Bank of England (Economic Affairs Committee Report)

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Thursday 2nd May 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I was a member of your Lordships’ Economic Affairs Committee when this report was produced last year, and I am delighted that my noble friend Lord Bridges of Headley has been able to secure this debate today.

As we have heard, the Bank of England acquired independence in relation to monetary policy as one of the Labour Government’s first acts in 1987. At the time, I was a non-executive director on the Court of the Bank of England and so had something of a ringside seat as this unfolded. It was hugely popular in the Bank and, I believe, with almost all the commentators at the time.

The Bank of England was not and is not completely independent of the Government. When it was nationalised in 1947, the Bank of England Act gave the Government various powers over the Bank, including the power to appoint the governor, the deputy governor—who was a singleton at the time, but there are now four—and its Court of Directors.

As was common for nationalisation legislation, which we have fortunately not seen much of in recent years, the Act contained a power of direction that can be exercised by the Treasury, although this does not extend to monetary policy. That power has never actually been used but, when I tried, during the passage of last year’s Financial Services and Markets Bill, to get the Treasury to give it up, it was absolutely sure it needed to keep it, so we must regard this power of direction as a live part of the constitution of the Bank of England. My point is that this means that the Bank of England has only qualified independence—but, importantly, the extent of its independence is in the hands of the Government and of Parliament.

Similarly, monetary policy independence is not absolute, either. The members of the MPC are appointed by the Government and statute defines the monetary policy objective—that of price stability. That is then amplified by letters from the Treasury which, inter alia, tell the Bank what price stability means: that is where we get the inflation rate target. This is just a roundabout way of saying that I do not think we should overstate Bank of England independence. It is not absolute but is always bounded by political decisions. I agree with what the noble Lord, Lord Burns, said about QE raising the important issue of whether further political decisions should be taken to change the scope of the Bank’s independence as we define it.

Our report set out to find out how independence was working in practice. In the inflationary turmoil of the last few years, it is easy to forget that the UK experienced a relatively long period of low and largely stable inflation, from the early 1990s until 2020. It would be wrong, however, to give the credit for that to Bank of England independence. First, my noble friend Lord Lamont, as he explained earlier, introduced in 1992 the concept of publicly targeting the inflation rate. By the time the Bank was given independence in relation to monetary policy, inflation was already at its then target rate of 2.5% in terms of RPI. So the Bank did not bring inflation down. Secondly, as evidence to the committee made plain, there were other factors at play—in particular, the impact of globalisation, which created a benign price environment. None of our witnesses claimed that the years of low and stable inflation were down to central bank independence.

We also looked at the strength of the independence model in light of the inflation experience of the last three years, which has clearly been less than impressive. The model appeared to do well for the first 20-odd years, but more recently it has been tested and found wanting. There have been serious misjudgments about whether the inflation spike which emerged was temporary, and we are still a way off the 2% target, as the OECD charmingly reminded us this morning.

As we have heard, the Bank’s forecasting record is not stellar. An independent review within the Bank in 2015 found that, while the Bank appeared to be in the pack with other central banks, its two-year horizon forecast—the important one in bringing inflation down within target—had, to use the bank-speak in which the report was written,

“statistically significant evidence of inefficiency”.

I think that means that the Bank was not very good at it, and its recent experience has raised even more questions.

As we have heard, last year the Bank commissioned an external review by Dr Bernanke, the former chair of the Fed. The Bank should take credit for that. The conclusion of the report was that the models needed a serious overhaul, and that it needed to move towards more scenario analysis and away from fan charts. However, the narrowness of its terms of reference, which has already been referred to, meant that it did not shed any real light on what went wrong.

As has already been referred to in this debate, several of our witnesses drew attention to what was happening to money supply—fuelled by the continuing QE—in the two years or so before inflation took off. But this barely got a mention by the Bank or MPC members at the time. Some serious thought about what was happening would have been useful, but the Bank is part of a global central bank consensus that has largely ignored money supply for a considerable period of time. I was disappointed, but not surprised, to find that the Bernanke report made no comment on this.

The committee’s conclusion that the Bank’s independence should be preserved was in line with that of our witnesses, but I think the conclusion owes more to sentiment than to hard evidence of the success of the model. I am not arguing that monetary policy independence should be done away with, but we need to see it as a pragmatic judgment which suits politicians and central bankers alike, rather than one with a firm evidence base, and we should be prepared to modify what we mean by independence as new facts emerge.

Of course, the key issue becomes whether the accountability framework surrounding the Bank is strong enough to underpin continuing monetary policy independence. I believe that the Bank failed the British people when it let inflation get out of control, but what has happened as a result of that? The governor has had a few uncomfortable appearances before parliamentary committees, and he has had to write a few letters to the Chancellor. Who takes responsibility for the dire state of modelling found in the Bernanke report? Who carries the can for the damage inflicted on the economy from excessive inflation and the resulting interest rate hikes? It seems that no one does.

I believe that there is outstanding business here. The Government have confirmed their commitment to monetary policy independence, but independence cannot exist in a vacuum. The Government need to reflect on whether that independence has sufficient checks and balances built into it, because independence without strong accountability is a recipe for disaster. The modest recommendation in our report is for a five yearly review by Parliament, and that would be a very good start.

Spring Budget 2024

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Monday 18th March 2024 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I will start by being positive about the Budget and talk about the things that I like. First, tax cuts are good, so I support the reductions in national insurance contributions. This will increase incentives to work.

Secondly, the longer-term ambition to eliminate employee national insurance contributions is excellent and will help to simplify the tax system. The contributory principle has been a fiction for a very long time, although I note that the Benches opposite have not yet caught up with that. I hope that the Chancellor will also look at employers’ national insurance, which is a tax on jobs and therefore a disincentive to job creation. I find it bizarre that we tax people-intensive businesses more highly than capital-intensive ones.

Thirdly, I support the focus on increasing public sector productivity. Too often, fingers are pointed at the private sector when discussing the UK’s poor productivity performance. The 20% or so of our GDP generated in the public sector has often been in negative territory and has been a significant drag on our overall performance. Because the NHS sucks up so much of our public sector resources each year, it was inevitable that the Chancellor would look there first, but my heart sank when I heard him talk about stuffing several billion pounds into NHS IT. The NHS’s history is littered with IT failures and, if the Government go ahead with this, they really must hold NHS England to account and not let it off the hook this time.

Fourthly, I was thrilled that the Laffer curve has been embraced. I have often extolled this in debates in your Lordships’ House. I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Eatwell, on many things, but on this I definitely do not. The reduction in the capital gains tax rate on residential property is pretty small beer in the overall Budget arithmetic, but it is a start, and I hope that the Chancellor will pursue tax rate reductions with more fervour in future. The OBR recognises the dynamic effects of tax changes only to a very limited extent, and the Chancellor must not let the OBR be a roadblock to more reductions in tax rates in the future.

I really wanted to find more things to praise in the Budget. I tried very hard, but I failed. This is yet another Budget which delivers very little to break out of the low-growth, low-productivity rut in which we find ourselves. We have a high-tax economy. Tax at 37% of GDP by 2028 is nothing to be proud of. We have fiscal drag, high marginal rates for individuals, a high rate of corporation tax and windfall taxes, all piled on top of a vastly complex tax system, and these are just some features of our current tax landscape. It is no wonder that, in last year’s tax competitiveness index, the UK was ranked 30th out of 38 countries, three places lower than the previous year.

We also spend too much. Public expenditure is way over 40% of GDP, and while it is on a downward trajectory, nobody really believes that this will last, absent detailed plans of how that is to be achieved. It is possible to get public expenditure down, but it will not be achieved by productivity gains alone. At the end of the day, we will have to stop doing some things. It will be very hard work, but I can see no evidence in the Budget papers of a commitment to doing it.

The Chancellor labelled his Budget

“a Budget for long-term growth”,—[Official Report, Commons, 6/3/24; col. 840.]

but the truth is that it lacks a single-minded focus on growth. The Chancellor’s speech was complacent on our recent dismal growth figures, and failed even to acknowledge that we seem to have slipped into a technical recession in the second half of last year. The Chancellor seems to think that bullying pension funds into investing in UK equities amounts to a pro-growth policy, but I think it amounts to a sub-optimal pensions policy. While I rarely agree with the chairman of the National Infrastructure Commission, he hit the nail on the head last week when he emphasised that pension funds need to invest for the benefit of current and future pensioners, and that means investing in the best investment opportunities wherever they are found.

The new UK-only ISA announced in the Budget is not much more than a gimmick. Apart from its being unlikely to have any significant impact on anything, the consultation shows that this is just another complicated scheme in an already complicated savings landscape. There are already five different types of ISA; we do not need a sixth, especially one which could well prohibit savers from making rational investment decisions. Growth will not come from this tinkering.

A key plank of supply-side reform is deregulation, especially for smaller businesses. It cannot be said too often that businesses just want to be left to get on with running their businesses. Every minute spent on the complex web of regulation which successive Governments have spun around the business world is a minute not spent on wealth creation. Large companies love regulation, because it squashes smaller competitors. A proper Conservative Government would smash through this, but there was not even a mention in this Budget.

I am used to being disappointed by Budgets produced by Conservative Chancellors. This one was no exception.

