Safety of Rwanda (Asylum and Immigration) Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Monday 12th February 2024 Lords Chamber

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

It is a privilege to follow what the noble Lord, Lord Tugendhat, said, and I strongly agree with it. I will focus on two things in relation to what the Government are asking us to do. Before that, I apologise for not having been here at Second Reading—I, too, was abroad. I declare an interest as a member of the Constitution Committee of this House, which published a report unanimously expressing very considerable concerns about the Bill.

I have two concerns about the Bill. As a nation, we have accepted for the last 70 years that we will not deport asylum seekers to a place where they may face death, torture or inhuman treatment, and that, if asylum seekers feel that that is a risk, they can seek protection from the courts. The courts may well give an applicant short shrift if they do not think there is anything in it, but we have stood by that protection for 70 years and incorporated it into our domestic law in the Human Rights Act 1998. The Bill envisages the possibility—or indeed it being the more-likely-than-not result, according to those who have looked at it independently—that people will be sent to Rwanda, where they will be at substantial risk of being refouled, which means sent back to a place where they could be tortured or killed.

The claim made by the Government is that we have entered into an agreement with Rwanda that says it will not send anybody who comes from here to anywhere except the UK, to which the answer is that given by the international treaties committee: that the reason there was a risk of refoulement was that Rwanda did not even have the most basic system of properly assessing asylum claims. The idea that the Bill envisages—that the moment the new treaty comes into force, it will provide that protection—is absolute nonsense. Everybody appreciates that except, as far as I can see, the right honourable Mr James Cleverly, the Secretary of State for Home Affairs. If we look at the conclusions that the Supreme Court introduced, we see that, factually, it is just a non-starter.

The Government say, and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Sharpe, will confirm it on their behalf, that they stand by the commitment we have made for the last 70 years that asylum seekers will not be exported to a place where they might be refouled. If that is their true position, how on earth can they allow this? The international treaties committee also said that, quite separately from the fact that we would need to reform completely Rwanda’s asylum system, we would have to enter into a number of other detailed provisions before it could be seen whether the provision in the new agreement prevented refoulement. Those agreements have not yet been entered into with Rwanda, and there is no requirement for them to be so before the Bill becomes law.

My first big objection to the Bill is that it goes against commitments we have made as a nation and stood by for the past 70 years. If we are looking for solutions to the problems of immigration in the world, turning our backs on all the international agreements that we have made seems a very bad start indeed.

My second big objection to the Bill is that it fundamentally crosses over the separation of powers. The noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, whom I greatly admire—he was a member of our Constitution Committee—said, “Oh, don’t worry. We’re just taking the opinion of the former Lord Chief Justice, who is the dissenting voice in the Court of Appeal”. No, that is not what the Government say they are doing. They are saying, “We’ve taken account of the Supreme Court judgment. We respect that judgment. We’re not going with the former Lord Chief Justice’s judgment; we’re dealing with the points that have been made—and, by the way, dealing with them while not letting anybody question us about that”. That is absolutely not the role of this House or the courts.

What this Bill leads to is Parliament delivering what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, described as silly, but is so much more profound than silly. I quite agree with him that the beginning of the Bill is very silly in the way that it reads—it is a cack-handed attempt to deliver a judgment, like a court would read—but it is not silly; it is dangerous.

Think of three examples. First, Parliament can say, “Even though we see Rwanda refouling people we are sending, and it is sending Afghans, Syrians and Iraqis back to death or torture, we will do nothing”. We will say that that is okay because we made our judgment that it was a safe country.

That is one example. Let us take another. Suppose the Prime Minister has a friend or a crony in the House of Commons who is convicted in a court of corruption of some sort. The Prime Minister then presents a Bill to Parliament, saying, “It is the judgment of Parliament that Snooks MP actually wasn’t able to present this new evidence to the criminal court that convicted him, so it is the judgment of Parliament that Snooks MP is innocent”. That is the route this Bill takes Parliament down.

Take a third example: the Electoral Commission decides that it will not investigate some problem of, say, not complying with expenses and the courts then say, in relation to that decision, “The Electoral Commission was overinfluenced by party-political considerations”—for example, the governing party was very unkeen for there to be a proper investigation of some expenses fraud in an election, and on judicial review the Electoral Commission’s refusal to investigate was set aside on the basis there was no basis not to investigate. Once again, relying on this precedent, the Government of the day, assuming they have a big majority, can produce a Bill that says, “It is the judgment of Parliament that the courts have got that opinion wrong”—as the noble Lord, Lord Howard of Lympne, introducing a whole new concept in the law, said is the position.

That is the danger of this Bill. I am not sure that I support all my noble friend Baroness Chakrabarti’s solutions—in particular, I am not sure the reference to the United Nations commissioner on refugees is the right source—but, my goodness, if we start letting Parliament make such judgments, we open a door that will be incredibly difficult to close. We in this House surely should not give effect to it.

