(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend makes a very good point. On the subject of productivity and the processing of claims, the decision output has increased significantly over the past 24 months. In fact, it has more than tripled as we have worked to deliver commitments to process the legacy backlog. For example, in November 2023, the average per decision-maker was about 7.89 initial decisions. The year before, that number was more like 2.6—so efficiency is very much improving.
My Lords, how many of those already denied asylum are still in the country?
I cannot answer that question in its entirety, but I can say that the number of complex legacy cases that remain has declined from about 4,500 to 3,900. Some of those are still in the country, but I do not know precisely how many.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberI support the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and the noble Lord, Lord Dubs. It would be something of a disgrace if we did not take these measures to protect, to a very limited extent, unaccompanied asylum-seeking children.
My Lords, I will speak to Motion G1. I declare an interest as co-chair of the parliamentary group on modern slavery and vice-chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation.
It is compassion that leads me to insist on the amendment that I put down on Report and bring back again now. We are talking about a group of people who are wholly different from any other group about which the Minister and others have spoken. They do not come here voluntarily, in the normal sense; they are brought here. Some of them are compelled to be here. They may think that they will not be victims, but that is why they are on a boat or in the back of a lorry. This group has no choice. It is not an issue of incentive—which the Minister speaks about—and how on earth can it be an issue of deterrence, since they are not in control?
In the past, the Government have offered evidence that the system of the national referral mechanism is subject to abuse. So far, I think that we have heard of only two cases of abuse out of the thousands of people who have gone through the national referral mechanism. The proposed arrangements in the Illegal Migration Act and the Nationality and Borders Act are absolutely inadequate. How on earth is it fair that someone in this group of people, many of whom will have gone through the traumatic experience of already being a victim, should be re-victimised by being sent to Rwanda? I ask the Members of this House to look at this most disadvantaged and vulnerable group of people, who are compelled to this country, and support my Motion.
My Lords, I will speak to Motion H1 and Amendment 10B in lieu. Having done so previously, I do not intend to rehearse the moral imperatives that underpin this amendment. In responding to the Minister, I will focus on the chasm that yawns between what the Minister in the other place said about what the Government might do post the current reviews of ARAP decisions of ineligibility and their unwillingness to accept this amendment that accomplishes their stated goal: to meet the debt of honour we owe to those who risked their lives in assisting the UK forces.
We are, once again, in a position where we are asked to deny the fruits of our reason and accept that black is white. First, we are asked to accept that, simply by legislative assertion, the Government can turn Rwanda into a safe country for all time, regardless of the facts. Secondly, having followed the somewhat convoluted logic-chopping of the Minister in the other place, we are told that men who braved death, courted injury and are forced into exile as a result of assisting our Armed Forces in fighting the Taliban are to be punished for arriving here by irregular routes—even where, owing to wrongful refusals on our part or possible malfeasance on the part of the Special Forces, they have been compelled to take these routes in the first place.
I will point out the inconsistencies in the reasoning of the Minister for Countering Illegal Migration, when he addressed the predecessor of my Amendment 10B on Monday. In outlining why he wished to refuse it, he said:
“Anyone who arrives here illegally should not be able to make the United Kingdom their home and eventually settle here. A person who chooses to come here illegally, particularly if they have a safe and legal route available to them, should be liable for removal to a safe country”.
What do the words “chooses” and “particularly” mean in that statement, when you are fleeing for your life, having endangered it because of service to this country, and then having been wrongly refused a relocation visa? What sort of choices are available? “Particularly” tacitly concedes the existence of such scenarios in which safe and legal routes are not available and have been wrongly closed off, but the statement determines that we will punish the victims of our own incompetence regardless.
There are two classes of person to whom this amendment applies. First, there are those in Afghanistan and Pakistan whom we are told are awaiting review of their previously determined applications. They should be determined as eligible and granted a visa, and will have no reason to take an irregular route. Secondly, and more importantly, a much smaller number whom this amendment seeks to protect are already here. These people, far from being deterred by this Government’s action, were compelled by it to seek irregular routes or face certain death or torture.
For the last year, the Independent, Lighthouse Reports and Sky have been exposing cases where, owing to the Home Office’s bureaucratic sclerosis and errors—in fact, I think that it is mostly the MoD’s sclerosis and errors—and alleged interference on the part of the Special Forces, Afghans who served either in the Triples or otherwise alongside our Armed Forces were wrongfully denied the ability to relocate and were forced to arrive here by other means. In Monday’s debate in the other place, the Minister for Countering Illegal Migration suggested—not promised—that regulations may be made under Section 4 of the Illegal Migration Act to ensure that these
“people receive the attention that they deserve”.—[Official Report, Commons, 18/3/24; cols. 667-68.]
If that is the intention, what has stopped the promulgation of these regulations before now? The Government have known for at least a year that these people existed and have been on notice for a year that the promulgation of these regulations would be necessary to accompany the Bill, if they had intended to use them to solve this problem.
Effectively, these people are being asked to trust the Ministry of Defence, the Home Office and, more broadly, the British Government—the same bodies that wrongfully refused their relocation visas in the first place, failed to protect them and have, in many cases, repeatedly threatened them with deportation to Rwanda. The idea that they would now repose their faith in the Home Office is absurd. In this context, trust is a currency whose value is now completely debased. Rather than wait for these regulations, why not, as the former Lord Chancellor, Sir Robert Buckland, suggested in Monday’s proceedings, simply accept this amendment, which precludes the need for their development?
Which offence do we believe to be more egregious? That of fleeing to a country that asked you to serve alongside its troops via an illegal route, having already been let down by that country’s administrative incompetence? Or having the power and means to pay a debt of honour to those we have exhorted to serve alongside us in our interests but refusing so to do? I believe the latter is shaming, and it is why I will be seeking, in moving my revised amendment, to test the opinion of this House and have the other place examine it, and the consciences of its Members, again.
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its Amendment 9.”
My Lords, the Minister did not refer to my amendment at all in his summing up. However, I beg leave to test the opinion of the House.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Bach, for his devastating critique of this draft order. I have spoken many times in this Chamber on the need for combined authorities to have the consent of the public for what they do and for the decisions that they make. This includes appropriate and effective consultation and proper management of scrutiny, audit and risk of those combined authorities. As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, said, this draft order entails the transfer of power being completed without the consent of the other relevant local authorities and notes that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee concluded that the public consultation required by law was not commenced before an initial decision was made.
As the noble Lord, Lord Bach, drew our attention to, in the 17th report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee, it is very clear that the Government have not understood the implications of their own legislation in the levelling-up Act. Secondly, it is very surprising that, when the consultation was done, the changes were opposed by a majority of residents expressing a view in public consultations and by other prominent figures in the West Midlands. This is simply unacceptable behaviour and, if the noble Lord decides to press his amendment to a vote, this side will support him.
My Lords, I come entirely fresh to this issue, but I would like to ask the Minister: what on earth is the point of a consultation if the majority says one way and the Government take no notice?