Autumn Statement 2023

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Wednesday 29th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I warmly welcome my noble friend to her new ministerial brief, but I am sorry that I cannot be as welcoming to the Autumn Statement. I know that all sides of the House, with the possible exception of our Green colleagues, who are not in their places, want to see a significant boost to the UK’s economic growth. They will not find that in this Statement.

Our growth prospects are uninspiring: the OBR says 0.7% next year and only 1.7% at the end of the forecast period. The Chancellor announced quite a lot of allegedly pro-growth policy measures, but the OBR calculated that they would increase potential output by only 0.3% at the end of the forecast period. Of course, that is better than nothing, but it does not transform our economic prospects by a very long way. I and many of my Conservative colleagues believe there are three foundations for growth: low taxes, low regulation and a small state. This Autumn Statement achieves none of these things, and for us it is not surprising that economic growth remains feeble.

On taxes, full expensing has been welcomed by the business community and by many noble Lords today, but it is very expensive and achieves very little. The policy costs £30 billion over the forecast period but produces extra investment of only £14 billion. I cannot see that this is a good use of taxpayers’ money.

A much bigger driver of business investment is the headline rate of corporation tax, which the Chancellor has kept at 25%. This is the main reason that the UK has plummeted down the competitiveness league tables for tax. The latest OECD figures show us at number 30 out of 38 countries.

I am sure that those in work will welcome the national insurance reductions, but they probably do not realise that they are paying for this themselves through fiscal drag. For all the talk in the Autumn Statement about tax cuts, there has been nothing to change the trajectory for this Parliament to be the biggest tax-raising one since the Second World War. Taxes as a percentage of GDP continue on an upward path and are even higher than at this year’s uninspiring Budget.

The Autumn Statement does nothing about reducing the size of the state, with total managed expenditure still around 43% of GDP at the end of the forecast period. The Chancellor missed another opportunity to get rid of the triple lock, which remains one of the biggest fiscal sustainability risks identified by the OBR. I applaud the efforts by my right honourable friend the Secretary of State for Work and Pensions to get more people into work, and to bear down on the bill for out-of-work benefits. However, he is barely making a dent in that bill, or cutting the nearly 9 million economically inactive people of working age who are a major drag on the economy. Apart from welfare, the Autumn Statement said nothing about cutting the size of the state.

Similarly, the Autumn Statement said nothing about cutting regulatory burdens. It bragged that the Government are

“bringing forward an ambitious package to supercharge small and medium sized enterprises”.

I got quite excited about this, until I read five meagre paragraphs. These include something on faster payments —I have lost count of the number of times that faster payments have been announced as an initiative—and something arcane about HMRC rewriting its guidance on the tax deductibility of training costs. SMEs need something more transformative than this.

The Chancellor announced in his Statement that he had 110 growth measures. I had expected the Autumn Statement documents to set them out. There are some costings covering 67 policy decisions in chapter 5 of the Statement, and a separate policy costings document which has detail under 55 headings. However, quite a lot of these could not conceivably be regarded as growth measures. Chapter 5 also has 200 paragraphs on policy decisions, some of which presumably have growth implications, but this is not always clear. The OBR has some analysis of the main policy decisions, but it does not reference the growth ones specifically, so I cannot find anything that says, “These are the 110 growth measures”. My question for my noble friend the Minister is: what are the 110? If nothing in the public domain sets them out, will she undertake to write to me and put a copy in the Library of what those 110 measures actually entail? I should be clear that if even by some miracle she has a list of the 110 measures in her briefing for this evening, this is not an invitation to her to read them out.

GDP growth of 1.7% at the end of the forecast period is nothing to be proud about. We must not be self-congratulatory about merely being in the pack with other G7 countries. This country needs more ambition and more imagination—certainly much more than this Autumn Statement provides.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Vere of Norbiton (Con)]

I will probably write to the noble Lord with clarity on that, because I would like to make a little progress.

A number of noble Lords tried to pull out one element of the Autumn Statement and made the point that it will benefit rich people more than poor. One cannot look at one measure in isolation. The Government have conducted extensive assessment of the policies announced both in this Autumn Statement and in previous years. It shows that, across all government decisions dating back to the 2019 spending round, the combined impact of tax, welfare and public services spending measures has benefited the lowest-income households the most.

I will touch briefly on welfare reforms. I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Jackson for his support for these reforms. We want to see people who can work be able to work; we are absolutely willing to provide support for them.

The right reverend Prelate the Bishop of Manchester mentioned mental health. I agree with him that we must confront this issue in our country. It remains a priority for the Government. Alongside other recent mental health interventions, the back to work plan includes nearly £800 million over five years to expand talking therapies for those with mild or moderate conditions, as well as individual placements and support to be delivered within community mental health schemes for those with more serious conditions.

I will write to noble Lords on a couple of other things. I come back to growth because it is undeniable that growth in many developed nations has been difficult. Since 2010, when this Government first came to power, the UK has grown faster than many of its competitors, including France, Germany, Italy, Spain and Japan. Would I like to see us grow even faster than we currently are? Absolutely—indeed, the growth trajectory is on an upward trend after the first two years. The noble Lord, Lord Livermore, did not quite get to those numbers but they are higher, peaking at 2% a year. This Autumn Statement is focused on creating sustainable growth without adding to inflation or overall borrowing. It is sensible supply-side interventions that boost business investment.

This is in stark contrast to the plans set out by the party opposite, such as they are. It is not clear to me which parts of the Autumn Statement the Labour Party actively oppose or would do substantially differently, and the noble Lord, Lord Livermore, has not enlightened me. So not only do we have a cut-and-paste shadow Chancellor; it seems we have a cut-and-paste shadow Exchequer Secretary too. It is worth reflecting on the much-vaunted flagship Labour spending policy of £28 billion. For clarity, that is £28 billion per year. In the absence of significant tax rises or substantial cuts to public spending—and only the former is in the traditional Labour playbook—this £28 billion per year will just add to our national debt, piling pressure on future generations and busting through fiscal rules. As I said, this Conservative Autumn Statement is about sensible supply-side reforms to support British businesses and boost productivity.

The noble Lord, Lord Howarth, asked whether full expensing represents value for money. The Government have prioritised the business tax cut as a targeted way to support businesses which invest. It does this by reducing the cost of capital for UK companies. This policy will drive 0.1% GDP growth in the next five years, increasing to slightly below 0.2% in the long run. Whereas the benefits of the policy will grow over time, the costs will reduce. Full expensing brings forward relief that would otherwise be claimed over decades, meaning that the costs are highest in the policy’s introduction.

The noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, talked about a productivity council. The Government take a range of advice on matters of growth and productivity from all sorts of organisations, including public sector organisations such as the National Infrastructure Commission and the Competition and Markets Authority, but also from academics, think tanks and businesses. While I respect his idea, at the moment we will probably not take it forward.

There was some interesting comment around the pension reforms. The noble Lord, Lord Davies, welcomed the proposals. He asked for the timing of implementation of changes to retired benefit schemes. This will become clearer when the consultation period has completed. I will write on the second question about pensions, because I am conscious that I will imminently run out of time.

My noble friend Lord Northbrook and the noble Lord, Lord Lee of Trafford, asked why the Government are not bringing back the VAT retail export scheme. The Government continue to accept representations from industry regarding the tourist tax and are considering all returns carefully. It is about providing very robust evidence on this. At the moment, we feel that it is a little lacking.

The noble Baroness, Lady Featherstone, talked about the creative industries. There is a large number of specific asks for a very specific sector, so I will certainly write.

It is also worth noting some of the more general discussions that noble Lords had today, and I hope will continue to have in the future. There were considerations around the size and shape of the state, the amount of contributions that should come from taxpayers, and, from the noble Lord, Lord O’Neill, public versus private sector investment. My noble friend Lord Willetts talked about the shape of the state. These are things to mull on, definitely. They will not change government policy today or in the near future but are really important issues that should be debated.

I second what my noble friend Lady Noakes said about regulation. We need to look at regulation as our economy develops. It is most helpful for the Government when noble Lords can go into specifics. I am always very happy to hear about specific regulations that we feel are not fit for purpose and which need to be improved.

Also, to my noble friend Lady Noakes, on the 100-plus measures, I say that the details can be found in the “Policy Decisions” chapter of the Autumn Statement document.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My request was quite simple. I did say that there were 200 paragraphs in Chapter 5 and a number of policy costings, but none of them actually shows what amounts to the 110, which was one of the leading statements made by my right honourable friend the Chancellor in his Autumn Statement. I am simply asking: which are the 110? Does my noble friend undertake to let me have that information if she cannot provide it now?

King’s Speech

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Monday 13th November 2023 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, there is predictably little in the gracious Speech on the Government’s economic policies, other than a reference to the Government’s focus on increasing economic growth. I know the Government believe in growth, but sadly I have often struggled to reconcile this with their actual policies. I am, however, an optimist and I am looking forward to next week’s Autumn Statement. I hope it will set out some clear policies to support a healthy and growing economy. I will be looking for three things: lower taxes, less regulation and a smaller state.

First, a high-tax economy is not a healthy economy. The current tax burden is around 37% of GDP. This Parliament is on track to be the biggest tax-raising one since the Second World War, higher even than that of the first term of the Blair Government. Thirty years ago, the UK was several percentage points below G7 and EU levels of tax, and we are now broadly on a par with them. If we look at the economies that are growing rapidly, we rarely find them carrying that level of taxation.

