Australia: Social Media Algorithms

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Thursday 10th September 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

The Government completely agree with my noble friend that users should have greater control over their online experiences. We have committed to taking steps for 16 and 17 year-olds that go further than Australia’s proposal and Meta’s commitments by switching off teenagers’ personalised feeds by default. Services will also have to use highly effective age assurance to enforce this. The Online Safety Act’s user-empowerment duties will come into force next year and will allow users of the largest platforms to control what content they see in their feeds. Ofcom is currently consulting on this measure. In addition, we committed earlier this year to building on these duties to give users greater control over their algorithms.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

Does the Minister agree that the burden for safety should be with the platform rather than the user? She made reference to the Online Safety Act in terms of tackling algorithms in this way. Why has not Ofcom used those powers?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

We have been really clear that the Online Safety Act is not the end of the road for online safety, and we had the Secretary of State’s announcement earlier this week. The Secretary of State has met the new chair of Ofcom to reinforce the importance of robust enforcement of the Online Safety Act. The Government have also asked Ofcom to publish a clear enforcement strategy and report to Parliament on progress. As the noble Baroness will be aware, it has significant enforcement powers and launches investigations, but we are trying to work with it to make sure that these are used as effectively as possible.

Cyber Security and Resilience (Network and Information Systems) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Committee stage
Monday 7th September 2026 Grand Committee

Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

99: After Clause 42, insert the following new Clause—
“Cyber security competence: functions of the UK Cyber Security Council(1) The UK Cyber Security Council is to exercise the functions described in subsection (2) and is accountable to the Secretary of State for the exercise of those functions.(2) The functions are—(a) to validate and accredit professional qualifications, standards and titles for cyber security professionals employed by regulated persons,(b) to monitor the supply of, and demand for, qualified cyber security professionals across the sectors regulated under this Act and the NIS Regulations, and(c) to audit whether, and to what extent, regulated persons employ or have access to appropriately certified cyber security professionals.(3) For the purposes of this section, “regulated person” has the same meaning as in Chapter 3 (see section 30).(4) A regulatory authority (as defined in section 24) must have regard to the information and standards provided by the Council under this section when exercising its functions.(5) The Secretary of State must by regulations made by statutory instrument make further provision about the exercise of the Council’s functions under this section, including provision about its accountability for the exercise of the functions described in subsection (2).(6) A statutory instrument containing regulations under this section may not be made unless a draft of the instrument has been laid before and approved by a resolution of each House of Parliament.”Member’s explanatory statement
This new clause would give the UK Cyber Security Council statutory functions to validate qualifications, to monitor the supply of and demand for cyber security professionals in the areas covered by the Bill, and to audit whether regulated organisations employ certified professionals—a “competence mandate” for the regime.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, all the amendments that I have put down to the Bill are derived from evidence we received on the National Resilience Select Committee. I am sorry that I was not here last week to address those that came up then, and I am very grateful to my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones for presenting them for me.

Several members of the Select Committee, including me, were in Finland last week looking at its preparedness for attack. Finland has faced the threat from its long border with Russia throughout the history of its country, and its preparedness on a whole-of-society basis is extremely impressive. Although we do not have a long border with Russia to focus our minds, we know that cyber attacks can immediately undermine our whole society and economy. One of the things we heard on our Select Committee is that not only are many companies unprepared for cyber attacks but that there is a shortage of skills in this area.

This amendment is seeking to move things forward. The proposed new clause would

“give the UK Cyber Security Council statutory functions to validate qualifications, to monitor the supply of and demand for cyber security professionals in the areas covered by the Bill, and to audit whether regulated organisations employ certified professionals—a ‘competence mandate’ for the regime”.

I have received some useful information from the sector, which welcomes my attempt to try to ensure that we have sufficient cyber professionals and that there is a mechanism by which they are certified. There are analogies with the certification of medical professionals, for example. Their certification is conducted independently, and I recognise the importance of that. What I am arguing for here is the principle and not necessarily the route suggested by my amendment. How this is best done can be further discussed between Committee and Report.

The National Cyber Security Centre reported that nationally significant cyber incidents have more than doubled in a year. According to its survey, only 7% of UK businesses have formally reviewed the potential cyber security risk presented by their wider supply chain. Evidence to our Select Committee suggests that skills shortages are a key challenge here, especially for SMEs and those in the public sector. It is clear that cyber education, training and apprenticeships, and so on, must accompany these reforms.

The Bill places greater responsibility on organisations to identify and manage cyber risk. However, beyond those technological solutions, these obligations will require skilled professionals to carry them out. The Bill refers to the appointment of a “skilled person” in the context of a national security directive but does not delve into what constitutes a skilled person. I realise that this will change over time, but there should be ways of addressing this.

Neither does the Bill acknowledge the role of skilled persons in delivering its wider objectives. Those in the field have called on the Government to amend the Bill to require organisations to access a cyber security workforce that is qualified to recognise professional standards. We know that this skills shortage exists, weakening our national resilience. One report showed that 87% of organisations experienced at least one consequence due to skills need, so it is becoming strategically important to address this. The Government should use the Bill as an opportunity to professionalise the sector by committing to a cyber security workforce and skills strategy, and mandating that regulators and regulated entities use suitably skilled people for the purposes of compliance with the regulation.

Recognised professional qualifications and certifications anchored in international standards should be required so that we and the regulators are reassured that the work is being carried out to a certain standard. The UK Cyber Security Council was granted royal chartered status to establish a self-regulating, politically independent professional body, structured on proven models of other professional bodies such as the GMC. The UK needs to transition from a fragmented patchwork of varying certifications to a unified national standard of professional competence and ethical conduct.

Therefore, the Bill should recognise the council as the authority for setting and maintaining these standards. Given that the Bill aims to enhance the security and resilience of the UK and the critical sectors that underpin our economy, that needs to be assisted by a suitably skilled workforce to implement it. Of course we need to take further action to make sure that we train people, but this amendment is designed to help move this forward by ensuring that those in this area are sufficiently skilled. I beg to move.

[Lord Clement-Jones (LD)]

My Lords, I was hoping that there would be other contributors—there will be a double-banking on this amendment.

I support Amendment 99, tabled by my noble friend. Throughout our deliberations on this Bill, the Government have placed enormous emphasis on imposing tough, outcomes-based statutory duties on operators and suppliers across our critical infrastructure, but we must confront an uncomfortable truth: we can pass the most sophisticated cyber security regulations in the world but, if our economy lacks the trained, qualified human beings required to design, implement and maintain those defences, those regulations remain completely meaningless. Without a professional workforce capability, this Bill merely codifies what ISC2 has rightly termed “compliance theatre”—an expensive box-ticking exercise that produces mountains of paperwork without making our national networks one bit safer.

