Covid-19 and the Use and Scrutiny of Emergency Powers (Constitution Committee Report)

Baroness Drake Excerpts

Tuesday 21st June 2022 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Drake]

That the Grand Committee takes note of the Report from the Constitution Committee COVID-19 and the use and scrutiny of emergency powers (3rd Report, Session 2021-22, HL Paper 15).

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, in June 2021, the Constitution Committee published its report COVID-19 and the Use and Scrutiny of Emergency Powers, following a broader inquiry into the constitutional implications of Covid-19 chaired by my esteemed noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton. The social, economic and health implications of the pandemic were profound, the constitutional impact significant. The committee examined the emergency powers sought by the Government, and the extent to which they were used and how. We wanted to determine if there were lessons to be learned for future uses of the emergency powers, their safeguards and the processes for scrutinising them. We addressed four main dimensions: the legislative approach taken and parliamentary scrutiny afforded; co-ordination between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations; the impact of rapid changes to the law on the public and public authorities; and lessons learned. Inevitably, for any Government, national responses to such a fast-moving crisis can sometimes be sub-optimal. However, any Government must be open to learning lessons to inform future contingency planning. Witnesses told us that much could be done differently the next time.

I turn to the legislative approach taken and parliamentary scrutiny. The pandemic unquestionably necessitated a swift response from the Government. Two Acts of Parliament were used by the Government to make regulations: the Public Health (Control of Disease) Act 1984, and the Coronavirus Act 2020. However, scrutiny by Parliament was significantly restricted due to the procedures in the 1984 and 2020 Acts and Covid-driven changes to parliamentary proceedings. A large volume of new legislation came into effect as secondary legislation, much through public health regulations placing unprecedented restrictions on ordinary activities and freedoms, often without parliamentary approval. Of the 425 Covid regulations by the end of the 2019-21 Session, 398 were subject to the “made negative” or “made affirmative” procedures, and 86 were made using the urgency procedures under the 1984 Act. Regulations under the 2020 Act were more targeted on matters such as business tenancy forfeiture and local government elections.

The Government relied on the powers in the 1984 Act, rather than the Civil Contingencies Act 2004, and rather than incorporating a Covid-specific lockdown power in the Coronavirus Act 2020. Either of these latter two options could have resulted in greater parliamentary scrutiny and legal clarity. As a committee, we took the view that, if the use of the Civil Contingencies Act was not considered practically desirable, the Government should have voluntarily subjected themselves to comparable parliamentary scrutiny safeguards in pandemic-related legislation. We recommended that Parliament be consulted on any future draft legislation prepared on a contingency basis to address a potential emergency, ensuring that it provides for sufficient parliamentary scrutiny.

I turn to co-ordination between the UK Government and the devolved Administrations. Joint action was necessary to respond to a UK-wide crisis. The Coronavirus Act 2020 was the product of collaboration, passed with the consent of all three devolved legislatures. In the early stages, the First Ministers of Scotland and Wales and the First Minister and Deputy First Minister of Northern Ireland were invited to attend COBRA meetings. Ministers from the devolved Administrations attended meetings of five new ministerial implementation groups—MIGs—that looked at aspects of the coronavirus response. The different Administrations’ Chief Medical Officers and Chief Scientific Advisers met regularly, sharing information. The chairs of the Scottish and Welsh advisory groups on SAGE outputs were also participants in SAGE.

As the UK moved out of the first lockdown, however, although co-ordination on some devolved areas continued, such as scientific advice, procuring equipment and virus testing, intergovernmental co-operation appeared to decrease significantly. Each Administration started to take independent decisions about lockdown restrictions. On 10 May 2020, the Prime Minister announced the change from “stay at home” to “stay alert” but did not make clear that it applied to England only. This change was apparently made without informing the devolved Administrations. The UK Government set out three phases for easing lockdown restrictions in England. The Northern Ireland Executive set five, the Scottish Government four, and the Welsh Government opted for a traffic light system.