Our corporation tax headline rate of 25% is quite simply anti-growth. No amount of relief for R&D or investment will change this, because headline rates are often a deciding factor in major investment decisions. The 25% rate is the key driver of the UK plummeting down the international tax competitive league tables. This year, we are 30th out of 48 OECD countries. For corporation taxes alone, we have fallen 17 places in the last year. This is shocking. We certainly cannot tax our way to economic growth, but the depressing thing is that our current corporation tax policies are doing the exact opposite. Our personal taxes are no better. In the last three years, frozen tax rates and thresholds have pulled around 4 million more people into the tax net and 1.6 million have moved into higher tax brackets.

The Government’s addiction to fiscal drag means that as many as one in five taxpayers will be paying the higher income tax rates. Very high marginal rates around the thresholds exacerbate this and create perverse incentives. Lower tax rates do not have to result in lower tax yields, as my late noble friend Lord Lawson of Blaby demonstrated when he was Chancellor. Low rates liberate the economy and higher activity, and that drives higher tax yields.

My second area is less regulation. We may have taken back control from the EU, but we have done little to relieve regulatory burdens, especially on SMEs. Big businesses love regulation, because it acts as a barrier to entry. We need to smash those barriers down to unleash the growth potential in our smaller businesses. The Government and their quangos need to get serious about deregulation, especially in the SME space.

Thirdly, we need a smaller state. The size of the Civil Service is shocking. Having wrestled the numbers down to around 385,000 in 2016, the numbers have gone back up again to around half a million. Quangos employed nearly 320,000 people in 2020, up nearly threefold since 2008. What on earth is going on? The public sector needs to stop doing things. Cancelling the white elephant of HS2 was a good start, but there is much more that needs to be done.

At some point, the Government, whichever party is in power, will have to face the fact that the NHS monolith needs serious reform. It eats up around 40% of day-to-day government spending and it has an insatiable appetite for taxpayers’ money, but it does not deliver a world-class health system. Even the British public are starting to realise that their precious NHS is letting them down.

I conclude with energy. I have been much encouraged by the Government’s new pragmatism on vehicles and on gas boilers, as well as by the announcement in the King’s Speech that there will be more licensing of oil and gas fields. Energy policies need to be affordable today or they will undermine our economic growth ambitions. It is time to get real and take net zero off its pedestal.

Amendments of the Law (Resolution of Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited) Order 2023

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Wednesday 19th April 2023 Grand Committee

[The Parliamentary Secretary, HM Treasury (Baroness Penn) (Con)]

Noble Lords will be aware that Silicon Valley Bank UK Limited, or SVB UK, was sold on Monday 13 March to HSBC. Customers of SVB UK are now able to access their deposits and banking services as normal. This transaction was facilitated by the Bank of England, in consultation with the Treasury, using powers granted by the Banking Act 2009. In doing so, we limited risks to our tech and life sciences sector and safeguarded some of the UK’s most promising companies, protecting customers, financial stability and the taxpayer. We were able to achieve this outcome—the best possible outcome—in short order, without any taxpayer money or government guarantees. There has been no bailout, with SVB UK instead sold to a private sector purchaser. This solution is a win for taxpayers, customers and the banking system.

SVB UK has become a subsidiary of HSBC’s ring-fenced bank. Ring-fencing requires banking groups that hold over £25 billion of retail deposits to separate their retail banking from their investment banking activities. The regime provides a four-year transition period for an entity acquired as part of a resolution process before it becomes subject to the ring-fencing requirements. As a result of this existing provision in legislation, SVB UK is not currently subject to ring-fencing requirements. However, HSBC UK, SVB UK’s parent company, remains subject to the ring-fencing regime.

To facilitate this transaction, the Economic Secretary to the Treasury laid in both Houses of Parliament on Monday 13 March a statutory instrument using the powers under the Banking Act 2009 to broaden an existing exemption in ring-fencing legislation with regard to HSBC’s purchase of SVB UK. This is the first time that the Treasury was required to use these powers since the resolution of Dunfermline Building Society in 2009. I note that the Secondary Legislation Scrutiny Committee has raised this statutory instrument as an instrument of interest in its 35th report, published on 30 March.

This exemption allows HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide below-market-rate intragroup funding to SVB UK. This was crucial for the success of HSBC’s takeover of SVB UK, because it ensured that HSBC was able to provide the necessary funds to its new subsidiary. HSBC has since stated publicly that it has so far provided approximately £2 billion of liquidity to SVB UK, money that it needed to continue to meet the needs of its customers. The Bank of England and the Prudential Regulation Authority fully support this modification to the ring-fencing regime as a necessary step to facilitate the sale.

In view of the urgency, and given that this statutory instrument was crucial in enabling the sale, the Treasury determined that it was necessary to lay this instrument using the “made affirmative” procedure under the powers in the Banking Act 2009. Parliament provided the Treasury with these powers for exactly these situations: recognising that exceptional circumstances can arise where the Government must take emergency action in the interests of financial stability, depositors and taxpayers.

The statutory instrument also makes a number of modifications to the Financial Services and Markets Act 2000 in relation to the rule-making powers of the Prudential Regulation Authority and the Financial Conduct Authority. Specifically, these rule-making powers are modified to ensure that the regulators can exercise them effectively, where these powers relate to the Bank of England’s transfer of SVB UK to HSBC and write-down of SVB UK’s shareholders and certain bondholders. The statutory instrument also waives the requirement for the regulators to consult on certain rule changes related to the sale.

In addition to the statutory instrument we are debating today, the Government will also lay a further statutory instrument to make further changes to the ring-fencing regime with regard to HSBC’s purchase of SVB UK. This is to permit SVB UK to remain exempt from the ring-fencing rules beyond the four-year transition period, subject to certain conditions. Unlike the legislation we are debating today, this second exemption is not required immediately and will be introduced in due course. The second exemption was also crucial to the success of the sale of SVB UK, as it ensures that it can remain a commercially viable stand-alone business as part of the HSBC Group.

A clear determination was made by the Bank of England and supported by the Government that these amendments were crucial to facilitating the purchase of SVB UK by HSBC. The UK has a world-leading tech sector with a dynamic start-up and scale-up ecosystem, and the Government are pleased that a private sector purchaser has been found. Therefore, I hope noble Lords will join me in supporting this legislation. I beg to move.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as a shareholder in UK banks which are subject to the ring-fencing regime. My husband and I hold shares in HSBC, which will benefit from this order, and in both NatWest and Lloyds, which are subject to the ring-fencing rules but do not derive a benefit from this order. I think my registered interests in this case probably cancel each other out.

I should say that I have never been a big fan of ring-fencing. The triple whammy of an electrified ring-fence, elaborate resolution planning and higher capital and liquidity requirements have imposed a very high set of costs on UK banks which can in the long run result only in disbenefits for UK bank customers —that is, all of us. I do, however, believe passionately in fair competition and level playing fields, and my concern about this order—and, more so, the one that we are promised that will come later—is that it distorts competition and creates an unlevel playing field by creating unfair advantage for one particular bank in relation to the ring-fencing rules.

I completely understand that the Bank of England had to operate under pressure to achieve a sale of Silicon Valley Bank over a weekend and that avoided having to place it into an insolvency procedure, and we owe the Bank a debt of gratitude for what it achieved over that weekend. But there are some aspects of the transaction—and therefore this order—which I find mysterious. I am also, as I said, concerned that HSBC has obtained an unfair competitive advantage compared with other UK banks, so I have some questions to put to my noble friend.

First, SVB UK is not a ring-fenced bank under UK legislation and it remains outside that legislation. Why did the Bank not agree to sell the bank to HSBC itself rather than to HSBC’s UK ring-fenced subsidiary? Had it done that, I do not believe that any special legislation would have been necessary. HSBC operates a narrow definition of ring-fencing—unlike other UK ring-fenced banks—such that the majority of its commercial customers are serviced within the non-ring-fenced part of HSBC. Why was it decided to place Silicon Valley Bank UK into the ownership of the ring-fenced bank? Would it not have been more appropriate to have put it somewhere else within the HSBC Group along with other commercial customers?

Secondly, what activities of Silicon Valley Bank UK would disqualify it from being housed within a ring-fenced bank? Commercial banking business can be satisfactorily included within a ring-fenced bank provided that the business within the ring-fenced bank is in effect plain vanilla business—that is, conventional lending and very simple derivatives, which are allowed. What does Silicon Valley Bank UK do which would disqualify it from being placed properly within the UK ring-fence of HSBC, and what policy grounds make it necessary to allow the ring-fenced bank to own this kind of business when it cannot carry out that business itself?

Thirdly, the Minister has said that the order was necessary to allow HSBC’s ring-fenced bank to provide funding out of the ring-fence at preferential rates to Silicon Valley Bank UK. Why was this funding not provided out of HSBC’s other, non-ring-fenced resources? Of course, I can see the attraction to HSBC of using the cheap funds that it has from its ring-fenced depositors, but the ring-fence regime was set up precisely to stop such funds leaching out of the ring-fence. Related to that, is there any limit on the amount of funding that HSBC UK can provide from within the ring-fence to Silicon Valley Bank in breach of the ring-fencing philosophy, and if there is not a limit, why not? Are there any limits to the generosity with which the ring-fenced bank can provide the funds, since it is going to be providing at rates below market rates? Will there be any limit to that degree of discount that it will allow, and again, if not, why not?

