Border Security, Asylum and Immigration Bill

Baroness Hamwee Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th July 2025 Lords Chamber

Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

59: Clause 16, page 10, line 18, after “care” insert “, humanitarian support”
Member's explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to probe whether provision of humanitarian support constitutes a “reasonable excuse” as a defence to the offence in this clause.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

In moving this amendment, I will speak also to Amendment 60. This clause, again, is about collecting information and reasonable excuses.

Clause 16(8) provides a non-exhaustive list of reasonable excuses. Our amendment is probing. We would like to see as many good reasons as are likely—I emphasise good reasons—in the legislation, rather than on each occasion being assessed by, in the first instance, someone fairly junior. In Clause 16(8), there is provision for an action or possession being for the purpose of

“providing, or preparing for the provision of, medical care or emergency shelter or supplies”.

Our amendment would insert “humanitarian support”. It seems that there is no difference between us as to the importance of promoting human welfare, so referring to it in the Bill follows from that.

I have been prompted having heard of so many refugees—I do not know whether this is a good example of a humanitarian matter or not—being keen to progress their education, or to work in a profession or another activity for which they have qualifications, but not when they get here being able to prove what qualifications they have. Bringing a document showing those qualifications would not be for the purposes of a “relevant journey”, but it is not irrelevant either to an asylum seeker for his or her future life. As I say, this is a probing amendment.

Amendment 60 concerns a matter raised by the organisation Justice and would except from the offences a person carrying out a legal activity, as defined—in other words, providing legal services. Perhaps I should declare—there have been a lot of declarations this afternoon and evening—that I was a solicitor, but that feels like a million years ago, so it is not personal. Everyone involved in the Bill will be aware of the shortage of good lawyers working in this field and available to undertake work on a legal aid basis or through a charity. The Bill is drafted widely, so it does not necessarily preclude the defence that it is for legal services, but I do not think that would be a huge encouragement to lawyers who might be worried about exposing themselves to a charge.

Lawyers, as a breed, are not always popular and are not always, in this field, trusted by the Government of the day, because the work almost inevitably means challenging the Government. If we are not further to risk access to justice, which is already an issue, we should not add further deterrents to legal practice in the asylum and refugee field. So the amendment proposes a specific exemption from prosecution.

[Lord German (LD)]

My Lords, there are only two amendments in this group, both of which are from my colleague and noble friend Lady Hamwee. They both probe whether providing humanitarian support and legal services is a reasonable excuse in the offence in Clause 16:

“Collecting information for use in immigration crime”.


While we welcome the inclusion of the defence of “reasonable excuse” in Clause 16 and the inclusion of those examples already contained in the Bill, we consider there to be a notable and concerning omission, namely an exception for those providing legitimate legal advice and preparing legitimate legal claims.

Given that I have just received an email from those representing lawyers stating that the Ministry of Justice has increased the amount of pay that it is giving for immigration lawyers—it is not sufficient, I am told by the lawyers’ association, but there is nothing surprising about that—it would be very strange indeed if they were to be subject to any danger from providing that legitimate advice. Because those who represent asylum seekers in the UK provide legal advice about their rights and publicise their work, they should be confident that they will not be caught by one of the offences, given the wide drafting of the Bill. Although the Bill does not necessarily preclude a defence for such individuals, in our view, they should be specifically exempt from prosecution, otherwise those providing legal services to vulnerable individuals will be left in an uncertain position, which, in turn, will create an unjustified risk to access to justice and the rule of law.

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[The Minister of State, Home Office (Lord Hanson of Flint) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am tempted to just say “I agree”, but it is important that we put some points on the record.

I thank the noble Baroness for her amendments. Amendment 59 seeks to include an explicit carve-out in the clause to list humanitarian support as a reasonable excuse. The list of reasonable excuses is already quite wide and includes specific exemptions for those undertaking or preparing to undertake the rescue of individuals from danger or serious harm, as well as for those acting on behalf of organisations that provide assistance to asylum seekers and do not charge for their services. I put to the noble Baroness that the list of reasonable excuses in this clause is non-exhaustive, and the provisions ensure that legitimate humanitarian activity is not captured by the offence. I hope that with that assurance, she will withdraw Amendment 59 accordingly.

