but not the others on their own.

The proposal of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, would completely change the approach to considering who has been involved in serious crime. The amendment would ensure that, rather than guessing the individual's state of mind, associations and foresight of what might occur, the CPS must look at actual material actions, making that the baseline objective threshold for prosecution. I hope that the Minister is finally prepared to change the injustice in the use of joint enterprise and start a new era based on facts, not suppositions.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, I fully support this amendment. I agree effectively with every word that has fallen from the lips of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and my noble friend Lady Brinton, and almost every word uttered by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox of Buckley. I hope that the Government will listen and give careful consideration to this amendment.

The law of joint enterprise has long been unsatisfactory. It was substantially improved by the decision of the Supreme Court in the Jogee case, as explained by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. The present state of the law in the light of Jogee is that an offence is committed by an accessory only if the defendant charged as an accessory intended to assist the principal in the commission of the offence. Even so, the law is still unsatisfactory and unclear, as extensively supported by the academic evidence cited by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and by the noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, and it sorely needs reform.

The phrase “significant contribution” to the commission of the offence used in the amendment is apt. It would overcome the difficulties mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, with the Court of Appeal’s position on the related accessory offences of procurement. The phrase has been proposed by the Centre for Crime and Justice Studies and widely by academics. It was the phrase used in Kim Johnson’s Private Member’s Bill, which was supported by, among others, Sir Bob Neill, who was then chair of the Justice Select Committee, and therefore one presumes by the committee itself.

While the expression may in some ways seem vague, it sets exactly the type of test that juries can and do recognise and regularly apply, rather similarly to the test for dishonesty used in relation to Theft Act offences. The amendment would make an offence of being an accessory much more comprehensible and justifiable than the present test. The present test, I suggest, focuses disproportionately on the mental element of accessory liability, whereas the amendment would focus on the actual contribution of the accessory to the commission of the offence.

There is considerable cause for concern that joint enterprise law in its operation is discriminatory. The noble Lord, Lord Ponsonby, mentioned the research showing that Black people are 16 times more likely to be prosecuted on the basis of joint enterprise than white people. The noble Baroness, Lady Fox, mentioned the same research. What neither mentioned is that that staggering figure—I suggest that it is staggering—was based on the CPS’s own figures for 2023.

I accept that there may be cultural issues, as mentioned by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, but they have to be judged against the caution that was mentioned by my noble friend Lady Brinton. There is also serious evidence of unjustified, unwarranted group prosecution. There is significant concern about evidence of racial bias and the risk of guilt by association in consequence. The point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Fox—that it sometimes may seem easier to prosecute for joint enterprise than by establishing individual guilt—is, or may be, justified. Concerns about guilt by association and gang involvement are entirely legitimate. I think they are shared by the public, and they are evidenced by the clear examples we have heard today. They evidence a lack of principle in prosecution and in the application of the law.

In evidence to the Leveson review, Keir Monteith KC and Professor Eithne Quinn from the University of Manchester argued that joint enterprise was overused. They went so far as to say that it contributed, as inevitably statistically it does, to the growth of the backlogs. They cited the trial of seven Black teenagers in 2022 who were accused of murder, where the prosecution accepted that they could not be sure who stabbed the victim, but asserted that all of those who went to the park where the killing occurred

“shared responsibility, at the very least contributing to the force of numbers”.

That was an inaccurate or, at the very least, incomplete statement of the law in the light of Jogee. Six of the seven defendants were acquitted, but the fact that they were tried and went through the period that they did prior to trial highlights the confused state of the law, which makes the essential ingredients of the offence difficult for jurors and sometimes even prosecutors to understand.

We should also take into account, particularly given the delays in bringing trials to court, the serious risk of charges based on joint enterprise leading to defendants who are ultimately acquitted being held on remand, as one of the seven defendants in the case I mentioned was for no less than 14 months.

Finally, I have a technical point that was mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, to whom I had mentioned it. While I support the amendment completely, it needs to be reworded or supplemented to cover summary offences. That is because, as a result of the amendment of Section 8 of the Accessories and Abettors Act 1861 by the Criminal Law Act 1977, the accessory offence under the 1861 Act applies only to indictable offences—offences that are either indictable only or triable either way. A parallel amendment to Section 44(1) of the Magistrates’ Court Act 1980 is required to cover summary offences. There is no justification for distinguishing between them. With that rather academic point, I hope that the Government will act on this.