Look at the scale of the crisis facing our domestic cyber workforce. In its landmark 2025-26 cyber security workforce study, ISC2 revealed that 52% of UK cyber security professionals identify severe skills shortages as their single greatest barrier to complying with cyber regulations. Further, 58% of organisations reported a critical or significant skills deficit, with an astonishing 87% suffering direct operational consequences from missed system patches and delayed vulnerability remediation to active security oversights. Across the civilian economy, the UK currently faces an 88% shortage of certified cyber practitioners. In an environment of such extreme scarcity, how on earth do the Government expect regulated water utilities, transport operators and medium-sized managed service providers to fulfil the heavy duties created by this Bill?

Amendment 99, from my noble friend, would provide a structural solution to this workforce crisis by placing the UK Cyber Security Council on a formal statutory footing. Crucially, as she explained, this connects directly to the definition of a skilled person under Clause 43. If the Government are serious about raising our national resilience floor, they must recognise that human competence is just as vital as technological hardware. By embedding the UK Cyber Security Council’s competence mandate in primary legislation, Amendment 99 would ensure that our cyber laws are backed by the skilled workforce needed to defend us.

I strongly urge the Minister to accept this amendment. By professionalising our cyber workforce, we would elevate this Bill from more than a compliance exercise to a genuine national capability.

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[The Parliamentary Under-Secretary of State, Department for Business, Innovation, Science and Trade and Department for Digital, Culture, Media and Sport (Baroness Lloyd of Effra) (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her amendment, in particular her focus on the importance of the skills and competence of the UK cyber security professionals on whom we all rely and our economy will continue to rely. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, said, an important aspect here is the spirit behind the noble Baroness’s amendment, with its focus on the skill set and professionalisation of these individuals, which we wholeheartedly agree is incredibly important.

I will focus on the council itself for a moment. It is an independent, royal chartered body that unites government, industry and other sectors to boost the professionalism of the entire cyber sector. The council does important work that already encompasses the majority of functions named in the amendment. It sets professional standards and maintains a register of the UK’s accredited cyber professionals. It establishes pathways for cyber professionals—experienced and new entrants—to have an easier route into quality cyber roles.

We disagree that there is a necessity to put this on a statutory footing. The Government consider the council to be akin to other professional bodies in the UK. Although there are some professional bodies with a statutory role and oversight by either government or Parliament, it is standard practice in technical fields for an organisation to be recognised through a royal charter and afforded operational independence from government. This includes the Engineering Council and the Science Council. Going down the route that the amendment proposes would undermine the council’s independence, and that could affect its relationship with the sector.

That is a separate point from the importance of the need to professionalise the cyber sector and the Government’s strong support for that. Indeed, the Government have committed to funding the UK Cyber Security Council over the spending review period until it becomes self-sustainable, working closely with stakeholders across the profession and wider workforce. We believe that professional standards, accreditation and professional titles in cyber security will improve our cyber resilience.

Moreover, to the points raised by the noble Lords, Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Markam, and others, the adequacy of skilled persons remains important. The Government’s TechFirst programme is helping to build the pipeline of talent for all frontier technologies and is available to all secondary schools across the UK. This month, approximately 1,300 undergraduate and master’s students are starting in the TechFirst scholarship programme, including over 300 students on a cyber security pathway.

On the question about how the Government monitor the adequacy of this, the Government publish annual data on the state of the UK cyber security workforce which shows that the supply of cyber skills is increasing. There is currently a net annual shortfall of approximately 3,800 people in the UK’s cyber security market. For the second year running, the workforce gap has remained markedly lower than our previous estimates, now 3,800, compared to 11,100 in 2023 and 14,100 in 2022. Focusing on the skills pipeline is incredibly important and something that the Government are backing.

Equally, the Government agree with the noble Baroness that regulatory authorities must have regard to the information and standards provided by the council. Indeed, we stated the need to align with council standards in the Government Cyber Action Plan. The Government have already worked with regulators to embed cyber security accreditation and professional standards into their guidance. We want to go further, which is why we intend to use the Bill’s powers to introduce security and resilience requirements in secondary legislation. These are designed to be consistent with the NCSC’s cyber assessment framework, and we propose that these requirements will address relevant training, skills and professional standards. We will consult on these proposals later in the year to ensure that the industries, large and small, covered by the regulated sectors will be able to feed back on this, as will the regulators which will be responsible in this area.

To the questions on SMEs raised by the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, whether inside or outside, whether they are or are not regulated entities, SMEs have access to NCSC and cyber resilience centres. I am sure that we will go on shortly, in the context of the noble Baroness’s subsequent amendment, to discuss further support that we can provide to those SMEs.

We are very committed to the role and function of the UK Cyber Security Council as a wide-reaching and effective independent body, and we continue to support skills development in the UK. As such, we are not convinced that there is a need to put the council on a statutory footing at this stage.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

I thank the Minister for her thoughtful reply and I thank other noble Lords for their support here. Clearly, we are all seeking to move in the same direction. There is a challenge and risks here that are incredibly important. Whether this is the right way forward, we will have to see.

I am very grateful to those organisations that fed into our Select Committee, which led me to table this amendment. This is an area that we will need to return to before Report, to look carefully at whether the drivers that the Minister has mentioned are sufficient. But at this stage, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 99 withdrawn.

Moved by

[Baroness Northover]

100: After Clause 42, insert the following new Clause—
“National cyber security support service for small and medium-sized enterprises (1) The Secretary of State must, by regulations, make provision for the establishment and operation of a national cyber security support and incident response service for relevant small and medium-sized enterprises (SMEs), for the purpose of improving the security and resilience of their network and information systems.(2) The service established under this section must—(a) be free at the point of use, and(b) provide, in particular following a cyber incident affecting a relevant SME—(i) advice and technical assistance,(ii) incident response support, and(iii) guidance on recovery and remediation.(3) For the purposes of this section, a relevant SME is a small or medium-sized enterprise which is—(a) an operator of an essential service,(b) a relevant digital service provider,(c) a relevant managed service provider, or(d) a critical supplier,within the meaning of the NIS Regulations.(4) In establishing and operating the service the Secretary of State must have regard to comparable national cyber security support services operated in other jurisdictions.” Member's explanatory statement
This new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a national, free-at-the-point-of-use cyber security support and incident response service for relevant SMEs, modelled on comparable overseas services such as the small-business support provided by the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, this amendment again comes out of the evidence submitted to our National Resilience Select Committee.