Amendment 60, again to Clause 16, also provides a list of very reasonable excuses where a person acts for a purpose that is reasonable in the circumstances. That list is non-exhaustive and the wording is intentionally broad to allow courts to assess on the facts of each case whether an individual’s conduct falls within the scope of legitimate activity, including carrying out legal work. In practice, as previously mentioned, law enforcement agencies exercise investigatory discretion when assessing the circumstances of any case, and the prosecution will apply the public interest test when considering charges. That means that individuals acting within the scope of their legal role will not be targeted for prosecution. I hope that gives the noble Baroness some reassurance on the points that she has raised in the amendment.

The clause as drafted provides robust protection for those acting lawfully while allowing law enforcement to focus its efforts—as I have said in every discussion we have had to date—on the groups facilitating illegal and dangerous crossings. I hope that is a reassurance to the noble Baroness and she will not press the amendment, but essentially these are areas where we think there is clarity. Therefore, I hope she will reflect on those points and withdraw the amendment.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, of course I recognise that the lists are not exhaustive. It seemed to me to be fairly helpful to use the term “humanitarian”—but there we are.

I am puzzled by the opposition to the reference to lawyers acting in the field. I wonder whether anybody in this Chamber who provides professional services would like to be dependent on discretion, on the public interest test, particularly when the specific provision in subsection (8)(c)(ii) is that the organisation

“does not charge for its services”.

The legal aid lawyers and others acting for asylum seekers and refugees do not get paid very much, and sometimes they are employed by charities that do not get paid directly for their services, although they raise funds to enable them to carry out those services.

This is not special pleading on the part of the legal profession. It is pleading on behalf of the recipients of legal services, in fact, because of the widespread concern that the relevant legal services are not easily accessed. There are far too many legal aid deserts and far too few people who are in a position to provide advice and representation in this field. I had better not say—I suppose I am about to—that it strikes me a little that “not invented here” is the response to this. That will not win me any friends, but I do not see a damage or a harm that would be caused by including an amendment on the lines of the second in this group.

I am clearly not going to pursue the matter tonight, but it is a concern if this is not accepted and if individuals are told they should just be dependent on discretion and the CPS’s good sense. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 59 withdrawn.

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Moved by

[Baroness Hamwee]

68: Clause 19, page 13, line 7, leave out “before or after” and insert “in the case of subsection (3)(b) before or after, or in any other case, after”
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is intended to remove the retrospective element of some, but not all, of the offences.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

I also have Amendment 209 in this group. Clause 19 defines “relevant person” for the purposes of search and so on in relation to what these days are simply called “devices”. There are other terms in Clauses 20 to 23. The amendment particularly goes to the point of retrospectivity. The clause provides that a relevant person is someone who has entered or arrived, whether before or after the section comes into force. The amendment would leave in as a subject someone who has entered in breach of a deportation order. It seems to me that there is a rather different flavour to retrospectivity here, because the individual knows what he is doing. Having been on the receiving end of a deportation order, he can hardly ignore that that is going to be relevant.

In the other cases, the wording puts it into the future: if the person

“requires leave … requires entry clearance … is required … not to travel … without an electronic travel authorisation”.

In parentheses, I wondered about the term “entered” compared with “arrived”, which I think might technically be the position, and the Explanatory Notes do not seem to help—but that is by the way. That first amendment would deal in all but one of the cases in this clause with the retrospective element.

Amendment 209 would require the affirmative procedure for regulations under Clause 25, extending powers to persons designated by the Secretary of State. This is a point made by the Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. As we said in our report, the committee has

“previously raised concerns about the extension to persons who are not recognised legal officials of powers which might be used to interfere with individual liberty”.

The Government say that the requirements would not create any new powers; they would extend the cohort of people who can use the powers, and the Secretary of State can impose such safeguards as she considers appropriate. The Constitution Committee reminds the Committee not only that it has previously raised these concerns but that the safeguards about designation of other people should be set out on the face of the Bill, so that this is not left to the discretion of the Secretary of State.

