Financial Services and Markets Bill [HL]

Baroness Kramer Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 8th July 2026 Grand Committee

[Baroness Altmann (Non-Afl)]

My Lords, I support Amendments 159 and 174 in the names of the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and the noble Lord, Lord Altrincham. I would be concerned about abolishing the ring-fence for similar reasons and concerns as those expressed by the noble Lord, Lord Vaux. However, I believe that a review of the workings of the alternative protections, such as the higher capital cushions and the bail-in regimes, would be appropriate. I also think that consultation would be advisable rather than simply removing these clauses. We are talking about taxpayer risk; that is basically what the ring-fencing is designed to mitigate. When it comes to consumer deposits, we have done an awful lot for retail savings to make sure that there is protection.

I apologise that I have been unable to participate fully in Committee, but I would like to put on record that there is another risk to the taxpayer in the form of retail pensions. In particular, I have concerns about the lack of any underpinning for the Financial Services Compensation Scheme around annuities, which are assumed to be 100% protected. There is a risk to the taxpayer, which I hope the Minister may consider or take back to the department to ensure that some of those issues are addressed through this Bill. Currently the implicit 100% guarantee can be met only by the taxpayer, and offshore operators of bulk annuities pose a serious risk to the retail pension sector.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I thought the Committee might like to be reminded why such a radical step as ring-fencing was taken after the 2008 financial crisis. It was in part because, in a universal bank encompassing both retail and wholesale banking, failure in the investment bank could and did destroy the viability of the retail bank. It was also in part because, as the noble Lords, Lord Tunnicliffe and Lord Pitt-Watson, said, the investment bank, able to access retail deposits at zero interest and protected by deposit interest, could now take risks that it never would have been able to take if it had had to raise that funding in the financial markets. That was a major factor behind the extraordinary and careless risk-taking that led us into the 2008 crash.

There was also a further reason: cultural contamination that led to irresponsible lending and funding in the retail banks and the abuse of customers as, under pressure from directors, they sought to catch up with the performance of their investment bank equivalents. We all, as a community, paid a very high price for that. Even at the time when the ring-fence was introduced and the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards recommended it as the best way to provide protection for the future, all of us knew that there would at some time in the future be a dangerous complacency. I quote from evidence to the PCBS:

“The classic problem for human institutions and for the design of our regulatory structures and our policy is how do we design against [delusion] in 25 years’ time, when … we have another: ‘This time it’s different. This time we’re cleverer than the previous generation.’”


Another quote is that

“financial crises don’t often happen immediately one after another; there tends to be a lag while those people who learnt lessons move out of the industry”.

In opting for ring-fencing, the PCBS warned of future pressures to weaken the separation:

“Those pressures will include the siren voices of those who contend that structural separation as implemented represents a barrier to financial innovation and growth”.


That was prescient indeed.

The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, said in a previous day of Committee that I look too much to the past. I accept that memory is inconvenient, but the amendments today from her and her colleagues come from a party that, perhaps with the exception of Nigel Lawson, never accepted its responsibility for light-touch regulation, the culture of hubris and the casino mentality that was quite heralded and led to the crisis in 2008. I still hear little sympathy, frankly, from those Benches for the ordinary people who bore the consequences. I do not want to denigrate the banking community—there are many good people in it—but most of them walked away largely untouched and with the personal rewards for the activities that led to the crisis still in their pockets. Respecting the positives of the financial sector always has to sit with a recognition that so much money can be made from a bending or an adjustment of the rules that guardrails are a necessity.

As I listened to the proposals in this group, I realised that growth has become an excuse and resolution has become a cover for eliminating the ring-fence and, essentially, the precautionary principle. Resolution for systemic banks is not just untested but—I was thankful to the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, for quoting my Second Reading speech—it has a poisonous side-effect for others in the financial sector, notably the insurance and pension funds that in this case hold most of the bail-in bonds through MREL, and for their customers.