Fourthly, can the Minister confirm that Silicon Valley Bank UK will not be allowed to form part of HSBC UK’s Bank Domestic Liquidity Sub-group, or DoLSub, and that liquidity will be monitored separately for the ring-fenced and non-ring-fenced parts of HSBC UK? If that is not the case, can the Minister explain the position on how liquidity is to be managed and monitored within the ring-fenced bank and its new subsidiary?

Lastly, it is clear that the intention is to provide some long-term exemptions from the ring-fencing regime, and the Minister referred to this. I appreciate that the precise details may not yet be finalised, but will the Minister set out what exemptions are likely to involve? I believe that the Minister said that this would be in a separate statutory instrument and therefore Parliament would be able to look at that, but it would be good if she could confirm that. My main concern when we come to the second order is whether it will be fair and reasonable for ring-fencing exemptions to be provided on a long-term basis, which disadvantages other UK banks which have to operate completely within the ring-fence rules. Put another way, when considering the case for HSBC to be allowed special treatment, will the Government ensure that they consider the case for equivalent relaxations to be more generally available? I look forward to my noble friend the Minister’s response.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

My Lords, first, let me say that obviously we will support this order—although I cannot see any way in which one could not. In retrospect, it confirms the regulatory adjustments that were necessary or enabled the efficient rescue of Silicon Valley Bank UK and the transfer of ownership to HSBC, effectively protecting customers from the implications of the collapse of the US parent. We need to congratulate the Government, or the Treasury, the Bank of England and indeed the industry—Coadec, Tech London Advocates and BVCA—for acting together, co-operating and moving swiftly to make sure that a problem did not turn into a crisis or catastrophe.

That said, I have a whole series of questions. I am incredibly grateful to the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, who in far more detail and far more effectively than me raised the relevant questions on ring-fencing. Where she and I slightly disagree is on her request that, if there is going to be a long-term exemption that gives a competitive advantage to HSBC, let us let everybody have it, whereas I am concerned about the undermining of ring-fencing in a fundamental way. I can understand that sometimes one has to act to undermine ring-fencing on a short-term basis, but this has pinned into it that second exemption, which effectively makes this a life-long exemption.

I will not repeat the points that the noble Baroness made. I have a lot of them down on the piece of paper in front of me, but she made those points so well that I think the Minister needs only to hear them once—they were so detailed and rightly crafted. We have to understand whether to some extent the Government are pre-running the changes that they anticipate making under the Edinburgh proposals. We saw that with previous financial services Bills, when powers were given to the regulator ahead of the consultation processes that would all be relevant to it, so the consultation process then led to a phase 2 or part 2 Bill that came in later. I am very anxious to understand whether this is reflective of the Government’s approach to ring-fencing from now on—in other words, that they no longer intend to separate retail banking from investment banking.

I recommend to everybody the work that we did in the Parliamentary Commission on Banking Standards, in taking evidence for more than two years. The reasons for ring-fencing retail banking from investment banking were multiple and complex, and certainly included culture. Retail banking is essentially a utility and investment banking is very different in its risk profile. There is no question but that some of the misbehaviour that we saw in retail banks, PPI being just one of many examples, was inspired by that cross-cultural flow between the investment bank and the retail bank.

It was also true that many risks that we saw banks take, which were entirely inappropriate and not well understood and which led to a crash, for which we all continue to suffer, were inspired by access to what was seen as very cheap and easy money—money sitting in retail deposits, checking accounts and saving accounts, and not protected to a certain degree by insurance, which took away any sense of responsibility to customers. Banks took on risks that they would not have been able to take on had they been financing themselves wholly in the financial markets, because the markets would have recognised those risks and demanded far higher returns if they were going to finance such activities. So that access to a pool of cheap money was absolutely critical to the structures that led to the financial crash of 2007-08. I am really concerned that we have changes here that foreshadow a much more extensive undermining of ring-fencing, and I hope that the Minister will respond to those broader issues, as well as to the detail that the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes, asked for.

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[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Before my noble friend leaves this point, I do not think she has addressed the question of why the ring-fence resources had to be used to do this. HSBC is very large and has very large UK operations that are not within the ring-fence, so I have been probing—and I know that the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is also interested in this—why the ring-fence has to be used. Why did the ring-fence exemption have to be used, because it is clearly not necessary in any absolute sense for HSBC to provide liquidity support to Silicon Valley Bank out of the ring-fence?

[Lord Tunnicliffe (Lab)]

In bringing this back to us, as the Minister will have to do for the second SI, and responding to these questions, can we have some analysis of the competitive advantage that HSBC will get out of this transaction?

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I am afraid I have to disappoint noble Lords and say that I have no further comment to make on the decision to purchase it by the ring-fenced bank. It was a commercial decision for HSBC.

My noble friend had some other questions on the use of the ring-fenced bank. She asked what activities SVB UK undertakes that are not allowed under the ring-fence regime. SVB UK provides lending to certain types of financial institutions, such as venture capital funds, which is not allowed under the ring-fencing regime. It also provides certain equity-related products in relation to its lending, which is also not allowed under the ring-fence regime. She also asked whether I could confirm that SVB UK will not be added to HSBC’s domestic liquidity subgroup. That is a matter for the regulator to decide.

All three noble Lords asked about the implications for competition and whether this move has given a competitive advantage to HSBC. The exemption is limited to the acquisition of SVB UK by HSBC, and was necessary to facilitate this acquisition—something I think all noble Lords welcomed. As Sam Woods explained at the TSC recently, a necessary condition of HSBC moving forward was that it could keep the entirety of SVB UK as one business. The value was in the integrated nature of the business, and HSBC could make that work only if it had it as a subsidiary of HSBC UK, the ring-fenced bank.

It is also worth reiterating that SVB UK remains very small compared to HSBC. Its assets amount to around £9 billion compared to HSBC’s $3 trillion group balance sheet.

To come on to the second statutory instrument and the permanent exemption from ring-fencing for SVB UK, the second exemption was also crucial, as it ensures that SVB UK can remain a commercially viable stand-alone business, as part of HSBC UK. It will be subject to conditions, which are intended to ensure that the exemption is limited to what was needed to facilitate the sale of SVB UK. We will set out details of those conditions alongside the second statutory instrument, which noble Lords will have the opportunity to debate. Alongside that, as I said earlier, the PRA outlined in its response to the Treasury Select Committee that it has a range of tools that it can and will draw on to ensure the effective supervision of HSBC and the protection of retail deposits.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Can I just clarify something with my noble friend? I can just about understand why, for the transaction to happen over the weekend, HSBC was allowed to bully the other participants into breaking the ring-fence rules to allow it to be set up. However, allowing a permanent change means that the ring-fenced bank will be allowed to provide liquidity, and presumably capital as well, on advantageous terms to a bank which can be used as a growth vehicle within HSBC, thereby increasing the risk to ring-fenced funds. I understand why you might have to do that initially, to get the deal through, but I do not understand whether there are any limits at all on what can happen after the acquisition has happened. These permissions have been set up in a way, and are likely to continue in a way, that will allow Silicon Valley Bank to continue to operate in a way that is completely antithetical to the ring-fenced banking regime. As I have said, I am not a fan of it, but I have a strong objection to one bank being allowed to operate in a distinctly different way from other banks.

[Baroness Kramer (LD)]

I shall just add something, so that the Minister does not have to repeat herself constantly. The Minister was very clear that the flow of funds out of the ring-fenced HSBC would go into the hands of a body that will then use it to fund venture capitalists. That is not normally permitted under the ring-fence because it is a very high-risk speculative activity. The whole purpose of ring-fencing is to split activity like that away from the utility role of retail banks. Since there is, apparently, no constraint on the amount of money that can be moved, it has just opened up a massive chasm in the separation, and a massive advantage for one particular high street bank versus the others. I think that the Minister said that the amount of money that could be moved was limitless —so it is really a big issue.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 23rd March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have put my name to two of the amendments tabled by the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, in this group: Amendments 243A and 243B, which would require the super-affirmative procedure to be used. I have not added my name to Amendment 241G. I am in complete sympathy with the call for Parliament to be able to amend statutory instruments; I pay tribute to the work done by the committees chaired by my noble friends Lord Blencathra and Lord Hodgson of Astley Abbotts. They have highlighted the dangerous shift to skeleton legislation with the resultant reliance on secondary legislation, which has inflicted great harm on Parliament’s ability to scrutinise and hold the Executive to account.

On the other hand, I recognise that this is a large issue that needs to be taken forward at a high level within both Houses of Parliament, and also of course with the Government. I do not believe that this Bill is the right place to start that process, although I do believe that we need to find a way of progressing the dialogue to find a way forward. I am of course concerned about the parliamentary processes around the many statutory instruments that will come under the powers in this Bill. The super-affirmative procedure is certainly better than the ordinary affirmative procedure, which is why it has my support.

In adding my name to these amendments, I am in fact hitching a ride on them in order to raise some wider issues about the statutory instruments that will come forward once this Bill is made law. This is an issue that should probably have been debated earlier in Committee but I have only recently been made aware of it. I have given my noble friend the Minister only a very small amount of notice of the nature of my concerns; I accept that she may not be able fully to answer at the Dispatch Box today.

