Children’s Wellbeing and Schools Bill

Baroness Longfield Excerpts

Thursday 18th September 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Longfield (Lab)]

My Lords, I will speak in support of Amendments 469 and 470, and I thank my noble friend for making such a strong and clear case for why they are important.

As a former Children’s Commissioner who worked very much within the framework of the UNCRC as the legal person required to promote and support children’s rights, the Committee will not be surprised to hear me speaking up for these amendments. As part of that role, I met children’s commissioners and Governments from around Europe and the rest of the world. They were at different stages of having regard to the UNCRC, but it was very clear from all my conversations with those who had taken the step towards incorporation—senior members of Government and others working in the public sector and wider society—that this was an important declaration for their country and for how they viewed themselves.

I am proud of the work that this Bill, as well as the wider work of government, is putting forward to make children a much more central commitment in decision-making. These amendments would offer a next, important step. However, the discussion around this can often become quite legalistic and technical, which sometimes distracts. We need to get to the heart of what this is about: making sure that we have a consistent focus on how we, as a nation, put our children first. We know that what happens in childhood will have an impact throughout the whole of life—and that impacts at the heart of who we are as a nation.

Children do not fit neatly into government departments; no one at the Cabinet table exclusively represents the best interests of children. Children do not vote, so they often get missed out in key moments of decision-making, and, as we know, they are most likely to fall through the gaps. In short, it is very easy for children to be overlooked and to fall between the departments and decision-makers who are making policies.

Children’s rights impact assessments can strengthen that move. They may sound technical and bureaucratic, but, again, this is about ensuring that decisions are made in the round and these issues are considered. We most seriously felt the lack of that during the pandemic, when decisions were made that were not in children’s best interests and there was no framework for wider consideration. Many departments undertake impact assessments, but I do not think that they yet have the status or consistency needed across government. During the pandemic, we saw other countries, such as Scotland and Wales, putting forward impact assessments on decisions made about children that considered wide-ranging issues, from economics to schooling and health, to ensure that children’s best interests were looked at in the round. It did not mean that those things could not be improved, but it meant that there was a consistent framework for consideration.

That is what I am putting forward for consideration today: that we take the next step to look at strengthening the framework, within government and our legal system, that puts children on a firm footing—not only in emergencies but in day-to-day life. We must have the ambition of putting children first in all the decisions we make, to ensure that we are not holding them back and that their best interests are taken into account.

[Lord Wei (Con)]

My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 502YP, which stands in my name. This amendment goes to the heart of how government power is exercised in the Bill. It would require the Secretary of State, when issuing guidance and reviewing parental appeals, to act in a manner that is substantively fair, proportionate and consistent with the best interests of the child while also taking into account the burdens that they might impose on families and parents.

Why is such a provision necessary? It is not enough for Ministers to draft guidance that looks acceptable on paper or to frame decisions in language that appears compatible with human rights law. What matters is how these powers operate in practice and how they impact parents and children, and other stakeholders in their daily lives.

Too often, many innocent families that I have spoken with experience the gap between theory and practice. They are told that regulations are light-touch, yet find themselves deluged with data requests, threatened with attendance orders or subject to investigatory processes that are often triggered not by evidence of harm but by mere administrative suspicion. From my work with home-educating families, I have heard repeatedly of parents treated as problems to be managed rather than partners in their child’s learning and well-being. That is not safeguarding; it is coercion disguised as oversight.

I understand that the guidance-led approach and strategy that the Government have taken is a means to try to block loopholes both now and into the future, but I urge the Minister and the department to think about the costs that this Henry VIII-led approach impose. For many families who find themselves on the wrong side of an investigation—and let us remember that the majority of investigations never lead to a conviction —it imposes huge court fees and requires them to set aside years of their lives to fight for their rights. It puts costs on to ordinary citizens. This amendment seeks to ensure that courts, when reviewing such actions, look beyond the fine words of official guidance to their real-world effect.

Does the policy genuinely protect children, or does it impose burdens that are unnecessary, unfair or disproportionate? Does it still respect the primacy of parents under Section 7 of the Education Act 1996, or does it erode it by stealth? The principle of substantive fairness is well established in case law. The Supreme Court has affirmed that state interference with family life must be proportionate, necessary and justified by evidence of significant harm. In R (W) v Birmingham City Council, the court stressed that suspicion alone is insufficient to override parental decision-making, and in Strasbourg jurisprudence, cases such as TP and KM v United Kingdom, and Folgerø and others v Norway, make clear that formal compliance with Article 8 is not enough if, in practice, families are subjected to arbitrary or excessive state interference.

This is not only about legal safeguards but about rebuilding trust. Parents must have the confidence that when the Secretary of State issues guidance it is designed to support, not to harass, empower or intimidate. They must know that appeals will be judged not by a tick-box reading of regulations but by a substantive assessment of what is fair, proportionate and in the best interests of their child.

To use one example, guidance might say that local authorities may request information as necessary. On its face, this sounds reasonable, but in practice families have reportedly been asked for intrusive details about their beliefs, philosophies or private lives—information far beyond what is needed to confirm that a child is receiving a suitable education. Under my amendment, the court would be obliged to ask not just whether the words of the guidance seem lawful but whether its application crosses the line into disproportionate intrusion.

Let us also consider parental appeals. Without a substantive fairness test the Secretary of State could uphold decisions that technically meet the letter of the law or guidance but are manifestly unjust, such as refusing deregistration when a child is in acute distress or supporting disproportionate monitoring conditions that make family life untenable. This amendment would require that such decisions be tested against their effect on the ground.

Some may fear that this opens the door to endless litigation. I would argue the opposite. By embedding the principle of substantive fairness from the outset, we give clearer guidance to decision-makers, reducing the scope for arbitrary or heavy-handed action and thus reducing the likelihood of judicial review. It is precisely when parents and families feel trapped, unheard and mistreated that they resort to the courts.

This amendment is not limited to home-educators; it will protect all families affected by the Bill. Schools will also benefit if guidance remains targeted and proportionate rather than bloated with impractical demands. Local authorities, often stretched to breaking point, will be shielded from the impossible task of enforcing rules that look neat in Whitehall but are unworkable on the ground.

It also respects the proper role of Parliament—of this place. Too often, we legislate with the assumption that the department will interpret and apply the law reasonably, but when guidance becomes overreaching or unfair, it is our reputation that suffers. This amendment restores a crucial check, ensuring that actions under the Bill are judged by their substance, not their spin.

Finally, I stress that this does not prevent the Minister issuing robust guidance where children are genuinely at risk. It requires that such guidance be necessary, proportionate and practically implementable without undermining parental and family rights. That is exactly the balance struck in our domestic law and by the European Court of Human Rights: protection where there is evidence of harm but restraint where there is not.

If we pass the Bill without such safeguards, we risk embedding a culture of formal compliance that is blind to lived reality. We risk measures that look lawful and feel great about them, but that feel unjust. In doing so, we risk losing the trust of the very parents, families and children whose partnership we need to safeguard children’s lives effectively.

Amendment 502YP offers a principled, proportionate solution. It ensures that the law is not just words on paper but fairness in practice. It strengthens oversight, protects families and upholds the integrity of our child protection and education systems. I commend it to the Committee.