In 2023, the Swiss financial regulator FINMA—I was reminded of this when the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, talked about the Swiss being so secure—saved the equity holders of Credit Suisse, a collapsing bank, in order to rescue it, but wiped out the bondholders, an issue that is still in litigation and has cost the Swiss very dearly in their bond issuances. FINMA took its decision on the grounds that any other action would have undermined financial stability, it was so conscious of the contagion that comes when you activate a resolution procedure. While the Bank of England has said it would not hesitate to activate resolution procedures and wipe out both equity and bondholders, I find very few people in the industry who actually believe it on those kinds of statements. No one should look with equanimity at the idea that we allow a bank to fail and be rescued only through the extreme activities of resolution, rather than looking at the precautionary principle.

Yesterday, the ground shifted even more. The noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, referred to the financial stability report of July 2026 from the Bank of England. I have not had time to read it thoroughly. I have done only a first read but, frankly, it is schizophrenic. The first half of the report, as others have raised, is chilling in its assessment of the increased risk—the noble Lord, Lord Vaux, raised some of these questions—of private credit, the Iran war and AI, and especially of these crises crystallising at the same time. But the second half of the report explains policy decisions to weaken the regulatory capital buffers for banks—the regulatory system that several people have spoken about here as the reason why it is possible to remove the ring-fence. That was weakened in yesterday’s publication. The reasoning appears to be that regulators overseas are weakening their buffers and, for international competitiveness reasons, we should too.

Last Sunday, the Sunday Times ran a piece in anticipation of this change, saying that the Bank is set to relax capital rules for lenders again. My reaction to the report is mirrored by the quote from Sir John Vickers in that article, in which he cautions against reducing capital requirements:

“At a time when risk has plainly gone up, it would not make sense to dial down insurance”.


The Bank, I suspect encouraged by the Treasury, is weakening the resolution system. The noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, and her party propose in addition to remove the precautionary protection of ring-fencing. All this is at a time of increased risk to financial stability. I came away from going through these amendments, frankly, in a mood of despair. We have to start once again to recognise the reality of risk.

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Moved by

[Baroness Kramer]

155: Clause 40, page 47, line 30, leave out from beginning to line 2 on page 48 and insert—
“(1) The appropriate regulator shall consider whether there is sufficient provision to ensure the effective provision to a ring-fenced body of services and facilities that it requires in relation to the carrying on of a core activity.(1A) Subject to subsection (1B), when considering whether there is sufficient provision for the purposes of subsection (1) concerning services and facilities that are provided to a ring-fenced body by another member of its group, the appropriate regulator shall take account of all relevant circumstances, including—(a) the appropriate regulator’s ability to assess and influence the terms on which such services and facilities are made available to a ring-fenced body,(b) the availability, continuity and sufficiency of such services and facilities, including in circumstances where the Bank of England would be entitled to exercise any of the stabilisation powers under the Banking Act 2009, and(c) any assessment that the Bank of England has made of a group of which the ring-fenced body is or proposes to become a member under a statement of policy that the Bank of England has issued pursuant to section 3B (safeguards relating to directions under section 3A) subsection (9) of the Banking Act 2009 and, where applicable, the absence of any such assessment.(1B) The appropriate regulator shall not consider that there is sufficient provision for the purposes of subsection (1) where a ring-fenced body is, or proposes to become, a member of a group for all or part of which the appropriate regulator is not responsible for consolidated supervision, and such services and facilities are provided to the ring-fenced body from outside the United Kingdom by a member of the group that is not in a part of the group that is subject to consolidated supervision by the appropriate regulator, unless the appropriate regulator has made rules to ensure that—(a) there is no less uncertainty concerning the availability, continuity and sufficiency of such services and facilities than there would be where they are provided to a ring-fenced body within a group that is subject as a whole to the consolidated supervision of the appropriate regulator, and (b) the ring-fenced body is not permitted to receive such services and facilities unless the provider of those services and facilities is adequately resourced and the arrangements under which those services and facilities are provided would facilitate the orderly exercise by the Bank of England of its stabilisation powers under the Banking Act 2009 in circumstances where the Bank of England would be entitled to exercise those powers.(1C) If, having regard to all the circumstances, including the matters referred to in subsection (1A), the appropriate regulator does not consider that there is sufficient provision for the purposes of subsection (1) or may not do so under subsection (1B), the appropriate regulator must exercise its power to make rules requiring a ring-fenced body to make arrangements to ensure the effective provision referred to in subsection (1).(1D) The appropriate regulator shall consider whether there is sufficient provision to achieve the group ring-fencing purposes.(1E) The appropriate regulator shall not consider that there is sufficient provision for the purposes of subsection (1D) where a ring-fenced body is or proposes to become a member of a group for all or part of which the appropriate regulator is not responsible for consolidated supervision, unless the appropriate regulator has made rules to ensure that there is no less uncertainty concerning the achievement of the group ring-fencing purposes in those circumstances than would be the case where the ring-fenced body is a member of a group that is subject as a whole to the consolidated supervision of the appropriate regulator.(1F) If the appropriate regulator does not consider that there is sufficient provision to achieve the group ring-fencing purposes, or may not do so under subsection (1E), the regulator must exercise its power to make rules for the group ring-fencing purposes that apply—(a) to ring-fenced bodies, or(b) to authorised persons who are members of a ring-fenced body’s group.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment, and others in the name of Baroness Kramer, seek to require the PRA to assess whether existing law and regulation makes sufficient provision in the case of regulated companies based outside the United Kingdom.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, this group originally preceded the one we just debated. I noticed the change this morning. My points in this group on ring-fencing are quite narrow. I am not particularly happy about the changes in Clauses 39 and 40, but I do not feel strongly enough that we need to change the relevant clauses wholesale.