By early June 2020, both COBRA and the MIGs ceased to meet, replaced by two new Cabinet committees. Neither included representatives from the devolved Administrations. Yet the Cabinet Manual makes it clear that this is permitted on an exceptional basis to deal with an emergency response. Differences arose between parts of the UK on the countries exempt from quarantine restrictions and the international travel restrictions. This strained intergovernmental co-operation contributed to a lack of clarity about what rules applied where, causing difficulties for enforcement and compliance.

There is much to learn from the pandemic period to inform improving intergovernmental working. The Secretary of State, Michael Gove, recognised this when he

“described the pandemic as ‘a learning process for everyone’, raising broader questions about ‘making sure the whole devolution settlement works’. He said the UK Government intended to address this through reforms to intergovernmental mechanisms”.

Can I ask the Minister what consideration has been given to how the new intergovernmental relations arrangements could be deployed in the event of another national emergency similar to that created by the pandemic?

Turning to the impact of rapid changes to the law, the Constitution Committee noted that legal changes introduced were often set in guidance, or announced during media conferences, before Parliament had an opportunity to scrutinise them. The law was sometimes misrepresented in these public-facing forums, leading to a lack of clarity about what was legally enforceable. This posed challenges for the police and local government, sometimes leading to wrongful criminal charges. Guidance and media statements, when used appropriately, can enhance access to the law by simplifying legal complexity in a format that is easy to digest, but the committee found that, throughout the pandemic, government guidance and ministerial statements failed to set out the law clearly, mis-stated the law, or laid claim to legal requirements that did not exist.

Sometimes, public health advice was incorrectly enforced by the police as though it were law, and public authorities incorrectly suggested that guidance had the force of law. The report contains the detail of our findings but, as an example, on 23 March 2020, the Prime Minister announced the first England-wide lockdown in a televised address. The following day, the then Secretary of State for Health stated:

“These measures are not advice; they are rules. They will be enforced, including by the police”.—[Official Report, Commons, 24/3/20; col. 241.]


The announcement caused confusion about their meaning, with one police force threatening to search individual shopping baskets in supermarkets to check for non-essential items.

The UK Government’s website included the headline rules:

“Stay at home. Only go outside for food, health reasons, or work (but only if you cannot work from home). If you go out, stay 2 metres … away from other people at all times. Wash your hands as soon as you get home.”


The first instruction was a simplified explanation of a legal obligation. The second and third instructions were public health advice. The chair of the National Police Chiefs’ Council later had to clarify that the two-metre rule was not a legal requirement enforceable by police. The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee also expressed concern that the distinction between legislation and guidance had been unclear, citing further examples.

New strains of the virus and spikes in infections made urgent legislative changes necessary, but sometimes seemingly non-urgent measures were introduced at short notice. In other cases, the urgency appears to have resulted from a lack of preparedness. The repeated repeal and amendment of Covid regulations added to confusion as to what restrictions applied at any one time. For example, on 2 and 3 September 2020 the “protected area” covered by the Health Protection (Coronavirus, Restrictions) (Blackburn with Darwen and Bradford) Regulations were amended twice in 12 hours. The Health Protection (Coronavirus, Wearing of Face Coverings in a Relevant Place) (England) Regulations 2020 were amended by three different statutory instruments made on 22 and 23 September 2020. The “all tiers” regulations were amended by eight further statutory instruments between December 2020 and March 2021.

In summary, legal uncertainty, short notice of new measures, and repeated amendment and revocation of secondary legislation combined in certain instances to undermine parliamentary scrutiny and made it difficult for public authorities tasked with enforcement to understand the law. Her Majesty’s Inspectorate of Constabulary reported:

“At times, the introduction of, and variation to, new legislation and guidance affected the police service’s ability to produce guidance and to brief staff. This inevitably led to some errors or inconsistencies in approach.”


The Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee recommended that an evaluation of how information about which instruments were superseded or had lapsed could have been provided more effectively. In our report, we strongly recommended that government information

“during a public health emergency conform to”

certain

“essential conditions to enable people … to understand the law”,

one such being

“A consistent approach to use of the terms ‘advice’, ‘guidance’, ‘recommendation’, ‘rules’ and ‘restrictions’”,


because those descriptions clearly did not have the clarity that people needed, and that in enacting any further restrictions,

“the Government should be guided by the principles of certainty, clarity and transparency”.

Finally, as to lessons learned, the Government used a wide range of emergency measures to respond to the pandemic, many introducing significant curbs on civil liberties and businesses. Scrutiny of these regulations by Parliament was significantly restricted. The chair of the public inquiry into the handling of Covid says that public hearings are unlikely to begin before 2023. Can the Minister give an indication of how long the inquiry will take? We recommended a review of the use of emergency powers by the Government, and their scrutiny by Parliament. It should take place in advance of the public inquiry, not after, so that the review can inform both the public inquiry and the planning for future emergencies. Can the Minister tell us the Government’s position on this recommendation from the committee?

It is unquestionable that the Government faced an enormous challenge with Covid-19, and the first responsibility of any Government is to protect their citizens. However, I refer to a conclusion that we made:

“All governments should recognise that, however great or sudden an emergency … powers are lent, not granted, by the legislature to the executive, and such powers should be returned as swiftly and completely as possible, avoiding any spill over into permanence.”


That conclusion is probably still valid while we wait to see the outcome of the various reviews that the Government are engaged in. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Drake (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank everyone who has contributed to a really important debate, in terms not only of efficiently dealing with a national crisis of huge relevance to its citizens—I am sure this will not be the only one—but of integrity around a Government and a Parliament in how they go about protecting citizens in that emergency.

I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, for his contribution, and particularly for stressing the importance of pre-legislative scrutiny in any amendment of the legislation. The Minister referred to any changes to legislation being subject to parliamentary scrutiny, but the Constitution Committee puts a powerful case as to why that should also include pre-legislative scrutiny. Again, I thank the noble and learned Lord for the importance he placed on the need to ensure that we work with the devolved Administrations across the UK so that we can deal with UK-wide emergencies as efficiently as possible. I thank everyone who contributed.

I will reflect on some of the points the Minister made. He took us in some detail through the 1984 public health Act and how it operated. Although I do not disagree with a lot of what the Minister said, there are two or three key messages from the Constitution Committee. The Act could have been added to by incorporating a lockdown power in the Coronavirus Act. It was not that the emergency procedures needed to be used—quite clearly there were several cases where they did need to be. The question was whether it was an emergency in every instance that they were used.

I absolutely acknowledge that a Government faced with the challenges that this Government were faced with need to move with speed on regulations, but that raises the bar for the expectations of the level of confidence that people need in the scrutiny of those actions taken by government.

On going forward with pan-UK working with the Administrations, I welcomed the Minister’s comments in respect of the initiatives being taken by the Secretary of State for Health. The Constitution Committee also produced quite a large report on the whole issue of governance within the UK, Respect and Co-operation. In a sense, the response in an emergency is part of a wider governance structure that applies, so I hope some of our recommendations in that report will also apply.

In conclusion, there is no question but that the Government faced an enormous challenge. They had to respond quickly and to protect their citizens. In an emergency, Parliament transfers to the Executive so that they can move at the speed necessary to do that, but the efficiency with which the Government deploy those powers is therefore so critical. The extent to which they are open to checks and scrutiny on the deployment of those powers becomes even more important, and that was the thrust of the Constitution Committee’s report. What are the lessons learned, and what is the experience that informed those lessons, so that the preparedness for the next emergency—I hope we never have one—and the confidence in the level of scrutiny and checks are there? However, I thank the Minister very much for his response.

Motion agreed.