Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Merron and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 12th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am grateful to the noble Lord and feel that this would probably be a very appropriate point to move on to my noble and learned friend.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will just pick up what the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, is saying. I think he is saying that the Act has been updated over the years and that people have taken account of improvements. He is absolutely right; from my own knowledge of the working of the Act, he makes an absolutely valid point.

I repeat what I said earlier—that we need to discuss this. I will deal with the interventions after I have given my response.

First, the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, is right in identifying the risks that arise. That is why I think that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, is right that we need to build in some form of enhanced protection.

As far as the intervention from the noble Baroness, Lady Berridge, is concerned, this amendment is limited to DoLS under the Mental Capacity Act; it does not include any exercise of the inherent jurisdiction of the courts on somebody whose liberty has been taken away. The noble Baroness is very welcome to come and discuss that with us, and I will give her notice of any meeting that we have.

As far as the noble Lord, Lord Harper, is concerned, how one provides effective protection depends first on the discussions that take place. I would envisage tabling an amendment on this or maybe agreeing that somebody else tables one. I cannot tell noble Lords the extent to which it will involve the Minister having powers, but it is something that we will discuss.

The points that the Minister, my noble friend Lady Merron, made about discrimination relate to people who have had a deprivation of liberty order in the past, or even those who have one now, who will be excluded altogether from the right to assisted dying. The nature of the Mental Capacity Act is that this should be done on a case-by-case basis. I am proposing that we discuss how to provide enhanced protection rather than excluding.

In the light of what I have said, I hope that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Baroness, Baroness Berger, on behalf of the noble Baroness, Lady Keeley, feel able to withdraw their amendments.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions to this debate. As I have said, I will keep my comments limited to the amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical or operational workability concerns.

On Amendments 17 and 309A, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Beith, and introduced by the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, Amendment 17 is a probing amendment that seeks to establish whether people who are registered with a GP in Scotland but live in England would be excluded from eligibility for an assisted death under the Bill. Noble Lords may wish to note that Amendment 17 would have limited effect as it amends only Clause 1, which is largely descriptive. Without further amendments to Clauses 10 and 17, which contain duties to assess eligibility criteria, Amendment 17 would not impact those criteria and would introduce conflicting provisions.

Amendment 309A would amend the corresponding eligibility criteria in Clause 10 to include a person registered as a patient with a general medical practice in England, Wales or Scotland. It would not amend Clause 17, which contains the assessment by the panel. Therefore, Amendments 17 and 309A would require further consequential amendments to ensure that the Bill is coherent. This would include amendments to ensure that data recording obligations and the associated criminal offences apply to Scottish GPs. These consequential amendments would likely require consultation with the Scottish Government, as the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, referred to, in line with the guidance for Private Members’ Bills.

I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, for tabling Amendment 62. The purpose of this amendment is to establish why the Bill requires only the actions set out in Clauses 10 and 11 to be undertaken by people in England or Wales, and not the preliminary discussion under Clause 5. Our understanding is that the reference to the preliminary discussion in Clause 5 is not mentioned in Clause 1(3) because Clause 5(3) already requires that a person wanting to have a preliminary discussion must be in England and Wales. Amendment 62 would require steps under Clauses 8 and 19 to be taken by persons in England or Wales. As drafted, the Bill requires that most of the steps in Clauses 8, 10, 11 and 19 will already have to take place in England and Wales.

In addition, Amendment 62 would have the effect that, when the Secretary of State makes regulations under Clause 19, the Secretary of State must be in England and Wales at the moment they sign the regulations. This could lead to the regulations being improperly made and challenged should the Secretary of State not physically be in England or Wales at the time of signing the regulations. This raises a practical issue of workability, as I am sure the noble Baroness understands.

On the points raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser, and the noble Lord, Lord Shinkwin, relating to Scotland and guidance that the Government have provided to the sponsor, as I am sure noble Lords will understand, and I have reiterated, we are providing technical and workability support to the sponsor on devolution issues, including those that have been raised. This is an evolving situation that will continue throughout the passage of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am grateful to everybody who has taken part in this short debate. I pay particular tribute to the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, who discussed the issues with me yesterday and was incredibly clear in the way that she raised them today. She also raised the concerns of the noble Lord, Lord Beith.