But I have a problem with a narrow area that feels to me like a Trojan horse. In easing ring-fencing in this Bill through giving the regulator greater flexibility to adjust the ring-fence, the Government are still taking greater risk. I find it frustrating that people who remove a protection then say that there is no additional risk. Let us be honest: there is greater risk. I am cautiously relieved that ring-fencing has not been holed below the waterline by the Government. But, in Amendments 155 to 158 and 160, I am trying to address a breach that has been identified in the ring-fence and that potentially has serious unintended consequences.

In the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 and the SIs under FSMA, which implemented much of it, the structural separation between retail and wholesale banks within the same overarching bank group left few shared operational services. The ring-fencing rules prohibited receiving services or facilities that are regularly required from any entity or company within the group that is not a permitted supplier, so that, in case of failure—for example, the failure of the wholesale bank—the retail bank could continue unaffected. This Bill relaxes the rules on intragroup services, and it argues in the Explanatory Notes that the current situation causes duplication and overlap.

As far as I can understand, the Government think that there is no risk to changing the rules because the bank resolution process now includes the operational continuity in resolution regulation, OCIR, which ensures that critical banking services are provided to customers should a bank have failed and be in resolution. There are some problems because the ring-fencing rules and the OCIR rules do not fully match, and what happens to non-critical shared services is not clear. At the very least, we need to know the intention around that.

Much more seriously, if a banking group is not headquartered in the UK, so that the PRA is not the group supervisor and the Bank of England is not the group resolution authority, how can shared services to customers be assured in a crisis? It depends completely on the voluntary support of an overseas regulator. Given the fragmentation in international co-operation that we see today, that becomes a serious potential risk.

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[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, Amendments 155 to 158 and 160 all relate to Clause 40. As I set out in the previous debate, Clause 40 makes the ring-fencing regime more flexible and proportionate by allowing the PRA to take account of protections already delivered elsewhere in the prudential and resolution framework, when considering whether ring-fencing rules are required. The clause is intended to reduce unnecessary duplication, while maintaining the core protections and purposes of the ring-fencing regime. We have already debated this, and it was clear that there were a wide range of views.

The noble Baroness’s amendments focus principally on shared services arrangements, operational continuity and cross-border group structures. The Government recognise the importance of these issues and we have spoken to a couple of outside parties on this topic. Ensuring the continuity of critical services and managing operational dependencies are important objectives of the ring-fencing regime.

However, I am not persuaded that these amendments are the right route forward. They would introduce detailed statutory tests governing when the PRA may rely on protections delivered elsewhere in the prudential and resolution framework, particularly for shared services arrangements involving cross-border or non-consolidated groups. Their practical effect would be to make it harder for the PRA to rely on equivalent protections elsewhere in the framework, increasing the likelihood of additional ring-fencing rules, greater complexity and additional compliance burdens, even where the PRA considered that the relevant outcomes were already being achieved.