The affirmative procedure is of some assistance in scrutinising—but not really blocking—the provisions. It would, of course, enable parliamentarians to debate and scrutinise in public this power of the Secretary of State to designate whoever it might be.

The Bar Council has raised another issue on the provision that the Bill will allow civil servants, if so designated, to access and keep information found on devices. A police constable exercising powers such as these needs authorisation from a superintendent; that is the usual level of authorisation. This Bill will allow junior Home Office civil servants and immigration officials to do so without oversight.

The Bar Council has briefed on its concern about the potential for violating the rights of privacy and legal privilege of people who may have entered the UK years ago and are engaged in legal proceedings against the Home Office.

So, that is a range of concerns, which I hope would be addressed by my amendment. I beg to move.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, it would be remiss of me if I did not begin my remarks on this group by mentioning the puzzling inclusion of Clauses 20 to 23 in the Bill, given that these powers already exist in statute. Section 15 of, and Schedule 2 to, the Illegal Migration Act 2023 already grant these exact same powers of search, seizure and access for electronic devices. Rather than retain the provisions that are already law, the Government are repealing those parts of the Illegal Migration Act and then re-enacting them through this Bill; I would submit that that does not really make much sense.

In fact, the wording of the sections that the Government are repealing are virtually identical to the clauses in the Bill. Paragraph 3(1) of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act says:

“An immigration officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article, if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”,


while Clause 20(1) of the Bill says:

“An authorised officer may search a relevant person for any relevant article if the officer has reasonable grounds to suspect that the relevant person is in possession of a relevant article”.


The only difference is that the Bill grants the powers to an authorised officer rather than an immigration officer. I understand the purpose of the distinction, as Clause 19 states that under the Bill the powers will be able to be used by police officers as well as immigration officers. I have no issue with that, but why repeal the whole of paragraph 3 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act simply to replace one word?

The similarities continue. Paragraph 4 of Schedule 2 to the Illegal Migration Act authorises the search of vehicles and containers for electronic devices, and Clause 20(6) of the Bill does exact same thing. Paragraph 5 of Schedule 2 authorises the search of premises for an electronic device, while Clause 20(5) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 6 of Schedule 2 authorises the search the person’s property for an electronic device, while Clause 20(4) does the same thing and has the same wording. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 2 authorises the seizure of electronic devices, while Clause 21(1) of the Bill does the exact same thing and has precisely the same wording. I could go on, but I believe it should be blindingly obvious that there is no practical purpose to Clauses 20 to 23; they are simply regurgitated provisions of already existing statute that the Government are performatively repealing.

I turn to one of the very few aspects of the powers relating to electronic devices that the Government have actually changed. My Amendment 69 is intended to probe the Government’s definition of “relevant articles” from which electronic information can be accessed and stored under Clauses 20 to 23. As drafted, the Bill essentially defines that as any electronic item that could contain information relating to an offence under Section 25 or 25A of the Immigration Act 1971. Consequently, the powers under Clauses 20 to 23 can currently be used only to garner information relating to the facilitation of unlawful entry or the illegal facilitation of the arrival of asylum seekers.

However, those are not the only offences that immigration officers might need to access electronic devices to investigate. For example, what about the information on electronic devices pertaining to offences under Section 24 or Section 24A of the Immigration Act 1971? If the Bill is aimed at tackling illegal immigration and protecting our border security, should it not address that in its totality? Why should immigration officers and police officers not be able to utilise information they have gleaned from the electronic devices of illegal entrants as evidence of the commission of the offences of illegal entry or the use of deception to gain leave to enter or remain? Is the prevention of those offences not crucial to our border security?

The previous Government recognised that these powers need to extend to information relating to a wider range of offences, which is why in the Illegal Migration Act we did not limit the definition of electronic devices in such a way. Rather, relevant articles were defined as anything containing information related to

“any function of an immigration officer, or … of the Secretary of State in relation to immigration, asylum or nationality”.