The amendments focus on parliamentary oversight of legislation being brought in by statutory instrument. What I think we have not focused on is whether there will be adequate consultation by the Treasury before the statutory instruments are laid in Parliament. Many of the statutory instruments will of course be uncontroversial in the sense that they will merely recreate the EU law in a UK-based framework for the rules that will then be made by regulators.

However, it is entirely possible, as the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, said, that the statutory instruments will contain significant changes from EU law. Clause 4, which allows the restatement of EU law, can be used to incorporate changes to the law within the huge range of possibilities that are allowed for by Clause 2(3). There is no requirement in Clause 4 for the Treasury to consult anyone at all before laying these statutory instruments. This is in stark contrast to the regulators, who have very clear statutory obligations to consult in respect of any rules they will be laying under the terms of the statutory instruments that give them the power.

In addition to Clause 4—this is the actual example that has come to my attention—the Treasury might choose to use the new designated activities power in Clause 8 to set up the replacement regulatory regime under UK law. As with Clause 4, the use of the Clause 8 power does not require the Treasury to consult anyone at all. The example that has been brought to my attention concerns the prospectus regime. I am indebted to the briefing provided to me by a partner in one of the Magic Circle law firms.

As part of the Edinburgh package, the Government published a policy note and a draft statutory instrument on how they intended to replace the EU prospectus rules. Put simply, the designated activities regime will be used to create the new prospectus regime when the existing EU law is repealed. The publication of the draft statutory instrument and the policy note was well received because it allowed those who specialise in this territory to get to grips with the proposed legal framework. Although the policy note was clear that the drafting was not final, it was not clear whether there would be a proper consultation on the new regime.

By way of background, there was a policy intent to deal with the issue of mini-bonds in the light of the London Capital & Finance scandal; that policy is, of course, uncontroversial. The Government were clear in their policy note that they intended to affect retail investors only and did not intend to cover things that were regulated elsewhere. It appears, however, that the chosen vehicle of relevant securities, as defined in the draft statutory instrument, also captures things with no likely impact on the retail market, including—somewhat incredibly—over-the-counter derivates and some loans, securities and financial transactions. I believe that this analysis has been made available to the Treasury via various players in the wholesale financial markets.

Although I understand that communications are constructive, there is a fundamental problem emerging: the so-called illustrative statutory instrument now seems to have morphed into a pre-final document on which no formal consultation will be held. This is important, given the significant widening of the reach of the proposals, well beyond the existing prospectus regime. I would be grateful if my noble friend the Minister could set out how the Government see the next steps for the prospectus statutory instrument and whether formal consultation will occur. I hope that she will be able to respond not only on the particular issue of the prospectus statutory instrument but, more broadly, on the extent to which the Treasury will consult across the range of replacement EU law when it brings that law forward.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I declare my interest as stated in the register.

I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, on finding a way to amend statutory instruments. If it really is possible to change what noble Lords have always believed about SIs, that is welcome news indeed. As the noble Lord says, this procedure would be used only on the rare occasions when your Lordships’ House or another place considered it vital.

I support the noble Lord’s Amendments 243A and 243B, to which my noble friend Lady Noakes has added her name. These would create a super-affirmative category of approval process, introducing a higher bar but only after a resolution is made by either House of Parliament. I also agree with the points made by my noble friend on the prospectus directive and other matters. I support all these amendments.

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[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The Government will make those changes only within the agreed scope set out in the Bill. That is perhaps why the DPRRC was content with the approach that they were taking.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Does my noble friend accept that the specification in Clause 3 allows for very significant changes to be made? There are many heads under which the Government could fit a change in policy, and that policy change could be significant in the context of the restatement of EU law.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The intention is to allow for the restatement within EU law or to adapt it to a situation or circumstances within the UK. As I have said, in undertaking that work the Government will seek to undertake a combination of formal consultation and informal engagement appropriate to the changes being made. As set out in the Government’s policy statement on the repeal of retained EU law in financial services, the Government aim to balance the need to deliver much-needed reforms with the need to consult industry and stakeholders. They will take the decision on the approach to this on a case-by-case basis.

I wanted to address my noble friend’s specific question on the prospectus regime. The Government intend—

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 21st March 2023 Grand Committee

My Amendment 241D would require any modification or revocation of the relevant principles established in the Financial Services (Banking Reform) Act 2013 and FiSMA 2000 to come before Parliament in primary legislation. This decision is so fundamental that it is one that Parliament should make.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, the banking commission did sterling work in the years after the banking crisis, helping shape the content of the banking reform legislation. However, I cannot support these amendments because they are trying to set the findings of that conclusion in concrete, to apply for all time. One thing we know is that times change—sometimes for the better, sometimes for the worse. Having constantly to hark back to what the banking commission said before any sensible changes can be made under the existing available rules seems the wrong direction of travel.

If there was one thing that the HSBC/Silicon Valley Bank episode showed, it was the rigidity of the ring-fencing rules, which were effectively one of the great successes of the banking commission in making sure that rigid rules were set in statute. What had to happen to facilitate HSBC’s acquisition and takeover of Silicon Valley Bank were special statutory exemptions via a statutory instrument. The result was that HSBC now has permanent changes to the ring-fencing regime for it alone, which may well end up with it having permanent competitive advantage over its other rival ring-fenced banks in the UK.

We need to learn lessons from what has happened over recent weeks; the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, is absolutely right about that. I would be interested if my noble friend the Minister could give more of an idea on the timing of when we might get a lessons-learned report—I think she spoke about that when she first spoke at the Dispatch Box about the HSBC takeover. The answer is not necessarily that we should be taking less risk and making things more difficult to happen, as that is not necessarily the right conclusion from what went wrong.

I hope that the Government will not be frightened by the recent events into not carrying out some reforms of ring-fencing. They have shown themselves willing to consider some sensible reforms to make sure that ring-fencing works well, particularly with regard to small and medium-sized banks. Only a few weeks ago in Committee the noble Baroness, Lady Kramer, agreed that the MREL rules caused a particular problem in the UK; indeed, she said that she constantly reminded the chief executive of the PRA about that. There is an issue about how the rules apply to small and medium-sized banks in the UK. We have to remember that the thresholds used to establish what is a small and medium-sized bank in the UK are way below the thresholds which were increased by the Republicans and which may well have contributed to the problems with Silicon Valley Bank in the US.

I hope that the Government will press on with their consultation on ring-fencing and on the senior managers regime. Having been on the receiving end of the senior managers and certification regime for the nine years that I was on the board of what is now NatWest, I know that it is very bureaucratic and inefficient, and it does not necessarily target the kind of things that people thought it was going to be targeting at the time. It is therefore time to step back and ask whether this is the best way of achieving the objectives, which are to ensure that people take responsibility for their actions. What this has ensured is that there is a whole industry of chopping down forests, in order to fill files of evidence that you have taken reasonable steps to carry out your responsibilities, and I do not think that was the intended outcome of the reforms at the time.

I therefore make a plea: let us not get panicked by what has happened in recent weeks into not accepting that there is a good case for reviewing both the ring-fencing and the SMCR rules. I have nothing to say on insurance because it is not my specialist subject.

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[Lord Eatwell (Lab)]

My Lords, on the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Holmes, surely these regulations are derived from the Financial Action Task Force. We would usurp international agreements if we modified our regulations in a way that was outwith the positions established by the FATF.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I completely accept that we need to comply with the Financial Action Task Force regulations but, as we discovered the other day when we were discussing PEPs, the regulations we have in the UK have in some instances gone beyond what is actually required by the Financial Action Task Force. The issue with the KYC regulations is one of immense bureaucracy and great irritation for people to no particular end. It is worth looking again at whether the way we have drafted our regulations, to the extent they go beyond what we are required to do, has in turn led to more problems for individuals.

I am sure we have all had problems but I will share one with the Committee. My husband had a very small investment—way below the level at which it would have to be declared as one of my interests in your Lordships’ House—and there was periodic updating of the know your client regulations. Because of the way that firm’s forms were comprised, it refused to accept my noble friend Lady Neville-Rolfe’s signature attesting that the document was a fair copy, because she could not tick a particular box on the form. It was completely ludicrous.

That permeates the way many financial service institutions have come to apply these rules in practice. They have become highly bureaucratic, operated by people who probably have no common sense and possibly not even a brain. To go back to the regulations and see what is absolutely required and then follow it on through the FCA seems a really important thing.

[Earl Attlee (Con)]

My Lords, although I agree with everything my noble friend Lady Noakes said, I point out that I have discussed Peter’s case at a very senior level with his bank and I can absolutely understand the decision the bank made. It looked at it very carefully, but it cannot take the risk because it is dealing with Ukrainian businessmen of whom it knows very little.