My Lords, the noble and learned Baroness has put an important question to the Minister, and I thank my noble friend Lord Bach for fighting on with this case with such determination for over a year.
I want to make three points. First, the original legislation required that the consent of the local authorities within the combined authority was given for such a move to be made. Mr Street made a number of efforts to persuade the local authorities in the West Midlands to give their consent, but they did not do so. The Government then came along and said, “Oh, we’ll just change the law then”, and determined that if Mr Street wants to do it then they would let him do it.
Of course, the Government have form. At the same time, they also connived with Mr Street to try adding Warwickshire into the boundaries of the West Midlands Combined Authority for the election coming up on 2 May. Mr Street, knowing that he is staring defeat in the face, was desperate to increase the electorate from the shire county. Fortunately, and understandably, opposition within Warwickshire meant that this had to be withdrawn.
But Mr Street is determined to get something out of the wreckage of those proposals. If the Government have their way, he will be the police and crime commissioner. No evidence whatsoever has been given, apart from the holistic approach that the Minister talked about, to support why the police and crime commissioner role should be abolished in the West Midlands—no metrics, no data, no evidence base.
The irony is that the Minister talked about us having greater accountability. That is absolute nonsense. We all know what happens. When a mayor becomes a police and crime commissioner, they appoint a deputy to oversee the policing. The deputy deals with 99% of the policing issues and is accountable only to one person —the mayor—not to the people of the West Midlands. This is what is happening here.
I pay great tribute to the scrutiny committee, chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Wirral, for its assiduous work in this area. The committee has given the Government and the Minister’s department one of the most excoriating criticisms that I have seen for how this has been handled. The Government did not even know the implications of their own legislation that they passed only a short time ago, yet the excuse from the Home Office Permanent Secretary—talk about a collective corporate government response—was to blame the local government department. It is extraordinary behaviour, including executive arrogance and executive incompetence. I hope that noble Lords will thoroughly support the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Bach.
(2 years ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I shall speak to Amendments 23 and 27, in my name and that of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. They deal with Clause 4(1)(a) and (b), and relate very simply to “compelling evidence”. The threshold is quite simply too high for someone to be found to require “particular individual circumstances” to be considered. The point of these amendments is to take away “compelling”.
My Lords, I am concerned about Amendment 9 from the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, which on the face of it seems extremely reasonable. If new, clear evidence and facts emerge, they should obviously be presented and tackled appropriately, but I wonder whether we are mixing up what the law can do with operational issues. After all, as was explained at some length from the Front Bench in the last debate, we have a monitoring committee with all sorts of bells and whistles, which should be able to pick up anything that is going wrong on the ground floor; it is the ground floor that matters. It is that issue—operational versus the law—that concerns me.
I quote to the House the remarks of Sir Robert Neill, who is a lawyer and chairman of the House of Commons Justice Committee, at Second Reading in the other place:
“Equally, the idea that legislation is the sole or even the principal solution to this situation is, I think, wrong. Ultimately, an operational solution is required … Ultimately, it will be operational measures that make the real difference”.—[Official Report, Commons, 12/12/23; col. 783.]
This is the point: there is a danger of mixing up operational issues, which may be dealt with by the Rwandan Government, the British Government, and the instruments put in place by the treaty, and getting the courts involved at too early or inappropriate a stage. That is the risk with the commendable idea that the noble Lord, Lord Anderson, has.
My Lords, I will also speak to related amendments that I have tabled: Amendments 24, 26, 28 and 30. I am extremely grateful to those who have co-signed all or some of those amendments: the noble Lord, Lord Cashman, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, and the noble Baroness, Lady Brinton.
I will speak very briefly, because I spoke previously about this both on Second Reading and in Committee. The current version of Clause 4(1) enables an applicant to oppose removal to Rwanda on the grounds that it is not a safe country for the applicant, but only if the applicant provides
“compelling evidence relating specifically to the person’s particular individual circumstances”.
Similarly, Clause 4(4), on the ability to obtain interim relief from removal to Rwanda, depends on particular individual circumstances relating to the applicant in question.
The defect in those provisions—a very basic defect—is that no provision is currently made for applicants in one of the important categories of refugee defined in Article 1A(2) of the 1951 refugee convention. That category comprises applicants who have a well-founded fear of persecution because of their
“membership of a particular social group”.
You can immediately see the difference between other categories of refugee under the convention, who are individual persons, and this category—which is probably the largest, or certainly the most important—comprising a large number of people who qualify as refugees because they are members of a particular social group. Yet when we look at Clause 4—I mentioned subsection (1) as well as subsection (4) on interim relief—there is no reference whatever to “group”, so one category of refugee has simply dropped off the list completely.
The proper approach of courts and tribunals to such a refugee was described in detail by the Supreme Court in HJ (Iran) and HT (Cameroon) v Secretary of State for the Home Department, a 2010 decision, especially in the judgment of Lord Rodger of Earlsferry. I will not take the House through the case in detail. It is sufficient for me to say briefly that the approach to be taken, as established by that case, is that, if the applicant for asylum claims to be a member of a particular social group, the other members of which have a well-founded fear of persecution, the applicant is entitled to be considered a refugee provided that they satisfy the particular decision-maker that they are a member of that social group.
HJ (Iran) and the other case I mentioned concerned men who wanted to live an openly gay life and would have faced persecution in their home country had they done so, but the principle that I just described of the way to treat this category of refugee, as set out in HJ (Iran), applies across the board. It is not limited to people who are LGBT but applies to those who are members of a particular social group because of their ethnicity or gender or who hold a particular religious or political belief. For example, by way of analogy with the LGBT men who applied in HJ (Iran), if people hold particular philosophical, political or religious views that they have not expressed because of a real risk of persecution, but would like to do so and to live a life in which they can express those views, they are to be treated as members of a social group and granted the status of a refugee accordingly.
As the noble Baroness, Lady Chakrabarti, said in Committee, the Bill presents us with a false dichotomy. On the one hand, it is all about me—the claimant, the individual; on the other hand, it is about Rwanda generally. The former, the Bill says in Clause 4, allows you to make a claim for interim relief or removal generally to Rwanda, but the latter does not. In between those two extremes is the category of a member of a social group with a well-founded fear of persecution. This is not a torpedo point; it is not intended to undermine or delay this legislation. It is a reflection of the omission of a basic category of refugee defined in the convention, and an extremely important category as well. On that basis, I beg to move.
My Lords, I have put my name to the four amendments tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton. I support everything he says and, since we are on Report, I do not propose to add to it. I also have my own Amendment 42. I declare an interest as the co-chairman of the All-Party Parliamentary Group on Human Trafficking and Modern Slavery and the deputy chair of the Human Trafficking Foundation.
