All 2 Debates between Baroness Butler-Sloss and Lord McColl of Dulwich

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Butler-Sloss and Lord McColl of Dulwich
Wednesday 25th February 2015

(9 years, 2 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Baroness Butler-Sloss Portrait Baroness Butler-Sloss (CB)
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My Lords, I shall speak also to Amendments 53, 56, 58, 59 and 71. The noble Lord, Lord McColl, and I have fought a battle with two separate Governments over the past six years or so to be able to create a situation in which child victims of human trafficking, from overseas, in particular, have someone as a mentor, or to monitor them, outside social services. We fought that battle—it took a long time—and I am absolutely delighted to be able to say that I strongly support Amendment 61, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Bates. It is for that reason that I think, for the first time, that the battle the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and I have fought has achieved, with the existing part of Clause 48 together with these amendments, nearly everything that we both want—certainly that I want. However, it would be helpful, when regulations and guidance are given, if the other matters in various amendments proposed by the noble Lord, Lord McColl, and with my name on them, were to be found somewhere, in secondary legislation or guidance. But for the time being I am delighted with the result that has been achieved.

Lord McColl of Dulwich Portrait Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)
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My Lords, I am extremely pleased that Clause 48 is part of the Bill. It recognises that trafficked children have particular needs and experiences that make them especially vulnerable. It has been a great pleasure to work with the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, over these years and it is great that the Minister has been so co-operative and helpful. I am also particularly grateful that he arranged the very helpful meeting with officials from the Home Office and Barnardo’s, which operates the child trafficking advocacy scheme.

The Minister’s amendments to Clause 48 deal precisely with the key areas of concern that we raised in Committee, and they are a testament to the Minister’s willingness to engage constructively on those issues—and I am very pleased to speak today in support of the majority of his amendments. I shall not go into great detail on matters contained in the amendments, trusting that my views are well known to your Lordships, and I shall focus my remarks on areas on which I would appreciate further clarification from the Minister.

Amendments 62 and 64 address the power to make regulations about details of the advocate scheme and will now require that regulations are made and cover the functions and appointment of the advocate. I strongly urge your Lordships to support Amendments 62 and 64, which will require the creation of regulations ensuring a robust statutory foundation for child trafficking advocates.

I have one question for the Minister. In previous amendments that I have brought to the House on this issue, I have always ensured that the functions of the role were based on internationally recognised best practice guidance from UNICEF and, more recently, from the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights. Can the Minister assure me that such international guidance and recommendations from other British studies such as the Still At Risk report will be considered in drawing up the functions in the regulations, as well as from the trials currently being undertaken?

I particularly welcome Amendment 61, in the name of the Minister, which gives child trafficking advocates the power to assist the child in obtaining the legal advice and power to appoint and instruct legal representatives. As I mentioned in Committee, I have met a number of lawyers who represent trafficked children and who have all told me that they have great difficulty in taking instructions from trafficked children. They have therefore recommended that the advocate should have the power to fill that gap.

I welcome the Minister’s Amendment 72, which states that regulations about the advocates will require public authorities to,

“recognise, and pay due regard to, the advocate’s functions, and … provide the advocate with access to such information … to carry out those functions”.

We have heard in the past various stories from organisations such as Barnardo’s where advice from charity workers supporting trafficked children has not been heeded by a local authority, resulting in a child going missing and no longer receiving the help that they need.

Amendment 72 would help to prevent this happening. I have one question for the Minister about that amendment: which bodies and agencies will have this duty? During the meeting with Barnardo’s arranged for Peers by the Minister, I was disappointed to hear the story of a child whose college did not accept the child’s valid reason for missing classes, which had been to attend official immigration appointments. It was frustrating to hear that the advocate had had to make repeated representations to the college explaining the child’s situation before it heeded her advice and removed the negative attendance report from the child’s records. I hope that such a scenario would not be possible in the future, as a result of Amendment 72.