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 13th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Bennett of Manor Castle (GP)]

My Lords, I rise briefly to offer Green support for this amendment and to agree entirely with everything that has been said thus far. I feel a sense of déjà vu all over again. I was just looking back at the comments I made in 2021, when, it is worth noting for the record, this issue of mortgage prisoners went to ping-pong: the House of Lords passed an amendment, and it went back and forth between the two Houses. Back then, we were talking about people suffering under high rates of 4% or 5%, and some were suffering with the vulture funds of 9%. As we have heard set out clearly, the situation has not improved but has got much worse, and we also have a cost of living crisis.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, noted that Martin Lewis is now involved in this, with his crucial supporting research. What a state our country is in when everyone can feel a great sense of relief and hope because someone who is, after all, only a private individual has stepped in where Parliament has failed. Surely this is the stage where Parliament—or the Government—can step up and rescue people trapped in often terrible situations through no fault of their own.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, like the noble Baroness, Lady Bennett of Manor Castle, I recall our debates on this subject in 2021. Indeed, I think the amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has tabled is word for word the amendment he tabled on Report during the passage of what became the Financial Services Act 2021. It will not surprise the noble Lord that familiarity with it has not made me any warmer to the amendment.

As the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, reminded us, mortgage prisoners derive from lending practices before the financial crisis. These mortgage borrowers were much more likely to have got a mortgage without proof of income or with an impaired credit history. They still have relatively high loan-to-value ratios, and they often have unsecured debt as well. Many of them have interest-only mortgages, with no repayment plan. Put simply, they typically have higher-risk characteristics than borrowers with active lenders.

The noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, has correctly excluded 50,000 or so of the population of mortgage prisoners from his amendment, because they are in arrears or within the last 12 months of their mortgage term, but I think he intends the remaining 143,000 to benefit from the largesse provided by this amendment. This is notwithstanding that the FCA estimates that 66,000 of them could, in fact, switch to active lenders because the active lenders in the market have changed their risk appetite, with the encouragement of the FCA, and they would now be able to remortgage. I do not believe that it is right to legislate to give preferential financial terms to those who choose not to take advantage of the opportunities available to them in the market.

The FCA’s last review found that around 30,000 of the remaining 47,000 would be unlikely to benefit from switching, because if they did find a deal it would cost them more than the interest rates that they are currently paying. High-risk borrowers do not get the best rates in the market, however much they might wish to. Amendment 197 would give these borrowers a rate that did not reflect the market for them, and I do not believe that it is fair to give them a special advantage by legislating for them.

The FCA has proposed some practical steps to assist the remaining population, but it does not propose anything like that which is contained in Amendment 197. That is not surprising because the LSE in its earlier, independent study—I have yet to see the study that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, referred to—concluded that market interventions were not justified and could cause markets harms.

We all have sympathy for those stuck with debt that they struggle to afford, but the problem is not confined to mortgage prisoners, and it is just not fair to single out this group of problem borrowers for special treatment. It is also an extraordinary departure from regulatory norms. The FCA does not tell lenders to whom they must lend money; that is not how regulation works. Under this amendment, the FCA would be telling lenders what their risk appetite should be, which raises big issues of moral hazard and fails to deal with the prudential consequences in terms of capital, on which the PRA is the arbiter.

Furthermore, the FCA is required to set interest rate caps, but only by reference to LTVs. This ignores the other key driver of interest rates—namely, the credit risk of the borrower. Whatever rate the FCA comes up with, it will be the wrong answer for some borrowers, and it would be plainly unfair if the FCA set the rate assuming high credit quality, because that is very likely to be at odds with the facts. In addition, requiring the standard variable rates to be no more than two percentage points above base rate ignores any evidence about the correct uplift for the particular type of loan and borrower characteristics, which can produce outcomes that do not reflect objective market realities. I hope that the noble Lord, Lord Sharkey, does not pursue this amendment, as he did in the 2021 Bill; it really does not make sense.

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Moved by

[Baroness Noakes]

201A: After Clause 65, insert the following new Clause—
“Financial Ombudsman Service
(1) FSMA 2000 is amended as follows.(2) After section 229 insert—“229A Power of FCA to require Financial Ombudsman Service to refrain from specified action (1) Where the first, second and third conditions are met, the FCA may give a direction under this section to the Financial Ombudsman Service.(2) The first condition is that the Financial Ombudsman Service is proposing to exercise any of its powers in relation to the determination of a complaint.(3) The second condition is that the FCA is of the opinion that the exercise of the power in the manner proposed may have implications beyond the specifics of the complaint in question.(4) The third condition is that the FCA is of the opinion that the giving of the direction is necessary in order to avoid the possible consequence described in subsection (3).(5) A direction under this section is a direction requiring the Financial Ombudsman Service not to exercise the power or not to exercise it in a specified manner.(6) The FCA must consult the Financial Ombudsman Service before giving a direction under this section.”(3) In paragraph 15(1) of Schedule 17 (fees) after “respondent” insert “or relevant party”.”Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment gives power to the FCA to overrule a decision of the FOS where this would have implications which would affect the FCA’s ability to regulate effectively and to allow the FOS to make persons other than the complainant make a payment towards the costs of a case.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, this amendment concerns the Financial Ombudsman Service. It is in fact two amendments in one; I should have separated them. The amendments were suggested by UK Finance and I will speak to each leg separately.

The first two subsections of proposed new Section 229A of FSMA, which my amendment would insert, would establish that, in certain circumstances, the FCA can direct the FOS in a particular complaint determination. I should say that I welcome Clause 38, which will set up a new duty of co-operation and consultation between the FCA, the FOS and the Financial Services Compensation Scheme. It was curious that FSMA provided for co-operation and consultation for the FCA and the PRA but the FOS was left out. In practice, I understand that Clause 38 would do little more than formalise what has already been happening in practice as part of the FOS’s wider implications framework, although that is entirely voluntary and Clause 38 would make it mandatory.

In the past, there have been problems with regulated firms having acted in a way that they believed was wholly in accordance with the FCA rulebook, including the principles that should guide how firms act. Firms believed that their actions were in accordance with the FCA’s expectations as well, although those are notoriously hard to pin down. Then, following a complaint, the FOS took a different view. As we know, the FOS is required to determine each complaint individually and makes its determinations using the FSMA formula of what is fair and reasonable in the circumstances of the individual complaint. That can and does result in outcomes that are, at best, frustrating for the firms involved when they believe that they have been doing exactly what was expected of them. A particular source of concern has been fraud cases, where the FOS has often gone beyond the requirements of the banking protocol, which was supposed to set out agreed expectations of what banks need to do in relation to suspicious transactions.

In addition, the FCA handbook requires firms to apply the outcome of FOS determinations to future complaints, so individual FOS decisions in effect become precedents, even though they were determined on the facts of individual cases. Another frustration can be that FOS decisions are not always internally coherent, so a confusing pattern of precedents can be created. In effect, a parallel rulebook grows up, but one created out of specific cases without underlying principles—certainly without any underlying principles that have been consulted on.

I think it fair to say that, although the financial services sector values the fact that the FOS represents a low-cost dispute-resolution service, it has for some time had concerns about how it operates and how its decisions become quasi-law. These concerns are now amplified, with the advent of the new consumer duty, which rests on the principle of delivering good outcomes for consumers. This adds a layer of complexity and uncertainty into an already challenging environment. There are concerns about precisely what firms are expected to do in the case of closed products and whether new vectors are being opened up for claims management companies. There will be an ongoing tension between the consumer principle, which is not intended to operate at the level of individual consumers, and the FOS, which is unambiguously focused on individual cases.

My amendment does not give the FCA an unconstrained ability to override the FOS; it is drafted to apply only where there are implications beyond the specifics of the particular complaint. The PRA has long had the power to overrule the FCA where it thinks it will have an adverse impact, as specified in Section 31 of FSMA. Similarly, the banking reform Act of 2013 gave powers to the Bank of England, the PRA and the FCA to intervene against the payment services regulator. It is genuinely puzzling that a similar power in relation to the FOS was not granted to the FCA when it was set up, or to the FSA under FSMA. This is a modest provision designed to ensure that the activities covered by both the FOS and the FCA are dealt with in a coherent way.

The second leg of my amendment is on a slightly different subject: it is a minor amendment to paragraph 15 of Schedule 17 to FSMA. Under this paragraph, the financial services firms complained about pay fees to the FOS—there is no problem with that. My amendment adds “or relevant party” to this, so that firms or individuals other than the firm complained about could be required to pay fees. This is obviously not intended to enable the FOS to charge fees to complainants, which I am sure it would never do, even if it had the power. Instead, it is intended to give some flexibility to the FOS so that, for example, claims management companies might be asked to pay fees if they have been responsible for unmeritorious complaints. That in turn could help disrupt the business model of the worst offenders in this parasitic industry. I hope this will be seen as a modest change that will give greater flexibility to the FOS. I beg to move.

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The Government are clear that all consumers should be able to access the FOS without the need of any CMC support in bringing their complaints. Ensuring that the FOS remains a free and impartial alternative to the courts is critical, and any legislative changes to this model would need to be appropriately targeted to maintain free access to the FOS for consumers. I am trying to say that we see the case being made and will look at it further, but we need to ensure that, in doing so, we do not override that fundamental principle of access for consumers. With that, I hope that, at this stage, my noble friend Lady Noakes is able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I thank my noble friend Lord Trenchard for his support; I was not expecting the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, to support my amendment, because she and I have discussed the FOS in the past.