I spoke to this in Committee. Quite simply, and taking on what the noble and learned Lord has just said, this is a very special group of people who are in this country not because they have chosen to take the boat trip but because they have been brought here, by boat, lorry or some other route, and they are victims. When one starts complaining about people who should have stopped in France because France is a safe country, it absolutely does not apply to victims of modern slavery. They are here on an involuntary basis and need to be regarded in a totally different way.
Since I have been opposing much of the Rwanda Bill, I have heard endlessly, “What is it that you or other opposition would do to improve the situation of those crossing the channel?” I deeply regret those crossing the channel and I do not have an answer, but I do not believe that the need to stop people crossing the channel in a dangerous situation is any reason to pass an utterly shocking Bill. It is constitutionally incorrect and does not look at genuine victims, such as those victims of modern slavery. It is no answer to those of us who cannot accept what is going wrong in this country and what is going wrong in this Bill that, because we cannot offer an answer to the people crossing the channel, therefore we should be disregarded. Modern slavery is one of the most shocking crimes, making vast sums for perpetrators across the world. About a third to half the victims of modern slavery come to this country. The Government are ignoring the plight of this most vulnerable group of people. I hope that, at this last moment, they will think again about victims of modern slavery.
My Lords, it is a pleasure to follow the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss. Before I refer to the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, I mention Amendment 25, in the names of my noble friend Lord Dubs and the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Winchester. Sadly, my noble friend cannot be in his place, but I raised this issue in another amendment in Committee. Our concern is about freedom of religion or beliefs and the effect that Rwandan legislation could have on such beliefs, particularly minority religious beliefs, and the conflict that could arise with the Rwandan blasphemy law. The right reverend Prelate might say more.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, has made a powerful case for the amendments in his name and for others within this group. I have added my name to his amendments. From Second Reading onwards, we have repeatedly made the case for these amendments. I will not return to the same arguments, pertinent and important though they are.
The Government insist that belonging to this particular social group—LGBT—would pose no threat in Rwanda because there is no discrimination in law. However, there are no clear protections against discrimination or persecution within law. I refer your Lordships to the comments that I read into the record from activists in Rwanda, who detailed their direct experiences of societal discrimination, which directly affects them and their quality of life.
As I understand it, they will be deported to Rwanda.
In conclusion, the Government of Rwanda have systems in place to safeguard relocated individuals with a range of vulnerabilities. The Bill already includes adequate safeguards which allow decision-makers to consider certain claims that Rwanda is unsafe for an individual due to their particular—
In relation to modern slavery, is there any law in Rwanda that protects those suffering from modern slavery or human trafficking?
I am unable to comment on Rwandan law, but, of course, the treaty takes care of this and I went into detail on that earlier. Under Article 5(2)(d) of the treaty, the United Kingdom may where necessary for the purposes of relocation provide Rwanda with
“the outcome of any decision in the United Kingdom as to whether the Relocated Individual is a victim of trafficking”,
and that includes a positive reasonable grounds decision. Under Article 13(1) of the treaty, Rwanda must have regard to information provided about a relocated individual relating to any special needs that may arise as a result of their being a victim of modern slavery or human trafficking, and must take all necessary steps to ensure that these needs are accommodated.
I have to answer the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, by saying that at the moment I do not know whether it has those laws enshrined in domestic laws, but when the treaty is ratified, it will.
As far as I know, there is no legislation to that effect in Rwanda.
My Lords, will the review of ARAP decisions apply to the Afghan interpreters and translators and not just to military personnel?
(2 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberMy noble friend raises some very good points, which I am happy to take back to the Home Office. I reiterate that this power is used very sparingly and only in conducive to the public good circumstances.
To pick up on the point raised by the noble Lord, Lord Dubs, about other British citizens in the Syrian camps, are the Government thinking of reviewing how other countries are taking back their citizens or do they refuse to consider it? If so, why?
The Government keep all these tragic cases under careful review. Where there are compelling circumstances, we will of course look at them again. Decisions on the return of British unaccompanied minors and orphans to the UK, where feasible, and subject to national security concerns, nationality and identity checks, and so on, are made on a case-by-case basis.
(2 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, the first thing to say is that officer strength at the moment is 34,899—at least it was in March 2023—which is up from 33,367 in March 2010; that is the highest number of officers the Metropolitan Police Service has had to date. As regards the conversations of the Home Secretary, the Home Secretary and the Policing Minister have met with the commissioner in the past two weeks. We fully support HMICFRS in identifying areas of poor performance and have seen the commissioner act swiftly to set out his planned improvements, which are necessary, through the plan that I just mentioned, A New Met for London. The Home Office is also a member of the HMICFRS police performance oversight group. We monitor progress and ensure that the Metropolitan Police gets the support it needs from across the policing sector to improve as quickly as possible.
My Lords, having heard the Minister’s dates for secondary and not primary legislation, why on earth is it taking so long?
The noble and learned Baroness asks me a very good question; I am afraid that I do not understand the inner workings of the secondary legislation and SI process, but I will find out.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, when the House last debated this issue, the noble Lord, Lord German, stressed the risk to the public purse as thousands are locked up while the search goes on for further Rwandas to send them to. I will not repeat his arguments. The House found them convincing and supported his Motion by a majority of 61; nor need I remind the House that neither my Motion nor the Motion tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, asks that those locked up for over six months be granted asylum. We ask simply that their cases be heard, as the refugee convention requires. Nothing in the Motion pre-judges the asylum adjudication procedure. It simply rules out the possibility—maybe the probability—of limbo, of extended inadmissibility gagged and incarcerated behind barbed wire.
I will make only three points, two new and one sadly familiar. First, the Minister, in arguing against the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord German, advanced only one argument—which he made again tonight. He said that it would simply encourage people to game the system, drawing things out to reach the six-month cut-off date. I suspect that the threat of being sent to Rwanda might be sufficient reason to seek a delay. However, in any case, the Minister’s point is met in the new version of the amendment. With all due respect to him, the change is substantive. The final subsection, proposed new subsection (3C), is new and means that nothing that a detainee does can advance the date on which the Government would have to countenance and begin to consider his application for asylum. Gaming the system would not be possible. If the Government’s concern was real, their objection is really met.
Secondly, the reason that the other place gave tonight for rejecting the amendment tabled by the noble Lord, Lord German, and so many other amendments, was that it is contrary to the purpose of the Bill to prevent and deter unlawful migration. However, willing the end does not and cannot mean willing all and every possible means. Capital punishment might be an effective deterrent, as might tarring and feathering or hanging, drawing and quartering. Willing the end does not absolve Parliament from discriminating among possible means, distinguishing the acceptable from the unacceptable. Sine die incarceration, case unheard, surely falls on the wrong side of the line.
My third and final point is that the underlying issue here is simple and sadly familiar. Our debate has not been just about conventions and commitments. It has been about people, about common humanity. It is about whether the House and the country think that locking people up sine die is a fair and reasonable way to treat those fleeing oppression, famine and war—locking them up and denying them any chance to explain why they seek sanctuary here and what it is that they fear back home. Doing that was in no party’s election manifesto. The House has so far taken the view that it is not what the country should do. I hope that we shall maintain that view. I beg to move.
