Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Thursday 27th February 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Tuesday 17th March 2020
(4 years, 1 month ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, this Bill underpins the Government’s ambition to deliver a new framework on private international law which has real and tangible benefits for people and businesses in the United Kingdom.
Private international law is viewed by some as a technical and specialist area of law, but it is an essential one. Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes. For example, these agreements can help small businesses which have been left out of pocket by a supplier based in another country to seek redress, or if a family relationship breaks down and one spouse moves abroad, they make it easier to sort out arrangements in the best interests of their children. These are sometimes difficult and challenging situations to resolve, but private international law provides a framework to do that for the benefit of all parties.
Of course, leaving the European Union does not halt cross-border trade, travel or family relationships that cross boundaries. These will endure and indeed grow in the years ahead, and where disputes arise, there continues to be a need for a framework to settle them in a clear, fair and predictable way. By helping to resolve cross-border disputes quickly, international agreements on the private international law framework help to reduce costs for UK businesses, individuals and families who become involved in them. These agreements also provide legal certainty for those travelling, trading or living abroad. They help avoid confusion by preventing multiple court cases taking place in different countries on the same subject and sometimes reaching different conclusions. They ensure that the decisions of United Kingdom courts and relevant competent authorities can be recognised and enforced in other jurisdictions. The Bill will allow us to implement these important and beneficial agreements in domestic law.
During our membership of the European Union, we helped build, develop and refine an advanced framework on private international law. Now that 31 January 2020 marks the first time in over 20 years that full competence in this area of law has returned to the UK, we must address it. Our task is to lead on building such a framework on a bigger scale in a global setting. We will begin by building on and cementing our role in international fora, such as the Hague Conference on Private International Law, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the International Institute for the Unification of Private International Law, with other global partners.
I turn briefly to the detail of the Bill, which has two main clauses. The first clause implements in domestic law three Hague conventions that the UK currently operates due to our previous membership of the EU. In other words, the EU is a signatory of those conventions on behalf of all its member states. We will become an independent contracting party to these conventions in our own right at the end of the current transition period. These three Hague conventions are widely supported by stakeholders in the legal and finance sectors and, I hope, by Members across this House. We need to ensure that these important conventions can continue to operate effectively in the future, so that businesses and individuals can continue to rely on their rules.
The first is the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition and Enforcement and Co-operation in respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children, which aims to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. It deals with issues such as residence of, and contact with, children whose parents live in different countries. The second is the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which aims to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. These clauses are common, particularly in high-value commercial contracts. Thirdly, the 2007 Hague Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and other Forms of Family Maintenance provides rules for the international recovery of child support and spousal maintenance.
The second clause creates a delegated power which allows the Government to implement other private international law agreements in domestic law in future via secondary legislation. I confirm that the Government intend to use this power to implement the Lugano Convention 2007, if our application to accede to that convention in our own right is accepted by our international partners, including the EU. This would provide clear, reciprocal rules on cross-border judicial co-operation in civil and commercial matters between the United Kingdom and all the parties to the convention, which include the EU. That would take effect beyond the transition period. However, we also want to use this power to implement other agreements that the United Kingdom may join, both now and in the future. We are already considering joining the Singapore convention of 2019, and the Hague Judgments Convention of 2019.
This power is both well defined and, I suggest, narrow. It only allows the Government to implement agreements in the limited field of private international law, which, as the Bill states, covers areas such as jurisdiction, applicable law, and the recognition and enforcement of judgments. For example, we could not use the Bill to implement an agreement designed to do anything other than facilitate the efficient resolution of cross-border disputes. All regulations implementing a new agreement will use the draft affirmative procedure. Furthermore, where the Government are inclined to enter into an international agreement on private international law, then, at the level of international law, that will still require full compliance with the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. There will, therefore, be parliamentary scrutiny of the international treaty itself before we seek to draw it down into domestic law by using the affirmative SI procedure.
In summary, the Bill enables us to remain at the forefront of promoting global co-operation in private international law, and it will be of significant assistance after the transition period for businesses, individuals and families. I beg to move.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
My Lords, this is undoubtedly an important Bill. It may not attract much attention in your Lordships’ House but it nevertheless is important, as the Minister indicated in moving that it be read a second time. In the debate on the gracious Speech on 8 January, the Minister indicated that it is
“a Bill enabling us to operate agreements on private international law”
after the transition period following our departure from the European Union. He specifically mentioned agreements that
“can help to return home a child abducted by one of their parents, help two parents living in different countries to agree custody arrangements in the best interests of their children, or help a UK business to resolve issues with a supplier based abroad.”—[Official Report, 8/1/20; cols. 187-88.]
These are obviously vital for both family and commercial reasons. It is therefore important that we do not have any post-Brexit lacunae in our law.
I put my name on the speakers’ list to raise the specific issue of the Hague Convention 35, on the international protection of adults. It is the 11th convention listed in Annexe B to the Explanatory Notes on this Bill. I am grateful to the Minister and his Bill team for taking the time last week to discuss this with me. I will return to that.
As my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is understandably unable to be with us this evening, I confirm that my party is generally supportive of the Bill. But, as with all legislation, it is important that your Lordships’ House should scrutinise it properly. I sometimes think that is especially the case when we are dealing with a Bill generally thought to be a good thing; we must still give it proper scrutiny.
In its briefing to Peers, the Bar Council very much makes this point. In its concluding paragraph, it states:
“Private international law is at once both a highly technical field and one that is extremely important in regulating the lives of individuals and businesses when they cross borders. Never has there been a greater need to consult specialists in this field to ensure rigorous scrutiny and to produce a cogent and coherent strategy in this field.”
It is important that we bear that in mind. Indeed, I ask the Minister: in the drafting of the Bill, how much consultation took place with specialists in the area?
I have no doubt that there will be detailed scrutiny in Committee. I will just highlight one or two points. As is often the case, the issue of delegated powers requires highlighting. As I understand it, it is a basic rule of constitutional law that when treaties are made by virtue of the royal prerogative, the involvement of Parliament is nevertheless required to change the law, to confer rights on individuals or, indeed, to deprive them of rights. That is invariably done by way of primary legislation.
Clause 2 confers regulation-making powers on the appropriate national authorities
“for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement … so far as relating to private international law”.
Clause 2(7) defines “international agreement” as
“a convention, treaty or other agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party”.
In other words, primary legislation may not be required. It may be done by regulation sometime in the future. In a non-EU context, when did we last have an international agreement or treaty implemented without primary legislation? In his speech moving this Second Reading, the Minister mentioned the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act and indicated that that would nevertheless give Parliament a locus. It is important to recall that the 20th report of Session 2017-19 by your Lordships’ Constitution Committee—of which I had the privilege of being a member and of which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was at the time a member—concluded:
“The current mechanisms available to Parliament to scrutinise treaties through CRAG are limited and flawed. Reform is required to enable Parliament to conduct effective scrutiny of the Government’s treaty actions, irrespective of the consequences of Brexit.”
I hope that when we come to scrutinise this, we will get some answers from the Government as to why they think CRaG is sufficient in circumstances where, in the past, it was all done through primary legislation. Indeed, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will well remember from his time on the Constitution Committee, recurring themes are delegated powers and treaty making and parliamentary scrutiny, as in our report. These two come together in this Bill, and we will want to give careful attention to that.
I referred to Hague Convention 35, of 13 January 2000, on the international protection of adults. It is for the protection of vulnerable adults who, by reason of impairment or insufficiency of their personal faculties, are not in a position to protect their interests. The convention determines which court has jurisdiction to take protection measures, which law is to be applied in the circumstances and who may be a vulnerable person. It establishes a system of central authorities that should co-operate, locate vulnerable adults and give information on the status of vulnerable persons to other authorities. The smooth legal arrangements for matters covered by the Bill, which the noble and learned Lord referred to in his speech, must surely also apply to some very vulnerable people.
The convention has 17 signatories and has been ratified for 10 jurisdictions. I use the word “jurisdiction” advisedly: although the United Kingdom is a contracting party, the convention has been ratified only by the United Kingdom Government on behalf of Scotland, on 5 November 2003. That ratification followed on from Section 85 and Schedule 3 to the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000. I declare a personal interest, because I was the Minister responsible for taking that legislation through the Scottish Parliament.
Since then, in Northern Ireland, there has been Schedule 9 to the Mental Capacity Act (Northern Ireland) 2016, which states that the convention will have effect in Northern Ireland—although there has not yet been ratification for Northern Ireland. In England and Wales, I understand that Schedule 3 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 makes some provision, but we have not had ratification in respect of England and Wales either. It may be argued that the procedures established by the 2005 Act mean that, in practice, courts in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland, can recognise and enforce protective measures from other states, be they contracting parties or not. But most contracting states will recognise and enforce only protection measures from other contracting states. As an example, France, Germany or Switzerland will recognise and enforce protection measures from each other, and from Scotland, but not from England, Wales or Northern Ireland. Why should citizens in these parts of the United Kingdom not enjoy the advantages enjoyed by those habitually resident in, or closely connected to, Scotland?
I believe it is in the hands of the United Kingdom Government to rectify this. It may not require legislation if some of the procedures are already in place through the 2005 Act. However, I hope that the advantage might be taken in this Bill to move forward on this and implement the convention for England and Wales and Northern Ireland.
One final matter is the difficulty that can be experienced in relation to the recognition of protection measures within the United Kingdom. Ratification of Hague Convention 35 may not necessarily resolve that, as they remain internal matters among the jurisdictions within these islands. Schedule 6 to the Bill deals with regulations made under Clause 2 and refers to implementing or applying an international convention to a particular part of the United Kingdom. In that regard, the Bar Council said that if it were to be given effect in, say, Scotland, but not elsewhere in the United Kingdom, the question of whether to apply an international convention’s rules between parts of the United Kingdom would often be very difficult. Where it is to be applied, extensive amendments to that convention are often appropriate; an example is the provisions in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which apply a substantially modified form of the European Union rules to instruct UK cases. The Bar Council is concerned that Schedule 6 does not provide sufficient safeguards in this respect, and considers that it should be amended to provide the requisite clarification. I would be interested if, in reply, the noble and learned Lord could say something about intra-United Kingdom recognition and indicate how some of the concerns raised by the Bar Council may be addressed.
In conclusion, some of the briefings and representations I received on notification of HC35 have highlighted numerous difficulties in the operation of the law in relation to powers of attorney and civil instruments, and more general issues on the rights of persons with disabilities. However, those are for another day. I believe that today there is an opportunity for the Government to commit themselves to taking a small step in the sphere of private international law which could be of benefit to an important section of our community.
Lord Judge (CB)
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has had the courtesy to show me a draft of what he is going to say. In view of the fact that he will say everything that I would have thought of saying, and rather a lot more—and will do it rather better—I shall be brief. But I would like to say before he speaks that I agree with him. In particular, I agree that this is sensible legislation. We need to have these arrangements. But I have a particular reservation about vesting power in a Minister, using secondary legislation apparently to change the entire law of arbitration as it works in this country. That needs to be examined, and the noble and learned Lord will no doubt develop the point.
The reason I am speaking is of course because we are dealing with secondary legislation, and this is yet another example of proposed legislation that is not exactly regulation-lite—I spell that “lite” because I want to show your Lordships that I have even seen Diet Coke. This is not diet regulation. We have one clause, then a second clause which is simply a regulation-making power, then we have 66 pages, perhaps more—yes, we come to page 68—and then we find the mother and father of Schedule 6, which is more regulation-making powers. Dare I ask the Minister a question? It has been a long day, and he has had to listen to a lot of speeches. Is Schedule 6 tucked away because it is shy of showing its face? It could just as easily have been part of a major structure of the Bill, not a schedule. But that is a minor detail.
Schedule 2 is not so bad. It is certainly better than Schedule 6. As the Minister said in opening, it attracts, or would attract, the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act. However, as noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, just explained, the Constitution Committee took a view that that did not provide all the answers to everything. Therefore, we have a measure of parliamentary control over Section 2 and the use of the regulations there, not none, which is therefore rather better.
I have simple questions about Schedule 2. What will the powers be used for? Why are they needed if the powers in Clause 2 are as clear as they are and are subject to the controls which the Minister suggested? I want to know what possible thought the Minister has in mind about why we need a Henry VIII clause. “Has it just come off the computer? Let’s stick a Henry VIII clause in.” Amending primary legislation is precisely what Henry VIII clauses are about. The House has heard me on numerous occasions on this topic. I will not entertain the few of your Lordships who are here tonight about it, but I would like the Minister to see whether he could help us with it. Beyond that, I have no further observations to make. We need to be careful about how we run our legislation through regulatory mechanisms.
Baroness Shackleton of Belgravia (Con)
My Lords, I put my name down to speak in this debate, not about what the Bill addresses but about what it fails to address. In the field in which I operate—matrimonial law—many elements of it are swept up by Hague and Lugano. Sadly, divorce is not. At the moment, the first past the post principle works. When we leave the EU there will be an enormous vacuum, and there has been no direction to the judges or to the people who practise in this area as to what will happen.
The prediction among divorce lawyers is that, following self-imposed confinement, it is very likely that the divorce rate will rise. Our peak times are after long exposure during the summer holiday and over Christmas. One has only to imagine what it will be like when families are sealed in a property for a long period of time.
Added to this, no legislation has come to this House, or indeed to the other place, on premarital contracts, and there is a real division between how this country deals with them and how the rest of Europe deals with them. The incentive to get proceedings in this country with parallel proceedings in another country will be even greater than usual when people are restricted from moving to another country. When a petition is lodged in this country, how will our courts deal with it? Are we or are we not going to deal with first past the post? What will be necessary to avoid a tsunami of litigation is for there to be some certainty as to what we are going to do. I fully understand that we cannot commit the other 27 parties to Brussels II, but our courts need to know what is going to happen.
Lord Mance (CB)
My Lords, this is an area in which I have long been engaged as a practitioner, and I believe that I still have the honour of chairing the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law—although, so far as I recall, we were not consulted on this Bill, nor on the 2018 regulations on private international law that until now have operated as the default on Brexit.
At the heart of this Bill is jurisdiction. Former practitioners such as I know that jurisdiction is commonly the most important preliminary issue in international litigation. The noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, referred to this in the context of divorce. I shall be referring to commercial litigation, but the same applies to other areas, including matrimonial disputes, children, insolvency and divorce. Any party wishing to avoid or delay liability or a judgment will seek the slowest or most amenable jurisdiction. To prevent this, it is common in commercial law to insist on an agreed forum for disputes—a choice of court or arbitration clause, often in favour of London.
London’s practitioners and courts have a reputation for the impeccable handling of complex disputes. It is part of the package of financial, business and trading facilities and activities that has made London a—if not the—world business centre. But what matters is that other courts and states recognise our jurisdiction. We can legislate domestically for all we are worth, but international recognition and enforcement of jurisdiction and judgments require in practice reciprocal international agreement.
The Bill’s Explanatory Memorandum notes that “key stakeholders” have consistently made clear the importance of the UK continuing to take a leading role internationally on private international law. The Minister has emphasised that it is essential for legal certainty to have a framework. The memorandum goes on to say that the UK
“will need to take steps to ensure continued participation in key PIL international law agreements”,
and that Brexit will allow the UK
“to agree ambitious new PIL frameworks with international partners all over the world”.
There is hyperbole in both statements. We are ceasing to participate in some key instruments with EU states, and the Bill is unspecific—to say the least—about the ambitious new frameworks with other world partners.
From the end of this year, the UK will cease to be party to what is probably—in fact, certainly—the most significant set of private international law measures in the world: the Brussels regime regulating jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments across EU states, and parallel measures such as the insolvency Regulation 2015/848 and the regulation on jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement in matrimonial and parental matters. The UK was itself a proponent of the successful recasting in 2012 of the first of those—the central Brussels regulation—to meet UK needs. As the Minister noted, we helped build these instruments.
The Government’s ambitions do not extend to repeating this existing framework, which has, over 35 years, attracted very considerable support in London as elsewhere. However, some form of substitute is now necessary, to apply as between the UK and EU states. In relation to children, there are, happily, the Hague conference conventions of 1996 and 2007—non-EU measures, which are referred to in the Bill—on which to fall back. In relation to commercial law, insolvency and divorce, there are no such parallels, although there are other measures focusing on commercial law, which are referred to in the Bill, to which I come.
The Bill is by its own lights a sensible measure, but its lights are rather dimmer than the halogen welcome given to it by the Explanatory Memorandum. I take first the Hague choice of court convention of 2005, which Clause 1(2) of the Bill paves the way to joining. That is an excellent instrument, again promoted by this country. In that, the committee that I chair had the privilege of playing a role but, absent specific declaration, it does not cover the very important area of asymmetric jurisdiction clauses. Many of the derivatives and banking clauses on which the City relies are asymmetric; in other words, they give one party but not the other, or others, a choice of jurisdiction. The better view is that the existing Brussels regime covers all choice of court clauses, whether they are asymmetric or not.
As a consequence of that, if you go to the website of the International Swaps and Derivatives Association, the first document you will see is headed “ISDA Amendment Agreement”, to change
“English Law to Irish or French Law”.
It provides the means to change the usual London jurisdiction clause in favour of Paris or Ireland. That is a measure of the current doubts about the future value of English jurisdiction clauses, which have been allowed to continue for some four years now to the detriment of London as a world centre.
A second problem about the Hague choice of court convention is that, even on the most optimistic reading, it covers only exclusive jurisdiction clauses agreed since l October 2015, when the EU first signed the UK up as a member state. In contrast, the 2012 Brussels regulation, which we have at present, applies to all proceedings begun since 10 January 2015; that is, proceedings begun rather than jurisdiction clauses agreed. But this will cease to apply to all proceedings begun after the end of this year. So, the position is that presently enforceable asymmetric jurisdiction clauses in favour of London will cease to be recognised at an international level by other EU states overnight on 31 December 2020. Indeed, all enforceable jurisdiction clauses, asymmetric or not, will cease to be recognised at an international level; they may, of course, be recognised at an overseas domestic level—that is quite a different matter. Until 19 June 2018, the UK’s position was that such clauses should be preserved, or grandfathered; that is, retain their current validity. This has gone. No doubt, even an additional glimmer of Court of Justice jurisdiction after the end of the year, however benign, was not acceptable.
A third problem with the Hague choice of court convention is that it contains a list of excluded topics, which is considerably longer than that in the Brussels regime. The excluded topics include, for example, personal injury, simple tort claims, immovable property and intellectual property claims.
I turn to the second instrument, which the Explanatory Memorandum and the Government’s paper on the future relationship evince enthusiasm for acceding to. As already mentioned, that is the Lugano Convention 2007; Clause 2 of the Bill would be used for that. The Lugano Convention corresponds to the main Brussels regulation before it was recast in 2012. As a result, it has severe defects. On the other hand, no doubt the great attraction, in the Government’s eyes, would be that the European Court of Justice would have no jurisdiction over it; there would be an obligation merely to take account of Court of Justice jurisprudence, not necessarily to agree with it.
On the other hand, the UK needs the consent of the other parties to join. There are four, three of which have welcomed the UK aboard. Switzerland, Iceland and Denmark all welcomed the UK aboard, but the last party—the EU, for its member states—is apparently silent, and there are rumours that it may not consent. Any clarity the Minister can give would be most welcome.
Even if we were to sign up, the un-recast, unreformed Lugano has significant weaknesses. First, its arbitration exclusion is less clear than the Brussels regime; again, that is important for London. Secondly, it is vulnerable to the famous “Italian torpedo”, whereby a London choice of court clause can be undermined by an entirely wrong or even abusive commencement of jurisdiction in some other court—the typical example being Italy. The aphorism comes from an Italian law professor, so I am not, I hope, in any way using unduly what is a well-quoted phrase. Lugano’s third defect is that it makes no provision for stay of proceedings in the face of prior litigation in a non-contracting state: in other words, you can agree on a New York choice of court clause, but Lugano will override it. That is an extraordinarily Eurocentric provision, which the recast Brussels regime avoids, largely. Can the Government say whether, having joined Lugano, they hope to follow the Brussels example, whereby the UK did have a big role, and recast the Lugano convention to cure these defects?
There is one other problem with signing up which the Government may have overlooked—again, I would welcome the Minister’s comments. If we sign up to Lugano, we are locked into its limitations, potentially precluding us from getting the advantages of the next instrument which the Government express an interest in joining: the 2019 Hague Convention on the Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgments in Civil or Commercial Matters. This is fairly hot off the press: it is mentioned in the Explanatory Memorandum and, again, the UK played a significant role in its preparation in the Hague conference. Perhaps it is one of the “ambitious new” private international law frameworks which the Government hope to agree
“with international partners all over the world”.
The less hyperbolic reality is that it has at present only two member states, with which our most obvious affinity is purely alphabetical: Uruguay and Ukraine. Even according to the Hague conference website, they have only signed, not ratified.
Secondly, this instrument deals only with recognition and enforcement; it does not limit or define jurisdiction, as the Brussels regime and Lugano do. Nevertheless, it appears to have one particular advantage in relation to our former EU partners which Lugano does not. It should be noted that the EU has expressed interest in signing up to the 2019 convention. If it does and we do, the convention will go some way to avoiding the Italian torpedo, because it will enable the refusal of such recognition or enforcement of any judgment given in breach of a choice of court clause, whether exclusive or asymmetric. For example, if proceedings were commenced in Italy in breach of a choice of court clause pointing to London, the UK or any EU contracting state could refuse to recognise the judgment. That beneficial provision would go some way to evading the Italian torpedo and correcting the main defect of the Lugano convention. Under Lugano, EU and Lugano courts—including the UK if it joined Lugano—would have to recognise and enforce the Italian judgment, even though it was patently given in proceedings started in Italy in breach of a London choice of court clause.
The UK would lose the advantages of this beneficial provision if we signed up to Lugano before signing up to the 2019 Hague convention, because Article 23 of the latter states expressly that it does
“not affect the application by a Contracting State of a treaty that was concluded”
by that state prior to conclusion of the convention. I would be very glad to hear the Government’s thinking on this. On the face of it, the message is: festina lente—in other words, be very careful and do not sign up immediately to Lugano without thinking very hard about it. By all means, sign up to the Hague choice of court convention as soon as possible, but consider whether it may not be better to wait for the EU to sign up to the 2019 convention and sign up ourselves at least before any attempt to join Lugano.
There are one or two minor points, or at least more minor points, although I do not want to underestimate their importance, particularly relating to the width of the powers relating to delegated legislation, on which noble Lords have already spoken. Even taking into account the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act, providing for scrutiny of any international agreement, the powers of delegated legislation are of a width that is questionably wide. That refers among other things, but perhaps particularly, to the Henry VIII clause, which my noble and learned friend Lord Judge has referred to.
Of particular interest to me, I declare as a practising arbitrator, is the definition of “private international law” to include recognition or enforcement of foreign arbitral award. Private international law normally keeps court jurisdiction and arbitration separate. International arbitration awards are enforceable under the New York convention of 1958. Brexit should not affect the enforceability or recognition and enforcement of arbitration awards. The Bill seems quite an inappropriate place to give Ministers the power to make regulations about arbitration, even subject to affirmative approval.
I conclude by welcoming this opportunity to discuss openly in this House a subject of huge importance to the City and this country’s financial position. There has been a fear that it may have been too low down the Government’s agenda and the subject of too little attention. I hope this debate will have focused minds and that there will now be wide and open consultation on whatever future measures, ambitious or not, the Government may consider signing up to.
Lord Collins of Highbury (Lab)
My Lords, the Bill is clearly vital to the future of UK private international law, and we on this side of the House strongly support the principle of it. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti would normally be dealing with this Bill but unfortunately, she is self-isolating due to feeling unwell. I am sure Members of the House will join me in wishing her a speedy recovery—certainly, I hope, in time for Committee.
I too am grateful to noble Lords who have spoken. All my favourite lawyers are here, and I have to agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, that that has made my task a lot easier, because I can simply say that I totally agree with the contribution of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. However, I will come on to some specifics in that regard.
The Bar Council brief, on which I am heavily relying, highlights that we are entering a major period of decision-making—a point amplified strongly by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—regarding the future of UK private international law, both nationally and internationally. It is clear that the Bill must be part of a wider government strategy, along with the ongoing negotiations at international level and the statutory instruments under the EU withdrawal Act. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has been very clear about the sequencing of some of the things we need to address.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, said, these matters are both highly technical and of the utmost importance in regulating the lives of individuals and businesses, and he quoted the Bar Council’s preference. I too ask the Minister to confirm that the Government intend to consult the specialists and take on board the comments about adapting a strategy.
Part of the problem with this debate is what comes next—what the Government hope to agree with the EU during and after the transition period. When does the Minister foresee the 2019 Hague judgments convention being implemented? The Law Society expressed the hope that it will become a central part of future international, civil and commercial law co-operation. What action are the Government taking to ensure faster uptake of the convention by the EU?
Again, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance: at the end of the transition period, the wide body of EU legislation will cease to be applicable, contingent on reciprocal treatment by member states. Despite the number of international conventions included in private international law, there is still no international convention in many areas. The Minister referred to the Government’s stated intention to apply to join the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments, which, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, highlighted, would require the agreement of each EU member state. As he made clear, it remains unclear whether the European Union would consent to the United Kingdom joining as a separate contracting state.
The noble and learned Lord also raised the issue of sequencing, which is very important; the default rules of private international law applicable in the United Kingdom after exit day are particularly important.
I do not wish to repeat the contributions that have been made, but the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I have spent some considerable time on Henry VIII clauses when considering previous Bills, not least the sanctions Bill that we had to deal with as a consequence of leaving the EU. That was a simple Bill —it had only two or three clauses—but it certainly gave the Government huge Henry VIII powers, particularly the ability to create and impose new criminal offences. My noble friend Lady Chakrabarti is concerned about those clauses and the power to create the offences that the Explanatory Notes appear to envisage. If that is the case, the affirmative resolution procedure does not provide sufficient parliamentary scrutiny. I understand that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report will be published later this week. I will read it with interest, because I am sure it will make a number of recommendations that we will want to consider in Committee.
We welcome the Bill and its principal objectives but we will seek clarification of several issues, including, as the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, said, future family law provisions.
Lord Keen of Elie
I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. I will take some of those points in turn. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, raised Hague Convention 35. Hague, unlike Lugano, for example, can be entered into by a state, but can be ratified and applied in respect of only one jurisdiction within the state. It so happens that Hague Convention 35 was implemented in respect of Scotland, but not of England and Wales, nor, I believe, Northern Ireland. I am not able to explain why it has been in abeyance for a number of years with respect to those other jurisdictions, but I can say that since the noble and learned Lord raised the point with me I have spoken to officials who are addressing that matter. Certainly, our recommendation would be that it should be applied in respect of England and Wales as well.
The noble and learned Lord asked when we last implemented an international treaty obligation without primary legislation. My stock response was going to be that we now have CRaG 2010, but he went on to criticise that. While I understand that some observations have been made about the sufficiency of CRaG, my response is that we now have primary legislation that requires parliamentary scrutiny in circumstances where we intend to enter into an international treaty. It is in that context that we use the affirmative procedure to draw down those obligations and apply them in domestic law. I venture that that is an acceptable mechanism, because it requires parliamentary scrutiny at the stage of international law. It allows parliamentary scrutiny at the stage of drawing it down into domestic law in accordance with the duality principle.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, adopted and advanced the submissions of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—which shows courage and, indeed, prescience. He also asked why we refer to arbitration. We do not intend to intrude wholesale on the New York convention or other aspects of arbitration, but it might be that there will be bilateral or multilateral jurisdictional issues where a party wishes to refer to arbitration. If, at that stage in the negotiation, we consider that appropriate, albeit in a limited circumstance, we will want to have the power to proceed with such an agreement. However, we are conscious of the need to keep a dividing line between provisions with regard to arbitration that are generally addressed by wholly different conventions, such as the New York convention, as distinct from those that apply more generally in private international law. We are not endeavouring to cross any lines there.
Schedule 6 is where it is because that is where it should be. It is not hiding. I reassure the noble and learned Lord of that. With regard to Schedule 2, my understanding is that it reflects or replicates the text of the 1996 Hague Convention on child protection and is in that form for that reason.
A question was also raised by the noble Lord, Lord Collins, and others about why we have these Henry VIII powers to amend primary legislation. There may be circumstances in which we want to insert implementation provisions into existing primary legislation. I ask noble Lords to notice that that is exactly what we are doing with Clause 1, where we are putting the three Hague Conventions into the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. It might be that we will want to use existing primary legislation and implement using existing primary legislation. That is why that power has been taken.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, gave a very detailed and reasoned distinction between the merits of the Brussels regime, in which we played a very prominent part, and the perhaps deficiencies, to use one term, or the less robust regime we find in Hague and even in Lugano, which essentially reflects Brussels rather than Brussels Ia and Brussels IIa. I have to notice that there are those differences. It is a consequence of us having left the EU on 31 January 2020 —it is as simple as that, is it not? I know the noble and learned Lord recognises that. We cannot be part of the Brussels regime now we have left the EU, and the Government have made it clear that they will not be subject to the jurisdiction of the ECJ.
Of course, if and when we become a party to Lugano, we will seek to move forward the Council of the Lugano Convention to address its equivalence because Lugano originally reflected Brussels I and Brussels II and it is yet to catch up, as it were, with Brussels Ia and Brussels IIa, but certainly if we were a party to it, we can see that we could drive the direction of travel.
That said, we have to be careful about when we engage in the Lugano process. We have made an application to the Council of the Lugano Convention. We have letters of support from the three existing Lugano states, but noble Lords are quite right to point out that we require the consent of the EU to become a party to the Lugano Convention. There are also questions about the way in which that will interrelate with the provisions of the 2019 Hague Convention, and we will have to look at that. Again, my understanding is that we were a material contributor to the development of the Council provision on the 2019 Hague Convention as well, so we are familiar with it, and we see its considerable benefit, all the more so if the EU were to become a contracting state to the 2019 convention.
However, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, is ahead of me. I thought only Uruguay had ratified so far, but he was able to add Ukraine.
Lord Keen of Elie
I apologise—it has signed but not ratified. As the noble and learned Lord will know, it takes a little time for signatures. There has to be a certain number of states signing to the convention and then ratification can take place. Clearly, we are conscious of that. The noble and learned Lord has highlighted a real issue, which is the care we must take in considering our position with regard to Lugano and with respect to the 2019 Hague Convention. If we were not conscious of that before, we are now, if I can put it that way. It may be that the Lord Chancellor’s consultative committee should have sat earlier.
I hope I have addressed the majority of the points that have been raised so far. There was one point the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, raised about intra-UK powers. We will have powers to implement an agreement intra-UK but clearly we would do so only after engagement with the devolved Administrations because the implementation of private international law is a devolved competence, albeit that entry into the treaty at the level of international law is a reserved competence. I reassure the noble and learned Lord that we would not do that without full consultation with the relevant parties.
I see that the noble Baroness, Lady Shackleton, is about to rise, but before she does so I shall just say that in the absence of Brussels and in the absence of provision in international law convention under Hague for certain matters, such as jurisdiction on divorce, we will fall back on our previous common-law position, which some will regard as less than entirely satisfactory, but it is a consequence of us having left the EU. I hope that that anticipates the intervention I was going to get.
Given the hour, I will rest my further submissions there. I look forward to further detailed discussion of these matters in Committee.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 13th May 2020
(3 years, 11 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 101-I Marshalled list for Virtual Committee - (7 May 2020)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
My Lords, this Virtual Committee will now begin. I remind Members that these proceedings are subject to parliamentary privilege and what we say is available to the public both in Hansard and to those listening and watching.
I shall begin by setting out how these proceedings will work. This Virtual Committee will operate as far as possible like a Grand Committee. A participants’ list for today’s proceedings has been published. I also have lists of Members who have put their names to the amendments, or expressed an interest in speaking, in each group. I will call Members to speak in the order listed in my brief, which Members should have received. Members’ microphones will be muted by the broadcasters except when I call a Member to speak and whenever a Question is put, so interventions during speeches are not possible and uncalled speakers will not be heard.
During the debate on each group I will invite Members to email the clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister. I will call Members to speak in order of request and will call the Minister to reply each time. Debate will take place on the lead amendment in each group only; the groupings are binding and it will not be possible to degroup an amendment for separate debate. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. Whenever I put the Question, all Members’ microphones will be opened until I give the result. Members should be aware that any sound made at that point may be broadcast. If a Member intends to say “Not content” to an amendment, it will greatly assist the Chair if they make this clear when speaking on the group. As in Grand Committee, it takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not content”, an amendment is negatived, and if a single voice says “Content”, a clause stands part.
I shall now put the Question that Clause 1 stand part of the Bill. All microphones will be open until I give the result.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 1. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put made that clear in debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; this Committee cannot divide.
Clause 2: Implementation of other agreements on private international law
Amendment 1
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“( ) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed at Lugano on 30th October 2007 (the “2007 Lugano Convention”), in the event that the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Convention in its own right.”
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
My Lords, the effect of the three amendments in this group—Amendments 1, 4 and 5—is that the power in Clause 2 which allows a Minister by regulations to change the law of the United Kingdom to reflect an international treaty on private international law that the country has entered into would be restricted to the Lugano convention only.
It is perhaps sensible if, in addressing the three amendments in this first group, I set out the context, in effect, of most of my amendments in Committee. Clause 1 introduces into the domestic law of the UK the content of three private international law treaties: one dealing with the abduction of children from one country to another; one dealing with the enforcement of child support and family maintenance orders; and one dealing with commercial agreements where a choice of court clause is specified in the agreement. The effect of bringing these three conventions into UK law is that the terms of those conventions become part of our domestic law and are what our courts then give effect to as part of the law. For example, the Hague abduction treaty means that where a couple bring up a child in one country, where there is custody with one parent, and that child is abducted by the other parent to another country—for example, the UK—then, according to that convention, the UK courts, as a matter of domestic law, should return the child to its normal place of residence and should refuse to do so only if there is fear for the child’s safety.
These private international law agreements change the law of the country as a result of agreements that the Executive have entered into. We on these Benches have no objection to those three treaties being brought into domestic law—this is a piece of primary legislation—but we have very considerable objections to Clause 2, and our primary position is that it should not stand part of the Bill. It allows the Government to change the law of the country by delegated legislation, even by changing primary legislation, to give effect to agreements that they have entered into in private international law.
Our objections are, in effect, threefold. First, as a matter of constitutional propriety, this is wrong. It is wrong that there should be such little accountability by Parliament in respect of potentially very significant changes in the law. In support of that principled constitutional objection, I have the support of the Constitution Committee, which is chaired by my noble friend Lady Taylor, the Delegated Powers Committee, which is chaired by the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, and the chair of the Treaties Sub-Committee, my noble and learned friend Lord Goldsmith. All see this as a matter of constitutional impropriety.
In the face of that unanimity of view about what is a constitutionally improper thing to do, what is the Government’s justification for doing this? I have scanned carefully the two speeches by the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland, Lord Keen of Elie, at Second Reading about why this move is justifiable. He gave no general explanation in either speech. He acknowledged in his opening speech that there might be an issue about the Lugano convention, which deals with the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between, among other things, members of the European Union. He said that we might end up in a situation where we want to join the Lugano convention, that we have to do it before the end of the transition period, and that we would negotiate it only at the very end of the period. He said that because of those exceptional circumstances there should be power to join the Lugano convention by delegated legislation.
For that reason—and that is the only example given —we have tabled, by way of probing amendments, Amendments 1, 4 and 5, which restrict the power to the Lugano Convention because of those special circumstances. There is a live debate about whether the UK should join the Lugano Convention, and in his speech at Second Reading the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, set out the shortcomings of the convention.
My preference is that we delete Clause 2 altogether and that, if the Government of the day join an international convention that has effects on our domestic law, that should be approved only by primary legislation. It is said that private international law is a “narrow” and “specialist” topic. The complex rules surrounding it can be both narrow and technical, but they deal with hugely important issues that affect everybody, such as family life, consumer, personal injury and international trade issues. That the law is complex does not mean that the issues covered are not of real significance.
I invite noble Lords to consider whether they wish to restrict Clause 2 only to the Lugano Convention, but that is in the wider context of urging them not to allow the Government this wholly inappropriate power, never used previously and for which no proper justification has been given. I beg to move.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I support the observations so powerfully made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I too am concerned about the width of Clause 2. My concern arises from the discussions and conclusions of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member, serving under the distinguished chairmanship of the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor of Bolton.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, the committee concluded that Clause 2 raises matters of considerable constitutional concern. The concern is that, with the exception of EU law—from which we are in the process of extracting ourselves—it is a fundamental principle of our constitution that international agreements can change the content of our domestic law only if and when they are given force by an Act of Parliament. The Constitution Committee saw no justification for the change that Clause 2 would introduce—that is, to confer on Ministers a power to achieve such a result by statutory instrument.
We recognise that many of the international agreements to which Clause 2 would apply are technical in nature and that their text cannot be changed after negotiations have concluded; nevertheless, we think there is no justification for allowing our law to be changed by statutory instrument without the need for full parliamentary debate. Clause 2 will allow not just for the implementation of the text of the international agreement but for “consequential, supplementary, incidental” provisions. It will allow Ministers to create new criminal offences by statutory instrument. These are matters requiring detailed scrutiny of a Bill through the various stages of the parliamentary process, during which amendments can be debated and, if necessary, divided on. Members of the Constitution Committee are concerned to maintain ministerial accountability to Parliament. This is not emergency legislation; it is a proposal for a permanent shift in power to the Executive.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering (Con)
My Lords, I am sympathetic to the context set out so eloquently by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
At the outset, I seek clarification on a question similar to that put by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. As the Deputy Speaker set out, it appears that we can debate only those amendments that form the first amendment of each group and that we are unable to have clause stand part debates. If my understanding is correct, does that mean that we cannot debate and subsequently vote on a clause stand part debate, as the thrust of Amendment 1 seemingly seeks the ability to do? It would be helpful to have that clarification.
As has been expressed so far, it appears that the purpose behind Clause 2 relates to the Lugano convention. Does it have implications for the Brussels II recast, if not also for the Brussels I recast convention? I entirely endorse the comments that have already been made about the importance of the Lugano convention, particularly to those in the UK who wish to obtain judgments and orders in the UK but also to those across the EU 27. This gives individual citizens and businesses the right to make concrete their desire to ensure that judgments obtained anywhere in Europe will remain readily enforceable in the UK and the EU 27. It facilitates trade and a level playing field and affects inward investment in the whole of Europe. It avoids competing jurisdictions, which I think we all want to avoid, and is central to protecting workers’ rights and consumer protection under insurance policies, which I hope we are all signed up to.
I have some short questions for my noble and learned friend in the context of Amendment 1 and the original Clause 2. What steps is he taking to enforce the terms that are similar to the Brussels II recast convention to give them effect? Have they been set in motion? What stage are we at with the EU 27 regarding matrimonial matters?
I understand, as set out by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that we are leaving agreement to join the Lugano convention until the 11th hour of the 11th day—literally right on the deadline of our leaving the European Union and terminating the transitional arrangements. Why are we leaving it so late in the day? Have soundings already been taken as to the likelihood of the EU and EFTA member states agreeing our application to join the Lugano convention, for the reasons given by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord? On balance, I would say that Lugano was a good thing to join.
Do the original Clause 2 and the Bill as currently drafted intend to give effect to not just the Lugano convention but the Brussels II recast convention? Can my noble and learned friend confirm my understanding that we would not in any way be conferring jurisdiction on the Court of Justice of the European Union but only giving weight to the relevant decisions, as we are currently obliged to do under the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties and common law?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
It may help the noble Baroness if I answer the procedural question she put at the beginning of her speech. It is possible for the Virtual Committee to debate every clause stand part question—indeed, each clause has to be stood part in this procedure—but it is not possible to vote on that at this stage. If that will be required at a later stage, voting can take place. I hope that she finds that helpful.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich (CB)
My Lords, as I understand it, the amendments in this group have two aims: to curb the overbroad power to implement relevant international agreements by regulation, and to signal in primary legislation that there is no objection to giving the force of law to the Lugano convention. I support the first, which is furthered by other groups of amendments, and am sympathetic to the second. However, for the reasons given by my noble and learned friend Lord Mance at Second Reading on the interrelationship between Lugano and the 2019 Hague Convention, there seems to be a question of whether we should sign up immediately to Lugano, even if the EU gives its consent, which is perhaps not a given. I would welcome the Minister’s considered comments on that.
It was good to hear the Minister say at Second Reading that the United Kingdom, should we become a party to Lugano, could drive for its amendment so as to incorporate into it the material improvements that as an EU member state we did so much to help deliver in the form of the recast Brussels regulation. Speaking as a practitioner—I declare an interest as a practising barrister—and as a former member of the EU Justice Sub-Committee, with some awareness in both capacities of the defects of the Lugano convention, I suggest that we not only could do so but should do so.
Lord Adonis (Lab)
My Lords, the arguments put forward by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer seem utterly compelling and are supported not only by every speaker in this debate so far but also by the Constitution Committee, chaired, as he said, by my noble friend Lady Taylor.
My aim in speaking is not to contribute to the specific discussion on the amendment, though I think it is overwhelming, but to comment on the Virtual Proceedings, because understanding what happens in this Committee will be hugely important to how we take forward both the Virtual Proceedings and hybrid proceedings afterwards. I hope that I can be permitted to comment on what is happening, as I will at later stages of our discussions, because this will be so important to the Procedure Committee in deciding how to take forward our proceedings hereafter. Of course, the noble Lords and the officials doing that will read the record; it is important to have in Hansard what is happening at these key stages.
I want to make three points that have occurred to me already. First, it is not clear to people taking part in these proceedings who exactly is in the Committee. At the moment I can see only a handful of faces. After the Deputy Speaker calls people to speak, they suddenly appear from nowhere on my screen. It is very pleasant to see them appearing but it is not at all clear who will appear next. I cannot see the Minister at all; I assume that he is in the Committee, but that is not evident on the screen. My second key point is that is it a bit haphazard as to whether people can be followed, depending on the quality of audio and visual equipment.
Thirdly, I flag up the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, about Report. My understanding is that it will be possible to table amendments exactly as tabled in Committee on Report, because we cannot vote in Committee—a hugely important point. In the discussion in the Chamber last week about how Report would be handled, the Leader of the House and my noble friend the Leader of the Opposition gave an almost categorical undertaking that we would not have Report until we had a hybrid House, so that it is possible for Members to participate in the Chamber and we can have the usual cut and thrust that we have in the Chamber, particularly when we are dealing with legislation and technical points.
I simply make the point that, from my observation of proceedings so far, it is essential that Report takes place in the Chamber and we should not have Report for this highly important Bill until it is possible to have the hybrid proceedings in operation.
Lord Mance (CB)
My Lords, I support the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and of the noble Lord, Lord Pannick. At Second Reading, I described this Bill as, by its own lights, a sensible measure, but said that its lights were rather dimmer than the halogen welcome given to it by the Explanatory Notes. I took some issue with Clause 2. The reality is that we are grasping in the half-light for whatever instruments we can find to replace the full toolkit of the Brussels regulations—including I and II, to which the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh, referred—which were in existence when we were members of the EU. This has been apparent ever since the House of Lords European Union Committee’s 17th Report of Session 2016-17, Brexit: Justice for Families, Individuals and Businesses?
In some areas, such as divorce jurisdiction, there seems to be simply no substitute in sight. In others, Clause 1 identifies three limited instruments, each in its own right very sensible. The second, the Hague choice of court convention, would protect the exclusive choice of court clauses in favour of UK courts, which are so important to the United Kingdom’s financial and business markets. The protection would be increased if the UK also signed up to the 2019 Hague Convention, which my noble friend Lord Anderson referred to and the Explanatory Notes mention as a possibility.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I have added my name to the objection to Clause 2 standing part of the Bill, to be moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for all the reasons that he gave, supported by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and others. That will be addressed in more detail in group 6, later today.
As has been said, this amendment is a limited version of the removal of Clause 2, permitting the Lugano convention to be implemented. Indeed, the Lugano convention was cited at Second Reading by the Minister as a reason for taking this power to implement international conventions by regulation. He confirmed at Second Reading the Government’s intention to implement the Lugano convention.
In the Government’s response to the report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, the Minister claimed that the urgency of implementing Lugano is such that it could not be done in time for the end of the transition period. He is supported in that by the briefing of the Bar Council for this Committee stage, which wants to see the convention implemented as part of domestic law before the end of the transition period. Indeed, it mounts a powerful argument for that. However, I am not convinced.
For my part, I would prefer to see Clause 2 removed in its entirety, because there should be no reason why the Government cannot lay primary legislation before the House before implementing Lugano. Even given the difficulties of Virtual Proceedings and the hybrid Parliament, provided that we could vote, it could be done. That would be the correct way to do it, and it would allow for proper and informed debate on the Lugano convention, which, at the moment, we are to be denied.
At Second Reading, as he has today, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, stressed the importance of the English choice of jurisdiction clauses in commercial contracts of many types to the status of London as a legal centre and to the status and recognition of English commercial law, which contributes not just to London lawyers but to London’s centrality to the global commercial system. The recognition and enforcement of English jurisdiction clauses is under threat as a result of our leaving the European Union and losing the protection of the 2012 Brussels recast regulation.
As the noble and learned Lord has pointed out, the problem—along with other problems with the Lugano convention, to which he has drawn attention, both at Second Reading and today—is that that convention does not replicate Brussels recast, in a number of ways. He has drawn attention to the “Italian torpedo”, whereby a choice of court clause can be overridden by subsequent litigation commenced in defiance of an English jurisdiction clause. He has also drawn attention to the advantage of the 2019 Hague Convention, coupled with the 2019 choice of court convention, to which we could sign up. The particular relevant advantage is that, under the 2019 convention, courts may refuse to recognise a judgment given in a contracting state if that judgment breaches a choice of court clause. If we sign up to Lugano as it stands then, even if we later signed up to the 2019 Hague Convention, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, pointed out, Lugano would trump that protection.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I thank all noble Lords for their contributions to the debate. I shall of course speak to each of the amendments, Amendments 1, 4 and 5. When taken together, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, observed, they have the effect of restricting the power to implement international private law agreements contained in Clause 2 in the 2007 Lugano Convention. But they not only limit the power of the United Kingdom to implement private international law agreements in this way, they also restrict our ability to mirror any such arrangements as between the United Kingdom’s different legal jurisdictions, and indeed as between the United Kingdom and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
Of course we accept, as we have previously, that the most pressing need for the power is in relation to the Lugano convention itself. Our application to rejoin the convention as an independent contracting party was made on 8 April—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
We appear to have lost the noble and learned Lord the Minister. Is he still with us?
Lord Keen of Elie
I think that I am coming back. I apologise, but something happened on the computer.
We have made the application and it is hoped that, subject to agreement, we will be able to rejoin the Lugano convention from the end of the transition period.
I will pause to notice some of the observations made by my noble friend Lady McIntosh of Pickering and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, with reference to Brussels Ia and IIa restated. My noble friend asked in a number of ways what steps we are taking with regard to what she termed the Brussels convention and what progress is being made on that matter. I think we have to remind ourselves that Brussels Ia and IIa do not form an international convention; they are internal instruments of the EU to which you may be a party only if you are a member of the EU. We of course have the transition period during which we enjoy the benefits of Brussels Ia and IIa until the end of the year, but there is no basis on which we can be members of Brussels, as was suggested, after the end of the transition period. That is why we are concerned to apply for membership of Lugano.
With regard to a number of the observations made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, of course I readily acknowledge that Lugano is not as well developed in a number of respects as the Brussels Ia and IIa restated provisions. We are well aware of that. We would hope to advance Lugano once we are a member, but we have to acknowledge that it is not on a par with Brussels Ia and IIa.
However, Lugano is not the only potential use of the power in Clause 2. For instance, Amendment 1 would prevent us joining two other private international law agreements on which the Government are currently considering their position. They are the Singapore convention on mediation and the Hague judgments convention of 2019. I will return to the latter in a moment because it has been mentioned before.
With regard to the Singapore convention, I have shared with noble Lords a copy of an exemplar statutory instrument to demonstrate the sorts of agreements that we may wish to implement under the Clause 2 power. While the final decision on joining that convention is still to be taken, I invite noble Lords to look at that exemplar statutory instrument when considering the ways this power might be used. The instrument contains what are, essentially, technical implementing regulations for a treaty agreed at the level of international law. The choice for this House and the other place at the point of implementation is about not the specific provisions of an agreement, but whether to approve the United Kingdom’s implementation of the whole agreement in domestic law.
Beyond those two examples of private international law agreements which already exist, and which the UK is considering joining, we are actively engaged in work through the Hague conference to develop rules on jurisdiction in international civil and commercial cases. The global arena of private international law is constantly developing. We have been active in it in the past, and hope and intend to take a leading role in the future.
Restricting the scope of the Clause 2 power in the way envisaged by this amendment would, I suggest, prevent the United Kingdom implementing any future agreements in a timely manner. That would in turn delay the benefit of those agreements to citizens and businesses. I regard that as an unsatisfactory position, given that in many cases there is considerable advantage to be gained from such international co-operation in the area of private international law. It would also mean that primary legislation will be needed to insert into a schedule to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 the text of the United Kingdom’s declarations and reservations in relation to the 2005 Hague Convention and the 2007 Hague Convention, in the absence of which the terms of the United Kingdom’s accession to those agreements will be far less accessible to users.
I also point out that it will mean that the definition of “relevant international agreement”, as used in subsections (2) and (3), and presently defined in subsection (7) by cross-reference back to subsection (1), will be unclear. That term is also used in Schedule 6 and defined by cross-reference back to Clause 2. In addition, the way that Amendment 1 has been drafted would not in practice allow us to make implementing regulations in advance of becoming a contracting party but only after joining. In that respect, I venture that it is defectively drafted because, essentially, one has to take these things in a particular order.
I turn to Amendment 4. As drafted, Clause 2(2) allows the terms of an international agreement, subject to suitable modifications, to be applied between United Kingdom jurisdictions: for example, between England and Scotland. Amendment 4 seeks to restrict this power to allow for only the Lugano convention to be applied in this way. International agreements on private international law would not ordinarily apply between the United Kingdom’s three jurisdictions because such agreements apply only between contracting parties and it is the United Kingdom Government, not their separate jurisdictions, who join international agreements. Although the relationship between the different parts of the union are perhaps far deeper than they are between foreign jurisdictions and ourselves, it often means that the rules between different UK jurisdictions need to be detailed and bespoke. Applying the same rules between United Kingdom jurisdictions that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will, not invariably but very often, be desirable. For example, it could reduce the number of sets of rules that courts need to apply in cases raising cross-border issues, making them more efficient and easier for courts, lawyers and litigants to understand. It would also mean that intra-UK private international law rules are at least as effective and up to date as the rules applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(2) allows for such keeping pace but would be exercised only if the relevant jurisdictions agree that it is beneficial to do so.
These sorts of arrangements are not without precedent. All three UK jurisdictions already apply rules that mirror the EU Brussels 1A regulation on jurisdiction for cross-border cases and much of the EU maintenance regulation as between themselves. The fact that, thanks to Schedule 4 to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, a modified version of the Brussels 1A rules is applied to cases between Scotland, Northern Ireland and England and Wales means that there might be limited prima facie rationale for suggesting that we replace this with the application of the rules under the Lugano convention. The rules are already substantially similar.
However, in addition, the amendment that I referred to has an altogether more significant deficiency. By limiting the intra-UK application of private international law agreements to the Lugano convention, the amendment may well result in the perverse situation in which the intra-UK rules are out of step, out of date and less effective than those governing the relationship between all three of these jurisdictions and a foreign jurisdiction. If the amendment were accepted, separate primary legislation would be needed to achieve this, potentially resulting in the intra-UK rules being less effective and less comprehensive than the rules that we apply with foreign jurisdictions until such primary legislation was passed.
Perhaps I may give an example. If the United Kingdom decided in future to join a new private international law agreement dealing with cross-border cases regarding children, the inability to implement that agreement between the UK’s jurisdictions at the same time as implementing an agreement between the UK and foreign jurisdictions could lead to families finding it more difficult to resolve disputes where parents live in, say, Northern Ireland and England than where one parent lives in the United Kingdom and the other in a foreign country. That would be a very strange outcome.
Amendment 5 has an effect similar to that of Amendment 4 in that it seeks to restrict the ability, under the Clause 2 power, for the United Kingdom to enter into arrangements with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that mirror, subject to suitable modifications, the provisions of a private international law agreement to which the United Kingdom is a party. As I explained in relation to Amendment 4, the UK Government are the contracting party to international agreements on private international law. As such, these agreements would not ordinarily apply as between the United Kingdom and one of the Crown dependencies or overseas territories.
However, as with the relationships between the different legal jurisdictions of the UK, applying the same rules between the UK and the Crown dependencies and overseas territories that we apply with foreign jurisdictions will sometimes be desirable. It can ensure that the relationships between the various members of the wider UK family can be at least as effective and up to date as those applied between the United Kingdom and foreign jurisdictions. Clause 2(3), as presently drafted, allows for such keeping pace but only if the relevant territorial Government agree that it is beneficial to do so.
I submit that this builds on a significant body of precedent. Both the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 enable the Government, via Order in Council, to recognise and enforce civil and commercial judgments from the Crown dependencies and overseas territories where reciprocal arrangements have been entered into with them. Furthermore, Section 39 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 enables the Government, by Order in Council, to apply a modified version of the Brussels 1968 convention between the United Kingdom and a Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, an order was made in respect of Gibraltar in 1997 to do exactly that: applying a modified version of this convention to relations between the UK and Gibraltar—an arrangement that sustains to this day.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, the following noble Lords indicated a wish to speak after the Minister: the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh of Pickering, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames. I shall call them in that order and ask the Minister to respond to each of them in turn.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op)
I had not intended to intervene at this stage. However, since this, is or ought to be, very similar to Committee if we were sitting in the Chamber, I hope that Members will understand why I do so. It is not to deal with questions that the Minister raised about Crown dependencies and overseas territories—although he answered the question that I had intended to ask later on, on other amendments, so that will shorten the debate later—nor indeed about the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom. Again, that will be dealt with in subsequent amendments and I can come back to that during that debate.
I want to say two things. First, I agree totally with what my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said; that will surprise neither him nor the Minister. Secondly, the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, made important points, which the Minister just touched on. As the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, said, we should note the significance of this being the first Committee stage of a Bill that we have held virtually. It is very important that we see that it operates properly.
As it happens, two members of the Procedure Committee are in this debate: the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, and me. At the committee’s last meeting, we asked for a report on the workings of this Committee stage—that is, how it will proceed. At its next meeting, the committee will discuss the procedure for virtual voting. If my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer hopes to divide the House on Report, as he indicated—I hope that he will—that cannot be done without virtual voting. It would be improper and unconstitutional for that to take place. My noble friend Lord Adonis should be reassured by that.
Finally, I hope that the Minister will treat this Committee stage just as he treats Committee stages on the Floor of the House—that is, take account of what has been said, be prepared for a challenge on these issues on Report and bear all this is mind before bringing the Bill in its present form back on Report. I hope he takes note of that.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I of course am listening to the contributions made to the debate in Committee and will take account of the observations that have been made. I make no comment on the procedural issues that the noble Lord raised.
Baroness McIntosh of Pickering
My Lords, I thank my noble and learned friend for his full answer to the concerns that were raised. Perhaps I misunderstood his response, but I think that the thrust of the interventions of noble Lords—nearly to a man and a woman—was that it is inappropriate to seek to put into UK law by delegated secondary legislation a new treaty that the Minister and the Government seek to sign. The thrust of the remarks was that it should require primary legislation. Have I misunderstood my noble and learned friend on that point? Why are the Government resisting the usual procedure of agreeing to implement anything that has been agreed by the Government by way of international treaty through primary legislation?
Lord Keen of Elie
First, let me make it clear that I do not accept that it is an invariable constitutional practice that the implementation in domestic law of an international law treaty is undertaken by way of primary legislation only. Secondly, when it comes to the implementation of a treaty that has been entered into at the level of international law, the purpose of drawing it down into domestic law is either to accept it into domestic law or not to accept it into domestic law. There is no scope for amending the terms of the treaty that has already been entered into. Therefore, the use of the affirmative statutory instrument procedure is considered appropriate. It gives this House and the other place ample opportunity to debate whether they should draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law. There is, essentially, no real scope for amendment; therefore, we consider the affirmative procedure perfectly adequate for that purpose.
Lord Mance
I have just a few points to raise with the Minister. At one point, he said that the first amendment would prevent us joining two other measures, the Singapore mediation convention and the 2019 Hague Convention. It is too easy to slip into that sort of language. What he really means is that it would prevent us joining those measures without proper parliamentary scrutiny by primary legislation.
In response to the Minister’s last point, yes or no can be a very important question, even if you cannot amend an international treaty once it is made; Lugano is a classic example. It is a difficult decision, as has been illustrated. It is also very easy to say that we would be prevented from implementing future measures in a timely manner, but there is no real evidence for that at all.
The Minister took various rather minor—if I may call them that— drafting points on, for example, the definition of related international instruments and ancillary provisions. Those would all be sorted out if the principle of the first four amendments was accepted.
On that principle, the Minister also took various points about the intra-UK relationship, suggesting that Amendments 4 and 5 raised complexity. As I see it, those amendments are perfectly simple. They ensure that the general power marches in tandem with the specific power to legislate Lugano into the intra-UK jurisdictional relationships and interrelationships with overseas territories. They are “keeping pace” amendments and there is nothing inconsistent or complicated about them.
As to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, I pointed out in my previous remarks that they are quite different, minor and limited measures relating to recognition of superior court judgments overseas, coming either from UK overseas territories or from territories with which we have reciprocal arrangements. Those judgments would have been recognised as common law by action on the judgments, which would operate as an estoppel in any event, so they are minor amendments.
It is true that the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act contained some provisions for delegated legislation in respect of, for example, Gibraltar. However, it was a piece of primary UK legislation in the first place, and it is no doubt a tribute to the quality of the UK Parliament’s consideration of that legislation if overseas territories are willing to accept that they should be legislated for on a delegated basis.
Lord Keen of Elie
I thank the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, for his further observations. I simply notice this: for the last 20 years, Parliament has had no oversight of the drawing down of these obligations into domestic law because it has been an EU competence. That has not led to any dramatic constitutional issue, as far as I am aware.
In the meantime, however, we have introduced CRaG, which means that the entering into a treaty at the level of international law is now subject to scrutiny by Parliament. After that scrutiny, the Executive can enter into the relevant treaty. Then, when it is drawn down into domestic law, the affirmative statutory instrument procedure ensures that both Houses of Parliament have an opportunity to scrutinise and debate this. There is no difficulty about that; it is the outcome that matters.
However, I notice the noble and learned Lord’s observation that there is little that can be done by way of amendment at that stage. That is why we would suggest that the affirmative procedure was a perfectly adequate mechanism, as distinct from primary legislation.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, before I call the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I should say that the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Pannick, have indicated their wish to speak after the Minister. I shall call them in that order after the contribution from the noble Lord, Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, I was not suggesting—and neither, I believe, was the noble Baroness, Lady McIntosh—that we can stay in Brussels recast or rejoin it after the end of the transition period. I was merely regretting the loss of the benefits of Brussels recast and pointing out that Lugano, if we joined it after the transition period ended, would not offer us comparable benefits. Apart from conceding that point, the Minister has not addressed the points made—notably by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance—that joining Lugano may be undesirable, and that we are deprived of the opportunity of debating that in the context of primary legislation. That, I think, is a point that he needs to address.
Lord Keen of Elie
On that point, of course I accept that Lugano does not go as far as Brussels Ia and IIa—Brussels restated. We are all well aware of that. As regards the interplay between Lugano and the Hague Convention 2019, one has to bear in mind that Hague has not been signed or acceded to by the EU. We do not know if or when it may intend to do so. Indeed, it is noteworthy that it took the EU 10 years to sign and accede to the Hague Convention 2005. On the other hand, Lugano is there and available as a convention. A number of noble and learned Lords have acknowledged its importance in the context of private international law. Therefore, it is appropriate that we proceed with Lugano at this stage.