In contrast, Clause 40 is intended to make the regime more flexible, streamlined and proportionate by reducing unnecessary duplication while maintaining core protections. It does not allow the PRA simply to assume that protections provided elsewhere in the framework are sufficient. The PRA may rely on those protections only where it considers that there is sufficient provision to achieve the relevant ring-fencing purposes and ensure the effective provision of services and facilities to ring-fenced banks.

For example, the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, asked whether the OCIR framework can be replaced by the PRA’s rule 9.1. This is a matter for the PRA, but it has indicated that it intends to consider these issues through consultation. Where the PRA does not consider that sufficient provision exists, including in relation to shared services arrangements or cross-border groups, it must act, including through making ring-fencing rules where necessary. The clause therefore preserves key protections.

If further details are required, I am more than happy to follow up before Report, but, for those reasons, I ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I am happy to withdraw.

Amendment 155 withdrawn.

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In supporting these amendments, I ask the Minister what more, in particular, HMT is planning to do to give that sense of a clear, crisp and focused mission statement to coalesce the community—it is a community in this country—around the potential and possibilities. Get that right, then right-sized regulation can flow and the growth will come.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, we on these Benches in large part support the amendments in this group, with a few caveats. It is important to emphasise the frustration that we do not have today, and do not seem to see in the near future, that comprehensive regulatory framework that will draw together the UK approach to all these assets. It is a disservice to Parliament, because it makes it hard for us to investigate as we attempt to pull together a report from one committee or one regulator and try to mesh it with something that has come from another. The experience of even trying to do that demonstrates a lot of the fragmentation. Many of us thought that the Bill would be one of the mechanisms to create that framework, but it is not here. I very much support the amendments that begin to address that issue.

My caveats may seem minor but reflect some fundamental frustrations. For example, subsection (2)(g) proposed by Amendment 164, which is to “have regard” to various factors, puts financial stability and international competitiveness on exactly the same standing. That is an ongoing frustration that I have had through much of the Bill. We have to understand the primacy of financial stability. It is one thing to have a secondary objective but, in general conversation, and over and over again in amendments, we see the two merged as being essentially on a par. That is highly questionable.

We have a history of variations on the digital industry forum. In the early days of fintech, it was the industry that really pulled itself together into a representative body and then the Government indicated their willingness to negotiate with that body. Out of that came a coherent set of appropriate regulations, which met the needs of both sides and were developed by engagement with both sides. I would like to see that industry begin to pull itself together. I am always suspicious when Governments set up forums, because then they pick and choose who sits on them and who the voices are. When industry does it, it tends to be a far more inclusive and more effective group, but the Government need to indicate that they would wish to have such a body and to engage with it. That would move us very much forward.

The issue of interoperability is absolutely key, but I take it further: it also needs to be looked at from a consumer perspective. If you get your salary in sterling stablecoin going into your virtual wallet but then you, as an individual, want to be able to go and get pounds, how on earth can you do that at a current ATM? That is simply impossible, so interoperability in all kinds of ways is fundamental to developing the whole new digital direction. However, costs are always involved when you look at interoperability. I would like the Government—or the regulators, if they are the appropriate bodies—to establish a principle that those who use the payment system and are part of it all carry a part of the burden, rather than simply falling back on the traditional banks to carry the costs. That would get us a whole lot further and make the banking community far more willing to be engaged in this process.

I hope that the Government will take these amendments seriously. They seem to move us very much in the right direction. As I say, my caveats are fairly small and I will be looking forward to the Minister’s response. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Ranger, for engaging with the industry to be able to bring forward amendments that take us in this direction.

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[Lord Ranger of Northwood (Con)]

My Lords, I support my noble friend Lord Holmes’s amendments across the alphabet, particularly because he is right about the detail and the need for us to look at the ambition and see whether we are really targeting changes that will help us fulfil the ambition. When it comes to the point about regulation and whether or not it has worked, in terms of KYC, AML and even PEP, we know that these fundamental versions of regulatory burdens do not succeed. We hear constantly of their failings, so how are we going to adopt and adapt as we move into the digital assets universe, as I have been calling it, rather than naming each different type?

