(1 week, 2 days ago)
Lords ChamberThat is true as far as that goes. However, in the wider context, the principal objective of that legislation is not to enable people to commit crimes but to prevent people being subject to endless civil and criminal litigation that may arise from their duties as representatives of public bodies, be they the security services, the police et cetera. So I think that the noble Baroness is being slightly unfair to the Ministers at the time who put through that legislation. What she outlined was clearly a corollary of passing that legislation, but it was not the principal reason, as I am sure she will concede.
The reason I wanted to speak is to interrogate the details of this amendment. Looking at paragraph (2B)(b) of the proposed new clause, I wonder what is meant by
“otherwise seeking to discredit, the person, people or group subject to the authorised surveillance operation”.
That seems a very wide-ranging paragraph and a recipe for much litigation in the future. Should it eventually be found on the face of the enacted Crime and Policing Bill, the way that it will be interpreted will give rise to a situation where the police, the security services and others are much more reluctant to enter into long-term surveillance of the kind I discussed earlier in seeking to thwart a terrorist plot, because of that quite wide-ranging and open paragraph.
Generally speaking, the noble Baroness has made a very fine point and I agree with much of what she said, but I genuinely do not understand the point of that paragraph. If it is a way of describing an agent provocateur, I understand that—and, because she is a prominent lawyer, she will no doubt tell me where that is found in other pieces of legislation. However, currently, that paragraph could be misinterpreted, and it will circumscribe the capacity of the security services and the police to do their job and protect individuals. For those reasons, while I am not necessarily against the amendment, I would like further clarification if possible.
My Lords, I have long had a responsibility for the investigation of matters involving CHISs and I fully accept that many people who agree to become CHISs do so in the public interest, because, without their activities, the intelligence that they are able to collect would be unavailable. I also accept that undercover activity of this kind has long been a feature of criminal investigation.
Nevertheless, while the CHIS Act, which was passed in 2021, provided a very necessary statutory framework for the operation of CHISs, because that was previously absent, it does not contain sufficient safeguards against abuse, particularly where such acts risk falling beyond the scope of the authorisation of the CCA, particularly where they are well concealed by those committing such crimes and not reporting back properly.
Regrettably, like many others, I have seen repeated abuses of authorisations of CHISs. I have also seen CHISs acting way beyond the scope of their authorisations, sometimes with the knowledge of those who manage them, to the extent that they value the CHIS more than dealing with unauthorised and perhaps criminal conduct by the CHIS.
When the CHIS is not an undercover officer—and, of course, not all CHISs are undercover state employees—there is less control and potentially a higher risk. Unlike in the experience of the noble Baroness, Lady Jones, we in Northern Ireland have been able to expose unlawful activities of CHISs to bring them to account. So it can be done.