Lord Adonis
I took the Minister’s response to my noble friend Lord Foulkes to mean that he did not recognise the constitutional doctrine that international treaties could take effect in UK law only by primary legislation. I took him to speak of “recent precedents”. Can he tell the Committee what those recent precedents are?
Lord Keen of Elie
I mentioned them earlier in my observations with regard to the 1920 and 1933 Acts, which, by Order in Council—not even a statutory instrument—can draw these matters down into domestic law.
Lord Pannick
An important part of the Minister’s argument is that an affirmative procedure suffices because all that Parliament is doing is approving, or not approving, an international agreement which cannot be amended. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has already made the point that this may involve very detailed and important policy questions. Can the Minister comment on a further point that, in any event, Clause 2 confers power on the Minister, not only to make regulations for the purpose of implementing the international agreement but in connection with implementation? He will know that implementing legislation often includes provisions which may be of some importance, which are not mandated by the international agreements but arise from them.
There may be discretionary decisions to be taken—for example, in relation to the creation of criminal offences. Therefore, I put to the Minister that it is not good enough to say that all Parliament is doing is implementing an international agreement which has already been negotiated and agreed. There are policy decisions that the statutory instrument will contain, and primary legislation is required so that Parliament can debate these policy choices in a proper, effective way and, if necessary, seek to amend the provisions, which are distinct from those contained within the agreement itself.
Lord Keen of Elie
There may of course be incidental policy issues that arise when we come to draw down into domestic law an obligation, or obligations, undertaken at the level of international law. Clearly, in circumstances where there were policy choices to be made, a Government would consult upon those matters to bring forward policy choices that were acceptable to stakeholders. If they were not acceptable to Parliament, even after consultation, Parliament would not pass the affirmative SI in question. I do not accept that it is necessary in each and every instance to bring forward primary legislation for this purpose. In those exceptional cases where there may be consequential issues to be addressed, clearly they will be addressed at policy level. They will be consulted upon and the matter brought forward. The Government will not bring forward a policy proposal for an incidental measure without realising that Parliament would be prepared to accept it. That would be a pointless exercise.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
This very interesting debate has raised, in effect, two substantial questions: as a matter of principle should there be the Clause 2 power at all and, if not, should we nevertheless make an exception for the Lugano convention?
First of all, should there be this power at all? In a speech that might be described as a Scottish smokescreen —because it dealt primarily with drafting issues and issues about the dependent territories and, important as those are, did not really address the principle at all—the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, gave one line to justify this unprecedented power. He said that not having this power under Clause 2 would prevent implementation of any international treaty “in a timely manner”. I forgive the noble and learned Lord for putting it in such wide terms and assume he means private international law treaties only. With respect, what he says is plainly wrong.
The noble and learned Lord was given the opportunity on two occasions to provide evidence that it would prevent the implementation of private international law treaties in a timely manner, once before the Delegated Powers Committee of this House and once before the Constitution Committee. The Delegated Powers Committee said that the Ministry of Justice
“offers no empirical evidence that delay has been caused to stakeholders by late implementation of private international law agreements … The argument from delay, apart from involving unsubstantiated assertion, might justify dispensing with Acts of Parliament in other areas where governments need to legislate quickly.”
It rejected it on grounds of lack of evidence and on grounds of principle.
The Constitution Committee also looked at the very same assertion made to it, and said:
“However, the Government offers no evidence to support this argument. The UK has become a party to only 13 Hague Conventions over the course of nearly 60 years. In respect of some of the Conventions the UK has signed, full ratification and implementation has taken years to complete. The Hague Convention of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults … was ratified for Scotland in 2003 but has not been ratified for England and Wales or for Northern Ireland … While there may or may not be an increase in the number of PIL agreements that are made in the coming years, there is nothing to suggest that PIL agreements will be produced at a rate that would preclude implementing them via primary legislation, nor that there are exceptional circumstances so urgent that resort to a fast-track bill would be impossible. It is therefore difficult to give weight to the Government’s argument that reputational damage will result from not having the power.”
Anybody who has looked at this in detail thinks the Minister’s argument is rubbish. It is not surprising that he never mentioned it at Second Reading.
The Minister then cited occasions when it has been done before, in particular two primary Acts of Parliament: the Administration of Justice Act 1920 and the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933. Reading those is worth while. The 1920 Act refers to a provision whereby a judgment obtained in one dominion can be enforced in other dominions as long as the dominion passes a power to agree to that. The 1920 Act—the 1933 Act is the same, but not in respect of the Empire—says that if another country agrees to this convention, we can add the name of that dominion or country to the list, having approved the convention by primary legislation. The idea that those two Acts give support to the proposition that we can now import wholesale into our domestic law every international treaty we enter into is absolute nonsense. They provide no sort of precedent at all. I really hope the Minister has noted that every single person who spoke took the view that Clause 2 was inappropriate.
As far as Lugano is concerned, I thought the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, were powerful. I do not know whether they are right or wrong, but they illustrate that we need a proper debate about Lugano: we cannot just import Lugano into our law by secondary legislation. Our debates about Lugano today—which, as one speaker identified, were not answered by the Minister; we never debated Lugano, we simply debated the principle of whether Lugano could be an exception to the deletion of Clause 2—illustrate that this very important convention, about which two views prevail, should be the subject of primary legislation. Of course, I will come back to this on Report.
The important point that was made about procedure, and which is worth emphasising, is that we cannot change a Bill unless there is consent, or as a result of a Division which agrees to change that Bill. It means that we cannot proceed with legislation until we have the ability to divide on legislation, whether remotely or in person. We cannot get to the next stage of this Bill until we have the power to divide. With the permission of the House, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 2. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee: this Committee cannot divide.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that Clause 2 shall apply only to those international agreements that exclusively relate to private international law.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I shall try to deal with this group very quickly. It illustrates the width and uncertainty of the power given in Clause 2. Clause 2(1) states:
“The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, as it has effect from time to time, so far as relating”.
As I understand it, if there is a treaty that relates partly to private international law and partly to other things, the Government can use regulations to implement the part that relates to private international law and make any regulations relating to that. For legal certainty, it would be much more appropriate if this power could be used only if the agreement it covers relates exclusively to private international law. That is what Amendment 2 does.
The next amendment in the group is Amendment 6. Clause 2(5) states:
“Regulations under this section may include provision about … legal aid.”
For reasons that are completely mysterious, provisions about legal aid can be made under a Bill on private international law. There should not be power under this Bill to deal with legal aid. If the Government want to make provisions about legal aid that might relate to the consequences of a private international law agreement, they should be made under legal aid legislation, not under this Bill.
Line 22 of page 3 of the Bill allows the Government, by regulation, to introduce changes to our domestic law in respect of not only agreements that have been entered into but of agreements to which we are expected to become a party. That would mean that if the Government reasonably believe they are about to sign something they can pass legislation that gives effect to it. What happens if we do not sign it? I suggest that we restrict the power to where the United Kingdom is a party to such an agreement. It would not cause a problem in relation to time. We normally sign and become a party before ratification, so the amendment would not cause any difficulties.
Amendments 10, 11, 12 and 13 would restrict the definition of private international law in a variety of ways. Currently, the definition of private international law in the Bill is not an inclusive definition but states what private international law includes but not exclusively. It says that it includes
“jurisdiction and applicable law … recognition and enforcement in one country or territory of … a judgment, order or arbitral award … an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations”
and “co-operation between … countries”. First, for legal certainty reasons it should not be a definition that includes only some examples and nothing else. It should relate only to those for the purposes of legal certainty. Secondly, it should not deal with arbitral awards because if it does it will be stamping on the toes of other bits of legislation. Thirdly, when the Bill refers to
“an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations”
that covers practically everything. It needs to be restricted.
The final amendment in this group relates to Clause 2(8), which allows model laws to be introduced. Model law is where a number of countries agree, for example on insolvency, that certain principles should be agreed across borders to apply to that area of law. There is no reciprocal requirement for each country to introduce the model law and it is for each country to decide how it implements a model law. Clause 2(8) would allow, for example, the UK to introduce by statutory instrument wholesale changes to our insolvency law, even though there was no reciprocity with other countries. It would be a door that opened a range of legislation on insolvency simply because some of the provisions included model laws. It is wholly inappropriate that this should be in the Bill. I beg to move.
Lord Anderson of Ipswich
My Lords, those of us who are less than happy with Clause 2 have three options: restricting it to Lugano, as we have just debated; voting to remove it altogether, as both the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the Constitution Committee have recommended; or voting to trim its scope in a variety of respects, as the amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in this and the following group seek to achieve. I welcome the amendments in this group, essentially for the reasons given by the noble and learned Lord, which there is no point in my repeating.
However, Amendment 16, which would remove the reference to model laws, is particularly important for two reasons. First, as the noble and learned Lord said, model laws are not international conventions but, as expressed by the Bar Council, collections of soft law provisions which often need to be modified substantially before being given effect in domestic law. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, illustrated that very well with the example of insolvency. Secondly, model laws are not subject to the provisions of CRaG and cannot benefit from such “limited and flawed” comfort—in the words of the Constitution Committee from April 2019, repeated today by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance —as may be given by the operation of its mechanisms.
That said, I incline to think that these amendments, even viewed collectively, are insufficient to meet the substantial constitutional concerns that the Constitution Committee identified in its recent report on this Bill, concerns which to my mind the Minister has not yet allayed, for example with his remarks on timing and reputational damage. That is a matter for the debate on whether Clause 2 should stand part, on which I see that a good deal of firepower has been virtually assembled and which I do not seek to pre-empt or express a final view on at this stage.
Finally, I think we all want to acknowledge the enormous efforts made by the staff of the House to ensure that debates on legislation such as this can take place in a coherent manner. I hope that I do not tempt the fates by saying that. However, I echo the comments of my noble friend Lord Pannick and the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, that voting on the Bill must be possible, by whatever means, when it is brought back on Report. I am grateful for the reassuring words of the Minister on that, but I would be even more grateful if he would upgrade his reassurance into an undertaking, which I think he indicated it was not.
Lord Morris of Aberavon (Lab)
My Lords, I am indebted to the noble Lord, Lord Rowlands, for drawing my attention to the impressive eighth report of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee, of which he is a member, and the Minister’s reply.
Any expertise I acquired in the course of my academic education in Cambridge has, I fear, slipped away. I am glad that, as a law officer, I was not particularly troubled by questions of private international law, in stark contrast to public international issues such as advising on Kosovo, Iraq, Sierra Leone, the United Nations and elsewhere. My remarks are addressed to Amendment 16 but equally apply to a lot of issues I would have raised on the stand part debate, and therefore I may be excused from repeating them when we come to that issue as the same questions arise.
Having examined the evidence in the two documents, surely the preferred course is a matter of judgment. I leave on one side the hugely impressive technical arguments we have heard during this debate. The issue is this: does one depart from the practice of 100 years of the need for primary legislation to implement a treaty or does one bow to the urgency and the apparent narrow window to implement the application of the Lugano convention before the end of the transition period? Other examples have been cited, but I do not expect that they have the same urgency as that.
The noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich, mentioned the hearing of the Justice Sub-Committee, which I used to chair, in which some rather fundamental concerns were raised about Lugano in the course of the evidence, particularly regarding family matters.
The Minister believes that proceeding by statutory instrument is necessary to implement agreements in a timely manner. That is the issue he puts before us today. The question that concerns me is, while there might be a discrete argument for dealing with issues in the way proposed during the transition period, has it occurred to Her Majesty’s Government that it might be more acceptable to put forward a much narrower clause to deal with a specific mischief such as Lugano? I agree with the spirit of the remarks made by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer.
It would be better if we had something much narrower to deal with the specific issue than the rather wide power that is now being granted to the Government. That certainly would have the attraction of being more proportionate. Failing that, my submission would be to delete Clause 2 altogether. That really would meet the harm that has been ventilated so ably in the course the debate.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
I believe that the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, does not wish to contribute at this point. I therefore move on to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance.
Lord Mance
My Lords, as has been pointed out, these amendments illustrate the width of the delegated power proposed. They really matter only if Amendments 1, 4 and 5 fail and Clause 2 remains in the Bill unaltered. I basically agree with all my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said and will add some comments on only some of the amendments.
On Amendment 10—replacing “includes” with “means”—Clauses 2(7) contains a quite exhaustive definition. “Includes” suggests that it is not exhaustive and that there are further things to be covered. To suggest that the definition is only partial in that way is a recipe for future doubt and argument.
Amendment 2 aims to rephrase the power
“so far as relating to private international law”
to read so far as
“that agreement exclusively relates to”
private international law. In his letter responding to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, pointed out that the Warsaw convention, governing the responsibility of international aviation carriers, and the CMR convention —he described it as the Geneva convention, but it is better known as the CMR convention—governing the liability of international road carriers each contain an individual provision relating to private international law. He went on to say that
“importantly, only those individual provisions could have been implemented under the clause 2 power in the Bill.”
That statement illustrates the reason for this amendment, because if that is how this Bill is or may be interpreted, it certainly needs amendment. It is wholly inappropriate to use this Bill to cherry pick a provision about jurisdiction, for example, or recognition of judgments out of a composite scheme, and to suggest that the Bill enables such a provision to be enacted without any context.
Take either convention. The jurisdiction provisions—who can be sued and where—make sense only in the light of the provisions regarding who can claim and who is liable. To require a consignor or consignee of goods, whether by air or by road, to sue in a particular country without incorporating the provisions that create the cause of action, and provide against whom the cause of action is, would be completely to misunderstand the scheme of such conventions. They are conceived as a composite package. Take the CMR convention—the acronym is French, but it deals with transport. The concept of a contract for the carriage of goods by road is fundamental to the operation of that convention, but it is an artificial one which may be satisfied by status and activities, such as taking over goods and the consignment note, rather than on ordinary contractual principles. If you incorporated the jurisdictional provisions, you would not incorporate the liability provisions—the two do not make sense separated.
The insertion of the words “exclusively relates to” in Clause 2(1) would ensure that it is only pure private international law agreement matters that can attract the use of the general delegated power, if that remains at all in Clause 2.
Turning to Amendment 3, I declare a potential interest as a practising arbitrator, in view of the definition in the Bill of private international law to include recognition and enforcement of an “arbitral award”.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, for information, Amendment 3 is in the next group of amendments. In this group we have Amendments 2, 6, 9, 10, 11, 12, 13 and 16. I hope that that is helpful.
Lord Mance
Yes, it is very helpful. Have I started addressing Amendment 3 by mistake? I certainly did not intend to. I want to address Amendment 11, which seeks to include the words “or arbitral award” in the definition of private international law.
As I said, I declare an interest as an arbitrator. Perhaps I might mention that, although I may not speak on this, I chair the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law, which is referred to later, in proposed Amendment 20. I assure the Committee that that committee had nothing to do with that amendment.
To go back to arbitral awards, the recognition of arbitration clauses and the enforcement of arbitral awards are matters governed by special international agreements, most notably the highly successful 1958 New York convention and the 1966 International Centre for the Settlement of Investment Disputes convention, also known as the World Bank convention. The current Brussels regime, the Lugano convention, the Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 2019 Hague Convention are all extremely careful to exclude arbitration expressly. But this definition for some reason includes it. One of the virtues of the 2012 recast of Brussels 1 was to reinforce that exclusion still further. London is a world centre of arbitration, and there would be concern about any suggested intervention by delegated legislation.
The inclusion of a reference to an “arbitral award” is therefore inappropriate and will arouse concern. It will also raise the further question: if arbitral awards are within private international law, what about international agreements on the jurisdiction of arbitrators? Is the word “jurisdiction” in Clause 2(7)(a) to be interpreted as enabling delegated legislation about arbitral jurisdiction?
The response at Second Reading from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, was not comforting. He said:
“We do not intend to intrude wholesale on the New York convention or other aspects of arbitration, but it might be that there will be bilateral or multilateral … issues where a party wishes to refer to arbitration … we will want to have the power to proceed with such an agreement.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1451.]
On the face of it, that suggests that, so far as the Government have any clear conception of why these words are there, they would cover jurisdictional issues—in other words, issues about where a party wishes to refer to arbitration and not just the recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards. That is an unwise and unnecessary indication of possible future interference by international agreement and delegated legislation in one of this country’s more successful export activities.
Surely the better approach is: if it ain’t broke, don’t fix it. If, at the international level, the New York or ICSID convention is supplemented, their domestic implementation should be by primary legislation, as it currently is under the Arbitration Act 1996 and the Arbitration (International Investment Disputes) Act 1966.
Finally, on Amendment 16, I endorse what has been said by my noble friend Lord Anderson and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Admirable though they may be, model laws do not have the same status as international agreements and frequently need close attention before domestic implementation.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
My Lords, in his letter of 19 April in response to the report of the Delegated Powers Committee, the Minister said:
“The Committee’s Report implies that the power in clause 2 of the Bill would allow the Government to implement agreements on any aspect of private law with a foreign element, rather than merely agreements on the much narrower subject area of private international law, as defined by clause 2(7) of the Bill. … It will not be possible for matters outside of the areas indicated by the definition of ‘private international law’ in clause 2(7) to be implemented using the power.”
The Minister echoed what was set out in paragraph 7 of the Explanatory Notes, which state:
“PIL agreements cover a discrete area of law that is narrowly defined.”
One would therefore have expected that the interpretation of Clause 2(7) to be narrowly defined, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, there is a width and uncertainty about these provisions that really do not follow the expressions being used.
For example, the definition clause for “international agreement”, which Amendment 9 deals with, includes,
“an agreement to which the UK is, or is expected to become, a party.”
What does that mean? Does that mean that legislation will be brought forward under these provisions and regulations brought forward in respect of an agreement to which we are not a party? As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out, what happens if the agreement is not ultimately made and the negotiations fall through? We would then, presumably, have regulations on the statute book dealing with an agreement to which we were not a party.
The definition of “private international law” is also contained in that same subsection, and Amendments 10, 12 and 13 demonstrate the loose wording that is used in case anything has been missed. That is rather typical of the drafting of the legislation. It is so drafted that anything can be bought in and the door is kept open. For example, it includes “rules and other provisions”, and there is to be co-operation in relation to the
“service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures”
not defined. Paragraph (c)(ii) deals with
“anything within paragraphs (a) and (b).”
It is so loose and ill-defined.
So the purpose of the amendment moved by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, is to define the scope of regulation-making powers of the Bill so that the regulations should be confined exclusively to the field of private international law. Any provisions that trespass into any other territory could not be incorporated into domestic law by these regulations. I wholly support what he says about that.
I also support what was said by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Manse, on arbitral awards and model laws.
But I am interested in Amendment 6. Perhaps the Minister will share his thoughts about any proposed regulations concerning legal aid. What proceedings in the field of private international law does he envisage? To what is this directed? Would these be additional provisions to existing legal aid regulations? Would there be more hoops or fewer? Would there be more generous or less generous provision, and in what fields?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I begin with Amendment 2, which as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, noted, would seek to limit the scope of the Clause 2 power to implement agreements to those that relate exclusively to private international law, whereas of course in its present form of drafting it is clearly intended to extend to the implementation of private international law provisions in wider agreements. In previous correspondence, as noted by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I referred, as an example, to the jurisdiction of the provisions of the 1961 Warsaw Convention, which is concerned with international carriage by air. The point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, was: why would you seek a power to implement such a private international law provision outwith the wider terms of the relevant international agreement? There may be some force in that point. It is one that I would like to consider further, and I will do so before we reach Report.
Amendment 6, which was just referred to by noble Lords, seeks to remove legal aid from the scope of the matters about which Clause 2 regulations can make provision. In the light of the observations of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas, perhaps I should explain that the Bill as presently drafted does not expressly include legal aid in the scope of the definition of private international law. However, under Clause 2(5)(c), it allows for regulations that implement or apply a private international law agreement to make provision for legal aid. This would mean that, where a private international law agreement to which the UK chose to become a party included obligations in relation to legal aid, those could be given domestic effect through Clause 2 regulations.
The reason for that approach to the matter of private international law and legal aid in the Bill is that, although there is some doubt about whether legal aid is typically encompassed in the scope of what is referred to as private international law as generally understood by practitioners and academics, there are circumstances in which a private international law agreement could contain specific legal aid provisions. This normally arises, as one might expect, in the field of family law. For example, there is a requirement in the 1980 Hague Convention on international child abduction for a contracting state to apply the same legal aid rules to citizens of, and persons habitually resident in, other contracting states in matters covered by the convention as it would to its own citizens and residents. It is therefore the Government’s view that, should similar conventions arise in the future providing for critical cross-border co-operation in matters of private international law, it would be unfortunate if there were to be a delay in people benefiting from the provisions of such an important convention.
Where a private international law agreement imposes requirements relating to legal aid that go beyond the sorts of areas for which the United Kingdom Government currently provide such funding domestically, we would need to think very carefully before proceeding. However, the normal process of consultation during the development of, and before taking the international steps to join, a convention of this nature would provide an opportunity for consideration of any legal aid implications.
In short, the amendment would create unhelpful doubt around whether the Clause 2 power could be used to implement a private international law agreement that included provisions relating to legal aid, and indeed it might even render that impossible.
Amendment 9 seeks to restrict the Clause 2 power to implement in domestic law only the private international law agreements to which the UK is already a contracting party and nothing further. It will not be possible for the Government to take the final steps necessary under international law for the United Kingdom to become bound by a new agreement in this area, such as depositing an instrument of ratification, because, in order to do that, the necessary implementing legislation must already have been made and, as a result of this amendment, it would need a different legislative vehicle.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
The extraordinary tedium of that answer should not detract from the enormity of what the Minister has just said. He basically said “I can’t really give you a definition in the Bill of a private international law agreement but we, the Government, will know it when we see it. Yes, it’s true that we’re taking power to do things that nobody really wants us to do, but generally we won’t do it—and if we were thinking of doing it, we’d consult first.” That was in relation to arbitral awards. In relation to model laws, he was saying, “It did occur to us that this looked like quite a convenient power for us to have, so could we have it?”
My answer is that this debate illustrates what a danger Clause 2 constitutes. I also look with real scepticism at the suggestion that the Government would consult, when they did not consult the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law, chaired by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, at all on the network of private international law instruments they introduced in the light of us leaving the European Union; they did not consult at all on this constitutionally unacceptable Bill. Although it was very hard for us to listen to that speech, it was quite an important one. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, I think it timely that we should now adjourn until 5.15 pm. That means that broadcasting will stop. Noble Lords may leave their device and turn off their microphone and camera, but please do not close the call or shut down. We will resume proceedings and broadcast at 5.15 pm.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Lord McNicol of West Kilbride) (Lab)
My Lords, the Virtual Committee will now resume. We come to the group beginning with Amendment 3. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee, which cannot divide.
Amendment 3
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, we have adumbrated many of the same points over and over, because they keep coming up again and again, so I will try to restrict my remarks on these amendments to essentially only new points. This group of amendments effectively deletes the Government’s regulation-making power where the regulations in effect intend to say how an international treaty shall apply either as between Scotland, England, Wales and Northern Ireland—within the United Kingdom—or as between the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man, any of the Channel Islands or a British Overseas Territory.
The effect of my amendment is that the Clause 2 power cannot be used where it is proposed to apply an international convention between the parts of the UK; to apply an international convention between the UK and a relevant territory; or to amend, extend, adapt or revoke any declaration made at the time of ratification. It is wholly wrong that any of these things should be done by regulation as opposed to primary legislation. I use these amendments simply to indicate the width of the power being sought. I beg to move.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD)
My Lords, I will make two preliminary points. The first echoes what has been said in many of our proceedings so far this afternoon. Perhaps not surprisingly, as a member of the Constitution Committee, I do not think that Clause 2 should be in the Bill, for all the reasons already outlined both in committee reports and by a number of your Lordships in debates on earlier groups. I have not yet been persuaded or heard any argument to the contrary, so my primary position is that Clause 2 should not be there.
The second point is that, where these amendments relate to jurisdictions within the United Kingdom, it is a question not of whether it should be done but of how. In his response to the first group of amendments, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, gave some good reasons why, as a matter of public policy, there should be certainty in the arrangements, for argument’s sake, for enforcing a Scottish court’s order in England, as there would be for enforcing an English court’s orders in France. Therefore, it is a question not of whether there is merit in having some kind of intra-UK arrangements but rather of how it should be done.
During Second Reading I reflected briefly on this and referred to the briefing from the Bar Council. It is perhaps worth going back to it and reminding ourselves what it said in relation to the provisions in Schedule 6:
“The question, however, whether to apply an international convention’s rules between parts of the United Kingdom is often a very difficult one. Where it is to be applied, extensive amendments to that convention are often appropriate, (an example being the provisions in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, which apply a substantially modified form of the European Union rules to intra-United Kingdom cases). The Bar Council is concerned that schedule 6 does not provide sufficient safeguards in this respect and considers that it should be amended to provide the requisite clarification.”
I endorse that. It is not a question about whether it should be done. We have heard that, for example, in the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 there were requirements to amend or change the rules for intra-UK cases.
It is also important to note that we are giving powers to the national authorities—not just the United Kingdom Parliament but to Scottish Ministers and Northern Ireland Assembly Ministers. As far as I can see—I stand to be corrected if I have not noticed something —these regulations would be brought in without any consultation between the different Administrations. There is no doubt that private international law is a devolved matter as far as the Scottish Parliament is concerned, but negotiating international treaties does not affect the sovereignty of the United Kingdom, and it seems to make some sense that there should be some negotiation, or at least consultation and discussion among the constituent parts of the United Kingdom, before regulations are brought forward. As far as I can see, neither Clause 2(2) nor Schedule 6 makes any provision for that.
My position is that it is not a question about whether it is right and proper that there should be intra-UK arrangements but rather that what is proposed in the Bill does not provide adequate safeguards about how that should be done.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, the question raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness is about how legislation should be made regulating implementation between jurisdictions within the UK and between the UK and other relevant territories. It seems to me that Clause 2(2) and (3) and Schedule 6 infringe the principles of devolution, particularly in the lack of provision for consultation with Scotland and Northern Ireland, as he pointed out. They also infringe the autonomy of the other relevant territories. For those reasons it seems to me that, in addition to the general reasons about the width of Clause 2 and the points already made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, we will support amendments such as these on Report.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, as with the previous groups of amendments, the underlying theme is that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill, but we have to look at these amendments in the context that it does stand part. They would therefore limit the power conferred by that clause—that context is important.
When discussing Amendments 4 and 5, I pointed out that, in the context I have just described, they in turn would result in an unacceptable restriction of the power in Clause 2 and would mean that co-operation on private international law matters between different parts of the United Kingdom family would be significantly less well developed than it is between the United Kingdom and international partners. As a matter of policy, we see no way to justify such a position. Why, for example, should two parties in London and Edinburgh have less legal certainty about the way in which their dispute will be resolved than if the dispute was between parties based in London and Paris or New York? Of course, the point is then made that it is not a question of whether, but how. If you are able to have this regulatory-making power under Clause 2 with regard to foreign jurisdictions, why not intra-UK?
If, as suggested by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, the concern is the power being perceived as risking imposing a position on Scotland, Northern Ireland, the Crown dependencies or overseas territories without consultation or consent, I would seek to assuage those concerns. Such arrangements under the power would require the agreement of all the relevant Administrations—the United Kingdom Government and the Government of the relevant devolved Administration, Crown dependency or overseas territory. Indeed, such a measure would be considered only after the Government had consulted appropriately with relevant stakeholders, and the statutory instrument to give effect to such a “mirroring” provision—that is what it would be—would still be subject to the scrutiny of the affirmative procedure, as I noted before.
There are examples where such mirroring-type relationships already apply. We apply a modified version of the terms of the 1968 Brussels Convention, an instrument that was the forerunner to Brussels I and the recast Brussels IA regulation, between the United Kingdom and Gibraltar. That works perfectly well. Therefore, assuming Clause 2 stands part of the Bill, we do not see any reason why it should be amended in the way suggested.
I now turn to Amendment 18, which would in turn require fresh primary legislation if the UK wished to amend or revoke, at a later date, any declarations it chose to make when it first implemented a new international agreement. This would mean, for example, that if, in implementing the 2005 Hague Convention, the Government decided to replicate the current EU declaration in regard to certain insurance contracts being out of scope of the convention and then wished to review that decision later, primary legislation would be required to implement that change.
Our policy intention is to replicate the current EU declaration in relation to the exclusion of certain insurance contracts when we accede to the 2005 Hague Convention later this year, because this is how the convention rules currently apply here and, given the tight timeframe between now and the end of the transition period, it makes sense to maintain the status quo and then review in the longer term. Under the proposed amendment, if we wished to change our position following that review, we would have to wait for a primary legislative vehicle to give effect to that change. In our view, that would simply create undue delay on a matter which could be addressed through secondary legislation without losing any of the desired scrutiny. It is in these circumstances that I respectfully ask the noble and learned Lord not to press his amendments.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
One speaker has indicated that they wish to come in on the amendment.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, I note what the Minister said about fears that something might be imposed on Scotland or Northern Ireland, but as I read it, Scotland or Northern Ireland could actually impose something on England. He then went on to say that there would of course be discussion, negotiation and consultation. If that is the case, why does it not say so on the face of the Bill? Would he be minded to give further thought to these provisions and how they are drafted to secure some degree of consultation, which does not, I would argue, detract in any way from the devolution settlement?
Lord Keen of Elie
Let me be clear: I do not accept the underlying premise of the noble and learned Lord’s argument. However, I am perfectly content to look at this before the next stage of the Bill in order that I can, again, reassure him of the position. There is no intent here to proceed to regulatory-making power without the consent of the relevant devolved Administration. That would be wholly inappropriate, and I accept the noble and learned Lord’s observation that it would conflict with the devolved settlement. However, I am perfectly willing to look at this again.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
The Minister remorselessly misses the point over a period of time. The purpose of the amendment is to ask the question: is it right that you can have a different private international law settlement as between the two countries or as between the United Kingdom and the other territories? Should that be decided upon by a Minister without primary legislation? The way the Minister answers that is to say, “You have to assume that it’s got to be done by secondary legislation”, which does not deal at all with the point. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 7. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee, which cannot divide.
Amendment 7
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the next in the name of Lord Foulkes are to explore whether conflict might arise as to whether it is the responsibility of Scottish Ministers or of the Secretary of State in consultation with Scottish Ministers.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
It is appropriate that these amendments follow those we have just been discussing, 3 and 18. I am pleased that four very distinguished lawyers will participate in this debate, as well as the Minister, who is an equally distinguished lawyer. I should explain that I am not a lawyer—although, mind you, that will become blindingly obvious during the course of what I have to say. These are very much probing amendments. I, like the vast majority of members of this Committee, hope that we will not have Clause 2. However, if we have it, we will need some clarification. I will therefore confine myself just to some questions for the Minister.
On the question of the appropriate national authority, in the Bill there are two different options in relation to Scotland. First, there is approval by Scottish Ministers—it would be for the Scottish Government to decide—or approval by the Secretary of State with the consent of Scottish Ministers. Will the Minister explain the difference between the two? How is it decided which of these two is appropriate, and who decides whether it should be approved by Scottish Ministers or by the Secretary of State with their approval? Will it be clear which treaties are UK treaties, dealt with by UK legislation, or by Scottish legislation? Of course, this applies equally to Northern Ireland, although my amendments do not apply to that. Does the Minister envisage that there might be a dispute between the devolved Governments and the United Kingdom Government? We have seen a few of those recently, sadly. If so, how would the question of who would be responsible for resolving the disputes be resolved?
Secondly, are there likely to be any cross-border elements that apply both to Scotland and to England and Wales in this case, and if so, how would they be dealt with? For example, could custody of children create any difficulties? We have seen the problems regarding people moving over the border to deal with or to avoid custody being taken by one parent or the other. Could that create difficulties?
Thirdly, English law and Scots law are different with regard to issues such as power of attorney. Could power of attorney which was dealt with in one jurisdiction be different and not applicable in another jurisdiction, and would that create problems?
Fourthly, on global contract law, which, again, is one of the treaties and part of the Bill, is there an issue of which jurisdiction might settle any dispute? If so, would this go to the English or Scottish court? How would the dispute be decided, and by whom?
Finally, this Bill requires a legislative consent Motion of the Scottish Parliament. I understand that that Motion has been lodged. When does the Minister expect it to be dealt with, and does he envisage that there will be any problem? Those are my questions for the Minister. I look forward to his replies, and to the interventions of distinguished lawyers, including, in particular, two Scots lawyers of great distinction. With that, I beg to move.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness
My Lords, as the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, has said, it is welcome that we have this opportunity to probe. In his Explanatory Statement, which appeared next to this amendment on the Marshalled List, the noble Lord said that it was
“to explore whether conflict might arise as to whether it is the responsibility of Scottish Ministers or of the Secretary of State in consultation with Scottish Ministers.”
But, as he indicated in his remarks just now, that is not actually in the Bill, which speaks of
“the Secretary of State acting with the consent of the Scottish Ministers”.
That is a crucial difference.
There is no doubt that negotiating or joining an international agreement on private international law is a reserved matter for the Government of the United Kingdom as a sovereign state. Equally, there is no doubt that private international law is a devolved matter. Section 126(4)(a) of the Scotland Act makes that expressly clear. Therefore, the implementation of these agreements is within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament.
It is right, therefore, that Scottish Ministers should be one of the appropriate national authorities. Equally, there will be occasions—perhaps a number of occasions —when it makes sense for the United Kingdom Secretary of State to make regulations with respect to the whole of the United Kingdom with the consent of Scottish Ministers. In paragraph 8 of their legislative consent memorandum, the Scottish Government draw attention to this fact:
“In 2018, the Scottish Ministers (with the approval of the Scottish Parliament) consented to two UK statutory instruments … including devolved material relating to the 2005 and 2007 Hague Conventions.”
So there is a very recent precedent for regulations to be made in the sphere of private international law. It has been done by a United Kingdom statutory instrument, but with consent not just in the case of Scottish Ministers but with the approval of the Scottish Parliament. These are often pragmatic matters, but the fact that it requires consent means that the UK Government cannot override the Scottish Parliament. The noble Lord, Lord Foulkes asked whether the legislative consent Motion has been passed; I checked yesterday—I do not think it has. But paragraph 19 of the Scottish Government’s memorandum says:
“The Bill is drafted to respect the devolution position: the Scottish Ministers make provision for implementation in Scotland with UK Ministers only being able to do so with the consent of the Scottish Ministers. Legislation in this area has in the past been taken forward on a UK basis and it may be convenient for it to be so in the future so the Scottish Government recommends this approach.”
There is one final matter which is not really germane to the terms and text of the amendments but I shall be grateful if the Minister is able to respond. Given that the implementation can be a matter for the Scottish Government, what engagement is he aware of with Scottish Government officials in some of the negotiations on these private international law agreements? For example, two agreements are referred to in paragraph 53 of the Explanatory Notes of the 2019 Singapore agreement and the 2019 Hague Convention. Is the Minister aware of any engagement or involvement by Scottish Government officials? Quite clearly, if the next step is implementation, it is important that Scotland is a party to these negotiations, albeit at the end of the day, as responsibility for joining these international agreements rests with the United Kingdom.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, explained in his introduction that these are probing amendments, and I hope that the Minister will understand my remarks in that context. I would like to speak to both amendments but my main focus is on Amendment 8, which seeks to leave out sub-paragraph (ii) in Clause 2(7)(b)—that is, the reference to the Secretary of State acting with the consent of Scottish Ministers. However, anything that I might say now is without prejudice to my support for the notice given by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and others of their opposition to the clause standing part of the Bill at all.
I have three points to make. The first reinforces what others have already said. It is important to know which of these authorities is expected to exercise the powers referred to in this clause. That is because if it is the Scottish Ministers, paragraph 4 of Schedule 6 applies and the regulation has to be laid before the Scottish Parliament as a Scottish statutory instrument under Section 29 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010. If it is the Secretary of State, it comes under paragraph 2 of Schedule 6 as a statutory instrument in this Parliament and the Scottish Parliament will have no say in the matter at all. The word “or”, which lies between those two alternatives, gives no guidance as to which of them, or in what circumstances, it is to be. My first question, following what others have said is: why is that?
This clause is about implementation and application—implementation in Clause 2(1) and application as between the relevant jurisdictions in Clause 2(2). I think that I could understand the position if the Bill said that implementation in Clause 2(1) was a matter for Scottish Ministers and application as between the jurisdictions was a matter for the Secretary of State with the consent of Scottish Ministers, but that is not how the Bill stands at the moment.
For example, on implementation, if one were considering the UK acceding to the Lugano convention, about which so much has already been said, it would seem that nothing more is needed to implement it into Scots law as an instrument as the instance of Scottish Ministers. One can look again at the illustrative statutory instrument—the Singapore convention, which the Minister attached to his helpful letter of 5 May. It gives the force of law to that convention in England and Wales. If the same were to be done for Scotland, surely that would be a matter for the Scottish Ministers alone. Therefore, in the context of implementation, what part has the Secretary of State to play at all?
My second point concerns whether the reference to the Secretary of State is consistent with the Scotland Act 1998. Paragraph 7 of Schedule 5 to that Act provides that international relations are reserved matters, but paragraph 7(2) states that paragraph 7(1) does not apply to
“observing and implementing international obligations”
or
“assisting Ministers of the Crown in relation to any matter to which”
paragraph 7(1) applies. Therefore, the matters dealt with in paragraph 7(2) are devolved, as indeed is private international law itself, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, has pointed out.
This clause is about implementation and application, and it would seem to fall squarely within paragraph 7(2). I should have thought that that reinforces the point that these should be matters for Scottish Ministers only. Section 53 of the Scotland Act provides for a general transfer of functions exercisable by a Minister of the Crown to the Scottish Ministers. That reinforces my query as to what function the Secretary of State has in this matter at all.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I am of course speaking as a Welshman. We have a very limited interest in the provisions being discussed, but I have some questions. Since the time of Henry VIII, who has a great deal to answer for, the jurisdiction of England and Wales has been merged. Only in very recent years has there been a suggestion that Wales should have its separate jurisdiction. We are one of the three jurisdictions that will be subject to the Bill’s provisions; we go along with England. I would like to know whether there is any prospect of consultation with Welsh Ministers about what provisions are being brought into effect, because private international law covers such a wide range of things. It has particular relevance to family life in Wales as much as anywhere else. Will there be any consultation? If so, what will it be?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I simply underline the points made by my noble friend Lord Foulkes and the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Hope. As far as my noble friend Lord Foulkes is concerned, the purpose of these amendments is to probe; as far as I am concerned, they illustrate the lack of thought that has gone into Clause 2. They simply underline the sense that there should not be a Clause 2.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am obliged to the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for tabling what he very candidly pointed out were probing amendments. I am also obliged to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, who drew on his experience of the devolved Administrations and was able to outline the position in this matter. I will come in a moment to address the questions raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, in the context of these provisions.
As the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, pointed out, two authorities are identified in this part of the Bill that might proceed to implement matters of private international law in Scotland. That is consistent with legislation in other areas. The Secretary of State might decide, with the consent of the Scottish Ministers, to make UK-wide provision for implementation. That is why he is one of the identified national authorities, because there are circumstances in which the Scottish Ministers would be entirely content for there to be UK-wide provision.
Alternatively, if that is not the case, Scottish Ministers may themselves then proceed as a national authority to implement the matter in domestic law. That is because, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out, the position is that—I am sorry, something came up on another phone and rather distracted me—the implementation of private international law is a devolved issue under the Scotland Act, so allowance is made for both provisions.
As regards this Bill, an LCM was discussed between officials. The Scottish Ministers have recommended that such an LCM should be provided, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, pointed out the terms of the recommendation that Scottish Ministers have made to the Scottish Parliament with regard to this matter. Indeed, there was prior discussion about these proposals last year, when the Lord Chancellor, for example, was in communication with the Scottish Government on matters of the convention. Perhaps I can clarify this by reference to the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope. The Secretary of State may be a national authority with the consent of Scottish Ministers because Scottish Ministers may, as sometimes happens, wish to see UK-wide regulations made here for implementation. Alternatively, as the national authority, they may choose to do that for themselves. The Secretary of State clearly does have the power to do that because under the Scotland Act there is the power to legislate for the entirety of the United Kingdom as regards the implementation of a matter that is otherwise within the devolved competences, so that does not raise an issue either.
With regard to the matter of whether or when it would be one national authority or the other, that is simply a matter that will be discussed, as it is in other contexts, between the United Kingdom Government and Scottish Ministers. If Scottish Ministers are content that the UK Government should legislate UK-wide on this matter, that will happen. If they are content for that to be done, then Scottish Ministers will deal with the matter. The Secretary of State cannot deal with the matter without the consent of Scottish Ministers, so I hope that that puts minds at rest in this regard.
As regards the identification of the Secretary of State as an authority and the reference, for example, in the Scotland Act to a Minister of the Crown, I accept that the reference in this Bill is more limited. Because I cannot answer immediately, I will consider why it was thought appropriate to limit it to the Secretary of State as opposed to the wider reference to a Minister of the Crown. But I will look at that to see whether there is an issue there that needs to be addressed.
As regards consultation on the implementation of international treaties, that is not an issue, but as regards entering into international treaties, that is of course a reserved matter. I recognise that it is appropriate that Scottish Ministers and others should be consulted on these matters for their interests when they arise. I do not understand that to be a difficulty in this context, nor a matter that would require express provisions in the terms of this Bill.
I thank the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, for his probing amendment and I hope that I have been able to put minds at rest as regards why there are two identified national authorities for the purposes of Clause 2. In the event that Clause 2 stands, these are appropriate alternative mechanisms for the implementation of these provisions.
One final matter raised by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, was the issue of contract, but of course, where you have a contract, it will have a choice of jurisdiction and a choice of law. If the contract has Scotland as a choice of jurisdiction and Scots law as the choice of law, that will be binding if we have a situation in which, for instance, the Lugano provision applies. I hope that that answers the query in so far as I have understood it.
I cannot give a precise date for the provision of the LCM, but as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, himself indicated, Scottish Ministers have recommended the granting of an LCM, and it is not anticipated that there will be any difficulty. With that, I invite the noble Lord to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
As no further speakers have indicated that they wish to intervene on this amendment, I call Lord Foulkes.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
I apologise for jumping in a little prematurely.
This has been a very useful debate and the Minister has answered a number of my questions. It is awfully useful that he is taking away the third point raised by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, about Ministers of the Crown. But the debate has highlighted that there is a difference of opinion between the noble and learned Lords, Lord Wallace and Lord Hope, on the one side, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on the other. Now, it is not unusual to find different opinions among two or three lawyers, but it highlights that there may be a problem around whether this is to be dealt with by the Secretary of State, after consultation with and the permission of Scottish Ministers, or directly by Scottish Ministers. I hope that is something that can be looked at further.
Nevertheless, in the light of the explanations given, I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 14. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the Question is put makes that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee. This Committee cannot be divided.
Amendment 14
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment and the next in the name of Lord Foulkes are to explore any issues regarding how this Bill might impact on the constitutional position of the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories in relation to the United Kingdom.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, this brings me to another of my special interests, and one that I have been pursuing for some time. Amendments 14 and 15 concern the Isle of Man, the Channel Islands—namely Jersey, Guernsey, Alderney and Sark—and the dependent territories. I will not mention all of the dependent territories, because those such as the Falklands are not quite so relevant in this context, but they include Gibraltar, the Cayman Islands, Turks and Caicos, the British Virgin Islands and Bermuda. I mention those particularly and not by chance, because many are well known as tax havens and the offshore basis for companies whose principal trade and activities are elsewhere, and not on those islands.
My first question is this. In an earlier intervention, the Minister indicated that there has been consultation with the islands’ authorities, and that they had approved the provisions in the Bill. But with whom were these consultations? Were they with just the governor, or were they with the directly elected councils and parliaments of the various overseas territories and Crown dependencies? It is important that the elected representatives were involved in these discussions. Secondly, what response has there been? I understand from what the Minister said that the islands have all agreed, but was that agreement conditional in any way?
Lord Thomas of Gresford
My Lords, I have nothing to add to the points succinctly made by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord for what I understand are, again, probing amendments. As I perhaps explained, the Crown dependencies and overseas territories have a constitutional relationship with the United Kingdom whereby the United Kingdom is responsible for their foreign relations. This means that the Crown dependencies and overseas territories do not generally themselves join international agreements, including agreements in the area of private international law, which we are concerned with here. Instead, an agreement that applies in the United Kingdom can usually be extended to apply also in a Crown dependency or overseas territory. We work with those Crown dependencies and overseas territories to determine where and when they would wish to have a private international law agreement apply between them and other contracting parties. The scope of the United Kingdom’s ratification of that agreement is then extended to them. This means that multilateral agreements extended to the Crown dependencies and overseas territories apply only between those jurisdictions on the one hand and the other contracting parties on the other, but not between the Crown dependencies and overseas territories and the UK. To apply the agreement with the UK, there needs to be a separate mirroring arrangement, as it is sometimes termed. I referred to that in responding to earlier amendments.
The general power within Clause 2(3) allows the United Kingdom to maintain and develop a private international law framework with the Crown dependencies and overseas territories as well as with foreign partners. That is the intent here.
The noble Lord asked about consultation. There was consultation, not with the governors of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories, but with each attorney-general and their officials. My understanding is that they were entirely content with the way in which these provisions are extended to the benefit of the Crown dependencies and overseas territories.
The noble Lord raised the question of entrustment. It does not directly arise in this context, but entrustment is where the United Kingdom essentially consents to a Crown dependency, for example, entering into an agreement at the level of international law. That can sometimes happen where, for example, a Crown dependency wants a reciprocal agreement with a foreign partner.
The behaviour of the overseas territories is monitored by the Foreign and Commonwealth Office and there are instances in which, for the purposes of good governance, the United Kingdom will intervene in the affairs of an overseas territory. The noble Lord himself gave an example in respect of the Turks and Caicos Islands where that has been done.
As regards the choice of court or arbitration that the noble Lord referred to, in so far as I understand his point, I would respond that it is up to parties to a private contract to determine how their disputes, if any, will be resolved. For that purpose, the parties can choose a law or legal system to apply to their private contract and the jurisdiction in which their disputes will be resolved. That is an issue that arises only in the context of their private contract and in the context of what we are dealing with here, which is private international law. At the level of private international law, we are concerned with the way in which other jurisdictions respect that law, respect the choice of jurisdiction and, indeed, then respect the judgment of that jurisdiction when it comes to enforcement.
I hope that answers the points raised by the noble Lord. I thank him for the probing amendments, but I invite him to withdraw Amendment 14.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness McIntosh of Hudnall) (Lab)
My Lords, I am not aware that any other noble Lords have expressed a wish to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock
My Lords, I am really very grateful to the Minister for a helpful reply; he has dealt with each of the points that I raised very properly and helpfully. This is an issue that I feel strongly about generally and will need to pursue in another context in the light of that. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content” when the question is put made that clear during debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; this Committee cannot divide.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I believe that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill. We have discussed these matters at considerable length today. I simply make the point that it will be constitutionally unprecedented if we end up in a situation where the Government have complete power in relation to private international law agreements in the future, not only to implement the changes to domestic law that are required by secondary legislation but to make regulations that relate to those agreements or connect with them, which goes very much wider than the terms of the agreement itself.
We have discussed considerably today the justification for this unprecedented power and it has been demonstrated —mainly on the question about timely implementation—not to withstand any degree of examination. I feel strongly that the House should reject Clause 2; we cannot do it in this Committee but, when the time comes, we should vote to remove it from the Bill. I think it is a separate debate as to whether there should be a special power in relation to Lugano, but this provision gives unlimited power for an unlimited time to introduce the consequences of international agreements into our domestic law with no primary legislation.
One final point, which has been made by the Constitution Committee, is that the consequence of doing this by secondary legislation is that it can be challenged in the courts and set aside by the courts on the grounds of judicial review. So not only is it constitutionally inappropriate, not only will it damage the quality of our private international law, but it will lead to legal uncertainty. Actions will be brought in court but set aside. I will invite the House on Report not to allow this provision to stand part. There is unanimity in this Committee with the exception—the plucky exception—of the Minister in that respect.
Lord Pannick
My Lords, I agree with the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I gave my reasons earlier for thinking that Clause 2 should not stand part and I shall not repeat them. I shall add just one further point. There has been discussion this afternoon, particularly from the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Foulkes of Cumnock, about the disadvantages of Virtual Proceedings, disadvantages notwithstanding the exceptional efforts made by the clerks and the staff, for which we are all very grateful, to ensure that these Virtual Proceedings can take place. The additional disadvantage that I want to mention—additional to those who have already been identified—arises from the correct observation of the noble and learned Lord that the Minister stands alone on this subject; all other speakers have explained why Clause 2 is objectionable.
The point is that if we were on the Floor of the House, the Minister would not just hear and see those who are speaking; he would see and hear expressions of disapproval from all around the House, including from his own Benches; he would sense the degree of concern that there undoubtedly is about the constitutional implications of Clause 2. This debate has highlighted those concerns, but I hope the Minister will understand that there is a very widespread concern around the House, not just from those who have spoken today but from those who would be present in Committee were normal proceedings to apply. By their presence and their body language, other Members of the Committee would indicate their profound concern. I hope he will take all that into account before Report.
Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)
I am in a slightly different position from many noble Lords because I joined this Committee sitting simply because of the strong feeling on the Constitution Committee, which I chair, that Clause 2 should not be part of the Bill. I am not a lawyer, so I have listened to the last nearly four hours with great interest. I knew that this was a complex area; having listened to all that has been said I think it even more incredible that the Government are actually suggesting that issues of this kind should be decided simply on their say-so and by secondary legislation. I cannot comment on the details and complexities of Lugano or anything else, but I have heard qualified senior lawyers talking about this, and anyone who has heard that would be convinced that there should be proper parliamentary consideration of all these issues before the Government are allowed to take any direct action. It is simply wrong, I think, that these matters will be determined by secondary legislation.
The Constitution Committee was unanimous in its view: we do not divide on party lines anyway, but it was not a difficult discussion, because members of the committee thought it was blindingly obvious that Clause 2 should not be part of the Bill.
We did, of course, have another thought at the back of our minds. That is the fact that we have been increasingly concerned, over many years, by the way in which the Government have used—or maybe abused—secondary legislation. We have seen an increase in the powers taken through secondary legislation. It is a question of not just the number of SIs but their content. The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred earlier to some of the consequences that might arise from this situation in the creation of new criminal offences if Clause 2 remains. We have seen new criminal offences created by SIs produced by the Government. I know that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, will speak later; I am sure that he will emphasise this very significantly.
Put simply, the Constitution Committee thinks it wrong that international agreements should be dealt with by the Government through secondary legislation. I certainly hope that either the Government will think again about this or that this clause can be taken out on Report. I share the concerns expressed by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer, my noble friend Lord Adonis and others about the procedure whereby we cannot vote at this time and express our opinion properly. However, I urge the Government to consider absolutely all that has been said today and realise that it is not good for parliamentary democracy and accountability for Clause 2 to remain part of the Bill.
Lord Judge (CB)
During the rehearsal for this afternoon, I was asked to say my piece, and I used two words. I said, “Henry VIII”. Just in case it was not apparent to anybody who heard me say that,I was trying to convey, as I did on 17 March, when the rather claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us, that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive power in the Executive and does so by secondary—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, the Committee is having some problem in hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and I wonder whether his connection is stable.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
Perhaps start again, or perhaps go at least two sentences back.
Lord Judge
I will try again. On Henry VIII, I was trying to convey that the Bill unnecessarily invests excessive powers—
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
Lord Judge, I am afraid that there is a problem with your connection. I suggest that we move to the next speaker and hope to come back to the noble and learned Lord at the end of the list, by which I hope his connection will be better. If that is acceptable, I ask the broadcasters to please unmute the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith.
Lord Goldsmith (Lab)
My Lords, I was looking forward to hearing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and saying that I agree entirely with what he said. I still imagine that I will agree with him, even if he has to come in a little later in the debate.
I start by declaring two interests. The first is as a practising lawyer whose practice includes international, commercial and public law cases, so some of the things discussed today affect the practice that I carry on. The second, and more important for present purposes, is that I am the recently appointed chairman of your Lordships’ EU Sub-Committee on International Agreements. It is in that capacity that I put my name forward to speak today.
My focus is on Clause 2. I have not spoken in any of the other debates that have taken place but, for all the reasons powerfully advanced by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton, my noble friend Lady Taylor of Bolton and the noble Lord, Lord Pannick —and in the future, no doubt, by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—I see this as a very unusual and constitutionally unprecedented thing. I could not improve on the speeches made already, including those of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, in an earlier debate, and the noble Lord, Lord Anderson of Ipswich.
However, I want to deal with one aspect in my capacity as chairman of the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee. It has authorised me to write to my noble friend Lady Taylor expressing its agreement with the conclusion that the Constitution Committee had reached in its report and concurring with its opinion that the clause, if it goes through, would reduce parliamentary scrutiny of international agreements inappropriately.
It is not an answer, as my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer has rightly said, to say that this is dealing purely with technical things. I know from experience that, although they may be technical, they are matters of great moment and matters of great importance both to the people who are making agreements and to this country. It is common for lawyers to be asked to advise which law should be put into an agreement or which law should govern any disputes that have to be dealt with, and the Bill would affect that.
As I understand it, two principal answers have been given about why the Government say this is appropriate. One is that all agreements will have been subject to parliamentary scrutiny, and that is the bit on which I particularly want to focus. The problem with that is that, as the Constitution Committee said,
“current mechanisms available to Parliament to scrutinise treaties through CRAG are limited and flawed”.
That is particularly so because of the gaps in the CRaG coverage—some of them have been mentioned today, such as model law—and the timing of CRaG means that an agreement will have been concluded by the time, strictly speaking, that the CRaG processes come into effect.
I shall quote one paragraph, paragraph 19, from the Constitution Committee’s report on CRaG, Parliamentary Scrutiny of Treaties. Professor David Howarth from the University of Cambridge observed:
“From the Whitehall point of view, everything is perfect. The whole process is under the control of Ministers. Parliament does not really get a look-in until after signature and, even after signature, the CRAG processes are very difficult for anyone to operate, especially in the Commons where the Government controls the agenda.”
That is the problem with CRaG.
The committee which I am honoured to chair may be an important part of the response to that lack of scrutinising ability. We are only in the foothills of our work, and we do not yet know how well this will work. Quite a lot will depend on how the Government engage with us and with Parliament more generally. I hope that they will wholeheartedly engage not only once an agreement has been concluded but at earlier stages. I know there is some disappointment already that, for example, the amendments made by this House to the previous Trade Bill have not found a place in the current incarnation of the Trade Bill.
Some assurances have been given in the context of the conclusion of trade agreements. Dr Fox made some important statements about the consultation and engagement that will take place. In its paper Public Consultation on Trade Negotiations with the United States, the DIT repeated the assurances that it gave. For example, paragraph 39 of that report repeats commitments made in its earlier paper, including,
“confirmation that at the start of negotiations, the Government will publish its Outline Approach, which will include our negotiating objectives, and an accompanying Scoping Assessment, setting out the potential economic impacts of any agreement.”
The second argument perhaps put forward is that the issue will be only yes or no and therefore the affirmative procedure, as proposed in the Bill, will be enough. I am not persuaded by that argument. It will often not be a question of yes or no. For example, there are treaties which contain options for the member states, such as powers to derogate from particular provisions. Under this binary approach to approval or engagement by Parliament, how will those treaties be considered? Or there may be methods of implementation which are available under the agreement. But more fundamental is the fact that if there is a power to amend that could strengthen the hand of the Government in negotiations, and there is some evidence that in some countries where scrutiny is not limited to yes or no, that is the case.
It seems inevitable that unless the Government drop this, as many noble Lords are urging them to do, this will come back on Report. If in doing so, the Government intend to rely upon the argument about the effect of parliamentary scrutiny under CRaG, they will need to give a very clear explanation of how they will engage with Parliament and the EU International Agreements Sub-Committee so that we can see the reality of what parliamentary scrutiny of the negotiation and conclusion of agreements will be. I look forward to those explanations being given, and in the meantime I support the amendment.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, and the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, I am not a lawyer, but I care about democracy and I care very much that if the Government make promises, they should actually deliver on them. Clause 2 is a case of the Government reneging on promises made only last year. I voice my concern about Clause 2, which would allow Ministers to subjugate our national law to international agreements and the jurisdiction of foreign courts, with minimal parliamentary scrutiny from people such as noble Lords, who actually know what they are talking about.
Last year, the Government promised us that we would take back control of our laws and our courts; there was no caveat that we would then delegate our laws to international organisations with nothing more than a tick-box exercise by Parliament. The clause gives far too much power to international trade organisations and allows model laws to be imposed on us at the whim of a trade Minister.
I am also concerned that this measure would be better addressed in the Trade Bill, so that we could develop a comprehensive and coherent system of scrutiny for agreements relating to international trade. Otherwise, we end up with different scrutiny arrangements for trade agreements and the private international law agreements that might go alongside them. Will the Minister please explain how this clause fits with the Government’s promise of Parliament taking back control of our laws and courts? I look forward to Report and the vote that I am positive will happen.
Lord Thomas of Gresford
Two questions arise when laws are made by secondary legislation: is there democratic legitimacy and has there been proper scrutiny? If private international law raised simply technical issues, that might be less important. But as has been said so often today, private international law raises a wide of range of matters; in particular, family law issues, where basic human rights are frequently involved.
On parliamentary scrutiny, the Minister referred to the ample opportunity for debate in the affirmative procedure. We all know about the affirmative procedure. It is a yes/no question, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, pointed out a moment ago. The matters before the House cannot be amended and frequently, nothing happens as a result of any Motion that may be moved in opposition. If it is Her Majesty’s Opposition’s policy not to vote in favour of a fatal amendment, the whole process is completely nugatory. I have heard Labour Whips tell their members not to vote in the case of a fatal amendment simply for that reason alone. Their turn will come.
The affirmative procedure is not in any way proper parliamentary scrutiny. Scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 has proved to be a non-event. It has already been quoted, but I will do so again: the Constitution Committee referred to that procedure being “limited and flawed” and indeed never properly applied.
It could be said that you can have democratic legitimacy providing there is direct participation in the legislative process by means of consultation. It is very noticeable that in this Bill there is no provision for consultation. Schedule 6 is devoid of any mention of it. That gives an opportunity for those affected by legislation directly to influence its content. Consultation is not everything: it has its problems. There are issues, for example, about the quality of the consultation document. That document may not reach the hands of everybody who is affected. The choice of who gets the document will be with the Government. Organisations or individuals may not have the time or the skills to deal with it. Strong groups who are well organised may have a disproportionate influence in the consultation process. It is of course useless, unless the Government are prepared to take the views of the consultees into account.
Lord Howarth of Newport (Lab)
My Lords, I agree that Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill. Under our normal procedure for Committee in the Chamber, I would have been able to come in earlier when I saw how widely the debates on previous groups were ranging. However, with the rigidity of Virtual Proceedings, I was unable to do so.
I underscore the points made by all noble Lords, all of whom—except the Minister—have objected to Clause 2. This clause is constitutionally offensive on a variety of grounds. The issues that arise in private international law are many, varied and important. They may be complex and technical, but they are not obscure or trivial. In family disputes, questions of divorce, child custody and child maintenance can cause great anguish to all concerned. By definition, if a commercial dispute comes to court, it is of great importance to the parties involved.
What is Parliament for? Our responsibility is not simply to wave through significant new legislation, but to scrutinise it and satisfy ourselves on behalf of the people of our country that it is appropriate. That can be done only through the processes of primary legislation. It cannot be done through our procedures for regulations. Even my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s super-affirmative procedure would not be satisfactory. The Minister has suggested that these regulation-making procedures provide ample opportunity, but they do not because there is no scope for amendment and scrutiny is still relatively perfunctory compared to the lengthy process of primary legislation.
