Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Report stage
Wednesday 9th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Howard of Lympne (Con)]

My Lords, I apologise that I was not present during the Committee stage. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, knows that I have great respect for him. We enjoyed working together in opposition to the Government’s Internal Market Bill. He was courteous enough to ask me my opinion of his amendment before he put it down. I told him that I would be unable to support it. The reason is the answer to the question that he posed during his remarks, to which my noble friend Lord Lansley purported, but failed, to give an answer, which is: what happens if there is, as there could be—and no one in your Lordships’ House can suggest that there could never be—a revival of the circumstances in the House of Commons between 2017 and 2019? The position was that the Government could not properly govern because they did not have a majority for many of the things that they wanted to do. The House of Commons did not want them to govern and so was content with that stalemate position and that hobbled Government, which did no good whatever to Parliament or the country.

I do not understand why this is referred to as a messy Bill. It is a perfectly straightforward Bill, which seeks to restore the position as it was before the Fixed- term Parliaments Act. The Act was necessary for the course of the coalition Government, but it should never have been made permanent. I very much regret that I did not vote for an amendment in your Lordships’ House that would have made it temporary.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

Would the noble Lord acknowledge, as my noble friend has proved, that, in the circumstances about which he is talking, the Government had a majority for an election? Therefore, this amendment would not have created the difficulties that he is suggesting.

[Lord Howard of Lympne]

The noble Baroness and her friends cannot possibly give an assurance that a circumstance will not arise not precisely the same as that which occurred between 2017 and 2019 but in which a simple majority could not be obtained for an election, because a majority of the House of Commons was content to stymie and hobble the Government and keep them in place in that paralysed state, which was what we saw in that unhappy time.

--- Later in debate ---

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I promised I would look up my personal record on that Bill. I have not done so, but I would be surprised if my name featured very heavily. Anyway, it is being done away with now, and I think the noble Lord and I agree that it should be done away with, whatever follows.

A vote in the House of Commons has created paralysis in a number of contexts and could create paralysis in many contexts. Some noble Lords have spoken on this, including my noble friends Lord Bridges and Lord Howard of Lympne, and the noble and learned Lord, Lord Brown. There could be minority Governments or situations where parties, Parliament or the nation have divided.

The kernel of the argument put forward by the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, and others is that their approach offers simplicity. In fact, it adds a complication to a Bill which is simple. Without going over the same ground, we saw that painfully in 2019, when the Labour Party was three times presented with the opportunity to force an election, and Mr Corbyn thrice denied the election to the Prime Minister and the British people by sitting on his hands. So do not tell me that there cannot be circumstances in which an Opposition would seek to prevent a general election. We have lived that system and I believe that my noble friend Lord Howard of Lympne, and indeed the noble Lord, Lord Butler of Brockwell, were absolutely right to warn that these circumstances could recur.

In Committee, I set out the negative consequences for the fundamental conventions on confidence. Simply put, the privilege to request that the sovereign exercise the Dissolution prerogative is an executive function enjoyed by virtue of the ability of the Government to command the confidence of the Commons. Our contention is that this simple process should not be unduly constrained by the type of process that the noble and learned Lord puts before us; it could be disruptive and unhelpful at times when expediency is essential.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

I am grateful to the Minister for giving way. He is talking about the use of executive powers. Is he concerned—I assume he is, because of Clause 3—that the courts might get involved in this and that that could cause serious constitutional conflict? Surely if the amendment proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, was accepted, that would reduce the need for the ouster clause in Clause 3?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I do not think it is an either/or question. If I may use a phrase that was once popular on the Benches opposite, there is third way, which is to have neither of those amendments and to return to the simple and proven practice of the past.

When we send an amendment to the other place, we are always adjured to be careful what we send and to show how we reflect and are thoughtful. I would like to consider some of the practical working of the proposition that the noble and learned Lord puts before us. There is little about that, despite its immense significance potentially for our constitution, and indeed its reversal of the Government’s manifesto commitment to repeal the Fixed-term Parliaments Act.

For example, the noble and learned Lord proposes that there should be a Motion that

“this present Parliament will be dissolved.”

