Courts and Tribunals Bill

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage
Tuesday 10th November 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords, in this group I have Amendments 13A, 13B and 15A. I have spoken on the principles associated with complexity and length in previous groups, and indeed my amendments echo my Amendment 17 in group 4, on which I have already spoken. The amendments would require, before a “judge alone” trial were ordered, that the case would genuinely be of sufficient complexity to warrant a trial by judge alone and would have a potential length of at least five months.

A great deal has been said about complexity, but I would just like to make some points about length. I do not accept that the likely length of a trial is itself any reason for abandoning a jury trial. First, it is the universal practice of judges to ask potential jurors when the jury is empanelled whether a very long trial would cause them serious difficulties. In the event of an affirmative answer from particular jurors, they are generally not required to serve for that trial. Indeed, I have never heard of a judge forcing a juror to attend who has serious difficulties on the ground of length and not accepting that reasoning.

Secondly, I suggest that jury expenses could be increased to permit jurors after a set number of weeks to serve on longer trials without significant financial disadvantage. If there were significant financial disadvantage, that would bring into play the judge forgiving the juror the right to attend that I mentioned earlier. Thirdly, I do not accept that length of trial, of itself, makes a trial unworkable in the absence of other factors. The very fact that we have had so many very long trials over recent years successfully tried and concluded with juries bears that out.

Finally, the length of trials can be, and I think often should be, better controlled by ensuring that charging decisions are made with a view to ensuring that unnecessary charges are not brought or pursued to trial, particularly when they would not lead to longer sentences, and evidence and the presentation of evidence are planned, contained and carefully organised with a view to keeping the length of trial under control. It is a relatively new idea that length of trial, of itself, should be a reason for dispensing with a jury and, frankly, without a great deal more evidence, I would reject that notion.

In view of our position generally on “judge alone” trials being ordered and, in particular, in view of what is going to be debated in forthcoming groups about the type of offences being added to, at this stage we will certainly be supporting the stand part propositions from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, in this group. I beg to move.

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)]

My Lords, I should advise the Committee that, if this amendment is agreed, I cannot call Amendment 14 by reason of pre-emption.

Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Committee stage & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard) & Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 13th May 2020 Lords Chamber

[The Deputy Chairman of Committees]

We were very glad to have your contribution.

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, for some years I had the privilege of serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. That committee has increasingly come to stand as a crucial protector of the role of Parliament, alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom I was delighted we were able to hear. The committee has acted in attempting to limit the Executive improperly taking powers for government Ministers to change the law by delegated legislation in significant ways and ways for which delegated legislation has never in the past been deemed appropriate.

The committee usually expresses itself, or certainly has until recent years, in circumspect terms and the Government have traditionally accepted its recommendations. The committee has left it to the House to implement its recommendations if the Government do not agree to do so. The clarity and decisiveness of the recommendation in paragraph 15 of the committee’s report on this occasion is anything but circumspect. The conclusion speaks for itself:

“We are of the view that clause 2 represents an inappropriate delegation of power and we recommend that it should be removed from the face of the Bill.”


The committee is forcefully supported by the report of the Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, from whom we have heard, and includes the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, from whom we have also heard. Paragraph 19 of that report contains the kernel of its conclusion:

“We are not persuaded by the arguments the Government has made in support of this power. If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”


Another important point made by the Constitution Committee, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review so that future regulations implementing international treaties could be the subject of challenge. It is entirely right that delegated legislation, which involves an exercise of executive power of itself, should be capable of being challenged as unlawful.

However, it would be a highly undesirable consequence of the Bill if, when enacted, the lawfulness of conventions entered into by the United Kingdom Government as a matter of our domestic law could not be guaranteed to our international convention partners until such challenges were determined.

I also agree with the point made by the Constitution Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the CraG procedure is at present inadequate and ineffective as an instrument of parliamentary scrutiny.

In the light of all that, can the Minister say whether, given the Constitution Committee’s report published on 4 May, he is prepared to go away and reconsider his extremely negative response, dated 17 April, to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report? I ask, because if these important committees of your Lordships’ House are going to be routinely ignored by government, parliamentary democracy is entering treacherous territory, in which the conventional boundaries between executive power and parliamentary sovereignty are roughly and unceremoniously shifted by the failure of government to adhere to well-established, valuable and principled conventions.

The central point is this. As it stands, the Bill involves moving a whole area of legislation—that of implementing private international law treaties in domestic law—from Parliament to the Executive. That is a dangerous extension and an unwelcome trend—noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—in our constitutional arrangements from parliamentary democracy to government by an overmighty Executive. If it is private international law agreements this year, what might follow next year? This House has rightly sought to resist the trend, which is dangerous and must be stopped. As parliamentarians, and respecting the traditional role of this House as a guardian of the constitution, we have a responsibility to stop it.

Prisons: Staff

Debate between Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Wednesday 22nd February 2017 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)]

My Lords—

[Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall (Lab)]

My Lords—