Freedom of Expression

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Wednesday 3rd April 2019 Lords Chamber

Asked by

[Baroness Ludford]

To ask Her Majesty’s Government what action they are taking to ensure freedom of expression following the temporary detention by Border Force of a man at Gatwick airport for displaying an anti-Brexit badge.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, freedom of expression is enshrined in Article 10 of the European Convention on Human Rights. This includes the,

“freedom to hold opinions and to receive and impart information and ideas without interference by public authority”.

Under the Human Rights Act 1998, public authorities have to act compatibly with the convention. The Government are happy to take this opportunity to reassure Parliament that they take freedom of expression very seriously and are determined to promote it actively.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I am not sure that that answers the Question. I think that the House’s understanding of the Question will be enhanced by my explaining, at the risk of breaking conventions, that the badge worn by Mr Brinsmead-Stockham read: “Bollocks to Brexit”—like the one I have with me. It was a bit rude, certainly, but surely not a reason to be detained by Border Force. Meanwhile, a leave campaigner has put malicious devices on train tracks in a politically motivated attack on infrastructure, which is apparently not being treated by the police as terrorism. Should the authorities not get their priorities right?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The individual concerned was delayed as opposed to detained—I think that there is a clear difference between the two.

Law Enforcement and Security (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marlesford (Con)]

My Lords, I too was unable to attend the debate on this instrument in Grand Committee but it seems that this is an opportunity to make some general remarks about its purposes. Frankly, I can think of no area of importance where our impending departure from the European Union needs to be less of an obstruction to our national security than the exchange of intelligence, as regards both policy and administration. These are all matters of mutual interest, not only between the United Kingdom and other members of the European Union but between the United Kingdom and other nations of the world. I therefore believe that what is needed is some sort of White Paper from Britain to take advantage of our departure from the EU to set out fresh targets of practical achievement—better security, better exchange of intelligence and better safeguarding of rights. However, we have seen many recent examples of where the present system simply does not work; the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, gave some but there are others. I suggest in particular something I have been pursuing for many years in this House: the need for the United Kingdom passport agency to be aware of other passports held by British passport holders.

This is self-evident to most people, but the Government, or rather the Home Office, have objected again and again to implementing it. Current regulations require that if you apply for a British passport, you must declare what other passports you hold. Not only is that information not retained—I have been told that by Home Office officials—but it is certainly not available, as it should be, to those charged with administering the security of our borders.

What should happen, of course, is that the electronic screening of the passport of anyone who passes through border control, into or out of the United Kingdom, should reveal what other passports they hold. In most cases, that would mean no further action, but there could be cases where it would be crucial to improving our national security. There has been a lacuna in creative thinking on this whole subject by the British Government, and the opportunity for us now to get a grip on it is provided by our impending departure from the EU.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, my noble friend Lord Paddick comprehensively covered a point I raised in Grand Committee. He is quite right to say that I fear the Minister did not answer my question, which was: do the EU 27 countries have to change domestic legislation in the same way as us as we shuffle between Parts 1 and 2 of the Extradition Act to operate Council of Europe Convention 57? Subject to what the DPP said, we know that they have the Council of Europe convention in their domestic legislation to operate with non-EU countries. We need to know whether that will be available to operate with us if we are no longer in the EAW.

Interestingly, I discovered that the noble Lord, Lord Jay of Ewelme, chairman of the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee—on which I do not have the pleasure of sitting; I am on the Justice Sub-Committee—wrote to the right honourable Nick Hurd MP, Minister of State for Policing, last week on 13 March. The committee had held an evidence session on 27 February. One point was in response to an official I remember working with when I was an MEP but is now, I think, in the Home Office. The letter states that,

“we remain concerned by the extent to which the effectiveness of, as Ms Ellis put it, the ‘plumbing’ put in place by the UK to move cooperation to non-EU mechanisms is ‘dependent on the position of other member states’. Whatever the extent of the UK’s preparations, it is not at all clear that our European partners would be ready to cooperate with us on the basis of the alternative mechanisms the Government intends to rely upon in a ‘no deal’ scenario”.

I have not had the opportunity to catch up on all the evidence, but that letter is in the public domain; it is published on the committee’s website.

Our distinguished colleagues on the EU Home Affairs Sub-Committee are obviously well apprised of the issue, and the Minister’s colleague, the Policing Minister, will presumably have to reply within 10 days. We are interested in precisely the same point. It would cover issues such as extradition of own nationals and political exemptions as well as the basic plumbing, as it was put.

The letter of the noble Lord, Lord Jay, also said:

“We would also be grateful for further information on the UK’s current operation of the Council of Europe Convention on Extradition—which witnesses indicated would be the ‘fallback’ mechanism for future cooperation on extradition with EU countries—with countries such as Norway”.