How would this parliamentary process be sequenced and when would it apply? How would it relate to confidence? Would it also apply following a loss of confidence? Would a Prime Minister have to go for a further Motion? Could anyone put before the House of Commons the Motion proposed by the noble and learned Lord, or would it be only the Prime Minister and the Treasury Bench? If the Motion is passed, is the Prime Minister bound to seek a Dissolution—for example, a sudden tactical alliance could trigger a general election—or could he seek to retain the confidence of the House of Commons? Even if there were such a Motion as the noble and learned Lord has proposed, when would the Prime Minister have to dissolve Parliament?

In even more extraordinary circumstances, given such an amendment, could a Government procure such a Motion on the first day after the end of the debate on the gracious Speech? Could they pass such a Motion

“that this present Parliament will be dissolved”,

and then wait for the rest of the Parliament? After all, it says “will”; it does not say “when”.

These questions are practical and unanswered. I submit that it is not a responsible role for a revising Chamber to send this amendment down to the elected Chamber with none of those issues worked through. They were carefully considered by the Joint Committee, which arrived at a conclusion. This is constitution-making on the hoof.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Committee stage
Tuesday 25th January 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Judge (CB)]

My Lords, the amendment in my name and those of the noble Baroness, Lady Smith of Basildon, and the noble Lords, Lord Newby and Lord Lansley, is about the constitutional location of power today and for the next 80 to 100 years. It is not about where, historically speaking, power in Parliament used to rest. It is about now, at the beginning of this century, after at least half a century in which the powers of the Prime Minister have been accreting at an alarming and chilling rate. I will not go through the endless efforts I have made to draw your Lordships’ attention to that fact, but it is a fact.

I was not able to speak at Second Reading but the issue of troublesome prerogative powers relating to Dissolution and Prorogation formed the basis of my contribution to the debate on the Queen’s Speech. I know that I am not taking the Minister by surprise because he and I have had many rather interesting discussions about the constitutional issues. It is important that I add this too: when I made that speech, the present Prime Minister was riding high in the polls. This is nothing to do with the fact that he has troubles abounding at the moment—Prime Ministers always run into trouble at some time. It is not about the present Prime Minister; it is about the person, whoever that might be, who holds this office not being given further power, as the Bill proposes.

We should not have a fixed-term Parliament. We all agree on that. There should be a maximum period. Five years is what is proposed and it makes perfect sense. What did not make sense last time was the proposal that a two-thirds majority was needed in the Commons for that term to come to an end. It did not make sense because of something that should have been absolutely obvious to everybody. I am sorry to say that to those who advocate for it. Just about every important piece of legislation enacted in Parliament has required a bare majority. Nobody set about trying to have two-thirds majorities; a bare majority would do. The Great Reform Act had a majority of two. The Habeas Corpus Act, where all our freedoms were determined, passed because the noble Lord acting as a Teller for one side counted a big fat Peer as 10 and so it was carried. That is what our liberties have turned on. My point is that a two-thirds majority is an aberration.

The question is: how do we replace the legislation? We have had the beginning of a fascinating discussion: do the current proposals revive the prerogative power? Fun—the noble Lord, Lord Norton, can get his students to write endless essays, all getting Firsts if they agree with him, on this subject. But this is the point: whatever the theory might be, the reality is that the power of Dissolution will now be based on statute—this statute, which might be changed. Prerogative power does not get elevated out of thin air; it is founded on the statute.

In answer to one or two of the matters raised in the noble Lord’s Amendment 1, whether the theory is that the Prime Minister gives Her Majesty—the monarch, rather—advice or a request, it seems to me, and here I agree with the noble Lord, Lord Grocott, absolutely impossible to understand that the monarch of the day would be prepared to enter into tempestuous political controversy, threatening the very existence of the monarchy, if the prime ministerial advice or request was rejected. It seems inconceivable. It might have been possible when the Lascelles letter was written to the Times in 1950. It was never put to the test; it never arose. In my view, it is inconceivable. If my view is right, here in the 21st century, the current legislative proposal in this Bill is that the decision whether Parliament should be dissolved would be vested exclusively in the Prime Minister of the day. Today, in a modern democracy, an uncurbed power to have Parliament dissolved—it is rather astonishing to think about it.

