(3 days, 16 hours ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, I thank all noble Lords for attending the debate and for their input. I listened intently to the highly experienced noble Baroness, Lady Foster. She raised a valuable point about the minute parts that might cause a serious failure. I recall the example used, albeit not as a practitioner. The answer to that is that type certificate holders will have a design process in place to establish the potential failure impact of every part, and that design process has to be established by the CAA as adequate. Any potential failure must be shown to have a negligible effect on the functioning of the aircraft. The screw that the noble Baroness referred to, part of the assembly of a windscreen, would be considered within the design process so that it would not be excluded from form 1 if the design process for the more major component was safety critical. You could not exclude the screws and still have the windscreen assembly—that is the practical answer to that question.
The noble Baroness asked who the CAA will delegate to. I cannot give her the names of the third parties, but the CAA has set out stringent requirements for third parties to be qualified entities. Qualified entities will be subject to an audit regime to ensure continuing compliance with the CAA’s requirements. They will clearly need sufficient subject matter expertise and regulation capacity, and the CAA will accredit and monitor their performance to ensure continuing safety. The CAA has to set out in detail how it intends to assess the competence of qualified entities for drone flightworthiness, assessment and training. It has experience of doing that in respect of how it dealt with the pilots of fixed-wing and rotary aircraft, so we are entitled to conclude that those processes are robust.
The noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, referred to the delegation of powers. The criteria are more or less what I have just said, but if there is any omission from the explanation that I should have given as a consequence of his question, I will write forthwith. As for the testing of adequate resources for the Civil Aviation Authority, I believe that it is the Government’s responsibility to ensure that the resources are adequate and that it has adequate resources to pay the agencies to which this work should be delegated. Again, for the avoidance of doubt, I will write to the noble Lord and confirm that that is the case in respect of this element of these regulations.
The noble Lord, Lord Moylan, rightly asked whether the department, and I as the Minister proposing these regulations, take responsibility for them and for the proposal to delegate. The answer to that is, of course, yes. The department should not propose such regulations without feeling confident that it is competent to propose them and that what it is proposing is the right thing to do.
I believe that I have answered all the points raised. I conclude by saying again that the safety of aviation and of the travelling public is a priority for the Government. My department is committed to ensuring that aviation remains safe. The draft regulations form part of an important legislative programme which implements proportionate best practice in aviation safety regulation. I commend the regulations to the Committee.
When I referred to the screws, the noble Lord quite rightly pointed out that we were looking at the design, et cetera, which makes sure that it is a bona fide part. The air accident that took place was not because the screws themselves were badly designed, or that they failed because of what they were, it was when they were fitted—it was the incorrect component. There is a differentiation here between something failing because of a design fault and something failing because the incorrect component has been fitted into a specific, probably critical, area of an aircraft. Could I just leave that with the noble Lord? I thank him.
I am very happy that the noble Baroness leaves it with me. I will make sure that I write to her. I recognise the issue that we are dealing with—the incorrect fitment of correct components.
(11 months, 1 week ago)
Lords ChamberIt is clearly wrong for the transport provider and the airport to know that a flight is cancelled, but for the passengers not to know. Similar circumstances sometimes apply on other transport modes and it is unacceptable there, too. I agree with the noble Baroness that it is unacceptable: what needs to be done about it is another matter. I will speak further to my honourable friend the Aviation Minister to see what needs to be done to stop this practice. It is unacceptable.
My Lords, Regulation 261 is actually a robust regulation and I do not believe that the compensation is too little. In addition, in relation to the comment made by the noble Baroness regarding air traffic control issues, I do not believe that was the case either. However, there is clearly an issue here. Given the number of times this specific flight had been cancelled, with our noble colleagues, certainly those from Northern Ireland, so badly affected, it would be quite helpful, perhaps, if the Minister could speak with the Aviation Minister and get the CAA involved with this—because it deals directly with Regulation 261—to find out the specific issue to do with this flight. I do not believe it is a slots issue. Turning round and saying to passengers that this is an operational issue and giving people two hours’ notice, when they know that the flight has been cancelled the day before, means there is clearly something more going on. We would be very grateful if we could get more information on this specific issue, certainly to help our colleagues in Northern Ireland.
If I were the airline concerned, I would not cancel this particular flight. It seems to me that having your operational business discussed in this House is probably not helpful to your reputation. But I shall otherwise do exactly what the noble Baroness suggests.