To inform our knowledge of how this alternative plumbing mechanism would work, how is it working at the moment with Norway?

Immigration, Nationality and Asylum (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[The Lord Bishop of Durham]

My Lords, it is striking how small a part asylum and resettlement have played in the conversation about a post-Brexit immigration system. Assuming—and praying—that we do not leave without a deal, I hope that discussion of these vital areas will not be limited to the margins of an already limited engagement with the immigration White Paper and the SIs. I have a series of questions for the Minister.

It might just be me, but I often struggle to see evidence of the Home Office applying the family test in SIs and other areas. Can the Minister assure me that the family test has been applied to these SIs? There is potentially a bit of a catch for people who have made an asylum application in an EU member state prior to 29 March, and who might have chosen to use the Dublin process for the purpose of family reunion. For such people, that might fall out if we leave on 29 March. Can the regulations be amended to ensure that, if they have made an application before 29 March, they will be able to use the Dublin process afterwards?

I endorse the questions of the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, and shall add a couple more. Of the 1,215 people reunited in the UK under the Dublin system in 2018, more than 800 arrived under Article 9, which allows people who claim asylum in another Dublin member state to join a relative in the UK who has been granted international protection. What assessment has the Minister made of how many of those people may have been eligible to be reunited under Part 11 of the UK’s Immigration Rules? Article 9 also allows people in other EU member states to join relatives in the UK who have been granted refugee status. It is concerning that people in these circumstances have had to travel to Europe to reunite, rather than being able to apply for refugee family reunion under the UK’s own Immigration Rules. What plans does the Minister have to improve access to refugee family reunion under Part 11 of the Immigration Rules, including by expanding eligibility and reducing the costs that families face?

I fully accept that we have to withdraw from the Dublin arrangements, but it is about protecting people, as the Government have promised, into the future. Like the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, I am grateful to the British Red Cross for its advice on this.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the right reverend Prelate makes a good point about the continuity of claims that have already commenced. If memory serves, the law enforcement regulations we were discussing earlier make provision for the continuation of cases that have already started. I too am interested in the answer to that question.

When we were discussing the previous SI, several of us were rather struck by the contradiction between the rhetoric about ending free movement and the reality that the Government actually intend to continue it on a one-way basis with no supervision or control whatever, which seems rather perverse. I am also struck by the proposal to pull out of Eurodac and the Dublin regulation, over which I sweated many days, weeks and months as an MEP—but that is neither here nor there.

The Home Secretary made several assertions on this earlier this year—not least when he curtailed his Christmas holiday to come back and deal with what he claimed was the major incident of a few hundred migrants crossing the channel. When addressing the other place on 7 January, he said that the first safe country principle is,

“at the heart of the EU’s own common European asylum system”,

which underpins the 2005 procedures directive and 2004 qualification directive. He went on:

“It is also a principle that underpins the Dublin regulation. The whole point of the Dublin regulation is that if someone has passed through another EU safe country, it is expected that they claim asylum first there”.—[Official Report, Commons, 7/1/19; col. 89.]


Both in that speech to the other place and in numerous instances of press coverage, not least in the Daily Telegraph, a great deal of emphasis was placed on the ability of the UK to send back to other EU countries, particularly France, people whom he thought might be designated economic migrants and would not qualify for asylum. How he could know their status in advance is another question. He made a great deal of this ability of the UK to send people back rather than allowing them to seek asylum in Britain. I found another assertion as recent as a few weeks ago; defending his call to declare a major incident in January, he suggested on 21 February on a visit to Dover that,

“those seeking asylum in the UK should have done so in France or elsewhere on the continent”.

A great deal of emphasis has been placed by the Government, particularly the Home Secretary, on the mechanisms of Eurodac and the Dublin regulation. Suddenly, they are going to disappear.

The Government have made some claims about what they hope to put in its place. Indeed, in the report of the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee we are told in Paragraph 8—apparently this was supplementary information supplied to the committee—that the Home Office said:

“We are also mindful of the obligation in section 17 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 (family unity for those seeking asylum or other protection in Europe)”.


As the noble Baroness, Lady Lister, pointed out, under Section 17 of the EU withdrawal Act this would apply only to children. The Home Office went on to say:

“We currently work bilaterally on returns with France where for example the Sandhurst Treaty, and the subsequent Joint Action Plan, features a mutual commitment to return more migrants to France who have used boats to illegally cross the Channel”.