I will deal with three issues: first, where the GP practice has to be to satisfy the eligibility requirements; secondly, whether the Clause 5 conversation has to take place with an England and Wales GP, or whether it can take place with a Scottish GP; and thirdly, how we will deal with the clashes between Scotland and England. I am aware, because the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, told me about it, of the deposit return scheme and how that went wrong. I am conscious of that as an issue.

First, the noble Lord, Lord Beith, asks with his amendment whether the GP to whom you have to be a member of the practice can be in Scotland. The answer is no under the Bill at the moment. The Bill is clear that you have to be in a GP’s practice in England or Wales. Everybody has said to me that it is perfectly normal for a person living in England in the border areas to have a GP in Scotland, and asked why cannot we change the Bill to say that your GP could be in Scotland, because that reflects how people actually live.

I am sympathetic to that, but the noble Baroness, Lady Fraser of Craigmaddie, legitimately points out that, if that happened, I would need to make various other changes. For example—and the noble Baroness made this point—under Clause 7, where there is a preliminary discussion it has to be sent to the GP, and the GP has to keep a proper record of it. How can I enforce that unless I expand the provisions of the Bill to allow Scottish enforcement, for which I would need Scottish agreement? My view in relation to the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Beith, is: let us see whether we can make it work, but it will require discussions with Scotland.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

Acknowledging that the amendments that I was referring to were tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, I have nothing to add to the points that I have already made, other than to say that the noble Baroness used the word “average” and therefore there is a question about workability. Therefore, our interpretations on the noble Baroness’s second point do differ.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I indicated my position in my intervention. I will summarise my understanding of the amendment, what my response is and next steps. All the amendments in this group seek a requirement in addition to having a GP before you can have an assisted death. My noble friend Lord Rook suggests having a GP for at least 12 months and having seen him twice before the first declaration. The noble Baronesses, Lady O’Loan and Lady Grey-Thompson, refer to having an “established relationship” with a GP. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, refers to one consultation and a home visit before the application. The noble Baroness, Lady Lawlor, refers to a two-year relationship, an average number of visits face to face and then a letter that relates to the medical condition, the treatment and the state of mind of the patient.

As I have indicated, the GP, in the structure of the Bill, is not somebody who has to be involved. The noble Earl, Lord Howe, encapsulated perfectly that the GP is somebody who is receiving information. All these provisions for making it necessary to have a better relationship with your GP than just having a GP do not touch the safeguards. Quite separately from that, I support what the noble Lord, Lord Deben, and the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said. These provisions have an air of utter unreality if you are saying that a condition of an assisted death is a particular relationship with a particular GP. I do not think that any of these safeguards work or reflect the current drafting of the Bill.

It is clear from listening to the debate that people who are concerned with the care should form a basis for the decision. It may not necessarily be making the decision—a lot of people would say that they should not be making the approval—but their input is vital. That was the insight of the noble Baroness, Lady Gerada, which was very much reflected around the Committee. I am willing and keen to reflect that insight in the Bill. But the route is not through newness in relation to the GP. It is reflecting the proposition that the multidisciplinary team dealing with the patient must have some input. I do not know whether that satisfies the question asked by the noble Earl, Lord Howe, but that is the purpose of what I am taking away from this very valuable debate.

As for the right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Gloucester, we are going to speak about prisoners on the next group. Can I reserve my position in relation to prisoners to avoid there being too much duplication?

In those circumstances, I invite the noble Lords not to press their amendments.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I refer the noble Lord to the provisions within the Bill. His earlier question was very much about policy. I am sure that my noble and learned friend will also refer to this, but this is a matter of policy and therefore it is for Parliament to decide.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I am obliged to noble Lords for all their questions. I will deal with the four issues that this group raises: prisoners, pregnant women, homeless people and those who are the subject of an education, health and care plan.