It has been reported that many SMEs think that they are too small to be a target. However, as was reported at Second Reading, government research shows that 50% of UK SMEs faced some kind of cyber breach or attack in 2025. It is also reported that, for many small businesses, a cyber incident can be existential and that roughly 60% of SMEs that fall victim to a cyber attack go out of business within six months.

In this amendment, I therefore seek to address the position of SMEs. Coming from the insurance sector, the Association of British Insurers feels that the Bill is narrow in scope and that

“large parts of the economy, including organisations that are economically significant due to their scale, interconnectedness or role in supply chains, will remain outside this regulatory perimeter. The Government’s approach to … these unregulated sectors relies primarily on voluntary governance mechanisms”,

including their new Cyber Governance Code of Practice. It feels that, without stronger incentives, measurement and accountability, there is a risk that it will not deliver consistent improvements. That is obviously concerning a number of people.

There are warnings—we know this—that cyber risk is inherently systemic. Disruption is rarely confined to a single organisation or sector but is increasingly transmitted through supply chains. As I mentioned in the previous group, according to the cyber security breaches survey, only 7% of UK businesses have formally reviewed the potential cyber security risks presented by the wider supply chain, so how do we bring in greater protection in a way that, as the noble Baroness, Lady Neville-Jones, and the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, have just mentioned, does not overwhelm SMEs?

This proposed new clause would require the Secretary of State to establish a national, free-at-point-of-use cyber security support incident response service for relevant SMEs, modelled on comparable overseas services, such as the small business support provided by the Australian Cyber Security Centre.

The ABI notes that the Bill rightly focuses on building resilience in our critical national infrastructure and that more must therefore be done to address the cyber resilience of SMEs. Not surprisingly, it is concerned about cyber insurance. It points out that the take-up of cyber insurance among UK SMEs is very low—somewhere between 10% and 40%—and argues that cyber insurance can help prevent and alleviate the impact of cyber attacks for SMEs. But, obviously, there is a cost to that. As cyber risks continue to grow, SMEs are typically more vulnerable and less well placed than larger businesses to respond to cyber threats due to overstretched resources, including IT and potential security and skills gaps.

We have to be careful to make sure that reporting is not too onerous for SMEs. It is suggested, for example, that maybe their reporting timelines should be not as short as those for bigger companies, and that there should be better clarification of what is an actual or suspected cyber incident, so that things which are not as significant do not, as it were, clog up the system. However, I think everybody agrees that we need to make sure that SMEs are better supported.

I welcome the fact that the Government have set up some support in this area. There is a cyber action toolkit, which was launched in March 2026 and includes a helpline, and a cyber adviser scheme, which offers a free 30-minute session. There is also a small business guide for response and recovery. But when you look at what they are suggesting, they are pushing companies towards the commercial market, so there is going to be a cost to that, and, down the line, towards fraud analysis and law enforcement. We know how challenging that is in so many areas, so it does not necessarily seem the most helpful or robust system.

The reason I mention the Australian cyber resilience service and have looked at what it does is that it goes further than we are now going, and I hope the Government will give thought to extending this in the way that the Australian system does. There is free, tailored, person-to-person support with two functions: helping small businesses assess and build resilience and helping them to recover after an incident, such as account compromise, phishing or ransomware, with case management and device remediation. It is much more supportive than what we currently have in the United Kingdom.

Clearly, much more needs to be done to ensure that SMEs are aware of the risks and do not simply wait until they have been hit, but also that they are actively assisted. That is important for them, but also for the wider economy, given how interlinked we all are. This is clearly an evolving area and I look forward to hearing what the Minister has to say about how we can move this forward, given how significant it is. I beg to move.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Lloyd of Effra (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for her amendment and for linking the issue of cyber security with wider questions on national resilience; she is absolutely right to situate it in that space. I also thank her for introducing the topic of the right amount of cyber security support for the SMEs regulated under the Bill; indeed, the discussion has led to SMEs that are not regulated under the Bill.

We know that SMEs require dedicated cyber security support. That is why there are a wide range of free tools, guidance and training to help SMEs implement cyber security measures. These resources are available to any business, not just those regulated under the regime. As the noble Lord, Lord Vaizey, mentioned, this includes the Cyber Action Toolkit, designed to scale nationally to empower millions of small organisations through tailored cyber security advice with NCSC-certified cyber advisers. A number of noble Lords referenced the importance of Cyber Essentials, as well as insurance and incident response. If an SME with a turnover of less than £20 million has Cyber Essentials, it also has cyber insurance cover of up to £25,000. That incentive is intended to link the process of getting Cyber Essentials with the benefits of insurance. Likewise, SMEs get cyber incident support 24/7 with Cyber Essentials.

The noble Lords, Lord Vaizey, Lord Londesborough and Lord Birt, talked about the “push”. We are indeed encouraging, perhaps not pushing, the private sector to engage its supply chain through the cyber pledge, which is for entities outside the regulated scope. That is one of the key elements of the cyber pledge. Likewise, under the GCAP, the Government’s cyber action plan, Cyber Essentials, or equivalent, are needed for government procurements using official data. These are the mechanisms by which we are encouraging large organisations to look at their supply chains—on the point that the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, made about the interconnectedness of all our organisations today—and encouraging the uptake of Cyber Essentials with these very tangible benefits.

I was asked a very fair question about the best way to provide cyber support to organisations. I heard at least one noble Lord say that SMEs do not like different provision. I think that many SMEs prefer—or, if asked, would request—local trusted advisers, which is exactly what the regional cyber resilience centres offer. They offer free support to SMEs across England and Wales, covering a wide range of services, such as incident response, a business continuity service and support with Cyber Essentials and security training.

The noble Lord, Lord Londesborough, made a point about a central, monolithic model compared with these local or regional models. There is a lot of merit in a regional model that has some common standards but is located much nearer to the SMEs that it serves. I reiterate that small and micro-organisations are exempt from being regulated as relevant digital service providers or relevant managed service providers. They can be regulated only if they are operators of essential services or designated as a critical supplier, for which there is a high bar. On the picture raised by the noble Lord, Lord Clement-Jones, we do not think that a huge number of small enterprises will be in scope of this legislation. All small businesses will benefit from the current provision, but they would not necessarily benefit from the model proposed by the amendment.