I have one final point. The noble Lord, Lord Murray of Blidworth, said, “Don’t worry, it’s all Clause 4”. It is not. Clause 4 allows appeals to be made only by people who say something different from “the country is not safe generally”; it is only if there is something specific about them. If, for example, I am a voluble member of the Rwandan opposition and I am then sent to Rwanda, where I may get tortured or killed, then I have a ground, but if I am from Syria or Afghanistan and Rwanda is refouling regularly, I have no basis for appealing.

My first point is that we should stand by our commitments to asylum seekers. My second is: do not listen to this siren song that this is not a fundamental change in our constitution. It is, and it will be the foundation of very bad things to come.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I was at Second Reading. I do not know if that makes me less interesting to listen to than the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and all the rest. I have heard some of these remarks before, of course, but it is always a pleasure to hear them again, if I agree with them. I will say something quite similar to what noble Lords have just heard from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. I will obviously say it less competently, because I do not have legal training, but what I do have is common sense. I am not suggesting that they are mutually exclusive, but they are two completely different things.

Judicial Review and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Monday 21st February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

I do not see this as a tool in the toolbox but as opening up a nest of snakes. When you use the phrase

“unless it sees good reason not to do so”,

it opens up some real complexity if people start to make further appeals on the basis that there was good reason not to do so or good reason to do so. I do not see that this is any sort of simplification. The Government will probably regret opening this system of quashing because it will add complications when the Government presumably want it to run more smoothly. I cannot see that there is any point to this. I hope that all those legal eagles over there will start circling round our little legal lamb here and explain to him that he has got this completely wrong.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

These are important amendments. They address the botched way that, if these powers are to come in, the exercise of discretion is to be applied. My noble friend Lord Ponsonby is saying that you would use what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, describes as the tools in the toolbox only if it is “in the interests of justice to do so”. That is the starting point. That sounds to me a lot more sensible a starting point than the very strange wording in new subsection (9), which is, if the court is to make a quashing order in accordance with new Section 29A(1),

“the court must exercise the powers in that subsection accordingly unless it sees good reason not to do so”,

and the condition is that

“as a matter of substance”

an order under new subsection (1) would

“offer adequate redress in relation to the relevant defect”.

Obviously, there is a difference between adequate redress on the one hand and what is the best order in the interests of justice overall on the other. Can the noble Lord tell us why this strange wording has been adopted if all that is intended is the broadest possible discretion in relation to using these two new tools in the toolbox?

My noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s amendments also relate to new Section 29A(8). The Minister said, in reference to prosecutions and taxation, that you would never make a new subsection (1) order, whether a delayed quashing order or prospective only one, and that is clear, he says, from new subsection (8). He relied in particular on new subsection (8)(c), which refers to

“the interests or expectations of persons who would benefit from the quashing of the impugned act”.

If I have been prosecuted under a regulation that was unlawful, I would expect my prosecution to be upheld. But then, new subsection (8)(d), refers to

“the interests or expectations of persons who have relied on the impugned act”.

Therefore, if, for example, it is made unlawful to do a particular thing and I have had my dog put down as a result or I have bought lots of expensive equipment to comply with the criminal law as I thought it was, my interests or expectations under new subsection (8)(d) would be “Let the law stand”. So new subsection (8)(c) points in one direction and new subsection (8)(d) in another. If it is the Government’s intention that all prosecutions brought under unlawful regulations or laws will never be prospective only, and if it is their intention that taxation raised under unlawful regulations will never be prospective only, in my respectful opinion—I may be wrong, in which case let me corrected by the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson—new subsection (8) does not get him anywhere near that. Indeed, it leaves the judge to decide and the judge has to decide on the basis of new subsection (9).

I therefore strongly agree with my noble friend Lady Chakrabarti. A bit more work needs to go into this to get to a point where there is clarity about what the Government intend, if their intention is that these are only two tools in the toolbox, with complete discretion over how to use them. If that is what they want, my noble friend Lord Ponsonby’s amendments are giving them quite a good opportunity of getting there.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 22nd November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I support these improved safeguards because although I have not been in court very often, and when I have been there, it has been mostly as the complainant or a witness, I do think that we need better support for victims—or the plaintiff—who at the moment are treated very much as bit players in the whole theatre. It seems that they are almost forgettable because the two protagonists are the defence and the prosecution, and they take centre stage. It was obvious when we debated the Domestic Abuse Bill, when we discussed anonymity and other techniques for helping witnesses give evidence in court, so clearly that is needed.

The witness is often treated as a sort of emotionless void, with the legal test focusing on whether the proposed measures will improve their ability to give evidence, rather than, say, protect them from the trauma, embarrassment and hurt of facing up against the accused. This is no more apparent than in the way we treat victims of sexual violence and rape. The Section 41 rules were a major step forward but still fall far short of what is necessary, and so the amendments in this group would help recognise victims as humans and not just incidental characters in the whole story. Most importantly, they would allow the complainant to have their own independent legal representation in Section 41 applications, rather than relying on prosecution counsel, who, in their role as administrators of justice, have many competing obligations to juggle.

I hope that the Minister will agree that there are still many unsolved challenges in the treatment of complainants, and they are in desperate need of solutions.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I should have opened those other amendments, and it is an error on my part that I did not. I am very grateful to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, because he has done a bit of the work that I should have done.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am afraid I did understand what the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said. It is exactly as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown, has put it. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, is right in the way that he analysed this amendment: it would exclude that evidence. I understand that that is the consequence, and I am saying it is a good thing.