Turning first to prisoners, I declare my interest as chair of a prison charity, Liberty Kitchen. I have been involved in prison issues for a very long time; indeed, I was once the Minister responsible for prisons. When I was in that role, every time a prisoner committed suicide, it was deemed a failure of the Prison Service and something that we took incredibly seriously.

As far as prisoners are concerned, I will make two points. First, this is about people who are terminally ill and have six months or less to live. The question that the sponsors address is whether prisoners should be treated differently from the rest of the population. The posit is: if you are a prisoner and get a terminal illness, is the condition of the prison so terrible that you should never allow a prisoner ever to have that right?

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Merron and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

The point that I was making just before I sat down was that noble Lords will want to consider the points that I have raised in relation to these amendments. I am sure that they will take into account what the noble Lord has just said too.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful to everybody who has contributed to the debate. I have made my position moderately clear in relation to what we should do—and I sense that the Committee is happy that we should take that course.

I completely understand the points about people aged 18 being impulsive and often emotionally immature. On the point made by the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, that is why the Sentencing Council refers to it. However, it is a different question here as to what the age limit should be. If people are emotionally immature, they will not have a settled view about what to do in these circumstances, but some people will. The noble Lord, Lord Kamall, asked: what happens if there are new developments in medicine that would extend life? The answer is that you would not have six months or less to live, which I think was the answer that he was giving in relation to it.

I have made my position clear. I invite the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, in the light of where we have got to, to withdraw her amendment so that we can move on to the next issue.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I, too, shall be brief. All but three of the amendments in this group have been tabled by the Bill’s sponsor and, as has been discussed, they make a series of drafting changes to the Bill, including making sure that terms are consistent throughout and removing ambiguity and duplication.

The Government are neutral on all the policy choices reflected in these amendments, as they are on the Bill as a whole, but have as usual provided drafting support to make the Bill legally workable. As a part of the discussion today, it is of course for the sponsor and for Parliament to determine whether any of the amendments that the sponsor has chosen to table have changed the intent of amendments that were debated in the other place.

Amendment 7 in this group, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, seeks to amend Amendment 6 by changing a reference in Clause 1(2)(b) from “a preliminary discussion” to “their first preliminary discussion”. It does not make any wider changes to the Bill to provide for more than one preliminary discussion to take place, so this may lead to uncertainty. As with all amendments that have not had technical input from the Government, noble Lords may wish to note that the current drafting of this amendment may require further consideration to make it fully workable, effective and enforceable.

Amendments 8 and 9, on which I raise no major workability issues, appear to be trying to achieve the same purpose as Amendment 6, tabled by the Bill’s sponsor. But I would note that Amendments 8 and 9 have not had the technical drafting support from officials and therefore may not be fully workable, effective and enforceable.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for all the interventions. These changes are only drafting changes. Some legitimate points were made, particularly by the noble Baronesses, Lady Finlay and Lady Lawlor, but they did not really go to the drafting points.

I go to the concerns various Members have expressed. Amendments 6 and 7, tabled by the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, would prevent doctors having a conversation with people—I am not saying this in a bad or a good way, but that is what she wants to do—particularly before they reach 18. There is a point there, but it is nothing to do with the change I have introduced in my Amendment 6. My amendment would simply make it clear that there has to be a preliminary discussion before you can go ahead to assisted death. I have done that to make it clear that it is one of the eligibility conditions; it says nothing about what should be talked about or whether such a conversation should take place under the age of 18.

In fact, as the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, said, Clause 6 states:

“No registered medical practitioner or other health professional shall raise the subject of the provision of assistance in accordance with this Act with a person under the age of 18”.


I do not think that the noble Baroness’s amendment would add to that protection. The key point is that all Amendment 6 is doing is saying that you have to have a Clause 5 discussion.

