Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]

Jonathan Djanogly Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading: House of Commons
Wednesday 2nd September 2020 Commons Chamber

[Robert Buckland]

I can assure my hon. Friend that not only do the Government place a very high premium upon the importance of accession to Lugano, but I personally have vested my own time in direct discussions with counterparts at the Commission and other member states of the EU. In fact, in Zagreb, at the final Justice and Home Affairs Council, I took the opportunity to discuss this at length with several other member states and, indeed, the then newly appointed Commissioner for Justice, and we had a very productive discussion.

My view and that of Her Majesty’s Government is very straightforward: the application for Lugano is a discrete matter. It is separate from the negotiations that are ongoing with regard to a future free trade agreement, and it should be treated as a separate matter. The time for ideology has gone. This is a time for us all to remember that the interests of the citizens that member states serve are paramount, and the interests of ensuring that civil judgments are enforced as swiftly as possible are clear. I call upon all interested parties to put those priorities first, and then hopefully we will see a swifter conclusion to the negotiations, but I welcome the warm support we have had from EFTA countries both prior and subsequent to our application.

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

I thank my right hon. and learned Friend for giving way on this Lugano point. I agree with everything he says: it should be treated as a discrete treaty, separate from us leaving the EU, and it is very important for our future trade. But if that is the case, why does he not mention Lugano on the face of the Bill? By doing so, he could perhaps limit the scope of the wide statutory instrument powers—the so-called Henry VIII powers—that I think he will talk about bringing back. He would then have the specific Bill that would make the other place a bit happier.

[Robert Buckland]

I am always grateful to my hon. Friend, who served with distinction as a Justice Minister, for his long interest in these matters as a member of the profession. I did indeed consider whether this Bill should be a Lugano-specific Bill, but I took the view—and I will explain it in more detail in the body of my remarks—that, because of the narrow ambit of what we are seeking to achieve here, there was a necessary flexibility in allowing the United Kingdom Parliament, by affirmative resolution and therefore by debate on the Floor of the House, to determine whether particular future treaties could be incorporated into domestic law.

I do not regard these as Henry VIII powers. I accept the point that there is a distinction to be drawn in relation to the bringing forward of primary legislation, but as a matter of strict interpretation these are not powers that would allow us unilaterally to amend primary legislation, which, of course, is what a Henry VIII power is. These are powers that will allow us to use secondary legislation, but with the necessary parliamentary scrutiny before the incorporation in domestic law of these treaties. Let’s face it, while we were members of the EU, in large measure, because of the competence of the EU in this area, many of these arrangements and agreements took direct effect in our domestic law without any debate whatever. In my view, this actually represents a qualitative improvement and creates a consistency with that flexibility to allow us to make the sort of advances—I know he shares my view on those—which I referred to in my remarks to my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham. I am very grateful not just to him, but to all Members in the other place who gave the Bill detailed and careful consideration. However, we believe that it is constitutionally appropriate and proportionate to deploy delegated powers to implement the type of international agreement envisaged in the Bill.

This delegated power, in my strong view, is narrow, well defined and proportionate. Indeed, private international law itself is still a very narrowly defined area of law. It is familiar in scope and content to courts, legal advisers and experts in the field. The type of international agreement which can be implemented under the delegated power relates primarily to jurisdiction: rules that determine where a dispute is heard, rules that determine which country’s law applies, and rules on the recognition and enforcement of legal decisions or judgments in cross-border cases. No agreement could be implemented that was not related to these specific sorts of issues, which arise in relation to the resolution of cross-border disputes.

On that point, we recognise that the Delegated Powers and Regulatory Reform Committee’s report on the Bill recommended the removal of the proposed delegated power, but it is our view that that is, respectfully, a misinterpretation of the breadth of the powers sought and the types of international agreements it can cover. Many of the examples given in its report that had previously been implemented by primary legislation are not actually private international law agreements in themselves. Although those agreements contain specific private international law provisions, they are wider in their overall scope and could not have been implemented using the proposed delegated power to be reintroduced into the Bill.