Could the Minister tell us how the family unity provisions under Section 17 of the EU withdrawal Act will work in the absence of the Dublin regulation? How will the arrangements with France, or with any other member state, work—sending people back whom the UK claims need to direct their claims towards the authorities in an EU state? What is the state of play on any replacement measures? Will we just have a blank space where Eurodac and the Dublin regulation currently exist?

Immigration (European Economic Area Nationals) (EU Exit) Order 2019

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Green of Deddington (CB)]

My Lords, we risk getting somewhat lost in the detail here. It seems that the Government are now proposing to open up some 9 million jobs to worldwide competition, while at the same time effectively continuing with free movement to the European Union, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said. As I said before, the risk is that this will run straight out of control. We really need to get hold of this, stay on the main points and be quite sure that the Government are ready to react if the numbers start getting really difficult.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I add to what my noble friend Lord Paddick said—it is the disjuncture and hypocrisy that upsets us. Of course, this is a one-way continuation of free movement. Many of us were extremely distressed when the Prime Minister cited the top reason for celebrating her ill-fated draft withdrawal agreement and political declaration last November; apparently, its top benefit was ending free movement. In fact, this is not happening—at least, not into the UK—and no consideration was given to the benefits of free movement for UK citizens in the rest of the EU. This instrument says nothing about those opportunities, which are being torn away from UK nationals. This will particularly affect young people and those of all ages who want to work or retire in the rest of the EU. It is the Government’s inconsistency which strikes such a difficult note.

Had I had the opportunity to ask my noble friends on the Front Bench, who know a great deal more about immigration law than I do, I may not have needed to ask this question, which concerns the difference between Articles 3 and 7, which I do not really understand. Article 3 is entitled:

“Grant of leave to EEA and Swiss nationals”.


Article 7 is entitled:

“Grant of leave by virtue of Appendix EU to the immigration rules”.


I simply do not understand the difference between those legal bases for extension of leave, as “EEA nationals” covers EU nationals as well. Perhaps the Minister could help me. That also spills over to the health charge, because Article 10, on exempting from the health charge, appears to apply only to those who acquire leave to enter or remain,

“by virtue of Appendix EU to the immigration rules”.

It does not appear to cover those who get leave under draft Article 3. As I say, it may just be that I do not understand how all this interacts, but perhaps the Minister can enlighten me.

[Lord Deben (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend for the careful and charming way in which she introduced this SI. But we had better remind ourselves what “free movement” actually means. It means that people can move from one part of the European Union to another—but in fact, of course, at some stage they have to have a job. You can remove them from one country to another if they do not have one. That is part of the arrangement.

My worry about this is that we say that we are ending free movement, but actually we have not included the one thing that is a perfectly proper restriction on free movement that we have had up to now. So we are removing the one thing that most people would find unacceptable, which is the mechanism whereby you make sure that people move around the European Union with a purpose and do not become a burden on a particular country they have chosen to go to. I find that bit really very peculiar. No doubt the Government have thought that all through, so we will hear exactly how it works.

Although I shall say this as politely as I possibly can, I think that this is a load of old nonsense. I really do think that the idea that we will grant these opportunities for the rest of Europe but are putting ourselves into a position in which none of these opportunities might be granted to any of our citizens seems to be one of the best examples of the fact that Brexit is a mechanism for shooting ourselves in the foot. The reason we are doing this in a one-sided way is exactly the same as with every other SI we have had: the only things we can do with SIs are the things that affect us, rather than anything in the rest of Europe that affects our people. What better exemplar of the stupidity of leaving the European Union can there be?

My noble friend is of course bound to defend the Government’s policy—although I have to say that I am not really sure what the Government’s policy now is. Indeed, I have not really been sure for some long time, and today it seems even less clear than it was yesterday. No doubt tomorrow it will be more opaque still. But the reality is that this SI displays the fundamental problem that, during the referendum campaign, a lot of promises were made. One of them was, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, said, that we would “take back control”. So we are taking back control to allow other people to travel into our country, but removing our right to travel into their countries. As a piece of control taking back, that seems somewhat limited in its attraction.

I often ask myself how I would speak on a platform if I was asked a question about these SIs. Indeed, it is a way I think when I look at what we are proposing on the climate change committee. I say to myself, “How would I explain that on a platform?” It is a useful thing for a long-term politician. So I am standing on a platform and somebody says, “Can I go to the rest of Europe like I have always done?” The answer is, “We don’t know, because we haven’t done a deal on that”. “Can my aunt, who happens to be French, come to Britain even if she hasn’t got a job?” The answer to that is probably yes. “How do they make sure she’s here for only three months if she doesn’t have to show her passport or have it stamped?” The answer is that they probably cannot. “Well, will they look out for her?” “No, we’ve agreed that there’s not going to be any looking out for people; it’s not going to be like that at all”.