There is a potential problem in the relationship between the FCA and the FOS with the introduction of the new consumer duty. I think that is particularly concerning people: we are going a little into the unknown. We know that if regulatory pressures get too difficult for firms, their natural response is, ultimately, to leave or severely curtail the elements of the market that they are prepared to operate in. We need look only at the availability of advised investment to see what can be the consequence of heavy-handed regulatory action. If the new consumer duty becomes a nightmare, with individual cases being settled on particular circumstances but then having to be read across because of the FCA handbook, which requires cases to then be followed by firms, we could end up with a very confused understanding of what the consumer duty involves. That was the main burden of my tabling the amendment, but we may just need to see what happens when the consumer duty operates in practice to see whether those harms genuinely emerge.

As for the second leg of my amendment, which should have been a separate amendment, I was very interested to hear what my noble friend said about the case having been made. What I am not quite clear about, which she may be able to clarify, is on what timescale she believes the Government will be looking at this, because not many financial services Bills come along to get things done in.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I will have to write to the Committee to clarify the timescale for the noble Baroness.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I look forward to that letter with great anticipation. With that, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 201A withdrawn.

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This is not what the AML regulations are meant to be used for. They are being misused. The Government have to step up to the mark and stop this. If they will not do it, let us put it into law.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I am sure we all have our own stories of how we have fallen foul of the PEP regulations. My own relatively recent one is that Revolut refused to let me have an international payment card, with no real explanation. It must have been because it tagged me as a PEP, because I cannot think of any other reason why it would not want to give me one. But I do not think this is really about our individual experiences, even though they are extremely aggravating for us and, indeed, our families.

I have Amendment 227 in this group, and I am grateful to my noble friend Lord Trenchard for adding his name to it. The Minister will see that the four amendments in this group are all slightly different, but she should take no comfort that they are not taking a consistent approach to this problem. They demonstrate, as I am sure this debate will, that we have a united resolve that this has to be dealt with.

Like my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, mine seeks to amend the 2017 money laundering regulations to exclude people with a UK nexus from the PEP regime in the area of financial services. My noble friend’s amendment excludes individuals who are “ordinarily resident” in the UK for tax purposes, while mine focuses on UK citizens. My amendment says that UK citizens are not to be treated as PEPs unless the FCA considers that any of the categories of PEPs set out in the regulation—my noble friend Lord Moylan read this out—presents a money laundering risk. My amendment is predicated on UK MPs, Ministers and all the others in the list not presenting a higher money laundering risk than the rest of the UK population. There may well be some bad apples in the PEP barrel, but no more so than in other segments of UK society.

I believe that the money laundering regulations are based on an erroneous assumption, at least so far as the UK is concerned, that all PEPs—and their families and associates—present a high risk in money laundering terms. My amendment leaves the decision on risk to the FCA, on the basis of a risk assessment, but I would be staggered if the FCA concluded that UK PEPs presented a particular money laundering risk. Indeed, its own 2017 guidance, which the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, referred to—and apparently enjoys reading in the evenings—states that UK PEPs should normally be treated as low risk.

My amendment is based on citizenship. I believe that is a fairly straightforward way, because it can be established by way of a passport, which will often be required in any event as part of proof of identity for money laundering purposes, for all categories of individual. I believe it is administratively less complex than the way based on tax status in my noble friend Lord Moylan’s amendment, for a number of reasons, including the fact that more than four times as many people have passports than fill in tax returns.

In addition, my noble friend’s amendment seems to admit that foreigners can be exempt from the PEP rules if they are resident in the UK and paying tax here. I am somewhat uncomfortable with that proposition. My noble friend may not be aware that the term “ordinarily resident”, which appears in the amendment, disappeared from the tax code 10 years ago.

I am similarly not convinced that the other two amendments in this group will do the trick, because they call for consultations and reviews by the FCA, but the FCA has consulted on and reviewed this before. As we heard, the latest set of guidance, which came out in 2017, recognised that UK PEPs are not high risk, but nothing has changed, as the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter, said. The fundamental problem remains that the regulations require enhanced due diligence for all PEPs, and that is where the aggravation arises. Even low-risk PEPs have to be subjected to enhanced due diligence, with all the record keeping and evidence that entails.

Furthermore, the regulated firms that have to comply with money laundering laws are, frankly, terrified of falling foul of their regulators, whether here or abroad. It has cost them a small fortune in regulatory fines and compliance costs, and they simply will not take unnecessary risks. From their perspective, upsetting a few PEPs and their families is a lot less expensive than getting entangled in regulatory enforcement. That is why I believe that we have to change the regulations if we are to achieve a step change and get UK PEPs treated with common sense in our own country.

[Lord Sharkey (LD)]

My Lords, I have added my name to Amendment 215 from the noble Lord, Lord Moylan. I congratulate him on his opening remarks.

I first encountered the PEP problem in 2016, as the banks were preparing for and, in some cases, anticipating AML regulations. For years I had had money with NS&I with minimal fuss and no difficulties at all, so I was very surprised when it wrote to me demanding very much more detail about my finances and sources of funds. My three children were even more surprised to get the same letter from NS&I—they did not even have NS&I accounts, which showed overzealousness on the part of the organisation.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

My Lords, although I have not been following the detail of that Bill, I am aware of the provisions in it. As part of looking at this question, one question asked is, in our broader ecosystem of the checks and balances that we have on our politicians and people defined as PEPs—the other requirements of disclosure that they are held to and the other tools that we have at our disposal—how they influence the risk assessment has been done. I reassure noble Lords that that question has been asked. I should also reassure noble Lords that I am seeing the Security Minister tomorrow to discuss economic crime, but also that issue. We are seeking wherever possible to ensure that there is join-up across government in our assessment of the risks and the tools available to deal with them, ensuring that where we have measures in place they remain proportionate. That is something that I continue to engage with, with the Security Minister and others across government.

I shall just try to answer the point on the Financial Action Task Force, the difference between domestic and foreign PEPs, and the requirements within that, as I understand it. I commit to following up in writing if it remains unclear or if anything I say is not correct. The requirement for automatic enhanced due diligence applies to foreign PEPs. However, within the FATF guidance on recommendations 12 and 22—I think that this is particularly around 12—there is still the need to take steps to identify whether someone is a domestic politically exposed person and then review the relevant risk factors. So they need to determine whether a customer or beneficial owner is a domestic PEP, then determine the risk of the business relationship in that context—and then, in low-risk cases, there are no further steps to determine whether a customer is a PEP. In other words, there is still a requirement to identify whether someone is a domestic PEP or not and to look at the risk around that.

Where there is a difference, in my understanding, from the Financial Action Task Force requirements, is that for foreign PEPs you need to apply automatic enhanced due diligence. Under the EU regulations, that also applied to domestic PEPs—and we therefore ensured that automatic enhanced due diligence applied to domestic as well as foreign PEPs was a system in our regulations. The review we did last year into all of our anti-money laundering regulations did not conclude that on this matter no further action was to be taken but that we needed to look at the risk profile and risks associated with domestic PEPs before determining whether those requirements of automatic enhanced due diligence remained appropriate, now that we had the ability to vary our money laundering regulations, having left the EU. So that was a further piece of work that needed to be done after the review was published last summer of our money laundering regulations overall. That further piece of work has been undertaken, and I have undertaken to write to noble Lords with further details if I can provide them on that risk assessment, but that concluded that it was appropriate to maintain automatic enhanced due diligence for domestic PEPs.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

Did this review involve the FCA? When the FCA reissued its guidance in 2017 it was very clear about domestic PEPs being low risk, but it was constrained by the regulations, which said that you had to do enhanced due diligence. It was within that context. There seems to have been a shift between the FCA’s apparent position on the risk profile of UK PEPs and what my noble friend the Minister is now saying that she is being told by the security services, which will always try to find things that can go wrong. It is quite easy to construct a case that we are potentially capable of being corrupted by whoever and involved in money laundering, but they are not involved in the money laundering processes; the FCA is. I am getting a bit confused about how robust this risk assessment is in the context of money laundering.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

I believe that it aimed to get relevant information from all those involved and take a holistic view. I appreciate and agree that we need to ensure that, when these measures are put in place, they are proportionate to the risk faced, so it is entirely right to interrogate that risk assessment. I also appreciate that it is a slightly frustrating process when the sensitive nature of some of these issues means that we cannot always go into all the details noble Lords want at this time. I have tried to explain the context as to why domestic PEPs are viewed as having sufficiently high risk so that enhanced due diligence should still apply. I have the FCA guidance in my pack but I will not go through it, but it is also true to say—this is another point that I checked—that although the risk is sufficient to have enhanced due diligence measures, it is lower for domestic PEPs than for foreign PEPs. That assessment still applies.

--- Later in debate ---

Amendment 227 from my noble friend Lady Noakes has similar challenges, although I acknowledge that she has allowed for certain classes of politically exposed persons to be included within those regulations on the authority of the FCA’s judgment of the risks involved. She rightly asked whether the FCA had been involved in the risk assessment that I referred to. One of the challenges with the approach in Amendment 215 is that, although the FCA will have a lot of that information, such a risk assessment would want to take into account wider considerations. We therefore think that it is right that the scope of the money laundering regulations—

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

This is a risk of money laundering, not anything else. What wider implications should be taken into account? The FCA knows about money laundering and its risks. How could there be wider considerations than money laundering?

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

Others are involved in looking at the risks of money laundering in counterterrorist and proliferation financing, which I believe are subject to these regulations.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

As far as financial institutions are concerned, all of those are dealt with by the FCA, not the security services or any other shadowy agencies that seem to be involved in this latest risk assessment, so I am struggling to see what wider issues could possibly have been taken into account.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

The Government believe that the decision about the scope of the money laundering regulations is best taken by, and should remain with, the Government, rather than being delegated to the FCA.