Fundamentally, one of the elements here is the use cases. These amendments speak to specific points and changes that could be brought through, but we must look at the use cases in which these will apply. We talk about tokenisation or how stablecoins will be used. We must talk about how property and assets might be traded differently. We must look at how services will be adapted and the wholesale settlement that international markets are looking at. We must talk about and consider the use cases around retail e-commerce. With that, I support my noble friend’s amendments.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I am going to be brief again: these are very interesting amendments. The breadth of the amendments put before us by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, gives us a sense of the extensive work that must be done, right across the plumbing of the entire financial services sector, to move and take advantage of the opportunities of the digital world. There is no discussion here of some of the risks, namely about the levers of power shifting to different hands and whether we should be concerned about that or whether there are monetary sovereignty issues. Those are crucial issues, and we cannot walk away from them. Plumbing seems boring, but it is crucial. It seems that every aspect of that plumbing has been raised here, something that I hoped we might hear about in greater detail from the Government. I am particularly focused on the first of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, which is Amendment 164C. I apologise, I have the wrong one.

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

That was good too, though.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

That was very good too. I meant Amendment 164E, which is headed,

“Shared digital identity and compliance utilities”.

I come from a party that is always very concerned about identity cards, whether they are digital or traditional, old-fashioned cards, and what they do to privacy and independence, so I have those caveats constantly in the back of my mind. It seems to me, however, that a series of fundamental questions are raised by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, in subsection (2), where he talks about the various specifications, the governance arrangements, the very straightforward things such as whether utilities are to be publicly or privately owned, under public specifications or operated as industry utilities. There are issues of data, access to digital ledgers, privacy, data protection and how to cope with the transition period, which will be very complex and very different for different individuals. Some people will transition completely almost in the blink of an eye, and others will be very late adopters. That creates a whole set of issues around financial inclusion and exclusion. I hope very much that we will get the discussion that we need, particularly around subsection (2), which then sits as a foundation to all the other issues that are raised. These are issues that engage the regulator, of course, but many of them are above the regulatory pay grade, and we need to be engaged on those issues here in this Committee.

[Lord Altrincham (Con)]

My Lords, this group is a snapshot, in a sense, of where we are now in digital regulation for financial services in the UK, as discussed by my noble friend Lord Holmes. This group somewhat dovetails with the amendments that we discussed in the previous group, which sought to probe the Government’s strategy for digital assets, tokenisation, access to banking and payment services and consumer redress. However, I am concerned that this package rather jumps the gun. The issue is more profound than the absence of individual regulatory provisions.

As my noble friends Lady Neville-Rolfe and Lord Ranger of Northwood, and the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, said, we do not yet have the basic architecture in place, and we do not yet have a clear digital assets strategy. We do not yet have a settled framework of engagement with the industry, and we do not have a proper industry forum through which the Government, regulators and market participants can work through these questions in a structured way. That matters because this is a fast-moving area: if we legislate too quickly, or in too much detail, without proper consultation and industry engagement, we risk creating a framework that is either obsolete before it is implemented, or misaligned with how the market is actually developing.

The point that we have been making throughout these debates is that the Government need to move from ambition, the Digital Markets Taskforce and their initiatives to strategy. It is not enough to say that the UK should be a global centre for digital assets or tokenisation: we need to know what that means in practice, who is responsible for delivering it, how the regulators are working together, what definitions will be used, and what sort of regime firms can expect. At present, the problem is not only a lack of regulation: in some respects, the problem is the way the regulatory system is operating, those overlaps between the Treasury, the FCA, the PRA, the Bank of England and other bodies. There are sometimes different emphases, different attitudes and different levels of appetite toward digital assets and tokenised finance. That creates uncertainty for firms.

Industry does not need more rules; it needs clarity, a coherent regulatory perimeter, regulators that are aligned with one another and confidence that the UK is developing a framework that supports responsible innovation, rather than simply adding new layers of process and permission. This is why we need to be careful before layering further statutory requirements on top of a system which has not yet been properly clarified. That said, the principle raised by my noble friend about looking to world leaders for inspiration is a good one. This is something we should be paying attention to if we wish to remain internationally competitive.