The amendment would also require the Secretary of State to have regard to international regimes. We are indeed aware of such schemes, such as the Australian Small Business Cyber Resilience Service. Many of the offerings that that service provides, such as tailored support and practical incident recovery support, already exist in the UK, as I have set out. We learn from international best practice, but we also tailor it to our local economy and the threats we see, to best support and meet the needs of UK businesses and interact with UK regulations.

I hope that I have set out that guidance for small and medium-sized organisations is already available through existing UK support. We are doing more to look at supply chains through discussions with large firms, through the GCAP and through this Bill. We think that a new dedicated service could divert resources from these existing services and potentially impact on their efficacy. On the central point that the noble Baroness started with, we absolutely agree with the importance of providing support to small and medium-sized enterprises under the Bill, ensuring that they have everything they need to be resilient and respond to incidents.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

I thank the Minister, and I thank noble Lords for their support. This is clearly an area where we agree that there is a problem; we are very vulnerable in the United Kingdom. What we have in place is clearly not working sufficiently well if 60% of SMEs that are hit by cyber attacks go under. That is the context in which we ought to look at proposals that might seek to address that. We clearly need to take SMEs forward in a way that does not overburden them.

I hear the point about extending insurance cover. We can indeed take more than one track, but there is a cost to not supporting SMEs. If they are going to go under, that will be an economic cost to the country and, if we do not support them, they are likely to be hit by cyber attacks, taking them and others under anyway, with that effect upon our economy. Clearly, the Government agree—hence putting in place the measures that the Minister has outlined.

I am suggesting, from the evidence we have received, that this needs to go further and faster. We can discuss exactly how, but it is clear that this is an escalating problem and that we need to do more to tackle it. That is on the basis, in particular, of the concerns expressed to the National Resilience Committee on which I serve and which, as I say, gave me the idea of putting this amendment forward. I think that we will need to return to this, because it is a major problem, but, in the meantime, I beg leave to withdraw the amendment.

Amendment 100 withdrawn.

2026 FIFA World Cup: Replica Kit Pricing

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Wednesday 20th May 2026 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

I have really missed responding to my noble friend Lord Foulkes’ questions. It is always good to have a question from him. I did ask how the kits and strips for other home nations compared in pricing with the England kit. I understand, without promoting them specifically, that the adult Adidas strips for other home nations come in at a much more reasonable price. Clearly, it is still a concern when people are outpriced in this way, so I will pass on his comments through the Scotland Office in the same way. I know all noble Lords will wish both home teams all the best in the World Cup.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, is the Minister aware that I have been instructed by my ecstatic kids that I need some updated Arsenal kit? Should I go along with what they suggest?

[Baroness Twycross (Lab)]

Absolutely. Whichever club noble Lords support—I support a club that has, sadly, been relegated—the joy that was apparent from all supporters, including the Prime Minister, at Arsenal’s victory is just uplifting. Congratulations to them and to all their supporters.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 15th July 2021 Grand Committee

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, it is a privilege to speak after the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup. I support Amendment 18, in the names of the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, and the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, and Amendment 25, which is also in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Alton.

These amendments propose a pathway forward that would ensure we are well equipped to handle the challenges that will inevitably come our way in the next decade. Amendment 18 places a requirement on the Secretary of State to create a body designed to analyse and consider existing and emergent threats in the telecommunications sector, incorporating representatives from the major bodies of our national security matrix. This body would then be required to lay an annual report before all Members of Parliament, ensuring adequate parliamentary scrutiny and oversight. Indeed, if not for Back-Bench agitation, we might still be aimlessly integrating Huawei into our critical infrastructure, lagging behind our Five Eyes allies in recognising the security threat that such high-risk vendors pose.

Amendment 25, building on the horizon scanning outlined in Amendment 18, requires the Secretary of State to publish a long-term telecommunications strategy in partnership with the aims and outcomes of our closest Five Eyes and NATO allies. In alignment with the integrated review of security, defence, development and foreign policy, this strategy would ensure that long-termism is built into our thinking across both our economic and strategic aims in the coming decade.

We have one of the most sophisticated and advanced intelligence-gathering apparatuses in the world. We are a significant asset to our Five Eyes and NATO allies and a crucial linchpin in ensuring the international order. Yet we have been slow to respond to the rapidly changing digital landscape that we find ourselves in.

An obvious example of this is the much-discussed high-risk vendor, Huawei. It is extraordinary to think that all the way back in 2013 a report from the Intelligence and Security Committee concluded that Huawei posed a risk to national security and that private providers were responsible for ensuring the security of the UK telecoms network. Yet now, according to Ofcom, Huawei accounts for about 44% of the equipment used in providing superfast full-fibre connections directly to homes, offices and other businesses in the UK.

In a Statement to Parliament last year, the Foreign Secretary made the welcome announcement that

“high-risk vendors should be excluded from all safety- related and safety-critical networks in critical national infrastructure”—[Official Report, Commons, 28/1/20; cols. 710-11.]

and yet, due to how embedded this vendor has become in our critical infrastructure and the lack of competition, Huawei, as we have heard, is not set to be removed as a provider until 2027. It should never have reached this point. A horizon-scanning body and deeper parliamentary oversight would ensure that we are not left sleeping at the wheel again. How was it that our Five Eyes allies were significantly more alert to this risk than we were?

Furthermore, without cross-body co-ordination, the rapid advances in technology we are set to witness over the coming years will make it even more difficult to adapt to threats as they manifest themselves. GCHQ Director Jeremy Fleming suggests that the UK needs to prioritise the advances in quantum computing, as well as working with allies to build better cyber defences and shape international standards and laws in cyberspace. With quantum computing becoming more mainstream, there is a risk that a sudden increase in processing power could render existing encryption methods useless.

These are just some of the challenges we face. The future of our security and sovereignty will depend on the steps we take in this Bill. According to MI5, at least 20 foreign intelligence services are actively operating against UK interests. We have a remarkable security and intelligence community but, as we enter this new era, we must accept that our ability to adapt to emerging challenges will be the defining feature that drives us forward and keeps us ahead of other nations that would challenge our national interests.

We have seen how easy it is for a digital attack to break down our critical systems. Just last month, a ransomware attack in the US took down the entire Colonial Pipeline infrastructure, which transmits nearly half the east coast’s fuel supplies. Analysts have suggested that hackers could have been inside Colonial’s IT network for weeks or even months before launching their ransomware attack.