The next point, raised by a number of Peers, is that I am watering down the protection in relation to domestic abuse. That, as a matter of drafting, is wrong. It is only a matter of convenience that, having defined domestic abuse as including everything so defined in the Domestic Abuse Act 2021, you get coercion, control and economic abuse as forms of domestic abuse. To avoid having to repeat that every time the Bill refers to training, I have simply referred to domestic abuse, and that is then defined at the top of page 41. I very much hope that people will accept that that is the position.

The noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, who is shaking her head, raises a different point about the position in relation to abuse that is not domestic. Perhaps your lawyer is exercising undue influence on you. That is a point that I will respond to in writing, but it is not a point raised by my drafting change, because all the restrictions have been in relation to domestic abuse, not to what the lawyers would call undue influence. But it is a perfectly legitimate point, which I will come back to in correspondence with her.

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure the noble Baroness will understand that I am restricted in the comments that I can appropriately make here. I heard my noble and learned friend Lord Falconer say that all these matters needed consideration, and I am sure that he will expand further on that very point.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will come to that question when I go through the points.

The purpose of Clause 1(1)(c)—namely, that to qualify you have to be ordinarily resident in England and Wales and have been so resident for at least 12 months—is, as noble Lords have said, to avoid people coming here specifically for the purpose of having an assisted death. It therefore would not be adequate to say that people should be ordinarily resident at the moment they apply, because they would have come specifically for that period. Hence you need a period, and 12 months is taken as a reasonable period in relation to that.

The phrase “ordinarily resident” appears right throughout the statute book in a whole range of settings and reflects the policy choice made by regulations or statutes. It says, “We want to give this right to people who permanently live in this country”, using the word “permanently” not in a legal sense but in an ordinary sense. In applying that phrase, the courts have not generally had any real difficulty as to what it means. It is a reflection of this Parliament saying that we want to give particular rights to the people who live here, and sometimes we say, as we are suggesting here, that we do not care what their citizenship status is—if they live here permanently, they get that right. For example, in relation to the National Health Service we say that if people live here permanently, they get that right.

With the greatest respect to the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, the cases have made it pretty clear that you can be ordinarily resident here but have temporary absences abroad—for example, if you go to work as a diplomat abroad, serve in the Armed Forces or take a job that takes you away for two months. The big case is somebody whose family lived here and who went to be educated in India for a period of time, who is still held to be ordinarily resident here. With the greatest respect to the noble Lord, Lord Mackinlay, I do not think that adopting the phrase “ordinarily resident” gives rise either to injustice or to legal difficulties.

I will deal with the points made by individual Peers. I am very sympathetic to the point from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, as I made clear in my intervention. I do not think she was putting in the word “permanently” other than to probe the question of those who live on the Isle of Man or Jersey and get all their medical treatment habitually in England. When the doctor in England says, “I will help you go home to the Isle of Man to get an assisted death”, assuming that it becomes legal in the Isle of Man, the doctor there will be committing a criminal offence under the Bill unless there is an amendment.

The BMA has proposed an amendment that, if you help somebody go home for an assisted death—home being, say, the Isle of Man or Jersey—and it is legal there, that should not be a criminal offence. I talked to the BMA about that. We need to work together to see whether we can get an amendment that satisfies the point that the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, has made. I would welcome her input in relation to this.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Merron and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 21st November 2025 Lords Chamber

[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department of Health and Social Care (Baroness Merron) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken today for their contributions on these important issues. As I have already made clear, I will keep my comments limited to the amendments on which the Government have major legal, technical and/or operational workability concerns.

On that basis, I will speak about Amendments 118 and 118B. Amendment 118, tabled by my noble friend Lord Hunt, could prevent a person from accessing assistance where there is no clear connection between their individual circumstances and the crime that their close relative is under investigation for or has been convicted of, even if the said crime took place some years in the past. Amendment 118B, tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Farmer, would expand the meaning of “close relatives” to include “friends”. It is not clear who would determine the meaning of “friends” in this context. I should also say that disclosure of personal data engages Article 8 of the ECHR and is regulated by the principles set down in the Data Protection Act. Detailed financial assessment of those connected to a person seeking assistance is likely to interfere with the privacy of those individuals, particularly where there are no signs of coercion. The necessity of doing so is difficult to assess in the round rather than considering this on a case-by-case basis.