How does that draw that into the same position as somebody who comes from the United States? Of course, that is entirely different; they have to show a passport and make the arrangements. I do not mind that, because we do not have a mutual arrangement with the United States—but at least we do not have a one-sided arrangement with the United States. At least we do not say that Americans can come here and do all these things and we have no willingness to go there.

I really got up to say to my noble friend how sorry I am that she has had to defend this SI—because it is indefensible. It is a nonsense. It is quite wrong to give other people the rights to enter our nation and say that that is taking back control, and it is quite wrong to give those rights without having previously arranged that we should have the same rights in the rest of Europe. To hide it behind the use of the phrase “free movement” is, of course, the really serious thing, because free movement has always been restricted. If the Government have not used those restrictions effectively, that has been the fault not of the European Union but of United Kingdom Governments of all denominations and types. So I say to my noble friend: okay, no doubt the SI will be passed, but do not think that it does any honour to this Government—and it certainly does no honour to Britain. I am getting more and more embarrassed at the way the rest of the world is seeing us.

Law Enforcement and Security (Amendment) (EU Exit) Regulations 2019

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Tuesday 12th March 2019 Grand Committee

We now have a 16-page Explanatory Memorandum replacing the 78-page memorandum. Certainly this guide is more easily handled, provided you can find it. The hard copy, which I collected at the end of last week, has the old memorandum attached to it. I am not persuaded that it enables scrutiny at the level and of the standard for which our House is known. I do not think that most of us will feel that we have really done the job as well as we should have done. There is a complexity and a scale to this, and bringing this draft instrument to the Committee so close to the wire—as may be the case—does not make the best use of the dedication and application that Members of our House show in scrutinising such instruments. There simply has not been the capacity to do so. It gives me no pleasure to say that, nor any pleasure to say that when the instrument goes to the Floor of the House, Liberal Democrats will oppose the instrument unless the Minister can satisfy noble Lords, although it is not her fault that we are in this situation.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, just what we will lose by not being part of all these EU measures emerges less from the fairly dry Explanatory Memorandum to the measure and more from the Government’s document of last November, Assessment of the Security Partnership. The introduction in paragraph 2 of the Explanatory Memorandum cites a lot of the issues, but the document of last November talked about how,

“the UK would rely on the 1957 Council of Europe Convention on Extradition. Without a surrender agreement as proposed in the Political Declaration”—

which itself begs the question of what such a surrender agreement would consist of—

“requests would be subject to a longer and more complex process, and extraditions would be more difficult”.

Although I have not seen any examples recently, we saw that difficulty in the extradition of a convicted person from Georgia. I do not know whether the Minister has any updates on how long that process will take, but it clearly takes a lot longer to extradite under the 1957 convention. To make the case for the UK’s need to stay in the European arrest warrant, or something very similar, the document of last November also cited how,

“ten years elapsed between the request to extradite Rachid Ramda, an individual accused of terrorism in France, and his eventual surrender in 2005”.

We could be talking about such extraditions taking anywhere between several months and a decade.

Indeed, one commentary raised the issue that,

“Extraditions under the Convention are not automatic and the state of bilateral relations can influence decisions. It takes 18 months on average to extradite a suspect under the Convention”—


in contrast to a few weeks under the European arrest warrant. Clearly, even just looking at extradition, the consequences of not having something similar to the European arrest warrant are severe.

It struck an odd note with me that the commentary in paragraph 2.7 of the Explanatory Memorandum says that is necessary,

“to revoke the relevant retained EU law to ensure that the domestic statute book operates effectively following the UK’s withdrawal”.

As my noble friend Lady Hamwee said, we know from senior police officers, including the Metropolitan Police Commissioner, that if we are not in the European Union, it is impossible for our systems to operate as effectively in terms of security and law enforcement co-operation across Europe. That includes all scenarios, not just no deal, although it applies particularly to a no-deal exit. It is odd to say that we need to do this so that our statute book operates effectively. I understand what that means, technically, but it is not the same as saying that our law enforcement system would operate effectively. We need to measure the impact of this decision. We need to know its effect on our effectiveness in fighting crime and bringing people to justice, and on our court systems and police—indeed, on our civil servants. Unlike the European arrest warrant, if you fall back on the 1957 convention civil servants and Ministers are involved.

On extradition, the aim is that the UK will have the correct legal underpinning to operate the 1957 convention. I think that is referred to somewhere as the housekeeping between Part 1 and Part 2 of the Extradition Act. I think that was in paragraph 12.5. At the briefing meeting that the Minister kindly put on a week or so ago, I tried to ask whether we have any knowledge of what our partners would need to do in terms of similar housekeeping and whether they are prepared to do it. Even if they still have the 1957 convention on their statute books—which they may well have for non-EU Council of Europe countries—they might have to make some domestic legislative changes, similar to ours under the Extradition Act, to make that work.