This issue extends into the digital space. A 2018 report commissioned by the US Senate intelligence committee, The Tactics & Tropes of the Internet Research Agency—a Russian propaganda unit—revealed that there was:

“A sweeping and sustained social influence operation consisting of various coordinated disinformation tactics aimed directly at US citizens, designed to exert political influence and exacerbate social divisions in US culture”.


I posit that we may not even be aware of the scope of the disinformation and destabilisation occurring online that is challenging our sovereignty and internal security.

I support these amendments in light of the fact that it has taken considerable Back-Bench activity to alert us to the security issues posed by high-risk vendors; that we are still not thinking clearly on China; and that we need systems and structures to ensure that long-termism is built into our thinking across both our economic and strategic aims in the coming decade.

[Baroness Northover (LD) [V]]

My Lords, Amendment 18 would require the Secretary of State to

“establish a body … to consider emerging and future developments for the telecommunications sector for the purposes of identifying current and emerging security threats.”

Amendment 25 would require the Secretary of State to

“publish a long-term strategy on telecommunications security and resilience.”

These are very sensible proposals, and the speakers have made a cogent case. I thank the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, for his wide-ranging and positive introduction to these amendments.

This is an extremely complex area, as we have heard, not only within our discussions of the Bill but beyond. We know from bitter experience that something can be flagged as a risk and then, without proper focus on it—given all that Governments have to focus on —follow-through is less than systematic. Think of pandemics, flagged, not least in the 2015 strategic review, yet followed through with little or no preparation. This picks up a theme that the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, emphasised in relation to Huawei: awareness but lack of action. Therefore, the case for a body that looks at this area in the widest sense is compelling.

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[Baroness Northover (LD) [V]]

My Lords, I have added my name in support of Amendment 22, which the noble Lord, Lord Coaker, explained so comprehensively and so well. He has picked up an ongoing theme that has been so agitating noble Lords—especially, I note, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge—about the Executive increasingly and simply bypassing Parliament. I think that the noble and learned Lord will be very interested in this matter when we come to Report in the Chamber.

In this regard, I can do no better than refer the Minister to the speech by the noble Lord, Lord West, at Second Reading. He is the Lords representative on the Intelligence and Security Committee. He pointed out that this is exactly what that committee is for. It is clearly vital that Parliament has a role in what is covered under the Bill, but we also understand the potential security sensitivities here. This is where that committee can play a vital role on behalf of Parliament, but under the strict security rules under which it operates. If there are matters that the Secretary of State is withholding from publication in the interests of national security and in related areas, these must be reported to the ISC. I therefore urge the Minister to accept this amendment.

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 13th July 2021 Grand Committee

Taking a co-ordinated approach with allies will help to protect against these threats, making it harder for the Chinese Government to single out any one country for retaliation. Earlier collective action could have prevented the later expensive U-turns. The Government’s own estimates calculate that belated Huawei decisions cost £2 billion, excluding the broader economic cost of the delayed rollout of the 5G network caused by changing policies. Belatedly and at great cost, that was the right thing to do, but let us not make the same expensive and dangerous mistakes again. The amendments seek to better protect our national interests in concert with our allies in the free world. I beg to move.

[Baroness Northover (LD) [V]]

My Lords, we move into the scrutiny of the Bill, which seeks to balance the need for the United Kingdom to be at the forefront in technological development and connectivity—requiring the fastest and most efficient broadband, for example—with the need to ensure that we do not inadvertently open ourselves to malicious actors or states as we do so. It is therefore appropriate that the first group of amendments seek to strengthen the security side, recognising the complexity of modern threats. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, has as ever laid out the case extremely clearly and in detail, and I look forward to the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, replying as comprehensively. He has long made sure that in the Lords we delve deeply into these issues as we challenge the Government and hold Ministers to account.

These are sensible amendments intended to set the Bill in the context of what our allies are doing, drawing from their knowledge and experience and, as the noble Lord said, most importantly, working together. They propose actions that should be happening anyway but which we know can be easily set aside or overlooked as Governments address many pressing issues. Amendment 1 includes a duty to review telecoms vendors

“which are prohibited in other jurisdictions on security grounds”.

It is important that we both learn from other jurisdictions and act together. We have seen how China, for example, seeks to pick off states, as in its recent threat to ban Australian beef on the basis of what it had judged to be interference in its internal affairs. We also saw the Foreign Minister of New Zealand at first indicate that her country should go its own way in relation to China, clearly worried about China’s possible actions, before stepping back from that position in recognition of the fact that we really are stronger together.

There are clear risks. We see Canadian citizens used as pawns in a wider concern about Huawei. As China becomes ever more dominant economically, and under its current leadership, resistance to its positions will become ever more difficult. We have been unable even slightly to hold it back in relation to Hong Kong, and it is therefore vital that like-minded countries work together. Therefore, there are two reasons for seeing what other like-minded countries are doing: first, to see what risks they identify and, secondly, to decide whether we should act together, as we would hope they would act when we saw risks. We are of course in a weaker position globally as we are out of the EU, which has strength in numbers and economic power.

Amendment 20 would expand the powers to include ownership or investment, and this clarifies further where risks might be; for example, through the investment clout of certain players. This is clearly vital.

Amendment 27 would require the Secretary of State to review the UK’s security arrangements with countries banned by a Five Eyes partner and decide whether to issue a designated vendor direction or take similar action with regard to the UK’s arrangements with that company. This updates previous legislation where this risk was not so apparent as it is now, with the hugely increased economic and other associated power, for example, of China. Of course, the Five Eyes of the US, Canada, Australia, New Zealand and the UK are very much aligned on this. Certainly, the risks identified by the Five Eyes should be front and centre in our thinking. I would say that we should add in the EU. Had we still been in it, we would have had that major sphere of influence to strengthen our position further. That makes these amendments even more important.

As the noble Lord, Lord Alton, laid out, we have become very dependent on China in many areas. That is true not only in the area of the Bill but in the new green industries, for example. We need to be much more strategic than we have been in this regard up to now. As he also set out, we cannot build our business on human rights abuses even up to genocide.

I am sure the Minister will say that these amendments are not needed as all these actions will be taken, but they are tabled to make sure that they are. We know that this has not happened adequately up to now; we need to strengthen the Bill, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, has stated. I therefore look forward to the Minister’s reply.