Hitherto, new private international law has been incorporated into our domestic law by way of primary legislation. The Minister disputed that, but he was unable to give us convincing examples of when that had not happened. What we are seeing is part of an objectionable behaviour pattern on the part of the Government. They seek to evade full parliamentary scrutiny and arrogate power to themselves to save themselves inconvenience.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was about to discourse on the matter of Henry VIII powers—I hope he will. We see egregious Henry VIII powers in this Bill, including an open-ended power to implement any future international agreement, even if it overthrows existing primary legislation. We see the deployment of those innocent-sounding but weasel words "in connection with", "consequential" or "supplementary" legislation, which would enable this Government to smuggle in very significant legislative changes in an arbitrary fashion.
Clause 2(5)(a) and Schedule 6, concerning enforcement powers, would allow the creation of new criminal offences, the extension of existing ones or increases in the penalties applying to them. Again and again, your Lordships’ House has said that is not an acceptable practice on the part of the Government when legislating. We see in Clause 2(5)(b) the Government taking a cavalier approach to questions of data protection, which are extremely sensitive and important matters in this era of surveillance capitalism and in the context of measures being taken to protect us against a pandemic.
At Clause 2(5)(c) a power to alter the regime for legal aid without scrutiny is brought in. This too is a super-sensitive policy and legal area, as we know from the history of the Legal Aid, Sentencing and Punishment of Offenders Act 2012, in consequence of which, I am sorry to say, the Government forfeited the trust of Parliament, the people and the legal profession.
The Government’s justifications for taking these open-ended, wide-ranging powers in Clause 2 are specious. They suggest that there may be an urgent need to legislate; we have had a significant discussion about the Lugano convention. The intervention by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, made it very clear that, while there may be urgency for us as a country to resolve whether or not we wish to participate in the Lugano convention, that is certainly not something to be dealt with by statutory instrument. It will possibly need to be dealt with by fast-track legislation, though again we should always be wary of that. There is certainly no case for allowing it to go through under the terms of this law.
It is almost comic to see the Government plead that they will be eager to implement Hague conventions. Let me gently remind the Minister that successive Governments of this country took 63 years to legislate to implement in our domestic law the 1954 Hague Convention for the Protection of Cultural Property in the Event of Armed Conflict. It did not get on to the statute book until 2017; despite endless pressure from Parliament, successive Governments refused to make time to legislate for it.
The Government make the case that, as there is little or no scope to amend international agreements, scrutiny by Parliament would be otiose. However, it is for Parliament to determine on principle whether or not to adopt important new legislation. If it decides that it is appropriate, it is again for Parliament to determine the manner in which that legislation is to be implemented in the specific circumstances of the United Kingdom—what we might refer to as the vernacular of implementation.
The Minister conceded that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 would not permit scrutiny of model laws, but he went on to say that model laws are a very important area of law. Surely, therefore, we need something beyond the zero scrutiny that CRaG would permit. The point has just been made by the noble Lord who spoke previously that statutory instruments fail to provide the same legal certainty as primary legislation. Recourse can be had to the provisions of the Human Rights Act and it may always be possible that what is legislated by way of statutory instrument can subsequently be modified and superseded by the development of the common law.
The Minister sought to assuage the anxieties of some of us that the provisions in the Bill would ride somewhat roughshod over devolution and fail to respect the status and responsibilities of the devolved Administrations. He gave some satisfaction in what he said about Scotland, but I think no satisfaction to the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, or myself about how the provisions affect Wales. Of course, in Wales there is no provision for co-decision by Ministers in the devolved territory as there is in Scotland and Northern Ireland.
Finally, the Minister, in pleading with us to be reassured, pointed out that, up until now and for a long period, the adoption of private international laws had been a matter for European Union competence. But we have just spent four years in a political convulsion to establish the right to make our own laws in our own Parliament, accountable to our own people, and for Parliament not to be obliged to rubber-stamp obscure deals made on our behalf by people who are not accountable. We have sought in all the agonising political disputes of the last four years to re-establish not executive absolutism but parliamentary governance. Having gone to all this trouble, we cannot accept the provisions of this legislation. Clause 2 should not stand part of the Bill.
Lord Hope of Craighead
My Lords, this matter has been so fully covered by the speeches already made that I have little to add other than my full support for what has been said. I hope very much that we may be able to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, before the Minister speaks.
I do, however, wish to emphasise two points. First, I refer to what I said in support of Amendments 7 and 8 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. The lack of clarity about whether it is the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State who are to exercise the powers referred to in Clause 2(1) and Clause 2 (2) is surely an indication, among others, that this Bill is seeking to do too much. The umbrella phrase “any international agreement”—I stress the word “any”—indicates that it is intended to catch a wide variety of international transactions and model laws relating to private international law. At present, with the possible exception of Lugano, we have very little idea of what they might be. It seems likely, however, that they will not be many. The pressure on Parliament, if we were to proceed by way of public Bills and not statutory instruments, would be quite limited. It is therefore hard to see why we are having to go down this road at all.
Secondly, there is no sunset clause in the Bill. I could understand it, although I would not like it, if the Bill were designed to deal only with measures that needed to be enforced before the end of the implementation period or shortly afterwards. But without such a clause, the Bill is entirely open-ended; committing all international agreements and model laws to the statutory instruments procedure, as a permanent feature of our laws whatever they may be, seems to me to be a hostage to fortune.
Lord Adonis
It is very clear that the Committee is overwhelmingly against the Government on Clause 2, although we hope that the Minister will reflect further before Report. Assuming that the Government stick to Clause 2 on Report, it is clear that the House will want to debate it further and, probably, divide on it.
I turn to the procedural issues that are raised thereby. First, although we pay tribute to the officials and the remarkable technical team who have managed our proceedings—and done so, I would say, to the efficiency limits of the technology available—our reflection on the last few hours is that it has been patchy at best. We have not been able to hear in this debate from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, one of our most distinguished Members, and I could barely hear the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, another of our distinguished colleagues, when he was speaking earlier. I do not think we would find it acceptable in any other circumstances to proceed to a vote or a decision of the House while key Members were being silenced and were unable to participate in the debate.
The noble Lord, Lord Pannick, referred earlier to the interchange between Members, which of course is necessarily reduced when we are online, but perhaps I may also draw attention to something that has become very clear in this debate. We need to separate the ability to vote online from the process of debate that leads to votes. Clearly, we cannot have a Report stage until it is possible to have a reliable system of voting online. I hope that our colleagues on the Procedure Committee—I think that my noble friend Lord Foulkes, who is here, is one, as well as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—will bring to the attention of the committee an issue that has become very clear in this debate: the big divorce between the ability to participate online, which is extremely restricted, and the engagement of the House as a whole.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
: My Lords, I am hoping to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon, in a second, but, before doing so, I should say that after the noble and learned Lord I intend to call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whose contribution we were not able to hear earlier. I understand that his connection is now properly established. I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris of Aberavon. Is he with us? I think we must assume that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Morris, will not be joining us at this time. Is the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, available?
Lord Judge
Good. Do you mind if I ask whether you heard anything that I said when I started last time?
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
In the interest of making sure that everybody hears everything that the noble and learned Lord has to say, perhaps I may suggest that he starts again from the top. I think that would be preferable to trying to start in the middle.
Lord Judge
I thank the Deputy Chairman very much. I apologise to those who have already heard me say this but, when I was tested at the rehearsal to make sure that my machine was working and I was well plugged in, my only response was “Henry VIII”. It was a wonderfully short speech. Effectively, it said what I wanted to say. However, just in case anybody does not know what I meant, I was intending to convey my view of the Bill, as I did on 17 March at Second Reading, when the awful, claustrophobic shades of the pandemic were closing in on us. Having listened to the debate and read the report of the Constitution Committee, I summarised my view of the Bill by saying that it unnecessarily vests excessive power in the Executive by means of secondary, not primary, legislation. It is a very simple principle and it is wrong. At the time, I submitted to the House in what I hope was my characteristic way—understated—that it was not exactly regulation-light.
The result of reading the report and listening to today’s debate—I do not wish to add to the many wonderful contributions that have been made—is that I can be less circumspect this time: this Bill is now heavy. It is overweight with regulation.
Why can we not be realistic about what the affirmative process actually does? It is not a means of controlling the Government. When, in 2015, a go was had at trying to stop a Conservative Government using Labour Government legislation to achieve £4.5 billion-worth of change to fiscal issues, it was apparently regarded as a constitutional outrage. That is us. As far as the Commons is concerned, unless something has happened very recently, it is 1979 since it rejected an affirmative resolution. That suggests that if we are honest with ourselves, the affirmative resolution process, even the super-affirmative, is not nearly as good as every Government of any colour always says it is supposed to be.
The fact of the matter, although I cannot identify a particular Henry VIII clause here save and except the usual ones about amending and getting rid of primary legislation, is that, from his underworld, Henry VIII has hacked into departmental computers. Alternatively, he has been inserted—resurrected and put into departmental computers. We must be very careful about attaching so much weight to the use of secondary legislation that might affect individuals’, companies’ and organisations’ rights. That is really all I want to say at this stage. I will say something about the regulations relating to the creation of criminal offences, but I support the concerns that have been expressed all round. Thank you very much for helping me to get that through, Deputy Chairman.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
We were very glad to have your contribution.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, for some years I had the privilege of serving on the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee under the chairmanship of my noble friend Lady Thomas of Winchester. That committee has increasingly come to stand as a crucial protector of the role of Parliament, alongside the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, whom I was delighted we were able to hear. The committee has acted in attempting to limit the Executive improperly taking powers for government Ministers to change the law by delegated legislation in significant ways and ways for which delegated legislation has never in the past been deemed appropriate.
The committee usually expresses itself, or certainly has until recent years, in circumspect terms and the Government have traditionally accepted its recommendations. The committee has left it to the House to implement its recommendations if the Government do not agree to do so. The clarity and decisiveness of the recommendation in paragraph 15 of the committee’s report on this occasion is anything but circumspect. The conclusion speaks for itself:
“We are of the view that clause 2 represents an inappropriate delegation of power and we recommend that it should be removed from the face of the Bill.”
The committee is forcefully supported by the report of the Constitution Committee, chaired by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor, from whom we have heard, and includes the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, from whom we have also heard. Paragraph 19 of that report contains the kernel of its conclusion:
“We are not persuaded by the arguments the Government has made in support of this power. If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”
Another important point made by the Constitution Committee, mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Howarth, is that delegated legislation is amenable to judicial review so that future regulations implementing international treaties could be the subject of challenge. It is entirely right that delegated legislation, which involves an exercise of executive power of itself, should be capable of being challenged as unlawful.
However, it would be a highly undesirable consequence of the Bill if, when enacted, the lawfulness of conventions entered into by the United Kingdom Government as a matter of our domestic law could not be guaranteed to our international convention partners until such challenges were determined.
I also agree with the point made by the Constitution Committee, my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Goldsmith, that the CraG procedure is at present inadequate and ineffective as an instrument of parliamentary scrutiny.
In the light of all that, can the Minister say whether, given the Constitution Committee’s report published on 4 May, he is prepared to go away and reconsider his extremely negative response, dated 17 April, to the Delegated Powers Committee’s report? I ask, because if these important committees of your Lordships’ House are going to be routinely ignored by government, parliamentary democracy is entering treacherous territory, in which the conventional boundaries between executive power and parliamentary sovereignty are roughly and unceremoniously shifted by the failure of government to adhere to well-established, valuable and principled conventions.
The central point is this. As it stands, the Bill involves moving a whole area of legislation—that of implementing private international law treaties in domestic law—from Parliament to the Executive. That is a dangerous extension and an unwelcome trend—noted by the noble Baroness, Lady Taylor—in our constitutional arrangements from parliamentary democracy to government by an overmighty Executive. If it is private international law agreements this year, what might follow next year? This House has rightly sought to resist the trend, which is dangerous and must be stopped. As parliamentarians, and respecting the traditional role of this House as a guardian of the constitution, we have a responsibility to stop it.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I thank noble Lords and noble and learned Lords for their contribution to this part of the debate. Since the commencement of this Committee, the matter of whether Clause 2 should stand part of the Bill has in a sense been the elephant in the virtual Chamber—or perhaps the virtual elephant in the Chamber. I therefore do not intend to rehearse or repeat the arguments that have been made repeatedly in Committee. However, I want to make it clear that the Government regard the powers in Clause 2 as essential to achieving their objective to build up the United Kingdom’s position in private international law, not only in the immediate future but in years to come.
Of course, there is one particularly pertinent example of our ambition; namely, our ambition to accede to the 2007 Lugano Convention on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, and the desire—indeed, the need—to do that before the end of the transition period. It would be gravely unfortunate if a gap was to emerge between the end of the transition period, when we continue to look to the Brussels I and IIa regime, and the application of the 2007 Lugano Convention. We are concerned that that should be avoided.
Briefly, first, we consider that the proposal in Clause 2 is not only essential but proportionate. International law agreements are generally uncontroversial and technical in nature, and the detailed content of the private international law agreements to which the Bill will apply will already be determined at the international level; they are by their very nature clear and precise in their terms.
Earl of Devon (CB)
I understood that I would get an opportunity to speak before the Minister rather than after him, as I have been on the list for the past few days, but I shall proceed none the less with what I was going to say. At the risk of flogging rather a dead horse at this stage, I wish to add that while I support the basic aims of the Bill, I do not support Clause 2.
Private international law and our membership of the Hague and other global jurisdiction and enforcement conventions are an essential part of our global standing and our ability to welcome and to home families from overseas. They are essential particularly to the professional and legal services markets in which we are world leaders. I note my interests in the register, and particularly my work as a dual-qualified, cross-border litigator, whose practice touches variously on this area.
I shall not speak at length because pretty much all the issues have been addressed in some detail. However, I thought that your Lordships might appreciate some stories from the front line. Unlike many of our eminent jurists in the Lords, I am currently active in this space and spent 10 years as a litigator in California, as a California-qualified litigator, in which capacity I advised often on jurisdiction clauses and dispute resolution provisions.
For the most part, the most popular forum for these was the courts of England and Wales, irrespective of the parties—typically, one of them was an American party, but we dealt with parties from all around the world. There were plenty of reasons for this, not least the English language, our time zones, our excellent legal services, our use of the common law and precedent, the independence of our judiciary, and the broad membership we have of cross-border conventions, such as those under consideration in the Bill.
Finally, and perhaps most important, is the rule of law—particularly the transparent, thorough and long-established legislative process by which our laws are passed. This is the reason that England and Wales is so often chosen as the preferred third-party forum for jurisdiction and dispute resolution clauses. That is directly threatened by Clause 2. Indeed, by seeking to short-circuit the long-standing practice of passing treaties by primary legislation, the Government are in danger of undermining one of the most important pillars that supports the UK’s pre-eminence in the provision of dispute resolution services in the global market.
I note that the US-UK trade negotiations started recently. Can the Minister give us any indication as to whether the subject of private international law has been raised within that forum? Is any pressure being brought to bear on the UK Government to align their cross-border enforcement and jurisdiction regime towards that of the US, which obviously takes a very particular line in these matters? We know, for example, that the current US Administration disfavour cross-border co-operation. I understand that in recent rounds of Hague conference negotiations, the US has become increasingly reluctant to engage. It is taking a back seat while burgeoning economies, such as China, are increasingly engaged.
Finally, before we reach Report on this crucial Bill, we must have either mastered virtual voting or returned to a normal practice. This is too important an issue to slip through at such a procedurally challenging time. I appreciate your Lordships’ indulgence.
Lord Keen of Elie
As regards the UK-US negotiations, I say only that I am not in a position to comment on how far they have gone, or on whether they have engaged the issue of private international law at all.
Lord Adonis
Perhaps I may add to my earlier contribution to the Committee, since it looks as if we will vote on this issue on Report. We are all agreed that it is a hugely important constitutional issue.
The House of Commons, which has been conducting its first online votes this afternoon, has descended into complete chaos on its latest vote. I can report to the Committee that on what was, I think, the third vote it held—after its Members had had an opportunity to get to know the system—there were 22 Tory rebels, including the Chancellor of the Exchequer, Rishi Sunak, who accidentally voted the wrong way. The Deputy Speaker, Eleanor Laing, pointed out that some MPs are struggling with the new electronic voting system but, she added, there was no need to rerun the vote because there was a majority of 51 for the Government.
I will point out two things for the benefit of our colleagues on the Procedure Committee. First, there is no natural government majority in the House of Lords, so how are we to know whether people have voted the wrong way accidentally? The constitution of our country could be rewritten because people did not understand the system of voting. Secondly, although I have the highest regard for all our colleagues in the House, if Members of the House of Commons are struggling with the new electronic voting system, it is fair to say that some colleagues in our House may also struggle with that new system.
I see not just a flashing orange light but a flashing red light about moving to electronic voting at any early stage in our proceeding, and certainly on a matter as grave and serious as this. If this were to be our first vote and it descended into chaos, as in the House of Commons, nobody could say that we were not warned.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, has made a number of extremely telling and important points. We are clearly in a situation where we must ensure either that we have an entirely reliable voting system in the upper Chamber, or alternatively a clear and telling government majority. I suspect that it is more likely that we will seek to secure the former.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Finlay of Llandaff) (CB)
My Lords, I shall now put the question that Clause 2 stand part of the Bill; all microphones will be opened until I give the result. As many as are of that opinion shall say “Content”.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, it takes unanimity to amend the Bill. If a single voice says “Content”, the clause stands part. The Contents have it.
Baroness Scott of Bybrook (Con)
My Lords, this may be a convenient moment for the Virtual Committee to adjourn.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
My Lords, the Virtual Committee stands adjourned.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 3rd June 2020
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 101-R(a) Amendment for Report - (3 Jun 2020)
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
Good afternoon, my Lords. This Virtual Committee will now begin. I remind Members that these proceedings are subject to parliamentary privilege and that what we say is available to the public both in Hansard and to those listening and watching.
I will begin by setting out how these proceedings will work. This Virtual Committee will operate like a Grand Committee as far as possible. A participants’ list for today’s proceedings has been published and is in my brief, which Members should have received. The brief also lists Members who have put their name to the amendments or expressed an interest in speaking on each group. I will call Members to speak in the order listed. Members’ microphones will be muted by the broadcasters except when I call a Member to speak and whenever a Question is put, so interventions during speeches are not possible and uncalled speakers will not be heard.
During the debate on each group, I will invite Members to email the Clerk if they wish to speak after the Minister. I will call Members to speak in order of request and will call the Minister to reply each time. Debate will take place on the lead amendment in each group only; the groupings are binding and it will not be possible to de-group an amendment for separate debate. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. Whenever I put the Question, all Members’ microphones will be open until I give the result. Members should be aware that any sound made at that point may be broadcast. If a Member intends to press an amendment or say “Not content”, it will greatly assist the Clerk if they make this clear when speaking on the group. As in Grand Committee, it takes unanimity to amend the Bill, so if a single voice says “Not content”, the amendment is negatived; if a single voice says “Content”, a clause stands part.
We will now begin. We start with government Amendment 17. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister’s winding-up speech should email the Clerk during this debate. The Minister should allow me to call those Members before seeking a decision on the amendment. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “Not content”, when the Question is put makes that clear in the debate. As I said, it takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; the Committee cannot divide.
Clause 4: Extent, commencement and short title
Amendment 17
Lord Keen of Elie
“( ) Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for section 2 (including Schedule 6) and section 3(2) and (3) to extend, with or without modifications, to the Isle of Man.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment inserts a new subsection into Clause 4. This allows Her Majesty by Order in Council to extend Clause 2 (including Schedule 6) and subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 3 to the Isle of Man.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, this government amendment seeks to allow certain provisions of the Bill to be extended to the Isle of Man through what is commonly known as a permissive extent clause. This is a well-established method of enabling UK legislation to be extended to the overseas territories and Crown dependencies.
I should clarify that the amendment was explicitly requested by the Isle of Man Government due to the legislative pressures that Tynwald, the island’s parliament, currently faces. I want to be clear with noble Lords that I am moving the amendment to allow debate and to put on record the request from the Isle of Man Government. I recognise that some noble Lords expressed concerns in the earlier parts of this Committee stage about both the scope and purpose of Clause 2, to which this amendment relates. I will therefore seek to withdraw the amendment once noble Lords have had an opportunity to speak to it.
Returning to the detail of the amendment, this permissive extent clause provides for the addition of a narrow delegated power that, when activated, will allow certain provisions of the Bill to apply in the Isle of Man. The power is exercisable by an Order in Council, which can be made at a time agreed between the UK Government and the Isle of Man Government.
Once made, the Order in Council would extend the Clause 2(1) power to the appropriate authority on the Isle of Man. This would enable the Isle of Man to make its own regulations to implement international agreements on private international law. This power could be used only to implement agreements that the United Kingdom has extended to apply in the Isle of Man, which means that both the United Kingdom and the Isle of Man would be able to operate the agreement between their own jurisdictions and the other contracting parties.
In addition, the amendment would enable the Isle of Man to implement an arrangement to apply the terms of a private international law agreement, subject to necessary modifications, between the Isle of Man and the United Kingdom. Clause 2(3) already provides this power to the United Kingdom. The amendment will enable that power to be extended to the Isle of Man to give it the power to do the same, alleviating the need for it to enact its own primary legislation to implement such an arrangement. Of course, in both cases, the arrangement will be about operating a private international law agreement that the United Kingdom has joined, as anything else would fall outside the scope of the power.
The amendment would not affect the United Kingdom directly. It would require the Queen to approve an Order in Council at a meeting of the Privy Council and would allow the Isle of Man also to make use of this important legislation. Should there be any effect on the UK, it is likely that any agreed arrangement relating to applying private international law agreements between the UK and the Isle of Man could be implemented efficiently both here and in that dependency by mutual agreement.
As I have already stated, this measure is limited to the Isle of Man simply because it issued a formal request for the Bill to include this permissive extent clause. We have engaged with the other Crown dependencies and overseas territories on the Bill; they have not requested that this provision be extended to them. In these circumstances, I beg to move.
Lord Adonis (Lab)
I have an obvious question relating to what the noble and learned Lord said. Why does he think that the Isle of Man wants this power but other Crown dependencies do not?
Lord Mackay of Clashfern (Con)
My Lords, I have always understood that the Isle of Man is different and that special provision therefore needs to be made for it, particularly at its request. Long ago, when I was Lord Advocate, I was called to defend an action of the UK Government, which had imposed restrictions on fishing in the waters surrounding the Isle of Man that were different from the common fisheries policy. I was constrained to argue that the Isle of Man was not subject to the common fisheries policy, since it was different from the United Kingdom. I regret to say that the Isle of Man was not sufficiently different for me to succeed.
I support the amendment as something that is utterly important for the Isle of Man and perfectly in order.
Lord Mann (Non-Afl)
My Lords, in Clause 2(7), “relevant territory” is defined as
“the Isle of Man … any of the Channel Islands … a British overseas territory.”
On what basis should there be a differentiation for the Isle of Man as opposed to the others—as the noble Lord, Lord Adonis, rightly asked—particularly regarding the two Crown dependencies of Guernsey and Jersey? Would it not be sensible from a UK stance to have consistency, particularly between the Crown dependencies and on our approach to defining “relevant territory”, as covered by Clause 2(7)?
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, we have no objection to the Bill as passed extending to the Isle of Man at its request, but that is of course subject to the whole question of our objection to Clause 2 standing part of the Bill and to any other amendments to the Bill that may be passed to it. In those circumstances, it is right that the Minister is not pursuing this amendment today, and it would be right that we should reconsider our position on Report.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I am grateful to the Minister for indicating that he is not going to proceed with this amendment today and that he has moved it simply to open it for debate. We oppose the amendment because we oppose in principle Clause 2, which inappropriately gives the Government the power by secondary legislation to introduce important changes to domestic law to reflect private international law agreements. At the moment, if that is the principle that we stand on, in our view it is wrong to say that the Isle of Man, of all the parts of the Crown dependencies, should have a special right to do it by statutory instrument. That, as previous Lords have indicated, would differentiate it from everyone else. We are against it for that reason.
We are also against it because this change would allow for differential application of international agreements as between the various parts of the United Kingdom and, for the reasons we gave the previous time this Committee met, we are against that. So, we oppose the amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
I am obliged to noble Lords for their contribution to the debate, and note what has been said. Perhaps I may respond to the points made by the noble Lords, Lord Adonis and Lord Mann, and touched upon by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer—although I have a correction to make there. The reason why this is being done only in respect of the Isle of Man is that the Isle of Man has specifically requested that this mechanism should be available, so that we can proceed by way of an Order in Council from the Privy Council. It will be for the other Crown dependencies to determine whether and when they wish to implement primary legislation within their own legislatures to come within the ambit of such international agreements as the United Kingdom draws down.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referred to variation between parts of the United Kingdom but of course the Crown dependencies are not part of the United Kingdom. They have a unique status and it is for them to determine whether and to what extent they wish to become a party to legislation that draws down into domestic law international treaty obligations. I continue to believe that this amendment is important and respect the request of the Government of the Isle of Man. However, I recognise the concerns expressed about the links between this amendment and the Clause 2 power to which exception is taken. The noble Lord, Lord Marks, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, made that point. In these circumstances I will therefore withdraw the amendment, but I intend to continue this discussion at a later date. For present purposes, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
We now come to the group beginning with Amendment 19. I remind noble Lords that anyone wishing to speak after the Minister should email the clerk during the debate. It would be helpful if anyone intending to say “not content” if the Question is put made that clear in the debate. It takes unanimity to amend the Bill in this Committee; this Committee cannot divide.
Amendment 19
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“( ) provision that creates, amends or extends a criminal offence, or increases the penalty for a criminal offence”
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
This is, in effect, a probing group of amendments, repeating many of the arguments that we discussed on day one in Committee, and the amendments do two things. Amendment 19 would delete the power of the regulation-making authority to create, amend or extend a criminal offence. Amendments 20 and 21 say that the regulation-making power should be subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure in the UK Parliament; and, in particular, that before any such instrument was made final a consultation would have to be undertaken with the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law and the European Union Select Committee of the House of Lords.
I make it clear, as I did on the previous occasion, that I am not in favour of this order-making power at all. I refer to Amendment 19 simply to indicate the width of this power, which includes the making or changing of criminal offences. In relation to the super-affirmative procedure, again, I am against it. There should not be that power at all. It gives me an opportunity, though, to make the point that the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law has been an important source of advice over a long period to the Lord Chancellor and the Ministry of Justice on private international law agreements. It was not referred to at all in the suite of maybe a dozen statutory instruments introduced under the withdrawal Act, in the wake of us changing our private international law arrangements with the European Union. That led to a great loss in the preparation of those statutory instruments. I very much hope that the Minister will give an under- taking that in any subsequent changes in private international law, the Government will consult unquestionably the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee and, as much as possible, the European Union Select Committee of this House. I beg to move.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD)
My Lords, first, I draw attention to paragraph 41 of the memorandum concerning the delegated powers, which says:
“We do not anticipate using the power to create, extend or increase the penalty for, a criminal offence very often, however it may be needed, in very limited circumstances, in order to implement effective enforcement provisions for some potential future PIL agreements.”
I stress: some potential future PIL agreements.
I want to speak mainly to Amendment 19, although I support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said in relation to Amendments 20 and 21 and his criticisms of the super-affirmative procedure. The Committee may recall that in its first sitting, I made comments about the necessity for democratic legitimacy and scrutiny when it comes to the making of legislation in this form. I do not consider that the form of approach of an affirmative resolution on its own is enough. I certainly do not think that the super-affirmative procedure adds very much to that. As for scrutiny, the noble and learned Lord has already referred to the fact that the Lord Chancellor’s committee was not given an opportunity to consider the Bill.
Criminal offences are set against the background that everybody is presumed to know what the law is. To put it another way, familiarly, ignorance of the law is no excuse. Any criminal offence created requires clarity, certainty and proportionality. I illustrate this by referring to what is very much in the public eye at the moment, the Health Protection (Coronavirus Restrictions) (England) Regulations 2020. No draft was laid or approved by Parliament by reason of urgency, and one understands entirely that reason, but the instrument has been amended twice since it was passed in March and the latest version came into force on Monday. It had 12 regulations and two schedules in its original form and Regulation 6(1) provides that everyone must stay overnight at
“the place where they are living”.
There are certain exceptions, including, at Regulation 6(2)(d),
“to provide care or assistance, including relevant personal care within the meaning of paragraph 7(3B) of Schedule 4 to the Safeguarding of Vulnerable Groups Act 2006, to a vulnerable person”.
At that point I gave up further research, but I do not think that particular exception can possibly refer to ordinary childcare. Yet there has been controversy. The Prime Minister and four of the Cabinet have taken one view or interpretation of these regulations and almost everybody else has taken a completely different view on whether what happened was legal or not. An unlimited fine is payable on summary conviction, which can be avoided by complying with a fixed penalty notice. Noble Lords will appreciate that that is typical of the sort of offence that can be created by secondary legislation that nobody understands—I say “nobody understands”; many people understand the drift of it, but the particular detail can be the subject of controversy.
Coming back to the Bill, it is obviously undesirable that there should be a lack of clarity in drafting criminal offences when it is possible for those criminal offences to result in a penalty of up to two years’ imprisonment. An unlimited fine is quite a burden, but imprisonment through regulations that refer to other Acts of Parliament—subsection this and sub-subsection that—is entirely undesirable and never gets, whether by the ordinary affirmative procedure or the super-affirmative procedure, adequate scrutiny and understanding by the authorities that have to put it into effect and, most relevantly, by the people who are affected by it and who have to obey the law.
Public international law covers, as we discussed, a wide variety of issues. It is not at all satisfactory for the wide power that I referred to—for some potential future PIL agreements to create criminal offences—to be put in the hands of Ministers. For that reason, this is an aspect of the Bill, never mind the whole of Schedule 2, that I find offensive.
Lord Mackay of Clashfern
My Lords, the Act referred to in the Bill is dated 1982, which shows that we are concerned with the time when I was Lord Advocate and before devolution. I remember it lucidly. It fell to the Lord Advocate to deal, inter alia, with the Scottish position and what the detail involved. I strongly oppose the group of amendments in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. My understanding of the principle that rules in this area is that when the United Kingdom undertakes an international obligation, that does not become part of the law of the United Kingdom until it becomes part of the domestic law of the United Kingdom and, since devolution, that may apply differently in devolved jurisdictions. A suggestion has been made that the principle goes further and requires that the result can be achieved only by primary legislation doing so directly, without the intervention of subordinate legislation. I do not agree with that. I can see no logical requirement to restrict the power of Parliament in that way.
My noble and learned friend the Minister has already given examples. Since we joined the EU, this has been achieved by a statutory instrument naming the treaty involved, without any further detail. The year 1982 yields another striking example. Section 60 of the Civil Aviation Act 1982 confers power by Order in Council to make provision for carrying out the Chicago convention. If the principle were as claimed, surely the Act could not confer this power. I regard the provisions of the Bill as entirely adequate. Once we undertake an international obligation, it seems right to implement it in our law as soon as possible. The ordinary affirmative procedure seems entirely adequate, particularly since the other place now has power in relation to international obligations.
The noble Lord preceding me, an expert in many of these matters, particularly in the criminal law, requires that the criminal law should not be specified except very clearly and very occasionally in statutory instruments. In my respectful submission to your Lordships, this is a space in which the international agreement must have in it the criminal offence in question, because it is only a reflection of what is in the international obligation that will become part of the law under Clause 2. This seems to me to adequately secure the definition of the offence in question. I will add only that I would like to see the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee consulted as much as possible: it is a very well informed, very good source of solid advice. I also add that if the Government’s ambitions are fulfilled for many international agreements in the future, it would be a great pity to saddle the procedure to implement them into our law with unnecessary delays.
Baroness Kennedy of Cradley (Lab)
My Lords, I shall restrict my comments and questions to parliamentary scrutiny. Private international law agreements are so important for businesses and individuals when they cross borders that to accept new international conventions into domestic law using broad delegated powers seems a step too far. The Government have failed to make a convincing case for why they need such extensive delegated powers here. What are the barriers that led the Government to propose such a low level of parliamentary scrutiny of new agreements?
Of course, this House is not against the Government getting their business through, but there needs to be appropriate scrutiny, challenge and revision. That is, after all, why we are all here. Amendment 20 offers a set of safeguards absent from the Government’s proposals and therefore has my support, as does Amendment 19. It cannot be acceptable to create and impose new criminal offences without consultation and some level of parliamentary scrutiny, the reasons having been eloquently set out by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. In responding to these amendments, will the Minister give insight and clarity as to why the Government believe they need such sweeping powers? Do the Government accept the conclusions of the House of Lords Constitution Committee? If not, why not? Do they really believe that private international law agreements are produced at such a rate that proper consultation and scrutiny can be set aside?
As the Constitution Committee noted:
“The UK has become a party to only 13 Hague Conventions over the course of nearly 60 years”
so the need for delegated powers to prevent a delay does not seem a very strong argument. Why is it necessary for these delegated powers to extend to matters wider than private international law? How do the Government envisage dealing with a future international convention that needs supplementing for a domestic situation? Where will the parliamentary scrutiny be in such cases?
Finally, is it the case, as has been argued by some, that statutory instruments in this area may be quashed under the Human Rights Act 1998, leading to unnecessary legal uncertainty?
In conclusion, I welcome and support the amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend. These are issues that need further consideration by the Government, and I hope that the noble and learned Lord will agree to look at them again.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB)
My Lords, I will speak briefly in support of the amendments put forward, in the event that such amendments become necessary. I will speak first to Amendment 19.
Private international law, by its very nature, is concerned generally with private individuals and private law. It seems to me, therefore, that if there are circumstances where the ordinary powers of the courts—for example, powers relating to injunctive or contempt proceedings—are insufficient, Parliament ought to have the opportunity of considering whether, in such circumstances, a criminal sanction should be imposed.
As to Amendment 20, it is fair to say that, from my own experience—save as is illustrated by what has happened on this Bill—the Ministry of Justice is fairly good at consulting widely. However, my experience of other ministries is, I regret to say, not as favourable. Therefore, I think it right that, in the event that these provisions become necessary, there be an express obligation, set out in some detail, in relation to consultation.
This has two purposes. First, it makes certain that each department has to think carefully as to whether there is a provision in the agreement it has made, and then set about a proper consultation. Secondly, it is always of value in international obligations to be able to say that the particular obligation concerned, in so far as it affects domestic law, has to be approved by Parliament. One notes that, quite often, this is a matter used by the United States with quite considerable effect. It seems to me that, at this stage, we do not have sufficient experience of knowing how effective CRaG will be.
We have to be very cautious these days in circumstances where framework legislation is now becoming so extensive. If we are to have much more framework legislation—and it looks as if we are going that way—we really have to look much more at our own procedures for considering regulations made under such framework legislation, which this is, in effect.
In the event that it is necessary to have an amendment of this kind, I therefore warmly support that put forward by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
Lord Adonis
Virtually every speaker in the debate has supported what my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer said. The obvious question to the Advocate-General is this: will he reconsider this matter before Report?
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB)
My Lords, I would like to say a few words in support of Amendment 19 and make a brief comment on Amendment 20.
Amendment 19 is an issue of principle, rather than detail. Most of what I want to say has already been said by the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd. The only point I add is this: when one is considering imposing a criminal sanction on an individual, you have to have regard to the effect of the sanction on the individual in question. For many people, to have a criminal conviction against them is a major disadvantage in future life, particularly for people seeking further employment who have to provide references to their criminal background, if any. It may also affect travel, particularly in countries which deny travel to people who have criminal convictions. Although it may be easy to say that a sentence of not more than two years is not much to trouble about, it is actually something to trouble a great deal about.
That is why the way in which these offences are created, and the extent to which the wording of the offence can be scrutinised, is so very important. It is not a light matter; it is a matter of great importance to the individual. For that reason, there is an issue of principle, which I think lies behind the noble and learned Lord’s amendment.
I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, will forgive me for saying that the framing of Amendment 20 creates a rather strange situation for the devolved institutions, and the legislatures in particular. The way in which Clause 2 defines the “appropriate national authority” is simple, so far as England and Wales are concerned, because it is simply the Secretary of State. But when you come to Scotland and to Northern Ireland, there is a choice: in Scotland, it is either the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State for Scotland; and in the case of Northern Ireland, it is the Northern Ireland department or the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland.
I raised the point at our first sitting that there is some doubt as to what exactly the function is of each of these two people. Take Scotland as an example. In what situations is it appropriate for Scottish Ministers to act alone, and when is it right for the Secretary of State for Scotland to act alone? If one is contemplating the use of the super-affirmative procedure, that is available only to the Secretary of State, because anything done by Scottish Ministers can only be the subject of an instrument laid before the Scottish Parliament. The same is true for the Northern Ireland department: it cannot use the UK procedure because its instruments have to be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly.
I make this point in case, by any chance, this amendment is to go further. I am not sure how far the noble and learned Lord wants to do that, but just in case he does, a bit more thought is required as to how exactly one is to relate this amendment to the position in the devolved Administrations. The way I left it at the first sitting was that I would much prefer that the Secretary of State for Scotland was not involved, and that the question of implementation—a devolved matter anyway—was left with Scottish Ministers. But one way or another, the situation will need to be clarified. The presence of this amendment gives me a chance to reiterate my point that there is a lack of clarity in the way that the Bill is framed, as far as the relevant authority is concerned.
Lord Kennedy of Southwark (Lab Co-op)
My Lords, Amendments 19, 20 and 21 are probing amendments tabled by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton. I welcome the amendments, as we have a chance to debate these important issues again.
As a general rule, I do not like Governments taking Henry VIII powers. It is much better that primary legislation is made or changed, and that both Houses debate and decide on the issue, rather than procedures such as these, which are not a proper substitute, whether they use the affirmative or super-affirmative procedure.
That brings me on to Amendment 19, moved by my noble and learned friend. This is a particularly important amendment as, without it, criminal offences could be extended or amended, and the penalties for offences could be changed. That is unacceptable. I hope all noble Lords will agree that it is a matter for Parliament to decide, and that there is no justification for doing otherwise. I would therefore like to hear from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, the justification for not accepting the intent of this amendment, if that is the Government’s position this afternoon.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, made the point that this is no way to make new law and new offences. I very much agree with that. There should be no cases of new offences having penalties agreed without the consent of Parliament, where that would normally be the case. But these powers could be used to circumvent that.
My noble friend Lady Kennedy of Cradley made the point that we have seen very few of these types of agreements in the last 60 years, and that the powers and procedures proposed here do not seem justified in that case. My noble friend also made reference to reports that statutory instruments in this area risk being struck down by the courts. It would be good if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, could address that point when he responds to this debate shortly.
Baroness Jones of Moulsecoomb (GP)
My Lords, Amendment 19 is a very important amendment to probe the Government on what they anticipate the application of Clause 2 will be. I very much enjoyed some of the other contributions today, particular that of the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, which was particularly scathing and deserves to be in a newspaper somewhere. I loathe the Government trying to make these power grabs. The idea that they can just extend the concept of a crime is inherently damaging to democracy.
In particular, the key question that I need the Minister to address is in what circumstances he foresees a private international law agreement creating or amending criminal offences. As I understand it, the Bill and the agreements that it seeks to implement are entirely focused on the resolution of disputes between individual people or companies. Can he tell us what situations would give rise to any criminal liability, as opposed to civil liability? Does he anticipate that we will attach criminal fines and imprisonment to civil disputes? If there are not any good examples, why is this provision contained in the Bill and should your Lordships’ House not amend the Bill exactly in the way proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton?
Lord Hain (Lab)
My Lords, I will speak to Amendment 20 to Schedule 6 in the name of my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer on the matter of proper consultation, which it would require. As a former Secretary of State for Wales and still living here, I am aware that no legislative consent Motion is required for this Brexit-consequential Bill and that the Welsh Government appear to seem at least content with it. But, as my noble friend Lady Kennedy highlighted, there are real concerns about the delegated powers to join future private international law agreements.
I understand that the UK Government have provided assurances to the devolved Administrations that, first, there are not any agreements in view at the moment that touch on matters within devolved competences and that, secondly, if any such agreement emerges the UK Government will guarantee to consult the Welsh Government, and presumably the Northern Ireland Executive and the Scottish Government. I would be grateful if the Minister specifically confirms this when he replies. I ask because, for nearly four years, Conservative Governments have had a sorry record of failing properly to enable devolved Governments to participate in framing a series of European Union withdrawal and Brexit-related Bills. Consequently, UK Ministers were regularly accused, as noble Lords might recall, of a power grab—of using the transfer of functions from Brussels back to the UK to recover to Whitehall previously devolved powers.
The First Ministers of Wales and Scotland both repeatedly complained about a failure of Whitehall Ministers to consult. Indeed, I have argued exactly that in your Lordships’ House on several occasions. There were also refusals to grant legislative consent Motions in Wales and Scotland until a satisfactory series of outcomes were belatedly conceded by the UK Government. This is not a good advertisement for the unity of the UK when it is under greater threat than ever.
I will put on record some specific examples of a failure to build consent, as Amendment 20 implies must be the case, because these must not be repeated. The 2017 EU withdrawal Bill, as originally drafted, represented a major assault on devolved competence. It was only as a result of very strong cross-party support in your Lordships’ House that the Government were forced to agree to a default position that all powers vested in the EU on matters of devolved competence would revert to the devolved institutions when we left the EU. This has led to a more consensual approach to the work of developing common frameworks where all four Governments agree that there needs to be a shared understanding and approach across the UK.
Lord Garnier (Con)
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, explained in Committee on 13 May, the Official Opposition had no objection to the three treaties covered by the Bill being brought into domestic law via primary legislation, but they had very considerable objections to Clause 2. Their primary objection to Clause 2 on 13 May, repeated today, was that it would allow the Government to change the law by delegated legislation.
I have no doubt that other noble Lords who have yet to speak, like noble and learned Lords and noble Lords who have already spoken, will support the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in his arguments while paying due regard to the contribution of my noble and learned friend Lord Mackay of Clashfern. For my part, I agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, on the matter of principle but gently remind your Lordships’ House that none of his arguments based on constitutional impropriety found favour with the Government of which he was a distinguished member between 1997 and 2007.
I spent a fair amount of time, when on the Opposition Benches, arguing with the noble and learned Lord’s colleagues, as he does now with mine, that the misuse of secondary legislation to alter or extend primary legislation is wrong. I thought it was then and I think it is now. If, as he appears to have done, he has changed his mind, I am delighted, but he must know, having been in Governments with majorities of 179, 167 and 157, why Governments with large majorities resort to this device: it is expedient, it is convenient and they can.
There is generally far too much legislation and most of it is inadequately considered in the House of Commons. Bills are closely whipped and programmed and Governments of all stripes—Conservative, Labour and the recent coalition—have used Henry VIII powers allowing Ministers to make law with insufficient parliamentary scrutiny. I make that observation coolly.
I am neither shocked nor surprised that the Bill contains such provisions, nor that the Official Opposition have taken the stance they have on the question, today and in May. I simply point out, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, must know, that this is what happens and will continue to happen until Governments with large majorities do less and do it better.
I think I am right in saying that only two of us speaking to this group of amendments—the noble Lord, Lord Hain, and I—were Members of Parliament, and government and shadow Ministers, in the other place before arriving in your Lordships’ House. I am quite sure that the noble Lord, Lord Hain, will not agree with me when I say that we have brought with us a degree of realism or cynicism, but as Front- and Back-Benchers we served on Bill committees and secondary legislation committees using the affirmative and negative resolution procedures. We know how Governments manage the agenda in the other place.
Therefore, when I see Amendment 20, which would ensure that all regulations made under Clause 2 were subject to a lengthy and protracted super-affirmative resolution procedure, I see a procedure which, if it cannot be killed at birth, will be neutered. I do not wish to be unhelpful, and I readily acknowledge that the noble and learned Lord has said that this is a probing amendment, but I fear that what I see is a cul-de-sac. I confess that I took part in similar debates on Henry VIII powers when in opposition to his Government. His fellow Ministers smiled sweetly and the provision was passed into law exactly as they had drafted it. My noble and learned friend Minister will be less direct than me, but one only has to read the terms of the amendment to realise that, but for the noble and learned Lord’s advertised withdrawal of it, it is heading nowhere but the butcher’s block, if not in your Lordships’ House then when it gets to the other place.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, is of course right to highlight the constitutional problem, a problem that he could not see quite so clearly when he was in government. I do not wish to discourage others from arguing against these ministerial powers even if, as I learned when I was in opposition, nothing will come of them today through the Bill. The arguments must be made, but in the context of the Bill I do not want the migration of these conventions into UK law delayed by this bigger constitutional question. I thus urge your Lordships to let it through unamended, not because I agree with the overuse of Henry VIII powers but because it is going to happen anyway and today is not the day to reform their use piecemeal. That said, I hope this very necessary reform will soon come about more widely with the agreement of both Houses and all parties.
Lord Bhatia (Non-Afl)
My Lords, the Bill is highly technical for a person who is not trained as a lawyer and does not have a degree in international law. I am not one of those legal minds. I have gone through the various features of the Bill and its policy background in some previous debates.
My concern is about divorces. Children often suffer most when a divorce takes place. The Advocate-General for Scotland, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, said in a debate in March:
“Private international law is viewed by some as a technical and specialist area of law, but it is an essential one. Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes.”
He went on to say that
“if a family relationship breaks down and one spouse moves abroad, they make it easier to sort out arrangements in the best interests of their children.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1439.]
These issues become very important when the marriage has taken place in a religious ceremony in a foreign country and one of the spouses is not British and the other is British by nationality. Often the non-British spouse gets the children and goes back to their country of birth. Here I refer to the sub-continent countries such as India and Pakistan. The spouse who is British and lives in the UK finds it difficult to fight a legal battle over the custody of the children when the other spouse is in India or Pakistan. The issue is further compounded because the cost of litigation is high and the British spouse cannot afford it. The other issue is that the legal processes in these countries can take many years to go before a judge because of the calendar of the courts, which have to deal with many cases each day. In many cases the British Embassy tries to lend assistance, but there is a limit to how much it can help.
I do not wish to raise the issue of forced marriages in this debate. I am just raising this issue because I feel that it will raise its head in future. From 1 February this year the UK has regained full competence to enter into international agreements on PIL in its own right. Such agreements with many countries will take a long time and could cause considerable costs and delays to pending court cases. Can the Minister assure the House that special arrangements will be made for such pending cases, particularly where children are involved?
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)
My Lords, this is a short piece of legislation but an incredibly significant one. That why I wanted to speak to this group of amendments.
Before going into the detail, I would like to make a general point to my noble and learned friend the Minister. Does he agree that the very nature of English law—how it has developed and how it is seen around the world—gives us huge potential post December as a tremendous export as it is respected and highly used across the globe, and we really should seek to maximise its positive impact to this respect?
I turn to the amendments. We see, as we have heard from other noble Lords, that it is envisaged that these powers would be used only infrequently—infrequently, yes, but with potentially extraordinarily huge impact for the individual. So, building on other noble Lords’ comments, my concluding question for my noble and learned friend the Minister is: as currently constructed without these amendments, how does he see the necessary level of scrutiny taking effect? What is his overall view of the coherent use of secondary powers and the coherent and sustainable way to legislate not just on matters such as these but across the piece?
Lord Triesman (Non-Afl)
My Lords, I am afraid I must start by disappointing the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier: I have not been discouraged from pursuing the point that a number of noble Lords have made in this debate. I strongly support my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer’s amendments. I do so for all the reasons that have been given about the need for scrutiny, questioning and elaboration. Because a number of other noble Lords have made those points, I will not make them again, other than to say that they seem to me to have considerable force.
Like the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, I am not a lawyer, but I share with my noble friend Lord Hain the honour of having been a Foreign Office Minister. One of the things that was in my portfolio was the consular service. I know in practice from the responsibilities that the consular service laid on me that, particularly where there were criminal cases or the kinds of cases that the noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, has mentioned, which touch on people considerably because they have to do with marriage, children and so on, there was a huge expectation on the part of UK citizens that the Foreign Office would be able to offer them competent advice and help through the consular service. Frequently, in order to work out what was needed, we found that we also, although not lawyers, turned to the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee. We tried to make sure that we had a very strong sense of what was and what was not possible, and from that we could work out what sort of help we could—or, sadly, on some occasions could not—provide to British citizens.
The biggest liability for British citizens was of course that, as in many cases in domestic law, they were not absolutely clear about what the law was or what it might imply for them. They could see nothing of considerable relevance to go back to in the debates there had been about it. Indeed, they probably did not even go back to those debates very frequently, but nor could we—the people who were trying to work out what should be provided through the service.
Lord Blunkett (Lab)
My Lords, at this point in Committee deliberations, I often find that we have had tedious repetition, some of it very necessary in terms of underlying principles. On this occasion, some extremely valuable contributions have brought in extraneous issues that I certainly had not thought of, including those raised by my noble friend Lord Hain.
I speak in support of the points raised by my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. He and I shared the pleasure of working together when the Home Office had what are now the powers of the justice ministry. We were, of course, faced from time to time with the desire to engage with a plethora of delegated legislation which would ease our burden and make the business of government easier. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, is correct in identifying that Governments wish to do this and Oppositions seek to check it. That is a perfectly reasonable combination because Governments have the dynamic of seeking to deal with issues that they will return to in an easier form and Oppositions, quite rightly, have to challenge, as is the case this afternoon, the reasons for that and whether they are acceptable.
I take, for instance, my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd’s third point about the framework of legislation now, in which we have become accustomed to dealing with underpinning issues. However, when principles relate to the extension of criminal offences and penalties, as my noble and learned friend pointed out at the beginning of this debate, we have to be extremely cautious.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, in a very entertaining and important diversion, referred to our present situation not just in terms of the underpinning measures that allow people to travel great distances but not to stay overnight, which are perverse in terms of trying to get Parliament up and running, by the way. Measures have applied in history, sometimes by necessity, such as Regulation 18B in 1940, but with consequences that had to be dealt with at length, with the picking up of thousands of people, some of whom should never have been interned in the way they were. Caution is always valuable in these circumstances so that consequential and unforeseen actions are avoided wherever possible. An example is the laying of regulations under both Public Health Acts and the emergency powers that we passed through this House on 25 and 26 March this year, which will be laid in the Commons later this afternoon, in respect of unworkable laws attempting to quarantine people coming from countries with less infection than we have ourselves.
Caution is necessary to make good law, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said. It tries to look down the line at what the consequential outcomes might be. That is why I think this has been a very useful debate and I hope that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, will reflect on this, given that, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said, substantial majority Governments can push through whatever they like but other people have to live with the consequences.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames
My Lords, on these Benches we are firmly with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, in opposing Clause 2 of the Bill, in line with the virtually unanimous view of those who spoke on 13 May and for all the reasons stated on day one in Committee. We will support the noble and learned Lord in opposing Clause 2 on Report. Therefore, it is with some regret that I find myself disagreeing with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, in particular in respect of the creation of criminal offences. He seemed to be suggesting that such offences would derive from the provisions of the international treaties themselves, rather than the provisions of the delegated legislation and, for that reason, the power in the Bill should be accepted.
However, that is not inevitably so. Under the Bill as it stands, new criminal offences could be introduced by the regulations giving the force of domestic law to private international law conventions and the implementation of those conventions, not by the treaties themselves. I therefore agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, on that issue and the possibility that he raised of new offences being introduced under the regulations.
These two amendments are, of course, alternatives to the removal of Clause 2, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, pointed out. Both amendments would plainly be right if we came to the position, contrary to what we believe should happen, that we were stuck with Clause 2. Amendment 19 on criminal offences raises an important principle. I agree with and endorse everything said by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford, as supported by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd and Lord Hope of Craighead, and the noble Lord, Lord Kennedy of Southwark. In this country we have always had a strong and principled objection to making new criminal offences or otherwise changing the criminal law by secondary legislation. The noble Baroness, Lady Jones of Moulsecoomb, expressed that principle forcefully and eloquently. It is an important principle, which I think we should be very firm about upholding.
Amendment 20 is on the super-affirmative procedure. Of course, it would be better than the affirmative procedure and clearly better than any negative procedure —which is not proposed. However, it is a poor alternative to requiring primary legislation to give international treaties the force of domestic law. Paragraph 31.14 of Erskine May says this about the super-affirmative procedure:
“The super-affirmative procedure provides both Houses with opportunities to comment on proposals for secondary legislation and to recommend amendments before orders for affirmative approval are brought forward in their final form. (It should be noted that the power to amend the proposed instrument remains with the Minister: the two Houses and their committees can only recommend changes, not make them.)”
That paragraph is accurate in respect of the super-affirmative procedure proposed by the noble and learned Lord’s Amendment 20. It follows that Parliament would have no right to amend, and that is why super-affirmative is still a poor alternative. It ultimately leaves legislative power with Ministers and not with Parliament.
It is also a fact that success in changing delegated legislation by the super-affirmative procedure comes very rarely—a point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier. We perhaps ought to return to that matter in the future. We should perhaps try to formulate a procedure that goes some way to meet the criticism he made—a procedure that permits Parliament to approve an instrument conditionally on its being amended in a way acceptable to both Houses. That might solve some of the problems that we have with delegated legislation. But I agree that that is for another day. Our position is that we support these amendments if we are stuck with having to use them in place of striking out Clause 2.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, taken together, the amendments relate broadly to either narrowing the scope of the Clause 2 power or increasing parliamentary scrutiny for use of that power, and I recognise the observations made by a number of noble Lords and noble and learned Lords that this is very much secondary to the opposition expressed to Clause 2 itself. I note the observation of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that this is essentially a series of probing amendments.
Before I look at the various amendments, I note that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and other noble Lords referred to the role of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law and the importance of consultation with it, with which I entirely concur. I am now co-chair of that committee, together with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. Its recent meeting was extremely useful. We looked at some technical issues surrounding the application of the Hague conventions of 2005 and 2007 at the end of the transition period. We may hear a little more of that in due course.
Amendment 19 deals with the creation of a criminal offence in the implementation in domestic law of a relevant private international law agreement. The use of the Clause 2 power to create a criminal offence there is very constrained. It is true that private international law agreements do not generally require contracting parties to create criminal offences, and there are no such requirements in the private international agreements that the UK is currently considering joining and implementing under the powers in this Bill. However, it remains a very real possibility that we might negotiate or seek to join a new agreement where a power to create or extend existing criminal penalties will be needed to fully implement the international law obligation. Take an agreement on reciprocal recognition and enforcement of protection measures, for example. In England and Wales, protection measures such as non- molestation orders or injunctions may be made by the courts under the Family Law Act 1996 or the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. Breaches of those orders are punishable by criminal penalties. Any future private international law agreement in this area on reciprocal recognition of such orders, if successfully negotiated, would particularly benefit those who are most vulnerable in our society and reliant on such protection measures, whether they remain within the United Kingdom or travel abroad, where they would wish to retain the protection of such orders.
If we entered into such an agreement, it would seem reasonable and appropriate to exercise the Clause 2 power so that, for example, we could extend criminal penalties for breach of a UK order to also apply to the breach of an order issued by a relevant foreign court. Breach of an order issued by a foreign court would in effect carry the same criminal penalty as that for breach of an equivalent UK order. But that criminal offence-making ability would of course be subject to the limitations within the Clause 2 power itself as currently drafted. Let me be clear: we could not create an offence under this power which would carry a term of imprisonment of more than two years, for example. That is an important safeguard on the exercise of the Clause 2 powers in this area.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees (Baroness Henig) (Lab)
No Member has indicated that they wish to speak after the Minister, so I call Lord Falconer.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I am very obliged to all noble Lords who have spoken in this debate, and I am very grateful for the almost universal support I got from the noble Lords, Lord Marks, Lord Bhatia and Lord Holmes, the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, and my noble friends Lord Blunkett, Lord Kennedy, Lord Hain, Lord Triesman and Lady Kennedy. I am dismayed not to be supported by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, but I disagree with the two propositions he made. The first was that he was happy for the criminal offences to be introduced by secondary legislation under the power of the international private law agreement. As has been made clear, including by the Minister, that is not right. Secondly, I am unfortunately not persuaded by him that it involves a similar degree of scrutiny as that which previously existed in relation to private international law. It most certainly does not. He referred to the Civil Aviation Act 1982. That refers to civil aviation, which was mostly dealt with by the European Union at that time, so it does not support the proposition that he advanced. Indeed, it was not relied on at any stage by the Minister.
I was disappointed in what the Minister said in three respects. First, he said that he was not even going to reconsider the position, even though there was practically universal opposition in the House to the idea of a Section 2 power; secondly, he failed to give any assurance to my noble friend Lord Hain in relation to the devolved Assemblies; and, thirdly, he did not give any assurance in relation to being willing to consult the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on justice. Of course, I will withdraw the amendment, but we will return to this in seeking to remove Clause 2 on Report.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Wednesday 17th June 2020
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 101-R-I Marshalled list for Report - (12 Jun 2020)
16:36 - Division conducted remotely on Amendment 2 - Ayes: 320 / Noes: 233 - Amendment 2 agreed.
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Faulkner of Worcester) (Lab)
My Lords, a limited number of Members are here in the Chamber, respecting social distancing. If the capacity of the Chamber is exceeded, I will immediately adjourn the House. Other Members will participate remotely, but all Members will be treated equally wherever they are. For Members participating remotely, microphones will unmute shortly before they are to speak; please accept any on-screen prompt to unmute. Microphones will be muted after each speech. I ask noble Lords to be patient if there are any short delays as we switch between physical and remote participants. I remind the House that our normal courtesies in debate still very much apply in this new hybrid way of working.
I begin by setting out how these proceedings will work. A participants’ list for today’s proceedings has been published and is in my brief, which Members will have received. I also have lists of Members who have put their names to the amendments in each group, or expressed an interest in speaking on them. I will call Members to speak in the order listed. Members’ microphones will be muted by the broadcasters except when I call a Member to speak. Interventions during speeches or before a noble Lord sits down are not permitted and uncalled speakers will not be heard. Other than the mover of an amendment or the Minister, Members may speak only once on each group. Short questions of elucidation after the Minister’s response are permitted but discouraged; a Member wishing to ask such a question, including Members in the Chamber, must email the clerk.
Debate will take place on the lead amendment in each group only; the groupings are binding and it will not be possible to de-group an amendment for separate debate. A Member intending to press an amendment already debated to a Division should give notice in the debate. Leave should be given to withdraw amendments. When putting the Question, I will collect voices in the Chamber only. If a Member taking part remotely intends to trigger a Division, they should make this clear when speaking on the group.
Clause 1: Implementation of the 1996, 2005 and 2007 Hague Conventions
Amendment 1
“3CA The 2000 Hague Convention to have the force of lawThe Convention on the International Protection of Adults concluded on 13 January 2000 at The Hague shall have the force of law in England and Wales, and in Northern Ireland.”
The Deputy Speaker
I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover of an amendment and the Minister may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press an amendment to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness (LD) [V]
My Lords, the amendment follows on from my contribution at Second Reading on 17 March. I tabled an identical amendment in Committee but withdrew it from the Marshalled List, having been invited to a further meeting with the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie. At the outset, I express my thanks and appreciation to him, his officials and his Bill team for their constructive—and, I hope, productive —engagement with me since before Second Reading.
Basically, the purpose of the amendment is something akin to jurisdictional catch-up. It seeks to give force of law in England, Wales and Northern Ireland to the provisions of Hague Convention 35 of 13 January 2000 on the International Protection of Adults. Section 85 of and Schedule 3 to the Adults with Incapacity (Scotland) Act 2000, which I had the privilege to sponsor in the earliest days of the Scottish Parliament, paved the way for ratification of the Hague Convention by the UK Government in respect of Scotland in November 2003.
