Crime and Policing Bill

Baroness O'Loan Excerpts

Wednesday 11th March 2026 Lords Chamber

[Lord Bailey of Paddington (Con)]

My Lords, Amendment 392 in my name is about fairness, discipline and humanity.

First, misconduct investigations that drift on for months and years are damaging to everyone involved—the officer, the family, the complainant and public confidence in the system. Secondly, where these cases run on endlessly, the consequences can be severe. Long investigations place huge strain on mental health and, in the worst cases, such prolonged uncertainty has been linked to suicide. That alone should make this House pause and ask whether the current system is working as it should. Thirdly, I want to stress that this amendment does not block proper investigation and does not touch criminal matters. It simply says that, after 12 months, there should be independent scrutiny by a legally qualified person so that cases can move on properly and an officer can either be brought back into service or removed from the service without delay. Finally, swift justice is a matter for all involved. It matters for the innocent officer who should not be left in limbo. It matters for the complainants who deserve prompt and credible outcomes. Justice delayed helps no one; this amendment would bring greater urgency, greater accountability and a greater sense of fairness to the police disciplinary system.

Morale in the police force, particularly in the Met, is very low and one of the things that officers continually point to is the length of investigations when an officer is accused of something. This is not to say whether the officer is innocent or not—that is a whole other affair—it is the length of the investigation. If you speak to any of your local bobbies, particularly if they are an officer, they are likely to tell you they are considering leaving. When you probe a bit deeper, this question of investigations always comes up. One of the major roles of this Government now has to be to improve police morale by doing the right thing and making the whole system fairer.

I come from the Black community, the community arguably most over and under policed simultaneously in this country. If we are to have a police force that can actually care for the people who have the most interaction with the police, we need to raise their morale. I commend this amendment to the House. It could be a very good step in the right direction to make these investigations fair and to raise police morale.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

My Lords, Amendment 393A in my name seeks to codify the Supreme Court decision in W(80) which relates to police disciplinary proceedings involving the use of force. The amendment relates to the test used to determine whether an officer misconducted themselves when he or she used force in self-defence. The amendment would place in statute the current legal position that an officer must hold an honest belief that they or others faced an immediate danger and, crucially, that where that belief is mistaken, the mistake must also be an objectively reasonable one.

I have retabled this amendment to encourage further consideration by the Government of their decision to depart from this test following Sir Adrian Fulford’s rapid review. Under their proposal, an officer would be able to rely on an honestly held but mistaken belief, even if the mistake was unreasonable. This is a significant shift, and one intended to be made by statutory instrument and without public consultation.

Since this is Report, I will not repeat the arguments made in Committee; however, I continue to believe firmly that the current civil law test is the right one in the context of misconduct proceedings. Of course, as many have rightly emphasised, it is essential that officers required to make split-second decisions in life-threatening situations are treated fairly, but fairness to officers must be balanced with the equally important obligations of learning, improvement and accountability of officers. The current test already achieves that balance. On the previous references to delays in the misconduct proceedings arena, I would say that these matters should be addressed by review, rather than removing the possibility of misconduct proceedings.

It is important to be clear that this amendment does not concern the criminal law. It does not touch on criminal prosecutions, as was suggested during Committee. To answer the noble Lord, Lord Hogan-Howe, with respect, the reason that disciplinary proceedings await the outcome of criminal proceedings is that this is what the police ask. I chair the safeguarding service in the Roman Catholic Diocese of Westminster and in many cases the police will say to us, “Please stop: do nothing”, and the policy is that we stop and do nothing until the police say we can do something. That is an important reservation.

[Lord Hogan-Howe (CB)]

May I address that simple point? To be clear, in these cases, the IOPC is the investigating body. It is in full possession of the information it has gained—interviews, evidence from the scene, et cetera—so it is in a good position to query criminal charge or, at that stage, query misconduct charge, but it waits until the end of the whole process to instigate the misconduct charge that it could have instigated at the beginning, indicating the point made by the noble Lord, Lord Pannick, that it may be an employment issue. I find it confusing that it waits until the outcome of a criminal case, where it will have had no reasoned explanation for the jury’s decision—it would in a civil case, but not in a jury case, because no reason is offered. That is my point. It can be different in other professions, I understand, because they did not have the benefit of the investigators deciding what to put forward to the CPS.

[Baroness O'Loan (CB)]

As police ombudsman, I was faced with exactly this problem, and I knew that our criminal proceedings had to be dealt with first.

To continue, what we are talking about here is the standard to be applied in misconduct proceedings. These proceedings exist in large part not just to ensure accountability but to enable forces to reflect and learn. They also enable the police to demonstrate that they take seriously situations involving the use of force, even when that force has been held not to be criminal. Despite that, the use of force must be necessary and proportionate.

This has broader implications. A disciplinary system that cannot scrutinise unreasonable mistakes risks undermining public confidence in policing. Retaining the civil law test supports public confidence by ensuring that unreasonable errors of judgment are open to scrutiny. Removing that scrutiny would weaken the learning function of misconduct proceedings, pose risks to public safety and give the impression that unreasonable policing errors lie beyond the review of accountability. That would have an impact, inevitably, by diminishing trust in policing.

For these reasons, I would be very grateful if the Minister could indicate what steps the Government are willing to take to address the serious concerns raised about moving to the criminal standard for self-defence in misconduct proceedings, particularly in the absence of wider public consultation or engagement with the communities most affected by police use of force. I am grateful to Justice, Inquest, the National Black Police Association and StopWatch for their help and support in this amendment.

[Baroness Doocey (LD)]

My Lords, these amendments all address the same question: how we protect the public from unlawful force while treating officers fairly when they carry out dangerous duties on our behalf. From these Benches, we start from two simple principles: there must be clear, consistent standards of accountability; and we must not drift into a two-tier justice system that treats police officers differently from everyone else.

On Amendment 391, in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Davies of Gower, we have particular concerns. It would, in effect, close off the possibility of independent scrutiny by the IOPC once a criminal court had acquitted an officer. That might sound attractive in the interests of family, but it risks confusing two distinct questions: whether conduct meets the high criminal threshold for conviction and whether it meets the professional standards we rightly expect from those who wield state power.

We are more sympathetic to Amendment 392 from the noble Lord, Lord Bailey. Misconduct cases that drift for years are bad for families seeking answers, for complainants whose evidence fades, for taxpayers funding prolonged suspensions and, not least, for officers left in limbo. The broad thrust of the amendment—that investigations need clear expectations and real grip—is one we support, while recognising that complex cases sometimes need longer and that rigid timelines can carry risks.

Amendment 393A, in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, seeks to put beyond doubt the test that should apply in police disciplinary proceedings involving the use of force. We support the aim of aligning those proceedings with the approach of the Supreme Court in W80 as a modest but important safeguard for bereaved families and communities who need to see that internal standards reflect the law as articulated by the highest court. If the Government are now moving in that direction through secondary legislation, so much the better, but Parliament is entitled to a clear, on-the-record explanation of the test, not simply an assurance that it will be sorted out behind the scenes.