Then there is the fact that it is much more difficult to extradite under the 1957 convention, which is precisely why the EAW was brought in. Some countries, such as Germany, have constitutional bars on the extradition of their own nationals, which the EAW solved. Does the Minister have any information on whether Germany is prepared to extradite its nationals to the UK in the scope of the 1957 convention? Some countries operate political exemptions, which were abolished by the European arrest warrant for a common list of crimes. That makes extradition more difficult.

Then you have the legal uncertainty under human rights law. I do not want to get totally into the subject of human rights and our worries about the Government’s intentions in that respect, but they have said that they continue to keep in their sights what they call reform of human rights law. A state of legal uncertainty surrounds the continuity of human rights protection in this country—if the Human Rights Act were to be abolished, for instance, let alone if we withdrew from the European Convention on Human Rights. What impact will that have on the confidence of partners to extradite to us?

If one looks at the Norway and Iceland treaty with the EU—the aim of which is to have procedures similar to the European arrest warrant but with some differences—that took 13 years to negotiate and there have been problems amending the national laws of some EU countries and Iceland. As of last June, Ireland and Italy had still not ratified that treaty. It gives you an idea of the problems if you drop out of the European arrest warrant and rely on the 1957 convention. The Government are failing to give us any information about what they understand to be the willingness of partner countries to extradite to us.

I have a couple of other points. The Government say that we will retain some data protection rules under which data was originally received, such as SIS data. Are they sure that there is no contradiction between those rules and the Data Protection Act? The aim is to have no gap, but have the Government done a filter to check that there is not a contradiction in any case between the rules under which the data was received from EU partner countries and the Data Protection Act?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, I shall start with the final point from the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, which concerns one of our first considerations as we leave the European Union: keeping our people here safe. He hits the nail on the head. For that reason, I hope that down the other end they are voting for the Prime Minister’s deal.

We need to be clear about these instruments. Should the UK leave the EU without an agreement at the end of the month—the no-deal scenario—the UK’s access to these tools and measures would cease. We are absolutely clear about that. At the same time, the UK would cease to be bound by the security-related EU regulatory systems. This would occur as a result of the UK’s withdrawal from the EU through the Article 50 notification, but not as a result of the provisions found in these instruments—I stress this yet again. It is important to be absolutely clear that the regulations play no part in bringing about the UK’s withdrawal from the EU. Rather the purpose of the instrument is to make amendments to the UK’s domestic statute book, including retained EU legislation, to reflect the new situation.

[Baroness Ludford]

Surely the difference that should be measured is between crashing out with no deal and the Government’s hopes for a security partnership, which are rather ambitious or, some might say, overambitious? The Government want something as similar as possible to what we have at the moment. That contrasts a great deal with simply cutting all our existing measures and systems.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Baroness makes a good argument, but it is not the basis of this statutory instrument. That is why I thought I would outline it. I do not disagree with her. I agree that we need to make sure that this country is kept as safe and secure as possible, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, says. However, that is not the argument we are having today; I need to make that clear upfront. We are at one on this. There is no way that we want to undermine safety.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee. As they said, it highlighted the sheer range of subjects included in these regulations. The Government responded, setting out the reasoning behind our approach. The changes made by the regulations are in linked policy areas and cover three subject areas—this should start to make it clear why we have linked them all. The three areas are: security, law enforcement and judicial co-operation in criminal matters currently underpinned by EU legislation; security-related EU regulatory systems for which the Home Office is responsible; and domestic legislation affecting the police and the investigatory powers made deficient by EU exit.

In regard to security, law enforcement and judicial co-operation in criminal matters, the regulations address deficiencies in connection with EU measures with a justice and home affairs, or JHA, legal base. Reflecting their shared underlying legal base, these measures all relate in some way to law enforcement and security in their subject matter, and in many cases interact at an operational level. For example, as the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, mentioned, SIS II circulates European arrest warrant alerts. The regulatory regimes, while not having a JHA legal base, have a similar underlying purpose to prevent, detect and prosecute criminal activity and to maintain security. Given that these are linked policy areas and that the changes made are very similar across most parts of the instrument—we are making the same sorts of amendments over and over again—we considered that combining them in a single instrument would assist scrutiny by providing as complete a picture as possible in one place. We expect it to assist the eventual users of the legislation, which will include law enforcement partners and prosecutors around the UK and who will often be using combinations of the EU tools covered by these regulations.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

That is pretty much so, but I will get on to that later. The impacts of no deal as a whole are completely outside the scope of the regulations.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, said that the regulations are indigestible. That is pretty much what the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, said too, but we cannot avoid them in the event of no deal, given the importance of this area. As I said in my opening speech, most of the changes being made by the regulations are very similar—indeed, one might say repetitive—in most parts of the instrument.