The convention is intended to give support to vulnerable adults who, by reason of impairment or insufficiency of personal faculties, need legal protection, specifically when there are interests in different international jurisdictions. For example, the convention can determine: which court has jurisdiction in relation to protective measures; the law to be applied in particular circumstances; and the establishment of central authorities, which can locate vulnerable adults, give information on the status of vulnerable persons to other authorities and facilitate mutual recognition of relevant orders.
In supporting ratification, the briefing from the Law Society of England and Wales states:
“Due to not being party to the convention, England and Wales does not have a central authority to issue the relevant certificates of authority for powers of attorney to act outside the jurisdiction. This gives rise to unnecessary difficulties in relation to the protection of overseas property and welfare by attorneys and deputies who have been appointed to protect potentially vulnerable people.”
I believe that there is a compelling case for ratification in respect of all parts of the United Kingdom. In this way, those resident in Glamorgan, Gloucester or Belfast will be on comparable terms to citizens in Glasgow or Banff in relation to recognition and enforcement of relevant court orders in 2000 convention contracting states. One might say that it would be a good example of levelling up.
Indeed, the primary legislation to give effect to the convention provisions is already in place for England and Wales through Section 63 of and Schedule 3 to the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and, in the case of Northern Ireland, through Section 283 of and Schedule 9 to the Mental Capacity (Northern Ireland) Act 2016. It would be helpful if, in his reply, the Minister could give an indication not only of the Government’s intentions but of discussions with the Northern Ireland authorities. Given that the Assembly passed the 2016 legislation, I hope that progress toward ratification for Northern Ireland can also proceed.
The long-overdue ratification of this convention would be beneficial for vulnerable adults and those who support them in England, Wales and Northern Ireland. I commend the amendment to the House and I am hopeful that the case for ratification will commend itself to the Minister. I beg to move.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
My Lords, I fully support the amendment moved by my noble and learned friend Lord Wallace of Tankerness. It is plainly an anomaly that the 2000 Hague Convention does not at this stage apply throughout the United Kingdom. The inclusion of the convention in Clause 1 will achieve this. I hope that the Government will accept the amendment to achieve the end that my noble and learned friend seeks.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
My Lords, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, makes a very strong case. It is extraordinary that this has not yet been incorporated into the law of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. I very much hope that the noble and learned Lord, the Minister, will explain why that is not the case and, at the very least, give us a timetable for it becoming part of our domestic law.
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, not only for his contribution to the debate but for engaging with my officials and me on this matter.
As noted, the amendment seeks to deal with the ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults in respect of England, Wales and Northern Ireland. Of course, the United Kingdom has ratified this convention, but the extent of this is limited to Scotland. I am pleased to confirm to the noble and learned Lord that it is our intention to extend the ratification of this convention to England and Wales. Discussions have commenced with officials in Northern Ireland to ascertain whether the Northern Ireland Executive would require the extension to apply to Northern Ireland.
The Mental Capacity Act 2005 largely implements the convention and contains powers to make any additional provision required. Schedule 3 to that Act provides for the recognition and enforcement in England and Wales of protective measures made in respect of vulnerable adults by the courts of other contracting states. Some Schedule 3 provisions are already in force and some will come into force upon ratification, at which point reciprocal recognition of domestic protective measures by other states will also come into effect. There remain some outstanding matters that require further implementation; largely, additional operational arrangements for the location or placement of vulnerable adults as between contracting states.
It is the Government’s view that the most appropriate way to implement these remaining matters is to make any additional provision required in or under the 2005 Act, using the powers provided for in that Act for this specific purpose. We will proceed with this as soon as we reasonably can, taking account of the need to take the Northern Ireland Executive with us if it is their wish that the matter be extended to Northern Ireland. In these circumstances, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw this amendment.
Lord Wallace of Tankerness [V]
My Lords, I thank my noble friend and the noble and learned Lords who contributed to this debate for their support for what I seek to achieve by it. I thank the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for his positive response, and for his clear and unequivocal commitment to ratification. I recognise that there is already in place a substantial body of primary legislation in the 2005 Act, which will allow that to proceed. I very much hope that the engagement with the Northern Ireland Executive will continue, so that when ratification takes place it can apply to the whole of the rest of the United Kingdom. On that basis, I seek leave to withdraw my amendment.
The Deputy Speaker
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 2. I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover and the Minister may speak only once, and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 2: Implementation of other agreements on private international law
Amendment 2
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, this is the main amendment on Report. It seeks to leave out Clause 2, which gives the appropriate Minister, whether in the devolved Administrations or in central government, the power subsequently to introduce changes to domestic law, including changes incidental to international treaties made with foreign countries, on the basis that domestic law should be changed because that has been agreed with a foreign country. In addition, it allows the Executive to introduce by secondary legislation changes to domestic law to give effect to model laws, for example in relation to insolvency. We oppose that extension of executive power. We believe that it represents a very substantial break with past practice, which requires treaties dealing with private international law to be introduced and change our domestic law by primary legislation, and we will press this issue to a Division.
I will set out briefly the way that we put our case in relation to this. Clause 1 gives effect, as part of the domestic law of this country, to three international agreements. The first is the 1996 Hague Convention on Jurisdiction, Applicable Law, Recognition, Enforcement and Cooperation in Respect of Parental Responsibility and Measures for the Protection of Children. This convention aims to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. It is a thoroughly good thing; it makes significant changes, or gives effect to significant powers, in the UK family courts.
The second is the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements, which aims to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. These clauses are common, particularly in high-value commercial contracts. Again, this is a good convention; it makes changes to UK domestic law and we support its incorporation.
Lord Pannick (CB) [V]
My Lords, I agree with the points made so forcefully by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. My concern about the width of Clause 2 arises from the discussions and conclusions on this Bill in your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, of which I am a member. The noble and learned Lord has already mentioned the relevant paragraphs of our report, HL Paper 55, which we published on 4 May, and perhaps I may add very briefly to what he has said.
The Constitution Committee recognised that many of the international agreements to which Clause 2 would apply are technical in nature, and it recognised that the text of an international agreement cannot easily be changed, or be changed at all, after negotiations have concluded—points emphasised at various stages by the Minister. However, we take the view that that is no justification for allowing the law of this country to be changed by statutory instrument in this context without full parliamentary debate. That is because important policy decisions might arise in this context both on whether to implement an international agreement in domestic law and on the manner in which such an agreement is to be implemented.
International agreements often recognise a discretion for signatory states on a variety of matters, some of them of considerable policy interest and concern. Those policy decisions should be the subject of detailed debate and possible amendment of a Bill on the Floor of the House—or whatever the remote equivalent of the Floor of the House is. Those policy decisions should not be for Ministers to decide by unamendable regulations in relation to which there can be only limited debate.
I emphasise that this is not emergency legislation; it is a proposal from the Government for a permanent shift in power to the Executive. In Committee, the Minister did not make out any case for such a change in the law. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, divides the House, he will have my support.
Lord Hope of Craighead (CB) [V]
My Lords, the matter has been so fully covered by the speeches already made that I have little to add, other than my full support for what has been said. However, I wish to emphasise three points.
First, the devolution arrangements in this clause have always troubled me. I refer to what I see as a lack of clarity about whether it is the Scottish Ministers or the Secretary of State who will exercise the powers referred to in Clause 2(1) in relation to “implementing” the international agreement on the one hand and “applying” it on the other. This is an indication, surely, that the Bill is seeking to crowd too much into this clause. It would be far better to leave these matters to primary legislation according to the ordinary and well-understood rules as to which legislature is to deal with what, according to what is reserved and what is not.
Secondly, the umbrella phrase “any international agreement”—I stress the word “any”—indicates that it is intended to catch a wide variety of international transactions relating to private international law. At present, leaving aside Lugano, we have no idea of what they might be. It seems likely, however, that they will not be many, but any one of them could be very important and raise issues which should not be left to the exercise of Executive power. The pressure on Parliament if we were to proceed by way of a Public Bill in the ordinary way and not by way of statutory instrument would be quite limited. Therefore, it is hard to see why we have to go down this road at all.
Thirdly, there is no sunset clause in the Bill. I could understand it if it had been intended to deal only with measures that needed to be in force before the end of the implementation period or measures that were otherwise urgent and short term, but, without such a clause, this Bill is entirely open ended. Committing all international agreements to the statutory instrument procedure at Westminster and in the devolved legislatures as a permanent feature of our law, whatever the political situation might be, seems to be highly undesirable.
Lord Blunkett (Lab) [V]
My Lords, I speak in support of my noble and learned friend. He will recall that in Committee, when we debated this matter briefly, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, laid down a challenge. He said that those who are in government are in favour of secondary legislation but, when they are in opposition, they are against it. I think that the case has been made this afternoon very clearly that this is an extension of the way in which Governments apply secondary legislation, and the Constitution Committee and Delegated Powers Committee have reinforced that very strongly.
As a politician—I am not a lawyer, although I am in the company of distinguished lawyers—I am reminded of the kinds of proposals that used to be brought before Labour Party conferences in the 1980s. A number of rather sensible measures—my noble and learned friend mentioned the 1996, 2005 and 2007 measures—are completely undermined by something highly controversial and unnecessary which is thrown in.
We are dealing with this matter in our virtual Parliament and seeking to find a way through. I hope that, as this amendment to delete this clause is pushed to a vote, the Government will think again and be prepared to attend to the major issues, rather than push through an extension of delegated power, including to complementary and associated measures and model laws, as has been described. We could then have wholehearted agreement.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
I too support this amendment. In the light of what has been said by the noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have already spoken, I can confine my remarks to a very few sentences.
Essentially, the constitutional position is one of long standing and should not be changed without justification. That justification has to be seen in the context of a significant move towards Bills becoming more of a framework and with more being done by secondary legislation. We should take a firm stand that that should happen only where necessary. No justification has been put forward for it being necessary. For example, most international conventions and model laws are negotiated at a glacial pace. There can rarely be any justification for the need for legislation to be implemented quickly.
I should add that of course there might have been an exception in the case of Lugano but, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, has already explained, that could have been dealt with. Of course, it is a convention that many lawyers in the UK want and hope that we shall accede to in the interests of the UK economy and of the position of London, but the Minister has taken the view that the clause cannot be confined to that. In those circumstances, I fully support, and will support in a Division, the amendment put forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I want first to say how privileged I am to be sandwiched in the list between two noble and learned Lord Thomases, emanating as I do from the junior branch of the legal profession. I ask my noble and learned friend the Minister, as I did in Committee, to affirm, in the light of the impending Brexit deal or no deal, his full support for the power of English law internationally and, indeed, for the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales. We have a unique gem here, which can not only speak to our international role but, as he knows, can be of such benefit to so many private international deals; this can only be built upon. I urge him to take every opportunity to push the positivity around English law and the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.
Secondly, I ask the Minister, in the most delicate and humble way: if Brexit was all about repatriating powers to Parliament, how does the current Clause 2 sit with that aim?
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
The Government’s position appears to be that the incorporation into domestic law of the terms of a treaty, or of an international agreement involving private international law, should not require any detailed scrutiny by Parliament. The Government’s reasoning is that the time for stakeholders to make representations is before the international agreement is made. Once the rules have been agreed, they say, a Minister has little or no discretion to exercise in framing the requisite statutory instrument. It is all over and there is no need for any shouting.
This would be all very well if we could have the slightest confidence that the negotiations of that agreement were transparent; but we have seen in the Brexit negotiations a complete lack of transparency. Many times, pleas were made to Ministers to outline our negotiating position. “Oh, we couldn’t do that,” the Minister would reply, “because that would undermine our bargaining position.”
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, in his response of 17 April to the report of the Delegated Powers Committee, said:
“As the UK develops its wider trading policy with the EU and rest of the world, agreements on private international law will be key to supporting cross-border commerce by providing businesses, investors and consumers with greater confidence that disputes across borders can be resolved in a clear and efficient way.”
This surely underlines the importance of the issues that we are discussing today. The question of jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments is crucial. Just because the word “private” is attached in the title to “international law”, it should not be thought that we are concerned merely with family disputes and the enforcement of access to children or maintenance orders in different jurisdictions. Important as those issues undoubtedly are, the significance of these provisions goes very much to the heart of rebuilding our economy and regaining our leading trading position in the world, not least in the provision of financial and legal services. For example, in the current negotiations concerning our leaving the European Union, with or without a trade deal, one stumbling block appears to be the jurisdiction of the European Court of Justice. For 40 years, we have accepted its jurisdiction and an analysis of its judgments demonstrates the overwhelming success of British lawyers before that court. We have lost very few contested cases and settled others very satisfactorily on agreed terms.
Jurisdiction is important. I cannot see why the Prime Minister thinks that the European Union is likely in these current negotiations to accept the British rejection of the European Court of Justice as a tribunal for resolving disputes, but that it will accept our Supreme Court as the ultimate arbiter. Such an approach seems to me to be in cloud-cuckoo-land.
Where there are critical issues such as jurisdiction to be resolved, obviously it is wholly inadequate to tell business and other stakeholders that they may make their case only before the details of a treaty or agreement emerge into the light of day. As for Parliament, do we have the slightest idea of the detailed negotiating position in these current talks? What possible contribution can parliamentarians make to the rules of our future trade with Europe, which may emerge by the end of October or by Christmas Day?
Government negotiators should have to bear in mind that any agreement or treaty they may enter into will require full analysis and debate in Parliament before being given the full endorsement of incorporation into domestic law. I was disappointed, as was the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, by the gloomy comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, in Committee. In effect, he said that we all agree in principle to parliamentary accountability, but in government, the reality is that the only consideration is time—getting the business over and done with. It was interesting that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, in his letter to the Committee, used the expression “in a timely manner” no fewer than five times, and with something of a Homeric ring. Come to think of it, the Prime Minister might pin on his wall in No. 10 the Greek motto of the Roman emperor Augustus: “speude bradeos”, or “hasten slowly”.
Suetonius wrote of Augustus:
“Nihil autem minus perfecto duci quam festinationem temeritatemque convenire arbitrabatur”,
meaning, “He thought nothing less becoming in a well-trained leader than haste and rashness.” Well, Augustus was a pretty successful politician. He really did rule the whole of the known world.
Lord Mance (CB) [V]
My Lords, I declare my interest in the field of private international law and arbitration. I am also chair of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law, which was not involved in the Bill generally but has, since Second Reading, been asked to advise on the subject of the government amendments to Schedule 5, which we will come to later and which the committee blessed. I have nothing to add on Clause 1, which is admirable and conventional. On Clause 2, I am grateful personally to the noble and learned Lord the Advocate-General for Scotland for engaging with me, but I regret that his response strikes me as a little like that of the Black Knight in the Monty Python sketch; having lost the arms and legs of his argument, he still comes forward with the Bill—particularly Clause 2—between his teeth.
Opinion is almost universally against Clause 2. The two committees that have reported have categorically condemned it. The argument based on the existence of CRaG 2010 has been described by the Constitution Committee as limited and flawed, and I will come back to that. The speeches at Second Reading and in Committee were almost unanimously against Clause 2. One wonders, as the noble Lords, Lord Thomas of Gresford and Lord Holmes of Richmond, have hinted, why this House exists as a revising Chamber at all if such universal adverse opinion is ignored.
It is true that Parliament generally has not had a major role in private international law since we became an EU state but, as noble Lords have pointed out, one thought that the purpose of recent events was to restore UK institutions to a fuller role. There is no real explanation or justification for Clause 2, an indefinite provision without a sunset clause, as my noble and learned friend Lord Hope has just pointed out.
Private international law is important, both to individuals personally, in areas such as divorce and family, and to businesses. It merits direct parliamentary scrutiny. The Government’s justification for Clause 2 is simply that it would be very convenient and might speed things up. The same reasoning would justify removing any role for Parliament at all, just leaving it to bless by affirmative order on a yes/no basis any subordinate legislation devised by the Executive.
As my noble friend Lord Pannick pointed out, the prior Acts relied on do not justify this large extension. The 1920 and 1933 Acts were confined in scope to recognise jurisdictions, starting with Her Majesty’s overseas jurisdictions and then other comparable foreign jurisdictions, and were limited to recognition and enforcement of judgments only. We are concerned in this Bill with wide-ranging schemes such as those we will lose the benefit of at the end of the implementation period for allocation of jurisdiction, dealing with things such as concurrent proceedings in two states. These are very controversial issues.
Although by itself the Lugano convention may well be the best we can go for in the present state, it merits parliamentary debate. There are defects in the Lugano convention compared with our present state of affairs as a member of the EU. There are very considerable questions whether one might not be better off with other arrangements. Still, while one might have accepted Lugano alone, the wide-ranging nature of Clause 2 means that it applies to anything indefinitely in the future.
The only things actually suggested are Lugano and passing references to the Singapore mediation convention, which is an extremely minor area of the law—it is important when mediation occurs, but there is probably no difficulty in any event enforcing mediation results under present domestic law. There is also the 2019 Hague Convention, which has many merits but is in complete infancy. It has only two signatories: Uruguay and Ukraine. That is a long way down the road. There is no urgency. There are no model laws pointed to, even if it were desirable to give the Government this power in respect of model laws. As my noble and learned friend Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd said a moment ago, private international law measures proceed at glacial pace.
I revert to the position on CRaG: quite apart from the inadequacy of its procedures, reliance on CRaG is fallacious for two reasons. The Explanatory Notes say that everything will already have been scrutinised by CRaG before domestic legislation takes place; Parliament will already, through CRaG, have agreed that the UK should join. That is not right; it is the wrong way round. Normally—this was practice until today—domestic legislation is enacted before ratification, and CRaG comes into operation only at ratification. There are a number of examples of that; in the case of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act, the convention was 1978, the domestic Act was 1982 and ratification was one or two years later. There is the same pattern with the Warsaw convention and the CMR convention on the carriage of goods by road. The domestic legislation preceded ratification by six years for the Warsaw convention and two years for the CMR convention, I think. CRaG does not help for that reason.
CRaG also does not help for a different reason: ratification may be subject, like signature, to reservations or declarations which are permitted by the relevant international agreement or are not inconsistent with its object and purpose. That is Article 19 of the Vienna convention of 1969. It is not therefore merely a question of whether to implement or the manner in which to implement domestically, as my noble friend Lord Pannick suggested. There are huge questions at the level of international law about what declarations or reservations to make, or there can be.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames [V]
My Lords, I have added my name to this amendment, which I support wholeheartedly. I will be relatively brief because I set out my reasons at some length in Committee, and because the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, and all other noble Lords and noble and learned Lords who have spoken have argued the case so persuasively.
To give private international law treaties the force of domestic law is not a trivial rubber-stamping exercise. It may involve significant and complex law in relation to treaty implementation and enforcement provisions. Those were points well made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. It is not just the breadth of the possible future treaties that might be affected by this clause but the sheer unpredictability of such treaties that we may consider in future. There is no way that that is defined or limited satisfactorily by the provisions of the Bill.
There is also a strong argument that this clause would open the way to the Executive further usurping the role of Parliament in an extension of what has been widely and rightly criticised as a thoroughly unwelcome trend for Parliament to have its role circumscribed by delegation of powers to the Executive. This type of argument is often dismissed as a “floodgates” or “thin end of the wedge” argument, because it is said to ignore the detail of the particular case under consideration. However, these arguments are real and, given the respect that we rightly pay to precedent in our constitutional discussions and in the context of our having an unwritten constitution, such arguments deserve to be taken seriously. If private international law treaties today, why not other international treaties tomorrow and a still less constrained role for the Executive further down the line?
No matter how often Ministers say that the availability of the affirmative resolution procedure or even the super-affirmative procedure gives Parliament a right to scrutinise and vote down delegated legislation, we all know the reality: that unamendable regulations are extremely difficult in practice to get changed, withdrawn or rejected as a result of parliamentary scrutiny. That is why removing this clause from the Bill is so important.
A particularly pernicious aspect of this clause is the power to create new criminal offences by regulation, even those carrying sentences of imprisonment. One can foresee that enforcement in particular of international treaty obligations may indeed involve criminal sanctions against non-compliant individuals. We may return to this with Amendment 10, if that turns out to be necessary. However, it would be far better for us to get rid of Clause 2 altogether—a change we may just succeed in holding when the Bill goes to the Commons.
I also remind the House of the important point, made in the Constitution Committee’s report, that regulations are amenable to judicial review and so could be challenged in the courts. Clause 2 would risk the unattractive position that, having entered into international obligations by treaty and Ministers having passed regulations to give them the force of domestic law and to enable compliance and enforcement, the courts would then be entitled to quash those regulations if they were challenged. That would be seriously unsatisfactory.
The Constitution Committee rested its argument on the valid ground of legal uncertainty. I add that such a position would undermine us internationally, further damaging our reputation for being good for our word and bringing our democratic legal processes into disrepute. This is an important point, but I wind up by saying that it is a subsidiary reason for removing Clause 2. The central point is the point of principle on which I suggest the House has a constitutional duty to vote this clause down.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, we debated Clause 2 at great length at Second Reading and in Committee, and I note the further observations made by noble, and noble and learned, Lords with regard to the issue. As I have explained, the Bill is about implementing in domestic law treaties that we have already determined to join. Parliament will be afforded scrutiny under the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—CRaG—process prior to ratification. If it is not content, ratification will not occur.
While I acknowledge that there are differing views as to how effective CRaG has been to this point, it is perhaps important to recognise that, as of 28 January this year, Parliament has decided to strengthen its procedures around the CRaG process by agreeing to create a new sub-committee of the European Union Committee to focus on treaties laid under the procedure. This should provide additional opportunities for scrutiny in this area. The Government look forward to engaging with the committee on these matters. I note the point made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, but I observe that ratification will ultimately be a matter for Parliament before implementation of an international agreement could ever take place.
Furthermore, as with other powers to implement international agreements by way of secondary legislation that exist in the fields of, for example, taxation or social security, we are talking about private international law agreements that are, by their nature, quite technical in their terms. The details of any rules contained in these sorts of agreements will already have been determined at the international level and are usually, by their very nature, clear and precise. The power seeks to allow Ministers to bring forward regulations to effectively implement rules that have been agreed with our international partners and to bring them into domestic law.
It is our view that the level of scrutiny afforded to the implementation of new agreements on private international law is reasonable and proportionate. The implementation of any such agreements would require an affirmative statutory instrument. Noble Lords will be aware that affirmative SI debates in this place are often very thorough, as they should be. There is no reason to suppose that there would be anything other than rigorous debate on the issue of implementation, just as there would be regarding ratification under CRaG.
It was argued in Committee and touched on this afternoon that there was a risk, under our approach, of a statutory instrument made under Clause 2 being struck down as non-compliant with, for example, the Human Rights Act 1998. Of course, that is true of any secondary legislation that the Government bring forward. However, the risk in respect of private international law agreements is not likely to be great. Indeed, I struggle to envisage a situation where the United Kingdom and its international partners would collectively agree a private international law treaty that was not compliant with the European Convention on Human Rights.
It remains the view of the Government that, in spite of the concerns raised, this power is necessary if we are to achieve our objective of building on the United Kingdom’s leadership role in private international law in the years to come. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond, mentioned the importance of the choice of English law and jurisdiction, and if we are going to maintain that important role, we must ensure that we are in a position to move effectively—and that may mean rapidly—in the implementation of private international law agreements. That would allow us to make the most of the competence that will return to us at the end of the transition period.
As has been noted by noble Lords and noble and learned Lords, in the immediate term we have specific concerns about accession to the Lugano Convention 2007, and there are further issues with regard to other conventions that have been mentioned. We may not know the outcome of the United Kingdom’s application to accede to the Lugano Convention for some months, and we cannot implement this convention unless and until the terms of our accession are agreed with the existing contracting parties, including the European Union. So there is a very real concern that there will not be sufficient parliamentary time for bespoke primary legislation to be drafted and taken through Parliament before the end of the transition period. That would mean a delay in our ability to implement the Lugano Convention, with serious adverse effects on United Kingdom businesses, individuals and families with regard to cross-border disputes after the end of the transition period.
Beyond the implementation of Lugano, the power is essential also, in our view, for future private international law agreements. Mention was made of the Singapore Convention on Mediation and the 2019 Hague Convention on Recognition and Enforcement of Foreign Judgements in Civil or Commercial Matters. I acknowledge, as a number of noble and learned Lords observed, that the pace with which such conventions proceed can be relatively slow, but as and when there is the necessary conclusion and ratification, it may be necessary to find appropriate time in which to ensure implementation in domestic law. If that is not possible by way of primary legislation, we are liable to find ourselves at a distinct disadvantage in that respect.
The extension of this to the matter of arbitration was also mentioned, I believe by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. The rules on recognition and enforcement of arbitral awards do of course fall within the definition of private international law. We recognise the success of the New York Convention, and that arbitration more broadly is an important matter approached by reference to that convention. The Government are not planning any change to our approach to arbitration, nor are we aware of any planned updates to the New York Convention, which is the leading international instrument in this area. We acknowledge that arbitration is a sensitive area, and that the current arrangements work well. I reassure noble Lords that, if there were any changes to the current arrangements for arbitration, that would be a matter on which we would consult extensively.
I return to the matter of precedent, which was touched on by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. It has been argued that taking a delegated power of this sort is unprecedented. However, we do not accept this. Our approach to Clause 2 broadly reflects the way in which we have implemented private international law agreements in recent years as an EU member state, under Section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972. Delegated powers have been taken to implement international agreements on private international law and in other contexts. That has been touched on already.
Of course, there are more recent instances—for example, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace, raised the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which contains extensive and important delegated powers in this area, concerning the ratification of the 2000 Hague Convention on the International Protection of Adults, and the extension and ratification of that for England and Wales.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I am obliged to every noble Lord and noble and learned Lord who has spoken in this debate. I have never been present when every single speaker has been against the Government, though when I heard the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, it was possible to understand why. He appeared to have failed completely to understand the basis of the objection to Clause 2. The basis of that objection is that the clause is wrong as a matter of principle and constitutes a change in our constitutional practice by allowing significant changes to be made in domestic law simply because we have agreed them with a foreign country.
At no stage did the Minister address that argument. Indeed, he advanced arguments which at some stages he had advanced previously but not with any degree of enthusiasm, in particular the argument that it was “essential” for the Government to have this power to remain a significant force in commercial law and financial and legal services. When one is a law officer, it is obviously okay to put forward entirely implausible political arguments—people can make their own judgment about them. These arguments went very close to the line in relation to the law. When asked to provide some justification for arguing precedent for this measure, the Minister did two things. First, he referred to EU law. It is hard to know what his answer is to the noble Lord, Lord Holmes of Richmond; I thought that the whole point of leaving the EU was to avoid powers of this very sort. He then referred to the 2005 Act bringing into force the convention in relation to vulnerable adults. He appeared not to have spotted that that was primary legislation giving effect to an international convention.
The Minister finally said that the Government would consult; for example, on arbitration. Is there any point in paying respect to that remark, when every single person in the Lords is opposed to Clause 2 and the Government have simply ignored it?
I am disappointed by what the noble and learned Lord has said, but, sadly, not surprised. I beg leave to test the opinion of the House on Amendment 2.
The Deputy Speaker (Baroness Garden of Frognal) (LD)
We now come to the group consisting of Amendment 3. I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover and the Minister may speak only once, and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this amendment to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Clause 4: Extent, commencement and short title
Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment is consequential on another amendment which omits subsection (3).
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, Clause 1 implements important Hague private international law conventions, including the 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements and the 2007 Hague Convention on the international recovery of child support. These six government amendments aim to provide a clearer and simpler approach to the implementation of the transitional provisions in the 2005 and 2007 conventions. In particular, they aim to make further amendments to the 2018 EU exit SIs which were originally made in respect of the 2005 and 2007 conventions in the event of a non-negotiated withdrawal from the EU.
The Government are bringing forward these amendments following correspondence on the Bill from stakeholders and from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. There was concern that the approach set out in Schedule 5 to the Bill was causing uncertainty for stakeholders. The approach involved continuing to rely on the transitional provisions of the EU exit SIs, which themselves relied on the saving of rights and obligations under Section 4 of the EU Withdrawal Act 2018. Concerns were also expressed about inconsistencies between the EU exit SIs and the transitional provisions of the conventions, to which the Bill gives legal effect under Clause 1. Furthermore, it was considered helpful to make it as clear as possible from which dates the conventions should be considered as applying in the United Kingdom.
Government Amendments 7 and 8 concern the savings provisions of the two 2018 EU exit SIs and make more extensive changes to them than originally set out in Paragraphs 3 and 4 of Schedule 5 to the Bill. The amendments revoke the savings provisions in the EU exit SIs in their entirety rather than retaining them in an amended form. Instead, reliance is placed on the transitional provisions in Article 16 of the 2005 Hague convention and Article 56 of the 2007 Hague convention which are given legal force by Clause 1. Amendments 4 and 6 are consequential on these changes to the EU exit SIs.
Amendment 9 makes it clear that the conventions should be interpreted as coming into force for the United Kingdom on the dates when the UK originally became bound by them—that is, upon the EU accession to the conventions—and that when the UK joins the conventions in its own right after the end of the transition period, it should be treated as having been bound by the conventions without interruption. This means in particular that in proceedings that take place after the UK rejoins the 2005 Hague convention in its own right, UK courts will apply the 2005 Hague convention rules to all relevant exclusive choice of court agreements made from 1 October 2015 in favour of the courts of an EU member state or the UK courts.
The content of these amendments was discussed at length at the main meeting of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law and the drafting has also been considered by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and other members of the committee. They have asked us to make sure that we provide a full explanation of the way in which the amendments are intended to work when we update the Explanatory Notes for the Bill before it passes to the other place, and I am happy to confirm that we will do so. Besides this, they were satisfied that the drafting properly gives effect to the policy intent, and I am very grateful to the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, and to the other members of the committee for their expertise in relation to this matter and for the time that they have spent considering these amendments.
I hope that this serves to reassure the House that these are sensible, proportionate and necessary amendments. I consider that they provide a clearer approach to the implementation of the transitional provisions for both Hague 2005 and Hague 2007 at the end of the transition period, and I hope that they will find support across the House. I beg to move.
Lord Mance [V]
My Lords, as my noble and learned friend Lord Keen has just said, these amendments were considered by the advisory committee that I chair. We welcome them. They are a wonderful simplification compared with the huge complexity of the previous Schedule 5, which introduced savings on savings on what was already, in Section 4 of the withdrawal Act, a saving. They also correct one important misconception or potential error that had crept into the drafting of some of the previous instruments by making it absolutely clear that, insofar as the Hague 2005 choice of court convention will be relevant—and it will not be very relevant if we join Lugano—it will be relevant in respect of all agreements since October 2015, when the UK was originally signed up to the convention as a member of the EU. That is a point on which the noble and learned Lord and I had personal communication after Second Reading.
I will mention just one further point. That protects, or would protect insofar as it applies, choice of court clauses made after October 2015 that fall within Hague 2005. That means probably only exclusive choice of court clauses. There are two categories that are therefore not potentially covered: first, non-exclusive, asymmetric choice of court clauses, which are very important on the London market and are frequently used in banking documentation; and, secondly, pre-2015 choice of court clauses. At the moment, they are protected under the Brussels regime—the Brussels regulation recast in 2012, of which we are going to lose the benefit.
I know that the Minister has this in mind, but I mention it openly: we should surely, domestically, introduce as much protection for those clauses as we now can. It may not be reciprocal, because we can legislate in this area only domestically unless we can persuade other states to agree with us. But domestically, we should protect clauses, particularly those favouring London, and we should avoid people who rely on such clauses having to go through the formality of seeking leave to serve out of the jurisdiction of the court. At the moment, under the Brussels regime, these clauses are protected, whether they are exclusive or non-exclusive, whenever they were made and we do not have to seek leave to serve out—so I urge the noble and learned Lord to pursue that message, as I know he has it in mind already.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames [V]
My Lords, I will add only this: I urge the Minister to heed what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, has just said in looking at ways in which we can give further protection to choice of court clauses—those that favour London are to our greatest advantage—and that he does so as far as possible after the implementation period ends.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I support the amendments. I will make two points. First, had the noble and learned Lord had his way in Clause 2, he could not have made these amendments, which indicates the importance of primary legislation. Secondly, I hope that he heeds what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said in his closing remarks. They were important. In the future, it would be more sensible to consult the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law before producing primary legislation, rather than after.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I am most obliged, particularly for the contribution from the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance. As he noted, as co-chair of the Lord Chancellor’s Private International Law Advisory Committee, he and I discussed this very point in detail at the May committee. I greatly appreciate not only his contribution but those of the other members of the committee, who have an in-depth understanding and knowledge of how these international agreements work and how the choice of court clauses work.
I am conscious of the issue of choice of jurisdiction and choice of law clauses arising in contracts made before 1 October 2015. I am also conscious of our need to do what we can to simplify the process in regard to that matter and, indeed, the matter of serving out of a jurisdiction, which we would have to look at in the context of the rules. These matters have been raised and I have them in mind at present, so I am most obliged to noble Lords for their contributions.
Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
Subsection (3) provides for certain consequential amendments in Schedule 5 to come into force by regulations. Those consequential amendments are omitted by other amendments. Therefore subsection (3) is no longer needed.
Lord Keen of Elie
Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment removes the saving provision for rights etc under section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 deriving from the 2005 or 2007 Hague Convention. The saving is no longer needed because another amendment ensures that the relevant Convention continues to apply after IP completion day to those cases to which it applies before IP completion day.
“(2) In Part 1 (introduction), omit regulation 2.(3) Omit Part 2 (the rights etc deriving from the 2005 Hague Convention).(4) In Part 3 (modification and amendment of primary and secondary legislation)—(a) in the heading—(i) omit “Modification and”;(ii) omit “and Secondary”;(b) omit regulation 7.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment revokes regulations relating to rights etc under section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 deriving from the 2005 Hague Convention. The regulations are no longer needed because paragraph 2 of Schedule 5 to the Bill disapplies section 4 in relation to those rights, and another amendment omits the saving provision for them.
“(2) In Part 1 (introduction), omit regulation 2.(3) Omit Part 2 (the rights etc deriving from the 2007 Hague Convention).(4) Omit Part 3 (modification and amendment of primary and secondary legislation).”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment revokes regulations relating to rights etc under section 4 of the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018. The regulations are no longer needed because paragraph 2 of Schedule 5 to the Bill disapplies section 4 in relation to those rights, and another amendment omits the saving provision for them. Inserted sub-paragraph (4) also revokes a regulation duplicated in other secondary legislation.
“PART 2TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONInterpretation of the 2005 Hague Convention as it has the force of law in the UK
7 For the purposes of Article 16 of the 2005 Hague Convention, as it has the force of law in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 3D(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as inserted by section 1(2) of this Act), the date on which the 2005 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom is 1 October 2015, and accordingly references in the Convention to a Contracting State are to be read as including, without interruption from that date, the United Kingdom.Interpretation of the 2007 Hague Convention as it has the force of law in the UK
8 For the purposes of Article 56 of the 2007 Hague Convention, as it has the force of law in the United Kingdom by virtue of section 3E(1) of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982 (as inserted by section 1(2) of this Act), the date on which the 2007 Hague Convention entered into force for the United Kingdom is 1 August 2014, and accordingly references in the Convention to a Contracting State are to be read as including, without interruption from that date, the United Kingdom.Interpretation of Part 2
9 In this Part of this Schedule—“the 2005 Hague Convention” means the Convention on Choice of Court Agreements concluded on 30 June 2005 at The Hague;“the 2007 Hague Convention” means the Convention on the International Recovery of Child Support and Other Forms of Family Maintenance concluded on 23 November 2007 at The Hague.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment ensures that there is no interruption at the end of the transition period to the implementation of the Conventions in the UK.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
“(b) provision that creates, amends or extends a criminal offence, or increases the penalty for a criminal offence.”
The Deputy Speaker (Lord Duncan of Springbank) (Con)
I remind noble Lords that Members other than the mover of an amendment and the Minister may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press an amendment to a Division should make that clear in the debate.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
My Lords, I will speak very briefly because this amendment has little significance now that the House has decided to remove Clause 2.
Schedule 6 deals with detailed regulation-making power under Clause 2. We will put down an amendment at Third Reading to get rid of Schedule 6, so this does not matter. I tabled Amendment 10 simply to illustrate the width of the power that was being given under Clause 2 and, had we lost the argument on Clause 2, to indicate that we would seek to remove this power. The power in Clause 2(1)(b) allows the Executive by statutory instrument to create offences in connection with the introduction of a private international law treaty with a punishment of up to two years. That is wholly inappropriate, and it illustrates the danger of what was being proposed. But I will not press this amendment to a Division because Schedule 6 will go in any event.
Lord Pannick [V]
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, Amendment 10 is now academic, but it provides an opportunity to mention that one of the concerns of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee is that Bills regularly seek to confer on Ministers the power to create criminal offences.
Paragraph 21 of the committee’s report on this Bill— HL Paper 55—said that the conferral of delegated powers to create criminal offences, particularly those that are subject to imprisonment, is “constitutionally unacceptable”. We made the same point in paragraph 30 of our report of 9 June—HL Paper 71—on the constitutional issues raised by Brexit legislation. There needs to be a strong justification for departing from that general principle. I hope, as I know do the other members of your Lordships’ Constitution Committee, that Ministers will take account of these important principles. If they do not and they bring forward similar clauses in other Bills, we will report on them accordingly to the House.
Lord Thomas of Gresford [V]
My Lords, as I said in Committee, it is a matter of important principle that criminal offences must be clearly defined. I pointed to the criminal offences created, without consultation or debate, by way of regulations, in connection with the current lockdown. I pointed to the fact that they had caused confusion between the Prime Minister and his cohorts and virtually the rest of the country. Since I spoke on that matter, these offences are being amended, or new offences are being created, on, it seems, almost a weekly basis.
As my noble friend Lord Marks pointed out in the previous debate, there can be no clarity as to even the topic of a future international agreement, so there is no clear context within which this House can consider the power to create criminal offences in the field of private international law.
Last week, when we came to debate the Agriculture Bill, I was interested to note that precisely this point had been made by the Delegated Powers Committee: that it was against principle for sentences of imprisonment to be imposed by way of regulation. That was part of the original agriculture Bill, which fell at the time of the general election. In the new Agriculture Bill, Defra has withdrawn its position and is no longer asking for the provision of power, by regulation, to create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment. To my mind, this is a very good way of proceeding, and I hope that it spreads to other government departments.
Lord Hope of Craighead [V]
My Lords, it is all too easy to think that a sentence of imprisonment for a term of not more than two years, which is what paragraph 1(1)(b) of Schedule 6 by implication permits, is a relatively light matter. It certainly is not. Any conviction for a criminal offence, whatever the sentence that results from it, can have the most serious consequences for the individual; for example, opportunities for travel, employment and obtaining insurance can all be affected. The issue, therefore, is one of principle. It should not be for Ministers to create criminal offences by statutory instrument.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd [V]
I will be very brief, as this amendment really has no purpose in the light of the result of the Division.
I too agree that, as a matter of principle, it was wrong to seek to include this power in the Bill. Furthermore, it must be recalled that, in relation to most aspects of private international law and the reciprocal enforcement of orders of other courts, the courts have significant powers by way of committal for contempt or injunctions. It cannot be justified to create and impose criminal offences with sentences of imprisonment in the circumstances of this particular Bill.
Lord Mance [V]
I share the view of other noble Lords and noble and learned Lords. This is pre-eminently a matter for Parliament. It has been slipped into Schedule 6 as a qualification to Section 2 powers regarding private international law. I suggest that, if one had read Section 2 by itself, one would not normally have expected it to cover crime at all, and yet this comes in as if it is automatic that it would cover it. It clearly should not.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames [V]
My Lords, I addressed this issue in the group on the removal of Clause 2. I agree with everything that has been said so far in the debate on this amendment, which I support. Once again, we have unanimity. Although it might not be directly relevant in the light of the removal of Clause 2, I note the points made by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, as to what will happen should Clause 2 be restored in the other place. I suspect that that would be curable here by passing a similar amendment, but I invite the Minister to consider that position as well.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, clearly, given that Clause 2 is no longer part of the Bill, this amendment would have no effect. However, I understand why the noble and learned Lord moved it—to allow further discussion of the issue. We believe that the inclusion of the provision to which the amendment relates would have been important in allowing the implementation of private international law agreements that necessitate the creation of a criminal offence, particularly in the family law area. I mentioned that in Committee.
In response to the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, I am not aware of any current examples where we have provided for criminal penalties when implementing a private international law agreement. However, that does not mean that it would not be the appropriate step to take in future agreements, for example, on mutual recognition and enforcement of protection measures, where the equivalent domestic orders were enforceable by criminal penalties such as orders under the Family Law Act 1996, or, indeed, injunctions under the Protection from Harassment Act 1997. One is looking to the equivalents of such orders made by a foreign court when it comes to enforcement in the United Kingdom.
I continue to suggest that the safeguards on the power that I outlined in Committee, including use of the affirmative procedure as a matter of course, would be effective and appropriate in this regard. However, since the Clause 2 delegated power is no longer part of the Bill, I invite the noble and learned Lord to withdraw his amendment. In the event that Clause 2 comes back to this House, it appears that there might be scope for him to revisit this issue.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
The only example that the noble and learned Lord has given of the need for a criminal offence is in relation to family law—for example, making it a criminal offence not to comply with an order made by a foreign court. I think that is a very sensible power to have. What the level of criminality should be, and whether we should recognise those sorts of offences, is plainly a matter on which Parliament should properly take a view in primary legislation. I was extremely struck by the fact that he gave no examples in answer to the question of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance.
I am absolutely bewildered as to why the Government are doing this. The amendment does not stop them doing what they want to do in relation to private international law; all it requires is that Parliament gets a say and can amend things, as we have just done in relation to the implementation of the three treaties that we are dealing with today. What is wrong with that? It does not cause problems. It means that you get much higher-quality implementation, as we discovered this afternoon through the amendments being debated.
Is it a knee-jerk reaction on the part of the Government that they want to keep Parliament out of things as much as possible? The Minister gives fatuous justification for this by saying that it is “necessary” and “essential” for the UK to remain in its pre-eminent position. This is obvious tosh, as we have been in a pre-eminent position without this existing power before.
I am not going to press this amendment because, as the noble and learned Lord impliedly accepts, Schedule 6 will drop out at Third Reading, which means that there will be nothing to amend. I am very surprised that he is being a dog in the manger about that—of course that schedule has to come out once Clause 2 has come out. I would be interested to hear whether he accepts that; if he does not accept it, I will think that he is behaving slightly childishly.
I am not sure whether our rules allow the noble and learned Lord to come back at this stage. I see noble Lords indicating that they do, so could he confirm that he will agree that Schedule 6 will come out before the Bill goes to the other place?
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, it appears to me that Schedule 6 is quite distinct to Clause 2 as a part of the Bill, but, clearly, it is entirely dependent upon the existence of Clause 2. Beyond that, I do not really comprehend what the noble and learned Lord is talking about.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I will explain the question. Does the noble and learned Lord agree that, now that Clause 2 has been deleted, Schedule 6 should also be deleted?
Lord Keen of Elie
It may well be that it should be deleted, but it is for the noble and learned Lord to move his amendment if he wishes it to be deleted.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
As the noble and learned Lord knows, I do not have such an amendment down. Obviously, what I was saying was that I would put down an amendment at Third Reading. Does he agree that that would be agreed to by the Government?
The Deputy Speaker
It helps if I can make the announcement so that people can capture this on camera. Does the Minister wish to respond?
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
That is disappointing.
In any event, I think the view of the House is unanimous. This is an inappropriate provision. I will not press my amendment. I take it that the Minister accepts that Schedule 6 is totally dependent on Clause 2. In those circumstances, I will put down an amendment at Third Reading to get rid of Schedule 6. I beg leave to withdraw my amendment.
“( ) Before laying a draft of an instrument before each House of Parliament under sub-paragraph (2), the Secretary of State must consult—(a) Scottish Ministers,(b) Welsh Ministers, and(c) the Northern Ireland department.”
The Deputy Speaker
I remind noble Lords that Members, other than the mover and the Minister, may speak only once and that short questions of elucidation are discouraged. Anyone wishing to press this or any other amendment in this group to a Division should make that clear in debate.
Lord Hain (Lab) [V]
My Lords, in moving Amendment 11, I shall also speak to Amendment 12. I am, of course, aware that the position on consultation is different for Northern Ireland and Scotland, which have separate and therefore fully developed legal systems, where Wales does not; therefore, private international law and the implementation of these agreements is devolved in their cases.
At Second Reading, I asked for copper-bottomed assurances from the Minister with regard to devolution—namely that, should the Government identify issues within devolved competence, which would be impacted by existing or future private international law agreements, they would consult the Welsh Government—I emphasise the word “consult”. I was arguing not that the Welsh Government or Senedd should be able to veto or prevent the UK Government concluding such international agreements but simply that, in doing so, they should first make sure they understood the perspective of the devolved institutions, which, in many cases, are obliged to implement such agreements, and preferably secure their consent.
Frankly, I was astonished by the cavalier—some might say high-handed or arrogant—dismissal by the Minister, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, of my request. We may be getting used to the way that this Government are determined to sideline and ignore Parliament, but I had not expected this response, because I was advised that the Welsh Government had been given specific verbal assurances on this point. Welsh Ministers were so concerned at his dismissive reply that their Counsel General, a Minister, wrote to the Lord Chancellor protesting about it.
This is not just a debating point. As I made clear at Second Reading, the UK Government have already signed international agreements which directly impact on the rights of the Senedd to determine the franchise—a pretty fundamental point, you may well agree—and a competence that was devolved only in 2017. The truth is that the Government did not consult any of the devolved Governments properly over a series of European Union withdrawal and Brexit-related Bills. Instead, UK Ministers tried to indulge in a series of power grabs, as previously devolved functions were returned from Brussels back to the UK. There were a series of stand-offs with the First Ministers of Wales and Scotland. There were also refusals to grant legislative consent Motions in Wales and Scotland until satisfactory outcomes were belatedly conceded by Her Majesty’s Government. I am sure that something similar would have arisen in Northern Ireland had Stormont not been so damagingly self-suspended for three years during this Brexit-dominated period.
I therefore repeat my request for the Minister to give an assurance at the Dispatch Box now on the necessity for full and early consultation, for my amendments are designed to ensure that the devolved institutions are not blindsided by finding out after the event that the UK Government have signed up to obligations on their behalf, without any forewarning.
Baroness Ritchie of Downpatrick (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I support the amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Hain. I am a signatory to Amendment 11, which quite clearly emphasises—as does Amendment 12—the need for direct consultation with the devolved institutions. I am a former Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly; I was also a Minister in the Executive and had direct responsibility for benefits and for the protection of children through child support. One facet of this Bill deals with those issues to do with absent parents and the protection of children when the absent parent has gone to live in another jurisdiction. I fully understand and appreciate the matter.
My point, in supporting the amendment, is to ensure that the devolved institutions are not blindsided. I carried out some, shall we say, investigation and research on this: we know that the Northern Ireland Assembly’s Committee for Justice was contacted by the Minister for Justice on 28 April and that the committee gave approval on 30 April. Then the legislative consent Motion, which gives effect to the UK Government legislation, was approved on 19 May.
However, on further examining that debate in the Northern Ireland Assembly on 19 May, I noticed that some Members, albeit accepting the premise and purposes of the Bill, were concerned that after its approval they would not be consulted as an Assembly. The Minister would simply be advised that certain instruments were to be laid and that this particular legislation would apply, but they as Members of the Assembly would not be able to debate it, change it or give an opinion. In my view, that is undemocratic, hence my support for both amendments in the name of my noble friend Lord Hain.
Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale (Lab)
My Lords, I too am grateful to my noble friend Lord Hain for the opportunity to raise some issues on Report, not least because it gives an opportunity to emphasise the different situations in Scotland, Northern Ireland and Wales and, very specifically, the different situation between Scotland and Northern Ireland and Wales, given the legislative competencies that exist in Scotland and Northern Ireland. That was perhaps highlighted earlier today in the amendment tabled by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, on the Hague convention. He reminded us that the Hague convention was carried into Scots law in 2003, when he was Deputy First Minister and I was First Minister, and it is still outstanding in UK law for England and the rest of the country.
I want to ask where we have reached with the legislative consent Motion for the Bill in the Scottish Parliament. I would be grateful if the Advocate-General would update us on that. I would also be grateful for his consideration of this issue of consultation and engagement with the devolved Governments and Parliaments on international treaties. It is accepted in the Scotland Act and the other Acts of 1998 that there is a reserved responsibility on international treaties, but it has been accepted ever since, most recently perhaps in the concordat on international relations between the UK Government and the devolved Governments, that there are joint interests here in relation to devolved legislative competencies and reserved legislative competencies. We can surely do better, as the Law Society of Scotland and others have argued now for many years, in finding systems for the engagement of devolved Governments and Parliaments in advance of treaties being negotiated and signed, rather than afterwards. It seems to me that we are long overdue a formal structure for the engagement of devolved Ministers and Governments in the agreement of negotiating mandates for treaties, rather than simply information, consultation and then approval afterwards. I would be interested to hear the views of the Advocate-General on that as a way forward.
Lord Thomas of Gresford [V]
My Lords, I support this amendment and I, too, was shocked by the lack of response to the very detailed speech by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, in Committee. It seemed to me that the Minister did not give a proper response to what had been said. I think it underlines the Conservative Party’s problem with devolution: either it does not understand it or, if it does, it does not accept it. To give one example, a Conservative Member of Parliament called for the end of devolution to Wales altogether and the scrapping of the Senedd, because his constituents could not, as they normally do at this time of year, go to the Welsh beaches to swim in the sea. That was sufficient to call for the end of devolution in Wales. With that sort of attitude, and with the noble and learned Lord’s attitude to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord Hain, it really makes the case that the Conservative Party is at odds with devolution and what it means.
Throughout the legislation going through Parliament at the moment, there is a gap in recognising the need for consultation and if possible agreement with the devolved Administrations. This is so on the Agriculture Bill, as I pointed out last week. The Joint Ministerial Committee is a joke; it has never worked properly and is ignored by English Ministers. These are great gaps that have to be filled if the devolution settlements are to be properly appreciated.
Lord Bhatia (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, under Amendment 11
“the Secretary of State must consult … Scottish Ministers … Welsh Ministers, and … the Northern Ireland department.”
Can the Minister confirm that this has been done and that the three departments are fully satisfied?
My main concern is about family law. There are family litigations in progress in the courts. A light has been shone on what happens if one of the spouses is resident in the UK and the other is in another EU country and has a different nationality. The question of the children’s custody will have to be resolved. As the UK will be out of the EU by the end of 2020, there are bound to be pending cases that will have to be resolved. Ratifying the Hague conventions will also have to be done.
There are other problems when one spouse is British and the other is in the subcontinent with the children. In such cases the children suffer the most, as the questions of their upkeep and final custody remain unresolved. This will be a very complex issue, and solutions will have to be found with diplomacy and patience. It would be useful if the Minister could explain how the above issues of children’s maintenance, cost and custody will be dealt with.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames [V]
My Lords, I have nothing to add to what was said by my noble friend Lord Thomas of Gresford on this amendment, which we support.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
I support the principle of this amendment. It is all of a piece with the way this legislation has been conducted. My noble friend Lord Hain described the attitude of the Minister when this was raised with him in Committee as “high-handed” and “cavalier”. Prior to that, as my noble friend said, there had not been proper consultation with the devolved Welsh Administration. The noble Baroness, Lady Ritchie, indicated that the Northern Ireland Assembly did not feel it had been consulted. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope of Craighead, said earlier that the devolution aspect of this had not been thought through. As became apparent during the earlier stages of this Bill, the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law was not consulted at all before the Bill was laid before Parliament.
This is not the right way to legislate. I very much hope that the Minister will reflect on the failures properly to deal with this Bill and the inadequacies in it as a result, in particular Clause 2 and the need significantly to amend Clause 1. Both Clause 1, which has broad support throughout the House, and the need for its amendment indicated how misjudged Clause 2 is. If the Minister has any respect for this House, he will properly respond to the points raised on this amendment.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Hain, for meeting with me after Second Reading, when we discussed what he termed the copper-bottomed guarantee that he had sought in that debate. I explained to him the difficulty I had with that demand, given that it conflated the position of the Welsh Government with that of the Northern Ireland and Scottish Governments in circumstances where there was a quite separate and distinct divorce settlement with regard to the latter two, in contrast with the position in Wales. I understood him to appreciate that—indeed he even mentioned amending his amendment. I indicated that I did not think that necessary, because of course we are dealing here with a point of principle, and an important one.
Before I turn to the detail of the amendments, I stress to noble Lords that Ministry of Justice officials are in regular conversation with their counterparts in the devolved Administrations, not only about the matters contained within the Bill but whenever private international law issues arise that touch on areas of their devolved competence more generally. We are very conscious of our responsibilities under the devolution settlements, and our approach in this area is always to seek to engage early and often when any questions arise. It is my view that such an approach of early engagement is the best way to make consultation genuinely meaningful.
The noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, referred to an earlier observation by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, with regard to his concern over the devolved aspects of the Bill. I have to say that I am perplexed by the observations of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Hope, and perhaps I should have responded earlier. There are two distinct ways in which these matters can be dealt with in the devolved context of Scotland. One is by the Scottish Ministers and the other is by the Secretary of State with the consent of the Scottish Ministers. The latter avenue is of course there because there are circumstances in which the Scottish Government will say to the UK Government, “We are quite content that you should implement these provisions throughout the United Kingdom without us having to replicate your efforts”. I hope that that assists in clarifying that point.
The Government have fully honoured the devolution settlements in this area as we approached the drafting of the Bill, including, I may add, the Clause 2 power itself and how it can be exercised in particular in relation to Northern Ireland and Scotland. It is important to point out at the outset that the devolution settlement is different in distinct parts of the United Kingdom, as I said before, and that difference is reflected in the Bill.
Amendment 11 affects Scotland and Northern Ireland, where private international law is a devolved matter, differently to Wales, where these matters are almost entirely reserved. For Scotland and Northern Ireland, there are already two designated “appropriate national authorities”, as I just mentioned, which may exercise the Clause 2 power for those jurisdictions: either the Scottish Ministers or a Northern Ireland department, or alternatively, the Secretary of State acting with the consent of those Ministers or the Northern Ireland department. Either way, the ultimate decision on use of the Clause 2 power in Scotland and Northern Ireland rests with the devolved Administrations, and that is reflected in the Bill.
In principle, I have no objection to consulting before the Secretary of State can make regulations which apply in Scotland and Northern Ireland. Indeed, it is something that would happen, because he can make those regulations only with the consent of the Scottish Government or of the Northern Ireland department. I refer also to Clause 2(7)(b)(i) and (c)(i), which provide that the Secretary of State already needs the consent of the Scottish Ministers or a Northern Ireland department to legislate for those parts of the United Kingdom. I do not see how one would gain such consent without consultation. It goes without saying that if you are to secure consent, you must consult and engage.
The Scottish Government and Northern Ireland Administration have been fully engaged in the drafting of the Bill, including the Clause 2 power, and there is strong support from both devolved Administrations on the Clause 2 power as currently drafted. That is reflected in the fact that a legislative consent Motion has already been granted by the Northern Ireland Assembly, and another has been laid before the Scottish Parliament, with both the Scottish Government and the Scottish Parliament’s Justice Committee recommending that consent be granted. There we have a clear picture of what is happening in the devolved Administrations with regard to the Bill, and in particular Clause 2, and their welcome of these developments. They are the product of consultation and of consent.
The Deputy Chairman of Committees
I have received no requests to speak after the Minister, so I call the noble Lord, Lord Hain.
Lord Hain [V]
I thank my noble friend Lady Ritchie of Downpatrick for the telling point that she made about Northern Ireland and the confused picture of consultation there. I also thank my noble friend Lord McConnell for the interesting points that he made, including on the long-overdue formal structure for mandates for treaties. It was an interesting point that the Government might want to consider. Whether it is over Europe or international treaties, I have always found the process for forming the mandate for the negotiations in respect of the devolved Administrations, as my noble friend Lord McConnell put it—as a former First Minister of Scotland, he is an authority on these matters—to be a sort of retrospective rather than prior consultation. I thank, too, the noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, for his important point about getting agreement, if possible, with the devolved Administrations on all the Bills that are descending on us in a great shower as we move to leave the European Union.
The noble Lord, Lord Bhatia, made important points about family law and proper consultation over the complexities of children’s rights. My noble and learned friend Lord Falconer made what I thought was the very telling observation that the way that these amendments have been handled and, indeed, the response to my points at Second Reading are all of a piece, to use his phrase, with the way in which the Bill has been conducted.
I thank the Minister for his response. However, I am afraid that I do not accept his interpretation of the way that I approached this matter at Second Reading, and I think that revisiting Hansard will confirm that. My points concerned Wales. I asked for a copper-bottomed guarantee on consultation over Wales. I did not get it then and I have only sort of got it, grudgingly, now. I simply say to him that I always found in my role as a Minister that it was better to own up and admit to mistakes if and when you made them. If I may say so as a former Secretary of State for Wales and for Northern Ireland, I think that it is also better to be open and embracing about devolution and the statutory requirements for consultation and agreement on these matters, rather than to be a bit grudging and chippy about them.
I have no idea what the Welsh Government will make of the Minister’s reply. He seems to have given a commitment to consult and reach agreement, but we will need to see. Maybe this matter will have to be revisited on Report, especially if the Welsh Government react with a letter to the Lord Chancellor in the way that they did after his response to me last week. Perhaps that will not be necessary—I certainly hope not. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Monday 29th June 2020
(3 years, 10 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 115-I Marshalled list for Third Reading - (24 Jun 2020)
Lord Keen of Elie
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Keen of Elie) (Con)
My Lords, I am grateful to the House for Members’ engagement on the Bill throughout its passage. The amendments in this group are all consequential on the removal of the delegated power contained in the former Clause 2 of the Bill. I am moving Amendment 1, and support Amendments 2 and 3, as the provisions to which they relate do not function without the delegated power.
Before I turn to the detail of the amendments, I wish to make clear from the outset that we believe that the delegated power contained in the former Clause 2 of the Bill was a necessary, proportionate and constitutionally appropriate measure, for the timely implementation in domestic law of future private international law agreements which the Government had decided that the UK should join. Subject to a successful application, this could have included the Lugano Convention 2007.
Any decision for the United Kingdom to join a treaty or agreement in this area of law would still have been subject to successful completion of parliamentary scrutiny procedures under the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010. The former delegated power in the Bill did not alter the well-established approaches to parliamentary scrutiny of treaties and wider ratification processes under CRaG. Instead, it was simply a mechanism to draw down the treaty obligations into domestic law in readiness for ratifying the treaty.
I will now speak to Amendment 1, in my name, which seeks to remove from the Bill subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 2, formerly Clause 3, which establishes the Crown application of the Bill. These provisions were consequential on what was, originally, Clause 2, containing the delegated power. They provided that regulations made in the exercise of the delegated power in former Clause 2 could bind the Crown, subject to exceptions which reflect those contained in Section 51 of the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982, as referred to in subsection (1).
The Government are bringing forward this amendment to remove these subsections from the Bill, as these two interlinked provisions were originally intended to apply to regulations made under the delegated power and therefore serve no function following its removal. As I have indicated, this is purely to ensure that the Bill is workable for its introduction into the other place, given the outcome of our deliberations in this House.
I have also put my name to Amendment 2, in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton. The amendment seeks to remove Schedule 6 from the Bill. It details how the delegated power could be exercised in practice, including the parliamentary procedures to be followed for making regulations. I accept that the House has made its view clear, and without the delegated power in the former Clause 2, Schedule 6 serves no useful purpose. In these circumstances, purely to enable the tidying up of the Bill, we support the amendment to remove Schedule 6 from the Bill at this point.
Amendment 3, also in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, seeks to amend the Long Title of the Bill. Again, this is a consequence of the removal of the delegated power. Given that the new title more accurately reflects the content of the Bill as amended by the House, namely the implementation of the 1996, 2005 and 2007 Hague Conventions under Clause 1, in these circumstances the Government are content to support the amendment.