It was also said in the other place that the use of delegated powers to implement private international law agreements would be constitutionally unprecedented. With the greatest respect, I wholly disagree. There are delegated powers to implement new bilateral agreements on recognition and enforcement of civil judgments via Orders in Council under the Administration of Justice Act 1920, the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, the Maintenance Orders (Facilities for Enforcement) Act 1920 and the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972. Indeed, the powers under the 1933 Act were used as recently as 2003 by the Labour Government to update a bilateral agreement with Israel relating to the recognition and enforcement of judgments, and extending that agreement to cover judgments of the Israeli magistrates courts. However, while it is important to look back at the precedents that exist, it is vital that we look forward, too. The powers contained in those Acts only allow us to implement bilateral agreements in this area. Frankly, the world has moved on significantly since the ’20s and ’30s, because most private international law agreements are now made on a multilateral basis. We need to ensure that the necessary powers exist to implement such agreements in a timely manner.

Parliamentary scrutiny procedures have moved on as well, and our proposals recognise this by requiring statutory instruments made under the delegated power to implement new agreements to be subject to the affirmative resolution procedure, which provides much more scrutiny than the Order in Council process. Any decision for our country to join a particular agreement in this area of law would also still be subject to successful completion of parliamentary scrutiny procedures under the provisions of the Constitutional Reform and Governance Act 2010—CRAG—which many of us got to know intimately in the context of last year’s machinations on Brexit.

The delegated power in the Bill would not alter the well-established approaches to parliamentary scrutiny of treaties and the process of approving ratification under CRAG. Instead, it would simply be a mechanism to draw down the resulting treaty obligations into domestic law in readiness for the ratification of the treaty. The Government recognise that Parliament has begun to strengthen the scrutiny procedures under CRAG, including, importantly, the establishment of the International Agreements Sub-Committee in April of this year under the chairmanship of Lord Goldsmith. We look forward to working with the Committee, including on the scrutiny of the private international law agreements.

[Mr Djanogly]

Does my right hon. and learned Friend appreciate that that is the exact same Committee that has constantly been attacking CRAG as totally inadequate and unfit for purpose?

[Robert Buckland]

Indeed it has made some very trenchant comments about CRAG, and that is precisely why it is important that that Committee does its work on improving and enhancing the procedure. I welcome its work and we will actively engage and ensure that that is so.

The most pressing need for the delegated power is to implement what we hope to see—namely, the Lugano convention, which we have already discussed. As I have said, we still do not know the outcome of our application. It is being considered by the contracting parties to the convention, including the EU. It currently underpins our private international law relationship with Switzerland, Norway and Iceland, but could also be used to underpin our relationship with the EU after the end of the transition period. It would provide valuable certainty on cross-border recognition and the enforcement of civil and commercial judgments, as well as clarity on which country’s courts may hear a dispute.

--- Later in debate ---

[Mr Jonathan Djanogly (Huntingdon) (Con)]

The Bill, as presented from the other place, is not in the least objectionable. As has been pointed out, the European Union (Withdrawal) Act 2018 automatically inserts directly effective treaty rights into domestic law after the end of the transition period. However, clause 1 takes a number of treaties that we all consider to be valuable and directly puts them into our own laws as though they were non-EU-signatory treaties. I agree that not only is that more transparent, but it makes a clear statement on our new post-Brexit position to the international community. So far, so good. The problem comes when we then get to discuss what Government powers should be in relation to the private international law issues that we do not currently know anything about.

Looking at this Bill, the dilemma I have, when including the Government’s stated intention to reinsert clause 2, is that we have an Administration keen to take back control when it comes to the EU, but there seems to be less of an issue with passing laws that facilitate the Executive handing out control and sovereignty to non-EU foreign powers with minimal parliamentary scrutiny. Building on one point made by my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), let me say that one confusing thing I find when looking through the Bill is working out which aspects of private international law we benefit from now through our former membership of the EU that we would wish ideally to retain. That is relevant because we still do much of our business with EU countries. We still have the most UK-owned foreign homes in France and Spain, and I would hazard a guess that UK citizens marry and have children with more European Union citizens than other foreigners.

The treaties set out in clause 1 are very limited—the protection of children, the exclusive choice of court agreements and family maintenance. They do not deal with insolvency, business law and many other key issues dealt with under European law. Could the Minister point me to some document that shows what is covered with the EU now and will be rolled over into our law, or to what extent those items feature in current EU deal negotiations? That would be helpful.