My Lords, I shall speak to Motion D1. I remind the House that this issue was raised at an earlier stage, either on Report or in ping-pong, by a Member of the Conservative Benches in this House. I also remind the House that how the law will be applied is not what the Minister says; it is what the law actually states. We are hearing from the Minister that in relation to unaccompanied children it will not be used very much, but that is absolutely not good enough. If the law allows unaccompanied children to be detained for well over 28 days—that is, unless the child gets to the tribunal, and how will the child know that he or she is to apply to the tribunal?—then under this law they could remain there indefinitely.
I have four points to make. First, there is a risk to the welfare of the child of this indefinite detention instead of the present 24-hour maximum—a very considerable increase. The Government talk about child-appropriate detention. I just wonder what that really means.
I am afraid that I have banged on to this House again and again about the Children Acts, but I am particularly concerned about the impact of the Children Acts on Home Office detention if the detention goes beyond just two or three days, because there is no parental responsibility. What happens, as a Conservative Peer said much earlier, if a child suffers a serious medical emergency? There is no one, particularly not in the Home Office, with the right to sign the consent form for a child. They would have to go to the court to get an emergency protection order for the child to be able to receive proper medical attention. It would be quite a good idea if the Home Office remembered that. I said it to it earlier, and so did the Conservative Peer, but it does not seem to have put that in its mind.
Secondly, I worry about the Department for Education. To what extent does it know the implications of the Bill? I get the impression that the members of the DfE in this House do not really have any knowledge of it.
Thirdly, there may be disputes between local authorities and the Home Office over a child being removed from local authority care under the Children Acts and taken into detention. What happens if there is a care order where a judge has ordered that a child should be living in a particular place under the care of a local authority? Is the Home Office really going to move the child where there has been a judicial order over where the child lives?
Fourthly, although I know this is not necessarily popular with many people, Article 5 of the human rights convention talks about detention. In due course I would like to test the opinion of the House.
My Lords, I shall speak to Motion E1. This Motion, as with Motion D1, concerns vulnerable children being deprived of their freedom—in this case, those accompanied children. I am disappointed that, regardless of the strength of opinion across this Chamber, the Government are still not proposing to set limits on the detention of children in the Bill, whether they are accompanied or unaccompanied. Despite the comments of the Minister about the possibility of fake families earlier in the debate, I wish to press the point.
My amendment, as originally tabled by the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester last week, seeks to address and bring forward provisions for children within families. It was the Prime Minister himself who stated that it is not the intention of the Bill to detain children. This amendment seeks to go some way towards ensuring that commitment for all children. It would ensure that for families with children, the children could be detained for no longer than 120 hours—five days—or for no longer than seven days, with ministerial approval. It presents a proportionate response to the possibility of unlimited detention of children that is a compromise on what is in the 2014 Act. Given that the Government intend to deport those meeting the conditions of Clause 2 swiftly, It would not hinder that objective.
Leave out from “House” to end and insert “do insist on its disagreement with the Commons in their Amendments 36A and 36B, do not insist on its Amendments 36C and 36D, and do propose Amendments 36E and 36F in lieu of Amendments 36C and 36D—
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, with reference to Motion L, I welcome the government amendments, which have the same effect as our original amendments of restoring the status quo ante with regard to pregnant women.
Before my round of thanks, I have one query from the lawyer who has kindly been advising us. He says that his only concern is that they are a separate provision for the new powers in paragraph 16(2C) and proposed new subsection (2A) of Section 62 rather than reapplying the protection of Section 60. The reason that this matters is that for the purposes of the time limit, the period of detention under the old detention powers would not be aggregated with the period of detention under the new detention powers. However, now, in theory, a pregnant woman could be detained for up to seven days under the old detention powers and then for another seven days under the new detention powers. Could the Minister confirm that this is not the intention and that the powers would not be used in this way?
I turn to my thanks. First, I pay tribute to Women for Refugee Women, in particular Gemma Lousley, for all their invaluable work in pressing this amendment, and also to David Neale of Garden Court Chambers for his pro bono legal advice. I thank all noble Lords around the House who have supported the amendments by adding their names, speaking in support, voting in support or deliberately abstaining. I am particularly grateful to those Members—largely women, I think—on the Government Benches who could not bring themselves to support the Government on this. That there was so much support for the amendments on the Government Benches is largely down to the noble Baroness, Lady Sugg, who I think of as a noble friend. She has been tireless, both behind the scenes and on the Floor of the House, as was recognised by the Immigration Minister yesterday.
The preservation of the time limits on the detention of pregnant women in recognition of the likely health impact of the original proposal to remove them represents one small beacon of light in what otherwise continues to be the gloom of a punitive Bill that will do untold harm. The government Motion was described on both sides of the Commons yesterday as a no-brainer. Nevertheless, it would be churlish not to recognise that the Government have listened on this issue at least, and I thank them for doing so.
My Lords, I rise to speak to Motion N1 in my name, which is just ahead of the Motion in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester. This is a rather different point; it relates to a situation where there may be a stand-off between the Home Office and the local authority.
Picture a child who is either being accommodated under Part III of the Children Act or for whom a judge or magistrate has made a care order which the local authority is complying with, and the Home Office, according to Clause 16, wishes the child to be removed in order to send them back to their parents or to some other place. Although it said to use it only occasionally, it does not say in Clause 16 that the local authority should be consulted or, rather more importantly, should actually consent. In particular, if there is a care order, that is an order of the court. As far as I can see, it would be very difficult for the Home Office just to pick the child up and take them away where there is a court order saying that the child must live with the family, or whoever it may be, arranged by the local authority.
Quite simply, what I am seeking is that the Secretary of State should bear in mind all these things and not just consult the local authority but gain its consent to the removal of the child from its care. It is a very simple proposition.
What I would like from the Minister is either an assurance that the Secretary of State will do that, or that he will take it back to the Home Office for the Secretary of State to consider and agree to it. I do not propose to put this issue to the House, but it is very important that the Home Office’s interaction with local authorities under Clause 16 be clarified and that the Home Office recognise the fact that it cannot just remove a child if it is contrary to the Children Act.
My Lords, on the narrow issue of the detention of pregnant women, I thank the Government and the Minister for listening to and considering carefully the arguments made in your Lordships’ House and acting on them. Thanks to the many who made the case, and the government amendment, the existing protection of a 72-hour time limit remains in place. That is a small change, but it will make a big difference to the women in question, and for that I am very grateful.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I will speak briefly in support of Amendment 156A, although I regret the limited nature of the appeal contemplated by that amendment. I very much welcome Amendment 158A, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope.
As a matter of principle, I am very much in favour of giving individuals the right of appeal although, as I said when I intervened on the right reverend Prelate, I fear that his amendment provides for a more limited right of appeal than I would wish.