I beg to move.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
I am obliged to the noble and learned Lord. There is no dispute between us; all three amendments should be approved, to reflect the changes resulting from removing the wider power. The Minister repeated his argument for why that power should be there. We have had this argument three times now. It was rejected when he put it to the Delegated Powers Committee, rejected when it was put to the Constitution Committee, and massively rejected when it was put before your Lordships’ House, so there is no point repeating it again.
The Minister said that we should be dealing with subsequent conventions by secondary legislation. We have made amendments in this Bill to the three conventions that we are bringing in today. We could not have done so if his Clause 2 powers had been there. I hope that he will bring back what was the view of everybody in the Chamber, apart from him—namely that the Clause 2 power should not be there.
Lord Garnier (Con) [V]
My Lords, as is often the case with legislation bringing treaties into domestic law, the meat of this Bill is to be found in the schedules rather than the clauses. Unfortunately, there was some gristle in Clause 2 that made it less palatable. That said, there has been a universal desire to see the three conventions in question come into our post-EU domestic law, and, subject to the already-announced recognition of the points made on Report on 17 June by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Wallace of Tankerness, in relation to the Hague Convention 2000, the real substance of this Bill has been agreed. I congratulate my noble and learned friend the Advocate-General, who has been carrying the Bill more or less on his own.
However, I also commiserate with him on coping with the gristle. He has not looked, still less asked, for sympathy from any of us. I dare say that he might have hoped for more voluble support from this side of the House, but as the experienced advocate that he is, he has not revealed his disappointment, even when the noble and learned lord, Lord Mance, disobligingly compared him to Monty Python’s armless and legless Black Knight.
Unquestionably, the provisions in Clause 2, which gave the Executive the extensive future law-making powers originally in the Bill, have been shown to be constitutionally awkward and unwelcome, by the Constitution Committee, the Delegated Powers Committee and contributors to these debates. When the Bill goes to the other place, I trust that the Government will not use their large majority there to restore the Bill to its original form.
Having said that, I would not want the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton—who is just as much a politician as he ever was in government 15 years ago—or the Labour Party, to claim that the amended Bill shows them in an altogether angelic light. In these proceedings they have no halo to burnish. As they know only too well, and as was graciously accepted by the noble Lord, Lord Blunkett, in Committee, there were times when the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and his colleagues in government enthusiastically gave the Executive extensive Henry VIII powers—powers he now decries. The same could be said of my Liberal Democrat partners in the coalition Government and, I readily confess, of me.
However, let us in a Bill of this type and content, cast political point-scoring aside and do two things. First, we should send this Bill to the other place with our strong advice that those Henry VIII powers that were once in the Bill should stay out of it so that the three conventions can be brought back into our national law as soon as can be sensibly arranged. Secondly, we should invite a Joint Committee of both Houses thoroughly to investigate and review the use of Henry VIII powers and make recommendations on their future use. The Clause 2 powers were by no means the most egregious example of them, but I am not alone in thinking that Ministers should not make or amend the criminal law or the substantive law more generally by secondary legislation. That should be confined to administrative and simple regulatory matters.
Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd (CB) [V]
I too warmly support these necessary amendments. I do not wish to traverse the arguments that took place on Report or prior to that. I merely add a word about the Lugano convention. It is universally agreed among lawyers that although it may not be the best solution, it is probably the best available solution to the position that we are likely to find ourselves in at the end of the year. It is of the upmost importance to many in the United Kingdom economy, but in particular also to those who conduct legal business in London, that we adhere to the Lugano convention. I see no reason why the other parties to the convention will not agree. I therefore express my earnest hope that if that takes place there will be no delay whatever in bringing forward the necessary legislation to make it part of our law. Any delay in the matter of the reciprocal enforcement and recognition of judgments can do nothing but damage the position of the United Kingdom as a whole and in particular London as a dispute resolution centre.
Lord Foulkes of Cumnock (Lab Co-op) [V]
My Lords, I enjoyed the speech of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, especially when, having made a couple of political points, he asked us to cast political points aside. It is nice to see that he is in his usual jolly form.
I am very pleased that the Government have decided to remove Clause 2 and Schedule 6 from the Bill. I agree with my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer. We would not want to give the Government carte blanche on any agreement, especially at a time when the Civil Service is being taken over by political ideologues—friends of Mr Cummings. But, like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, having made a couple of political points, I have two specific questions for the Minister. First, on the state of play in discussions with the Crown Dependencies and Overseas Territories, have any memoranda of understanding been agreed, and what does he expect the final outcome to be?
Secondly, as a delegate from this Parliament to the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe I noted that paragraph 5 of the Explanatory Note states that
“Agreements containing PIL rules may also be negotiated through the Council of Europe.”
I am keen to know what agreements would come into that category. I would be grateful if the Minister could respond today, but if he cannot, I would appreciate his response in writing.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, I too am glad to see that Clause 2 and the schedule will go and I fully support the amendments brought forward by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer. Is it the Government’s intention to replace Clause 2 and in particular Schedule 6 when the matter goes to the other place? If so, is it their intention to have criminal offences, which are punishable by imprisonment, by secondary legislation? I made that point at an earlier stage of the Bill. In principle, it is quite wrong for imprisonment to be imposed as a result of secondary legislation. In this particular instance it is even worse, because the scope of private international law is so wide that anything could be the subject of it within the principles of private international law. There is no clarity at all about where a criminal sanction involving imprisonment would be imposed. I would be grateful if the Minister could deal with that point.
Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale (Lab)
My Lords, these are sensible amendments and I support the Bill as it now stands. There was an interesting exchange on Report in relation to devolution issues, particularly in relation to Wales following the amendment moved by my noble friend Lord Hain. It was an informative debate. During that discussion, I raised the issue of the arrangements in place to involve the devolved Governments in the discussion of international treaties. There is a commitment in the concordat between the UK Government and the devolved Governments to ensure that there is prior consultation in relation to appropriate international treaties.
In that debate on my noble friend’s amendment, I asked specifically if it might be appropriate at some stage for us to move towards an institutional framework for the involvement of the devolved Governments in the agreement of negotiating mandates for international treaties, rather than simply a preference from Government to Government on consultation. I heard the response of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen, on that day and I read it again afterwards. The Government’s wording is carefully chosen. He said:
“We are very conscious of our responsibilities under the devolution settlements, and our approach in this area is always to seek to engage early and often when any questions arise. It is my view that such an approach of early engagement is the best way to make consultation genuinely meaningful.”—[Official Report, 17/6/20; col. 2251.]
That is of course very sensible. But will the Minister reflect on the opportunity for this and other Bills that will come before us as a result of our departure from the European Union and other factors to prompt us along the road of a better institutional framework for the engagement of the devolved Governments in negotiating mandates for international treaties? Perhaps, outwith a piece of legislation that might just polarise us in debate, there might be scope for a debate on this in your Lordships’ House in the future.
Lord Holmes of Richmond (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, I support the three amendments, largely for the reasons already eloquently elucidated by other noble Lords. I spare a word for my noble and learned friend the Minister in his dogged determination in the way that he has taken this Bill through. Perhaps he, like others, will agree that the Bill will now leave this place in a better state than when it arrived. We all hope that we are bidding au revoir to Clause 2 and hope that when the Bill appears in the other place it will in no sense be à bientôt.
In making those points, I underscore the important place of London as a centre for international dispute resolution. I ask my noble and learned friend, as I have on each occasion, to underline our gift—a gleaming jewel—in having English law and the jurisdiction of the courts of England and Wales.
Lord Mann (Non-Afl) [V]
My Lords, it is a little disconcerting to end up being thought by the noble and learned Lords, Lord Garnier and Lord Falconer, to be on the side of the angels, but I concur with the consensus that has emerged on the Bill. When we left the European Union, we did not leave in order to give the Executive more power. The argument that was put was that power would be transferred back to the British Parliament. There is a substantive difference between Parliament and the Executive in our democracy, and it would behove the Government in future to be significantly less reliant on so-called Henry VIII powers. That is not taking back control of democracy; it is ceding control to the Executive. That will come back and bite the Executive politically in the view of the general public at some stage in future. I am pleased that we have a consensus today.
Finally, I add to the question posed by the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes, to clarify what the situation will be in relation to Northern Cyprus.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD) [V]
I welcome these sensible amendments which tidy up the Bill, but I also welcome them for an important reason, which is that in removing Clause 2 this House made an important constitutional decision. I welcome the thrust of much of what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Garnier, said. However, I doubt that we need a thoroughgoing review of delegated legislation or the powers to delegate legislation. What we need is to respect more thoroughly the views of the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee and the principles that it applies, which are well known and are often stated and applied by this House and were importantly so stated and applied during debates on the removal of Clause 2.
I regard it as a shame that the Minister opened this afternoon’s discussion with a reassertion of the position that he enunciated during earlier stages of the Bill— that Clause 2 was constitutionally proper and not inappropriate. This House decisively rejected that view. I hope that the Government will listen to what has been said today and, more importantly, will consider the arguments that were advanced during the earlier stages of the Bill, change their mind and decide not to reinstate Clause 2 and send it back to this House, taking advantage of their majority; and, rather than having a thoroughgoing review, will decide to exercise some self-control in future and not put before us Bills which contain delegated powers that most of us regard as entirely wrong and inappropriate.
Lord Keen of Elie
My Lords, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Thomas of Cwmgiedd, and my noble friend Lord Holmes observed, it is important that we maintain the position of English law and the jurisdiction, particularly in London, with regard to commercial dispute resolution just as it is maintained under the New York convention with respect to arbitration. That is why we have made our application to the council of the Lugano convention to join that body, but it is step that can be taken only with the consent of the member states and the EU. We recognise that if our application is accepted it is a matter of urgency for us to draw down that treaty into domestic law, which in part explains the position that we have adopted with regard to Clause 2.
It is not often that I find myself in a position where I have to correct the noble Lord, Lord Foulkes of Cumnock. Indeed, I regard this as highly unusual, but I observe that where he said that the Government had decided not to proceed with Clause 2 that was not entirely accurate. It was decided for us, and there is a distinction to be drawn there. As regards the state of play with the Crown dependencies, the provision with respect to the Isle of Man fell with the amendments to the Bill in this House. As regards the Council of Europe, while in theory it may seek to promote some issues in respect of private international law, I do not understand that it has done so or that it imminently intends to do so, but I will make further inquiry and if necessary write to the noble Lord.
The noble Lord, Lord Thomas of Gresford, talked about a matter of principle with regard to the introduction of what would amount to a criminal offence of some limited penalty by way of secondary legislation or something other than primary legislation, a situation that has obtained for almost 50 years since the European Communities Act 1972.
The noble Lord, Lord McConnell of Glenscorrodale, raised prior consultation. I reiterate the points I made at an earlier stage with regard to that. Both the Government of Wales and the Government of Scotland granted an LCM to the Bill in its original form, so they appeared to be relatively content with its provisions.
I am not clear about the reference made by the noble Lord, Lord Mann, to Northern Cyprus in the context of the Bill, but I understand the complications that arise with regard there to private international law, and I would be content to speak to him later if there is a further point that he would like to elucidate, and I would be happy to consider it.
The Government are content to support this group of amendments as they relate to elements of the Bill which no longer function without the delegated power previously in Clause 2. However, as I have made clear, the Government’s position on the Clause 2 delegated power has not changed.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]
Wednesday 2nd September 2020
(3 years, 7 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 115-I Marshalled list for Third Reading - (24 Jun 2020)
The Lord Chancellor and Secretary of State for Justice (Robert Buckland)
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read a Second time.
Private international law might sound rather dry and technical—[Laughter.] I get ready assent from the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry)—but at its heart sit the lives of real people and the challenges they face when legal disputes arise in relation to cross-border matters. I am talking about people such as the parents who need to make arrangements in the best interests of their children when a relationship breaks down and one spouse moves abroad, or the small business left out of pocket by a supplier based in another country needing to seek redress in the courts.
Reciprocal private international law rules provide a framework to allow businesses in the United Kingdom, families and individuals to resolve these difficult and challenging situations. They help to avoid confusion for all parties by preventing multiple court cases taking place in different countries on the same subject and potentially reaching different conclusions. Such reciprocal rules also allow for the decisions of UK courts to be recognised and enforced across borders. All this helps to reduce cost and anxiety for the parties involved. It is vital, therefore, that in the future the UK can not only continue to co-operate on private international law matters with existing partners, but implement new agreements into our domestic law that are fit for the 21st century, and this Bill underpins our ambition to deliver real and tangible benefits for our country and our citizens both now and in the years to come.
I would also like to reassure right hon. and hon. Members that whilst private international law can support and underpin cross-border trade, the Bill is not about the implementation of free trade agreements. The terms on which trade between two countries take place are clearly outside the scope of the Bill.
During our membership of the EU, we helped to build, develop and refine an advanced framework of rules on private international law. On 31 January 2020 we marked the first time in more than 20 years that full competence in this area of law returned to the UK. It is important that we acknowledge this new reality and take appropriate steps, and those include ensuring that our statute book is fit for purpose. The Bill achieves this by reimplementing in domestic law three key private international law agreements in which we currently take part so that in future we do not need to rely on retained EU law as the main legal basis for our continued participation.
These three agreements are Hague conventions, adopted under the auspices of the Hague conference on private international law. The UK currently operates them due to our previous membership of the EU, but we will become an independent contracting party to them in our own right at the end of the transition period. Our continued membership of these agreements is widely supported by interested parties in the legal and finance sectors, and indeed by Members in this House and the other place. Clause 1 ensures that these important conventions can continue to operate effectively in the future by stating that they
“shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom”
from the end of the transition period, instead of relying upon retained EU law for their implementation domestically beyond then. This will make their implementation clearer and more straightforward for practitioners, litigants and, indeed, our international partners.
These three conventions cover distinct areas of private international law in the fields of commercial and family law. The 2005 Hague convention increases legal certainty in disputes that relate to cross-border commercial contracts, which include an exclusive choice of court clause. It does this by ensuring that there is no dispute over where a case should be heard and enables any resulting judgment to be recognised and enforced across borders.
These types of choice of court clause are common in high-value commercial contracts, but in family law we are also reimplementing two conventions that cover sensitive and important issues for individuals and families who become engaged in cross-border disputes when a relationship unfortunately breaks down. The 1996 Hague convention improves the protection of children in cross-border disputes and helps families to resolve issues such as residence of and contact with children whose parents live in different countries. Finally, the 2007 Hague convention provides for the recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance across borders.
The Government made a number of minor and technical amendments in the other place, which received widespread support, to provide a clearer and simpler approach to the implementation of the transitional provisions relating to the 2005 and 2007 conventions. However, the reimplementation of the Hague conventions is only a measure for the status quo. We need to ensure that we are ready for the opportunities that will arise in the future.
I firmly believe that we must now seize that opportunity of regaining full competence in this area by building on our long and proud history in private international law and cementing our role in international forums, such as the Hague Conference, the Council of Europe, the United Nations Commission on International Trade Law and the International Institute for the Unification of Private Law. We have long been a world leader in this field, and we should aspire to remain so. While being justifiably proud of our achievements in this space thus far, to really harness our potential we need a legislative vehicle to be able to implement any new agreements successfully negotiated with our international partners.
John Redwood (Wokingham) (Con)
This is an extremely good, positive vision. Can my right hon. and learned Friend give one or two examples of the kind of reforms or improvements that he would be looking to make when we exercise our influence?
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to my right hon. Friend, who will share my strong belief in the success of the legal services sector both in England and Wales, and in Scotland, as well as in the Northern Ireland jurisdiction, and the importance of maximising the advantage that we have not just in our outstanding rule of law reputation, but our reputation as an international forum for the resolution of disputes. I can think in particular of issues related to arbitration and mediation, where important international conventions are being developed, where the United Kingdom not only needs to be part of it, but to be at the heart of it when it comes to improving not just the prospects for legal services, but the opportunities for the businesses and the citizens we serve.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
My right hon. and learned Friend mentioned the Council of Europe. I want to stick on that, because it works on the basis of signing international treaties to get things done. At the moment, they take forever to get through, and the UK is one of the worst signers of them. Is this going to help to speed up the process?
Robert Buckland
I share my hon. Friend’s enthusiasm and sense of impatience about the pace of change in fora such as the Council of Europe. I just need to caution him on this basis. When it comes to the use of the powers that we anticipate under this Bill, we are talking about a narrowly defined type of agreement—practical, detailed but important changes that will lead to the sort of improvements that I referred to in responding to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood). I am sure that as he hears not just my contribution but the one made in winding up by the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk), he will be even clearer about the particular role that this Bill will play in the incorporation of international law.
That is very important, because concerns were raised in the other place that somehow this was a Trojan horse or an invitation to open the floodgates, to allow for the incorporation of major swathes of international treaty law into domestic legislation with minimal scrutiny. Nothing could be further from the case.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
Will my right hon. and learned Friend give way?
Robert Buckland
I give way to my hon. Friend the Chair of the Justice Committee.
Sir Robert Neill
I know that we will move on to the question of what is not in the Bill and what might be later, but before the Lord Chancellor leaves the issue of improving our access to international legal agreements, he has not yet mentioned our application to accede to the Lugano convention, which many regard as critical, it being markedly superior in a number of respects to those listed on the face of the Bill. There is a concern that the Commission is currently recommending against Britain joining the convention, even though the European Free Trade Association members of that convention support it. What is the position on that? Will he assure us that the Government regard this as one of the highest priorities in our ongoing negotiations? It should not be allowed to be hijacked and held as a hostage to fortune in other negotiations.
Robert Buckland
I can assure my hon. Friend that not only do the Government place a very high premium upon the importance of accession to Lugano, but I personally have vested my own time in direct discussions with counterparts at the Commission and other member states of the EU. In fact, in Zagreb, at the final Justice and Home Affairs Council, I took the opportunity to discuss this at length with several other member states and, indeed, the then newly appointed Commissioner for Justice, and we had a very productive discussion.
My view and that of Her Majesty’s Government is very straightforward: the application for Lugano is a discrete matter. It is separate from the negotiations that are ongoing with regard to a future free trade agreement, and it should be treated as a separate matter. The time for ideology has gone. This is a time for us all to remember that the interests of the citizens that member states serve are paramount, and the interests of ensuring that civil judgments are enforced as swiftly as possible are clear. I call upon all interested parties to put those priorities first, and then hopefully we will see a swifter conclusion to the negotiations, but I welcome the warm support we have had from EFTA countries both prior and subsequent to our application.
Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)
I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way on this Lugano point. I agree with everything he says: it should be treated as a discrete treaty, separate from us leaving the EU, and it is very important for our future trade. But if that is the case, why does he not mention Lugano on the face of the Bill? By doing so, he could perhaps limit the scope of the wide statutory instrument powers—the so-called Henry VIII powers—that I think he will talk about bringing back. He would then have the specific Bill that would make the other place a bit happier.
Robert Buckland
I am always grateful to my hon. Friend, who served with distinction as a Justice Minister, for his long interest in these matters as a member of the profession. I did indeed consider whether this Bill should be a Lugano-specific Bill, but I took the view—and I will explain it in more detail in the body of my remarks—that, because of the narrow ambit of what we are seeking to achieve here, there was a necessary flexibility in allowing the United Kingdom Parliament, by affirmative resolution and therefore by debate on the Floor of the House, to determine whether particular future treaties could be incorporated into domestic law.
I do not regard these as Henry VIII powers. I accept the point that there is a distinction to be drawn in relation to the bringing forward of primary legislation, but as a matter of strict interpretation these are not powers that would allow us unilaterally to amend primary legislation, which, of course, is what a Henry VIII power is. These are powers that will allow us to use secondary legislation, but with the necessary parliamentary scrutiny before the incorporation in domestic law of these treaties. Let’s face it, while we were members of the EU, in large measure, because of the competence of the EU in this area, many of these arrangements and agreements took direct effect in our domestic law without any debate whatever. In my view, this actually represents a qualitative improvement and creates a consistency with that flexibility to allow us to make the sort of advances—I know he shares my view on those—which I referred to in my remarks to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham. I am very grateful not just to him, but to all Members in the other place who gave the Bill detailed and careful consideration. However, we believe that it is constitutionally appropriate and proportionate to deploy delegated powers to implement the type of international agreement envisaged in the Bill.
This delegated power, in my strong view, is narrow, well defined and proportionate. Indeed, private international law itself is still a very narrowly defined area of law. It is familiar in scope and content to courts, legal advisers and experts in the field. The type of international agreement which can be implemented under the delegated power relates primarily to jurisdiction: rules that determine where a dispute is heard, rules that determine which country’s law applies, and rules on the recognition and enforcement of legal decisions or judgments in cross-border cases. No agreement could be implemented that was not related to these specific sorts of issues, which arise in relation to the resolution of cross-border disputes.
On that point, we recognise that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report on the Bill recommended the removal of the proposed delegated power, but it is our view that that is, respectfully, a misinterpretation of the breadth of the powers sought and the types of international agreements it can cover. Many of the examples given in its report that had previously been implemented by primary legislation are not actually private international law agreements in themselves. Although those agreements contain specific private international law provisions, they are wider in their overall scope and could not have been implemented using the proposed delegated power to be reintroduced into the Bill.
It was also said in the other place that the use of delegated powers to implement private international law agreements would be constitutionally unprecedented. With the greatest respect, I wholly disagree. There are delegated powers to implement new bilateral agreements on recognition and enforcement of civil judgments via Orders in Council under the Administration of Justice Act 1920, the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1920 and the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972. Indeed, the powers under the 1933 Act were used as recently as 2003 by the Labour Government to update a bilateral agreement with Israel relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and extending that agreement to cover judgments of the Israeli magistrates courts. However, while it is important to look back at the precedents that exist, it is vital that we look forward, too. The powers contained in those Acts only allow us to implement bilateral agreements in this area. Frankly, the world has moved on significantly since the ’20s and ’30s, because most private international law agreements are now made on a multilateral basis. We need to ensure that the necessary powers exist to implement such agreements in a timely manner.
Parliamentary scrutiny procedures have moved on as well, and our proposals recognise this by requiring statutory instruments made under the delegated power to implement new agreements to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, which provides much more scrutiny than the Order in Council process. Any decision for our country to join a particular agreement in this area of law would also still be subject to successful completion of parliamentary scrutiny procedures under the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—CRAG—which many of us got to know intimately in the context of last year’s machinations on Brexit.
The delegated power in the Bill would not alter the well-established approaches to parliamentary scrutiny of treaties and the process of approving ratification under CRAG. Instead, it would simply be a mechanism to draw down the resulting treaty obligations into domestic law in readiness for the ratification of the treaty. The Government recognise that Parliament has begun to strengthen the scrutiny procedures under CRAG, including, importantly, the establishment of the International Agreements Sub-Committee in April of this year under the chairmanship of Lord Goldsmith. We look forward to working with the Committee, including on the scrutiny of the private international law agreements.
Mr Djanogly
Does my right hon. and learned Friend appreciate that that is the exact same Committee that has constantly been attacking CRAG as totally inadequate and unfit for purpose?
Robert Buckland
Indeed it has made some very trenchant comments about CRAG, and that is precisely why it is important that that Committee does its work on improving and enhancing the procedure. I welcome its work and we will actively engage and ensure that that is so.
The most pressing need for the delegated power is to implement what we hope to see—namely, the Lugano convention, which we have already discussed. As I have said, we still do not know the outcome of our application. It is being considered by the contracting parties to the convention, including the EU. It currently underpins our private international law relationship with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, but could also be used to underpin our relationship with the EU after the end of the transition period. It would provide valuable certainty on cross-border recognition and the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments, as well as clarity on which country’s courts may hear a dispute.
Sir Robert Neill
I welcome my right hon. and learned Friend’s commitment to joining Lugano. It is important for all the reasons he has set out. There was compelling evidence given to the Justice Committee over a number of years about the importance of this. Also, is it not important that we join so that we can then, as one of the convention parties, seek to influence the development of the convention—for example, to avoid a race to the bottom in jurisdictional terms in dealing with the threat, as it is sometimes called, of the Italian torpedo? We cannot deal with the Italian torpedo until we are in Lugano to sort it out, so is that not all the more reason to reflect on putting this on the face of the Bill? Perhaps nothing would be lost by doing that.
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to my hon. Friend. The Italian torpedo is not a reference to the successful naval action by the Royal Navy against the forces of fascist Italy in the second world war. This is a particular device taken by parties who issue proceedings in a jurisdiction that they know will not accept control over the particular proceedings. It is, in other words, a massive delaying tactic that can cause real obstruction to the course of justice and to the resolution of important disputes, and that is why he is right to say that Lugano would be very much a beginning when it comes to the development and refinement of that type of important co-operation.
My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) asked why we do not mention Lugano. Well, there is an obvious argument that I should have addressed, which is that, as we have not yet been able to join it, it would perhaps be premature for us to refer to it directly on the face of the Bill, as opposed to the Hague conventions, which we have joined. Regrettably, there will not be time to bring forward further primary legislation before the end of the year, should our application be approved within the next few months. Therefore, for that sad but practical reason, it would be right not to pass anticipatory legislation but rather to await the outcome of the negotiation and then to allow the use of the delegated power.
The power could also be used to implement other agreements. I have talked about mediation, and in particular the 2019 Singapore convention on mediation and 2019 Hague judgments convention. We have not yet taken a formal decision on either of those, but of course I am happy to talk more about those conventions with hon. Members during the passage of this Bill and, indeed, in the future as we decide on our final approach to these instruments.
John Howell
If I catch your eye, Mr Deputy Speaker, I will speak a little more about the Singapore mediation convention, because I think everyone approves of it. All it does is bring mediation settlements under UK law in the same way that arbitration settlements are included within the New York convention. I hope that my right hon. and learned Friend’s offer to speak to people who are involved with this includes me, because I would be very happy to discuss it further.
Robert Buckland
I am grateful to my hon. Friend and he is right to mention the New York convention. Indeed, it develops the point I made to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham about our ambition on the recognition of arbitral decisions and mediation resolutions, too.
The reintroduced delegated power would allow us to strengthen our internal UK and our wider UK family relationships, including those with the Crown dependencies and the overseas territories, by allowing us to apply and to implement the terms of an international agreement between the different jurisdictions of the UK or, indeed, to apply and implement an arrangement or a memorandum of understanding based on the terms of an agreement between a self-governing territory or a dependency and the United Kingdom. Of course, this would be done only with the agreement of the relevant devolved Administration or self-governing territory or dependency, because the Government recognise that private international law, including the implementation of agreements, is indeed fully devolved to Scotland and Northern Ireland, and this will continue to be reflected in any reintroduced delegated power in the Bill.
In summary, this Bill will allow our country to capitalise on regaining full competence to enter into international agreements on private international law in our own right after our withdrawal from the EU. It simplifies the implementation of three important Hague conventions in domestic law, to which the UK will be an independent party from the end of the transition period. The reintroduction of the former delegated power will also allow us quickly to implement any new agreements we strike with our international partners, thereby remaining at the forefront of promoting global co-operation and, indeed, best practice in this area. Finally, it will also allow our citizens to harness the benefits of these agreements in a timely manner, including to assist in the resolution of cross-border disputes. I commend the Bill to the House.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Labour welcomes the principle of the Bill to maintain and enhance our legal co-operation across jurisdictions and to provide certainty and fairness for those involved in cross-border litigation. In a post-Brexit world, this is essential in attempting to maintain a prosperous economy, protecting our legal system, and providing for families and individual claimants engaged in cross-border disputes. International agreements provide clear and reciprocal mechanisms for dealing with international disputes. In doing so, they are crucial in protecting our country’s proud reputation as the world centre for resolving complex disputes, while offering us a competitive advantage in finance, business and trade.
However, this Bill, and the Chancellor talked about this, will also affect human stories. A wide range of family law issues can lead to cross-border disputes, including when one partner takes a child abroad and there is a disagreement about parenting arrangements—I have had such cases in my own surgeries—as well as when making arrangements for divorce in similar circumstances and, of course, issues relating to abduction and adoption. To keep our citizens safe, we must ensure we have robust international agreements so that justice can be done. Clause 1, which gives effect to international treaties in domestic law through primary legislation, is therefore both necessary and welcome. It is hoped that the provisions affecting the rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments overseas will play a crucial role in building a strong economy and provide some certainty for families in often desperately difficult circumstances.
Although we welcome the principle of the Bill as it currently stands, it must be noted that this is largely due to the successful efforts in the other place of my noble and learned Friend Lord Falconer and others to remove clause 2 of the Bill—[Laughter.] I am glad the Lord Chancellor finds that amusing. I will touch on that in due course, but, first, let us come to the specific points of the Bill on which we agree.
Clause 1 gives effect to key international conventions in our domestic law, which is welcomed on the Opposition Benches. The Lord Chancellor spoke of these issues. The 1996 Hague convention on jurisdiction, applicable law, recognition, enforcement and co-operation in respect of parental responsibility and measures for the protection of children is critical to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. The 2005 Hague convention on choice of court agreements aims to ensure the efficacy of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. We support this incorporation into domestic law, as such clauses are commonly provided for in high-value commercial disputes.
The 2007 Hague convention on the international recovery of child support and other forms of family maintenance provides for the international recovery of child support and spousal maintenance. It is abundantly clear that this is a positive move, which will help to ensure that parents pay their fair share when providing for their children. We welcome these provisions and hope most certainly that we can offer that certainty in other areas of cross-jurisdictional disputes—I have just managed to tie my tongue in knots.
Labour will not, however, support any attempt by the Government to reintroduce clause 2, which would allow for the future agreements to be implemented via secondary legislation only. As we heard in the other place, this provision would be of profound constitutional significance. Labour is concerned that the reintroduction of clause 2 would represent an extension of the power of the Executive into uncharted territory, amending the convention that international legal agreements that change our domestic law can only be given force by an Act of Parliament.
Robert Buckland
I am listening with great interest to the hon. Gentleman’s speech. Would he care to comment on the involvement of the noble Lord Falconer as a Minister in the passage of the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which did precisely what the hon. Gentleman complains of with regard to the incorporation of important international agreements on mental capacity? I would be very interested in his view.
Alex Cunningham
The Lord Chancellor has an advantage over me; he has expertise in this particular area. I accept that we may have dealt with things quite differently in the past, but it is important that we recognise that this is a matter of international law.
I was rather surprised to hear the Lord Chancellor effectively rubbish the concerns of those in the other place, particularly given their comprehensive arguments. The House of Lords Constitution Committee said that this change would represent a
“significant new power that would change the way this type of international agreement is implemented in UK law and how Parliament scrutinises them.”
The House of Lords Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee both considered whether the secondary legislating power should be granted, and both were very clear that it should not. The Constitution Committee stated:
“If the balance between the executive and Parliament is to be altered in respect of international agreements, it should be in favour of greater parliamentary scrutiny and not more executive power.”
As his lordship, Lord Mance—the chair of the Lord Chancellor’s Advisory Committee on Private International Law and perhaps the pre-eminent expert in this area of law—told the other place:
“Opinion is almost universally against Clause 2. The two committees that have reported have categorically condemned it.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 17 June 2020; Vol. 803, c. 2228.]
Lord Pannick, another pre-eminent constitutional lawyer, argued in the debate that there is
“no justification for allowing the law of this country to be changed by statutory instrument in this context without full parliamentary debate. That is because important policy decisions might arise in this context both on whether to implement an international agreement in domestic law and on the manner in which such an agreement is to be implemented.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 17 June 2020; Vol. 803, c. 2224.]
The Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee also offered a stern warning about the unprecedented nature of the constitutional change, saying:
“For the first time there will exist a general power to implement international agreements on private international law by statutory instrument, thereby obviating the need for an Act of Parliament. This will be so regardless of the nature or importance of the agreement.”
In its briefing, the Bar Council was also highly critical of this new constitutional grab, stating:
“The Bar Council is…somewhat concerned that the power in section 2”—
that is, clause 2—
“to proceed by delegated legislation is very broad. For instance, it enables the appropriate national authority…to make regulations ‘for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement’”.
The power could extend to matters in our criminal law, such as increasing or, indeed, reducing the penalties for criminal offences.
To give effect to international treaties in domestic law is not a rubber-stamping exercise. The effect, implementation and enforcement of such provisions requires robust parliamentary debate; we must protect the parliamentary scrutiny of such important legal provisions at all costs. The Government have attempted to make arguments as to why the new constitutional measure would be necessary, but all have failed to convince. Their first argument was that the new provision would allow the Government to implement each new international agreement without unnecessary delay, yet there is no evidence to suggest that fast-track legislation is required. In the past, the implementation of international agreements has often taken years, and there is nothing to suggest that implementing them by primary legislation would cause any difficulties beyond the Government’s having to put legislation through normal parliamentary scrutiny.
The Government raised the 2007 Lugano convention, which deals with the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between members of the European Union. The Government’s argument appears to be that there may be only a short period during which to legislate to give effect to the Lugano provision at the end of the transition period. Of course, that is not an argument for developing the new executive power more generally. The Government have not considered providing for clause 2 only in relation to Lugano, which might be more amenable—why not? That question has already been posed this afternoon. The Lord Chancellor said that is the main reason that the Government want to have the delegated powers; if that is so, why does he not just put that on the face of the Bill and recognise the issues that have been raised in the other place?
The Government claimed that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 allows for sufficient parliamentary scrutiny. Once more, that argument does not carry much weight. As a result of clause 2, the Government would be able to give force to model law without being subject to the scrutiny mechanism under the 2010 Act. That Act does not allow for the amendment of treaties or the consideration of measures to implement treaties. It is a red herring and the argument has unravelled when subjected to expert scrutiny.
This is an issue of constitutional propriety for a Government with a reputation for constitutional vandalism. The Conservative peer Lord Garnier stated:
“Unquestionably, the provisions in Clause 2, which gave the Executive the extensive future law-making powers originally in the Bill, have been shown to be constitutionally awkward and unwelcome, by the Constitution Committee, the Delegated Powers Committee and contributors to these debates. When the Bill goes to the other place, I trust that the Government will not use their large majority there to restore the Bill to its original form.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 29 June 2020; Vol. 804, c. 483.]
Unfortunately, we on the Labour Benches fear that that is the very intention of the Government, who on so many occasions have shown themselves to be keen to avoid parliamentary scrutiny.
As Members of Parliament, we have a duty to tread with real care when reforming our constitution, especially when the Executive is empowered and the power of Parliament is undermined. There is no evidence before us as to why the reintroduction of clause 2 would be necessary or right; with that in mind, Labour will support the Bill as it currently stands but wholeheartedly oppose any attempts to reintroduce clause 2 as the Bill progresses through its remaining stages.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I welcome the approach to the Bill that the Lord Chancellor has adopted and I support the Bill. I support it without hesitation, because it is necessary, but also with a measure of sadness, because I wish it were not necessary. It is a consequence of a decision that was taken that some of us continue to regret and is perhaps an example of the price that is paid in respect of an issue that some thought was technical and dry but that in fact affected people’s everyday lives and the prosperity of the business community of this country but was perhaps not given enough attention in the course of the debates that preceded our decision to leave the EU. Perhaps that caused us not to value enough the system of connections and regulation that we were party to.
The reality is that we are doing our level best—the Lord Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the hon. Member for Cheltenham (Alex Chalk) are doing precisely that—to put in place the best possible scheme that we can have and that is available to us when, at the end of the year, we leave the most comprehensive set of private international law agreements that exist. We just have to accept that that is the reality, but let us not kid ourselves that we will get any improvement: we will end up with something that is less good than we had and that we are leaving behind—ironically, when the Brussels IIa recast, particularly in its relation to the strengthening of the provisions in relation to jurisdiction-of-choice clauses, is something that Britain has succeeded in having changed and improved specifically to advance and protect the interests of the British-jurisdiction and English-law clauses that greatly advantage the City of London and our broader national financial services sector. I put that on the record as a matter of context and to get it off my chest, but it needs to be said, because it ought to influence the way and the speed with which we now move on this.
I welcome the fact that the Government have picked up, on this and the preceding measures, a number of the Justice Committee’s recommendations on how we might best deal with the situation that we find ourselves in. For example, bringing the Rome regulations on family and other matters, which did not require reciprocity, into domestic law, and implementing the Hague convention, as set out on the face of the Bill, are desirable. The ambition to join Lugano is, for reasons that we have already debated, very important. The Hague conventions are worthwhile but are not as good as what we had before, so moving to Lugano, which would be an improvement, would be a step forward.
I hope, too, that we swiftly deal with the other two conventions referred to in the helpful letter that the Under-Secretary of State for Justice, my hon. Friend the Member for Cheltenham, sent to all Members of Parliament: the 2019 Singapore convention and the future Hague convention agreements. There has been some debate in the other place, particularly from Lord Mance, about which order they shall come in. On balance, I am persuaded by the evidence that we have heard over the years and the arguments made by the Law Society of England and Wales—I think the Law Society of Scotland finds itself in the same place—that the more important thing is not to have any gap in the recognition and enforcement of judgments and recognition of international public clauses. That is why the Law Society favours pressing ahead with entry to Lugano as soon as we can, rather than waiting for what may develop with the Hague arrangements. The Government are right not to delay in that regard; we must press ahead.
That is, of course, the means by which we should deal with the Italian torpedo. I mention it not because this is like when we were doing trials in long, boring fraud cases, and there was sometimes a bit of a side bet to make an unlikely comment in one’s closing speech to the jury. The truth is, as we all know, that the Italian torpedo—the delaying tactic of seeking to thwart an exclusive jurisdiction clause, very often operating in favour of the UK, by commencing unmeritorious and almost abusive proceedings in another jurisdiction, which would then hold up the process—has caused a problem in commercial matters and real hardship in many family law cases. Getting the family law issues right is particularly important. The Government’s objective of ensuring that, for example, the partner of a finished relationship is able to enforce her maintenance payments from the other partner, who may be in one of the EU or other contracting states, is critical for ordinary individuals—not just businesses. Having in place a means of protecting the English and Scots law jurisdiction clauses, which are very important for financial services contracts, is critical too.
It is perhaps not the time to go into this in detail, but when we get to Committee, may I ask Ministers to reflect on the matter of asymmetrical jurisdiction, which was raised by Lord Mance, who has massive experience in this field? I tend to agree with him on that, whereas I am not persuaded about the sequencing of Lugano and Hague. He referred to it in some detail in his speech in the Lords. I will not repeat what he said, as he is much more experienced than me, the Lord Chancellor and the Under-Secretary of State, who did not have the fortune—literally or otherwise—to practise in that field. Lord Mance’s wise words are important, because this issue relates to derivative swaps and other financial instruments, which, for reasons that he set out well, are of particular importance to the UK financial services sector. As things stand at the moment, the provisions in the Bill do not sufficiently address that.
That is a technical but important matter for our business interests that we ought perhaps to reflect on as the Bill makes progress in Committee.
The other thing I want to say at this stage is that while I know the Lord Chancellor wishes to be ambitious in scope, I am not saying that this is necessarily a Henry VIII power or that all wide-ranging powers to amend by delegation are always wrong. Lord Garnier, who has been referred to as a mutual friend of all those on this side of the House and elsewhere, put it rather well when he said—I paraphrase him—that essentially all parties when in opposition oppose clauses of this type, but all parties when in government make use of them. He said that he had done so himself, and I did so myself when I was a Minister. Those on the Treasury Bench have done so at various times, so it is not a question of haloes in that regard—
Alex Cunningham
But on this occasion, Lord Garnier was actually in support of the Opposition’s position.
Sir Robert Neill
He was indeed, and if the hon. Gentleman allows me to develop it, I will suggest a nuanced way around this. It is not to say that we should not have delegated powers, but that we should perhaps look again at the way in which they are cast. I do not think it would necessarily be needed to bring back clause 2, as it was before it was removed by the other House—and I understand Lord Chancellor’s point about not bringing in pre-emptive legislation—but there was some merit and a genuine concern to assist in the point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) about putting the power on the face of the Bill with a provision to exercise it at such time as the application was approved. That might remove the sting from it.
I know that the Under-Secretary has examples of instances when delegated legislation is used to create criminal offences. Those of us who have much more experience in that field, as the Lord Chancellor and others have, know it happens. It is not an objection in principle, but it might be possible to redraw the provisions more tightly to make sure that that is not unduly widened. Perhaps there are things that can be done to speed up the process without bringing ourselves into what might be quite a significant conflict given the size of the majority by which clause 2 was rejected in the other place; I think it was 320 to 233, so it was not a marginal matter. I hope, therefore, if we are to ensure the swift passage of the Bill, which is the one thing that we absolutely must have for the sake of avoiding a lacuna on 31 December this year, perhaps some imagination can be given to how that potential difficulty with the other place might be overcome.
I hope that we will be able to proceed with the Bill swiftly. We do not perhaps always give sufficient value and attention to these matters. The status of our civil law and the status of private international law are not talked about enough—
John Redwood
I wonder whether my hon. Friend will address my query to all the expert lawyers in the House about what Britain could now do by way of leadership to improve a big area like family law through these mechanisms. Does he have any ideas for Ministers?
Sir Robert Neill
The first one is one that we have been talking about, which is early joining of Lugano, and being active in the international law field. I think we can do that and, in particular, one area in family law has been a concern, which was expressed by the Family Law Bar Association in evidence to the Select Committee some time ago. It is that the current arrangements in The Hague convention can tend—as the evidence of Philip Marshall, QC, the then chairman, suggested—to militate against mediation in family law cases. Active participation in that could be a very constructive way forward.
I am keen that we get on with this. As I know, and my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) will talk about this more, Britain has a world-leading sector in mediation and arbitration, and that is something that we should also develop. In terms of commercial cases, it is of great value to the country, but it is also of real human value when it can be applied in mediation cases. Despite my regret about the necessity for the Bill, it is well put forward by the Lord Chancellor and I take on board his points. I hope that we will be able to resolve any outstanding issues between this House and the other place as to the best way forward to get the practical objectives that we all share across the House on the statute book as soon as possible.
Joanna Cherry (Edinburgh South West) (SNP)
It is a pleasure to follow the Chair of the Justice Committee. I found much with which to agree in what he said and I share his regret that the Bill is necessary.
I start, however, by recognising that the Bill is necessary as a result of the United Kingdom’s withdrawal from the European Union, and I wish to make it clear that the Scottish National party supports the swift implementation of the 1996, 2005 and 2007 Hague conventions, because that will allow vital family law co-operation measures to continue after the transition period. My party is all for close and co-operative judicial relationships and we hope that, despite some worrying signs to the contrary, the United Kingdom will work with the European Union to ensure such relationships during and beyond the transition period.
However, my party’s support for the Bill does not change the fact that the Scottish National party, along with the majority of people living in Scotland, deeply regrets the withdrawal of the United Kingdom from the European Union on 31 January 2020. That happened without the consent of the people of Scotland and against the explicit wishes of our Parliament. In the EU referendum, which seems an awfully long time ago now, Scotland voted by a significant majority to remain in the European Union, and majority support for EU membership remains constant in opinion polls in Scotland. Indeed, at every electoral opportunity since the 2016 referendum, voters in Scotland have given my party and the other pro-EU parties a resounding majority. I know these facts may be unpalatable to some on the Government Benches but they are facts, and ignoring these facts—ignoring the repeatedly expressed democratic wishes of people in Scotland—has consequences. These consequences are plain to be seen in the fact that, even in the absence of a campaign, support for Scottish independence has reached 55% in the opinion polls during the current crisis. Brexit is widely recognised as a significant factor in the rise of that support, which is now at unprecedented levels.
The Government and those on their Back Benches would do well to listen to wise voices, such as that of the right hon. Member for Sutton Coldfield (Mr Mitchell), who last night told “Newsnight” that
“Brexit has made the case for the Union more difficult to push in Scotland”
and that it would be
“very difficult to resist”
a second independence referendum.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
Order. I understand the point that the hon. and learned Lady is making, but is there any chance that she could now get to the Bill in front of us?
Joanna Cherry
I was about to do so, Mr Deputy Speaker, but I think it is important for the record that we restate the view, and make it crystal clear—as my constituents, and those who elected my fellow SNP Members, would wish us to do—that we are agreeing to the Bill only because we see it as inevitable to protect constituents and businesses in Scotland; but that we do not agree to the fact of Brexit, and that that has consequences, which I am sure are relevant to all discussions in this Parliament going forward—at least from the point of view of Scottish Members of Parliament.
Returning to the specific terms of the Bill, we accept the need to make preparations for the circumstances that will arise as a result of the end of the transition period. As others have said, although international private law is rather dry—as a student, I regarded it with dread—nevertheless it is really important to our constituents, and particularly important in the field of family law, but also really important for commerce and business.
As an aside, I was pleased to see that during the Bill’s passage through the Lords, the UK Government registered their intent to ratify and implement the 2000 Hague convention on the international protection of adults. That has already been done in Scotland, but I am pleased to see that it will now happen in England and Wales, and that there will be an appropriate consultation with the Northern Ireland Executive.
Although the Bill’s introduction has been triggered by the UK leaving the EU, there are aspects of it that go beyond Brexit. I think the Bill—certainly clause 2—was very much about the future strategy for international relations in the area of private international law, about which the Lord Chancellor spoke. I very much hope that for so long as Scotland remains part of the United Kingdom and, indeed, afterwards, when it becomes an independent nation, the strategy of the Government will be based on a commitment to international co-operation on private international law, including multinational agreements, and not just limited to the European Union. As others have said, these agreements are important because they allow and support the legal services sector in the United Kingdom, including in the separate jurisdiction of Scotland, to participate in private international law developments internationally. The commitment to international co-operation on international private law is in line with my party’s policy. We would like to see more international co-operation, not less, and that is certainly the strategy that an independent Scotland will pursue in the years to come.
I welcome the fact that this Bill was drafted to recognise that Scotland is a separate legal jurisdiction and to make provision accordingly. The Lord Chancellor knows that, in another area, I have had occasion to write to him recently to remind him of the fact that the Scottish system of civil justice is indeed completely independent from that of England. That is not just because of devolution, which, of course, is a fairly modern event. It is important to understand that the civil justice system under the Scotland Act 1998 is the preserve of the Scottish Parliament, but that separateness is also guaranteed by the Treaty of Union—in particular by article 19 of the Treaty of Union.
Although I am afraid, as the Lord Chancellor knows, that in the field of judicial review there may be a threat of an excursion into Scottish territory, I am very pleased to see that, in this Bill, that is not the case. None the less, it is worth reminding ourselves that it has often been said that some parts of the Treaty of Union, such as the preservation of Scotland’s Church and also Scotland’s legal system, are so fundamental that this Parliament does not have the power to legislate in contravention of them. I am aware that that point has never been definitively tested in a court of law, but were there to be an excursion into Scots law in the field of judicial review, that might be the opportunity to test that question, and I think the outcome of any such litigation could have interesting knock-on effects. However, as I say, it is not a bridge that we need to cross in relation to this Bill. I see the Lord Chancellor shaking his head with something approaching belief and I am sure that he will be aware that any interference in Scotland’s independent legal system would be met with some resistance, not just from adherence to the cause of Scottish independence, but from the Scottish legal profession. The two things are not always the same thing, although they are increasingly becoming the same thing.
I do not mean to jest here because I am grateful to the Government for having drafted this Bill in a way that recognises that, under section 126(4)(a) of the Scotland Act, private international law is part of Scots private law and that includes matters such as choice of law that this Bill covers, choice of jurisdiction, recognition of judgments and enforcement of decisions. There is also the convention under section 28(8) of the Scotland Act—the Sewel convention—that this Parliament would normally legislate with regard to matters that are within the legislative competence of the Scottish Parliament without the consent of the Scottish Parliament. I know that that has been breached on a number of occasions recently, but thankfully not in a relation to this Bill. Under the original clause 2 of this Bill, Scottish Ministers were given certain powers in relation to delegated legislation because, whereas negotiating and joining international agreements on private international law is reserved, implementing them in domestic law is devolved. As the Lord Chancellor will be aware, the Scottish Government have considered carefully the provisions of the Bill as originally laid insofar as they legislated for Scotland and legislative consent was sought from the Scottish Parliament and granted on 17 June. That was very much because the view was taken that, because the provisions of the Bill cover Scotland as a separate jurisdiction, Scotland would be placed in a prejudicial position if allowance was not made, and that would adversely impact on Scottish citizens and businesses. I think it is fair to say that my colleagues in the Scottish Government wanted to provide reassurance to those affected by cross-border family support and custody mechanisms, as other Members have adverted to.
Finally, I come to the removal of clause 2 in the other place. I appreciate that if clause 2 is not reinserted into the Bill, it will mean that for each private international law agreement the UK enters into in future, primary legislation will be required to implement it domestically. A lack of clause 2 would not mean that the UK did not have the ability to enter into these agreements, but it would mean that they would have to be brought before this House and implemented into law by way of primary legislation. I note that the Lord Chancellor intends to reinstate clause 2, but I say to him, having read the debate in the Lords, that legitimate concerns about parliamentary scrutiny, or the lack thereof, in relation to delegated legislation were raised.
Let me pick up on what other hon. Members have said. If it is the case, as it appears to me, that the Government’s clear policy is to rejoin the Lugano convention—obviously, we would need to do that quickly—I suggest to the Lord Chancellor, and I am indebted to the Law Society of Scotland for this suggestion, that one way around this would be to reintroduce clause 2 on the basis that it focuses only on the implementation of the Lugano convention. I believe that was suggested by the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly). If the Government are insistent on bringing it back on a general basis, might I suggest attaching a sunset clause to it, perhaps for a year or so?
More broadly, the Government need to establish a clear and comprehensive approach to ratifying treatments, one that includes an appropriate role for this Parliament in providing scrutiny, because when the transition period ends, the UK will negotiate and sign treaties on a much larger scale than when we were members of the EU. Although the negotiating and signing of treaties is a function of government, exercised through prerogative powers, the increasing complexity of modern treaty obligations and the way they affect individual rights creates a need to ensure that they are adequately scrutinised here. As others have mentioned, it is particularly important that that happens when criminal offences are being created, or indeed amended or extended, because that has particular implications for individual rights. Let me finish by saying that if the Government do not find a way to enhance parliamentary scrutiny of these matters, the promise that leaving the EU meant taking back control will be made a mockery of.
Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)
The Bill, as presented from the other place, is not in the least objectionable. As has been pointed out, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 automatically inserts directly effective treaty rights into domestic law after the end of the transition period. However, clause 1 takes a number of treaties that we all consider to be valuable and directly puts them into our own laws as though they were non-EU-signatory treaties. I agree that not only is that more transparent, but it makes a clear statement on our new post-Brexit position to the international community. So far, so good. The problem comes when we then get to discuss what Government powers should be in relation to the private international law issues that we do not currently know anything about.
Looking at this Bill, the dilemma I have, when including the Government’s stated intention to reinsert clause 2, is that we have an Administration keen to take back control when it comes to the EU, but there seems to be less of an issue with passing laws that facilitate the Executive handing out control and sovereignty to non-EU foreign powers with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. Building on one point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), let me say that one confusing thing I find when looking through the Bill is working out which aspects of private international law we benefit from now through our former membership of the EU that we would wish ideally to retain. That is relevant because we still do much of our business with EU countries. We still have the most UK-owned foreign homes in France and Spain, and I would hazard a guess that UK citizens marry and have children with more European Union citizens than other foreigners.
The treaties set out in clause 1 are very limited—the protection of children, the exclusive choice of court agreements and family maintenance. They do not deal with insolvency, business law and many other key issues dealt with under European law. Could the Minister point me to some document that shows what is covered with the EU now and will be rolled over into our law, or to what extent those items feature in current EU deal negotiations? That would be helpful.
As the Lord Chancellor said, the issue with this Bill is not what is in it now, but rather what has been taken out by the other place—namely, the former clause 2 delegated powers provision. I note that no attempt was made in the other place to upset the royal prerogative and demand that PIL treaties are approved by Parliament before signature, although the weakness of the CRAG pre-ratification review process was well covered as being limited and flawed.
On looking at the debates on this Bill in the Lords, the key difference between the Government and almost everyone else who spoke was the Government’s contention that these proposed Henry VIII powers—that is what I think they are—were not a constitutional breach, as they had already been used for other laws. We heard the Lord Chancellor repeat that today. Lord Keen referred to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which came up in an earlier intervention, but it was pointed out that that Act was the primary legislation that gave effect to an international convention, and as such, it was not the best example that the Minister might give.
It seems to me that we need to consider the Government’s suggestion that PIL is a narrow enough genre to merit its own delegated powers. That is a hard case to make, and it has not yet been made by the Government. To answer the point validly made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), the processes, for instance, to enforce private contracts, international financial bonds or insolvency procedures are difficult to lump into the same basket as, say, child protection or mental health, which is what the proposal in clause 2 does.
The Government have repeatedly said that clause 2 is necessary to move ahead with the Lugano treaty, yet their wording referred to “any international agreement”, which could stretch to much more than the Lugano treaty. Furthermore, the proposed powers last without a sunset clause, so they could presumably be used in the future for not only the implementation of now unknown treaties but any changes to those unknown treaties, no matter how significant.
Other issues arise. I am concerned, for instance, about the extension of Executive power to use statutory instruments to change domestic law to give effect to model laws. I am concerned at such powers being used to make new criminal offences by order. A more general observation would be on the timing of the process. In recent weeks, Ministers have been arguing for Bills to be heard in an afternoon because of the covid emergency. International treaties, however, work on the slowest and most planned of timescales, so to say that these issues are time-constrained is not realistic. Likewise, to accuse these PIL subject areas of being only technical is unrelated to how very important they tend to be to the lives of people who actually need them. Furthermore, given how the world becomes an ever smaller place, I foresee these cross-border jurisdictional issues becoming more, not less, relevant and important, particularly with our being out of the European Union.
For all those reasons, my instinct suggests that the Government should accept the position presented to them by the Lords and simply move on. At the least, we could tie the powers to named foreseeable treaties in the Bill such as Lugano. However, if the Government are dead set on their current course, I suggest that they need to improve their offer to Parliament, and four areas comes to mind. First, they should limit the order-making powers to a period of, say, two years after each relevant treaty has been signed. Secondly, a Joint Committee should be formed to review the orders. Thirdly, a Government report should be issued to Parliament setting out the proposal, and fourthly, the report should be issued a minimum period of, say, 21 sitting days before the relevant SI Committee sits.
As things stand, the Government’s proposed reinsertion of clause 2 must represent one of the largest potential power grabs ever seen by the Executive in this Parliament. The Government should think again.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
I first declare an interest as an associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
I welcome this Bill and the proposals to change it during its next stages. As I said during an intervention, I want to mention one thing in particular—the Singapore mediation convention. This is a treaty that we have been waiting to sign since it was first talked about in 2018. It is absolutely unconscionable that it has not been signed, ratified and brought into UK law in a much shorter period. This goes to the heart of the question asked by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood)—what do we need to do to keep ourselves ahead of the game in this? I went to Singapore and talked to the mediation community there. We are being left out. The centre of mediation is here in London. It is being left out because there is no means of making sure that the mediated conclusion to a dispute can be brought into law in another country. In fact, the process that one has to go through is a fairly arbitrary one where, after the mediation, one has to get new proponents as arbitrators, which increases the cost enormously, to have a formal arbitration that can be caught under the New York convention. That is an utterly absurd way to go about this.
We all know that mediation has become an important part of modern business, especially as the courts are busy. When I was doing my Industry and Parliament Trust fellowship in law and sitting with judges, I was very pleased that many of them advised the people who were pleading before them that they should go away and consider mediation beforehand. Getting a mediation settlement agreed and applicable across countries seems to be a very narrow and technical thing to do. It does not affect anyone in an adverse way, and it has been welcomed by almost everybody I have spoken to.
I hope that the Minister will be able to confirm that this Bill will allow us to steam ahead in getting the Singapore mediation convention ratified and brought into UK law so that, for the future, we can maintain our position in the UK as the centre of mediation in the world.
Jim Shannon (Strangford) (DUP)
It is a pleasure to make some brief comments in this debate. The Lord Chancellor is no longer here, but I thank him for setting the scene so well for us all to follow. As we are all aware, the Library has made things clear in the notes on the Bill. I want to start with the words of the Bar Council:
“Private international law is at once both a highly technical field and one that is extremely important in regulating the lives of individuals and businesses when they cross borders. Never has there been a greater need to consult specialists in this field and to ensure rigorous scrutiny to produce a cogent and coherent strategy in this field. Time is short to ensure that United Kingdom private international law is left in a clear and satisfactory state upon exit day.”
That sets the scene for where we are and the importance of what we are trying to achieve.
The Bill as introduced into the House of Commons contains only one substantive clause that would give domestic effect to three international agreements covering aspects of private international law—the Hague conventions of 1996, 2005 and 2007. These provide a framework for determining jurisdiction and enforcement in international disputes covering child custody and maintenance, and civil and commercial matters. The United Kingdom currently participates in these arrangements as a result of our former membership of the EU, as well as the EU-wide measures covering co-operation on cross-border legal issues.
My interest in these matters comes purely from my constituency work load. Over the years, as a Member of Parliament since 2010 and as a Member of the Northern Ireland Assembly prior to that, constituents have come to me with such issues, and most of those were to do with the custody of children or divorce, but sometimes there were insolvency or commercial matters. However, the real issue was family law, so I am encouraged by what the Lord Chancellor said in relation to that, because there is a necessity to provide certainty and protection to children and families in what is often the very fractious and difficult environment of family disputes. Some cases and disputes that I have been involved in over the years as an elected representative—not as a legal matter; I am not legally qualified and I am always conscious of saying that—can be made additionally complicated by the cross-border element.
I have also been involved in issues when there have been accidents in other jurisdictions, where there were claims to be made and where accountability was part of that process, and that again comes under international law. On one or two occasions, someone has bought a product in another country and wants the right of recourse because it was defective. The hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) referred to one of the greater issues in the last few years—the purchase of houses and villas. I suppose my introduction to this was on behalf of constituents who then had difficulties with the purchase of those properties, and with land disputes. These are key issues for some of my constituents. There were not just problems with the law—sometimes the problems were with the interpretation of the law and, ultimately, with the language difficulties that arose.
We have found, in most cases, that the successful Brexit vote has determined that we must have arrangements in place that will include the continuation of our ability to govern cross-border legal disputes. I believe that that is essential—as the Lord Chancellor said earlier—for Northern Ireland and our border with the EU member, the Republic of Ireland. We want, need and desire a good working relationship with the Republic of Ireland and, if possible, with the EU. Many international companies operate in Northern Ireland, such as Bombardier in my constituency, to which my hon. Friend the Member for Belfast East (Gavin Robinson) referred in a question to the Prime Minister today, as well as insurance firms. These are among many others in Northern Ireland who need confidence and the assurance that, in the post-transition period, they will continue to be offered the same protections that EU firms enjoy. It is very important for firms in my constituency to have that same protection and to know that that will happen because of the Bill we have before us.
In a briefing for the peers, the Bar Council welcomed clause 1 of the Bill, suggesting that although it might not be necessary, it would be helpful in making things clearer in primary legislation. I am pleased to see that this has been retained. The Lord Chancellor also stated that for the Scottish Parliament, which the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) spoke about, and the Northern Ireland Assembly, matters will be devolved. Will the Minister say in his conclusion—it would be good to have this on record—whether there will be occasions when Westminster, or the House of Commons, will and can overrule what may happen at the Northern Ireland Assembly or the Scottish Parliament? I just want to have that on record, if possible.
The Bar Council also referred to the fact that it might be necessary to consult specialists in the field. The specialists that we have in the Northern Ireland Assembly and Northern Ireland will guide us and give advice, so it is always good to know whether there are occasions when we may find ourselves, not in conflict with the House of Commons in any way but with a difference of opinion legally.
In conclusion, I would also like the Minister, in summing up, to underline that the consultation process with those who work daily with the remit of this legal principle has cast the net wide—I am sure it probably has, but I ask him please to confirm it. Will he also confirm that he understands the necessary protections needed to ensure that on the day that our chains to Europe are finally broken—boy, do I look forward to that day—we have the continuity of domestic protection with effect to the three international agreements governing aspects of private international law, The Hague conventions of 1996, 2005 and 2007?