Of course, as was said in an earlier debate, it is perfectly true that the Prime Minister, in making his or her decision, has to be mindful of the possible adverse reaction of the electorate if they choose to think that his or her idea of having an election is a bad one. Of course it is, but whether the public do or not, general elections are about the next five years. The election arrives and a decision is made on the health service, the education system, the Armed Forces. It is not just about this single decision made by the Prime Minister. So I go this far with the argument against me: okay, the Prime Minister would take into account possible adverse reactions from the electorate if the electorate do not want an election. But this is not a principle; it is simply a matter of prime ministerial judgment. It is not constitutional control; it is the Prime Minister making a purely political decision: “Where does the balance of advantage to me and my party lie?”

It will also be suggested—it has been suggested to me and I have read it pretty frequently—that recent events in the Commons in the context of Brexit underline the need for this prime ministerial power. The Brexit debates were hardly a model of clarity but let us remember what they reflected: a huge parliamentary and, indeed, national divide, splitting parliamentary parties themselves, in the context of the constitutional aberration of a referendum, with the Dissolution process itself governed by the requirement for a two-thirds majority rather than a simple majority, which, as I said a moment ago, altered parliamentary processes and, indeed, strategies. In constitutional terms, the Brexit shambles demonstrated the folly of a two-thirds majority being superimposed on the result of a referendum that was not welcome to a majority in the House of Commons. That is not a sufficient justification for reviving or creating—it does not matter what you call it—this unrestricted power over the length of the life of the Parliament for the Prime Minister of the day.

These arguments overlook something so obvious that it is not merely in danger of being overlooked, it is being overlooked. I am not going to let it be overlooked. The Dissolution of Parliament eradicates the choice made by millions of citizens when they cast their votes at the previous election and chose who would represent them in the House of Commons. That sounds over- dramatic, but I invite your Lordships to think about it, because that is what it means.

To ensure continuing democratic involvement, to ensure that we live in a democracy and to enable us all to reflect on where power should lie, of course there has to be a finite time for each Parliament. That is a necessity in a democracy. But when the Dissolution is not a consequence of the effluxion of time but is simply based on a unilateral prime ministerial decision, the votes at the earlier general election are wiped out. The earlier democratic decision is revoked. One vote trumps millions of votes. To me, in a democracy there is a certain level of absurdity about such a principle. If this Bill passes unamended, the effect of those votes will be revoked by—and I am choosing a word used recently by the Delegated Legislation Committee—diktat. If you do not like “diktat”, call it decree, call it command, call it whim, call it fancy. I do not mind what you call it. but it is one person’s decision—unconstrained and unrestricted—by an assessment of political advantage.

Surely in the 21st century the exercise of power to change and to ditch the democratic vote should at least be subject to a modicum of control. The amendment from the noble Lord, Lord Norton, offered the possible control of the monarch and, for the reasons I have given, I respectfully suggest that that is not sufficient. Surely we should rest some responsibility on the House of Commons of the day—the elected representatives. That is what the Commons is there to do: to control and to keep an eye on the Executive and to keep a particular eye on the accreting power of the Prime Minister.

This is something that we cannot just accept on the basis that a prerogative power is being revived. This is going to be a statute.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I listened carefully to the noble Lord, Lord True, and he is right that this is an important Bill. I very much welcome the repeal of the Fixed-term Parliaments Act—I was never a fan and I am pleased to see it go.

I hesitate to disagree on any occasion with the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, but I am not sure that I follow his logic entirely. Maybe that is because of the political experience that some of us have seen and felt when Prime Ministers have not always got these things right and have not always chosen the right minute to have an election. My noble friends Lord Grocott and Lord Rooker will well remember 1978 when Jim Callaghan did not have an election at a time when people thought it might be advantageous and subsequently lost a few months later. Gordon Brown did not have an election in 2009 and subsequently lost a year later.

The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, is right that this is about the constitutional location of power, but it is also about the role of the Executive and the legislature. Yes, the legislature is there to hold the Government to account—a very important function. If I was in the House of Commons at the moment, having been given a vote by the Fixed-term Parliaments Act I think I would have wanted to hold on to that vote to say whether an election should take place. I thought that that might have been one of the compromises that was reached during the consideration of this Bill by the Government and when the Joint Committee looked at it. I am surprised that the Commons gave up so easily the power to have a say and to sanction the calling of a general election.