The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, made a very serious point about the Liberal Democrats intending to vote against the regulations. Obviously, it would be deeply regrettable, particularly in this area, to take that course of action. The noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, pointed that out. These regulations will provide legal and operational certainty for operational partners. Clearly, it is vital that they uphold the rule of law and protect the public. We should be doing everything we can to support their work and to manage the transition to a no-deal scenario. I hope that does not happen, but if it does that is exactly what the instrument will do. I must say to the noble Baroness that if the changes in these regulations in the extradition space are not made, it is not clear that new incoming extradition requests from EU member states could be lawfully processed, with potentially serious consequences for our extradition arrangements with EU partners.

The noble Baroness asked how many EU member states need to make legislative changes to operate the Council of Europe’s European Convention on Extradition with the UK. All EU member states operate the European Convention on Extradition with Council of Europe countries that are not EU member states. I will not speak on behalf of other member states as to their particular systems, but we anticipate operating the European Convention on Extradition with all EU member states. I think that answers the question asked by the noble Baroness, Lady Ludford.

The noble Baronesses, Lady Hamwee and Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, talked about extradition. The noble Baroness, Lady Hamwee, asked me about “almost” no policy changes; here there is a tiny tweak which I will now explain. In the case of extradition, the regulations help to support the implementation of the no-deal contingency arrangement. The regulations will ensure that we have the correct legal underpinning, as I have already said, to operate the no-deal contingency arrangement with EU member states. However, the legal underpinning for our contingency arrangements for March 2019—the end of this month—largely exists outside these regulations. To be clear, the convention is already in place, and it is in use by the UK with other countries. These regulations will recategorise EU member states for the purposes of the Extradition Act 2003 so that we can administer requests from them under Part 2 of the Act rather than under Part 1 as at present. That is the tweak. I hope the noble Baroness will agree that it is a small tweak.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, asked how much longer a Council of Europe case will take compared to a European arrest warrant case. We have absolutely accepted that, in the event of no deal and having to revert to Council of Europe conventions, it will take longer and cost more. The noble Baroness also made the point that it will not be as effective in the case of a no deal—she does not want Brexit at all, but that is by the by. The purpose of the regulations is to ensure that the statute book functions correctly and reflects the new situation should a no-deal scenario materialise. She very rightly asked about human rights. As the White Paper and the political declaration make clear, the UK is committed to membership of the ECHR, and we will remain party to it after we have left the EU. I also add that this country has some of the strongest human rights legislation in the whole world, and I remain confident that we will be world leaders in that.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy, very sensibly asked about data protection. The default position on data protection is that in a no-deal scenario we can continue to process data received from other member states before exit day, subject to compliance with the Data Protection Act 2018. One of the principles in that Act is that there should be compliance with the conditions under which personal data was first accessed, which in this case would imply the conditions—including those found in the measures themselves—under which the UK accessed the data while still a member state. However, to put the legal position beyond doubt and to reduce the risk of legal challenge, the approach taken in relevant areas of the regulations is to save the specific data protection measures. Saving those provisions helps to create legal certainty, including for operational partners.

The noble Baroness, Lady Ludford, also talked about the cost per extradition going up, and asked why that is not in these regulations. We have gone over that ground—this is not about no deal generally, but about putting things on the statue book. We are absolutely not denying that the cost will go up and that the time will be longer. I hope that answers all noble Lords’ points.

[Baroness Ludford]

I do not deny that I have been somewhat distracted by events going on elsewhere—

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I noticed!

[Baroness Ludford]

However, I do not think that the Minister answered my question about other countries.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I did. The noble Baroness was very involved in her phone. I do not say that as a criticism because I am dying to go on to mine but, if she likes, I will repeat it in a letter.

[Baroness Ludford]

I will read it. I apologise.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

No worries.

Terrorism Act 2000 (Proscribed Organisations) (Amendment) Order 2019

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Thursday 28th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Ramsay of Cartvale (Lab)]

My Lords, one does not often hear these words from the Opposition Benches, but I congratulate the Government, particularly the Home Secretary, on doing the right thing about Hezbollah.