[Lord Naseby (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise to my colleagues that I was not able to speak at Second Reading. I am quite clear, as I suspect we all are, that the security of the UK’s telecoms infrastructure is vital. Sadly, we come pretty late to the scene. The expansion of 5G and full-fibre broadband should have happened years ago, so this is not before time.

I read economics at Cambridge and looked at a number of aspects of economic expansion there, particularly in relation to business sectors. It is all very well saying that we will try to prevent the supply chain to the UK network being dependent on a limited number of suppliers. That may be a good idea in theory, but I just reflect that we have a national grid which is every bit as important as 5G; we have one or two aircraft manufacturers, and we have a couple of shipyards, so I just wonder whether there are a whole lot of suppliers out there for the telecoms world—there will be others who are better qualified than me to judge that. However, it is clear that we need to identify areas of risk, and Huawei is clearly one of them.

I would just ask a couple of simple questions. The noble Baroness, Lady Northover, mentioned Five Eyes. Is there a co-ordinating structure for Five Eyes in relation to this particular structure? If so, where is it based, what is our contribution to it and who exactly is doing it?

Some of our colleagues may have read the recent trading standards report that has just come out—I read it only last evening. A massive number of scams is happening at this point in time and we are dealing with the trouble they cause.

Amendment 20 refers to

“a specified country or … sources connected with a specified country, including by ownership or investment”.

I have worked overseas, including in a fair number of countries in south Asia such as Pakistan, India and Sri Lanka, so I ask: who on the ground will actually be doing the work? Quite frankly, I know of nobody in any of our high commissions capable of doing that sort of analysis. Do we have a floating investigatory system? How are we going to judge the evidence properly?

On Amendment 27, we need to take care, clearly, but we must recognise that there may be a valid opportunity in a company that has upset the host Government. You and I would not know the situation, but we should be aware of that fact.

I am a bit sceptical about the security check. I made a freedom of information inquiry—it was nothing to do with telecoms—and, at the end of the day, the reason given for not producing all the evidence following my FoI request was the security of the country. It was never explained in words of one syllable—or indeed in any syllables at all—what aspect of my inquiry would affect the security of the UK. I would like to know this from the Minister: are we relying on Five Eyes or are we relying on Ofcom? Who is it specifically that will be doing this analysis?

Telecommunications (Security) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 29th June 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, this has been a thoughtful debate, with contributions from several former Ministers who have worked in this area, including the noble Lords, Lord Young and Lord Vaizey, and the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan. Their insights into the challenges here are welcome. As this Second Reading has shown, we have a problem and the Bill is put forward as the solution. I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Barran, for laying out its provisions and intentions clearly.

The problem identified is the security risk potentially embedded in our telecoms systems, as exemplified by Huawei and other companies. Set against that, especially as we seek to make our own way outside the EU, is the Government’s aim that the UK should be at the forefront in science and technology, as laid out as the strategic direction for the UK in the integrated review. Therefore, there is a need to draw on the best telecoms systems, as the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, clearly laid out.

However, in addition, balancing the ability to use whatever is best in the market globally and the need to protect our security is another vital strand. We cannot and must not use technology built on human rights abuses and thus become complicit in those abuses, rather than fight to address them. Noble Lords have set out the challenges, particularly from the rise of China, as well as the necessity of not using companies built on abuse. The experience of the middle of the 20th century marks a huge warning to us. We need only look at the history of the chemical and pharmaceutical giants that multiplied in size in Germany and were built on the appalling slave labour in the extermination camps.

We know that genocide and gross human rights abuses are not things of the past. We need to be ever vigilant. Up to 1.5 million Uighurs have been forcibly removed by the Chinese state by mass transit and put into forced labour camps in which components used in Huawei technology are made. The noble Lords, Lord Alton and Lord Balfe, and the noble Baronesses, Lady Bennett and Lady Stroud, all emphasised those important points. When the Minister winds up, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, requested, I should like her to outline what further action the Government will be taking that regard, given the international obligation to take such action once a country becomes aware that genocide may be occurring. We have signally failed to challenge China in regard to Hong Kong. What lessons have we drawn from that? Does the Minister agree that the Bill should not simply set technological advance against security but incorporate that concern? Can any other position be justified?

The key issue is whether the Bill achieves what it sets out to do and whether it brings its own risks and possible unintended consequences. As my noble friend Lord Fox and others have said in this Second Reading debate, we support the principles of the Bill. I note that the noble Lord, Lord West, the House of Lords member on the Intelligence and Security Committee, said that the Bill rightly seeks to address concerns first raised by his committee seven years ago in its report, Foreign Involvement in the Critical National Infrastructure. He feels that the Government are finally listening to those warnings. However, as with the National Security and Investment Act, he reports that his committee is

“concerned that the Bill does not provide for sufficient parliamentary oversight of these important new powers.”

The noble Earl, Lord Erroll, and others also warned on that.

The noble Lord, Lord West, made the sensible point that if the material is sensitive, it should be submitted to the ISC—that is the very purpose of the committee. The noble Lord, Lord Holmes, just reiterated that. Alternatively, of course, we could just look behind bus stops in Kent and then gather it up and pass it to the noble Lord, Lord West.

The theme of scrutiny came through from other noble Lords. The Delegated Powers Committee has expressed reservations and my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones went further in his criticism in this regard. The Bill gives Ofcom new powers to monitor and assess the security of telecoms providers, with very heavy fines if companies are deemed to have transgressed. It introduces new controls on the use of Huawei 5G equipment, including a ban on the purchase of new equipment from the end of 2021 and a commitment to remove all equipment from 5G networks by 2027.

My noble friend Lord Fox set the Bill several tests. He asked whether the Bill’s effect can be shown to shut out the technology it is meant to shut out. Can we be assured that the Government and Ofcom have the right powers, the necessary checks and balances, and the resources to do such work? When it comes to supply chain diversification, are we able to shut out Huawei and others but still have 5G in a timely manner? My noble friend Lord Fox, the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, and others also noted the lack of diversity we face here—the noble Baroness, Lady Morgan, identified it as a market failure—and the risks that this poses to the economic position of the United Kingdom. The noble Lord, Lord Young, pointed to the report of the noble Lord, Lord Livingston, which sets out clearly the ways in which the UK might be able to develop this industry and how that requires working with other like-minded countries so that there are common standards and codes of practice. I look forward, as no doubt others do, to receiving the letter which the noble Lord suggests the Minister should write on the matter.