It would not necessarily have been a simple thing to do. The noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, mentioned the two-thirds majority that was clearly just part of the political fix of the original deal between the Conservatives and the Liberals after the 2010 election, and that is a non-starter. However, I wonder whether he would say that the majority had to be 50% plus one of those voting on the issue or 50% of the whole House plus one. What would the Motion be and what would the role of the Speaker be in terms of a tied vote? We have to consider all those arrangements. I do not think it is a simple issue although, had I been in the Commons when this Bill was going through, I would have been very reluctant to give any say whatever in terms of when an election should take place.

Downing Street Christmas Parties

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 9th December 2021 Lords Chamber

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, the rules of the House of Commons are for the other place. As far as I am concerned, every Minister acts on his or her honour to be truthful to whichever House they are a member of.

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, would the Minister confirm that anybody who works in No. 10, or elsewhere in government, who was or was not invited to that party, will not have their career prospects jeopardised by giving evidence to the courts, the police or indeed this inquiry?

[Lord True (Con)]

My Lords, I sincerely hope that that would be the case. Obviously, the Cabinet Secretary is responsible for the conduct of the inquiry. He is the senior civil servant and will own the responsibility to which the noble Baroness referred. I should make it clear—following on from something that I did not reply to from the noble Lord—that the terms of reference, which I will lay in the Library of your Lordships’ House later today if they are not there now, will make it clear that where there are credible allegations relating to other gatherings, these may be investigated.

Dissolution and Calling of Parliament Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

2nd reading
Tuesday 30th November 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I very much welcome the Bill. I was never a fan of the Fixed- term Parliaments Act and, indeed, never a fan of fixed terms, whatever the manifesto said at any particular time.

We should start by reminding ourselves of how we got that legislation in the first place. It was a simple, blatant political fix between the Conservatives and the Liberals, between Cameron and Clegg—I do not know how many other people were consulted. As a former Chief Whip I have no problems with a political fix, but please do not dress it up as some constitutional principle because it was never that in the first place.

The Constitution Committee, which I currently chair, was very temperate in its language at the time. It said, as the Minister reminded us, that the Fixed-term Parliaments Bill

“owed more to short-term political considerations than an assessment of constitutional principles.”

I think that is the polite way of saying “a political fix”. Clearly, the committee was quite right in assessing the longevity of that legislation. As we have seen, it was proven that it was possible for a Government—for a Prime Minister—to get around the provision, so the Minister was quite correct when he said it was a political experiment that failed.

So, here we have the withdrawal of that legislation and, as I say, I welcome that. However, the repeal is the easy part—we can all agree that that is simple; we are now entering new territory. In the Constitution Committee’s report we say that it

“touches the bedrock of the constitution, particularly the precise balance between the rule of law, the separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament.”

Before I go into the conflict and the details, particularly Clause 3, I say at the outset that we should all welcome the clarity of a five-year term for any Parliament; I think most of us will be happier with that. In respect of other parts of the Bill, it is not a case of being happy with them so much as hoping that they are workable.

There has been a lot of discussion about whether it is possible to return to the pre-Fixed-term Parliaments Act provision. Can a prerogative that has been abolished be reinstated? In some respects the Government have adopted a belt-and-braces attitude: they have a statutory provision and the ouster clause. That aspect of Clause 3 is clearly causing not just academic concern but concern on all sides of this House, and it will have to be addressed in Committee.

I think we all agree that we need to keep the Monarch out of all the potential political considerations. I remind the House what the Constitution Committee said about Clause 3, because it is extremely relevant to the discussions we will have later:

“The use of ouster clauses to restrict or exclude judicial review of executive decisions touches the bedrock of the constitution, particularly the precise balance between the rule of law, the separation of powers and the sovereignty of Parliament. On the one hand ouster clauses should provide legal clarity about the ability of the executive to make decisions which may be considered more appropriate to political rather than judicial deliberations. On the other hand, judicial review”—


this is important—

“should provide a backstop against exceptional use of an executive power which significantly erodes a fundamental principle of the UK constitution.”

We go on to say:

“There is a risk that a Prime Minister might abuse the power of dissolution if the courts are unable to exercise control over the limits and extent of this power, particularly in exceptional circumstances.”


To build on what the noble Lord, Lord Butler, was saying, the experience of the last few years tells us that exceptional circumstances and events are not as exceptional as we might have expected. We need to consider how to make sure that the balance that is required is maintained and workable. There are dangers there. They have been highlighted in the debate today, and they will be looked at in great detail in Committee.