A decision on the age of an individual is critical in determining a person’s status under the legislation. I am concerned that, in many instances, the original decision about age will be made in a somewhat perfunctory manner. I imagine that immigration officers may get rather impatient and make rather perfunctory decisions. At the end of the day, age is a matter of evidence and I cannot find any persuasive reason why the original position on age should not be challenged. In my view, the right of appeal should extend to appeals based on the ground that the relevant authority had made a mistake of fact. That is what the noble and learned Lord seeks to achieve in Amendment 158A. However, if I have correctly understood the amendment and its relation to the Bill, the grounds of appeal are limited to those set out in Clause 56(5) of the Bill as it stands. The grounds specified there are essentially judicial review grounds—for example, that there was some procedural unfairness, or the ground of irrationality—and appeals based on fact are expressly excluded. I regard that exclusion as highly regrettable.
To meet some of the anxieties that I fear will be expressed by the Minister regarding my comments and the amendments, I make this point as well: the rights of appeal could be abused, and I would therefore like the burden of establishing the appeal to be on the appellant. It must be for them to satisfy the relevant appellate body that the grounds of appeal are made out. That may in fact be the existing law and practice—it has been such a long time since I practised in that field of law that I simply do not know. If it is not, it should be, and it would meet many of the anxieties likely to be expressed on the government Benches.
My Lords, I understand very well the child rights impact assessment on this issue. Naturally, the Government are concerned about people’s ability to pretend that they are under age when they are not, but that does not in fact deal with the underlying problem: there are a large number of children from countries outside Europe who mature much more quickly, certainly quicker than children in western Europe.
I remember going on a visit to Safe Passage, which was offering a drop-in centre for young men under 18. A number of those I met, and whom Safe Passage was absolutely satisfied were under 18, had beards or moustaches. If such person is interviewed by the Home Office, will it not immediately assume that a moustache or beard absolutely means that they are over 18? In the case of some of these young people, that will be incorrect.
I also remain very concerned about the issue raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in relation to Clause 5. If the issue is, as I suspect it will be, that they got it wrong, it is not necessarily—or probably not ever—an issue of law but a question of fairness. It is a question of dealing fairly and in the best interests of those who are genuinely under 18.
Reading through the child impact assessment, what depresses me is the suggestion regarding the extent to which the Government are following the principles of the Children Act—which every Government in my lifetime have followed—and looking out for the best interests of children. They are saying it again and again and, quite simply, doing the exact reverse. This is extraordinarily depressing.
My Lords, most of what I wished to say has been said by others. I pay tribute to my noble and learned friend Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Viscount and my noble and learned friend Lord Hope for what they have said, and I support the amendment in the name of the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham.
I will simply say this: it is a matter of fairness. In its scrutiny of the Bill, the Joint Committee on Human Rights remained unconvinced by this approach and believes that any penalisation for refusing to undergo some form of age assessment should be challengeable in the courts, which remains not the case at the moment. Removing a young person’s right of appeal against an age assessment which may have been carried out on appearance only, or by any other means, is, as my noble and learned Friend, Lady Butler-Sloss, said, cruel and demeaning.
It is all the more disgraceful if that young person has been tortured or abused and is terrified of being touched by strangers when there is a scientific assessment. It is all the more disturbing given that the so-called scientific methods for age assessment are widely questioned by the scientific community, especially those who have particular expertise, such as the Royal College of Paediatrics and Child Health. I chair two hospitals, as noted in my interests set out in the register. I have never met a doctor or any other health professional who supports these so-called scientific age assessment methods, yet I have met several asylum-seeking young people who have been tortured and abused and are terrified of being touched. If they refuse, they can be penalised and treated as adults. This is a matter of fact. Any young person should have the right of appeal.
I am grateful to the Minister for the way he introduced the government amendments to Clause 59, but I am sorry that they were limited in scope. When we had an exchange in Committee and I argued that the revision of the cap should take account of exogenous as well as endogenous factors, he told me that he thought he and I were not far apart. The cap level should not be determined simply by consultation with local authorities. It should take some account of famine, war, massacre, earthquake and natural disasters abroad, which are what tend to encourage the demand for asylum. He told me he did not think we were far apart and agreed to look at it, but I see no amendment. I regret that, but I guess that is where we are.
I support Amendment 163 and I particularly support Amendment 164, proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. I congratulate her, the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, and the noble Baroness, Lady Helic, on their courage in coming forward with such a sensible amendment.
Clause 60, which the Government have put in the Bill, is welcome, but the report it foresees is a purely descriptive document. It is not prescriptive. Amendment 164 calls for a further report which will be more purposive. The amendment is however quite modest; it does not attempt to point to any particular type of safe and regular route which the Government should explore. It does not suggest we take up the French offer of a processing centre in France, although for the life of me I do not know why we do not. It does not suggest we reconsider what seems to be a systematic reduction now going on in the number of family reunion cases we are allowing. It does not consider —this would fall foul of the ruling of the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope—that we should change our advice to UNHCR on the number and types of resettlement cases that we will be prepared to take.
About 5,000 people from Iran who came into this country in 2022. It is an astonishing fact that 5,642 arrived by irregular routes and 10 by the regular resettlement route. That seems absurd and can be only on the basis of instructions to keep the flow to a minimum. The amendment does not suggest that we sift new applications for asylum in the same sensible way that the Home Office is now sifting those already in the queue from people who are here, waiting to have their case heard. There is no reason why a similar sift should not be conducted remotely.
If you are a young woman who has demonstrated in Tehran and is now on the run, and wanted by the authorities, there is no remote way in which you can register your wish for sanctuary in this country. We allow remote access to people who want to get into our immigration system, but we do not allow remote access to our asylum system. If you are safe where you are but simply want to live and work here, you may apply remotely on the internet or via diplomatic representation, although the internet is the more likely route. But if your life is at risk, if you are on the run, if you are in Kabul or Khartoum and you are wanted, if you are starving or if your tribe is being massacred, we will not consider your case for asylum in this country, unless you get here directly by some route that does not exist. That seems to me shaming. We cannot put that on our statute book; if we have to do so, let us at least add Amendment 164.
It is hypocrisy to pretend that the aim of the Bill is to stop the small boats. The most obvious way of stopping the small boats is to open new, regular routes. If we can do it for immigrants, by sifting their applications remotely, why can we not do it for asylum seekers? To refuse to do it for those fleeing for their lives—to refuse them even the possibility of applying for sanctuary here—seems a bit immoral, a bit illegal under international law, a bit hypocritical and entirely ineffectual, because it will keep the small boat men in business. I strongly support Amendment 164 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud.
My Lords, I agree with everything that the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has said and I particularly support the amendment in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. During last year and this year, one of the criticisms we have heard in this House of the small boats and those coming across has been that they should have taken safe and legal routes; but as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has demonstrated extremely clearly, there are absolutely no safe and legal routes at the moment, unless you go through UNHCR. For people like the woman fleeing Tehran, whose case was given as an example by the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, there is no way she could get here.