We have already heard concern about the powers given to the Government and to Ofcom. We also hear of concerns about the lack of clarity and transparency, which, as my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones said, is causing great concern within the industry. The criticism is that the proposed measures are either technically unworkable or damaging to the industry. One area which my noble friend flagged is in relation to providers whose networks are not based only in the United Kingdom and which would therefore find it challenging to engage as codes might be drawn up if there is no formal structure through which this might be done. My noble friend argues for a technical advisory board, and I note also that concerns were expressed about the flexibility and future-proofing of the Bill.

The Minister spoke of the Bill applying not just to one company, one country and one threat. That clearly must be the case. I note, for example, what the noble Lord, Lord Young, said about the number of departments which might be relevant here and the newly pressing risks of cyber rather than conventional warfare, yet the absence of the DCMS Secretary of State from the National Security Council points to our being behind the curve.

Questions have been raised which will need to be considered in areas beyond the Bill. There is a wide challenge here, as the noble and gallant Lord, Lord Stirrup, the noble Lord, Lord Balfe, and others emphasised. As we move to green technology, China is far ahead of us, controlling the raw materials as well as the technology needed to power it. That competitive advantage has probably been given rocket boosters by the pandemic, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, noted in relation to lateral flow tests. I took one the other day; it was a sort of strange little pregnancy test. Clearly, all this has brought economic benefit to the Chinese economy from our reliance on its traders for so much of the resources needed in the pandemic. As the noble Baroness, Lady Stroud, pointed out, we are moving into a different geopolitical landscape, although the noble Lord, Lord Maxton, put us as perhaps a little point in a very long historical process.

We are indeed in challenging times, out of the EU and unable therefore to strengthen our position as we could before as part of the richest trading bloc in the world. Instead, we need to find allies as the headwinds of changing superpower strengths buffet us. How closely then are we working with the EU on this as well as with the United States? The Bill marks a recognition of that challenging position, but in Committee and on Report there will no doubt be challenges as to whether it can deliver that security and moral compass which the Government claim, at the same time as we face major financial pressures, out of the EU and recovering from the pandemic. I look forward to the Minister’s response.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

3rd reading & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Thursday 28th January 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord Forsyth of Drumlean (Con) [V]]

My Lords, I do not wish to detain the House at this stage in the Bill, especially following that excellent speech by the noble Lord, Lord Alton. I do not wish to repeat many of the arguments that have been put at an earlier stage in the Bill and the information which has been made available to the House about the atrocities which are happening in China today—not just among the Uighur people. The noble Lord, Lord Alton, has set out in great detail the arguments which I would have thought would persuade any Government of the virtues of this amendment.

I join him in paying tribute to my noble friend the Minister, who has worked hard to find a way through this. I appreciate that collective responsibility means that it is not always possible to deliver what Ministers might wish to achieve. However, following on from the remarks the noble Lord made about the debate on Tuesday next week on the all-party amendment on genocide, I think it is absolutely outrageous that those of us who wish to speak in that debate are unable to do so unless we appear in person at the House.

I have just received a letter from the Clerk of the Parliaments advising me that it is very undesirable for Members to come to the House, as indeed it is from a wider social point of view. At the beginning of each sitting, the Chair has indicated that all Members will be treated equally. It seems that the procedures that operate under ping-pong are preventing Members of the House carrying out their duties while being socially responsible and while following the advice from Public Health England and Scotland. I hope very much that this can be looked at before next Tuesday, so that we are all able to carry out our duties to the House of Commons and meet our responsibilities to our fellow citizens.

The noble Lord, Lord Alton, seemed to indicate that he would not press this amendment to a Division. Had he done so, I would have happily supported him, because I believe that it is a sensible amendment for the reasons put forward in earlier stages of the Bill. However, as I have said, I will not detain the House other than to indicate my support for the noble Lord and my admiration for the enormous energy that he has put into defending human rights and championing the cause of those people in China who, unbelievably, are experiencing what we have always been told after the events in Germany during the 1930s and 1940s would never be allowed to happen again.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I too start by paying tribute to the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his commitment and persistence. He is so often the conscience of this House on human rights abuses globally, and once more he has made a very powerful speech.

How can anyone who watched the ceremony to mark Holocaust Memorial Day, which was broadcast last night, not be deeply moved. It made plain how propaganda led to persecution and, step by step, to the appalling slaughter of the Jews and others in the Holocaust. It has been said, “Never again”, and international measures were put in place to try to counter such atrocities and bring people to account, yet there have been genocides in Cambodia, Bosnia, Rwanda, Darfur, Myanmar and so on. As the Holocaust memorial event also mentioned, we are now hearing appalling accounts coming out of China, especially in relation to the Uighurs, including of forced organ harvesting, the sterilisation of women and the re-education camps. We hear credible reports, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned, of slave labour. We know that, in Germany, the chemical and pharmaceutical industries, in which the country had an international lead, drew on such slave labour, as did others.

We have seen worrying signs in the UK and across Europe more generally, and especially whipped up recently in the United States, of propaganda and discrimination being exploited by those seeking power. It has been an object lesson in how these things can happen, step by step, and how constant vigilance is always required. We knew it then, and we know it now, so the mover of the amendment and those speaking to it are right that, even here, in this limited Bill covering a specific area, the test should be applied as to whether an operator could be using infrastructure to breach human rights.

I am glad to hear of the efforts being made by the Minister to seek to address this, as the Government also did in the Medicines and Medical Devices Bill, and there managed, working with the noble Lord, Lord Hunt of Kings Heath, and others, to bring forward a relevant amendment. In her letter to us, the noble Baroness cites the actions of the Foreign Secretary in relation to Xinjiang. We are waiting to see the results of this translated into targeted sanctions, as the noble Lord, Lord Alton, mentioned, and the persuasion of other countries, starting with the EU, to follow suit. Sanctions are most effective if they are undertaken collectively.

We will shortly be considering the National Security and Investment Bill, and I am sure that these issues will be raised again. Prior to that, we have the Trade Bill. Surely if the Government are committed to this issue, when we get to that Bill, it is obvious that the Government must accept the amendment on genocide. How could we possibly agree to trade with a country that is committing genocide?

I thank the Government for their engagement, including that of the noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, with Sir Geoffrey Nice, the chair of the China Tribunal, on forced organ harvesting, and I look forward to further engagement. However, that engagement needs to turn into specific action. We cannot turn a blind eye, and I am sure that the noble Lord, Lord Alton, will make sure that we do not.