That offered a far wider-ranging power to investigate the whole plethora of immigration crimes, all of which would fall under the Government’s definition of border security in Clause 3 of the Bill.

The Prime Minister has spoken on many occasions of giving the Border Security Commander counter- terrorism-like powers. I have to say to the Minister that the substance of what is contained in Clauses 19 to 23 is utterly consistent with the tough language that the Government have been throwing around, and if they are indeed serious about matching their rhetoric with their actions then they should accept Amendment 69 and expand the definition of relevant articles in Clause 19.

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[Lord in Waiting/Government Whip (Lord Katz) (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the thoughtful contributions made by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lords, Lord Davies of Gower and Lord German. Amendments 68, 69 and 209 raise important questions about the scope, application and oversight of the powers in the Bill.

I will address the comments made by the noble Lord, Lord Davies, around Clauses 20 to 23 being lifted from the Illegal Migration Act. The noble Lord, Lord German, is smiling already; maybe he anticipates a cracking punchline—but there is not one. It is a simple fact that, clearly, one of the chief intentions of this legislation is to replace the Illegal Migration Act. It was deemed easier in drafting terms to do that and then include certain sections that were deemed worthy of keeping in this Bill, rather than simply have to go back and unpick the Illegal Migration Act in different parts of the Bill. It was felt that this was a cleaner way of doing it. I am not sure if that has made the noble Lord, Lord German, smile; it has not particularly raised a laugh with me, but there we go.

While I recognise the intentions behind each proposal, I will respectfully set out why the Government do not support them. In each case, the current drafting of the Bill is deliberate and proportionate and designed to ensure operational effectiveness, legal clarity and appropriate safeguards.

Amendment 68 seeks to limit Clause 19 by removing what is perceived to be a retrospective effect. I want to be clear that Clause 19(2)(a) does not operate retrospectively in the way suggested by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee. The powers in the clause come into effect only after the Bill receives Royal Assent. The clause has been carefully drafted to ensure that powers apply regardless of when an individual entered or arrived in the UK before that date.

This is not retrospective legislation. Individuals who entered the UK without leave did so in breach of immigration laws that were already in place at the time of their entry. The clause does not impose a new penalty for past conduct. Instead, it enables the powers to be used from the moment they come into force, provided that the individual still meets the relevant criteria at that time. This approach ensures that the law can respond effectively to ongoing encounters of individuals who have already arrived illegally in the UK and does not create loopholes that could be exploited by those who may look to take advantage of immigration controls.

The amendment, while well intentioned, would narrow the scope of Clause 19(2)(a) and undermine its operational effectiveness. It would create a two-tier system, in effect, treating individuals differently based on the timing of their entry or whether they are subject to a deportation order, and result in missed opportunities to gain valuable information to stop organised immigration crime groups. In summary, the clause as drafted strikes the right balance: it is not retrospective in its legal effect, and it is forward-looking in its application. It ensures that the Government can act decisively to protect the integrity of UK borders and uphold the rule of law.

I turn now to Amendment 69, which proposes to broaden the definition of a “relevant article” to include any article containing information on the commission of an offence under any of the immigration Acts, as defined in Section 61(2) of the UK Borders Act 2007. While I understand the desire to ensure comprehensive coverage of immigration offences, I must respectfully oppose this amendment too.

The current drafting of Clause 19 is deliberately narrow and targeted. It focuses on offences under Sections 25 and 25A of the Immigration Act 1971, offences that relate specifically to facilitating unlawful immigration and assisting illegal entry. These are the offences most relevant to the operational intent of this clause: to disrupt organised criminal networks and protect the integrity of our borders. Expanding the definition to include all offences under the immigration Acts risks capturing a wide range of minor or administrative breaches, such as overstaying or failing to comply with conditions, which are not the intended focus of this power. Our concern here is that such a broad approach could undermine the proportionality of the measure and expose it to legal challenge.

Amendment 209 seeks to amend Clause 60 so that regulations made pursuant to Clause 25 are subject to the affirmative procedure, as pointed out by the noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord German, and recommended by the Lords Constitution Committee. While we fully respect the committee’s role in scrutinising delegated powers, we respectfully disagree with the necessity of this amendment and the affirmative procedure.