Modern Slavery Bill

Debate between Baroness Butler-Sloss and Lord McColl of Dulwich
Monday 1st December 2014

(9 years, 5 months ago)

Lords Chamber
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Lord McColl of Dulwich Portrait Lord McColl of Dulwich (Con)
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My Lords, I welcome government Amendment 7, which provides clarity about the role of consent in the understanding of whether a person has been trafficked or not. I had the privilege to sit on the Joint Committee for the pre-legislative scrutiny process. During our hearings we received a good deal of evidence that the issue of consent in relation to the offences of slavery, forced labour and servitude in Clause 1 is rather problematic. The barrister Riel Karmy-Jones, who has extensive experience of prosecuting such cases for the CPS, told our committee:

“I think consent is an issue for clause 1 as well, because you do have people occasionally who are brought up in a position of servitude and know nothing else, and so effectively could be seen to be consenting to their condition”.

Another barrister, Peter Carter QC, who acted as special adviser to our committee, also raised concerns that consent was what he termed a “live issue” in Clause 1 by virtue of subsections (2) and (3), and especially in relation to children.

The reason that the issue of consent is problematic is because where a victim of slavery, forced labour or servitude appears to consent to their situation, perhaps by not running away, or where they are not physically restrained, police officers may incorrectly presume that such cases are not truly cases of forced labour, slavery or servitude. Some charities that work with victims have told me that misunderstandings and presumptions about what constitutes forced labour can mean that cases do not receive the serious treatment that they should. The charity Hope for Justice has told me that it commonly comes across a misunderstanding among police officers that,

“victims have to be locked up in order to be considered as being in forced labour”.

The issue of consent is not only a problem in relation to police investigations but can be used also by defence counsel to raise doubts in the minds of juries. Amendment 7 will make it clear for police officers, courts, lawyers and jurors that slavery, servitude and forced labour are complex situations, and that numerous factors can lead a person to consent to exploitation without necessarily meaning that the exploitation is not taking place. Those psychological barriers can be much stronger than any physical restraints, such as a locked door.

Threats to the individual victim or a family member can deter people from trying to escape, even if they have the opportunity. Fear of the authorities, of prison or of deportation—encouraged by those who exploit them—can prevent a victim seeking help. Debt bondage can cause a person to continue in a situation of forced labour or servitude without any restrictions on their freedom. Even where that debt is created by deception or fraud, a victim can be so desperate to pay back the money that they have been told they owe that they will consent to servitude or slavery. For other victims, their dependency on their exploiters, perhaps for shelter or food, however inadequate those might be, leaves them at risk and certainly in fear of facing greater destitution if they try to escape.

I welcome this amendment from the Minister, which will make it clear in the Bill that such consent need not necessarily preclude a finding on the basis of other evidence that a person has been held in slavery or servitude or required to perform forced labour. Doing so will make understanding the offence simpler for police officers and jurors and, as a result, aid successful prosecutions, which we all hope the Bill will help to promote.

I note, however, that Amendment 7 refers to the person’s consent to,

“any of the acts alleged to constitute holding the person in slavery or servitude, or requiring the person to perform forced or compulsory labour”.

Might the Minister consider a similar amendment to the Clause 2 offence, which presently addresses consent only in relation to a person’s travel and not the exploitation that they are put through?

Baroness Butler-Sloss Portrait Baroness Butler-Sloss
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My Lords, I support Amendments 4, 7 and 101, which are government amendments. I am very happy to see Amendment 7 at the bottom of Clause 1, as it seems to make entirely clear the situation of consent in relation to children as well as to adults. I am also very pleased that under Amendments 4 and 101 it is made clear what a child is; that is, someone under the age of 18. That is a very useful bit of interpretation, so I strongly support the amendments. I think that I prefer Amendment 7 to Amendment 8, because Amendment 7 sets it out in rather more detail and therefore is preferable.