(2 days, 14 hours ago)
Grand Committee
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I will say a little more in our debate on the next group about how surpluses should be used, but we must recognise that employers in defined benefit schemes underwrite defined benefit scheme finances; they are the ones who have been putting in very large sums of money to keep these schemes going for the past 20-odd years. It is only right that we should recognise the interest that employers have in taking money that is no longer required within a scheme.
We have had so many years of deficits in pension schemes that we have rather forgotten that this was like an everyday happening in the pensions world, if you go back to the 1990s, when surpluses arose. Indeed, pension schemes were not allowed to keep pension surpluses; there were HMRC rules which made that rather difficult to do. These were perfectly ordinary transactions in the pensions world which we have just forgotten about because of the deficits that have existed for the last 20 or 30 years, which employers—not employees—have had to bear the burden of.
On the amendments in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies, I understand the technical point about removing assets rather than surplus, but surplus is the language that has always been used in the context of pension schemes; it is in the 1995 Act. The noble Lord’s amendments amend only this Act; as I understand it, they do not go on and amend the earlier Act. It is just language that has been used for a long period; I think people know what it means, and it will be very confusing at this stage to change the language.
My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Davies, for putting these amendments down and speaking in detail about them. We also heard good words from the noble Lord, Lord Kirkhope, the noble Viscount, Lord Thurso, and the noble Baroness, Lady Noakes. I almost thought, “Is there any point in getting up and speaking?” but I am a politician.
This group goes to first principles. What is a defined benefits pension surplus and what is it for? For us, DB surplus is not a windfall or an accident, as I think others have said. It is a result of long-term assumptions, member contributions, employer funding decisions and investment outcomes—all those—but above all, it exists within a framework of promises made to members in return for deferred pay. We are therefore concerned about renaming—we keep on coming back to this—“surplus” as simply “assets” available for redistribution.
Language matters here because it shapes both legal interpretation and member confidence. Treating surpluses as inherently extractable risks weakening the fundamental bargain that underpins DB provision. Our position is not that surplus should never be accessed, but that it should be considered only after members’ reasonable expectations have been fully protected. That includes confidence in benefits security, protection against inflation erosion, and trust and accrued rights not being retrospectively interpreted. I have always thought that with DB pensions you need prudence. How far do prudence and good governance go?
Finally, the question for Ministers is whether the Bill maintains the principle that DB schemes exist first and foremost to deliver promised benefits or whether it marks a shift towards viewing schemes as financial reservoirs once minimum funding tests are met. In that case, one has to think, “What is the minimum for the funding tests?” We shall come on to that in an amendment that the noble Lord, Lord Sikka, has put down later in the Bill on where companies fail. It is a question of when those surpluses are available, if they are ever available.
(1 week ago)
Grand CommitteeMy Lords, as has been stated, this clause introduces compulsory mergers of Local Government Pension Scheme funds, and the word “compulsory” worries me. We on these Benches accept that consolidation can sometimes improve efficiency and governance, but compulsion—I emphasise this—is a serious step that demands strong justification and clear safeguards, as the noble Baroness, Lady Stedman-Scott, stated.
At present, the Bill establishes the power without clearly setting out the criteria, process or routes of challenge. That sequencing matters. Trustees, employers and members need confidence that mergers will occur only when there is compelling evidence of benefit to the people—that is, the pensioners themselves. We on these Benches are concerned that forced mergers, if poorly handled—and some may well be poorly handled—could undermine trust rather than strengthen it. Before endorsing compulsion, which we are asked to do, Parliament should understand how decisions will be made, how dissent will be treated and what protections exist if a merger proves detrimental.
At this stage, it is quite right that there should be probing as to what is behind all this and what will happen in all the various circumstances that need to be in place to protect members of the Local Government Pension Scheme. I wait to see further information as the Bill progresses.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
My Lords, I apologise for speaking after the Liberal Democrats—the noble Lord got up rather quickly.
Baroness Noakes (Con)
I endorse everything that both speakers have said about understanding more about the use of this power. I want to go back to the Explanatory Notes. They say that Clause 6 amends Schedule 3, et cetera,
“to clarify that, in the case of the LGPS, the responsible authority’s powers also include the power to make regulations”.
That implies that the Government believe that this is a declaration of an existing power. If that is the case, can they explain why they feel it is necessary to put Clause 6 in this Bill? Can they also explain the history of mergers with the involvement of the regulatory authority and what problems, if any, have led to the need to insert this in Clause 6? As the noble Lords who have spoken said, it looks like a very draconian power to be taking and yet the Explanatory Notes imply that they already have the power. It would be useful to have some more background.