There are just three other points that I want to make. The most important concerns the issue raised by my noble friend Lord Grocott. I was very surprised that the House of Commons gave up any say whatever in the calling of an election. As I say, I did not like the Fixed-term Parliaments Act but it did give MPs that power and that say—although not to the extent that many people suggested—so I was surprised that the House of Commons did not reinstate at least some kind of confirmatory vote in the House, should the Prime Minister decide to call an election. I am not sure how much difference it would have made, but in the exceptional circumstances that we can all perhaps envisage, it could have been possible.

Secondly, I welcome what the Minister said about taking on board the concerns of the Scottish and Welsh Governments about possible clashes of election dates. That needs restating and underpinning in some way because it could create some significant problems.

Thirdly, in early September the Constitution Committee published a report on the need to review and update the Cabinet Manual. The Minister indicated when he will respond to our report on the Bill, but he has not yet responded to that report. The Government’s response is significantly overdue, and I hope we can get some indication of when that review will take place. But it is also important that we get an acknowledgment that Parliament and parliamentary committees should have some say on the content of the Cabinet Manual. It is important that the Dissolution principles we have been discussing on the fringes of this debate are part of that, that they can be discussed by Parliament and that Parliament can have some influence there.

Finally, I remind the House that the Constitution Committee has long emphasised that constitutional change should be able to stand the test of time. The Fixed-term Parliaments Act did not do that. I hope this House can make sure that this Bill is in a fit state to pass that test.

Government: Leadership Training

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 16th September 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab)]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Lord, Lord Norton, on this debate. I look forward to the quality of the answers the Minister will give to the questions he raised. Indeed, while he was speaking I recalled the preparations made in the 1990s for the then shadow Cabinet, and indeed the whole of the Front Bench. We were involved in seminars, training and away days at Templeton College; that was very good discipline and preparation, especially for a party that had so few people who had ever been in government before. I am not sure how long that approach lasted, and much of what the noble Lord said is an entirely timely reminder for everyone about what needs to happen.

I also recall that every time I became a Minister—several times—I was given a great deal of paperwork about my obligations and the way to behave, but I was also spoken to by the Permanent Secretary, and perhaps that was more important in outlining ministerial responsibilities. That approach might still exist, or exist in theory, but I am not sure how successful it is for Ministers’ obligations to Parliament. The noble Lord referred to that.

I will emphasise not the nature of the training that should take place but why it is so important that we have a new approach at this time. As I see it, the basic problem is the lack of respect for Parliament on the part of Ministers. We see that in the dismissive answers given to Parliamentary Questions and in announcements being made outside the House. The Speaker in the other place has tried to get the Government to behave more appropriately.

It is also a very significant problem in the way Ministers approach legislation. For the last number of years I have been a member of the Constitution Committee of this House. During that time, I have become increasingly concerned, and indeed alarmed, at the extremely unhealthy trends that I think are accelerating—trends in what government Ministers think they can get away with without properly consulting Parliament, in an attitude that I can describe only as cavalier. Time and again, the Constitution Committee has looked at Bills coming before the House and expressed very significant concerns at their skeletal nature and the vast number of Henry VIII clauses giving Ministers great delegated powers, allowing them to create offences and even to give effect to an international treaty by statutory instrument, as opposed to an Act of Parliament. Almost every time the committee examined a major Bill, we expressed serious concerns about the Government’s approach.

The more significant problem is not the issues in each individual Bill but the underlying trend we are seeing of moving away from Parliament making our laws and Ministers increasingly taking powers to change the rules, regulations and guidance. This has obvious dangers for a parliamentary democracy—the Government must be accountable to Parliament and Parliament must make our laws—but it is also dangerous for Ministers. Ministers are much more likely to get legislation that is right, workable and not open to legal challenge if there is appropriate parliamentary scrutiny. We have seen this time after time.

The situation has been made worse in recent years. During the Brexit negotiations, and subsequently, the Government’s brinkmanship meant that vital legislation had to be fast-tracked through Parliament. That was not inevitable. It was the Government’s choice in their tactics with the EU, and their tactics in handling Parliament and minimising parliamentary scrutiny. We have also seen with Covid that the Government have taken unprecedented extra powers, using statutory instruments to change rules, regulations and guidance frequently and often very late in the day.