Shaun Bailey (West Bromwich West) (Con)
I promise that I will try to keep my comments as brief as possible. It is a bit of an intimidating experience to follow such distinguished lawyers, particularly as I was only sitting my legal practice course finals some two years ago, so to be here debating with the Lord Chancellor on private international law is an interesting one.
A really important point was raised at the start of the debate, which was about making the Bill applicable to real life. To reiterate that point, which was articulated particularly well, I must say, by the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), this affects real people’s lives. This is about how businesses operate and how some of the most vulnerable children and young people in our society are protected. I think about the exporters in my region of the west midlands who account for a quarter of a million jobs. The export value of the goods sent out from the black country was something like £3.81 billion in 2018-19. The Bill is really important, because it relates to people’s livelihoods. It is absolutely vital that we get it right.
On the protections for young people who need financial support from absent parents, I have 3,000 lone parents in my constituency who rely on support for their children. Looking at my caseload, I would say that many of them do not get that support. We spend time having to fight very complex battles to receive very complex levels of support, so we must relate this to the situation on the ground. I think of businesses in my constituency, such as KTC Edibles in Wednesbury, which rely on these provisions to do their day-to-day business. It is as simple as that: they rely on private international law to ensure they can trade and can keep their employees in a job.
Turning more widely to the provisions in the Bill, I want to touch on the clause 2 that was removed by the other place. We have heard articulate arguments about that today. In my preparation for this debate, I read the comments in the other place. To an extent, I have sympathy with what was said on the possibility of utilising the delegated powers as some sort of Executive power grab. What I would say—I think this was articulated by my right hon. and learned Friend the Lord Chancellor—is that the preceding system was one of direct effect, so in a way it took those powers away from this place in the first place. Having said that, however, equally we cannot just remove the role of this place entirely. We cannot allow that to happen. I am somewhat reassured that, through the affirmative procedure, there is a degree of scrutiny. I appreciate that for some Members it is not the desired level of scrutiny, but I have been very impressed by my hon. Friend the Minister’s openness in taking forward suggestions on how it could perhaps be improved on.
Mr David Davis (Haltemprice and Howden) (Con)
Apart from diluting the number of lawyers here for my hon. Friend’s comfort—
Mr Davis
I am the client of the House today.
The hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) made the very important point that these prospective pieces of legislation, only under secondary legislation, could actually create criminal offences and therefore impinge directly on the rights of our citizens. They could, when I think about it, even put the rights of those citizens under foreign laws, as has happened with the European arrest warrant and other such measures. Does my hon. Friend think that that specific test of whether it creates a criminal offence that might impinge on our citizens might require rather more than simply secondary affirmative legislation?
Shaun Bailey
I thank my right hon. Friend for his intervention. He raises a really important point very eloquently, which I would need to explore. I do not want to give him a definitive answer right now, because I would need to explore it further. If I were to do that I would want to formulate my opinion based on the fullest research, but he makes a really important point that is certainly one to take forward and one that I have listened to with great interest in this debate, which has sort of formed my opinion.
Moving forward with this, and conscious of the fact that I want to keep my remarks as brief as possible, I would say that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) made an important point, which was supported by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood): we have got to ensure that, as we move forward now, this country is at the forefront of improving private international law. We cannot just pass this legislation and think, “Right, okay, there we go. We are an observer, or we are just partaking.” We have to be a leader on this, because when that campaign was happening four years ago and people made that decision, whatever people’s views on that, one premise of the campaign was that we would once again be a leader in the world. To do that, we have to ensure that we take a proactive and positive approach.
I am heartened to see that there has been respect for the devolved Administrations, particularly for Scots law. We need to respect the unique legal structures and legal framework in Scotland. I am pleased to see that in the Bill.
To round up my comments, I would say that this is a Bill that, on the face of it, has broad support from all sides. There are some interesting debates still to be had as it proceeds on its passage and I am heartened by the way those on the Treasury Bench have been open to discussions and to listening. We might think this measure is technical and convoluted—the joy of legal debates among lawyers in the Tea Room—but it is people’s lives. This is every day. This is about keeping people in jobs. This is about ensuring that the most vulnerable in our society remain protected. I commend the Bill to the House.
Alex Cunningham
With the leave of the House, I will sum up on behalf of the Opposition.
When I was preparing my closing remarks, I thought I was following the hon. Member for Darlington (Peter Gibson) and I was going to remind him that he has the privilege to represent what was my home town for a large part of my life. He also has the privilege of following in the footsteps of great MPs such as Ted Fletcher, who was himself an internationalist and would have been interested in today’s proceedings. He was a person who believed very much in action rather than words, and he put his life in the line of fire when he fought in the trenches in Spain against the fascists in the civil war. I am pleased to have this opportunity to pay tribute to Ted, the first MP I was honoured to knock doors for. He inspired me and I would never have been here if it had not been for him.
As I said in my opening speech, Labour recognises the importance of private international law, particularly in a post-Brexit setting. Without the framework that private international law provides, UK businesses, families and individuals would face greater difficulty in seeking to resolve conflicts arising from cross-border disputes. As we get closer to the new year and the great and growing uncertainty posed by Brexit, the need for a clear and fair framework to settle cross-border disputes becomes ever more urgent. Without this framework, businesses and individuals would face great uncertainty. That is why Labour fully supports clause 1, which gives effect in domestic law to three important international agreements to improve the protection of children involved in cross-border disputes, regulate court arrangements relating to high-value international transactions, and allow for the recovery of child support and spousal maintenance.
Not only will each of those three agreements make a significant and positive change to domestic law; they will be incorporated in domestic law in the proper way, by primary legislation debated before the House. That is why we support them. This is the exact opposite of what the original clause 2 sought to do, and it is regrettable that the Government seek to bring it back in Committee. The Lord Chancellor would be wise to take the counsel of the hon. Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and the Chair of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill). They have outlined specific issues, and if the Government were to concentrate on those areas, they might find themselves with a little more support for their proposals. Also, the Government should do that because it would recognise the concerns of those in the other place. I hope that when the Minister winds up in a few minutes he addresses that good advice given by Members on his own side, because we know that clause 2 represents a very concerning extension of Executive power in any other circumstances, allowing the Government to bypass parliamentary scrutiny and implement private international law agreements by the back door by utilising statutory instruments. That would represent a dangerous break with past parliamentary practice, which so far requires all public international law treaties to be implemented by Act of Parliament. Instead, it would represent a permanent shift of power from Parliament to the Executive, with little reasoning provided for why such a shift is needed. Sadly, it appears that this shift is very much the approach of this Government and it must be challenged. That is why the Bill was amended in the other place. As we have heard, distinguished lawyers and constitutional experts across the political divide voted against the inclusion of this clause because it so offends the constitutional principle of parliamentary sovereignty that requires proper scrutiny of international agreements before they have effect in domestic law.
When the Government were asked to explain the need for the powers contained in clause 2 they provided three basic arguments. I spoke of them in my opening speech, so suffice it to say now that not one of those arguments held under expert scrutiny in the other place.
It is not only those of us on the Labour Benches who have been far from convinced by the case put forward by the Government for the need for clause 2. As we have heard, when the Constitution Committee considered whether this legislative power should be granted, it made it clear it should not. The Committee went on to say:
“It is inappropriate for a whole category of international agreements to be made purely by delegated legislation”.
It went on to say that that is not only because it reduces parliamentary scrutiny but because
“Such an approach risks undermining legal certainty.”
Why would the Government seek to reintroduce clause 2 at a later stage in the Bill’s passage if each of the arguments for its inclusion have been shown to be false? The Government currently have a perfectly reasonable and necessary Bill, which I imagine would receive wide cross-party support; we have seen examples of that this afternoon.
In conclusion, as we leave what is arguably the world’s most comprehensive network of private international law agreements in the new year, it is vital that we have a framework in place that fills that void. Labour recognises that, and it is our collective responsibility to defend parliamentary scrutiny, irrespective of procedural ease or expediency. For that reason, we will support this Bill in its current form but will reject any attempts to reintroduce clause 2 or any other clause that allows for the implementation of international agreements in domestic law by secondary legislation.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)
I want to begin by expressing my gratitude to all Members who have contributed to the debate, with speeches of conspicuous clarity of thought. It is clear that across the House there is proper concern about the balance that exists between the powers of the Executive and the powers of the legislature. I will return to that, because it is absolutely right that those important points are engaged with fully. But first let me make some brief introductory remarks, setting the stage for why this matters and why, indeed, the Government are taking the approach we are.
As others have indicated, the Bill might at first glance appear somewhat dry and academic, but, as my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West (Shaun Bailey) noted, it is of great practical importance for the lives and livelihoods of individuals and businesses in all our constituencies. It is also important—this point should not be lost—for the international rules-based order, which we can and must consolidate and strengthen in the months and years ahead. My hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) made the excellent point about the urgency of a mediation agreement, but in summary this Bill provides a legal framework for resolving cross-border disputes, and that framework provides legal certainty about jurisdiction, recognition and enforcement for both businesses and individuals whose legal affairs cross borders.
As has been noted, it benefits individuals where, for example, the relationship with the former partner has broken down but both parties need to resolve the child contact arrangements where one parent lives overseas. Such cases have arisen in my constituency surgery in Cheltenham. They are very painful cases, and are more painful still without these rules in place. It benefits businesses, too, for example where suppliers are abroad and the parties want to know that the agreement to litigate any dispute in a particular country will be honoured and upheld internationally, and it matters that when our jurisdiction is chosen by the parties in a commercial agreement other courts and states will recognise and enforce that jurisdiction. That is really what matters.
How does this Bill achieve that? In essence, in two ways: first, it carries over international treaties that we were parties to by dint of our membership of the EU; and secondly—this is the point that has attracted the most attention in this debate—it creates a mechanism for us to participate in future agreements and, in doing so, to strengthen the international rules-based order for the benefit of all our citizens. I just want to underscore that point. There is a countervailing public interest in our being able to do that in a timely and efficient way, because the longer that we delay in implementing these arrangements, the longer the delay in strengthening the international rules-based order.
It is important to be clear what the Bill is not about. The Lord Chancellor did that before me, but it is right that I underscore it. It is not about trade agreements. Private international law agreements remain distinct from free trade agreements both in content and scope. As hon. Members well understand, FTAs are agreed between countries, and they remove or reduce tariffs and other restrictions on most goods traded between them to allow easier market access. FTAs rarely, if ever, contain specific private international law provisions.
Promoting international recognition of jurisdiction and enforcement is important because the UK is the chosen court centre for so much of the world’s litigation: 40% of all global corporate arbitrations used English law in 2018, 75% of cases in the UK commercial court in the same year were international in nature and English law is the leading choice of law for commercial contracts. That is underpinned by the excellence and integrity of our judiciary and the calibre of our legal practitioners. It is right to pay tribute to them, and I am pleased to have the opportunity to do so.
As a result, our successful legal sector contributed £26.8 billion to the economy in 2017 and employs over 300,000 people. To sustain that, we in the United Kingdom must be ready to contribute more than ever to the international rules-based order. For the UK to remain a progressive force in the field of private international law, we must be able both to negotiate and then to implement into British domestic law modern agreements with our international partners once the UK has decided to become bound by them.
The hon. Member for Strangford (Jim Shannon) made the point—he will forgive me for paraphrasing—“Look, will the British Government impose things on Northern Ireland?” The answer to that is no. Just as we recognise, of course, the distinct and distinguished legal arrangements that exist in Scotland, so it is in Northern Ireland, and no doubt that is what lay behind the legislative consent motions. While it would be the British Government who negotiate the agreement, the decision on whether to bring it into force is a devolved matter for the Ministers in Scotland and, indeed, in Northern Ireland, respectively.
Let me turn to what the Government are proposing to do in respect of clause 2 as was, before the other place removed it. The reintroduction of the delegated power to implement private international law agreements into domestic law via secondary legislation is necessary, proportionate and constitutionally appropriate. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), in a characteristically eloquent speech, referred to this at one stage as, I think, the largest potential power grab for some time. I think that was his point, but I respectfully suggest that that needs to be placed in some wider context.
Let me first underscore the point that was touched on by my hon. Friend the Member for West Bromwich West, but also by the Lord Chancellor. Lest we forget, the arrangements that prevailed when we were in the European Union operated a bit as follows: the European Union, on behalf of all the member states, would go out to negotiate these agreements, and having reached an agreement with another country, it would fall to the UK Government in effect to implement it. How would that take place? It would take place either under the doctrine of direct effect, which lawyers in this Chamber will remember stems from the case of Van Gend en Loos, which essentially means—[Interruption.] The right hon. Member for Walsall South (Valerie Vaz) perhaps remembers; I am not sure.
The case of Van Gend en Loos means that, so long as such an agreement satisfies certain appropriate criteria, it would take effect in this country with no parliamentary intervention at all. In other words, hon. and right hon. Members would be entirely ousted from the process of its taking effect in the United Kingdom. However, even if it did take effect by way of direct effect, the effect of section 2(2) of the European Communities Act 1972 means that it would be Ministers using the negative resolution procedure who brought it into effect in this country.
Joanna Cherry
Of course that is accurate, but as I said earlier, the whole point of Brexit was to take back control. If that is really what Brexit was about, why are the Government reintroducing clause 2 without any of the compromises that I and others have suggested? The whole project of leaving the EU was about taking back control—so we are told—yet the Government are taking that control, rather than giving it to the House or indeed the people.
Alex Chalk
When we talk about taking back control, it is important to note that in future it will not be the EU but the British Government negotiating private international law agreements. I am simply pointing out that when the EU negotiated the arrangements and Parliament had no role at all, it did not seem to attract any concern in this place, yet when it is the British Government negotiating them on behalf of the UK, it seems to create difficulties.
Alex Chalk
I will come to the hon. and learned Member’s second point in a moment, but first I will let my hon. Friend come in on this point.
Mr Djanogly
The difference is that in the EU the Parliament has a vote and a potential veto on international trade agreements. My hon. Friend is arguing in effect that we move back to the position before we were in the EU. I think the point the hon. and learned Lady is making, which I would back up is, that we do not want to go back to what we had before we were in the EU; we want to move forward and have a system that is relevant to today’s democracy.
Alex Chalk
I take that point completely. I will answer it by touching first on what the situation was before we entered the EU and then on how it ought to evolve in a way that I hope meets my hon. Friend’s concerns. He is right—others have touched on this—that arrangements were in place prior to our entering the EU, albeit on a bilateral basis, for us to enter into these sorts of agreements. Two have been touched on because they have been used quite recently: the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 and the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972.
It is worth taking a moment to consider them. How is the first Act used in practice? In 2003, it was used for us to enter into a PIL agreement with Israel that had a significant impact: namely British courts would have to give effect to what magistrates courts in Israel said. Yet how was that brought into force in the UK? Was it brought into force through an Act of Parliament? No. Was it was brought into force through the affirmative resolution procedure? No. It was brought into force through an Order in Council. It states:
“Her Majesty, in exercise of powers conferred on Her by section 1(4) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order”—
and then she gave effect to this private international law Bill. My point is simply that this procedure, which was used in 2003, is far inferior to what we are introducing in clause 2. We are doing away with any idea of an Order in Council, which we accept would be too old fashioned. The appropriate way to apply scrutiny in this House is through the CRAG procedure and the affirmative resolution procedure.
The second Act was used in respect of a US agreement in 2007 as a result of which an Order in Council had the effect that an order on maintenance would have to be given effect in the UK. How was that PIL agreement given effect in the UK? It was not through an Act of Parliament but again through an Order in Council, and again we are going beyond that in this Bill.
In dealing with this matter, I want to make one final and very important point. Not content with simply using Orders in Council to introduce PIL agreements in the past, in fact the House has legislated in recent memory to include more scope to introduce PIL agreements by way of delegated legislation. First, the House passed the Insolvency Act 2000, which created a power to introduce regulations in 2006. Secondly—this is the final point that I will make on this issue, but it does seem relevant—the House passed the Mental Capacity Act 2005. That Act created powers to make further provision as to private international law. Paragraph 32(1) of schedule 3 states:
“Regulations may make provision—(a) giving further effect to the Convention”—
that is the convention on the international protection on adults—
“or (b) otherwise about the private international law of England and Wales in relation to the protection of adults.”
In other words, it was being created in 2005.
Mr Djanogly
I appreciate that, but it did not provide a statutory instrument for looking at international financial bonds, insolvency law or other jurisdictional issues; it was focused on that specific area. The point that has been made by many hon. Members this afternoon is that this is too broad.
Alex Chalk
I accept my hon. Friend’s point, but the way it has been framed thus far is, “Look, this is constitutionally unprecedented.” It is not constitutionally unprecedented, and that ought to be borne in mind.
The distinguished Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), made the proper point about criminal laws, and I recognise that that is something that we should look at carefully. It would be going too far to suggest that delegated legislation is not used to introduce criminal laws. An extremely distinguished paper was produced by academics at the University of Glasgow which went so far as to say that the overwhelming majority of criminal offences are created by delegated legislation, particularly where they are highly specific, technical, environmental offences and so on, so it is not without precedent at all, but I recognise that the point requires consideration.
In short, the Bill will future-proof our legislative requirements in this area for the years to come, while at the same time ensuring that UK businesses, individuals and families can continue to benefit from an efficient and effective framework to help resolve cross-border disputes. It will also ensure that our domestic laws can keep up to date with the latest developments in private international law in international forums, and that the UK can implement any agreements it intends to join in a timely manner while maintaining appropriate parliamentary oversight. I commend this Bill to the House.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read a Second time.
PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS) BILL [LORDS]
Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),
That the following provisions shall apply to the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]:
Committal
1. The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.
Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading
2. Proceedings in Committee of the whole House, any proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings in Committee of the whole House are commenced.
3. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.
4. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to other proceedings up to and including Third Reading.
Other proceedings
5. Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Leo Doherty.)
Question agreed to.
Mr Deputy Speaker (Mr Nigel Evans)
We will now suspend the sitting for three minutes; those who are leaving the Chamber should do so carefully.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]
Tuesday 6th October 2020
(3 years, 6 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: Committee of the whole House Amendments as at 6 October 2020 - (large print) - (6 Oct 2020)
16:20 - The Committee divided: - Ayes: 324 / Noes: 175 - Question accordingly agreed to.
The Chairman of Ways and Means (Dame Eleanor Laing)
I should explain that, in these exceptional circumstances, although the Chair of the Committee would normally sit in the Clerk’s chair during Committee stage, in order to comply with social distancing requirements, I will remain in the Speaker’s Chair, although I will be carrying out the role not of Deputy Speaker but of Chairman of the Committee. During Committee, the occupant of the Chair should be addressed as Chair of the Committee, rather than as Deputy Speaker.
Clause 1
Implementation of the 1996, 2005 and 2007 Hague Conventions
Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)
I beg to move amendment 2, page 2, line 20, at end insert—
“3F The 2007 Lugano Convention to have the force of law
(1) The 2007 Lugano Convention shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom.
(2) For the purposes of this Act the 2007 Lugano Convention is to be read together with any reservations or declarations made by the United Kingdom at the time of the approval of the Convention.
(3) For convenience of reference the English text of the 2007 Lugano Convention is set out in Schedule 3H.”
The Chairman
With this it will be convenient to discuss the following:
Amendment 3, page 2, line 21, leave out “3G” and insert “3H”.
Amendment 4, page 2, line 22, leave out “4” and insert
“(Schedule to be inserted as Schedule 3H to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982)”.
Amendment 1, page 2, line 24, at end insert—
“(5) The 2007 Lugano Convention on Jurisdiction and the Recognition and Enforcement of Judgements in Civil and Commercial Matters shall have the force of law in the United Kingdom, conditional upon the United Kingdom accession to such Convention.”
Clause 1 stand part.
Government amendment 5.
This amendment provides that regulations made under NC5 may make provision binding the Crown.
Clause 2 stand part.
Government amendment 6.
This amendment inserts a new subsection into Clause 3. This allows Her Majesty by Order in Council to extend to the Isle of Man NC5 (including NS4) and subsections (2) and (3) of Clause 2 inserted by Amendment 5.
Clause 3 stand part.
Government new clause 5—Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3)—
“(1) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, as it has effect from time to time, so far as relating to private international law (a ‘relevant international agreement’).
(2) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom.
(3) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, giving effect to any arrangements made between—
(a) Her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the government of a relevant territory,
for applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between the United Kingdom, or a jurisdiction within the United Kingdom, and that territory.
(4) Regulations under this section may make—
(a) consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision;
(b) different provision for different purposes or for different parts of the United Kingdom.
(5) Regulations under this section may include provision about—
(a) enforcement of obligations arising under or by virtue of the regulations;
(b) sharing of information;
(c) legal aid.
(6) Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3))) makes further provision about regulations under this section.
(7) In this section—
‘appropriate national authority’ means—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State;
(b) in relation to Scotland—
(i) the Scottish Ministers, or
(ii) the Secretary of State acting with the consent of the Scottish Ministers;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland—
(i) a Northern Ireland department, or
(ii) the Secretary of State acting with the consent of a Northern Ireland department
‘international agreement’ means a convention, treaty or other agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party;
‘private international law’ includes rules and other provisions about—
(a) jurisdiction and applicable law;
(b) recognition and enforcement in one country or territory of any of the following that originate in another country or territory—
(i) a judgment, order or arbitral award;
(ii) an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations;
(c) co-operation between judicial or other authorities in different countries or territories in relation to—
(i) service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures, or
(ii) anything within paragraph (a) or (b);
‘relevant international agreement’ has the meaning given in subsection (1);
‘relevant territory’ means—
(a) the Isle of Man;
(b) any of the Channel Islands;
(c) a British overseas territory.
(8) This section and Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3))) have effect, with the following modifications, in relation to a model law adopted by an international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a member as it has effect in relation to an international agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party.
The modifications are—
(a) a reference in this section or that Schedule to implementing or applying a relevant international agreement is to be read as a reference to giving effect to the model law (with or without modifications);
(b) subsection (1) is to be read as if the words ‘as revised from time to time’ were substituted for the words ‘as it has effect from time to time’.”
This new clause contains a power to implement international agreements relating to private international law.
Amendment (a) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (1), leave out from “implementing” to “relevant ” and insert “the”.
This amendment together with amendments (c), (d) and (g) is intended to ensure the powers in Government NC5 may be used only to implement the 2007 Lugano Convention.
Amendment (b) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (1), leave out “any” and insert “an”.
This amendment with Amendment (f) is intended to ensure that order making powers are confined to the international treaties set out in clause 1 only.
Amendment (c) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (2), leave out “a” and insert “the”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment (a).
Amendment (d) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (3), leave out “a” and insert “the”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment (a).
Amendment (e) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (6), leave out
“Schedule (Regulations under section(Implementation of other agreements on private international law (Amendment3)))”
and insert
“Schedule (Regulations under section(Implementation of other Agreements on Private International Law (Amendment 2)))”.
This amendment would provide for super-affirmative procedure to be applied in accordance with NS3 to regulations made under Government NC5.
Amendment (f) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (7), after “party”, insert
“and which is set out in section 1.”
This amendment with Amendment (b) is intended to ensure that order making powers are confined to the international treaties set out in clause 1 only.
Amendment (g) to Government new clause 5, in subsection (7), leave out
“has the meaning given in subsection (1)”
and insert
“means the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed at Lugano on 30th October 2007 (the ‘2007 Lugano Convention’);”.
See explanatory statement for Amendment (a).
New clause 1—Implementation of other agreements on private international law—
“(1) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing an international agreement, as it has effect from time to time, so far as relating to private international law (a ‘relevant international agreement’).
(2) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom.
(3) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, giving effect to any arrangements made between—
(a) Her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the government of a relevant territory,
for applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between the United Kingdom, or a jurisdiction within the United Kingdom, and that territory.
(4) This section applies (subject to subsection (5)) where the United Kingdom has authenticated a relevant international agreement.
(5) This section applies only if the proposed agreement is not binding on the United Kingdom as a matter of international law unless it is ratified by the United Kingdom.
(6) Before the United Kingdom ratifies the proposed agreement, a Minister of the Crown must lay before Parliament a report which gives details of the proposed agreement.
(7) In this section a reference to authenticating a relevant international agreement is a reference to doing an act which establishes the text of the agreement as authentic and definitive as a matter of international law.
(8) This section applies where a Minister of the Crown proposes to make regulations under subsections (1), (2) or (3) for the purpose of implementing a relevant international agreement to which the United Kingdom and another signatory (or other signatories) are signatories.
(9) A draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations may not be laid before Parliament unless, at least 10 Commons sitting days before the draft is laid, a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a report which gives details of, and explains the reasons for, the relevant international agreement.
(10) In this section ‘Commons sitting day’ means a day on which the House of Commons begins to sit.
(11) Regulations under this section may make—
(a) consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision;
(b) different provision for different purposes or for different parts of the United Kingdom.
(12) Regulations under this section may include provision about—
(a) enforcement of obligations arising under or by virtue of the regulations;
(b) sharing of information;
(c) legal aid.
(13) No regulations may be made under subsections (1),(2) or (3) after the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the date of enactment of this Act.
(14) In this section—
‘appropriate national authority’ means—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State;
(b) in relation to Scotland—
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland—
‘international agreement’ means a convention, treaty or other agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party and which is set out in section 1 of this Act;
‘private international law’ includes rules and other provisions about—
(a) jurisdiction and applicable law;
(b) recognition and enforcement in one country or territory of any of the following that originate in another country or territory—
(c) co-operation between judicial or other authorities in different countries or territories in relation to—
‘relevant international agreement’ has the meaning given in subsection (1);
‘relevant territory’ means—
(a) the Isle of Man;
(b) any of the Channel Islands;
(c) a British overseas territory.
(15) This section has effect, with the following modifications, in relation to a model law adopted by an international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a member as it has effect in relation to an international agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party.
The modifications are—
(a) a reference in this section or that Schedule to implementing or applying a relevant international agreement is to be read as a reference to giving effect to the model law (with or without modifications);
(b) subsection (1) is to be read as if the words ‘as revised from time to time’ were substituted for the words ‘as it has effect from time to time’.”
This new clause is a modified version of clause 2 removed from the Bill by the House of Lords. This new clause requires a Minister to lay a report before Parliament at least 10 Commons sitting days before regulations implementing a relevant international agreement are laid in draft under subsections (1), (2) and (3) requires a Minister to lay a report before Parliament before the UK ratifies a private international law agreement with another country and contains a sunset provision.
New clause 2—Implementation of the 2007 Lugano Convention—
“(1) The Secretary of State may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters signed at Lugano on 30th October 2007 (the ‘2007 Lugano Convention’), in the event that the United Kingdom becomes a party to the Convention in its own right.
(2) The Secretary of State must consult the Scottish Ministers, the Welsh Ministers and a Northern Ireland Department before making regulations under subsection (1).
(3) Regulations under subsection (1) are subject to super-affirmative resolution procedure (see Schedule (Super-affirmative resolution procedure)).”
This new clause would enable the Secretary of State to make regulations implementing the Lugano Convention in the UK, subject to the super-affirmative resolution procedure in NS2.
New clause 6—Report on relevant international agreement—
“(1) This section applies (subject to subsection (2)) where the United Kingdom has authenticated a relevant international agreement in accordance with section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3)).
(2) This section applies only if the proposed agreement is not binding on the United Kingdom as a matter of international law unless it is ratified by the United Kingdom.
(3) Before the United Kingdom ratifies the proposed agreement, a Minister of the Crown must lay before Parliament a report which gives details of the proposed agreement.
(4) In this section a reference to authenticating a relevant international agreement is a reference to doing an act which establishes the text of the agreement as authentic and definitive as a matter of international law.”
This new clause requires a Minister to lay a report before Parliament before the UK ratifies a private international law agreement with another country.
New clause 7—Report to be laid with regulations under section 2(1), (2) or (3)—
“(1) This section applies where a Minister of the Crown proposes to make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3)) (1), (2) or (3) for the purpose of implementing a relevant international agreement to which the United Kingdom and another signatory (or other signatories) are signatories.
(2) A draft of the statutory instrument containing the regulations may not be laid before Parliament unless, at least 10 Commons sitting days before the draft is laid, a Minister of the Crown has laid before Parliament a report which gives details of, and explains the reasons for, the relevant international agreement.
(3) In this section, ‘Commons sitting day’ means a day on which the House of Commons begins to sit.”
This new clause requires a Minister to lay a report before Parliament at least ten Commons sitting days before regulations implementing a relevant international agreement are laid in draft under subsections (1), (2) and (3) of Government NC5.
New clause 8—Sunset Provisions—
“No regulations may be made under subsections (1),(2) and (3) of section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3)) after the end of the period of 2 years beginning with the date on which this Act is passed.”
That schedule 1 be the First schedule to the Bill.
That schedule 2 be the Second schedule to the Bill.
That schedule 3 be the Third schedule to the Bill.
That schedule 4 be the Fourth schedule to the Bill.
That schedule 5 be the Fifth schedule to the Bill.
Government new schedule 4—Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 3)).
New schedule 1—Schedule 4A—
“Schedule to be inserted as Schedule 3H to the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982
SCHEDULE 3H
Text of the 2007 Lugano Convention
CONVENTION ON JURISDICTION AND THE RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT OF JUDGMENTS IN CIVIL AND COMMERCIAL MATTERS
(Concluded on 30 October 2007)
The High Contracting Parties to this Convention,
Determined to strengthen in their territories the legal protection of persons therein established,
Considering that it is necessary for this purpose to determine the international jurisdiction of the courts, to facilitate recognition, and to introduce an expeditious procedure for securing the enforcement of judgments, authentic instruments and court settlements,
Aware of the links between them, which have been sanctioned in the economic field by the free trade agreements concluded between the European Community and certain States members of the European Free Trade Association,
the Brussels Convention of 27 September 1968 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as amended by the Accession Conventions under the successive enlargements of the European Union,
the Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which extends the application of the rules of the 1968 Brussels Convention to certain States members of the European Free Trade Association,
Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 of 22 December 2000 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, which has replaced the abovementioned Brussels Convention,
the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Brussels on 19 October 2005,
Persuaded that the extension of the principles laid down in Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 to the Contracting Parties to this instrument will strengthen legal and economic cooperation,
Desiring to ensure as uniform an interpretation as possible of this instrument,
Have in this spirit decided to conclude this Convention, and have agreed as follows—
TITLE I
SCOPE
Article 1
(1) This Convention shall apply in civil and commercial matters whatever the nature of the court or tribunal. It shall not extend, in particular, to revenue, customs or administrative matters.
(2) The Convention shall not apply to—
(a) the status or legal capacity of natural persons, rights in property arising out of a matrimonial relationship, wills and succession;
(b) bankruptcy, proceedings relating to the winding-up of insolvent companies or other legal persons, judicial arrangements, compositions and analogous proceedings;
(c) social security;
(d) arbitration.
(3) In this Convention, the term ‘State bound by this Convention’ shall mean any State that is a Contracting Party to this Convention or a Member State of the European Community. It may also mean the European Community.
TITLE II
JURISDICTION
SECTION 1
General provision
Article 2
(1) Subject to the provisions of this Convention, persons domiciled in a State bound by this Convention shall, whatever their nationality, be sued in the courts of that State.
(2) Persons who are not nationals of the State bound by this Convention in which they are domiciled shall be governed by the rules of jurisdiction applicable to nationals of that State.
Article 3
(1) Persons domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may be sued in the courts of another State bound by this Convention only by virtue of the rules set out in Sections 2 to 7 of this Title.
(2) In particular the rules of national jurisdiction set out in Annex I shall not be applicable as against them.
Article 4
(1) If the defendant is not domiciled in a State bound by this Convention, the jurisdiction of the courts of each State bound by this Convention shall, subject to the provisions of Articles 22 and 23, be determined by the law of that State.
(2) As against such a defendant, any person domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may, whatever his nationality, avail himself in that State of the rules of jurisdiction there in force, and in particular those specified in Annex I, in the same way as the nationals of that State.
SECTION 2
Special jurisdiction
Article 5
A person domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may, in another State bound by this Convention, be sued—
(1) (a) in matters relating to a contract, in the courts for the place of performance of the obligation in question;
(b) for the purpose of this provision and unless otherwise agreed, the place of performance of the obligation in question shall be—
in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a State bound by this Convention where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered;
in the case of the provision of services, the place in a State bound by this Convention where, under the contract, the services were provided or should have been provided;
(c) if (b) does not apply then subparagraph (a) applies;
in the case of the sale of goods, the place in a State bound by this Convention where, under the contract, the goods were delivered or should have been delivered;
in the case of the provision of services, the place in a State bound by this Convention where, under the contract, the services were provided or should have been provided;
(2) in matters relating to maintenance—
(a) in the courts for the place where the maintenance creditor is domiciled or habitually resident; or
(b) in the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings concerning the status of a person if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties; or
(c) in the court which, according to its own law, has jurisdiction to entertain proceedings concerning parental responsibility, if the matter relating to maintenance is ancillary to those proceedings, unless that jurisdiction is based solely on the nationality of one of the parties.
(3) in matters relating to tort, delict or quasi-delict, in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred or may occur;
(4) as regards a civil claim for damages or restitution which is based on an act giving rise to criminal proceedings, in the court seized of those proceedings, to the extent that that court has jurisdiction under its own law to entertain civil proceedings;
(5) as regards a dispute arising out of the operations of a branch, agency or other establishment, in the courts for the place in which the branch, agency or other establishment is situated;
(6) as settlor, trustee or beneficiary of a trust created by the operation of a statute, or by a written instrument, or created orally and evidenced in writing, in the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the trust is domiciled;
(7) as regards a dispute concerning the payment of remuneration claimed in respect of the salvage of a cargo or freight, in the court under the authority of which the cargo or freight in question—
(a) has been arrested to secure such payment; or
(b) could have been so arrested, but bail or other security has been given;
provided that this provision shall apply only if it is claimed that the defendant has an interest in the cargo or freight or had such an interest at the time of salvage.
Article 6
A person domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may also be sued—
(1) where he is one of a number of defendants, in the courts for the place where any one of them is domiciled, provided the claims are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings;
(2) as a third party in an action on a warranty or guarantee, or in any other third party proceedings, in the court seized of the original proceedings, unless these were instituted solely with the object of removing him from the jurisdiction of the court which would be competent in his case;
(3) on a counter-claim arising from the same contract or facts on which the original claim was based, in the court in which the original claim is pending;
(4) in matters relating to a contract, if the action may be combined with an action against the same defendant in matters relating to rights in rem in immovable property, in the court of the State bound by this Convention in which the property is situated.
Article 7
Where by virtue of this Convention a court of a State bound by this Convention has jurisdiction in actions relating to liability from the use or operation of a ship, that court, or any other court substituted for this purpose by the internal law of that State, shall also have jurisdiction over claims for limitation of such liability.
SECTION 3
Jurisdiction in matters relating to insurance
Article 8
In matters relating to insurance, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Articles 4 and 5(5).
Article 9
(1) An insurer domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may be sued—
(a) in the courts of the State where he is domiciled; or
(b) in another State bound by this Convention, in the case of actions brought by the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary, in the courts for the place where the plaintiff is domiciled; or
(c) if he is a co-insurer, in the courts of a State bound by this Convention in which proceedings are brought against the leading insurer.
(2) An insurer who is not domiciled in a State bound by this Convention but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the States bound by this Convention shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
Article 10
In respect of liability insurance or insurance of immovable property, the insurer may in addition be sued in the courts for the place where the harmful event occurred. The same applies if movable and immovable property are covered by the same insurance policy and both are adversely affected by the same contingency.
Article 11
(1) In respect of liability insurance, the insurer may also, if the law of the court permits it, be joined in proceedings which the injured party has brought against the insured.
(2) Articles 8, 9 and 10 shall apply to actions brought by the injured party directly against the insurer, where such direct actions are permitted.
(3) If the law governing such direct actions provides that the policyholder or the insured may be joined as a party to the action, the same court shall have jurisdiction over them.
Article 12
(1) Without prejudice to Article 11(3), an insurer may bring proceedings only in the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the defendant is domiciled, irrespective of whether he is the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary.
(2) The provisions of this Section shall not affect the right to bring a counter-claim in the court in which, in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending.
Article 13
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement—
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or
(2) which allows the policyholder, the insured or a beneficiary to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section; or
(3) which is concluded between a policyholder and an insurer, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same State bound by this Convention, and which has the effect of conferring jurisdiction on the courts of that State even if the harmful event were to occur abroad, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State; or
(4) which is concluded with a policyholder who is not domiciled in a State bound by this Convention, except insofar as the insurance is compulsory or relates to immovable property in a State bound by this Convention; or
(5) which relates to a contract of insurance insofar as it covers one or more of the risks set out in Article 14.
Article 14
The following are the risks referred to in Article 13(5)—
(1) any loss of or damage to—
(a) seagoing ships, installations situated offshore or on the high seas, or aircraft, arising from perils which relate to their use for commercial purposes;
(b) goods in transit, other than passengers’ baggage, where the transit consists of or includes carriage by such ships or aircraft;
(2) any liability, other than for bodily injury to passengers or loss of or damage to their baggage—
(a) arising out of the use or operation of ships, installations or aircraft as referred to in point 1(a) insofar as, in respect of the latter, the law of the State bound by this Convention in which such aircraft are registered does not prohibit agreements on jurisdiction regarding insurance of such risks;
(b) for loss or damage caused by goods in transit as described in point 1(b);
(3) any financial loss connected with the use or operation of ships, installations or aircraft as referred to in point 1(a), in particular loss of freight or charter-hire;
(4) any risk or interest connected with any of those referred to in points 1 to 3;
(5) notwithstanding points 1 to 4, all large risks.
SECTION 4
Jurisdiction over consumer contracts
Article 15
(1) In matters relating to a contract concluded by a person, the consumer, for a purpose which can be regarded as being outside his trade or profession, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Articles 4 and 5(5), if:
(a) it is a contract for the sale of goods on instalment credit terms; or
(b) it is a contract for a loan repayable by instalments, or for any other form of credit, made to finance the sale of goods; or
(c) in all other cases, the contract has been concluded with a person who pursues commercial or professional activities in the State bound by this Convention of the consumer’s domicile or, by any means, directs such activities to that State or to several States including that State, and the contract falls within the scope of such activities.
(2) Where a consumer enters into a contract with a party who is not domiciled in the State bound by this Convention but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the States bound by this Convention, that party shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
(3) This section shall not apply to a contract of transport other than a contract which, for an inclusive price, provides for a combination of travel and accommodation.
Article 16
(1) A consumer may bring proceedings against the other party to a contract either in the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which that party is domiciled or in the courts for the place where the consumer is domiciled.
(2) Proceedings may be brought against a consumer by the other party to the contract only in the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the consumer is domiciled.
(3) This Article shall not affect the right to bring a counter-claim in the court in which, in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending.
Article 17
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement—
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or
(2) which allows the consumer to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section; or
(3) which is entered into by the consumer and the other party to the contract, both of whom are at the time of conclusion of the contract domiciled or habitually resident in the same State bound by this Convention, and which confers jurisdiction on the courts of that State, provided that such an agreement is not contrary to the law of that State.
SECTION 5
Jurisdiction over individual contracts of employment
Article 18
(1) In matters relating to individual contracts of employment, jurisdiction shall be determined by this Section, without prejudice to Articles 4 and 5(5).
(2) Where an employee enters into an individual contract of employment with an employer who is not domiciled in a State bound by this Convention but has a branch, agency or other establishment in one of the States bound by this Convention, the employer shall, in disputes arising out of the operations of the branch, agency or establishment, be deemed to be domiciled in that State.
Article 19
An employer domiciled in a State bound by this Convention may be sued—
(1) in the courts of the State where he is domiciled; or
(2) in another State bound by this Convention—
(a) in the courts for the place where the employee habitually carries out his work or in the courts for the last place where he did so; or
(b) if the employee does not or did not habitually carry out his work in any one country, in the courts for the place where the business which engaged the employee is or was situated.
Article 20
(1) An employer may bring proceedings only in the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the employee is domiciled.
(2) The provisions of this Section shall not affect the right to bring a counter-claim in the court in which, in accordance with this Section, the original claim is pending.
Article 21
The provisions of this Section may be departed from only by an agreement on jurisdiction—
(1) which is entered into after the dispute has arisen; or
(2) which allows the employee to bring proceedings in courts other than those indicated in this Section.
SECTION 6
Exclusive jurisdiction
Article 22
The following courts shall have exclusive jurisdiction, regardless of domicile—
(1) in proceedings which have as their object rights in rem in immovable property or tenancies of immovable property, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the property is situated.
(a) However, in proceedings which have as their object tenancies of immovable property concluded for temporary private use for a maximum period of six consecutive months, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the defendant is domiciled shall also have jurisdiction, provided that the tenant is a natural person and that the landlord and the tenant are domiciled in the same State bound by this Convention;
(2) in proceedings which have as their object the validity of the constitution, the nullity or the dissolution of companies or other legal persons or associations of natural or legal persons, or of the validity of the decisions of their organs, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the company, legal person or association has its seat. In order to determine that seat, the court shall apply its rules of private international law;
(3) in proceedings which have as their object the validity of entries in public registers, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the register is kept;
(4) in proceedings concerned with the registration or validity of patents, trade marks, designs, or other similar rights required to be deposited or registered, irrespective of whether the issue is raised by way of an action or as a defence, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the deposit or registration has been applied for, has taken place or is, under the terms of a Community instrument or an international convention, deemed to have taken place.
(5) in proceedings concerned with the enforcement of judgments, the courts of the State bound by this Convention in which the judgment has been or is to be enforced.
SECTION 7
Prorogation of jurisdiction
Article 23
(1) If the parties, one or more of whom is domiciled in a State bound by this Convention, have agreed that a court or the courts of a State bound by this Convention are to have jurisdiction to settle any disputes which have arisen or which may arise in connection with a particular legal relationship, that court or those courts shall have jurisdiction. Such jurisdiction shall be exclusive unless the parties have agreed otherwise. Such an agreement conferring jurisdiction shall be either—
(a) in writing or evidenced in writing; or
(b) in a form which accords with practices which the parties have established between themselves; or
(c) in international trade or commerce, in a form which accords with a usage of which the parties are or ought to have been aware and which in such trade or commerce is widely known to, and regularly observed by, parties to contracts of the type involved in the particular trade or commerce concerned.
(2) Any communication by electronic means which provides a durable record of the agreement shall be equivalent to ‘writing’.
(3) Where such an agreement is concluded by parties, none of whom is domiciled in a State bound by this Convention, the courts of other States bound by this Convention shall have no jurisdiction over their disputes unless the court or courts chosen have declined jurisdiction.
(4) The court or courts of a State bound by this Convention on which a trust instrument has conferred jurisdiction shall have exclusive jurisdiction in any proceedings brought against a settlor, trustee or beneficiary, if relations between these persons or their rights or obligations under the trust are involved.
(5) Agreements or provisions of a trust instrument conferring jurisdiction shall have no legal force if they are contrary to the provisions of Articles 13, 17 or 21, or if the courts whose jurisdiction they purport to exclude have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22.
Article 24
Apart from jurisdiction derived from other provisions of this Convention, a court of a State bound by this Convention before which a defendant enters an appearance shall have jurisdiction. This rule shall not apply where appearance was entered to contest the jurisdiction, or where another court has exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22.
SECTION 8
Examination as to jurisdiction and admissibility
Article 25
Where a court of a State bound by this Convention is seized of a claim which is principally concerned with a matter over which the courts of another State bound by this Convention have exclusive jurisdiction by virtue of Article 22, it shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction.
Article 26
(1) Where a defendant domiciled in one State bound by this Convention is sued in a court of another State bound by this Convention and does not enter an appearance, the court shall declare of its own motion that it has no jurisdiction unless its jurisdiction is derived from the provisions of this Convention.
(2) The court shall stay the proceedings so long as it is not shown that the defendant has been able to receive the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document in sufficient time to enable him to arrange for his defence, or that all necessary steps have been taken to this end.
(3) Instead of the provisions of paragraph 2, Article 15 of the Hague Convention of 15 November 1965 on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil and Commercial matters shall apply if the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document had to be transmitted pursuant to that Convention.
(4) Member States of the European Community bound by Council Regulation (EC) No 1348/2000 of 29 May 2000 or by the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on the service of judicial and extrajudicial documents in civil or commercial matters, signed at Brussels on 19 October 2005, shall apply in their mutual relations the provision in Article 19 of that Regulation if the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document had to be transmitted pursuant to that Regulation or that Agreement.
SECTION 9
Lis pendens—related actions
Article 27
(1) Where proceedings involving the same cause of action and between the same parties are brought in the courts of different States bound by this Convention, any court other than the court first seized shall of its own motion stay its proceedings until such time as the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established.
(2) Where the jurisdiction of the court first seized is established, any court other than the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
Article 28
(1) Where related actions are pending in the courts of different States bound by this Convention, any court other than the court first seized may stay its proceedings.
(2) Where these actions are pending at first instance, any court other than the court first seized may also, on the application of one of the parties, decline jurisdiction if the court first seized has jurisdiction over the actions in question and its law permits the consolidation thereof.
(3) For the purposes of this Article, actions are deemed to be related where they are so closely connected that it is expedient to hear and determine them together to avoid the risk of irreconcilable judgments resulting from separate proceedings.
Article 29
Where actions come within the exclusive jurisdiction of several courts, any court other than the court first seized shall decline jurisdiction in favour of that court.
Article 30
For the purposes of this Section, a court shall be deemed to be seized—
(1) at the time when the document instituting the proceedings or an equivalent document is lodged with the court, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have service effected on the defendant; or
(2) if the document has to be served before being lodged with the court at the time when it is received by the authority responsible for service, provided that the plaintiff has not subsequently failed to take the steps he was required to take to have the document lodged with the court.
SECTION 10
Provisional, including protective, measures
Article 31
Application may be made to the courts of a State bound by this Convention for such provisional, including protective, measures as may be available under the law of that State, even if, under this Convention, the courts of another State bound by this Convention have jurisdiction as to the substance of the matter.
TITLE III
RECOGNITION AND ENFORCEMENT
Article 32
For the purposes of this Convention, ‘judgment’ means any judgment given by a court or tribunal of a State bound by this Convention, whatever the judgment may be called, including a decree, order, decision or writ of execution, as well as the determination of costs or expenses by an officer of the court.
SECTION 1
Recognition
Article 33
(1) A judgment given in a State bound by this Convention shall be recognised in the other States bound by this Convention without any special procedure being required.
(2) Any interested party who raises the recognition of a judgment as the principal issue in a dispute may, in accordance with the procedures provided for in Sections 2 and 3 of this Title, apply for a decision that the judgment be recognised.
(3) If the outcome of proceedings in a court of a State bound by this Convention depends on the determination of an incidental question of recognition that court shall have jurisdiction over that question.
Article 34
A judgment shall not be recognised—
(1) if such recognition is manifestly contrary to public policy in the State in which recognition is sought;
(2) where it was given in default of appearance, if the defendant was not served with the document which instituted the proceedings or with an equivalent document in sufficient time and in such a way as to enable him to arrange for his defence, unless the defendant failed to commence proceedings to challenge the judgment when it was possible for him to do so;
(3) if it is irreconcilable with a judgment given in a dispute between the same parties in the State in which recognition is sought;
(4) if it is irreconcilable with an earlier judgment given in another State bound by this Convention or in a third State involving the same cause of action and between the same parties, provided that the earlier judgment fulfils the conditions necessary for its recognition in the State addressed.
Article 35
(1) Moreover, a judgment shall not be recognised if it conflicts with Sections 3, 4 or 6 of Title II, or in a case provided for in Article 68. A judgment may furthermore be refused recognition in any case provided for in Article 64(3) or 67(4).
(2) In its examination of the grounds of jurisdiction referred to in the foregoing paragraph, the court or authority applied to shall be bound by the findings of fact on which the court of the State of origin based its jurisdiction.
(3) Subject to the provisions of paragraph 1, the jurisdiction of the court of the State of origin may not be reviewed. The test of public policy referred to in Article 34(1) may not be applied to the rules relating to jurisdiction.
Article 36
Under no circumstances may a foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.
Article 37
(1) A court of a State bound by this Convention in which recognition is sought of a judgment given in another State bound by this Convention may stay the proceedings if an ordinary appeal against the judgment has been lodged.
(2) A court of a State bound by this Convention in which recognition is sought of a judgment given in Ireland or the United Kingdom may stay the proceedings if enforcement is suspended in the State of origin, by reason of an appeal.
SECTION 2
Enforcement
Article 38
(1) A judgment given in a State bound by this Convention and enforceable in that State shall be enforced in another State bound by this Convention when, on the application of any interested party, it has been declared enforceable there.
(2) However, in the United Kingdom, such a judgment shall be enforced in England and Wales, in Scotland, or in Northern Ireland when, on the application of any interested party, it has been registered for enforcement in that part of the United Kingdom.
Article 39
(1) The application shall be submitted to the court or competent authority indicated in the list in Annex II.
(2) The local jurisdiction shall be determined by reference to the place of domicile of the party against whom enforcement is sought, or to the place of enforcement.
Article 40
(1) The procedure for making the application shall be governed by the law of the State in which enforcement is sought.
(2) The applicant must give an address for service of process within the area of jurisdiction of the court applied to. However, if the law of the State in which enforcement is sought does not provide for the furnishing of such an address, the applicant shall appoint a representative ad litem.
(3) The documents referred to in Article 53 shall be attached to the application.
Article 41
The judgment shall be declared enforceable immediately on completion of the formalities in Article 53 without any review under Articles 34 and 35. The party against whom enforcement is sought shall not at this stage of the proceedings be entitled to make any submissions on the application.
Article 42
(1) The decision on the application for a declaration of enforceability shall forthwith be brought to the notice of the applicant in accordance with the procedure laid down by the law of the State in which enforcement is sought.
(2) The declaration of enforceability shall be served on the party against whom enforcement is sought, accompanied by the judgment, if not already served on that party.
Article 43
(1) The decision on the application for a declaration of enforceability may be appealed against by either party.
(2) The appeal is to be lodged with the court indicated in the list in Annex III.
(3) The appeal shall be dealt with in accordance with the rules governing procedure in contradictory matters.
(4) If the party against whom enforcement is sought fails to appear before the appellate court in proceedings concerning an appeal brought by the applicant, Article 26(2) to (4) shall apply even where the party against whom enforcement is sought is not domiciled in any of the States bound by this Convention.
(5) An appeal against the declaration of enforceability is to be lodged within one month of service thereof. If the party against whom enforcement is sought is domiciled in a State bound by this Convention other than that in which the declaration of enforceability was given, the time for appealing shall be two months and shall run from the date of service, either on him in person or at his residence. No extension of time may be granted on account of distance.
Article 44
The judgment given on the appeal may be contested only by the appeal referred to in Annex IV.
Article 45
(1) The court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 shall refuse or revoke a declaration of enforceability only on one of the grounds specified in Articles 34 and 35. It shall give its decision without delay.
(2) Under no circumstances may the foreign judgment be reviewed as to its substance.
Article 46
(1) The court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 may, on the application of the party against whom enforcement is sought, stay the proceedings if an ordinary appeal has been lodged against the judgment in the State of origin or if the time for such an appeal has not yet expired; in the latter case, the court may specify the time within which such an appeal is to be lodged.
(2) Where the judgment was given in Ireland or the United Kingdom, any form of appeal available in the State of origin shall be treated as an ordinary appeal for the purposes of paragraph 1.
(3) The court may also make enforcement conditional on the provision of such security as it shall determine.
Article 47
(1) When a judgment must be recognised in accordance with this Convention, nothing shall prevent the applicant from availing himself of provisional, including protective, measures in accordance with the law of the State requested without a declaration of enforceability under Article 41 being required.
(2) The declaration of enforceability shall carry with it the power to proceed to any protective measures.
(3) During the time specified for an appeal pursuant to Article 43(5) against the declaration of enforceability and until any such appeal has been determined, no measures of enforcement may be taken other than protective measures against the property of the party against whom enforcement is sought.
Article 48
(1) Where a foreign judgment has been given in respect of several matters and the declaration of enforceability cannot be given for all of them, the court or competent authority shall give it for one or more of them.
(2) An applicant may request a declaration of enforceability limited to parts of a judgment.
Article 49
A foreign judgment which orders a periodic payment by way of a penalty shall be enforceable in the State in which enforcement is sought only if the amount of the payment has been finally determined by the courts of the State of origin.
Article 50
(1) An applicant who in the State of origin has benefited from complete or partial legal aid or exemption from costs or expenses shall be entitled, in the procedure provided for in this Section, to benefit from the most favourable legal aid or the most extensive exemption from costs or expenses provided for by the law of the State addressed.
(2) However, an applicant who requests the enforcement of a decision given by an administrative authority in Denmark, in Iceland or in Norway in respect of maintenance may, in the State addressed, claim the benefits referred to in paragraph 1 if he presents a statement from the Danish, Icelandic, or Norwegian Ministry of Justice to the effect that he fulfils the economic requirements to qualify for the grant of complete or partial legal aid or exemption from costs or expenses.
Article 51
No security, bond or deposit, however described, shall be required of a party who in one State bound by this Convention, applies for enforcement of a judgment given in another State bound by this Convention on the ground that he is a foreign national or that he is not domiciled or resident in the State in which enforcement is sought.
Article 52
In proceedings for the issue of a declaration of enforceability, no charge, duty or fee calculated by reference to the value of the matter at issue may be levied in the State in which enforcement is sought.
SECTION 3
Common provisions
Article 53
(1) A party seeking recognition or applying for a declaration of enforceability shall produce a copy of the judgment which satisfies the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity.
(2) A party applying for a declaration of enforceability shall also produce the certificate referred to in Article 54, without prejudice to Article 55.
Article 54
The court or competent authority of a State bound by this Convention where a judgment was given shall issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate using the standard form in Annex V to this Convention.
Article 55
(1) If the certificate referred to in Article 54 is not produced, the court or competent authority may specify a time for its production or accept an equivalent document or, if it considers that it has sufficient information before it, dispense with its production.
(2) If the court or competent authority so requires, a translation of the documents shall be produced. The translation shall be certified by a person qualified to do so in one of the States bound by this Convention.
Article 56
No legalisation or other similar formality shall be required in respect of the documents referred to in Article 53 or Article 55(2), or in respect of a document appointing a representative ad litem.
TITLE IV
AUTHENTIC INSTRUMENTS AND COURT SETTLEMENTS
Article 57
(1) A document which has been formally drawn up or registered as an authentic instrument and is enforceable in one State bound by this Convention shall, in another State bound by this Convention, be declared enforceable there, on application made in accordance with the procedures provided for in Article 38, et seq. The court with which an appeal is lodged under Article 43 or Article 44 shall refuse or revoke a declaration of enforceability only if enforcement of the instrument is manifestly contrary to public policy in the State addressed.
(2) Arrangements relating to maintenance obligations concluded with administrative authorities or authenticated by them shall also be regarded as authentic instruments within the meaning of paragraph 1.
(3) The instrument produced must satisfy the conditions necessary to establish its authenticity in the State of origin.
(4) Section 3 of Title III shall apply as appropriate. The competent authority of a State bound by this Convention where an authentic instrument was drawn up or registered shall issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate using the standard form in Annex VI to this Convention.
Article 58
A settlement which has been approved by a court in the course of proceedings and is enforceable in the State bound by this Convention in which it was concluded shall be enforceable in the State addressed under the same conditions as authentic instruments. The court or competent authority of a State bound by this Convention where a court settlement was approved shall issue, at the request of any interested party, a certificate using the standard form in Annex V to this Convention.
TITLE V
GENERAL PROVISIONS
Article 59
(1) In order to determine whether a party is domiciled in the State bound by this Convention whose courts are seised of a matter, the court shall apply its internal law.
(2) If a party is not domiciled in the State whose courts are seised of the matter, then, in order to determine whether the party is domiciled in another State bound by this Convention, the court shall apply the law of that State.
Article 60
(1) For the purposes of this Convention, a company or other legal person or association of natural or legal persons is domiciled at the place where it has its—
(a) statutory seat; or
(b) central administration; or
(c) principal place of business.
(2) For the purposes of the United Kingdom and Ireland ‘statutory seat’ means the registered office or, where there is no such office anywhere, the place of incorporation or, where there is no such place anywhere, the place under the law of which the formation took place.
(3) In order to determine whether a trust is domiciled in the State bound by this Convention whose courts are seized of the matter, the court shall apply its rules of private international law.
Article 61
Without prejudice to any more favourable provisions of national laws, persons domiciled in a State bound by this Convention who are being prosecuted in the criminal courts of another State bound by this Convention of which they are not nationals for an offence which was not intentionally committed may be defended by persons qualified to do so, even if they do not appear in person. However, the court seised of the matter may order appearance in person; in the case of failure to appear, a judgment given in the civil action without the person concerned having had the opportunity to arrange for his defence need not be recognised or enforced in the other States bound by this Convention.
Article 62
For the purposes of this Convention, the expression ‘court’ shall include any authorities designated by a State bound by this Convention as having jurisdiction in the matters falling within the scope of this Convention.
TITLE VI
TRANSITIONAL PROVISIONS
Article 63
(1) This Convention shall apply only to legal proceedings instituted and to documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments after its entry into force in the State of origin and, where recognition or enforcement of a judgment or authentic instruments is sought, in the State addressed.
(2) However, if the proceedings in the State of origin were instituted before the entry into force of this Convention, judgments given after that date shall be recognised and enforced in accordance with Title III—
(a) if the proceedings in the State of origin were instituted after the entry into force of the Lugano Convention of 16 September 1988 both in the State of origin and in the State;
(b) in all other cases, if jurisdiction was founded upon rules which accorded with those provided for either in Title II or in a convention concluded between the State of origin and the State addressed which was in force when the proceedings were instituted.
TITLE VII
RELATIONSHIP TO COUNCIL REGULATION (EC) No 44/2001 AND OTHER INSTRUMENTS
Article 64
(1) This Convention shall not prejudice the application by the Member States of the European Community of the Council Regulation (EC) No 44/2001 on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, as well as any amendments thereof, of the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at Brussels on 27 September 1968, and of the Protocol on interpretation of that Convention by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, signed at Luxembourg on 3 June 1971, as amended by the Conventions of Accession to the said Convention and the said Protocol by the States acceding to the European Communities, as well as of the Agreement between the European Community and the Kingdom of Denmark on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters, signed at Brussels on 19 October 2005.
(2) However, this Convention shall in any event be applied—
(a) in matters of jurisdiction, where the defendant is domiciled in the territory of a State where this Convention but not an instrument referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article applies, or where Articles 22 or 23 of this Convention confer jurisdiction on the courts of such a State;
(b) in relation to lis pendens or to related actions as provided for in Articles 27 and 28, when proceedings are instituted in a State where the Convention but not an instrument referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article applies and in a State where this Convention as well as an instrument referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article apply;
(c) in matters of recognition and enforcement, where either the State of origin or the State addressed is not applying an instrument referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article.
(3) In addition to the grounds provided for in Title III, recognition or enforcement may be refused if the ground of jurisdiction on which the judgment has been based differs from that resulting from this Convention and recognition or enforcement is sought against a party who is domiciled in a State where this Convention but not an instrument referred to in paragraph 1 of this Article applies, unless the judgment may otherwise be recognised or enforced under any rule of law in the State addressed.
Article 65
Subject to the provisions of Articles 63(2), 66 and 67, this Convention shall, as between the States bound by this Convention, supersede the conventions concluded between two or more of them that cover the same matters as those to which this Convention applies. In particular, the conventions mentioned in Annex VII shall be superseded.
Article 66
(1) The conventions referred to in Article 65 shall continue to have effect in relation to matters to which this Convention does not apply.
(2) They shall continue to have effect in respect of judgments given and documents formally drawn up or registered as authentic instruments before the entry into force of this Convention.