I turn to Amendments 222 and 612, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Hollins. Amendment 222 proposes a new clause to oblige the Secretary of State to provide specialist psychological assessment and support for persons considering an assisted death and their families. It would also oblige the Secretary of State to establish bereavement support services offering psychological support before an assisted death to all persons concerned. The Bill does not require families to know about an assisted death in advance, so requiring the offer of psychological services to them could create an undeliverable obligation on the Secretary of State.

Amendment 612 would mandate the video recording of a person being assisted to end their own life. The amendment would also require the person to confirm in the video recording their identity, their wish to die of their own free will, their capacity and that they are acting without persuasion or coercion. The amendment would require that this recording is sent to the coroner within 72 hours of death and it would create a regulation-making power for the Secretary of State concerning the practical arrangements for the recording, storing and transmission of the recordings. Requiring that a person’s death be video recorded where they did not wish the event to be recorded could risk being a significant intrusion into their family and private life under Article 8 of the ECHR. Since the Bill includes several safeguards, this intrusion is unlikely to be considered justified, and this amendment could also raise GDPR issues and concerns.

Amendment 460, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, specifies a range of actions the panel must take into account when considering a person’s psychosocial and safeguarding circumstances. It includes a requirement to offer immediate access to safe housing and financial support where abuse is disclosed. As the Bill is drafted, neither the panel nor the commissioner is provided with such a function and it is not clear how this would interact with local authority responsibility for housing provision.

As for the other amendments in this group where I make no detailed comments, although they may be deliverable, some would be challenging to implement. For example, Amendment 47 would require assessing doctors and the panel to assess a person’s state of mind or private thoughts. Amendment 58 would require an assessment of indirect structural disadvantage, including poverty or lack of care. Although I raise specific workability issues with only a small number of amendments in this group, noble Lords will be aware that the other amendments in this group have not had technical drafting support from officials. The issues raised by these other amendments are rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider and decide on, but I note that the way in which they are currently drafted means that they may not be fully workable, effective or enforceable.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, in this debate we heard deeply personal information from the noble Lords, Lord Empey, Lord McCrea, Lord Watts, Lord Polak, Lord Griffiths, Lord Carlile of Berriew and Lord Shinkwin, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Hollins, Lady Hayter and Lady Grey-Thompson. I express my profound respect for people being willing to share in that way. I make it clear that in nothing that I say do I in any way intend to disrespect any of what must have been quite difficult statements to make. I really treasure many of the things that have been said, whether for or against the Bill.

As all noble Lords engaged in the debate know, at the heart of the Bill—there is no dispute about this—the decision to have an assisted death has to be where the patient, to quote the Bill,

“has a clear, settled and informed wish to end their own life, and … has made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and has not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.

There is no dispute in the Committee that there have to be appropriate and sufficient safeguards to ensure that there is no coercion.

The current safeguards in the Bill are as follows: first, a doctor has to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. Secondly, a second doctor has to be satisfied that the person is not being coerced. Thirdly, a panel has to assess that the person is not being coerced. Fourthly, the first doctor—after a period of reflection, in signing a second declaration by the patient—has to be satisfied again that the person is not being coerced. Finally, the doctor providing the assistance has to be at the last moment satisfied that the person is not being coerced.

The two doctors who give the certificate at the beginning must both have had specialist training in domestic abuse, including training on identifying coercive control and domestic abuse, and including identifying the effect of financial control. The panel considering the matter must consist of a psychiatrist, a social worker and a senior lawyer. If either of the two doctors have any doubt about the position in relation to capacity, they have to consult a psychiatrist. Anybody who by dishonesty, coercion or pressure induces the patient to either execute a declaration that they want an assisted death or take the assistance is guilty of a criminal offence. If all that the person does by dishonesty, coercion or pressure is to induce the person to execute a relevant document, the maximum sentence is 14 years. If, on the other hand, if they induce the person to take their own life, then the maximum sentence is life.