I think there is a very real danger that Ministers, and indeed civil servants—and maybe even parliamentary counsel—will think that this is a new norm and that the Government can actually get away with anything; that bouncing Parliament and riding roughshod over important conventions is the way the Government can operate in the future. That is very dangerous and should be resisted by this House. It is also why this kind of training for Ministers, civil servants and everyone involved—including Members of Parliament, who do not always understand this House—is absolutely essential. People have got to learn not just the principles surrounding parliamentary democracy but how a functioning democracy actually works best. That is why I am very pleased to support the Motion moved by the noble Lord, Lord Norton.

UK Government Union Capability

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

Thursday 1st July 2021 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I congratulate the noble Earl, Lord Kinnoull, on obtaining this debate and the noble Lord, Lord Dunlop, on the work he did in his report. I wish that we could congratulate the Government on their response, but, while it was right to commission the Dunlop review, they have not taken on board the basic problems that exist, and there is little evidence that they understand the basic concept of devolution.

The Dunlop review was commissioned to ensure that the UK Government were working in the best possible way to “realise the benefits” of the UK. This was considered particularly pertinent post Brexit. However, the Government continue to insist that they alone always know best. If they had been working properly with the devolved institutions, we would not have seen their dismissive approach to the problems of the Northern Ireland protocol, referred to already. If the Government had been working properly with other people, we would not have seen problems of the severity that we saw when we were passing the internal market Bill. There is a very long way to go before anybody can have any confidence that the Government actually respect the devolved institutions—that is part of the basic problem.

The Dunlop review gave an analysis that most would agree with and made some serious recommendations, many of which I agree with. But even if Ministers were to turn around and tell us now that all of those recommendations were going to be implemented, along with some other ideas that have been mentioned, that would not be sufficient or the end of the problem. Structural changes will take us only so far; what is really needed is a deep-seated change of attitude on the part of the Government, including the Prime Minister.

European Union (Future Relationship) Bill

Baroness Taylor of Bolton Excerpts

3rd reading & 2nd reading & Committee negatived & 2nd reading (Hansard) & 2nd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & 3rd reading (Hansard) & 3rd reading (Hansard): House of Lords & Committee negatived (Hansard) & Committee negatived (Hansard): House of Lords
Wednesday 30th December 2020 Lords Chamber

[Baroness Taylor of Bolton (Lab) [V]]

My Lords, I speak as chair of the Constitution Committee and I say at the outset that this Bill elevates to a new level our concern about the way the Government present legislation to Parliament. The Bill fails all the tests for achieving good-quality legislation. It is long and complex and gives significant new powers to the Executive. We have not had anywhere near enough time to scrutinise the Bill as we would wish, and in any other circumstances the Constitution Committee would issue a detailed, thorough and critical appraisal of it. However, the committee did meet yesterday, and we published our immediate response. We acknowledged that the fast-tracking of the Bill is now necessary, but only because of the Government’s own actions ahead of the cliff edge of 31 December.

On the substance of the Bill, we noted that a prominent argument for the UK leaving the EU was to take back control of our laws—for laws to be determined by the UK Parliament, rather than the EU’s lawmaking bodies. Asserting the sovereignty of the UK Parliament was considered of such importance that it was included in the European Union (Withdrawal Agreement) Act 2020. It is regrettable that the Bill, which determines how the UK’s future relationship with the EU will be implemented into UK law, was published less than 24 hours before parliamentary scrutiny was due to begin. This does not allow Parliament much by way of control. This is the core of our concern. If, as the Government say, powers are coming back from the EU, where do those powers go? Are the Executive taking all these to themselves? What does this mean for the relationship between Parliament and the Government? Can this House fulfil its constitutional responsibilities?

In the Explanatory Notes, the Government say:

“The Bill is not suitable for post legislative scrutiny”.


We very much disagree, because the content of the trade and co-operation agreement cannot be amended by Parliament, but the mechanisms used by the Bill to rewrite UK domestic law to implement this have significant and potentially long-lasting implications, particularly for the role of Parliament and for the devolved arrangements. The Constitution Committee therefore recommends that the House consider how best to conduct post-legislative scrutiny as soon as possible. We believe that the quality of such scrutiny will be an early and substantial test of whether or not Parliament possesses a significant tranche of returned powers. As the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, said, this is what increased parliamentary sovereignty requires.