Article 67
(1) This Convention shall not affect any conventions by which the Contracting Parties and/or the States bound by this Convention are bound and which in relation to particular matters, govern jurisdiction or the recognition or enforcement of judgments. Without prejudice to obligations resulting from other agreements between certain Contracting Parties, this Convention shall not prevent Contracting Parties from entering into such conventions.
(2) This Convention shall not prevent a court of a State bound by this Convention and by a convention on a particular matter from assuming jurisdiction in accordance with that convention, even where the defendant is domiciled in another State bound by this Convention which is not a party to that convention. The court hearing the action shall, in any event, apply Article 26 of this Convention.
(3) Judgments given in a State bound by this Convention by a court in the exercise of jurisdiction provided for in a convention on a particular matter shall be recognised and enforced in the other States bound by this Convention in accordance with Title III of this Convention.
(4) In addition to the grounds provided for in Title III, recognition or enforcement may be refused if the State addressed is not bound by the convention on a particular matter and the person against whom recognition or enforcement is sought is domiciled in that State, or, if the State addressed is a Member State of the European Community and in respect of conventions which would have to be concluded by the European Community, in any of its Member States, unless the judgment may otherwise be recognised or enforced under any rule of law in the State addressed.
(5) Where a convention on a particular matter to which both the State of origin and the State addressed are parties lays down conditions for the recognition or enforcement of judgments, those conditions shall apply. In any event, the provisions of this Convention which concern the procedures for recognition and enforcement of judgments may be applied.
Article 68
(1) This Convention shall not affect agreements by which States bound by this Convention undertook, prior to the entry into force of this Convention, not to recognise judgments given in other States bound by this Convention against defendants domiciled or habitually resident in a third State where, in cases provided for in Article 4, the judgment could only be founded on a ground of jurisdiction as specified in Article 3(2). Without prejudice to obligations resulting from other agreements between certain Contracting Parties, this Convention shall not prevent Contracting Parties from entering into such conventions.
(2) However, a Contracting Party may not assume an obligation towards a third State not to recognise a judgment given in another State bound by this Convention by a court basing its jurisdiction on the presence within that State of property belonging to the defendant, or the seizure by the plaintiff of property situated there—
(a) if the action is brought to assert or declare proprietary or possessory rights in that property, seeks to obtain authority to dispose of it, or arises from another issue relating to such property; or
(b) if the property constitutes the security for a debt which is the subject-matter of the action.
TITLE VIII
FINAL PROVISIONS
Article 69
(1) The Convention shall be open for signature by the European Community, Denmark, and States which, at the time of the opening for signature, are Members of the European Free Trade Association.
(2) This Convention shall be subject to ratification by the Signatories. The instruments of ratification shall be deposited with the Swiss Federal Council, which shall act as Depositary of this Convention.
(3) At the time of the ratification, the Contracting Parties may submit declarations in accordance with Articles I, II and III of Protocol 1.
(4) The Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the sixth month following the date on which the European Community and a Member of the European Free Trade Association deposit their instruments of ratification.
(5) The Convention shall enter into force in relation to any other Party on the first day of the third month following the deposit of its instrument of ratification.
(6) Without prejudice to Article 3(3) of Protocol 2, this Convention shall replace the Convention on jurisdiction and the enforcement of judgments in civil and commercial matters done at Lugano on 16 September 1988 as of the date of its entry into force in accordance with paragraphs 4 and 5 above. Any reference to the 1988 Lugano Convention in other instruments shall be understood as a reference to this Convention.
(7) Insofar as the relations between the Member States of the European Community and the non-European territories referred to in Article 70(1)(b) are concerned, this Convention shall replace the Convention on Jurisdiction and the Enforcement of Judgments in Civil and Commercial Matters, signed at Brussels on 27 September 1968, and of the Protocol on interpretation of that Convention by the Court of Justice of the European Communities, signed at Luxembourg on 3 June 1971, as amended by the Conventions of Accession to the said Convention and the said Protocol by the States acceding to the European Communities, as of the date of the entry into force of this Convention with respect to these territories in accordance with Article 73(2).
Article 70
(1) After entering into force this Convention shall be open for accession by—
(a) the States which, after the opening of this Convention for signature, become Members of the European Free Trade Association, under the conditions laid down in Article 71;
(b) Member States of the European Community acting on behalf of certain non-European territories that are part of the territory of that Member State or for whose external relations that Member State is responsible, under the conditions laid down in Article 71;
(c) any other State, under the conditions laid down in Article 72.
(2) States referred to in paragraph 1, which wish to become a Contracting Party to this Convention, shall address their application to the Depositary. The application, including the information referred to in Articles 71 and 72 shall be accompanied by a translation into English and French.
Article 71
(1) Any State referred to in Article 70(1)(a) and (b) wishing to become a Contracting Party to this Convention—
(a) shall communicate the information required for the application of this Convention;
(b) may submit declarations in accordance with Articles I and III of Protocol 1.
(2) The Depositary shall transmit any information received pursuant to paragraph 1 to the other Contracting Parties prior to the deposit of the instrument of accession by the State concerned.
Article 72
(1) Any State referred to in Article 70(1)(c) wishing to become a Contracting Party to this Convention—
(a) shall communicate the information required for the application of this Convention;
(b) may submit declarations in accordance with Articles I and III of Protocol 1; and
(c) shall provide the Depositary with information on, in particular—
(i) their judicial system, including information on the appointment and independence of judges;
(ii) their internal law concerning civil procedure and enforcement of judgments; and
(iii) their private international law relating to civil procedure.
(2) The Depositary shall transmit any information received pursuant to paragraph 1 to the other Contracting Parties prior to inviting the State concerned to accede in accordance with paragraph 3 of this Article.
(3) Without prejudice to paragraph 4, the Depositary shall invite the State concerned to accede only if it has obtained the unanimous agreement of the Contracting Parties. The Contracting Parties shall endeavour to give their consent at the latest within one year after the invitation by the Depositary.
(4) The Convention shall enter into force only in relations between the acceding State and the Contracting Parties which have not made any objections to the accession before the first day of the third month following the deposit of the instrument of accession.
Article 73
(1) The instruments of accession shall be deposited with the Depositary.
(2) In respect of an acceding State referred to in Article 70, the Convention shall enter into force on the first day of the third month following the deposit of its instrument of accession. As of that moment, the acceding State shall be considered a Contracting Party to the Convention.
(3) Any Contracting Party may submit to the Depositary a text of this Convention in the language or languages of the Contracting Party concerned, which shall be authentic if so agreed by the Contracting Parties in accordance with Article 4 of Protocol 2.
Article 74
(1) This Convention is concluded for an unlimited period.
(2) Any Contracting Party may, at any time, denounce the Convention by sending a notification to the Depositary.
(3) The denunciation shall take effect at the end of the calendar year following the expiry of a period of six months from the date of receipt by the Depositary of the notification of denunciation.
Article 75
The following are annexed to this Convention—
a Protocol 1, on certain questions of jurisdiction, procedure and enforcement,
a Protocol 2, on the uniform interpretation of this Convention and on the Standing Committee,
a Protocol 3, on the application of Article 67 of this Convention,
Annexes I through IV and Annex VII, with information related to the application of this Convention,
Annexes V and VI, containing the certificates referred to in Articles 54, 58 and 57 of this Convention,
Annex VIII, containing the authentic languages referred to in Article 79 of this Convention, and
Annex IX, concerning the application of Article II of Protocol 1.
These Protocols and Annexes shall form an integral part of this Convention.
Article 76
Without prejudice to Article 77, any Contracting Party may request the revision of this Convention. To that end, the Depositary shall convene the Standing Committee as laid down in Article 4 of Protocol 2.
Article 77
(1) The Contracting Parties shall communicate to the Depositary the text of any provisions of the laws which amend the lists set out in Annexes I through IV as well as any deletions in or additions to the list set out in Annex VII and the date of their entry into force. Such communication shall be made within reasonable time before the entry into force and be accompanied by a translation into English and French. The Depositary shall adapt the Annexes concerned accordingly, after having consulted the Standing Committee in accordance with Article 4 of Protocol 2. For that purpose, the Contracting Parties shall provide a translation of the adaptations into their languages.
(2) Any amendment of Annexes V through VI and VIII through IX to this Convention shall be adopted by the Standing Committee in accordance with Article 4 of Protocol 2.
Article 78
(1) The Depositary shall notify the Contracting Parties of—
(a) the deposit of each instrument of ratification or accession;
(b) the dates of entry into force of this Convention in respect of the Contracting Parties;
(c) any declaration received pursuant to Articles I to IV of Protocol 1;
(d) any communication made pursuant to Article 74(2), Article 77(1) and paragraph 4 of Protocol 3.
(2) The notifications will be accompanied by translations into English and French.
Article 79
This Convention, drawn up in a single original in the languages listed in Annex VIII, all texts being equally authentic, shall be deposited in the Swiss Federal Archives. The Swiss Federal Council shall transmit a certified copy to each Contracting Party.
In witness whereof, the undersigned Plenipotentiaries, have signed this Convention.
Done at Lugano, on 30 October 2007.”
New schedule 2—Super-affirmative resolution procedure—
“1 If the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, the Secretary of State Minister may lay before Parliament—
(a) draft regulations, and
(b) an explanatory document.
2 The explanatory document must introduce and give reasons for implementing the international agreement.
3 Subject as follows, if after the expiry of the 40-day period the draft regulations laid under subsection (1) are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Minister may make regulations in the terms of the draft regulations.
4 The procedure in paragraphs (5) to (8) shall apply to the draft regulations instead of the procedure in paragraph (3) if—
(a) either House of Parliament so resolves within the 30-day period, or
(b) a committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft regulations so recommends within the 30-day period and the House to which the recommendation is made does not by resolution reject the recommendation within that period.
5 The Secretary of State must have regard to—
(a) any representations,
(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and
(c) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft regulations, made during the 60-day period with regard to the draft regulations.
6 If, after the expiry of the 60-day period, the draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make regulations in the terms of the draft regulations.
7 If, after the expiry of the 60-day period, the Secretary of State wishes to proceed with the draft regulations but with material changes, the Secretary of State may lay before Parliament—
(a) a revised draft of the regulations, and
(b) a statement giving a summary of the changes proposed.
8 If the revised draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make regulations in the terms of the revised draft regulations.
9 For the purposes of this Schedule regulations are made in the terms of draft regulations or revised draft regulations if they contain no material changes to their provisions.
10 In this paragraph, references to the ‘30-day’, ‘40-day’ and ‘60-day’ periods in relation to any draft regulations are to the periods of 30, 40 and 60 days beginning with the day on which the draft regulations were laid before Parliament.
11 For the purposes of paragraph 10 no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.”
This new Schedule would apply the super-affirmative resolution procedure to regulations implementing the Lugano Convention in the UK (see NC2).
New schedule 3—Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2))—
“Restrictions on power to make regulations
1 (1) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)) may not include—
(a) provision that confers power to legislate by means of regulations, orders, rules or other subordinate instrument (other than rules of procedure for courts or tribunals);
(b) provision that creates an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18 (or, in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland, 21) is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years (ignoring any enactment prohibiting or restricting the imprisonment of individuals who have no previous convictions).
(2) Sub-paragraph (1)(a) does not prevent the modification of a power to legislate conferred otherwise than under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)), or the extension of any such power to purposes of a similar kind to those for which it was conferred.
(3) A power to give practice directions or other directions regarding matters of administration is not a power to legislate for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1)(a).
Regulations to be made by statutory instrument or statutory rule
2 The power to make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2))—
(a) is exercisable by statutory instrument, in the case of regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(b) is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)), in the case of regulations made by a Northern Ireland department.
Parliamentary or assembly procedure
3 (1) This paragraph applies to a statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)).
(2) If the instrument contains (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to the United Kingdom or a particular part of the United Kingdom, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to the United Kingdom or a particular part of the United Kingdom, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation,
it may not be made unless it has been approved under the super-affirmative procedure (see paragraph 4).
(3) In this Schedule ‘relevant arrangements’ means arrangements of the kind mentioned in section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)) (3).
(4) If sub-paragraph (2) does not apply to the instrument, it may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
Super-affirmative procedure
4 (1) If the Secretary of State considers it appropriate to make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, the Secretary of State may lay before Parliament—
(a) draft regulations, and
(b) an explanatory document.
(2) The explanatory document must introduce and give reasons for implementing the international agreement.
(3) Subject as follows, if after the expiry of the 40-day period the draft regulations laid under sub-paragraph (1) are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make regulations in the terms of the draft regulations.
(4) The procedure in sub-paragraphs (5) to (8) shall apply to the draft regulations instead of the procedure in sub-paragraph (3) if—
(a) either House of Parliament so resolves within the 30-day period, or
(b) a committee of either House charged with reporting on the draft regulations so recommends within the 30-day period and the House to which the recommendation is made does not by resolution reject the recommendation within that period.
(5) The Secretary of State must have regard to—
(a) any representations,
(b) any resolution of either House of Parliament, and
(c) any recommendations of a committee of either House of Parliament charged with reporting on the draft regulations, made during the 60-day period with regard to the draft regulations.
(6) If after the expiry of the 60-day period the draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make regulations in the terms of the draft regulations.
(7) If after the expiry of the 60-day period the Secretary of State wishes to proceed with the draft regulations but with material changes, the Secretary of State may lay before Parliament—
(a) a revised draft of the regulations, and
(b) a statement giving a summary of the changes proposed.
(8) If the revised draft regulations are approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament, the Secretary of State may make regulations in the terms of the revised draft regulations.
(9) For the purposes of this paragraph regulations are made in the terms of draft regulations or revised draft regulations if they contain no material changes to their provisions.
(10) In this paragraph, references to the ‘30-day’, ‘40-day’ and ‘60-day’ periods in relation to any draft regulations are to the periods of 30, 40 and 60 days beginning with the day on which the draft regulations were laid before Parliament.
(11) For the purposes of sub-paragraph (10) no account is to be taken of any time during which Parliament is dissolved or prorogued or during which either House is adjourned for more than four days.
Scottish affirmative procedure
5 (1) This paragraph applies to regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)).
(2) The regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure (see section 29 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010).
Northern Ireland affirmative procedure
6 (1) A Northern Ireland department may not make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)) unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly and approved by a resolution of the Assembly.
(2) Section 41(3) of that Act applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) in relation to the laying of a draft as it applies in relation to the laying of a statutory document under an enactment.
Interpretation
7 In this Schedule—
‘amend’ includes repeal or revoke;
‘primary legislation’ means any provision of—
(a) an Act of Parliament,
(b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(c) an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru, or
(d) Northern Ireland legislation;
‘relevant arrangements’ has the meaning given in paragraph 3(3);
‘relevant international agreement’ has the same meaning as in section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law (No. 2)).”
This new schedule is linked to Amendment (e) to Government NC5 and makes provision for regulations made by the Secretary of State under Government NC5 to be subject to super-affirmative procedure, and for all regulations made under that section by Scottish Ministers or Northern Ireland departments to be subject to the relevant affirmative procedure.
Government amendment 7.
Amendment 8, in title, line 1, at end add
“and the Lugano Convention of 2007;”
This amendment is consequential on either Amendment 1 or on Amendments 2 to 4 and NS1.
Amendment 9, line 1, at end add
“and to provide for the implementation of other international agreements on private international law, subject to certain conditions.”
This amendment is consequential on NC1.
Amendment 10, line 1, at end add
“and to provide, subject to a super-affirmative procedure, for the implementation of the Lugano Convention of 2007.”
This amendment is consequential on NC2 and NS2.
Amendment 11, line 1, at end add
“and the Lugano Convention of 2007; and to provide, subject to consultation and a super-affirmative procedure, for the implementation of other international agreements on private international law.”
This amendment is consequential on Amendment (e) to Government NC5 and NS3.
Mr Djanogly
The main outstanding issue with the Bill concerns parliamentary scrutiny—that is, of the UK’s accession to a private international law treaty itself and then concerning orders made pursuant to that treaty. To those Members who may have been mesmerised by the complexity of the amendments today, I should say that this was not helped by the Government tabling their amendments only late last week, which required an element of guesswork for everyone else. Having said that, this belies a high level of consistency in the approach taken with tabled amendments by those who remain concerned at the Government’s position, as I shall explain.
Following Second Reading, the Government have unfortunately decided to re-table, almost unamended, the order-making powers as new clause 5, which was so decisively rejected in the other place. Despite multiple meetings with Ministers—where, I have to say, they have only been polite and listening—I am not much the wiser about the Government’s reasons for what can only be seen as a significant proposed extension of the power of the Executive.
The Government’s hinted amendment to remove criminal sanctions of more than two years’ sentencing from the order-making powers would be a good start but would not be nearly enough. I have therefore tabled amendment 2 and others, in my and others’ names. Those amendments need to be put into the context of the Bill as a whole. That is because the Bill only deals with the UK’s entering specific existing PIL treaties. It does not look at how we approve, or scrutinise entering, other future PIL treaties in the first place. Then it goes on to give the broad order-making powers for any unnamed future PIL treaties. I would suggest that, by focusing on future order-making powers, rather than the initial treaties themselves, it is effectively putting the cart before the horse.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I rise in support of the amendments in my name and that of my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly). I agree with and adopt the arguments that he has made—in particular, in relation to scrutiny and the inadequacy of the current arrangements under the CRaG Act. That is not satisfactory, and we are going to have to address it sooner or later. As a consequence of leaving the European Union, we will be signing a great number of international treaties and other important international obligations, too—free trade agreements of many kinds. We do have to put in place a fit-for-purpose system, and relying on the Ponsonby convention really is not sustainable at the current time.
I had the pleasure, funnily enough, of knowing the third Lord Ponsonby of Shulbrede—now no longer with us—who was very active in London government, and it was his grandfather who was responsible for this. That is itself indicative of the passage of time. It was in 1924, at the time of the Zinoviev letter, when this convention was put in place, so we really do have to have something—with every respect to the memory of the Lords Ponsonby—that is more fit for purpose for the modern time, particularly because this deals with very important issues and because international treaties have themselves become much more complex and very frequently now have implications for domestic law, as well as international treaty law obligations. Therefore, a new system, as set out of my hon. Friend, for scrutinising these issues is something we have to do at some point.
The one issue that does need to be dealt with quickly—my hon. Friend is right about how long such treaties take—is that we should sign up to the Lugano convention as a matter of absolute urgency. It is one of the unfortunate consequences of our departing from the European Union that we will leave one of the most sophisticated and effective means of civil justice co-operation that exists. That was not probably something very much debated during the referendum, and it is perhaps collateral damage in that sense of the broader decision that was taken, which I have to respect, but it is an important potential loss for British legal services and British business.
That can be made good if we swiftly joined Lugano, and a number of other international conventions, including the various Hague conventions, that go with it. That is why our amendment would in fact place joining Lugano in the Bill, although I will not read out new schedule 1 in detail. There is a real concern among businesses, as well as among lawyers, of a lacuna. At the moment, any British company or individual contracting with someone in the EU or the European Free Trade Association for that matter would, by virtue of our membership of the EU, be part of the Brussels I and Brussels II recast conventions and also of the Rome conventions in relation to domestic family law. Those enable contracts to be recognised and enforced, and judgments of the courts on those contracts to be recognised and enforced automatically in any of the member states. We have that advantage at the moment by virtue of our membership of the EU, carried over in the transition period, but that will go.
Obviously, for any contract to be worth its weight, it has to be enforceable—there is no point in having it otherwise—and that runs across every type of business. There is the significant and highly lucrative development of derivatives and other financial instruments, in which the City of London remains a world leader, and they have to be enforceable should they ever be called upon, as do contracts for manufacturers or the supply of agricultural produce. Contracts for any type of good or service that have an international dimension have to be effectively enforceable, and the same applies for the rights of individuals.
For example, for the British tourist or business person abroad who is injured in a road accident where the defendant—the driver at fault—is resident in one of the continental states, at the moment they can pursue their action in Bromley county court if need be or in the High Court to get a judgment and then have it enforced in France, Germany or elsewhere. Without getting into Lugano, there will be a gap in that person’s ability to seek justice and redress. It would be unconscionable if we should get ourselves into that state of affairs.
There is also the position of the single parent if the father, perhaps, of a child has moved to one of the EU jurisdictions. At the moment, the mother can enforce the judgment of the British family courts for maintenance payments, access arrangements and so on. They can be enforced in the place where the father is domiciled, and she can get her money. Again, it would be unconscionable if we were to have a gap. I know that that is not what the Minister wants, and I know that the Government are striving earnestly to achieve this, but at the moment we do not have it. If I get the chance, I may say more about that on Third Reading, but that is why we think giving statutory provision for Lugano in the Bill demonstrates its importance.
As the negotiations go forward, it is obviously important that we get a deal on free trade in relation to goods and tariffs, but absolutely as important is that we get a deal on judicial co-operation—whether criminal and police co-operation, but also civil co-operation. I hope that our negotiators will be saying, “If we get a deal with the EU, part of that must include the Commission dropping its current objections to the UK joining Lugano.” I hope that that is a negotiating gambit at the moment. The EFTA members are happy for us to join. The EU members at the moment, on the advice of the Commission, are not. This may not be easy, because France and Germany, in particular, have a history of being highly protective towards their jurisdictions in matters of legal services, so it is not something that is to be a footnote for Mr Frost’s agenda—the full Frost agenda, if I can put it that way. It should be central. That is why we think it is sufficiently important to flag it up on the face of the Bill. The Minister knows that, and I think it needs to be stated and put out there, right across Government.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
Let me first declare an interest, as an associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators. I take a different view on this Bill from my hon. Friends the Members for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill). When I looked at the Bill and what it does, two words came out as being necessary to preserve, the first of which was agility. The Government need to have the agility to be able to implement treaties in this way. The second word was “flexibility”, which partly comes down to the issue of speed. My hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon was wrong when he said that these sort of treaties take forever and there is no rush to get them through. There is a rush to get them through. One example of where there is a need to get a treaty sorted out is the Singapore mediation convention. It harms absolutely no one. All it does is make the decisions that are reached in mediation in countries that have signed the convention applicable anywhere around the world. It stops the enormously artificial process of having a mediation and then changing the mediators for another set of arbitrators, who then introduce the arbitration on exactly the same lines as the mediation in order for it to be caught by the New York convention, which is applicable around the world and which we have signed.
Understanding why we need to be quick with that treaty, which, as I say, does no harm, comes back to the visit that I and colleagues from both sides of the Houses made to Singapore earlier in the year. We have heard that many people see alternative dispute resolution as the way forward, but that is a complacent way of looking at the situation in the UK. The UK is not doing very well at maintaining itself as a global hub for alternative dispute resolution. The facilities available for conducting arbitration or mediation are far inferior to those that can be found in Singapore. If we sit around for much longer thinking that we can carry on being the global hub for this, we will lose that position very quickly and it will go to somebody else.
The techniques that we need to approve a major treaty are completely different from the sort of techniques that are needed to adopt a small treaty such as the Singapore mediation convention. We are speaking not about a new Maastricht treaty, but about treaties such as the Singapore mediation convention. We do not need an Act of Parliament for that; we need Ministers to get on with signing and implementing them as quickly as possible.
The Law Society has rather missed the point. It stresses the point that the effects of a treaty can have influence on domestic law, but it totally ignores the need for speed and it falls into the trap of complacency when it looks at the situation in the UK and the global role that we play. The House of Lords, when it looked at the measure and made its recommendations, also failed to recognise those points. I say again to the Minister that he needs to judge these amendments and new clauses according to whether they increase his agility and flexibility to get treaties such as the Singapore mediation convention signed and operational as quickly as possible.
Miss Sarah Dines (Derbyshire Dales) (Con)
It is a pleasure to speak under your chairmanship, Dame Eleanor. As a relatively new Member of Parliament, it really is a joy to be speaking on this Bill. I refer the House to my entry in the Register of Members’ Financial Interests. I was a practising barrister for 30 years and for many of those years, I practised in these areas.
I am truly delighted to be speaking on this Bill in Committee. The very consideration of it is evidence that the transition period of our leaving the EU is coming to an end. For me, that is very welcome news. I support the propositions put forward by my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell), who said that the Government need to be responsive, and there is a need for speed, agility and considered thought.
It is of course right that, prior to the end of the transition period, the UK takes steps to ensure continued participation in key agreements in its own right, at last as a free and independent trading nation. From 1 February, the UK has regained full competence to enter into this sort of international agreement in the field in its own right. This is wonderful progress. As the UK develops its wider trading policy with the EU and the rest of the world, PIL agreements will be key to supporting cross-border commerce, which will be particularly important going forward. They will also regulate the very foundations of our society—how we deal with international family law matters—and build confidence for consumers as to how trade and disputes will be settled, all of which are very good things.
Jerome Mayhew (Broadland) (Con)
I cannot match the technical analysis of my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), but I hope I can bring to today’s deliberations some practical experience of the implications of new clauses 2 and 5.
The honouring of agreements has been at the heart of international trade since such trade began, but it is worth remembering that Governments have not always supported international trade. If we look back at the approach of our Government and other Governments in Europe from the 16th and 17th centuries, and even well into the 18th century, we see that we operated mercantilist policies that actively prevented international trade. Such trade was discouraged to protect domestic manufacturing. Policies such as high border tariffs were implemented, and there were even export bans on tools that could be used to improve manufacturing in third countries. Many arcane rules and requirements to use local suppliers and local trades were implemented to make it harder to undertake international trade.
There was also no support for the legal enforcement of contracts. Consequently, businesses had to make their own arrangements, which were founded primarily on personal trust and the reputation of organisations and families. I have some personal experience: I was once recruited by my brother to work in his company, eventually as the managing director. His rationale was that he had no idea whether I was competent at anything but did know that I was unlikely to steal from him. I will leave it to other people to decide whether that was ultimately good for the economy of that business. On an international basis, that approach has been disastrous: throughout the 16th, 17th and 18th centuries there was a general stultification of growth.
I am delighted to say that it was the United Kingdom that led the world away from narrow protectionism and towards free trade. That great man Adam Smith led the charge. He destroyed the argument for protectionism, demonstrating the desirability of imports—they are more efficiently produced and therefore cheaper—and stating that exports were merely the necessary cost of acquiring them. It was through this place that we led the way in the repeal of protectionist laws: first, with the Reciprocity of Duties Act back in 1823, and then much more famously with the repeal of the corn laws in 1846. What was the result? We see it if we look around us today: the explosion of world trade.
PIL agreements have been crucial to the modern support of international trade. They bring legal certainty, deal with conflicts of jurisdiction and allow for judgments to be enforced internationally. The Bill helps to achieve those aims, particularly as we transition from EU membership into the big wide world. That transition period, to which I shall come back later in my speech, is relevant because of the time constraints that it imposes on Her Majesty’s Government.
I want to return to my first-hand experience of the impact of PIL agreements. I was the managing director of a UK-based SME that was entrepreneurial in its outlook, and we were doing pretty well in the UK, so naturally I looked to international markets as a means for expansion. In my time, I negotiated joint ventures in Russia, the United States of America, Australia and South Africa, as well as undertaking preliminary discussions in a number of other jurisdictions. It was noticeable that the only two joint ventures that we progressed to fruition were those in the United States of America and Australia, and the fundamental reasons that I felt unable to progress further in those other jurisdictions were the fears over the enforceability of contracts, particularly in relation to intellectual property, and the fears over the effectiveness of the rule of law in those jurisdictions. PIL agreements affect countless such economic decisions all around the world and in this country every day, so we must not underestimate their importance for economic decisions just like the ones that I took.
There is an urgent need for more PIL agreements, particularly as we move out of the transition period. They are an integral part of our pivot towards global Britain, and there should be no unnecessary delay in the Government’s ability not only to negotiate such agreements but to bring them into force. International enforceability is key to trade growth and to London remaining the centre of dispute resolution around the world. It is also key to the continued dominance of English and Welsh law, and it is worth reminding ourselves that that law is dominant because it is predictable in its interpretation and its enforceability. That is a key advantage for this jurisdiction.
I understand well the concerns that have been raised by old clause 2 and new clause 5. As a Back Bencher, I stand here to defend the rights of Parliament, but it is also right that I should do that with a sense of proportion. PIL agreements are significant—I have done my best to explain how significant they have been to international commerce—but they are fundamentally uncontroversial. They are not major treaties in the sense of Maastricht, which was mentioned by a previous speaker, and we need to have some practical considerations weighing on our mind as we decide whether we should implement new clause 5.
The transition period is a time when we should be lifting our eyes to the wider horizons of international trade, and that is going to mean many more PIL agreements. As my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) highlighted, the Government’s agility, and their ability to strike while the iron is hot to take advantage of this brave new world into which we are entering, are material practical considerations. We also have the legislative timetable to consider. It is already clogged up with covid-related delays, and to require multiple Acts of Parliament to be progressed through that clogged-up timetable in order to progress time-sensitive and time-critical agreements would be disproportionate. It would create negative delay for the Government’s domestic agenda as they seek to progress this stodge, and delay for the implementation of the agreements themselves.
As a businessman and as a Back Bencher defending the rights of this Parliament, I operate with that sense of proportion, and my conclusion is that it would not be proportionate to prevent the Government from using secondary legislation in this manner. Consequently, I support the Government’s new clause 5 and I am against new clause 2.
Dehenna Davison (Bishop Auckland) (Con)
I rise today not as a lawyer, surprisingly—like many right hon. and hon. Members across the House—but merely as someone who has taken an interest in the Bill because I want the best for my constituents. I often joke that I am bilingual, because I can speak standard English and northerner, but I do not speak legalese, so Members may have to forgive me for a bit of plain speaking on this one.
New clause 5, which has been the subject of much discussion, effectively sets out the procedure by which international agreements on legal disputes are brought into UK law. The new clause would allow Ministers to implement treaties via an affirmative statutory instrument, rather than going through the full primary legislative process.
Rob Butler (Aylesbury) (Con)
I rise to speak in support of new clause 5 in the name of the Minister, which, on balance, I believe would result in proportionate scrutiny for the measures that would fall under the jurisdiction of the Bill. The general points about the need for international agreements on private international law have been well rehearsed. Without such agreements, there would be a considerable impact on British businesses, individuals and families who are engaged in cross-border litigation. Indeed, it is not inconceivable to foresee a situation where parallel judgments by different courts contradict each other, resulting in legal limbo with little hope of redress and no hope of justice.
That is perhaps particularly evident in the case of custody disputes, where a child has been abducted and taken outside the UK by one parent. Right hon. and hon. Members across the House are no doubt all too aware of examples of such cases. Sadly, that pain has been felt by families in my own constituency of Aylesbury. If we compound that heart-wrenching situation with a quagmire of legal process in different jurisdictions, with no mutual recognition of judgments, desperation becomes hopelessness, and loving parents risk permanent separation from their children.
Less emotional, but equally important, is the plight of small British businesses seeking redress from an overseas supplier or customer. Buckinghamshire has more microbusinesses than any other county in the country. There are small firms that need the law to be simple and straightforward, so that they can focus on what they do best—producing goods and services that generate wealth and taxes—safe in the knowledge that the judicial system is there to protect them.
New clause 5 seeks to use delegated legislation to ensure that any future agreements concerning international private law are speedily implemented, thus benefiting individuals, families and businesses in the ways I have described. Parliamentary scrutiny will exist through the affirmative process, and what is more, it will be prompt. That seems to be appropriate and proportionate. Insisting on primary legislation to bring such new agreements into effect is disproportionate and unnecessary, not least because of the likely challenges of finding parliamentary time for what, as other Members have said, are unlikely to be matters of huge controversy. When international private law agreements were in the competency of the European Union, they were implemented by direct effect. Once the transition period is over, Members of this House will be able to scrutinise and vote on such agreements, bringing power back to Parliament through the DL procedure.
I am rather surprised by some of the opposition to new clause 5, both from Opposition Members and from the other place, because what is proposed today is not novel. There is precedent for the Government’s proposed course of action, and precedent is not to be lightly dismissed. Indeed, in justifying the decision of one of Mr Speaker’s illustrious predecessors, Erskine May said that he had
“found what convinces the House of Commons more readily than any argument—I have found a precedent”.
Several Acts passed in this place contain delegated powers concerning international private law. The Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 contains delegated powers allowing decisions to be made by Order in Council. The same is true in family law relating to the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972 using the same mechanism. I therefore support the Government’s desire to introduce new clause 5 and hope that Members of the other place will feel able to take the opportunity afforded them of a second chance to consider the implications of their earlier action.
As we conclude the transition period from leaving the EU, I want the UK to be a country where we focus on getting deals done, where we support our businesses to trade and where we strive to protect our citizens’ rights in a way that is straightforward and fair. I have had countless emails from constituent businesses asking me to ensure that they can run as smoothly as possible after the transition period. I have not had one single email from a constituent business demanding primary legislation for every single commercial agreement that is made in future—that is not a cue to 38 Degrees to start such a campaign.
I want us to be agile in the way we respond to opportunities from our friends and partners overseas and able to follow up an agreement made in person with swift delivery of parliamentary scrutiny in proportionate form that enables us to implement a deal and reap the benefits in short order. Businesses in my constituency of Aylesbury are hungry for the opportunities that await us on the international markets. They want Parliament to pave the way for them to bring greater prosperity to our country. Let us do that with new clause 5.
Owen Thompson (Midlothian) (SNP)
I rise to speak in support of the amendments in the name of my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) and myself. As other Members have said, there is a degree of consistency across a number of the amendments on the selection paper.
I welcome the action to enhance transnational co-operation. For once, instead of measures that seek to breach international agreements or upset international partners, this is a step in the right direction and a move that I hope we will see reflected in other bits of legislation that the Government bring forward.
I wish that this Bill was not necessary, but, having left the European framework, it is essential that we make alternative arrangements to ensure that the three Hague conventions still apply, to prevent Scottish businesses and families from being disadvantaged. The conventions add legal certainty for parties to cross-border commercial contracts, and they help with family maintenance decisions across borders and the protection of children in disputes where parents have separated but live in different countries. These conventions may be technical, but they are very practical for those caught in difficult and tangled situations. There is therefore a clear need to replace the previous mechanisms whereby the EU reached agreements on these types of cross-border disputes on behalf of member states.
Aspects of this legislation fall within the devolved competencies, forming parts of Scots private law relating to choice of jurisdiction, recognition of judgments and enforcement of decisions. The Bill, if passed, will provide reassurances, in particular, to those affected by cross-border family support and custodial mechanisms, so we are keen to see that move forward. The Scottish Government have considered the aspects that require a legislative consent motion under section 28 of the Scotland Act 1998 and will seek consent from the Scottish Parliament to allow agreement to the Bill. The Bill has been drafted with great respect for devolution and, again, I very much welcome that. It is the proper and democratic way to proceed. It is a great pity that that is not always the case with this Government, but certainly it is very much to be welcomed in this case.
I speak in favour of the amendments proposed by myself and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West. I pay tribute and give thanks to the Law Society of Scotland, which has supported us in the drafting of them. Amendment 10 has a particular focus on the Lugano convention, and the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill) has already told us of the significance of the need to put the mechanism in place and of having it on the face of the Bill. Given the Government’s confirmation that they are intent on continuing with the convention, putting it on the face of the Bill would be a proper and appropriate way of doing that. The convention created common rules across the EU and EFTA, avoiding multiple court cases taking place on the same subject and saving the costs of all those involved. I welcome the steps taken.
The regrettable decision not to be part of the single market may yet come back to hit us. However, we are where we are, and if the UK joining the convention in its own right is accepted by 31 December, we will need to work quickly to introduce a simple mechanism to implement the convention. That is what the amendment from me and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West seeks to achieve, and I argue that the Government should amend the Bill to provide for a regulation-making power focused specifically on the implementation of the Lugano convention. That point is not being made just by Scottish National party Members; it is reflected on all sides of the House. That, in itself, speaks volumes.
It is important to note that that move would not preclude us from reinstating the previous regulation-making powers under clause 2 that were removed from the Bill during its passage in the other place. As was said earlier, that debate raised legitimate concerns about the lack of parliamentary scrutiny of delegated legislation, and I strongly suggest that the Government strongly reflect on that when seeking to reintroduce those powers.
The Bill fulfils a commitment in the political declaration between the UK and the EU, and I recognise that. I certainly welcome the fact that in this situation at least the Government appear to be looking to keep their promise and to keep private international law clear after the transition. As a proud internationalist, I welcome any measures that will continue to help to support and facilitate cross-border co-operation.
Mr David Lammy (Tottenham) (Lab)
On Second Reading, the official Opposition made it clear that they would oppose any attempts by the Government to reintroduce clause 2, which was removed by a majority in the other place. On Second Reading, numerous Members on both the Opposition and Government Benches made very sensible suggestions on how the Government could modify clause 2 and harness cross-party support. Sunset clauses, placing Lugano on the face of the Bill, as has been suggested by Members across the House this afternoon, and limiting the power of clause 2 were all among the suggestions discussed. Very sadly, the Government did not listen. That is surprising, particularly for this Minister, who is known to be attentive and a very able lawyer indeed.
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)
It was a great pleasure to listen to the powerful advocacy of the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy). Unfortunately, on this occasion, I am unable to agree with him, but out of courtesy to him I will explain why.
It is a real pleasure to address the Committee of the Whole House on a Bill which, while technical, is of great importance. Private international law is not just an arcane and abstract legal construct. As my hon. Friends the Members for Broadland (Jerome Mayhew), for Derbyshire Dales (Miss Dines) and for Aylesbury (Rob Butler), among others, have indicated, it is a very real framework for the dispute resolution of cross-border civil and family justice matters that affect families and businesses in our country. Indeed, the hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) made the point that every time we enter into one of these agreements we strengthen the international rules-based order. That is a point we should not lose sight of either.
I am very grateful for the quality of the debate that we have witnessed today, as well as on Second Reading. It has been, if I may say in all sincerity, a debate of conspicuous clarity and ability. I really do appreciate the interest that has been shown in these important matters. I thank colleagues from across the Committee for the time they have taken to prepare the amendments and for the explanations that they have provided. Even where the Government take a different view—which, as I say, I will come on to explain—I recognise that these are serious amendments that have been tabled in good faith in an endeavour to improve the legislation.
Let me begin, if I may, by turning to amendments 5 and 6, new clause 5, new schedule 4 and amendment 7. Taken together, these amendments, in effect, restore the implementing power that was deleted in the other place and reverse the consequential amendments that flow from their deletion. The ability to be able to implement PIL agreements in a timely and effective manner is important. One of the things that really shone out from the excellent contributions that we heard was the word “agility”, which was used by my hon. Friend the Member for Derbyshire Dales in referring to the context of family agreements, and by my hon. Friend the Member for Broadland and, indeed, by my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) in talking about the Singapore mediation agreement. That agility is important. It is what allows the UK to be a credible negotiating counterparty, so that if British Ministers agree a PIL agreement—which, incidentally, strengthens the international rules-based order—it can be brought into effect in an agile way.
If indeed, as we all appear to accept, such agreements are good for citizens and businesses, we want to make sure that there is no undue delay in rolling out those benefits. There is a public interest in ensuring that implementation and scrutiny mechanisms are proportionate—again, a word that shone out from the contributions we have heard—in striking the important balance between timely implementation and appropriate scrutiny. If I may make one point about the contribution by the right hon. Member for Tottenham, I think it is fair to say that he did not dwell particularly on the scrutiny procedures that are in place. I will develop that a little bit, and I hope that will put his mind at rest. I do not suppose that I will be able to get him to join us on the Government Benches, but I live in hope.
The provisions are necessary and proportionate because the agreements are recognised across the House as manifestly in the public interest. If I may say respectfully to my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly), one of the principal points he made actually, I suggest, undermined his argument. He said, “These are very rarely party political.” The right hon. Member for Tottenham said, “I don’t recall it being vaguely contentious.” He is absolutely right. These agreements are not contentious.
Indeed, if we look at the previous Lugano convention in 2007, or at the previous Hague conventions, which we are introducing under clause 1, nobody ever prayed against them. Equally, on the old Lugano convention—the 1988 one, which preceded the 2007 one—I think only three of their lordships spoke in the other place, there were no amendments and nothing was said here. We must ask ourselves: if my hon. Friends accept that this is non-contentious, why go for what might be perceived to be the disproportionate step?
Mr Djanogly
I intervene only because the Minister suggested that I said something. I may have said that this is not party political, but that does not mean to say that it is not important, complicated and potentially contentious—but not for party political reasons.
Alex Chalk
But ultimately, my hon. Friend cannot have it both ways. If we accept that it is not contentious, it is important that the mechanisms that are in place are proportionate to that. Indeed, the Opposition knew this when they were in government, because of course all these rule-making powers were on the statute book and they did not repeal them. There was the Administration of Justice Act 1920, the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972—I could go on. They stayed on the statute book because they are not really offensive to the constitutional balance that we enjoy, but not only were they not repealed; they were used.
The right hon. Member for Tottenham knows that because he was the Minister at the time. He was Minister at the Department for Constitutional Affairs when the British Government used the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 to bring into force an international agreement with who? With Israel. He knows that because he was the Minister at the time. Who was the Lord Chancellor at the time? Lord Falconer. The right hon. Gentleman cannot very well say that these are a monstrous and egregious affront to our constitution when they were used, because they were used a second time in 2007. They created a power to give effect to bilateral agreements with the United States on reciprocal enforcement of family maintenance orders.
Just to complete that point, not only were those powers used; the right hon. Gentleman, for whom I have enormous respect, created new ones of his own. In 2005—[Interruption.] He is laughing, but he knows it is true. He was the Bill Minister on the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which, incidentally, on this very rainy weekend I had a chance to re-read. That Act created a wide delegated power to introduce international agreements in that area.
I do not want to labour this point too much, but I had a chance to look at proceedings in Committee on that Bill, during which a Conservative hon. Member talked about that specific power and effectively asked the right hon. Gentleman, “Is he sure that he wants to do this?” He added:
“Those in another place get very excited about any sort of Henry VIII clause.”
The right hon. Gentleman responded, effectively, “Don’t worry,” saying that
“they are technical and necessary provisions.”––[Official Report, Mental Capacity Public Bill Committee, 4 November 2004; c. 406-407.]
Is not that precisely the point? What was technical and necessary when he was in government has now become an egregious affront to our constitution.
Alex Chalk
But the point is that when we were in the European Union and the European Union had competence to enter into PIL agreements, those would be brought into effect in the United Kingdom via the doctrine of direct effect. What role did this Parliament have? None. We are seeking to introduce much more by way of parliamentary scrutiny—the points, respectfully, that the right hon. Gentleman did not advert to. First, there is the CRaG procedure, and secondly there is the affirmative procedure.
I am at pains to mention that because I talked just a few moments ago about the Israeli agreement and the United States agreement. How did those come into force? Not through the affirmative procedure, not even through the negative procedure, but through an Order in Council. In other words, normal hon. Members—mere mortals like most of the people in the Chamber—had no say at all; just Privy Counsellors. We therefore respectfully say that it does not lie in the mouth of the Opposition to raise these concerns.
My hon. Friend the Member for Bishop Auckland (Dehenna Davison) made the point powerfully that this precedent, which the Opposition understood when they were in government, recognises that there is an opportunity cost. If we start filling up the parliamentary timetable with such legislation, which everyone accepts is not controversial, there is less time and less space for schools, hospitals and transport, etc.
On the point about criminal offences, which was made powerfully by the Chairman of the Select Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), this is an area where it is important to move cautiously. We will continue to reflect on the range of views expressed. I agree with him that an awful lot of offences are created by statutory instruments, but we need to take care, none the less.
Sir Robert Neill
I am grateful for the Minister’s observations in relation to criminal offences, and I will take him at his word as far as that is concerned. I know that he will want to take away, perhaps, how we deal with that proportionately.
The Minister refers to the value of the affirmative procedure, as is proposed. That, of course, is used when the PIL treaty first comes into force in our domestic law, but often these treaties or agreements can be modified as they go along. Can he help me with the concerns raised by the Bar Council and the Law Society about how the proposed scrutiny regime would deal with, for example, declarations that are attached to international agreements when we bring them into force? Such declarations can sometimes modify or limit their scope. Secondly, how will we deal with model laws, which are now often used in international trade negotiations?
Alex Chalk
If I may respectfully say so, that is an excellent point. That is one of the reasons why we seek to frame things this way, because one of the points my hon. Friend made most powerfully is that there are shortcomings in the Lugano convention. He talked about the Italian torpedo, but there are others, some of which Lord Mance referred to in the other place, for example.
How are we to be expected, in an agile and proportionate way, to address those changes, supposing they are negotiated, if we effectively have to have a new Act of Parliament each time? With respect, that would be wildly disproportionate. It would clog up this place unnecessarily, because there may be very good opportunities to improve those agreements and get them on to the statute book.
Let me deal with this business about Lugano, in amendments 1 to 4, 8 and 9, new clauses 1 and 2, new schedule 1, new schedule 3, new clause 5 and amendments (a) to (g). First, it is premature to put Lugano into the Bill while our application is outstanding, even if amendment 2 specifically includes reference to this being contingent on the UK’s accession. It is also inadequate—this is the point I was adverting to—as additional provisions will be required, mostly of a procedural or consequential nature, to properly implement to Lugano convention into domestic law.
For example, the civil procedure rules might need to be changed. What if Lugano is improved, as I indicated? What, also, if our application is unsuccessful? We may then need to move quickly. With whom will we want to move quickly? As my hon. Friend well knows, Norway, Iceland and Switzerland have published statements of support for our Lugano application, and that may be a route we would want to go down.
The most important point is that we have, and indeed should have, ambitions beyond Lugano. We must stay at the forefront of developments, whether the Singapore convention on mediation, as my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell) powerfully referred to, or the Hague convention on recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in civil or commercial matters, also known as Hague ’19.
I advert to the fact that the Bill properly complies with the devolution settlement. We take that extremely seriously. As the hon. Member for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) indicated, both the Scottish Parliament and the Northern Ireland Assembly have passed legislative consent motions for the Bill, and the Welsh Government have agreed that an LCM is not required as PIL is almost entirely reserved. There is a small exclusion for Cafcass Cymru, but that is really it.
The right hon. Member for Tottenham spoke about the super-affirmative procedure, and I accept this amendment was submitted in the spirit of trying to be helpful. I entirely acknowledge that. These proposals are contained within paragraph 4 of new schedule 3, tabled by the Opposition, and there is a similar proposal in new schedule 2, although the SNP new schedule would introduce a super-affirmative scrutiny power only for Lugano. I respectfully make the point, and I appreciate that this is to the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), but why would we need a super-affirmative scrutiny power for Lugano, which we have been operating for years? That is not very obvious to me.
The bar for the super-affirmative scrutiny procedure has always been high. Let us look at the context. Section 85 of the Northern Ireland Act 1998 provides for a super-affirmative procedure for regulations that deal with changes to reserved matters as set out in that Act. The Human Rights Act 1998 provides for such a procedure for remedial orders that deal with legislation that has been found to be incompatible—declarations of incompatibility. Under the Public Bodies Act 2011, a super-affirmative procedure is needed for orders that abolish, merge or change the constitutional funding arrangements. I dealt with those quickly, but the point is that super-affirmative procedure is reserved for matters of key constitutional importance. We must not forget that in the case we are discussing, we have the additional CRaG brake.
If we drill into the detail of super-affirmative procedure, it creates additional stages, but I query whether it results in improvements to the proposed regulations. Instead, it simply delays. It would also create a potential discrepancy between England and Wales and the devolved jurisdictions. One could easily imagine a situation whereby two litigants lived five miles either side of the border and the cases were dealt with differently, to the disadvantage of a litigant in England, because the Scottish Parliament had got on with it and simply brought an agreement into force. That would be unsatisfactory. I do not suggest that that is what the right hon. Member for Tottenham intends, but I fear it could be a consequence.
New clauses 1, 6 and 7 deal with laying the report. New clause 6 would require a report to be laid in Parliament before the UK ratifies an agreement. New clause 7 would require the Government to lay a report in Parliament for 10 House of Commons sitting days before a draft statutory instrument was laid. I accept the need for clear and detailed explanations, but it is not immediately obvious that new clause 7 would add anything to the current process. All SIs are already accompanied by an explanatory memorandum. I dug one out to prepare for the debate. It deals with the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Act 1982. It runs to 18 pages and is very detailed and helpful. Other than requiring the information 10 days earlier, I cannot see that new clause 7 would make a difference. We should not forget that an SI is typically laid several weeks before the House gets to debate it. None the less, I accept the point that my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst made about the need to reach out to distinguished practitioners and jurists. It is right that we should do that, and I am keen for that happen.
I am very grateful for the consideration of the Bill in Committee. I share the desire to ensure that PIL agreements that we wish to join and domestically implement are appropriately scrutinised. All Governments must balance the need for scrutiny with the need to move in a timely manner to ensure that British citizens can enjoy the benefits of PIL agreements as soon as it is properly possible to provide for them. Those benefits are significant, and if the House gets the balance wrong, our citizens will be denied them by an unnecessarily labyrinthine process.
The proposed procedures provide for scrutiny of a delegated power using an affirmative SI together with the CRaG procedure to implement the agreements. That is a balanced and proportionate approach.
Sir Robert Neill
Perhaps the Minister can help my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and me. I understand what the Minister is saying, and none of us wishes to create a labyrinthine process. Does he accept that it may be necessary to learn from experience with CRaG as we go forward? Are the Government closing their mind to the idea that we could seek refinements and improvements to the CRaG process as we operate it? The answer might help us.
Alex Chalk
I thank my hon. Friend for raising that point. There is no doubt that the CRaG process is evolving and maturing. Proper points have been made about the need to consider it and how it should evolve over time. I certainly do not want to shut my eyes or my ears to my hon. Friend’s proposals.
The Bill takes a balanced and proportionate approach. I therefore invite hon. Members to support the Government amendments and reject the remainder.
Mr Djanogly
The debate has been interesting and gone some way towards creating a more common understanding of the important issues at stake, the balance between efficient process and appropriate parliamentary scrutiny, and why, as I have argued, we need a more modern process of scrutiny for PIL treaties as much as for the ministerial orders that are derived from them.
Alex Chalk
I beg to move, That the Bill be now read the Third time.
Let me start by thanking all the right hon, hon. and , in particular, learned Members from all parts of the House for their careful scrutiny of the Bill at each stage of its passage. A variety of opinions have been expressed, and I value all the contributions made on these important issues. We have been fortunate, throughout the passage of this Bill, that the debates have been genuinely enriched by the experience and expertise of the speakers, both in this House and in the other place. One thing that has been raised time and again from all involved is an acknowledgement of the importance of private international law and the real-world impact it can have on our constituents.
I have to accept that historically that acknowledgement has not always been in place. A former Lord Chancellor, Lord Hailsham, who introduced a key piece of private international law legislation, the Civil Jurisdiction and Judgments Bill, into the House of Lords in 1981 opened the Second Reading debate by saying:
“I rather feel that it should be accompanied by a Government health warning. There is nothing whatever that I can do to make my speech short, and those who expect to find it of throbbing human interest will, I fear, be wholly disappointed.”—[Official Report, House of Lords, 3 December 1981; Vol. 425, c. 1126.]
But of course we know in this House that this is extremely important. Reciprocal private international law rules provide a framework to enable UK businesses, families and individuals to resolve their difficult and challenging situations. They help to avoid confusion for all parties, by preventing multiple court cases from taking place in different countries on the same subject and reaching potentially different conclusions. Such reciprocal rules also allow for the decisions of UK courts to be recognised and enforced across borders. All of this helps to reduce costs and anxiety for the parties involved. It is therefore vital that in future our country is able not only to continue to co-operate on private international law matters with existing partners, but to implement in our domestic law new agreements that are fit for the 21st century.
The Bill underpins our ambition to deliver real and tangible benefits for the United Kingdom—for our citizens—both now and in the years to come. I reassure Members on a point that I know they realise but that can never be emphasised enough: although private international law can support and underpin cross-border trade, the Bill is not about the implementation of free trade agreements. The terms on which trade between two countries takes place are clearly outside the scope of the Bill.
Over the next few years, we face the challenge of replacing and updating the UK’s private international law framework, recognising our regained competence in this area of law. Although we have not yet agreed, as between this House and the other place, on how best to scrutinise future agreements, I am now confident that there is an eagerness to do so effectively. That eagerness recognises the overwhelming public interest of such agreements.
More broadly, I am pleased that, whatever the outcome of ping-pong, we will have in place legislation that allows the UK to realise the future opportunities in this area of law. I think all parties in this House are agreed not only that we want the UK to remain at the forefront of delivering justice internationally and to ensure that our legal services sector continues to flourish, but that we want to ensure that we are at the forefront of the international rules-based order—we want to see it strengthened and we want to play our part.
I conclude simply by thanking all Members for their contributions. I commend the Bill to the House.
Mr Lammy
I join the Minister in thanking colleagues from all parties for their thoughtful contributions to this important debate. I especially thank the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), the hon. and learned Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry), and the hon. Members for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and for Midlothian (Owen Thompson) for their eminently reasonable suggestions on how the Bill could secure cross-party support.
On Second Reading, Labour made it clear that we supported the fundamental principle behind the Bill. The Opposition fully accept that as we leave the largest network of private international law agreements in the world, we must have a legislative framework in place to replace it. As we leave the European Union, we must protect our country’s proud reputation as the international forum of choice for the resolution of commercial and legal disputes.
We should also remember the human aspects of private international law. Helping parents separated by borders to come to custody agreements in the interests of their children is very important, as is allowing the safe return of a child who has been abducted. That is why the Opposition have always been fully supportive of the Government’s desire to implement the international treaties listed in clause 1, each of which has been fully scrutinised by this House and is being brought into domestic law by primary legislation. That is how the implementation of international agreements has always been done, and how we would like to see it done in future.
Unfortunately, we have seen during the Bill’s passage the Government’s desire to prise parliamentary scrutiny away from this House and these Benches. That is something we regret and something to which the other place will no doubt return in the debate ahead. Once again, we see a Government keen to do all they can to avoid proper democratic scrutiny—a Government more at ease with ruling by decree than daring to test the will of this House.
Sir Robert Neill
We have had a constructive set of debates on the Bill, and I pay tribute to all Members for the approach that has been adopted. I pay particular tribute to the skill and elan with which the Minister has steered the Bill through the House: he is a credit to our mutual profession. He is certainly no Henry VIII—and I say that in a good way—but of course he and I are both proud members of the Honourable Society of the Middle Temple. The nearest Tudor connection I can find is that the first Middle Templar to be Lord Chancellor was Lord, previously Sir, Richard Rich, for those who follow “A Man for All Seasons”. I am not sure whether that is a good sign, but I do not think that the Minister is a Richard in terms of personal integrity, since he was certainly one of the most successful Lord Chancellors but also one of the most corrupt. We have moved forward a great deal, and I suspect that the legacy still entertains us in Middle Temple with the wine cellar.
The Minister has done a great job on the Bill, and I hope he will reflect on some of the comments made, none of which were aimed to obstruct or make life difficult for the Government, because we all share the objective. I welcome the tone adopted throughout by the shadow Secretary of State, the right hon. Member for Tottenham (Mr Lammy), and those on the SNP Front Bench. It is important for the country’s sake that we get this right.
It has been rightly observed that this is not just about dry technical law. When I went to the London School of Economics in the ’70s, it had an international law module, which most of us avoided. It had just introduced a European law module, and somebody said, “There’ll never be much work around that,” which shows how things can be got wrong. As we exit a period of 40 or more years during which EU law has been an increasingly important part of our domestic and international legal systems, it is all the more important that we have a proper means of getting private international law agreements on a sound footing. I think we all share the Government’s objective in that.
I suspect that this may not be the last we hear of the Bill, either in the other place or here. I hope we will find a constructive way forward that meets some of the concerns raised in the other place about how scrutiny is dealt with. I welcome the Minister’s longer-term commitment to look at those issues. I hope he will take away the criminal sanctions aspect in particular, and the need to look at how CRaG operates.
May I give the Minister a further reading list, so to speak? As well as the Mental Capacity Act 2005 and the other things for a wet Friday, perhaps he could look at the Law Society and Bar Council briefings on how we deal with the two issues that I flagged briefly in Committee in relation to our having a proportionate and effective means of scrutinising the declarations that are frequently attached to international legal agreements. International agreements are often adopted by country with a declaration that modifies or limits the extent of its application to varying degrees. The Bill provides for the affirmative procedure for the initial adherence to the treaties, but it might not, as far as we can see at the moment, cover how we would properly scrutinise the declarations, which could have a significant impact.
An example of that, if the Minister wants it, is that we are committed to seeking to join in our own right the Hague choice of court convention 2005, which is an important document. When we joined it as part of the EU, the EU opted to exclude insurance contracts from that agreement. The provisions that we made following the withdrawal agreement and the memorandum on delegated powers that accompanies this Bill suggest that we will continue to exclude insurance contracts from it.
We need to think about why that is and how we will deal with scrutiny of changes to that, because the potential effect of that is to deprive court judgments based on excluded contracts of the right to be enforced by the 2005 convention when we hopefully sign up to it. That would leave a considerable gap in a very important sector of the British economy. Insurance and reinsurance markets are of real significance to the financial world, and we need to have a means of adjusting the position if that is required and taking on board those concerns. That is precisely the area where it is suggested that we should be talking to the experts in not only private international law but the insurance sector. I have already declared my interests in relation to these matters, but it is important that we take that as an example.
A similar issue arises in relation to how we will deal with model laws. Model laws are not international conventions that impose rights and duties between contracting states, but they are what are sometimes termed agreed soft law provisions, which are often modified substantially before they are given effect in domestic law. They are important, none the less, and they are a growing area of activity, so I hope the Minister can think about the mechanism that we have to ensure that they are properly scrutinised, as well as being brought in timeously. I flag those up as examples of what we need to do. It is certainly important that we do not just stop at joining Lugano. Whether it is on the face of the Bill or not, I know that the Minister and the Government are committed to joining it, and that is an important first step, but as we all know, there are other conventions that it is most important we seek to join, some of which have already been mentioned. I hope that we will push on swiftly, for example, to implement and ratify the 1997, 2005 and 2007 Hague conventions, because between them they would provide a suite of the vital civil and family law co-operation measures that we want to see continue after the transition period.
Of course, we also hope that the Government will ratify and implement in England and Wales the 2000 Hague convention on the international protection of adults. It has already been brought into force in Scotland but not in England and Wales, and it seems bizarre that a vulnerable adult could be treated differently if they were in Gloucester as opposed to Glasgow. That implementation would, for example, enable us to deal with important issues relating to vulnerable adults such as people who are subject to powers of attorney or who are under the jurisdiction of the Court of Protection and who might have overseas assets or overseas properties. Not having continuity of legal recognition of the judgments and contracts that are entered into could make it difficult to deal with those persons’ affairs.
These are techie issues, but they affect real lives, so the technical is not insignificant or without a human dimension. I hope that, as we go forward on a constructive basis, we can ensure that, having decided to leave the EU and branch out into broader areas of economic activity, the Government will make a concerted effort, as both the Law Society and the Bar Council have called for, to take a lead in selling, maintaining and building on the UK’s position as a jurisdiction of choice. Tens of thousands of jobs depend on it, as does billions of pounds-worth of economic activity, and it is in our fundamental national, strategic, economic interest to do this. With this Bill on the statute book, I hope that that is the most important thing the Government take forward as a matter of high policy in our negotiations to, hopefully, exit the EU with a deal, and in future free trade agreements.
So far, it has been tough to get free trade agreements to deal with services, and legal services in particular, but we have a potentially strong asset in our legal system and in the integrity and standing of our judiciary, which we should never pillory. No politician should ever knock lawyers for the sake of it, because ultimately, respect for the integrity of the system is fundamental. I know that the Minister and the Lord Chancellor share that view, and I hope that the Bill will give us an opportunity to build strongly on that.