If I may respectfully say so, it is hypocritical of the Government to suggest that there are routes that could have been taken to avoid taking the small boats. I deplore the small boats. I do not want to see any more of them. The dangers are appalling and I recognise the problems that the Government have but, as the noble Lord, Lord Kerr, has said, they need to provide safe routes. To suggest that these may be ready by the end of 2024 seems a nonsense; we need them now. If we are to get rid of the boats, we absolutely must have well-known, safe routes from somewhere in Europe.
My Lords, we have just had mention made of the young woman from Tehran. I have been in touch with that young woman; in fact, there are more than one of them. Some of your Lordships may have seen the BBC programme last week, which showed the amount of footage that was recorded on cell phones of what happened when the young woman Mahsa Amini was taken into custody because she had her scarf on in an inappropriate way. She ended up in a coma, and then dead. Two young women journalists had got into the hospital and photographed her in that coma, then photographed her family being told that she was dead. Photographs were seen in that programme of her beaten body, her face obviously pulverised by blows. In the days immediately afterwards those two journalists knew that, once they had published their film footage, they would be at risk of arrest—and there was no way that we could get them out. Contact was made, but there was no way.
A few months ago I spoke to the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, who is always so sympathetic to these positions. Turkey is one of the obvious places that people can flee to, but it is not a safe place for Iranian women; we have seen returns of people to Iran. The question was: if they got to Turkey, could they go into the British embassy, ask for a visa and be given sanctuary and help to get out? The noble Lord had to come back to me and say no, that would not be an acceptable way of dealing with this.
So what is the mechanism for journalists like that, who are in imminent danger? Those two women journalists are now serving six years apiece. They were put on trial, were not allowed to have lawyers and are now serving sentences in jail. That is why I tabled an amendment to the Bill suggesting that there should be emergency visas so that people in imminent danger can do something to get out.
That usually means journalists. I have personal experience of sitting in this country with Anna Politkovskaya, a Russian journalist who had written about Putin and his conduct. She went back to Russia, and three weeks later I saw her body on the stairwell of the building she lived in, with blood pouring down the stairs because she had been shot. These are real events in the lives of people who are being courageous in calling out the abuses of Governments, yet there is no way that we can help them to escape.
It is not only journalists. The lawyer acting for Navalny, the opposition leader who was making a stand against Putin, was immediately arrested. There ought to be ways in which we can provide emergency visas for people to get out. In 2019 the Government announced:
“A new process for emergency resettlement will also be developed, allowing the UK to respond quickly to instances when there is a heightened need for protection”,
and that is what we were calling for. Four years later, that still has not happened.
In 2021, in the months immediately after the military evacuation of Afghanistan, I was directly involved in trying to get judges, particularly women judges, out of that country. We managed to evacuate 103 women judges and their families, but only a small number of them were taken in by Britain. At that stage I delivered a petition to No. 10, signed by tens of parliamentarians, lawyers and human rights experts, calling on Her Majesty’s Government to introduce as a matter of urgency emergency visas for the remaining women judges, women television presenters and women Members of Parliament who had not managed to get out. I did not hear a dicky bird. I did not even get a reply to the petition; I am sure that Mr Johnson took it with him into retirement.
We now have the embarrassment that Canada has created emergency human rights defender visas, as has Ireland. The Czech Republic recently did so too, at the behest of the great project that this country was at the heart of creating, the Media Freedom Coalition. We advised that there should be emergency visas for journalists and were persuading the world to create them. The Czech Republic did so, and it now has a huge number of the journalists who had to flee Russia. Do we have many of them?
I too will support the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud. I will not ask for a vote on mine because we are in a bit of a hurry but, if we accept the very sensible amendment to create emergency visas and new routes for people, I call on the Government to include the ones that will be necessary where people’s lives are in imminent danger, as we have seen in a number of conflicts recently.
My Lords, I very much support the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Swire. As has already been said so well by him and by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, this is an extremely sensible idea. The public, as well as ourselves and the House of Commons, are entitled to know where we stand and what is happening with the numbers.
I share, to some extent, the concerns of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, about the amendment of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, purely and simply because I wonder to what extent the National Crime Agency has actually been consulted on what its priorities are. I quite see the importance of giving this priority, and I totally support it, but I would be interested to know, before we make this a part of primary legislation, whether the National Crime Agency, which I happen to know has a large number of different duties and works extremely well in many areas in this country, sees this area as a priority.
My Lords, first, I address the amendment in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Swire. He wondered why the amendment had not captured the imagination of the House. Speaking for those of us on these Benches, the Bill is entirely focused on refugees and asylum seekers, who form a very small proportion—a tiny fraction—of the 1.3 million people given leave to remain in the country last year. So while I agree in principle with what the noble Lord says—that we should have a much firmer grip on the number of illegal immigrants in this country—his amendment is not germane to the Bill.
This is an important initiative from the most reverend Primate on this subject, for two reasons. First, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, just said, it is truly an international subject; there are huge issues here that we cannot escape and generations to come will not be able to escape. Secondly, we have to tackle this on a long-term basis, but that does not mean that it has to be set in concrete for 10 years. I am sure the most reverend Primate meant exactly that.
For example, Australia has a framework with which both its Liberal Party and its Labor Party agree. Each year they look at the numbers and agree how many should come in for work reasons, as asylum seekers, for economic reasons or for family reasons. The number is debated in Parliament and it may change. We ought to debate immigration and how much we should have every year, as we debate the Budget. We will disagree. Governments will change and the numbers will change, but within a framework that we all understand and to which we can relate. It would give ordinary people in this country a better feeling about this subject, rather than the resentment and difficulty that we have faced over many years, as we did over Brexit, for example.
The most reverend Primate may be pushing at an open door. He may be aware that, last week in Brussels, the Governments of eight countries—Denmark, Greece and Austria among them—wrote to the European Commission asking the European Union to pursue a new approach, based on the British model. That is one point.
Secondly, alongside those eight countries, another group—including Italy and the Netherlands—has said that it wants to pursue a new model, based on the British approach. No other practical approach has been forthcoming. We think that we have problems, but Italy is talking about the possibility of 400,000 people crossing the Mediterranean, when we are talking about 45,000 last year. As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, was saying, this is a truly international problem and will have only an international conclusion. As that is what is happening in Europe, the most reverend Primate may be pushing at an open door.
It is not surprising that this is happening because, whichever way you look at this issue, you come back to something along the lines that the Government are proposing. I know that some quite serious amendments have been proposed in this House, some of which will go through and some of which will not. None the less, the basic bones of this—safe and legal routes on the one hand, and some means to deter illegal migrants on the other—will be there whatever we try. Over a year ago, the Tony Blair Institute for Global Change said that, whichever way you look at this, those two elements will probably be there in any solution.