The question before the House in this debate is whether those protections are adequate to ensure that there is not coercion. I have before me a number of amendments. Amendment 3 is proposed by the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay: she would like “independent” to come before “decision”. I wholeheartedly agree with her that the decision must be independent, in the sense that it is a free decision made by the person, unpressured or coerced in the way that I have described. I am always influenced by what the noble Earl, Lord Howe, says in relation to that; he said, “Reassure us”. There is no dispute between me and the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, that it has to be an independent decision. Is it clear enough in the Bill? With the deepest respect to both the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, and the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I point out that it specifically says that the person should have

“made the decision that they wish to end their own life voluntarily and … not been coerced or pressured by any other person into making it”.

With respect, I say that it is clear enough on the face of the Bill.

I turn to Amendment 45, that of the noble Baroness, Lady Fox, which would insert “encouraged” in addition to “coerced” and “pressured”. I have thought very carefully about this, and I am against putting it in. The reason is that I see the reality: somebody who is thinking about an assisted death will want to talk frequently to those who love them. They may want to talk to the multidisciplinary team which is looking after them. Let us suppose somebody says, “I really, really want to go now. Should I take that opportunity?” If somebody says, “I encourage you to make the decision that is best for you,”, what the noble Baroness is proposing is that that becomes a criminal offence, potentially imprisonable for 14 years or for life. To me, that does not seem sensible.

I turn to Amendment 46. The noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, asks for “influenced” or “encouraged” to be added. I have dealt with “encouraged”. With regard to “influenced”, the multidisciplinary team or the person’s loved ones may well—with the best motives—influence somebody to go ahead with it. I do not criticise them for that if that is what the person wants and if it helps. It seems to me, again, wholly inappropriate to go beyond “coerced or pressured”.

On Amendment 47, the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, suggests that it should be “external or internally” pressured that one is concerned with. We can understand external pressure—that is, somebody pressurising someone else to do it, and pressure carries with it an inappropriate degree of influence—but how does one in practice deal with an analysis of what would make me, for example, want my life to end? My noble friend Lady Merron also referred to that. The pain, the lack of dignity, the sense that I am not the person that I was in front of my own children is internal pressure. It might include me thinking, “I do not want to go on with this; in part, I’ve only got two or three weeks to live, and I want it to end”. The internal pressure is making me come to that conclusion. It is impossible to ask people, in particular the law enforcement authorities, to investigate what is going on in my mind. I have thought very carefully about that. I reassure the noble Lord, Lord Ashcombe, that I have given each of these amendments very careful thought, because they are important, but, again, I do not think that is a practical solution.

Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Merron and Lord Falconer of Thoroton

Committee stage
Friday 14th November 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

I am sure it would be expected that safety is absolutely paramount. The point I am making—and I look forward to hearing from my noble and learned friend—is that our position in government here is not to deal with matters of policy. As I have said, we are restricted to areas to which any Government would be restricted.

We will absolutely work with the Welsh Government, NHS England and the NHS in Wales to understand the impact of any changes to the law and the provision of healthcare services in Wales, during the coming stages of the Bill.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

My Lords, I make a declaration of interest: I have an assistant who is funded by Mr Bernard Lewis and who helps me on this Bill. I make a declaration that Dignity in Dying paid for the printing of the material that was circulated to Peers in my name before this process commenced.

I compliment the noble Baroness, Lady Coffey, on the short way that she introduced the important issue. I very much hope that I can put to rest most of the misconceptions that were expressed during this debate.

As everybody agrees, criminal law is not devolved to the Welsh Senedd. Therefore, any change in criminal law has to come from the UK Parliament. You cannot proceed with assisted dying without changing the criminal law. Therefore, the UK Parliament has to provide a legislative change for that.

