Terminally Ill Adults (End of Life) Bill

Debate between Baroness Stroud and Baroness Hollins

Friday 5th December 2025 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Stroud (Con)]

My Lords, I want to speak in support of the noble Baroness, Lady Berger. I will limit my remarks because some of them have already been made by previous speakers. I think the reality is that maturity is a scale and choosing to proceed with assisted dying at the age of 18 poses difficult questions, which we must grapple with, about the neurological maturity required for true, settled and informed consent on a matter of such gravity, and not just particular circumstances. I intend to speak in a subsequent group to Amendment 22 in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Grey-Thompson, but some of the points I will make then are also relevant to this group.

I note that research undertaken by the Sentencing Council in 2024, which focused on aggravating and mitigating factors in sentencing guidelines, has this to say about age and maturity:

“Age and/or lack of maturity can affect … the offender’s responsibility for the offence and … the effect of the sentence on the offender. Either or both of these considerations may justify a reduction in the sentence”.


The report goes on to note:

“In particular young adults (typically aged 18-25) are still developing neurologically and consequently may be less able to: … evaluate the consequences of their actions … limit impulsivity … limit risk-taking … Young adults are likely to be susceptible to peer pressure and are more likely to take risks or behave impulsively when in company with their peers”.


I do not want to cross over into debate on the subsequent group, but this seems highly relevant to our deliberations on the appropriate age for assisted dying. Of course, age and maturity are mitigating factors only, and therefore discretionary, but it seems extraordinary to me that the principle of maturity is one which is accepted in a legal context, and there remain calls for dedicated sentencing guidelines for 18 to 25 year-olds in recognition of this, yet the Bill as drafted does not seem adequately to account for this in a similar manner with regard to the permanent decision to end one’s own life. I would be grateful if the noble and learned Lord, Lord Falconer, could comment on this when he responds to the debate.

The autonomy on which the Bill is purportedly built must be grounded in safeguards commensurate with the irreversible nature of the proposed act. With regards to the age of eligibility, I do not believe the Bill as drafted meets this standard. For these reasons and more, I support the amendments in the names of the noble Baronesses, Lady Berger and Lady Lawlor, as well as those in the name of the noble Baroness, Lady Goudie, and the noble Lord, Lord Moylan.

[Baroness Hollins (CB)]

My Lords, I have an amendment in this group and I support the noble Baroness, Lady Berger, in this. I just want to add to earlier comments. The transition from children’s to adult services at 18 is well known to be a very confusing and destabilising period during which key clinical relationships are lost and important elements of a young person’s history may not be carried forward. These factors are directly relevant to assessing decision-making capacity and identifying safeguarding concerns for individuals aged 18 and above who may seek assisted dying. I think that raising the minimum age would allow for any medical advances—for example, with emerging new treatments that might change a young person’s prognosis. It is important not to be too hasty.

I also want to comment on the Scottish Sentencing Council and to add that, again, there is something about the developmental process which is still under way which can increase susceptibility to influence, vulnerability to risk-taking and the likelihood of short-term, emotionally driven decision-making. We have only to think about the fact that in that age group, the biggest cause of death is actually accidental death. Research done by the Sentencing Council and other research shows that maturity may be delayed by adverse childhood experiences. It is therefore reasonable to assume that some young adults with serious illness may carry such developmental vulnerabilities into their decision-making around the end of life. The Sentencing Council guideline suggesting lower culpability and a greater capacity for change than in older adults endorses the suggestion that we should change the minimum age to 25. This is an irreversible decision. We need enhanced safeguards for this age group, and I support the amendments.