I want to raise a separate point with my noble friend the Minister, which I have raised before but not yet had answered. There is a lot of legality surrounding the Government’s proposals, the European Convention on Human Rights and the European Court of Human Rights. We should not get too bogged down in the legalisms, because we need a common-sense approach that deals with the problem as it is today. As I understand it, discussions are going on not only in Europe about adopting the British model for the overall problem but between the UK Government and other Governments about how this would sit against our existing treaties in Europe, in particular the ECHR, and whether elements are incompatible or are largely in agreement. I would like to know whether these discussions are taking place. I am not a lawyer, but it seems sensible, if the legal arrangements allow it, for these sorts of discussions to take place. That seems common sense to me, rather than having ping-pong arrangements in which some people disagree and it goes to the courts. We ought to be able to discuss these issues rationally before they go to the courts.
The most reverend Primate is raising this issue in the right sort of way, but I believe that all this, taken together, means that the Government are right to persevere on their fundamental track while taking account, sympathetically, of the points that have been made.
My Lords, I declare my interest on the register in relation to human trafficking. If I may respectfully say so, the most reverend Primate has put forward not only a very shrewd but a very wise proposal. It ought to be cross-party; it certainly should not be brushed aside as though it were just part of the Bill, because it is much deeper and goes much further.
I am very glad that proposed subsection (2) includes provisions for tackling human trafficking, because there is a chance that we might retrieve a little of the Modern Slavery Act—something of which this country ought to have been intensely proud, until last year and this year—if we manage to do something sensible, as the most reverend Primate has suggested.
My Lords, I will say a brief word in support of the most reverend Primate and to follow my noble friend Lord Horam. If we are to deal with this problem, it ultimately has to be on the basis of cross-party support, rather like defence. How are we going to do that without somebody first putting forward a framework that will, undoubtedly, be unsatisfactory to the other parties? Then there will be debate and ultimately consensus.
There has to be international action, but that is so difficult. Unless our own country takes a broad-based approach to this problem, we will drive the solutions to the fringes, which will be very dangerous for our politics. It has happened in Italy and Hungary, and is perhaps happening in the United States. It is happening around the world where Governments have failed to base their response broadly enough and therefore keep the extremists at the very fringes, where they always are.
The most reverend Primate offers a way of introducing that kind of debate into our programme. I am the last person to think that making a strategy is the solution to a problem. That is always the long grass—let us have a strategy and it will disappear for ever into committees. I did that myself as a Minister many a time. What he is offering here—and I hope we respond to it in the right spirit—is perhaps the beginning of a way in which we can broaden the basis of agreement about our approach, so that what does not happen, if, say, by some surprise the party opposite comes into power, is that it reverses everything that we have done. What will the electorate think then? They will say that these people cannot be trusted to deal with this problem, which is right in the general public’s mind. If we make it the knockabout of ordinary party politics, we will not have served our people well.
(2 years, 8 months ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, Amendment 87 is in my name, and I thank the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, and the noble Lord, Lord Touhig, for adding their names to it. We on these Benches support all the amendments in this group. With the exception of the amendments in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher, who wishes to remove Clauses 15 and 16 from the Bill—that would be the ideal solution but is unlikely to win the day—they try to fully understand the relationship between the Home Secretary’s new powers as indicated in Clauses 15 and 16 and the obligations and duties of local authorities to children as laid out in the Children Act 1989.
The statutory scheme for looked-after children has been carefully developed over many decades, with safeguards added in response to learning from systematic failings and research into different aspects of child well-being. Empowering the Home Secretary to radically change that statutory scheme and the provisions around it on the basis of how a child arrives in a local authority area is both radical and untested; it restructures England’s child welfare system.
Where there was total clarity on the interests of the child, the clauses bring ambiguity and confusion. I am confused, as are many other noble Lords, about how the powers given to the Home Secretary in Clauses 15 and 16 are in line with the duties and obligations of local authorities. Unaccompanied children seeking asylum are children in need under the Children Act 1989, and local authorities have specific duties to them and specific powers—for example, under Sections 17 and 47. Under Part 1 of Schedule 2 to the Act, certain activities have to follow.
Section 22C of the Children Act sets out the ways in which local authorities are to accommodate and maintain children. Section 23ZA requires local authorities to regularly visit looked-after children. Sections 25A and 26 place a duty on local authorities to appoint an independent reviewing officer for looked-after children and to make arrangements for independent advocates for them.
The first question I wish to tease out is: when children are removed—either put into the Home Office accommodation initially or removed at the request of the Secretary of State—do they still have looked-after status? If so, how will provision be made for local authorities to carry out the duties they have to looked-after children? The significant question is: what happens when the local authority deems that the Home Office accommodation is not in the best interests of the child, as the statutory scheme suggests? Under this provision of the Bill, can the local authority override the Secretary of State’s request to move a child into certain accommodation and move them into accommodation that is in their best interest? It is a key question that was asked in Committee which the Minister did not answer. The Minister said that he would write to noble Lords on this issue, and I am very pleased that at 12 pm today a letter dated 3 July arrived in our inboxes.
However, that letter creates further confusion and does not answer the following central questions. How will local authorities be able to conduct all their duties under the Children Act 1989? Why does the Secretary of State’s new power lie in the provisions of that Act in terms of where a child shall be put, particularly in terms of the best interests of the child? We really need clarity to be able to understand the interrelationship and how local authorities can carry out their full legal duties under the Children Act 1989 to put the interests of the child first. The Minister was unable to clarify this in Committee and it is important that those issues are now clarified on Report. I beg to move.
My Lords, I declare that I was President of the Family Division and tried endless care cases involving local authorities. I am extremely concerned about Clauses 15 and 16 and their interrelation with the Children Acts, particularly the Children Act 1989. As the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, has already pointed out, the Secretary of State does not have parental responsibility for children.
I pointed this out to the Minister several times in Committee. So far, and I do not mean to be impolite, I am not sure that either he or—more importantly—the Home Office have put their minds to the implications of parental responsibility. I have not seen a copy of the letter that apparently was sent. It would have been helpful if I had seen it before I came to this House, because since I have been here I am afraid that I have not been looking at my emails.
The local authority is, under the Children Act, the only corporate parent and no one else can be. If the local authority goes to the court and seeks a care order under Section 31 of the Children Act 1989, there will be a court order requiring the local authority to keep the child and place the child in appropriate accommodation. I ask the Minister: has the Home Office has reflected on what Clause 16 is saying—that the Home Secretary can take a child away from local authority accommodation and put that child somewhere else? Is it intended that this Bill is to override the Children Acts and create a new situation where parental responsibility is of no significance if the Home Secretary considers that a child should be dealt with by the Home Office and not a local authority?
This is a very serious legal situation for children. Although there may not be all that number of younger children, there are certainly some. Even a child of 16 is entitled to the care of a local authority. I just wonder whether the Government have thought through the implications of this. I do not believe that this matter will be taken to a vote, which I am rather sad about in a way, because I would like the Government to put their minds to the existing law—which, I have to tell noble Lords, a Conservative Government passed in 1989, and I was one of those who played a part in the legislation. I am extremely sad to see these two clauses.