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

From a woman’s point of view, I would just like to say that there are things I would have done at 20 that I absolutely would not do now, at 70. We can all learn and adapt our behaviour, so the past may not be relevant.

Police, Crime, Sentencing and Courts Bill

Debate between Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Lords Hansard - part one & Committee stage
Monday 1st November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)]

My Lords, I rise to support these amendments. We are now getting into the stuff that I will fight tooth and nail over. As an archaeologist and activist, I feel that I have a little bit of insight into this whole situation and perhaps into the ridiculous law that the Government are trying to introduce here. Instead of debating and discussing it and coming to a sensible resolution, this is part of a battle in a culture war, which is absolutely ludicrous.

History is important, but it is not fixed. People like to think that we all know what it is and it is in all the books, but, actually, as an archaeologist, I know that we reinterpret it all the time and are constantly making new discoveries. Just in the last week or so, we found Roman statues in a totally unexpected place. This is what happens: we change our minds about history and it gets rewritten.

The problem is that we have some very ugly history, which is littered with powerful and wealthy white men who, behind a thin veneer of toffish respectability, did some quite nasty things and were responsible for atrocities such as the enslavement of millions of people, genocides, war crimes and the grabbing of wealth from some of the many nations that we now call “developing nations”. Our statues ignore this history and pretend that it was benign and that these were good guys, which is simply not true: they were slavers and pillagers, and we ought to recognise that. Having their so-called heroism set in stone is actually quite offensive. There is no hint in many of these statues that they did some evil deeds.

People—many members of the public—do not like this, and they are showing their dissatisfaction with celebrating people who really should not be celebrated. They raped and pillaged, and the fact that they then spent a lot of money on universities, libraries or parks does not really make it all all right. So the question of what we should do with these monuments is important, but not easy. It should force us to confront the evils within our history and reflect on how they carry through to the social and economic conditions of our present.

Instead of leading on this quite important dialogue, the Government simply storm in with a new criminal offence, which I find so ludicrous that I feel I ought to go and speak directly to the Home Secretary about it. They are trying to put their fingers in their ears, sing “Rule Britannia” and pretend that all of this did not happen and that it was all okay—but it was not. Councils all over the country and the Government have to realise that statues are not something that we cannot change or remove. The fact is that some of these statues celebrate evil deeds, and the Government should recognise that.

I have more to say, if noble Lords wish.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I apologise for not standing up promptly—I was expecting the noble Baroness to say more. I will deal with two issues in relation to this group. First, I will deal with the points made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, in relation to what is in effect an increase in the penalty for certain sorts of criminal damage. We on this side completely understand that certain sorts of criminal damage—for example, to the gravestone of a much-revered and loved person—that cause very little financial damage nevertheless absolutely cut to the heart of a community or an individual. Our view is that it should be possible, in certain circumstances, for that to be dealt with somewhere other than a magistrates’ court.

This absolutely over-the-top provision is not necessary to ensure that something like that, which does merit a Crown Court trial, should be dealt with in the Crown Court. I would have thought that a much more targeted amendment could have dealt with that, but this, which deals with absolutely every sort of thing, is unnecessary. You do need a provision to make sure that protection is provided in relation to things that are deeply offensive, such as the desecration of a grave—but, beyond that, the law works, by and large.

I also agree that a lot of thought has gone into this, but there is practically nothing in the Bill—except for one or two increases in sentences for violence—that deals with the protection of women and girls. Instead, there has been this very complicated provision. But, as I say, we accept that it will be appropriate in certain cases to allow for a trial in the Crown Court.

Our Amendment 115, which comes after Clause 46, is designed to deal with a practical issue in relation to criminal damage: the effect of vandalism on safety equipment. This amendment was moved in the other place by Sarah Champion MP, and it reflects a campaign that has been run by Simon and Gaynor Haycock, whose son, Sam Haycock, went swimming in Ulley reservoir in Rotherham in May 2021, on the very day that he finished school, aged 16. He went to help a friend who was in trouble. At the reservoir, a throw line that has a safety belt on it, which you can throw into the water to try to assist someone, is behind a locked cupboard. You can access the throw line only by ringing 999 and getting a PIN number from the police in order to get the line out. The delay in getting the throw line out may well have had tragic consequences on this occasion. The reason that it is behind a locked door with a PIN number is because of the vandalism of safety equipment. I wonder whether the Government could spend their time focusing on something that has a practical effect, rather than engaging in rather divisive culture wars. I very much hope that the Minister will feel able to say something to help Simon and Gaynor Haycock in their campaign.

The amendment proposes that it is made a specific offence to intend

“to destroy or damage any property which is considered life-saving equipment, including life-belts, life jackets, or defibrillators.”

Of course, it would already be an offence to do that, but it matters a lot to indicate that this is something that the law regards with particular hostility because it costs lives, including the life of Sam Haycock. I very much hope that the Haycock family will hear good news from the Minister tonight.