As the Lord Chancellor said, the issue with this Bill is not what is in it now, but rather what has been taken out by the other place—namely, the former clause 2 delegated powers provision. I note that no attempt was made in the other place to upset the royal prerogative and demand that PIL treaties are approved by Parliament before signature, although the weakness of the CRAG pre-ratification review process was well covered as being limited and flawed.

On looking at the debates on this Bill in the Lords, the key difference between the Government and almost everyone else who spoke was the Government’s contention that these proposed Henry VIII powers—that is what I think they are—were not a constitutional breach, as they had already been used for other laws. We heard the Lord Chancellor repeat that today. Lord Keen referred to the Mental Capacity Act 2005, which came up in an earlier intervention, but it was pointed out that that Act was the primary legislation that gave effect to an international convention, and as such, it was not the best example that the Minister might give.

It seems to me that we need to consider the Government’s suggestion that PIL is a narrow enough genre to merit its own delegated powers. That is a hard case to make, and it has not yet been made by the Government. To answer the point validly made by my right hon. Friend the Member for Wokingham (John Redwood), the processes, for instance, to enforce private contracts, international financial bonds or insolvency procedures are difficult to lump into the same basket as, say, child protection or mental health, which is what the proposal in clause 2 does.

The Government have repeatedly said that clause 2 is necessary to move ahead with the Lugano treaty, yet their wording referred to “any international agreement”, which could stretch to much more than the Lugano treaty. Furthermore, the proposed powers last without a sunset clause, so they could presumably be used in the future for not only the implementation of now unknown treaties but any changes to those unknown treaties, no matter how significant.

Other issues arise. I am concerned, for instance, about the extension of Executive power to use statutory instruments to change domestic law to give effect to model laws. I am concerned at such powers being used to make new criminal offences by order. A more general observation would be on the timing of the process. In recent weeks, Ministers have been arguing for Bills to be heard in an afternoon because of the covid emergency. International treaties, however, work on the slowest and most planned of timescales, so to say that these issues are time-constrained is not realistic. Likewise, to accuse these PIL subject areas of being only technical is unrelated to how very important they tend to be to the lives of people who actually need them. Furthermore, given how the world becomes an ever smaller place, I foresee these cross-border jurisdictional issues becoming more, not less, relevant and important, particularly with our being out of the European Union.

For all those reasons, my instinct suggests that the Government should accept the position presented to them by the Lords and simply move on. At the least, we could tie the powers to named foreseeable treaties in the Bill such as Lugano. However, if the Government are dead set on their current course, I suggest that they need to improve their offer to Parliament, and four areas comes to mind. First, they should limit the order-making powers to a period of, say, two years after each relevant treaty has been signed. Secondly, a Joint Committee should be formed to review the orders. Thirdly, a Government report should be issued to Parliament setting out the proposal, and fourthly, the report should be issued a minimum period of, say, 21 sitting days before the relevant SI Committee sits.

As things stand, the Government’s proposed reinsertion of clause 2 must represent one of the largest potential power grabs ever seen by the Executive in this Parliament. The Government should think again.

--- Later in debate ---

[Alex Chalk]

When we talk about taking back control, it is important to note that in future it will not be the EU but the British Government negotiating private international law agreements. I am simply pointing out that when the EU negotiated the arrangements and Parliament had no role at all, it did not seem to attract any concern in this place, yet when it is the British Government negotiating them on behalf of the UK, it seems to create difficulties.

[Mr Djanogly]

rose—

[Alex Chalk]

I will come to the hon. and learned Member’s second point in a moment, but first I will let my hon. Friend come in on this point.

[Mr Djanogly]

The difference is that in the EU the Parliament has a vote and a potential veto on international trade agreements. My hon. Friend is arguing in effect that we move back to the position before we were in the EU. I think the point the hon. and learned Lady is making, which I would back up is, that we do not want to go back to what we had before we were in the EU; we want to move forward and have a system that is relevant to today’s democracy.

[Alex Chalk]

I take that point completely. I will answer it by touching first on what the situation was before we entered the EU and then on how it ought to evolve in a way that I hope meets my hon. Friend’s concerns. He is right—others have touched on this—that arrangements were in place prior to our entering the EU, albeit on a bilateral basis, for us to enter into these sorts of agreements. Two have been touched on because they have been used quite recently: the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933 and the Maintenance Orders (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1972.