I turn to Amendment 224 from the noble Baroness, Lady Hayter of Kentish Town. This would require the FCA to consult with consumers with regard to its functions relating to PEPs. In the discussion—

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 7th March 2023 Grand Committee

[Lord Holmes of Richmond (Con)]

My Lords, my Amendment 187 seeks to draw together the need for access to cash and acceptance of cash, but in no sense places burdensome requirements on retailers or financial services providers, in terms of the provision in local communities, by virtue of what is now possible through shared banking hubs. As we heard earlier in the debate, since the Bill entered Parliament on 20 July 2022, 390 bank branches have closed. Can the Minister say how many shared banking hubs have opened in that time? If we plot a similar trajectory for this year, which seems reasonable on the data we have available to us, and suggest a similar, if not slightly higher, number of bank branches closing, how many shared banking hubs will be open by 31 December this year?

Amendment 187 would provide access to banking facilities on every high street and give the Treasury the power to determine the size and scale of that high street to enable provision across the country for individuals and micro, small and medium-sized enterprises for deposit and withdrawal for the benefit of the community, the economy and our country.

Moving to Amendment 189, if we consider not only the need for cash but the current geopolitical circumstances we find ourselves in, it would seem a very good idea to classify the cash network as critical national infrastructure. I thank my noble friend Lord Naseby who has put his name to this amendment, which simply states that the cash network should be critical national infrastructure because of economic reasons. I believe we can move positively to a digital financial future where everybody is included. It is one heck of a transition, but I believe we can get there. Even when we reach that point, for reasons of reliance, there may well still be a need for cash. The level of the cash network could be determined by the Government, but having a cash network would seem to be a thoroughly good idea for reasons of resilience, unless the Minister can suggest an alternative second or third line of resilience, which I would be delighted to hear.

Finally, my Amendment 239 asks the Government to consider an access to digital financial services review. This is critical and timely. It would build on the great work that was done with the Access to Cash Review published in 2019. It would have many of the same aims, but in no sense the same specificities. If the logic was good for an access to cash review, which I believe it was, does my noble friend agree that the logic for an access to digital financial services review is equally good? I suggest that the review should look at issues around access to digital payments, online platforms, mobile applications, skills and, crucially, connectivity.

It is probably best to look at this in terms of an example. Imagine a mobile application, the best digital payments application ever created. However, I do not own a smartphone, so that digital payment is not being made. Imagine the same application, but it is not accessible. That digital payment is not being made. Imagine I own a smartphone and I have that app, but I am in an area of low or no connectivity. I could have the best digital skills, the best smartphone and this best app, but the payment is not being made. Imagine I have the app, the smartphone and the connectivity, but I do not have the digital skills. That payment is not being made.

It is those issues and more that we urgently need to look into with an access to digital financial services review, which can come up with recommendations for the Government to put into practice for the benefit not just of individuals but of micro-businesses, small and medium-sized enterprises, local economies, communities, cities and our country. The logic was good for an Access to Cash Review; I believe it is good for an access to digital financial services review.

To conclude, we need access to cash, as well as acceptance of cash; access to banking services on every high street; cash as critical national infrastructure; and an access to digital financial services review. Will my noble friend the Minister channel a retro TSB marketing campaign and, for all these amendments, be the Minister who likes to say yes?

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

My Lords, I have Amendments 179 and 190 in this group. I am not very enthusiastic at all about the provisions for cash access and distribution in the Bill. I am far from clear that a heavy-handed regulatory solution, which is what we have in the Bill, is necessary to preserve cash access and distribution, but, if we have to have it, I believe that the powers in the Bill should be time limited, which is what my Amendments 179 and 190 seek to achieve. Under these, the powers would expire in 10 years, unless the Treasury brought a statutory instrument giving a later date.

This is not a hard-nosed sunset clause, because we genuinely do not know what the future will be like. What we do know is that, before Covid, the use of cash was on a long-term downward trend and the use of debit cards had already overtaken cash. Covid then accelerated those trends so that, by 2019, debit card usage was 50% higher than the use of cash, and the latest data for 2021 shows that debit cards were used three times more often than cash. UK Finance forecasts that, by 2031, cash will account for only 6% of transactions while debit cards will account for more than half.

I do not deny that some people are more comfortable using cash than other payment options, and I accept that digital exclusion exists. It may well be a proportionate response to the current need for cash to protect its availability in the way that the Bill does, but I find it hard to see why we should set cash up on a pedestal as though it is some form of human right.

There is a large cost associated with cash provision. The Access to Cash Review found that it costs around £5 billion per annum. That is ultimately borne by all users of banking services, with the possible exception of holders of basic bank accounts, which do not cover their costs anyway and are already loading costs on to other users. As the use of cash continues to plummet, the cost will become disproportionately high because most of the costs involved are fixed.

I am certain that the future is digital, and the real need in the medium term is not to build shrines around cash points but to incentivise the financial services sector to make digital payment systems more accessible and inclusive. The best fintech brains should be put to work on this, and the banks need to see that it is in their interests to support innovation. This is where the regulators should be putting their efforts, rather than working out where cash points should be.

For this reason, I quite like the idea behind my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond’s Amendment 239, which calls for a review of access to digital financial services, although I am not sure that now is quite the right time. I am also not sure that a review should result in decisions made by government. We need to incentivise the providers of financial services to provide answers for this, rather than thinking that government can dictate how things will work in practice as society changes.

Some of the other amendments in this group, in particular those in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, and the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, seek to cling to an idea of high street banking that has already been overtaken by events. Bank branches closed because people stopped going to them; I predict that the new hubs will go the same way. The future is digital—that is what we should be trying to encourage. Making banks shoulder the costs of branches or hubs that are little used will simply increase the costs of the banking sector. This will end up harming consumers because costs will be passed on to them or, in some cases, providers may decide to withdraw from servicing particular sectors. In trying to preserve high street provision, the outcomes for consumers are not good.

I do not believe that it is responsible to legislate to preserve a version of the past unless there is clear evidence that the benefits outweigh the costs. I doubt that the cost-benefit case could, in truth, be made at the moment for maintaining branches or paying for the setting up of hubs, but I am absolutely certain that, when we look back in 10 or 20 years’ time, we will be amazed that we even thought that standing Canute-like against technological and societal change was the right thing to do in this area.

[Viscount Trenchard (Con)]

My Lords, I recognise the good intentions of the noble Baroness, Lady Tyler of Enfield, in introducing her Amendment 176. However, the tide is running out for cash. We are not the most advanced country in this area. It is now almost impossible to use cash in Sweden. What does my noble friend the Minister know about how the authorities in countries such as Sweden, which have largely dispensed with cash in daily life and where retailers are not prohibited from refusing to accept cash, support those who have no bank account, debit card or credit card?

I sympathise with the aim of this amendment. I regret the disappearance of the bank manager, but I doubt that this is an area where the Government should be too prescriptive. Where there really is demand to meet a bank manager, surely the market will respond and one or more banks will locate a manager where he or she is needed.

I support Amendments 179 and 190, to which my noble friend Lady Noakes has already spoken so ably. Her amendments recognise the reality of the disappearing role of cash.

I have sympathy for the aims of Amendments 180 and 181 in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Tunnicliffe, as I think it important that banks continue to provide in- person banking services where there is demand for them.

I sympathise with Amendments 238 and 239 in the name of my noble friend Lord Holmes of Richmond. The way the KYC rules are interpreted by banks and credit card providers is completely absurd and disproportionate. It really is ridiculous to have to prove one’s existence to an institution with which one has had an active business relationship for many decades. Can my noble friend the Minister tell the Committee whether she agrees that a review of the KYC rules is absolutely necessary?

Financial Services and Markets Bill

Baroness Noakes Excerpts

Committee stage
Wednesday 1st March 2023 Grand Committee

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

In Committee, we are discussing the different proposals that have come from noble Lords to solve these problems. I am trying to set out where the Government have previously considered these questions and the thinking behind our approach in the Bill, demonstrating that where we have been able to, for example in the introduction of Clause 37, we have made amendments to the Bill further to take into account some of these issues. When it comes to the specific proposals we are talking about, it is right that I set out that this has been considered by the Government, including through public consultation.

[Baroness Noakes (Con)]

I was not going to speak on this group in order to have a speedier debate, but I completely failed in that aim, so I think I am allowed to say something now. Can my noble friend explain to what extent these two consultations actually address the issues that have been raised by the amendments of my noble friend Lord Bridges? From memory, neither of the consultations examined the idea of having some kind of independent scrutiny of the regulators; they merely proceeded on the basis of what the Government wanted to do and did not seek to analyse the benefits of an alternative solution.

[Baroness Penn (Con)]

That is a similar question to that of the noble Baroness, Lady Bowles, and it is probably because I did not answer it satisfactorily that it has come up again. Noble Lords are right that there was not a question on those specific proposals in those consultations. I endeavour to point out, however, that does not prevent the respondents to those consultations, where they believe it to be a good idea, to use them to put forward their support for such an approach. Perhaps I could write to noble Lords specifically on the areas within both those consultations that touched on accountability measures.