Owen Thompson
I too welcome the contributions of all hon. and right hon. colleagues today and throughout the Bill’s previous stages. I am deeply disappointed that the amendments in the names of myself and my hon. and learned Friend the Member for Edinburgh South West (Joanna Cherry) were not supported by the Government, but I will try not to take it personally. However, we will always continue to try to do what we can to make the Government’s laws better than when they were presented. I also find myself, not for the first time, in the slightly strange position of agreeing with the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill).
This is a largely technical Bill, but it will have important consequences for many businesses and individuals. We only have to consider the impact on an individual family, and the extra hassle they might have to go through, if we were unable to get a replacement or an agreement to continue with the Lugano convention. We cannot underestimate the impact on people if these things are not got right, so every effort needs to be made, regardless of whether it is on the face of the Bill. Obviously we will need to see what comes forward. I heard the Minister say that we should now move to replace and update the legislation on other conventions, and I would certainly encourage following the precedent set through this Bill’s process in working across the Chamber and in respecting the devolution settlement and the rule of international law.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
Let me add my gratitude to everyone who has spoken in this debate. It has been a very good debate, and I am sure that we have all learned a lot from it. I congratulate the Minister on what he has been able to do. What amazes me is that he has been able to get through the Bill without once using my skills as a mediator. That must be to his great credit.
We have here something that is in the interests of the country and that gives us a new tool in the box. From a personal point of view, I look forward to the Singapore mediation convention being signed and ratified by this country as quickly as possible. I even volunteer to sit on the statutory instrument Committee in order to do that.
Question put and agreed to.
Bill accordingly read the Third time and passed, with amendments.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [HL]
Thursday 19th November 2020
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-I Marshalled list of motions and amendments for Consideration of Commons amendments - (17 Nov 2020)
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1, and do propose Amendments 1A and 1B as amendments thereto—
“Implementation of other agreements on private international law
(1) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, implementing any international agreement, as it has effect from time to time, so far as relating to private international law (a “relevant international agreement”).
(2) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom.
(3) The appropriate national authority may make regulations for the purpose of, or in connection with, giving effect to any arrangements made between—
(a) Her Majesty’s government in the United Kingdom, and
(b) the government of a relevant territory,
for applying a relevant international agreement, with or without modifications, as between the United Kingdom, or a jurisdiction within the United Kingdom, and that territory.
(4) Regulations under this section may make—
(a) consequential, supplementary, incidental, transitional or saving provision;
(b) different provision for different purposes or for different parts of the United Kingdom.
(5) Regulations under this section may include provision about—
(a) enforcement of obligations arising under or by virtue of the regulations;
(b) sharing of information;
(c) legal aid.
(6) Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)) makes further provision about regulations under this section.
(7) In this section—
“appropriate national authority” means—
(a) in relation to England and Wales, the Secretary of State;
(b) in relation to Scotland—
(i) the Scottish Ministers, or
(ii) the Secretary of State acting with the consent of the Scottish Ministers;
(c) in relation to Northern Ireland—
(i) a Northern Ireland department, or
(ii) the Secretary of State acting with the consent of a Northern Ireland department
“international agreement” means a convention, treaty or other agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party; “private international law” includes rules and other provisions about—
(a) jurisdiction and applicable law;
(b) recognition and enforcement in one country or territory of any of the following that originate in another country or territory—
(i) a judgment, order or arbitral award;
(ii) an agreement, decision or authentic instrument determining or otherwise relating to rights and obligations;
(c) co-operation between judicial or other authorities in different countries or territories in relation to—
(i) service of documents, taking of evidence and other procedures, or
(ii) anything within paragraph (a) or (b);
“relevant international agreement” has the meaning given in subsection (1);
“relevant territory” means—
(a) the Isle of Man;
(b) any of the Channel Islands;
(c) a British overseas territory.
(8) This section and Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)) have effect, with the following modifications, in relation to a model law adopted by an international organisation of which the United Kingdom is a member as it has effect in relation to an international agreement to which the United Kingdom is, or is expected to become, a party.
The modifications are—
(a) a reference in this section or that Schedule to implementing or applying a relevant international agreement is to be read as a reference to giving effect to the model law (with or without modifications);
(b) subsection (1) is to be read as if the words “as revised from time to time” were substituted for the words “as it has effect from time to time”.”
“(3A) Regulations under subsections (1) to (3) may only be made during the operative period.
(3B) The operative period is the period of five years beginning with the day on which this Act is passed.
(3C) The appropriate national authority in relation to a part of the United Kingdom may by regulations extend the operative period for that part of the United Kingdom by a period of five years.
(3D) The power under subsection (3C) may be exercised more than once.
(3E) The operative period may not be extended for any part of the United Kingdom after it has expired in relation to that part of the United Kingdom.”
The Advocate-General for Scotland (Lord Stewart of Dirleton) (Con)
My Lords, I will speak to Commons Amendments 1 to 5 and Amendments 1A, 1B and 4A to 4E, which are in my name.
Private international law is a technical area of law, but it is important to people and businesses that become involved in legal disputes with a cross-border aspect. A family may need to enforce a maintenance decision when one parent moves abroad, or a small business that has been left out of pocket by a foreign supplier may need to seek redress. Agreements on private international law create reciprocal rules to enable UK businesses, families and individuals to resolve these difficult and challenging situations. They prevent multiple court cases taking place in different countries and allow for the decisions of UK courts to be recognised and enforced across borders. All of this helps to reduce costs and anxiety for the parties involved.
The House will recall that this Bill contains two substantive clauses. The first implements three key Hague conventions which currently apply as a consequence of our former membership of the European Union, allowing us to continue to co-operate on important aspects of private international law with existing partners. The second establishes a delegated power to implement further agreements on private international law now that we have regained full competence in this area from the European Union. This stood part of the Bill on its Lords introduction but was removed on Report. Commons Amendments 1, 2, 4 and 5 simply return this clause, and related provisions, to the Bill.
There is also Commons Amendment 3, which I hope will be uncontroversial and will not address in detail. It adds a permissive extent clause to the Bill allowing the implementing power to be extended to the Isle of Man; this is at the request of the Isle of Man Government. This is the standard approach to extending UK legislation to the overseas territories or Crown dependencies and in this case does not directly affect the United Kingdom. My noble and learned friend Lord Keen spoke in detail on this amendment back in May but was unable to move the amendment at the time.
The agreements implemented under Clause 1 are widely supported by interested parties in the legal and finance sectors, and indeed by Members in this House and the other place. The 1996 Hague Convention aims to improve the protection of children in cross-border disputes. It deals with issues such as residence of and contact with children whose parents live in different countries. The 2005 Hague Convention on Choice of Court Agreements aims to ensure the effectiveness of exclusive choice of court agreements between parties to international commercial transactions. The 2007 Hague Convention provides rules for the international recovery of child support and spousal maintenance. The Government have already taken the necessary international steps to ensure our continued membership of these agreements following the end of the transition period.
It is vital that the UK’s membership of these agreements continues seamlessly from the end of the transition period. This means that Clause 1 needs to be in force within a few weeks. Although the implementation of the Hague conventions contained in Clause 1 is agreed and not subject to further amendments, the timing aspect creates an imperative for us to agree a way forward on the delegated power promptly.
Before I address the amendments, I will clarify the types of agreements that can be implemented under the delegated power. The power only covers the implementation of international agreements on a very narrowly defined area of law: agreements which are typically uncontroversial and have received widespread support in Parliament in the past. The Bill only allows implementation of private international law agreements which it defines in subsection (7) of the relevant clause. Principally, such agreements cover rules on jurisdiction to hear disputes which raise cross-border issues; which country’s law should apply to such cases; recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments; and co-operation between judicial and other authorities in different countries on these matters. It will not be possible for matters outside the areas covered by the definition of “private international law” in the clause to be implemented using the power.
I know that, in the past, debate on this Bill has touched on topics such as the Hague-Visby Rules, or the 1961 Warsaw Convention on the carriage of goods by air. Let me be clear: these conventions—bar possibly one or two provisions—are out of scope of the power, and if the UK joined these conventions today they would still need to be implemented by primary legislation. This Bill is only concerned with implementing provisions on private international law, not any international agreements on private law matters generally.
Bearing that point in mind, I turn to the amendments. This House has already discussed the delegated power at length and made its views known. However, the clause comes back from the other place with a majority of 149, so, despite the reservations many of your Lordships have and have expressed, I believe we need to accept that such a clause has a place in the Bill and think about how to make it more acceptable to this House. The amended clause will still allow private international law agreements to be implemented promptly. This is important because, following the end of the transition period, there is a need to update the United Kingdom’s private international law framework. The Government have already made clear their intention to join the Lugano Convention. This power minimises any gap in its application if we are able to rejoin that convention and allows us to respond flexibly if we are not.
Implementation of these narrow and technical private international law agreements is largely about drawing down into domestic law detailed rules that have already been agreed at an international level. There is very limited ability for Ministers to deviate from these once the UK agrees to become bound by the relevant agreement. The rules in the agreement will not be amendable, and implementation will often largely be a yes or no question, coupled with making provisions largely of a procedural or technical nature, making the affirmative statutory instrument procedure appropriate. There are well-established precedents for implementing agreements which meet our definition of private international law by secondary legislation. It is not just that much of our current private international law framework was implemented under the powers of the European Communities Act. Even before that, there were many examples of agreements of this type being implemented through secondary legislation. The most notable of these is the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933.
Without this power, each new private international law agreement or update to an existing agreement would require primary legislation. Given the need to update our private international law framework and the current busy parliamentary agenda, such a requirement would be disproportionate and damaging. The intellectual arguments about the extent to which the implementation of international agreements by secondary legislation is constitutionally appropriate are important, but the other House recognised that those arguments are not the beginning and end of this debate. We must remember that these agreements can have a real impact on the lives of the general public, and delays in implementing them and reaping their benefits could negatively impact UK businesses and families. It is my view that the power provides a proportionate solution to an important problem, while retaining a far greater role for Parliament in the scrutiny process than it has had for many years.
All that said, I recognise the many and varied concerns that have previously been raised about this power. Opinions are sincerely held and there is merit to many of the points which have been made. I have sought to familiarise myself with the views your Lordships expressed in the Chamber during earlier debates, and I have listened closely to concerns expressed by noble Lords in engagement with myself and ministerial colleagues in recent weeks. The amendments in my name are a good-faith attempt to find a way forward. Indeed, the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, described the suite of amendments that I have put before this House as “substantial and constructive”. They attempt to strike a balance, sensitive to the aims of the Government and the concerns of your Lordships’ House.
First, Amendment 4A removes from the power the ability to create criminal offences which are punishable by imprisonment. In my analysis of the debates on this Bill, it is clear that this aspect of the power has been the most widely criticised. I certainly see that this is a sensitive issue, and it is right that the Government act cautiously. Although private international law agreements do not generally require contracting parties to create criminal offences, there are exceptions. Some conventions include non-discrimination clauses that require states to apply the same enforcement methods for foreign judgments as are available in domestic cases.
The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)
The question is that the House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 1 and do propose Amendments 1A and 1B as amendments thereto. On Amendment 1C, I call the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton.
Amendment 1C (as an amendment to Amendment 1A)
Lord Falconer of Thoroton
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
My Lords, I move my Amendment 1C as an amendment to Amendment 1A. It would leave out subsection (3D) of the Government’s proposed amendment. Leaving out the subsection would mean that the power to extend the sunset period could be exercised only once.
I start by welcoming the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton. Throughout the process of this Bill, he has been very engaged, incredibly helpful, very courteous and really engaged in the detail, and we are all incredibly grateful for that. I also compliment him on the presentation he has just made, which was persuasive and clear and addressed all the issues. So I really am glad to see him there and I completely support him—as indeed does the whole House—in relation to the bringing into UK domestic law and ratifying the three treaties referred to, and which remain referred to, in Clause 1 of the Bill.
I remain disappointed and believe it to be very much the wrong policy to give the Government the power to introduce private international law treaties by secondary legislation, as in the amendment introduced by the Commons to the Bill that was sent from the Lords. There was an almost universal view in this House when it was last here that that should not be dealt with by secondary legislation, because it would reduce the quality of private international law agreements that were given the force of law by legislation. The question of whether it was legitimate to do it by secondary legislation was considered after the consideration of evidence, both by the Constitution Committee of this House—and I am glad to see the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, here as a distinguished member of the Constitution Committee—and the Delegated Powers Committee of this House as well. Both considered, in detail, evidence put before by them by the Ministry of Justice and rejected the suggestion that secondary legislation was the appropriate way to deal with such treaties.
I did not find the reasons given by the noble and learned Lord convincing. But he, like his distinguished predecessor, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, did not really engage on the issue of why to use secondary rather than primary legislation. He asserted that secondary legislation had been used in the past, and, like his predecessor, referred to the 1933 and 1920 Acts. What he was referring to was bringing into force the provisions on enforcement of judgments in those two Acts in relation to individual territories or countries. All that happens by that secondary legislation is that additional countries are added, whether they be Commonwealth countries for the 1920 Act, or non-Commonwealth countries for the 1933 Act. I would not have any objections whatever to something like that. But that is not the power taken in this Bill; it is the whole of the private international law agreement. It would not just be the addition of countries; it would be the whole Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 in the examples that have been given. That will lead to this country having a worse network of private international law agreements than it has had previously. That is bad for this country, because one of the things we are incredibly good at is private international law. That is what makes English law so attractive to commercial institutions. I am disappointed that no real additional arguments have been advanced.
I accept the political reality here; this House has almost universally asked the other place to think again, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, is right to point out that it had the opportunity to think again and decided to go ahead. We have to accept that in a case such as this.
In relation to the sunset clause, these agreements take a long time to negotiate and introduce—with the possible exception of us adhering to Lugano, because that may have to be done in a hurry, so I can see that there is a case there. I am interested that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, has said that if one had Hague-Visby or Warsaw, that would not be covered by this Bill and would, therefore, have to be introduced by primary legislation. I am not sure, then, under what circumstances this is ever going to apply in substance, because the nature of these private international agreements is that they will have provisions about jurisdiction and enforcement as well as about substantive law—Hague-Visby and the Warsaw convention.
Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames (LD)
My Lords, I add my welcome of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, to his place in taking over this technical but difficult Bill, one that raises issues of principle.
I welcome the government amendments, which have the power to act as safeguards on the power reinserted into the Bill by the Commons amendments. I agree with the summary by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, of the Government’s amendments as sensible and constructive. But I share the disappointment of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, that the Commons amendments reinstate the delegated power that this House so comprehensively rejected.
I also agree with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, that outlawing the power to create offences punishable by imprisonment is of particular importance. I welcome the fact that the principle of a sunset clause has been accepted, although, for all the reasons mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, it should be meaningful and not liable to be endlessly renewed. It is also important that the Government have introduced a requirement for consultation before regulations are made. On that, in particular, I am grateful to the noble and learned Lord for the time he and the Bill team have spent with me and others discussing the government amendments to the Commons amendments and considering suggested changes.
For my part, I support the amendment on the sunset clause in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, for all the reasons he gave. I understand the Government’s concern to ensure that there is sufficient time to bring new private international law agreements into UK law, and I accept that there may possibly, on occasion, be a need for more than five years to achieve that. However, I simply cannot see the need for further extensions beyond 10 years. It is in the nature of these international agreements that they take a long time to be finalised. However, the point about the first five years is that there are a number of international agreements, notably the Lugano Convention 2007, to which the Government wish to accede, which may need to be brought into law in the reasonably short term, and there are others on the horizon that may need more than five years. The problem with allowing for extensions beyond 10 years—that is, more than one extension—is that such a long sunset period may involve permitting the Government to implement in the UK international agreements that are currently unforeseen and unforeseeable. It was partly to address that issue that this House took the view that primary legislation should be required before implementing such agreements in domestic law.
I appreciate that this issue is addressed, in part at least, by the requirement for consultation before regulations are made implementing further private international law agreements. That requirement is, indeed, a welcome safeguard. My amendment to government Amendment 4B is designed to ensure that such consultations are both objective and impartial and seen to be so. The shortcoming of the present proposal is that the choice of those to be consulted lies entirely, in England and Wales, with the Secretary of State and, in Scotland and Northern Ireland, with Scottish Ministers, the relevant Northern Ireland department or the Secretary of State acting with their consent. That means that the power to choose who is to be consulted lies entirely with the Executive.
Of course, we accept that many Ministers can be confidently relied on to exercise that power dispassionately, but that confidence cannot always be assumed, and it has not always been justified by Secretaries of State. The change in the role of the Lord Chancellor may also have had an impact. I understand the Government’s concern to ensure that there is flexibility in the choice of those to be consulted. It goes without saying that, for example, a convention concerned with family law matters may call for different experts to be consulted than would a convention concerned with commercial law or contractual matters. That is why my amendment does not seek to impose on the Secretary of State a list of those who must be consulted. It lies behind what the noble and learned Lord said about the Government’s reasons for not setting out such a list, but I and others are also concerned to ensure not only that the choice of those to be consulted is clearly objective, impartial and apolitical but that the organisation, management and follow-up of the consultations are thorough and meaningful.
Accordingly, I understood the noble and learned Lord to be offering, on behalf of the Government, assurances to the House in that connection. I invite him to confirm, first, that consultation on the implementation of a private international law agreement will generally be in public, and that the Government will announce their intention to consult and invite people to offer their views. Secondly, will he confirm that if the Government decide that such a consultation will not be in public they will publicly explain that decision and the reasons behind it? Thirdly, will he confirm that the Government will report on the outcome of such consultations, if not in a separate report, then, as he envisaged, in or in a document accompanying the Explanatory Memorandum that comes with any proposed regulations made under the powers in the Bill? Finally, I understood the Minister to be offering an undertaking, which I ask him to confirm, to ensure that the explanations in or accompanying such explanatory memoranda will be thorough and detailed, setting out whom the Government have consulted and a fair and balanced summary of the views expressed in any such consultation.
Such assurances and undertakings, if confirmed in the terms I have set out, would offer reassurance to those of us who are concerned that all such consultations will be the genuine safeguards we need them to be. I beg to move.
The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)
The following Members in the Chamber have indicated that they wish to speak: the noble Lords, Lord Pannick and Lord Berkeley. I therefore call the noble Lord, Lord Pannick.
Lord Pannick (CB)
My Lords, I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, in welcoming the Advocate-General for Scotland, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart, to his post. I thank him and the Minister in the Commons, Alex Chalk, and their officials for taking the time to discuss with me and many other Members of this House our concerns, the House’s concerns and the concerns of the Constitution Committee about the delegated powers in the Bill and how those concerns can be accommodated by amendments. The noble and learned Lord has taken a very welcome constructive approach to these issues and I thank him sincerely for that. He has tabled amendments that go a significant way, in my view, to meeting those concerns.
Like the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, and the noble Lord, Lord Marks, I would have liked, ideally, to see greater restrictions on the use of delegated powers in this context, but the theme tune that often—not always, but often—accompanies Lords’ consideration of Commons amendments is the Rolling Stones song “You Can’t Always Get What You Want”, and since we will not get exactly what we want today, the next best thing is for the Minister to assure noble Lords of the Government’s intentions in this context. Again, he has very helpfully gone a long way to do that this afternoon. I ask him to confirm my understanding on three topics that are raised by paragraph 1A, on consultation, as introduced by government Amendment 4B.
The first of these topics is the purpose of the consultation. There is a mandatory obligation to consult. It is not a discretion; there is a duty to consult. The amendment does not expressly say what the purpose is, but does the Minister agree that it is implicit that one of the purposes of the consultation will be to assist the Secretary of State in deciding whether it is appropriate to implement a particular international agreement by regulations, or whether primary legislation is needed?
Can the Minister confirm that the Government recognise that some international agreements, even when they are in the scope of this Bill, as explained by the Minister, may require changes that are so significant that it would not be appropriate to implement the international agreement other than by primary legislation? I suppose, also, the consultation might assist on whether the international agreement would alter substantive law, albeit incidentally, which I understood the Minister to accept would not be an appropriate subject for delegated legislation. That is the first matter: the purpose of consultation.
Lord Berkeley (Lab)
My Lords, I am grateful to be able to participate in this debate. I join other noble Lords in welcoming the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart. I am grateful for the time he spent with me and the Commons Minister Alex Chalk MP discussing what I am about to talk about. I also congratulate my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer of Thoroton on his birthday today.
My interest is in something called the Luxembourg Rail Protocol, which we have all agreed is an item of private international law. The protocol is sponsored, along with the Cape Town convention, by the organisation UNIDROIT—I hope I have the right pronunciation. The UK is a full member of this organisation. The purpose of this rail protocol is very similar to a successful one that has existed for the air sector for many years. It is to do with moveable equipment: the financing, recognition, protection and enforcement of creditor rights in relation to equipment that can move. I spoke briefly about this in Committee on the Trade Bill, which I shall return to, but obviously, if investors want to financially support equipment that can be moved anywhere around the world, they want to have some comfort that they know where it is and will get their due money back or whatever.
I recall, from my experience in the railway industry about 20 or 30 years ago, that there was a time when rail wagons got as far as Italy and sometimes never came back. It is not like that today, but it might be like that in other parts of the world. It is really important for UK businesses—not only those that operate or own the relevant bits of equipment but also the export business that will come. I am advised that this needs to be done before the end of the year to provide continuity.
There has been quite a lot of debate here—and in our discussions with Ministers—as to whether this needs primary or secondary legislation. Other noble Lords with much greater experience than I have been discussing it this afternoon. I originally put down an amendment in Committee on the Trade Bill, and the Minister, the noble Viscount, Lord Younger, said he was very supportive of fitting the Luxembourg Rail Protocol into UK law, but thought that the Trade Bill was not really the right place for it. He said it would be much better if it were done as a statutory instrument under the scope of this Bill, assuming that the text of this Bill allows it to happen. I know that there have been planned discussions between Ministers here and Ministers in the Department for Transport, because obviously they will have to promote some secondary legislation, but the important thing now is for the Minister, when he comes to wind up, to give the strongest assurance that the Government are empowered under this Bill—or Act, as it will be—to adopt the Luxembourg Rail Protocol through secondary legislation, and that he will do all he can to encourage the Department for Transport to get this moving so that we have a statutory instrument by the end of the year. I know there is a big queue of legislation, but it would be really good if that could happen. Given that so many Ministers have said to me that they want this to happen and that it is good for businesses—I have not heard anyone saying that it should not happen—I hope that the Minister will be able to give me the strongest assurance that he can.
The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)
Does anybody else in the Chamber wish to speak? I call the noble Lord, Lord Mance.
Lord Mance (CB) [V]
My Lords, I declare an interest as a practitioner in the field of private international law and as joint chair of the Lord Chancellor’s advisory committee on private international law, to which reference has been made. I do not, of course, speak in that capacity and, as I mentioned on a previous occasion, that committee was not consulted about this Bill before its original introduction, although we have been very happy to be involved subsequently in relation to machinery under and related to the Bill.
I too welcome the Minister to his place and possibly, in succession to his predecessor the noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, to a co-chairing of that committee with me. I would of course welcome that very much. I particularly welcome his measured and very careful consideration of the issues raised by the Bill. Described as “technical”, it has happily and rightly also been described as “important”. It is promoted as part of the United Kingdom’s preparation for the post-Brexit era—I will come back to that. It will certainly introduce into the UK’s legal systems three identified and very valuable Hague conventions, which have been mentioned, including the choice of court convention of 2005. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said, what has been controversial is the provision for the introduction by delegated legislative regulations of any number of further private international law measures which might be agreed at international level during an indefinite future.
I hope that I shall not be thought ungrateful in what follows for the mercies which have been granted. Certainly, the amendment relating to offences and the removal of the delegated power to create criminal offences punishable by imprisonment is highly welcome. So too is the Government’s agreement to limit the operation of Clause 2 to an operative period of five years. However, that is renewable, as has been pointed out, so that is not as large a change as the House wished —and I think would still wish—to see. The five-year period is capable of being extended by regulations and, moreover, more than once. In that respect, I support what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, said.
If the Bill is addressing the post-Brexit era, let us truly hope that that at least will be well and truly past within 10 years. In any event, we should be under no illusion that any great volume of instruments is likely to require attention under the Bill. Again, I echo a point that the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, made. We know that the Government have, for better or worse, decided, if permitted by the European Union, to sign up to membership of the Lugano Convention 2007—that paler image of the present Brussels regime, which, as I previously remarked, is well accepted and understood, and popular in the City in particular. The signing up to the Lugano Convention 2007 will, as I have also pointed out, largely undo as regards EU states the potential benefits of signing up to the Hague choice of court convention 2005. That is because Lugano trumps the choice of court convention under the internal terms providing for their priority.
Apart from that, the 2019 Hague convention is a possibility which has been mentioned. It relates to recognition of judgments and one day, but certainly not soon, it may come into play as a possibility. At the moment it has no subscriptions of any significance at all. Then there is the Singapore mediation convention, previously much loved by government speakers here and in another place—but I am glad to see that, I think realistically, it was not mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart. Its significance in promoting the enforcement of agreements reached as a result of mediation is certainly commendable but hardly earth shattering, those agreements being in any case enforceable at common law.
Lord Thomas of Gresford (LD) [V]
My Lords, it is indeed a privilege to follow the magisterial and extensive exposition of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, whose depth of experience and knowledge I defer to. He referred to the Bill as an intruder, which was an interesting description.
The Second Reading took place on 17 March, just at the beginning of lockdown. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Keen of Elie, outlined the wide scope of the issues raised by the Bill. He said:
“Without private international law agreements, UK businesses, individuals and families would struggle to resolve the challenges they face when dealing with cross-border legal disputes.”—[Official Report, 17/3/20; col. 1439.]
The Minister echoed that opening today but I was surprised when he suggested that the area of law was narrow. As we have heard from the noble Lord, Lord Berkeley, it may encompass disappearing railway carriages in Italy, which has an Agatha Christie ring about it.
The new clause inserted by the other place reflects that width. The Westminster Government or a devolved Government may, by regulation, implement any international agreement so far as it relates to private international law. Further, the appropriate national authority may, by regulation, apply any agreement between the different jurisdictions within the United Kingdom or give effect to any arrangements between the UK Government and the British Overseas Territories, the Isle of Man or the Channel Islands. The emphasis throughout is on any future agreement of whatever nature that involves private international law anywhere in the world or internally within the United Kingdom.
It would appear that the Government have listened to the many voices suggesting that these clauses are excessively wide. Consequently, in response, the Minister today introduced the outline of a sunset clause, limited in the first instance to five years. He said that the urgent need is “ to update the framework” lost by our leaving the EU. The principle that there should be a temporal limit to the exercise of these wide powers in the uncertainties of the present time is clearly a good one. Unfortunately, the Government have decided that, like the British Empire, the sun shall never set upon these provisions. That is the effect of granting power to extend the operative period, not just for a further period of five years but, under proposed new subsection (3D), to renew the power to extend the period indefinitely. It just keeps rolling along. That makes a mockery of a sunset clause; consequently, I am delighted to support the amendment in the name of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer.
As I said at earlier stages of the Bill, our hugely unsatisfactory procedures for passing secondary legislation by resolution, whether affirmative or negative, may be tempered in the interests of democracy by consultation with interested parties. Amendment 4 pays lip service to that concept but, in effect, gives power to the Minister to choose whomsoever he thinks appropriate to consult. The wording is loose, such that although there is a duty to consult if the Minister thinks subjectively that there is nobody appropriate—as the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said—he does not have to exercise that choice; or, as the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mance, said a moment ago, he could walk out into the street and consult someone.
The purpose of the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames is to bring some objectivity to the exercise. The Minister may be surprised to know that the shelf life of a Minister in this and the previous Government tends to be no more than two years, and that Secretaries of State come and go through the various offices of state without necessarily knowing anything at all about their work. As WS Gilbert put it over 100 years ago, the way to advancement may well be to polish up the brasses on the big front door of No. 10.
Consequently, it is only sensible to have the guiding hand of the head of the judiciary in the various jurisdictions. No doubt the Sir Humphreys of this world can suggest that the Secretary of State rounds up the usual suspects, but that is no substitute for the Lord Chief Justice and his peers, who have a lifetime of experience of the legal world and the whole of the judiciary to draw on for advice as to who the suspects should be. As the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, said, it is inconceivable that they should not be consulted in any event.
I support the amendment in the name of my noble friend Lord Marks and, in particular, his call for a full and transparent report on the fruits of the consultation.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton (Con)
My Lords, I begin by thanking noble Lords for their thoughtful and erudite contributions. I thank them also for their courteous and warm words of welcome to me at the Dispatch Box. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in a phrase that I think will resonate with the entire House and with which none of us would disagree: our imperative is the preservation of this country’s good name and its standing in private international law matters.
The matters raised in the course of our discussions overlapped to some extent but I will, if I may, do my best to treat the contributions to the debate in the order in which they were made. First, I shall address the comments of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer of Thoroton, in relation to Amendment 1C, which omits some text from my Amendment 1A, the effect of which would be to allow the sunset period—which my amendment allows to be extended for five years by affirmative statutory instrument—to be extended only once.
Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)
May I express the gratitude of the whole House for the care with which the noble and learned Lord, Lord Stewart of Dirleton, dealt with every single issue that was raised? That I disagree with some of the answers is not the same as saying that he did not deal with them. For a Bill like this, it was an absolute model of going through every issue and putting the Government’s argument; I am incredibly grateful for that. There is nobody more disdainful than me when questions are not answered but, my goodness, the noble and learned Lord did a very good job and the whole House is grateful for that.
I will focus on my amendment, which concerns not being able to extend and extend the provision. My reading of what the noble and learned Lord said is that the sunset clause was intended in part to deal with the objections raised by this House. As he knows, the reason for those objections is that we do not consider secondary legislation appropriate. He replied, in effect, that there are good reasons for it—Lugano, primarily. As I read it, he is saying that unless there are good reasons, the sun will set on this Bill. If that is the right approach and what he is indeed saying, my view is that the Lugano provisions that currently apply—we may be only four or five weeks away from wanting them to come into force—mean that it is very unlikely that future circumstances will arise that would justify using secondary legislation. I hope that is what he means.
The noble and learned Lord has acknowledged the reasons why this House did not want the secondary power. In those circumstances, mindful of the need to get the three conventions in Clause 1 on to the statute book 1, I will not be moving my amendment—but only on the basis that I earnestly expect that the Government will not need one, let alone two extensions to the sunset clause. I beg leave to withdraw the amendment standing in my name.
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendments 2 and 3.
“(2) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) may make provision binding the Crown.
(3) The reference to the Crown in subsection (2) does not include—
(a) Her Majesty in Her private capacity,
(b) Her Majesty in right of the Duchy of Lancaster, or
(c) the Duke of Cornwall.”
“(2) Her Majesty may by Order in Council provide for section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (including Schedule (Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law))) and section 2(2) and (3) to extend, with or without modifications, to the Isle of Man.”
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 4, and do propose Amendments 4A, 4B, 4C, 4D and 4E as amendments thereto—
“SCHEDULE
Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)
Restrictions on power to make regulations
1 (1) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) may not include—
(a) provision that confers power to legislate by means of regulations, orders, rules or other subordinate instrument (other than rules of procedure for courts or tribunals);
(b) provision that creates an offence for which an individual who has reached the age of 18 (or, in relation to Scotland or Northern Ireland, 21) is capable of being sentenced to imprisonment for a term of more than two years (ignoring any enactment prohibiting or restricting the imprisonment of individuals who have no previous convictions).
(2) Sub-paragraph (1)(a) does not prevent the modification of a power to legislate conferred otherwise than under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law), or the extension of any such power to purposes of a similar kind to those for which it was conferred.
(3) A power to give practice directions or other directions regarding matters of administration is not a power to legislate for the purposes of sub- paragraph (1)(a).
Regulations to be made by statutory instrument or statutory rule
2 The power to make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law)—
(a) is exercisable by statutory instrument, in the case of regulations made by the Secretary of State;
(b) is exercisable by statutory rule for the purposes of the Statutory Rules (Northern Ireland) Order 1979 (S.I. 1979/1573 (N.I. 12)), in the case of regulations made by a Northern Ireland department.
Parliamentary or assembly procedure
3 (1) This paragraph applies to a statutory instrument containing regulations made by the Secretary of State under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law).
(2) If the instrument contains (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to the United Kingdom or a particular part of the United Kingdom, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to the United Kingdom or a particular part of the United Kingdom, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation,
it may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before each House of Parliament and approved by a resolution of each House.
(3) In this Schedule “relevant arrangements” means arrangements of the kind mentioned in section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3).
(4) If sub-paragraph (2) does not apply to the instrument, it is subject to annulment in pursuance of a resolution of either House of Parliament.
4 (1) This paragraph applies to regulations made by the Scottish Ministers under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law).
(2) The regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure (see section 29 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010) (asp 10)) if they contain (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to Scotland, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to Scotland, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation.
(3) If sub-paragraph (2) does not apply to the regulations, they are subject to the negative procedure (see section 28 of the Interpretation and Legislative Reform (Scotland) Act 2010).
5 (1) A Northern Ireland department may not make regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) that contain (whether alone or with other provision)—
(a) provision made for the purpose of implementing or applying, in relation to Northern Ireland, any relevant international agreement that has not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) or otherwise),
(b) provision made for the purpose of giving effect, in relation to Northern Ireland, to any relevant arrangements that relate to a particular territory and have not previously been the subject of any such provision (whether made by regulations under that section or otherwise),
(c) provision that creates or extends, or increases the penalty for, a criminal offence, or
(d) provision that amends primary legislation,
unless a draft of the regulations has been laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly and approved by a resolution of the Assembly.
(2) Regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) made by a Northern Ireland department are subject to negative resolution, within the meaning of section 41(6) of the Interpretation Act (Northern Ireland) 1954, if a draft of the regulations was not required to be laid before the Northern Ireland Assembly and approved by a resolution of the Assembly.
(3) Section 41(3) of that Act applies for the purposes of sub-paragraph (1) in relation to the laying of a draft as it applies in relation to the laying of a statutory document under an enactment.
Interpretation
6 In this Schedule—
“amend” includes repeal or revoke;
“primary legislation” means any provision of—
(a) an Act of Parliament,
(b) an Act of the Scottish Parliament,
(c) an Act or Measure of Senedd Cymru, or
(d) Northern Ireland legislation;
“relevant arrangements” has the meaning given in paragraph 3(3); “relevant international agreement” has the same meaning as in section (Implementation of other agreements on private international
law).”
(b) and insert “punishable by imprisonment.”
“Consultation
1A Before the Secretary of State makes regulations under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) the Secretary of State must consult such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate.”
(e) provision made under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3C),”
(e) provision made under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3C).”
(e) provision made under section (Implementation of other agreements on private international law) (3C),”
Lord Stewart of Dirleton
That this House do agree with the Commons in their Amendment 5.
Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]
Tuesday 24th November 2020
(3 years, 5 months ago)
Commons ChamberRead Full debate Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Act 2020 Read Hansard Text Read Debate Ministerial Extracts Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-I Marshalled list of motions and amendments for Consideration of Commons amendments - (17 Nov 2020)
The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State for Justice (Alex Chalk)
I beg to move, That this House agrees with Lords amendments 1A and 1B.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
With this it will be convenient to consider the Government motion to agree to Lords amendments 4A to 4E.
Alex Chalk
Private international law, sometimes known as conflict of laws, comprises rules applied by courts and parties involved in legal disputes for dealing with cases raising cross-border issues. The rules generally apply in the context of civil law, including specialist areas such as commercial, insolvency and family law. PIL typically includes rules to establish whether a court has jurisdiction to hear a claim that has cross-border elements, which country’s law applies to such a claim, and whether a judgment of a foreign court should be recognised and enforced. However, it can also encompass rules on co-operation between courts and other public authorities in different countries involved in dealing with cross-border issues, such as service of documents, taking of evidence abroad or even establishing efficient procedures to assist with the resolution of cross-border disputes.
These agreements are important. They are the sort of thing that a member of the public, or a business trading across borders may not know they need until a difficulty or a disagreement arises. Without these agreements, cross-border legal disputes can become expensive and difficult to resolve. With them, the path to resolution is clearer and smoother.
Sir Robert Neill (Bromley and Chislehurst) (Con)
I am very grateful to the Minister for giving way so early on in his speech. As he will know, I have to chair the Justice Committee in a few moments, but may I thank him for stressing the importance of this not just for the big financial institutions and businesses of this country, but for individuals? Will he confirm that, in accepting the amendments, we have managed to achieve an improvement to the Bill through the very constructive approach for which he in particular has been responsible? Will he also confirm that, as well as the Bill, it is the Government’s firm intention to seek to join the Lugano convention on the enforcement of judgments and other international co-operation at the earliest possible date, so that we do not have any gap post the end of the implementation period, and to move on to the other international conventions—Hague and others?
Alex Chalk
I thank the Chairman of the Justice Committee for his remarks and for the contribution he has made throughout the passage of the Bill. I am quite confident that we are in a better place because we have looked at it constructively. That is, in large part, because of the contributions he has made, together with others. Yes, this is about individuals as well as businesses, and yes, we want to use this as the vehicle to get into Lugano, which will be good for the rule of law, good for individuals, good for certainty and good for businesses.
I was making the point that these agreements mean the path to resolution is clearer and smoother. Just by way of a couple of examples, these agreements can help a family where relationships break down and one spouse moves abroad, and they can help to sort out arrangements for custody, access and maintenance in the best interests of the children. These agreements can provide a framework for a small business to seek redress when left out of pocket by a supplier based in another country.
Christian Matheson (City of Chester) (Lab)
The Minister is explaining the scope of the Bill and I am trying to understand it. We all represent constituents and I have a couple of constituents’ cases, for example one where there is a dispute over a property in Cyprus and another where a constituent was involved in an assault in Italy. They both relate to issues that are not cross-border, but relate specifically to incidents or disputes in those countries. Are those kinds of cases covered by the Bill, or does the Bill look at issues only where there are cross-border affairs that need to be resolved?
Alex Chalk
I am grateful to the hon. Gentleman for asking that question. The Bill is more likely to affect the former example, rather than the latter. On the specific issue of a criminal offence, that is likely to fall outwith the Bill. There is, of course, a regime for cross-border co-operation in that regard, but that normally sits outside private international law agreements, which tend to be about family issues—whether you have maintenance and enforcement, and which agreements are going to be upheld by which courts—and commercial agreements, for example, between a widget manufacturer in the hon. Gentleman’s constituency and a supplier in another part of the world. This relates to agreements that are already in existence which we want to roll over, but also creates the framework for us to agree and implement future agreements.
The Bill contains two substantive clauses. The first ensures the continued implementation of three Hague conventions on various aspects of private international law that are currently implemented—at least until the end of the transition period—under the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. The second concerns the implementation of further PIL agreements—the point that I was just making—by secondary legislation. This clause was removed from the Bill in the Lords on Report, but was returned by this House in Committee back in October. Although clause 1 is not subject to the amendments in front of us today, the need to have these provisions in force by 31 December creates an imperative to resolve the outstanding issues without delay.
Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)
As things stand, is it the Minister’s intention that there will be only one five-year period—that in five years’ time the Government will drop it? Or is his current intention that it will be extended if other things come up?
Alex Chalk
The legislation is clear that it can be extended more than once, but the real point is that parliamentarians will want to be satisfied that that process is not entirely a rubber-stamping exercise and that, first, Governments of any stripe will be actively required to turn their attention to whether it is the proper thing to do—and they will be, because of the consultation requirements in the statute—and secondly, that Parliament will be sufficiently notified of the Government’s intention to do so that it is well placed to marshal whatever opposition it thinks is appropriate.
All of that feeds into the next points that I wish to make, but before I do so I should say that the Government have been clear about how they want to use the power over the next few years, and that includes in respect of implementing the Lugano convention—or, indeed, alternatives with Norway, Iceland and Switzerland, should our application be declined—as well as, subject to consultation, the Singapore convention on mediation and the 2019 Hague judgments project. I pause to mention that the Singapore convention has no more doughty champion in this place than my hon. Friend the Member for Henley (John Howell).
If the Government ask Parliament to extend the power in five years’ time, they will need to make their case again and have the relevant regulations approved in both Houses. In any view, the sunset amendment represents a significant concession by the Government. It takes account of the concerns that have been powerfully expressed, while still retaining a proper measure of the flexibility and agility that we seek—manifestly in the national interest, we contend—to support the UK’s long-term private international law strategy which, I pause to note, strengthens the international rules-based order.
Finally, on the third of the three points to which I referred, Lords amendment 4B adds a requirement for the Government to consult prior to making any regulations under the Bill, whether those regulations concern the implementation of a private international law agreement or propose to extend the sunset period—the point I just addressed with my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly). The amendment puts on the face of the Bill the commitments that we have already made from the Dispatch Box on engagement with Parliament and other stakeholders. Although there will be times when a wide-ranging and broad consultation is appropriate—for instance, when the UK is seeking to join a new private international law agreement—there will be other times when the power is used to make minor technical and procedural updates to agreements, such as to update the name of a foreign court referred to in an existing agreement.
The requirement to consult applies across the piece but allows for a proportionate approach to different issues. Different instruments will require different approaches and, no doubt, different consultees, and the consultees who might be most appropriate to offer a view on an instrument about family law will not necessarily be the same as those who might add most value in respect of an instrument that deals with commercial disputes. As with any statutory obligation to consult, there is a requirement to take proper account of the representations received, and I can give an undertaking that the Government will meet that requirement. In the explanatory memorandum that must accompany any statutory instrument laid before this House, we will provide—I hope this will provide some comfort to my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon—a thorough and detailed explanation of the consultation that has taken place, setting out not only those whom we have consulted but a fair and balanced summary of the views expressed.
In conclusion, I restate the point about the importance of resolving this issue today. Clause 1 needs to be in force before the end of the transition period. It is plainly in the interests of this country to avoid an extended back and forth, and the Bill represents a pragmatic approach that respects the misgivings that have been expressed while ensuring that Governments retain the agility and flexibility that they need to enter into vital international agreements. I urge right hon. and hon. Members to accept this compromise as an appropriate and balanced approach.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
I call the shadow Minister, Alex Cunningham.
Alex Cunningham (Stockton North) (Lab)
Thank you very much, Madam Deputy Speaker—from one Alex to another.
When I stood at the Dispatch Box some weeks ago for the Bill’s Second Reading, I made Labour’s position very clear: we absolutely understand and appreciate the need for the Bill. The Minister was rightly wholehearted in his endorsement of the Bill and provided us with some excellent examples of how it will work and what it will mean. He even mentioned that it will apply to widgets. Perhaps when he does his summing up, he can tell me what a widget is.
In a post-Brexit world, it is essential that individuals, families and businesses have access to fair and clear legal mechanisms for dealing with international disputes. This has never been contentious and, from the very beginning, Labour made its support for clause 1 of the Bill clearly known. Labour welcomes the principle of the Bill because it maintains and perhaps enhances our legal co-operation across jurisdictions and provides certainty and fairness for those involved in cross-border litigation. In a post-Brexit world, this is essential to maintaining a prosperous economy, protecting our legal system and providing for families and individual claimants engaged in cross-border disputes. International agreements provide clear and reciprocal mechanisms for dealing with international disputes. In doing so, they are crucial in protecting our country’s proud reputation as the world’s centre for resolving complex disputes while offering us a competitive advantage in finance, business and trade.
This is also a Bill that will affect human beings and human stories. A wide range of family law issues can lead to cross-border disputes—for example, when one partner takes a child abroad and there is a disagreement about parenting arrangements, when making arrangements for divorce in similar circumstances, and on issues of abduction and adoption. Over the years, many of us have seen examples of that in our constituencies, when a child has been removed from this country against the will of another parent, and yet we have struggled, even with the existing laws, to resolve those sorts of disputes. Of course, this is also about keeping our citizens safe. We must ensure that we have robust international agreements so that justice can be done.
On Second Reading and in Committee, we were content to give our full support to clause 1, which gives effect to international treaties in domestic law through primary legislation, because we recognised that it is both necessary and welcome. It is hoped that these provisions, which affect the rules on jurisdiction and the recognition and enforcement of judgments overseas, will play a crucial role in building a strong economy and provide some certainty for families in often desperately trying circumstances.
Labour welcomes the principle of the Bill, but we remain of the opinion that there was no need for clause 2. Attempts by those in the other place to persuade the Government to ditch the unnecessary and, some would say, dangerous provisions covered by clause 2 were successful. Sadly, their decision was not appreciated by the Government and, despite the pleas and arguments put forward by their lordships, the Government felt compelled to reinstate the clause when it came back to the Commons. The House will be aware that despite the clear and sensible arguments of the Opposition and others, ultimately the Government are the Government and use their majority to prosecute their will, and, with no surprise, succeeded in reinstating clause 2.
Christian Matheson
My hon. Friend is right that the Government have the right to push through their agenda even in the face of well-meant advice either from the Opposition or the lordships’ House. I wonder whether there are any other independent expressions of concern, perhaps from the legal system, that also concur with the view that perhaps clause 2, as it was, was not the best way forward.
Alex Cunningham
Yes, there are many organisations, including the Bar Council, and I will develop that point later in my speech. It is important to recognise that this is not a case of the people sitting down the other end of the corridor making things up on the hoof. They were doing it on the basis of expertise and the opinions of others.
It was not the end of the matter after the Commons sent the Bill back to their lordships. Their lordships were intent on their ambition and refused to let the matter drop. Happily, that situation has been improved somewhat in recent days. I will return to the message from their lordships quite soon. Before I do that, I am happy to reiterate our support for the Bill’s provisions in clause 1, which give effect to key international conventions in our domestic law. That is very welcome on these Benches.
Christian Matheson
My hon. Friend is outlining one of the concerns that I raised earlier, which is about wider concerns raised by experienced legal sources. There may be—and I might ask the Minister to comment on this later—inconsistencies between agreements between the UK and one country and agreements with another country that are achieved through secondary legislation. If the agreement with that particular country is different, citizens will be treated differently depending on the terms of a particular statutory instrument.
Alex Cunningham
My hon. Friend is correct. That could lead to considerable confusion in the system. What happens if a family member is moved from country to country? They will be subject to different jurisdictions and different laws, and it would be all the more complicated and difficult for resolutions to be made.
There appeared to be intense opposition to what the Government were trying to do, and it was not just from the other place; it was coming from all over the place. The Bar Council, in its helpful briefing, was highly critical of this new constitutional grab. It was somewhat concerned that the power in clause 2 to proceed by delegated legislation was very broad, and that, for instance, it enabled the appropriate national authority to make regulations for the purpose of or in connection with implementing any international agreement. To give effect to international treaties in domestic law is not a rubber-stamping exercise. The effect, implementation and enforcement of such provisions require robust debate, and we must protect the parliamentary scrutiny of such important legal provisions at all costs.
The Government attempted to raise arguments as to why that new constitutional measure would be necessary, but all of them have failed to convince. The first argument was that the new provision would allow the Government to implement each new international agreement without unnecessary delay, but there is no evidence to suggest that fast-track legislation is required. The implementation of international agreements in the past has often taken years, and there is nothing to suggest that implementing them through primary legislation would cause any difficulties without having to subject legislation to normal parliamentary scrutiny.
The Government raised the 2007 Lugano convention, which deals with the jurisdiction and enforcement of judgments between members of the European Union. The Government’s arguments appear to be that there may be only a short period in which to legislate to give effect to the Lugano provision at the end of the transition period. That is not an argument for developing that new Executive power more generally. The Government have not provided for clause 2 in relation to Lugano but, as the Chairman of the Select Committee, the hon. Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), said, there appears to be some movement on that, and I look forward to clarification from the Minister.
The Government also claimed that the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 allowed for sufficient parliamentary scrutiny. Once again, that argument does not carry much weight. As a result of clause 2 as originally drafted, the Government would be able to give force to model law without being subject to the scrutiny mechanism under the 2010 Act, which does not allow for the amendment of treaties or consideration of measures to implement them. That is a red herring, and the argument unravelled when subjected to expert scrutiny.
Even some of the Government’s own Members were rightly worried. It is worth putting on the record again a statement by the Conservative peer, Lord Garnier:
“Unquestionably, the provisions in Clause 2, which give the Executive the extensive future law-making powers originally in the Bill, have been shown to be constitutionally awkward and unwelcome”.—[Official Report, House of Lords, 29 June 2020; Vol. 804, c. 483.]
I think that the Minister has begun to address those issues.
Sadly, the Lords asked the Government to drop clause 2. The Government used their majority. A Conservative peer asked that them not to do so, but that is what they chose to do, so clause 2 was reinstated. As I have said, their lordships were not about to roll over, and they were determined that the Government should not get away with a smash-and-grab raid on our constitution and the way in which we do business in this country. It is no good at all our trumpeting a return of control of our own affairs—control for our Parliament to make decisions on the issues that affect our country and citizens—only for Parliament to surrender that control to an overbearing Executive who appear to be seeking shortcuts to creating legislation and regulations. That is not what the British people handed the Government a majority to do. I do not think they would tolerate the sidelining of MPs they elected to serve them. More importantly, we want to ensure that laws in this land are not just fit for purpose, but have been subjected to the widest possible scrutiny. Opposition Members have always been opposed to the power in clause 2 to implement future international agreements by secondary legislation, but we recognise that change to that clause can be made.
As I mentioned, both the House of Lords Constitution Committee and the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee considered whether the power in clause 2 was appropriate, and both made it clear that it was not. None the less, Labour welcomes amendments 1A and 1B, tabled in the other place, which act as a safeguard to clause 2, as reintroduced here. It was good to hear the Minister speak with some affection for those in the other place, and their expertise and skills. Although Labour Members remain disappointed that clause 2 has been reintroduced, the Government have heeded some of the Opposition’s concern by agreeing to the five-year sunset clause to clause 2.
Let me turn to amendments 4A and 4B. Labour also welcomes the amendment to remove the power from the Bill to create criminal offences that are punishable by imprisonment. For obvious reasons, this is a sensitive issue and it is only right that the Government act with caution in this area. Finally, Labour supports the amendment to place an obligation on the Secretary of State to consult before using the implementing power contained in clause 2 or before extending it for a further five-year period. Ideally, we would like to have seen further detail on who the Government are obliged to consult, but this is none the less better than nothing. That said, the Minister might like to address that issue in his summing up.
Before I conclude, I wish to pose a few questions to the Minister, where he could go some way to alleviating the remaining concerns many of us, in and out of this place, have about the amended clause 2. Will he give assurances to the House that any consultations on the implementation of a PIL agreement will be held in public rather than in private? Will he confirm that any consultations on the implementations of a PIL agreement will be announced in good time to allow experts to offer their views? Will he give assurances that the Government will produce a report on the outcome of such consultations and ensure that it is widely available to Members of this House? To sum up, although the Opposition would ideally have liked to see clause 2 taken out completely, or for greater restrictions to have been placed on its power, it is clear that the Government have listened to the concerns of the House and have taken some action to address them. We will therefore support these amendments this afternoon.
Kenny MacAskill (East Lothian) (SNP)
Obviously, I rise to support the general principles of the Bill. The Scottish National party, in giving support to this legislation, takes the view that it is not where we wish to be, but in the circumstances of where we find ourselves, it is the best that can be done. It has to be put in the context, both legal and political, of where we find ourselves. In the legal context, many others have mentioned, correctly, that private international law is not even noted a great deal within the wider sphere of law and is rather a specialist niche. I say that as someone who was a lawyer and practised for 20 years, who was a Justice Secretary for seven and a half years and who was the Convenor of the Subordinate Legislation Committee when the Scottish Parliament was first established. Private international law does occasionally result in people’s eyes glazing over, but it is fundamentally important. Significantly, subordinate legislation is equally of great importance and far too frequently missed. Both require to be addressed, because as the Minister and the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) have mentioned, they are fundamental. This is fundamental to business contracts, as we seek to promote business in a globalised world. It is fundamental to ensuring that litigation can take place if accidents occur abroad, and in the world in which we travel more that is understandable. In family matters, it is fundamental because children are taken, and deeply distressing custody battles are waged over abducted children not only across the border between Scotland and England but around the world. It is also important for the enforcement of aspects such as aliment, as we call it in Scotland, or alimony, as it is referred to down here. All those things depend on the ability to settle on a jurisdiction—a jurisdiction of choice, or sometimes one that is required—in which rights can be enforced.
Christian Matheson
The hon. Gentleman is touching on a point that I have expressed concern about. If these legal agreements are done on a bilateral basis with different countries, we might find that we have agreements with some countries and not others, and therefore constituents of ours with a case in one country will get better access to justice than those with cases in countries where such agreements have not been concluded.
Kenny MacAskill
Absolutely. It is well known—and I have experienced it myself—that where children have been taken to, for example, some north African nations, it can be extremely problematic, if not impossible, for parents seeking their return. Although they had the right to that child, their ability to enforce it was often not recognised. If that is to be the situation we find ourselves in with countries with which we have had greater movement in recent years and greater involvement in terms of trade, the complexities will be extremely difficult indeed.
In the political context, this is the reality. It is not the delusion that we have been given about the sunny uplands of Brexit, or in the defence review about aircraft carriers steaming towards warmer climes, dispensing all sorts of social dividend. I always thought that the people who should be doing the soft diplomacy should be the British Council, as opposed to military forces. I recognise and welcome any work that they can do in that sphere, but it is not what they are trained to do, nor is it their trained function.
This is not the sunny uplands of Brexit. It is the harsh reality of what we face on rights that we have had for more than a generation, on the security of an understanding that lawyers have had about what they could do and where they could go, and the arrangements that have built up. I myself in legal practice had relationships with lawyers in London and Northern Ireland, or wherever else—it was passed around. If all that breaks down, the difficulty for individuals is damaging.
All the emphasis in the public eye has been, perhaps, on the dangers and difficulties we face with access to Europol—there are huge difficulties there—and the difficulties that we may face in terms of sharing information about criminals. We all know that more individuals in this country appear before a tribunal than before a court. We all know, in this Chamber, that more people will be affected by the civil aspects in private international law than will be affected by the far too many, but still far fewer, aspects of criminal offending by those who come here and would require those provisions.
This is the harsh reality of Brexit. We are signing up for something that is acceptable but not as good as what we had. It carries numerous risks. It leaves the danger of deficiencies—sometimes through error, perhaps, but sometimes through a failure to negotiate—that will leave each and every citizen of this country in a worse place. This is not what we were promised. We vote for these measures, but we do so with a heavy heart. It is the harsh reality of Brexit coming home. I hope that many families do not suffer as a consequence.
Mr Djanogly
The ongoing disputes over the Bill have not related to the content of private international law treaties, but rather to parliamentary scrutiny of orders made pursuant to PIL treaties and scrutiny of the PIL treaties themselves. As far as the order-making powers are concerned, we have ended up today with a welcome compromise, eked out in the other place following a significant defeat and general kickback from basically everyone for the initial proposals for a Henry VIII clause.
To that end, there were counterproposals to limit the scope for orders to specific treaties, for reports to be laid before auditors and to a stated timetable and for a super-affirmative procedure. Although none of those proposals has been accepted, others have been. I welcome the concessions offered today by the Minister, who I have to say has now listened, in terms of the exclusion of some level of criminal offences punishable by prison, the introduction of a five-year sunset clause, albeit a renewable one, and a prior duty to consult on orders, although only with such persons as the Secretary of State thinks appropriate. That is, frankly, as far as we are going to get on this and I shall support what is offered. However, I wish to make two related wider points.
First, while Government suggest that the PIL treaties are non-contentious, the sweeping scope and initially non-restricted life of order powers clearly represent a significant increase in the power of the Executive. It is also an attack on the constitutional principle that international agreements should only change domestic law if they are instituted by Act of Parliament. Here we need context, because if one looks at the range of current Government Bills, one sees time and again power being removed from this place to the Executive. That was recently described by one journalist as this Government’s Maoist tendency.
It may be that recent staff changes at Number 10 are going to reverse that tendency. The Government should keep in mind that the Executive will not always be a Conservative one, and messing with our finely tuned unwritten constitution may not be to the Conservatives’ advantage in the long run.
My final point concerns what has been persistently avoided in the Bill, which is the urgent need to reform the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010 provisions for scrutinising proposed international treaties. Frankly, I have not been able to understand Ministers’ feet dragging on this issue. As things stand, it looks like CRaG reforms are more likely to come in piecemeal via the Trade Bill and the Agriculture Bill. In my view, that sectoral hotch-potch should be managed by the Justice team, to cover all international treaties. I suggest that Ministers apply their many talents to that task.
John Howell (Henley) (Con)
Let me first declare an interest as an associate of the Chartered Institute of Arbitrators.
I thought for a moment that I was going to welcome the agreement that there clearly is between my hon. Friend the Member for Huntingdon (Mr Djanogly) and me, but, given his last comments, I am not sure any more—I need to think about them. However, I think we are on the same sort of page at the moment.
I, too, welcome these Lords amendments and point out that they are a very good compromise between this House and the other place. I also welcome what the Minister has said in bringing them forward. In taking away the criminality, having a sunset clause and bringing in a consultation, they have done a tremendous amount to bridge the gap that there previously was during our discussions on this Bill. But in fundamental essence, the Bill remains the same in what it can do, and I am glad that it does.
I made the point on Report as to why that was important. I am not going to repeat the entire speech that I made then—I probably could not get away with that—but I stressed the need for agility and flexibility, and I put that in the context of the Singapore mediation convention. There is a great necessity to get the Singapore mediation convention into working order and on the statute book. The reason for that is twofold.
First, it fundamentally does no harm whatsoever—in fact, it does a tremendous amount of good for the small businesses that are choosing mediation as a means of settling their disputes. Secondly, it ends the farce we have at the moment with the system that is in place whereby if one has a mediation, one then has to agree an arbitration, however short that may be, in order to take advantage of the New York convention. That is a nonsense that we do not want to continue with. We must implement the Singapore mediation convention, which allows the results of a mediation to be recognised in the countries that have signed up to this.
The Minister was kind enough to say that I am a great champion of the Singapore mediation convention, and he is quite right, because I have seen that it does a tremendous amount of good for this country. It is also because, as the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) said, a tremendous amount of alternative dispute resolution takes place in this country. We are world leaders in this, but we will not remain so for very long unless we sign up to the Singapore mediation convention and get stuck into what the rest of the world is getting involved in. All I can do is recommend to the Minister that he gets on with introducing the statutory instrument to get the Singapore mediation convention up and running in this country. To repeat what I said on Third Reading, I am very happy to serve on the SI Committee that introduces the Singapore mediation convention and to see a great dream come true.
Alex Chalk
Let me begin, a little sooner than I had planned, by saying that I am absolutely delighted that this Bill is now going to be supported across the House. It is worth reflecting on the journey that we have made, because, as the hon. Member for Stockton North (Alex Cunningham) rightly said, concerns were raised, first on Second Reading but also in the other place, but we have now got to the point where the Labour and Lib Dem amendments were withdrawn in the other place and this Bill will now receive cross-party support. In getting to this point, their lordships recognised, in the words of Lord Pannick, that “substantial and constructive” amendments had been made by the Government. We did so because we recognise that the issues we are addressing here, when it comes to the constitutional balance in our country, are ones that merit proper and careful consideration. But the imperative for this was in fact laid bare in the points made by the hon. Member for City of Chester (Christian Matheson), who is no longer in his place—[Interruption.] He is back, as if by magic. He asked whether there would be different treatment for British citizens in different parts of the world. That is precisely what the Bill is all about. It is to try to reduce those differences. If we had no private international law agreements, that is exactly the situation we would increasingly find ourselves in. Because we are now better able to implement them, we are better able to provide that certainty and clarity which are in the interests of our constituents and their businesses, whether they manufacture widgets or any other products.
Madam Deputy Speaker (Dame Rosie Winterton)
In order to allow for safe exit and entry before the next business, we will have a three-minute suspension.
Royal Assent
Monday 14th December 2020
(3 years, 4 months ago)
Lords ChamberRead Full debate Read Hansard Text Amendment Paper: HL Bill 139-I Marshalled list of motions and amendments for Consideration of Commons amendments - (17 Nov 2020)