Clause 25 does not create new powers; rather, it allows for the extension of existing powers to a broader cohort of authorised officers. The use of the negative procedure in this context is appropriate and proportionate. Moreover, Clause 25(3) provides an important safeguard that the Secretary of State is required to include such safeguards as they consider necessary. This ensures that any extension of powers is accompanied by appropriate checks and balances. The negative procedure is appropriate for this type of technical and operational regulation, which ensures agility without unduly compromising oversight. Regulations made under the negative procedure are still laid before Parliament and subject to annulment, providing a clear route for scrutiny while avoiding unnecessary delay in operational matters. Conversely, requiring the affirmative procedure in this case would introduce unnecessary delay and complexity into what is a targeted and operationally focused provision that must be able to respond agilely to any challenges. The negative procedure strikes the right balance between parliamentary oversight and practical implementation. For these reasons, I urge noble Lords not to press their amendments.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, seeing the back of the Illegal Migration Act will be a great pleasure. I am with the noble Lord on it being better to have an easy-to-read version of this Bill, including provisions, rather than having to refer back to another piece of legislation. I do not think that is entirely the case throughout the Bill, but there we are.

On the retrospectivity amendment, I am not sure that I have followed the argument, since the wording of the clause is

“whether before or after this section comes into force”.

I thought the Minister was talking about a distinction being made because the clause would need to come into force before it had any effect, but I will have to read what he has to say.

The Minister says that Amendment 209 is not necessary, but I think that depends on your point of view. The checks and balances are better scrutinised through the affirmative procedure than through the negative procedure. I have heard what he has to say and I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 68 withdrawn.

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[Baroness May of Maidenhead (Con)]

My Lords, in speaking to Amendment 84, I also wish to speak to Amendment 90. I do not wish to detain the Committee for long.

The principle—sorry, I am looking at the wrong Minister—behind these two amendments is the same as that behind Amendment 49: namely, the circumstances addressed in Clause 21 concern the search of a person and the circumstances addressed in Clause 23 concern the retention of material information that has been copied as a result of that search. In both those circumstances, the material should be so protected on its retention that it is available to the individual should they wish to use it in a court or particularly in a case before the national referral mechanism, so that anybody who is potentially in slavery has access to the information they need to be able to support their case.

The Minister, in responding to Amendment 49, referenced the Police and Criminal Evidence Act. I think he would accept that there have sometimes been incidents where the police’s retention of evidence has perhaps been less than perfect. Therefore, it would be helpful to put this requirement in relation to the retention of information, so that it can be used by potential victims of slavery in national referral mechanism cases, on the face of the Bill. I beg to move.

[Baroness Hamwee (LD)]

My Lords, having supported the noble Baroness on her previous amendments, from these Benches we do so on these, too.

[Lord Davies of Gower (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak briefly on Amendments 84 and 90, tabled by my noble friend Lady May of Maidenhead. These amendments raise a serious and important concern that we believe merits the attention of the Committee. It seeks to ensure that, where personal belongings are retained by the authorities under Clause 23, particularly in the case of potential victims of modern slavery, those items and the information they contain are preserved in a manner that allows them to be relied on as part of a national referral mechanism determination.

For many victims of trafficking, the evidence contained on a mobile phone or similar device may be the only proof they possess of their exploitation, whether that be messages, photographs or location data. To risk the loss, corruption or mishandling of that data would not only undermine the pursuit of justice but could place the individual concerned at even greater risk. We therefore support the principle behind this amendment. These protections are vital.

That said, we also recognise that many of these safeguards may already be provided for under the existing statutory framework, particularly under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act, which governs how evidence is secured and handled. But I accept what my noble friend said earlier about retention by police in some cases. If the Minister can offer the Committee reassurance that those protections already apply in the context of Clause 23 and that the rights of potential victims are adequately safeguarded in practice, that will be most welcome. This amendment raises a proper, necessary point of clarification and we hope the Government will respond accordingly.