My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 87. Like the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, I do not support the other amendments, which would get rid of these clauses entirely.
I had hoped not to have to put my name to that amendment, particularly as I hoped there would be a government amendment because of the clarification by the Family Division of the High Court during Committee on 9 June, in a case brought by Article 39, which was trying to make missing unaccompanied asylum-seeking children wards of court. It is interesting to note in that case that the lead submissions from the Government were not from my noble friend the Minister’s department but from the Department for Education, which holds the responsibility for the Children Act.
I have a simple question to my noble friend the Minister. As a Conservative, I believe it is important that every child has a parent. While the children are accommodated by the Home Office when they initially come into the country, who has parental responsibility? From my reading of the Bill—I am grateful to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss—we are changing a fundamental principle in our law and children may not have a parent, without due consideration of the consequences. It might just be for two days, two weeks or four weeks, but it is really important.
I can foresee, even on my cursory glance at this, at least three cracks in that foundation. First, if a child who is being accommodated in these hotels or hostels ends up at A&E and needs an operation but there is no parent to consent to that surgery—so to do that surgery would be an assault—then precious NHS time would be spent contacting the Home Office and not caring for patients.
The second healthcare situation is that children can be detained under the Mental Health Act. That Act gives important powers, duties and safeguards to the statutory nearest relative—and there is a list of those. Again, if a child is under a care order, under the Mental Health Act the corporate parent is the nearest relative. If the child has no parent and is detained in a secure mental health unit, who will be the nearest relative? Again, precious NHS resources will be, in my view, ill-used.
The most worrying crack—which I hope I am wrong about; I remind noble Lords that I am not a criminal lawyer, and I have done my best when looking at this piece of legislation—is that, when child protection functions under Parts 4 and 5 of the Children Act, such as Section 31, are exercised, there is then a very important exemption for local authorities or public authorities from criminal liability under Section 7 of the corporate manslaughter Act 2007. I would be grateful to hear my noble friend the Minister’s view on that statute. It defines senior management. That perhaps includes the board, civil servants in the department, as well as Ministers and, potentially, the Secretary of State. Giving evidence to public inquiries and appearing before Select Committees is commonplace for civil servants; what is not commonplace is being called as a witness to a Crown Court trial for such a prosecution of the corporate body, the Home Office, which is included under Schedule 1 to the corporate manslaughter Act. If there were to be a change of Government next year, it might be the right honourable Member for Pontefract going to the trial, and it would not be good enough for her to say, “We had only been in office for two weeks before the child fell out of the hotel window”.
My Lords, Amendment 87 put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, seeks to ensure that all children covered by the duty in Clause 2 have the protections afforded to children under the Children Act 1989. No one can disagree with the sentiment behind his amendment. However, in a sense, it misses its intended target, as the 1989 Act does not impose obligations, duties or responsibilities on the Secretary of State but rather on local authorities. There is nothing in this Bill that alters those duties or responsibilities, particularly as regards an unaccompanied child—a point well made by my noble friend Lady Berridge.
That said, Section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 already requires that the Home Secretary carry out her functions in a way that takes into account the need to safeguard and promote the welfare of children in the United Kingdom, and I can assure noble Lords that this will continue to be the case.
Subsection (3) of the proposed new clause brings me to the provisions in Clauses 15 and 16 which were referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Meacher. She seeks to remove those clauses; the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Durham seeks to amend them with Amendments 88A, 89 and 89A.
Clause 15 makes provision for the accommodation of unaccompanied migrant children in scope of this Bill. This clause confers on the Secretary of State a power to provide, or to arrange for the provision of, accommodation and other support to unaccompanied migrant children in England. While the clause contains no time limit on how long any child spends in Home Office accommodation, as I have said previously on a number of occasions, our clear intention is that their stay be a temporary one until they transfer to a local authority for a permanent placement. This is not detained accommodation, and the support that will be provided will be appropriate to the needs of these young people during their short stay.
The problem is Clause 16, because the Home Office can remove the child from the otherwise permanent care of the local authority. How on earth is what the Minister is saying compatible with Clause 16?
It is obviously necessary that the Bill contain a power to allow for such a transfer, in order to ensure the appropriate removal of a child on attaining their majority, for example, or for any other purpose that might be necessary to ensure implementation of the scheme. The Government expect local authorities to meet their statutory obligations to unaccompanied children from the date of their arrival in the United Kingdom, and that the Home Office step in only sparingly and temporarily. Indeed, an unaccompanied child in scope of the scheme may enter local authority care without first being accommodated by the Home Office under this power. However, it is important that there be legal certainty about the ability of the Home Office to step in to ensure that an unaccompanied child arriving on the south coast can immediately be accommodated and supported.
As we have just discussed, Clause 16 then makes provision for the transfer of an unaccompanied migrant child from Home Office accommodation to a local authority in England. The clause provides a mechanism for the Secretary of State to decide that a child is to cease residing in Home Office accommodation and to then direct a local authority in England to provide accommodation to the child, under Section 20 of the Children Act, after five working days of the direction being made. As was the subject of the intervention a moment ago, the Secretary of State may also direct a local authority in England to cease accommodating an unaccompanied child and to transfer the child into accommodation provided by the Home Office after five working days of the direction being made. This power is the subject of the right reverend Prelate’s amendment.
I suggest, with respect to the right reverend Prelate, that this amendment is unnecessary given that protections are already in statute in Section 55 of the 2009 Act, which I have already referred to. The Secretary of State is required to have regard to the interests of children as a primary factor in immigration decisions affecting them. Let me be clear: best interests are not the only factor that must be considered; other relevant factors, such as close consideration of individual circumstances, must be taken into account. In making decisions and devising policy guidance under this Bill, the Home Office will continue to apply the Section 55 duty.
We are working through the operational processes relating to unaccompanied children and the circumstances in which we will use this power. This includes engaging with stakeholders to understand the concerns they might have about the power to transfer unaccompanied children into Home Office accommodation. We are working very closely with the Department for Education, as we want to deliver the objectives of the Bill while being mindful of the needs of children and young people. I hope this provides some reassurance to noble Lords.
Before the Minister answers, I will add to what the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, said. Throughout our consideration of the Bill, I have been particularly concerned about children. As far as I can remember, there are no more amendments of any significance in relation to children in the final part of Report. All I have said has been without sight of the impact statement. For me and many other noble Lords who are concerned about children, it is quite simply too late.
I have looked into the history of child rights impact assessments, and they are a rare document. Tomorrow, when the assessment is provided, noble Lords will see an explanation of the background to these documents. There is an element of opportunism about the timing; clearly, these are difficult documents that need to be prepared with care. I say that it will be published tomorrow, so it will be published tomorrow, and at this point I cannot give any more detail as to the precise timing.