[The Deputy Speaker (The Earl of Kinnoull) (Non-Afl)]

The noble Lord, Lord Vaizey of Didcot, has withdrawn, so I call the next speaker, the noble Baroness, Lady Falkner of Margravine.

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

Just to clarify, the Government brought two versions of the amendment, not one. To the best of my knowledge, there is no intention to bring it back because the focus of the Telecommunications (Security) Bill is on telecoms security and national security. Therefore, any such amendment would face the same barrier as it faced in this Bill—namely, it would be out of scope. If it were effective on the supply chain, it would be out of scope.

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

The Government have always said that genocide must be decided judicially. The noble Lord, Lord Ahmad, has always reiterated that. Can the Minister clarify what she apparently said —that the Government seem now to have decided, in effect, that genocide might be decided by Parliament?

[Baroness Barran (Con)]

I hope I did not confuse the House. I am very happy to put in writing the Government’s exact position on this.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

Report stage & Report stage (Hansard) & Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Monday 29th June 2020 Lords Chamber

[Lord Hain (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I thank the Minister for her gracious and generous intervention—or speech. Having long campaigned for human rights globally, especially against apartheid, where I called for commercial sanctions against the regime and complicit companies, I applaud the noble Lord, Lord Alton, for his compelling speech and for co-ordinating Amendment 5 and tabling it on a cross-party basis.

I support, to the point of voting for it if he calls for a vote, its objective, which is to ensure that Huawei has to respect human rights in order to operate within the terms of the Bill. The Chinese state, which sponsors Huawei, has made at least 1 million Uighur Muslims in Xinjiang the victims of mass internment, torture and a brutal assault on their human rights. President Xi is now also, some say deliberately, allowing a coronavirus outbreak to plague Uighur Muslims, who are herded into these internment camps—cramped, with terrible sanitation and medical facilities—and are therefore very vulnerable, in what is an ideal breeding ground for Covid-19. The important point is—I end on this—that, as the German scholar Adrian Zenz shows in his report, Huawei is a part of the security services in Xinjiang; in other words, this giant corporation is complicit in all the horror, and this amendment seeks to end at least that, within the terms of this Bill.

[Baroness Northover (LD) [V]]

My Lords, the noble Lord, Lord Alton, and others have laid out the human rights abuses that are emerging from China, particularly in relation to the Uighurs. The possible complicity of Huawei in this is a charge that it must answer. We cannot turn a blind eye to this, which is why we support the amendment.

I hear what the Minister has said about engaging with the movers of this amendment prior to Third Reading. I look forward to hearing whether the noble Lord, Lord Alton, feels that this is likely to address his, and our, concerns.

Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill

Baroness Northover Excerpts

2nd reading & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 22nd April 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Northover (LD)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness for introducing the Bill. I also thank the noble Lord, Lord Parkinson, who is assisting her, for contacting me to see what issues I might raise. I hope that both of them will be somewhat reassured, as in my response I indicated that I would not cover the subject matter of the Bill but would speak on behalf of my colleagues who cannot and should not be present because of social distancing. I speak in this Second Reading on behalf of the Liberal Democrat Benches. My colleagues who lead the team for this Bill are my noble friends Lord Clement-Jones and Lord Fox.

It is good that the House is moving forward on the current need for us to conduct our business in virtual form. The Bill is about new technologies, so perhaps it is especially puzzling that the House of Lords has not managed to resolve the need to sit virtually on all aspects of its business by now. My task therefore is to put on the record excerpts from my noble friend Lord Clement-Jones in relation to the Second Reading of the Bill needing to be held in the Chamber today. At his request, I will read from his letter to the Procedure Committee.

“Dear Lord Chairman, I am writing to express both concern and disappointment at the decision of the Procedure Committee to conduct the Second Reading of the Telecommunications Infrastructure (Leasehold Property) Bill not virtually but in the Chamber on 22 April. I am the digital spokesperson on our Liberal Democrat Benches and would have expected to wind up in the Second Reading debate. Chris, Lord Fox, our BEIS spokesperson, would have opened for us. A decision which compels those of us who have so far stayed safe in lockdown to attend in person in the Chamber if we are to participate is quite extraordinary when, of all the virtual proceedings possible, a Second Reading debate would be the most technically and technologically straightforward. Neither I nor Lord Fox will be attending on 22 April. We will be speaking in Committee whenever it occurs, but wanted to leave you and the Procedure Committee in no doubt as to our views on this decision. With regards, Tim Clement-Jones.”

I know that both my noble friends feel passionately about the huge possibilities of new technology and how vital it is that the UK leads in this area while at the same time looking closely at the possible risks and down sides, and I know that they look forward to participating in the Bill virtually in due course. I understand that the Procedure Committee has accepted the proposition that those unable to be present today—we have very small numbers in the Chamber—will be able to give their Second Reading speeches about the key principles and concerns of the Bill in Committee, although that usually looks at only the detail of a Bill. That is certainly welcome and it sounds as though this situation will not arise again.

However, when I see that my noble friend Lady Harris had to swear in in person when she should be shielding at home so that she can continue to participate virtually in our proceedings, I do wonder when the House of Lords will catch up. Having just observed the hybrid Questions to the acting Prime Minister, Dominic Raab, from the Commons Public Gallery, it seems clear that there are ways of doing things in the Commons that can be very effective. Members asking Questions remotely were interspersed with those present in the Chamber and were clearly visible on monitors set up around the Chamber. Not only could we see and hear each of them ask their Questions, we could also see their reaction to the Minister’s response. I know that we are all learning and I appreciate the opportunity to put my colleagues’ concerns on the record.

[Lord Adonis (Lab)]

It is difficult to follow the noble Baroness because the House of Commons is sitting both physically and virtually. It has not moved to being entirely virtual, but she is making the case for moving to entirely virtual. That is emphatically what the House of Commons has not done, which is part of the reason it has maintained such a high media and public profile, whereas I am afraid your Lordships’ House has almost vanished from sight so far as the public are concerned.

[Baroness Northover]

I take very seriously what the noble Lord has said. One of the things that emerged yesterday was that each House will be looking carefully at how the other operates and what works well. What I am saying in this learning process, having just watched how it worked in hybrid fashion in the Commons, is that it is very interesting. Clearly, we have a different demographic in this House and there may be more people who need to work virtually. It is therefore exceptionally important that we place their health first and foremost, but there may well be ways in which we can learn from how the Commons is dealing with things and make sure that we are as effective as the second Chamber of Parliament needs to be in holding the Government to account.