(6 days, 19 hours ago)
Lords ChamberMy Lords, I would like to comment on this group in response to what the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, has just said.
In its recent briefing for Peers, the Royal College of Psychiatrists gave its view:
“Assessors should be required to take all practicable steps to work with professionals involved in a person’s health and social care, and to talk to a relative, carer or nominated friend, including by accessing medical notes from both primary and secondary care”.
It expressed concern that
“a consideration of suicide protection duties are being bypassed by the Bill in its current form”
due to unmet need not being formally assessed. A previous DoLS is relevant to consideration of current capacity to decide to end one’s life. What would be the mechanism for reliably ensuring information that there has been a DoLS before it gets to the assessors and the panel?
Having mentioned the Royal College of Psychiatrists, I would like to make a short statement. The college has asked me to respond to the allegations about its leadership made by the noble Baroness, Lady Murphy, on 14 November, our first day in Committee. The president of the college, Dr Lade Smith, wrote to the noble Baroness asking her to withdraw her allegations, as they are inaccurate. But although the noble Baroness was present in the Chamber the following week, no clarification was provided. As a past president myself, I beg leave to set the record straight.
The college’s recommendations on the Bill are, in fact, based on 18 months’ consideration by a cross-college working group involving membership surveys, debate with members on proposals before other jurisdictions, and discussions with colleagues in other jurisdictions where assisted dying is practised. The president is clear that Dr Annabel Price, the appointed college lead for the Bill, has accurately represented its views when giving formal evidence to both Houses. With the Bill before the Lords, the Royal College of Psychiatrists is focusing on how to make it safer for people with mental health needs and learning disability needs, and better aligned with the responsibilities of psychiatrists. I feel that, in the light of the discussion on DoLS, this is an appropriate statement to make.
My Lords, I have put my name to Amendment 16. I also support Amendments 16A, 114 and 114A because the very general definition in Clause 1 of a terminally ill adult who has the capacity to take their own life does not contain any consideration of those who have been deprived of their liberty under Section 4 of the Mental Capacity Act. It is an unfortunate reality that many of those detained in hospitals or care homes are detained because they lack the capacity to make a decision about their own care or treatment. As the noble Baroness, Lady Finlay, said, in such circumstances it is surely axiomatic that there should be careful consideration of cases involving individuals subject to a DoLS.
As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, said, even assessing the capacity of someone with dementia or another neurological condition, for example, can be profoundly difficult. This is not just because of the frequent fluctuation of both capacity and the extent to which any identified capacity enables the making of a particular decision; a medical practitioner or social worker who meets a person for the first time may be misled as to the capacity they actually have. As the Royal College of Psychiatrists noted in its written evidence,
“an assessment of a person’s mental capacity to decide to end their own life is an entirely different and more complex determination requiring a higher level of understanding”
than in other assessments of capacity.
In the 1997 case of Re MB, the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Butler-Sloss, said:
“The graver the consequences of the decision, the commensurately greater the level of competence required to take the decision”.
Capacity assessment is not a precise science. The unique context of this Bill makes taking a cautious approach appropriate. It is common sense that there is a likely correlation between incapacity in one area, so extreme that the state must deprive the person of their liberty, and incapacity to decide whether to end one’s own life. People whose incapacity for basic decisions is so severe that they are deprived of their liberty are the most vulnerable members of society.
I want to give your Lordships a brief example. I was aware of a woman in her late 80s who had been assessed and was subject to a DoLS. She objected to it and appealed against it. Intellectually, she was enormously able, possessed of considerable social skills despite her dementia. She was able to persuade those dealing with her appeal that she had capacity despite the very real concerns of her family, who knew the extent of her incapacity. The DoLS was lifted and she went back to her own home. Shortly afterwards, she was found playing golf in the road in her pyjamas at two o’clock in the morning. She was going to the supermarket at 4 am. She was leaving the door unlocked all night for her husband and cooking his dinner every night; he had died some 20 years previously.
That lady was my mother. She certainly would not have understood a suggestion that she should opt for an assisted death. The DoLS was subsequently reinstated. This is not an unusual situation. If the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, rejects these amendments, how does he consider that such vulnerable individuals can be protected from making this final decision, although they may not understand exactly what they are doing?