In addition, the principle for higher regulatory neutrality between traditional and tokenised assets is a sensible one. If two instruments have the same economic substance and risk profile, there is a strong case for treating them consistently. But before that principle can operate effectively, the Government and the regulators need to define clearly what counts as an additional asset—a tokenised security, a crypto asset, a stablecoin or a form of digital market infrastructure. That is why the industry forum proposed in the previous group seems so important. We need a better mechanism for engagement before we decide the detailed architecture, and we need to hear from banks, payment firms, digital asset businesses, market infrastructure providers, asset managers, lawyers, technologists and consumer representatives. Without that, we risk legislating for a market as we imagine it, rather than for a market as it is developing.

In summary, my noble friend Lord Holmes raises important issues and many of the ideas in this group may well form part of the future architecture for digital finance. The first task is to sort out the foundations. We need strategy, clarity, co-ordination and proper industry engagement before we start building further layers of regulations. For those reasons, I welcome the debate and the questions raised by these amendments. The Government must first address the more fundamental uncertainty at the heart of the UK’s approach to digital assets and tokenised finance.

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[Lord Davies of Brixton (Lab)]

No, I am not for one moment suggesting that. I am saying that, in other discussions, I have heard it said explicitly or by implication. It is a danger and, given what we are trying to achieve, it is one that we should recognise and take account of.

My second point is that both amendments refer to the FCA. The first amendment, from the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Rolfe, specifically refers to pensions. Let us be clear: the FCA knows little or nothing about pensions. It is the wrong body to undertake any form of public information about pensions. I have heard the discussion on the regulation of pensions and people asking, “Why do we have two regulators?” Well, we do have two: one is the Pensions Regulator and the other is the FCA, but the FCA’s involvement is narrow and we should understand that it is dying. It is going because personal pensions are dead, and the FCA will have little or nothing to do with pensions in the future. The life companies have not quite realised this yet—they are fighting against it—but history will remove them from this market.

Clearly, pensions do not fall within the ambit of the FCA for these purposes. It can provide information about life insurance products and annuities, but those are not pensions. The word “pensions” is wrong in Amendment 167.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, I suspect that nobody in this Room would not speak out very strongly in favour of financial education and that, in this House, we would be really grateful if there were some capacity for it, particularly in the ever-changing world that we are dealing with today, with all its complexity. I sign up totally to that underlying concept, although I think that the noble Lord, Lord Davies, alighted on an important point. I know that my noble friend Lady Tyler speaks a lot on financial inclusion and always talks about financial education as part of that, but she becomes extremely frustrated when people seem to think that, somehow, financial education is a substitute for the other actions that are needed, such as access to cash or to personal services. The noble Lord is completely right that we want financial education, and it is brilliant if we have good financial education, but that does not take away from the need to make sure that our financial services sector delivers proper, safe, first-class services, appropriately regulated.

Of all the bodies to choose to provide financial education, the FCA would be right at the bottom of my list. This is a body that has so many responsibilities already, and to take on another absolutely massive task—communicating with the ordinary person on the street, among other things—would be way beyond its capacity. It has plenty to do without this. Also, has anybody read letters from the FCA? It does not write human in its general communication. I think this is probably a government responsibility, and to me it makes a whole lot more sense to fund someone—I am picking this out of the blue—such as Citizens Advice, with people who speak with normal people and understand the issues they face and how they face them, if we are going to look for a financial education champion. I am sure people will come up with others.

I want to address Amendment 171 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, because it is very important. It would provide a right of action to SMEs for breaches of the FCA handbook. I have from time to time, in this House and even in this series of debates, expressed my very deep frustration with the regulatory perimeter: the consumer protections that the FCA provides are limited to individuals—consumers. It now includes very small micro-businesses, but it does not include small businesses. Bad actors in the industry completely exploit that. We have seen that in example after example of mis-selling, whether back in the days of asset stripping or the mis-selling of derivatives or a play with mini-bonds. That perimeter has been used as a mechanism, because, on the far side of the perimeter, from the FCA perspective, there is not protection: it is entirely caveat emptor. In the complex world of today, where small businesses have to deal with so much and compete on a scale that they never had to if you go back a generation or so, I think it is wrong not to recognise that they will not have the capacity to be able to deal with some of that financial complexity.