There is no division of Hezbollah. Nasrallah has explicitly said time and again, “We do not have a military wing and a political wing”. He must get quite frustrated with the British Government for not understanding that, but he keeps repeating it. It is true; Hezbollah is one. Due to my professional past, I am the last person to criticise the Foreign Office but I feel that it is to blame for our Government not taking the correct, logical and obvious position of proscribing the whole of Hezbollah. I can see that an ambassador in Lebanon might find it difficult if the Government with whom he is trying to co-operate include terrorists.

We seem to have paid a very high price in not proscribing Hezbollah for so many years out of diplomatic convenience. There is no doubt about it: you can have perfectly normal relations with the Lebanese Government without the problem of Hezbollah being in the Government and being proscribed. The heavy price referred to by the noble Baroness, Lady Deech, included Hezbollah flags flying on the streets of London time and again in 2017 and 2018 during demonstrations. They flew under the excuse that they were for the political, not the proscribed, wing. That is unacceptable on our part.

Hezbollah is not just anti-Israel. It is deeply anti-Semitic and makes no pretence about that. The noble Baroness, Lady Deech, quoted Nasrallah as saying that it is very useful if all the Jews gather in Israel because then Hezbollah does not have to go round the world looking for Jews to kill. His deputy has also said that God imprinted blasphemy on the Jews’ hearts. That is an extreme anti-Semitic point, even for some of the anti-Semites we know about in Britain. We must accept that it is an unacceptable, nasty, anti-Semitic, dangerous terrorist organisation that threatens all our democracies, not just those in the Middle East. It is high time that it was proscribed and I congratulate the Government on doing so.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

I also agree that the decision to proscribe Hezbollah in its entirety has logic and merit. It not only commits terrorist acts; as the noble Baroness just said, it wants to destroy not only Israel but Jews. It is wholly anti-Semitic. Like the Home Secretary, I was at last night’s Community Security Trust dinner, where everyone was aware of the rising incidence of anti-Semitic hate crime. That is a huge concern for not only the Jewish community but all of us.

Treating the two wings of Hezbollah as distinct has always been artificial. Noble Lords have described Hezbollah’s boldness and consistency in declaring itself one single entity. That raises the question of timing. I agree with my noble friend Lord Paddick and the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, that the Government owe us a rather better explanation than we have had so far.

The noble Lord, Lord Polak, said that it was due to the change of personnel. If I recall his precise words, he said that the present Home Secretary, Defence Secretary and Foreign Secretary all have integrity. Does that imply that the Conservative Secretaries of the past nine years did not have integrity? That is quite a strange argument. After all, all those posts have been filled by the same party for the past nine years. It is true that just 13 months ago the Security Minister said:

“Hezbollah is anti-Semitic and wishes the destruction of … Israel”,


but he resisted the argument that the political and military wings of Hezbollah were indivisible, joined at the hip and centrally led. He said:

“Ministers do not make up proscription decisions over a cup of coffee. We make them on the recommendations submitted to us by our law enforcement agencies, security services … and intelligence services”.—[Official Report, Commons, 25/1/18; cols. 507-8.]


It is therefore fair to ask how that advice has changed.

To me, it would be a viable argument to say that it is because of the rising incidence of anti-Semitic hate crime against people and property, such as the destruction of headstones in cemeteries. Appalling things are going on both against the person and against property. In that context, it is totally unacceptable that the Metropolitan Police is unable to take action against demonstrators proclaiming their support for Hezbollah, waving the flag and putting stickers on it saying, “We are the political wing so you cannot touch us”. I would be interested to hear the argument from the Government: “It is unacceptable that on the streets of London fear should be put into the Jewish community and all of us who want to see decency and an absence of prejudice and discrimination”. But we have not heard that argument from the Government and they are being coy by not telling us what has changed. So, if I have to fall back on the argument of the noble Lord, Lord Polak, that it is because of a change of personnel, that raises interesting questions about the attitude of the holders of those offices over the past nine years.

Lastly, I want to ask how Brexit is going to affect European co-operation in counterterrorism and things such as asset freezing. Every form of Brexit will damage that co-operation, but a no-deal Brexit will damage it even more. We are to have a mega-SI from the Home Office shortly. I attended the briefing meeting kindly held by the Minister on Tuesday. However, although we have been hearing discussions about whether or not no deal is being ruled out, I have just seen a clip of the Leader of the House of Commons, Andrea Leadsom, who this morning is still protesting that she has total support for a no-deal Brexit. That would have a catastrophic effect on our co-operation across the European Union in exchanging vital data, working with Europol, extradition and the exchange of evidence to bring people to trial, and a whole range of counterterrorism co-operation, as well as the freezing of assets. How is the Government’s attitude to Brexit—any kind of Brexit, let alone a no-deal Brexit, which the Prime Minister and the Leader of the House of Commons are refusing to rule out absolutely—consistent with an apparent stance of wanting to do everything in our power to counter terrorist organisations? That really does not quite add up.