It is worth taking a moment to consider them. How is the first Act used in practice? In 2003, it was used for us to enter into a PIL agreement with Israel that had a significant impact: namely British courts would have to give effect to what magistrates courts in Israel said. Yet how was that brought into force in the UK? Was it brought into force through an Act of Parliament? No. Was it was brought into force through the affirmative resolution procedure? No. It was brought into force through an Order in Council. It states:

“Her Majesty, in exercise of powers conferred on Her by section 1(4) of the Foreign Judgments (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, is pleased, by and with the advice of Her Privy Council, to order”—

and then she gave effect to this private international law Bill. My point is simply that this procedure, which was used in 2003, is far inferior to what we are introducing in clause 2. We are doing away with any idea of an Order in Council, which we accept would be too old fashioned. The appropriate way to apply scrutiny in this House is through the CRAG procedure and the affirmative resolution procedure.

The second Act was used in respect of a US agreement in 2007 as a result of which an Order in Council had the effect that an order on maintenance would have to be given effect in the UK. How was that PIL agreement given effect in the UK? It was not through an Act of Parliament but again through an Order in Council, and again we are going beyond that in this Bill.

In dealing with this matter, I want to make one final and very important point. Not content with simply using Orders in Council to introduce PIL agreements in the past, in fact the House has legislated in recent memory to include more scope to introduce PIL agreements by way of delegated legislation. First, the House passed the Insolvency Act 2000, which created a power to introduce regulations in 2006. Secondly—this is the final point that I will make on this issue, but it does seem relevant—the House passed the Mental Capacity Act 2005. That Act created powers to make further provision as to private international law. Paragraph 32(1) of schedule 3 states:

“Regulations may make provision—(a) giving further effect to the Convention”—

that is the convention on the international protection on adults—

“or (b) otherwise about the private international law of England and Wales in relation to the protection of adults.”

In other words, it was being created in 2005.

[Mr Djanogly]

I appreciate that, but it did not provide a statutory instrument for looking at international financial bonds, insolvency law or other jurisdictional issues; it was focused on that specific area. The point that has been made by many hon. Members this afternoon is that this is too broad.

[Alex Chalk]

I accept my hon. Friend’s point, but the way it has been framed thus far is, “Look, this is constitutionally unprecedented.” It is not constitutionally unprecedented, and that ought to be borne in mind.

The distinguished Chair of the Justice Committee, my hon. Friend the Member for Bromley and Chislehurst (Sir Robert Neill), made the proper point about criminal laws, and I recognise that that is something that we should look at carefully. It would be going too far to suggest that delegated legislation is not used to introduce criminal laws. An extremely distinguished paper was produced by academics at the University of Glasgow which went so far as to say that the overwhelming majority of criminal offences are created by delegated legislation, particularly where they are highly specific, technical, environmental offences and so on, so it is not without precedent at all, but I recognise that the point requires consideration.

In short, the Bill will future-proof our legislative requirements in this area for the years to come, while at the same time ensuring that UK businesses, individuals and families can continue to benefit from an efficient and effective framework to help resolve cross-border disputes. It will also ensure that our domestic laws can keep up to date with the latest developments in private international law in international forums, and that the UK can implement any agreements it intends to join in a timely manner while maintaining appropriate parliamentary oversight. I commend this Bill to the House.

Question put and agreed to.

Bill accordingly read a Second time.

PRIVATE INTERNATIONAL LAW (IMPLEMENTATION OF AGREEMENTS) BILL [LORDS]

Motion made, and Question put forthwith (Standing Order No. 83A(7)),

That the following provisions shall apply to the Private International Law (Implementation of Agreements) Bill [Lords]:

Committal

1. The Bill shall be committed to a Committee of the whole House.

Proceedings in Committee, on Consideration and up to and including Third Reading

2. Proceedings in Committee of the whole House, any proceedings on Consideration and any proceedings in legislative grand committee shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion one hour before the moment of interruption on the day on which proceedings in Committee of the whole House are commenced.

3. Proceedings on Third Reading shall (so far as not previously concluded) be brought to a conclusion at the moment of interruption on that day.

4. Standing Order No. 83B (Programming committees) shall not apply to proceedings in Committee of the whole House, to any proceedings on Consideration or to other proceedings up to and including Third Reading.

Other proceedings

5. Any other proceedings on the Bill may be programmed.—(Leo Doherty.)

Question agreed to.