I have always been keen on a right of private action; it is a very old and core tradition in British common law. One of my frustrations with the FCA has been that, in a sense, it went down the path of adopting the consumer duty to avoid doing what this House had intended it to do: look for a duty of care—because embedded in a duty of care is a right of private action. The FCA opted for a tick-box approach, rather than the principled approach that lies with a duty of care and the right of an individual citizen to get redress through the court system if they feel they have been damaged. For small businesses to now have a right of private action when they deal with the regulator seems to be an important step forward and a recognition of the reality of the challenges that small businesses face today.

[Lord Stockwood (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to noble Peers for raising the important issues of financial education and the right of action for SMEs. On financial education, Amendment 167 would place a statutory duty on the FCA to promote financial capability, and Amendment 170 would require the FCA to publish a national financial education strategy. I am clearly supportive of the motivation, but I do not believe that new statutory duties on the FCA are the right way to achieve it.

The noble Baroness has already mentioned some of the good work that is being done by the Government on financial capability as part of their financial inclusion strategy, such as the work the Department for Education is doing in schools. The Government are also taking steps to improve financial education for adults. For example, we have announced the expansion of the Money Guiders programme, which is run by the Money and Pensions Service. This helps front-line workers, such as nurses and social workers, to have conversations about money with those they support. Fair4All Finance is also deploying £50 million funded by dormant assets in England to support financial capability initiatives. I assure the noble Baroness that the Money and Pensions Service already has a statutory function to develop and co-ordinate a national strategy to improve financial capability and education, as set out in the Financial Guidance and Claims Act 2018, and the FCA also carries out substantial work in this space. Helping consumers navigate their financial lives is already one of the FCA’s four priorities for 2025 to 2030.

Amendment 171 relates to SMEs and would significantly extend private rights of action. The Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 already draws a clear and deliberate distinction between general private law claims available to all parties, including SMEs, and the specific statutory right of action under Section 138D, which is limited to “private persons”—generally individuals and persons not acting in the course of a business. That reflects Parliament’s long-standing judgment that FCA rules are primarily regulatory and supervisory standards, rather than offering a comprehensive basis for civil liability for all market participants. SMEs can and do bring claims under contract, misrepresentation, negligence and other established causes of action.

I understand why the noble Lord is motivated to extend the right of action to SMEs for regulatory breaches. Historically, SMEs were often left with little option outside litigation, and I agree that those firms have fewer resources to seek redress. This was deliberately addressed in 2019 with the significant expansion of the Financial Ombudsman, which is now accessible to 99% of the UK’s small businesses.

I hope I have gone some way to reassuring noble Lords on the action the Government are taking on these important issues, and I therefore ask the noble Baroness to withdraw her amendment.

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[Baroness Neville-Rolfe (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 172A is in my name and that of my noble friend Lord Altrincham. It would require the Treasury to publish draft legislation to replace the Financial Ombudsman Service with a new financial adjudication service, and to create a dedicated financial services chamber within the First-tier Tribunal. This is a significant amendment but also a serious and necessary one. As noted earlier, it follows the policy announcement made by the leader of my party, Kemi Badenoch, at TheCityUK’s conference last month.

The amendment reflects a wider concern about the way in which the Financial Ombudsman has evolved, and about the need for a consumer redress system that is fast, expert, accessible and legally certain. A little bit of history: the Financial Ombudsman Service was created to provide a low-cost and informal alternative to the courts. That purpose remains important. Consumers and SMEs need an effective way of resolving disputes with financial firms. Going directly to court can be expensive, intimidating and slow. There must, of course, be a route to redress that is accessible and free to use.

However, the FOS has moved far beyond a simple dispute-resolution function. It now operates in many respects as a quasi-regulator. Its decisions can set expectations for firms, shape market behaviour and influence the way in which FCA rules are understood. Yet it does not receive the same scrutiny as regulators such as the FCA, nor does it produce binding legal precedent in the way that a court or tribunal would. That creates a serious problem of legal uncertainty.