[Lord Suri (Con)]

My Lords, I strongly welcome the announcement this week by the Home Secretary that the UK will proscribe Hezbollah in its entirety. Does my noble friend agree that this will send a clear message that no terror group will be given a free pass to operate on British soil?

Brexit: Economic Impact

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Wednesday 20th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bates]

I do not accept that, because the point is that we do not know what that final deal is. There are also significant factors that need to be put in here, such as new trade deals that could be secured with trading partners. We already had exports at record levels last year. The UK is still regarded—just last month—as the number one location for foreign investment, according to Forbes. Just in January, Deloitte said London was the world’s best city to invest in. The reality is that this country has a huge amount to offer. Once that energy is released and we get beyond Brexit, I believe we will make those figures look pretty sad and depressed.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, I follow up the points made by my noble friend Lady Kramer. A statistic in the White Paper on the long-term economic analysis, which assumed much more serious non-tariff barriers than the Chequers White Paper, showed that the hit to GDP would, instead of 0.6%, be over 2%—between three and four times worse. That was reckoned to be the nearest to the actual withdrawal deal—not frictionless trade or all these fabulous unicorn trade deals we were supposed to get, but closer to the reality. I press the Minister again on the need for a real economic analysis of what the Prime Minister is actually negotiating, not a fairy tale.

[Lord Bates]

I agree with that analysis. That is why I said 0.6% was modelled on the White Paper, but then we introduced a sensitivity analysis which showed that the hit might be 2.1%. That information—which we were told was deficient and incomplete in order to make decisions—is there.

EU Settlement Scheme

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Thursday 14th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I do not know whether the sample was easy. It was taken from the north-west of England, which I was very pleased about, and involved staff and students at 15 institutions. Of those who applied, 65% received settled status and 35% pre-settled status.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, in the pilot scheme 30% were granted only pre-settled status, which lasts for just five years. One problem seems to be that the automatic checks by HMRC and the DWP are not validating a lot of people who have been here for longer than five years, particularly the self-employed. The danger is that people will find giving supplementary evidence such a hassle that they will settle for just pre-settled status—but that is very dangerous. Can the Minister look into whether the Home Office can send them reminders—as HMRC does with tax returns—that they have to convert that into full settled status?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

I thank the noble Baroness for that question. She is right that someone with pre-settled status might forget to apply for full settled status. Of course, they have five years in which to do so—but I will certainly take back her constructive point and respond to her in due course.

Windrush Scheme

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Tuesday 5th February 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

The noble Lord asked how we can prove that everyone who is the subject of the debate today is a foreign national offender. I am reliably informed—and I have asked repeatedly—that all the people who will be deported are foreign national offenders. The answer is yes. They are not only foreign national offenders but serious criminals. On the subject of people who came here as infants or children, obviously someone who was here before 1973 would have an assumed status, but just because you came here as an infant or child does not exempt you from the provisions in the UK Borders Act 2007, which the Labour Government rightly brought in to ensure that people convicted and sentenced to 12 months or more should be deported.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, will the Windrush unit, or something parallel to it in the sharing of expertise, be deployed to assist EU citizens? I am not thinking of those who have come since the free movement directive came into force 15 years ago but those who been here for many decades. One hears anecdotally about people—I saw a reference to someone the other day who had been here for 74 years. A lot of elderly people might be in a state of uncertainty and anxiety, and one sees the potential for similar issues to arise. Is the Home Office gearing up to deploy its expertise or personnel in those cases?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

Certainly, the Windrush task force has stood ready to help anyone who has been here since before 1988 and would like to regularise their status. It has not precluded people from member states of the European Union, and that would include older people.

Brexit: Security

Baroness Ludford Excerpts

Tuesday 29th January 2019 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My noble friend is absolutely right. With particular reference to Europol, this is pertinent, as we would have to have a series of bilateral co-operation mechanisms. In addition, we would be moving our Europol liaison bureau to The Hague.

[Baroness Ludford (LD)]

My Lords, the case in Georgia is likely to be an example of how long extradition takes when a country is not in the European arrest warrant. On access to databases such as the SIS and Europol, the Government are going to have to seek a data advocacy decision. Is not their unreliability on upholding European human rights standards going to prove an obstacle to getting that decision?

[Baroness Williams of Trafford]

My Lords, it is important to point out that Ireland is not part of SIS II. Of course, we used alternative channels such as Interpol up to 2015, so it is clear that alternative systems do work. Our nearest neighbour, Ireland, is not actually part of SIS II.