Healthcare is rightly devolved to the Welsh Ministers and the Senedd. The Bill makes provision in England for Ministers to produce regulations on how assisted dying will be implemented and regulated in England. Clause 42 requires Ministers to produce such regulations. It is wrong, as part of the devolution settlement, to require Welsh Ministers who are responsible for health in Wales to do that. It is for the Welsh Government to decide what provision to make. Unlike Clause 41, which relates to England, Welsh Ministers are given the option to introduce such regulations as they see fit. Those regulations will permit the assisted dying process to be introduced in Wales, in the National Health Service, and for Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government to provide whatever provision for it in regulations that they see fit.

The noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, asked why we are legislating for England and Wales but not Scotland at the same time. It is because we are doing exactly what the noble Lord, Lord Gove, asked me to do—and I am so glad he did—which is to respect the devolution settlement. Will the noble Lord let me finish? Then I will come back to him.

The way this structure works is that, first, we in this Parliament determine whether the criminal law should be changed. Secondly, the Welsh Government are given the power to introduce regulations. That power should normally be given to Welsh Ministers by an Act of the Senedd. Therefore, a legislative consent Motion has been proffered by the Welsh Government for the Senedd to decide whether it would be willing to give us consent to legislate in an area that would normally be legislated for in the Senedd.

The LCM—legislative consent Motion—in the Welsh Senedd covers the following. I give these details for noble Lords to consider them at their leisure: Clause 40, which gives Welsh Ministers power to issue guidance; Clause 42, which gives Welsh Ministers power to regulate how this is to be introduced in the health service in Wales and with what regulations; Clause 51, which gives the Welsh Government power to talk about and make regulations about the Welsh language; Clause 54, which gives them a general power to make regulations; and Clause 58, which gives the Welsh Ministers and the Welsh Government power to introduce certain of the provisions.

The sponsor in the other place and I have discussed this arrangement with the Welsh Government, and by that I mean Welsh Ministers and Welsh officials. We have done what the Welsh Government would wish us to do to respect devolution. We have taken these powers in the Bill, subject to Parliament, so that there is not a position where, after this Bill is passed, Welsh Ministers lack the power to introduce regulations if they choose to do so.

I have listened to this torrent of points about Wales saying it has not been thought out. I say with suitable humility that we have thought it out and sought to reflect what good devolution practice would require. I do not invite people to come back, but please think about what I have said and consider—

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[Baroness Merron (Lab)]

My Lords, I am grateful for the insightful contributions that have been made to this debate. I will be very concise on the point. In summary, it is our view that workability concerns are less significant, although the Government are unable to confirm at this stage that the current drafting is fully workable, effective or enforceable. As noble Lords will understand, the amendment has not had technical drafting support from officials.

On this point, if the amendment is passed in isolation, it is likely to have minimal legal effect, as Clause 1 is essentially declaratory rather than operative. The remainder of the Bill would refer to the capacity to make a decision, which, as noble Lords will be aware from the Bill, is to be read in accordance with the Mental Capacity Act 2005.

I anticipate coming later to discussions on amendments to Clause 3, as noble Lords have referred to, as those amendments would change the operation of the Bill. I will comment on proposals when we come to the relevant debate. These issues are, of course, rightly a matter for noble Lords to consider, deciding which test is to be used.

[Lord Falconer of Thoroton (Lab)]

I will deal first with the central issue in this debate, which is the amendment from the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay. The wording currently mentions:

“A terminally ill person in England or Wales who … has the capacity to make a decision”.


The noble Baroness proposes that “capacity” should be changed to “ability”. From what the noble Lord, Lord Wolfson, says, I understand that we should read that with Amendment 115, although there is another amendment that the noble Baroness proposes in relation to Clause 3. But I accept what the noble Lord says in relation to Amendment 2.

With the greatest respect to the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, she is suggesting that we remove “capacity” and replace it with “ability”. The noble Lord, Lord Sandhurst, put his finger on it when he said that “capacity” is well known to the law. You could not possibly have a Bill that did not refer to capacity because what it means, in the eyes of the law and of people in practice, is the ability to make the decision. As the noble Lord, Lord Blencathra, said, if you do not have capacity, you cannot make the decision. That applies right across the doings of human beings, and the law recognises that. If, therefore, you replace “capacity”—