At the heart of this issue is the “fair and reasonable” test. The ombudsman is required to decide complaints, not simply according to law, but according to what it considers fair and reasonable in all the circumstances. That gives the FOS a broad discretion. It means that firms can comply with the law, the FCA rulebook and their contractual obligations but still be found against on the basis that the ombudsman takes a different view of what is fair and reasonable. That is not a stable foundation for a predictable regulatory system and that has been recognised, I am glad to say, by the Government but they are not going far enough.

Courts have confirmed that the FOS must take account of the relevant law but is free to depart from it. Firms do not know whether compliance with the FCA’s rules will be enough. They do not know whether the FOS will go further than those rules or whether an individual determination will be treated as an indication of wider expectations. That uncertainly drives gold-plating and overcompliance.

One example that has been raised with us concerns packaged bank accounts and the consumer duty. The concern is that the FOS may take the view that providers should look at whether a customer has used any of the benefits of a packaged bank account in the previous year and, if not, prompt them that this might not be the right account for them. That goes far beyond current FCA guidance.

The wider point is that if the FCA believes that its rules need to change, it should amend them prospectively. If Parliament believes that the statutory framework needs to change, it should legislate. We should not have a system in which major changes in practical standards emerge through a redress body applying a broad fairness jurisdiction.

There is also a serious performance issue, which we have touched on before. The FOS is under significant strain. The backlog has become very large and timeliness targets have been missed. The FOS is now being used as an instrument of mass redress when it was not designed to operate as a quasi-court, a quasi-regulator and a quasi-mass claims mechanism.

Our proposal is to reform the architecture. The financial adjudication service would retain the benefits of a specialist and accessible adjudication system. It would be designed to provide speed, expertise and high settlement rates. Consumers and SMEs would continue to have a route to redress without the cost and complexity of ordinary litigation. The key difference is that decisions would be made according to law. The “fair and reasonable” test would be removed. The new service would apply statute, FCA rules, contractual obligations and legal principles. Where the law is unclear, that uncertainty should be resolved through proper legal determination, not discretionary case-by-case judgment.

Where a dispute required appeal or authoritative determination, it would go to a dedicated financial services chamber of the First-tier Tribunal. That would create binding precedent. It would fill the gap that currently exists between the FOS and the courts, where the only meaningful challenge to an FOS decision is judicial review. Judicial review is not a proper merits appeal. It requires firms to show that the decision was not merely wrong but unlawful or irrational. In practice, this means that FOS decisions are rarely challenged.

A tribunal system would be different. It would allow principles to be determined clearly, openly and according to law. Over time, that would create a body of precedent that would help firms, consumers, advisers and regulators to understand what the rules mean in practice.

That is the point of our amendment. It is not about removing redress but about making redress clearer, faster, more expert and more legally certain. Nor is it about weakening consumer protection. Consumers benefit from certainty too. They benefit when firms understand their obligations, when decisions are consistent, when disputes are resolved quickly and when similar cases are treated in similar ways. This amendment therefore asks the Government to publish draft legislation for a new model. It would not require every operational detail to be settled in the Bill today. It asks the Treasury to come forward with the legislative architecture needed to move from an ombudsman model based on broad discretion to an adjudication and tribunal model based on law.

The purpose of the amendment is to begin a serious conversation about the future architecture of financial redress. We need a system that is accessible for consumers, fair to SMEs, predictable for firms and capable of generating clarity over time. The current model sadly no longer does that. It is too uncertain and discretionary. A financial adjudication service, backed by a dedicated financial services chamber of the First-tier Tribunal, would preserve access to redress while restoring legal certainty. That is the balance that we should seek to strike. I beg to move.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I have one question for the noble Baroness, as my noble friend Lord Sharkey will speak for us on this. What will the cost be to the individual of going to the tribunal system? I am conscious that an individual needs to raise between £40,000 and £50,000 to get to preliminary hearing at the employment tribunal. Is that the kind of number that she has in mind?

[Lord Massey of Hampstead (Con)]

I support this amendment and just raise the point of the First-tier Tribunal. I have experience of dealing with the FOS as a firm. At the moment, if you want to appeal the decision of the FOS, you have to go to judicial review. Therefore, whatever the cost of this First-tier Tribunal, it would be very substantially less than going through a process of judicial review, which firms are reluctant to go through, as noble Lords can imagine, because of its cumbersome nature.