English Devolution and Community Empowerment Bill

Baroness Thornhill Excerpts

Committee stage
Thursday 29th January 2026 Grand Committee

[Lord Shipley (LD)]

My Lords, these have been an interesting set of interventions. I agree with the noble Baroness, Lady Royall, that it is important that party-political contributions are kept to an absolute minimum when we are debating a Bill.

There is a basic issue in this group. The public have a right to expect that elected individuals do not end up with two jobs: being a mayor and being an MP. In some circumstances, it might be possible for the electorate to knowingly vote for that. However, that would be most unlikely to be the case. There is a question as to where, geographically speaking, the mayor might be the MP; it might be within the mayoral authority and it might be elsewhere. Either way, there is a clear conflict of interest, because Parliament judges the allocation of funding, for example, to the mayoral authority.

I do not think that you can have one person doing two jobs. Amendments 76 and others in the name of the noble Lord, Lord Gascoigne, would allow that, for whatever period, there could be an overlap of both mayor and MP retaining both offices. To be absolutely clear, we think that that is wrong. I say to the Minister that these matters are important and should not be for political parties to judge alone. It should instead be clearly understood that, when people have been elected to one of the posts, they should carry out the responsibilities that they have been given by the general public.

On Tuesday, I said that if, in a mayoral authority, there had been a large number of commissioners appointed by the mayor but then that mayor decided to become a Member of Parliament, he or she would leave the mayoralty and, as the Bill is currently drafted, all the commissioners would lose their jobs as a consequence. When politicians are elected to a job, they must see the job through and do it to the best of their ability, given that the public have expressed confidence in them doing so. They have an obligation to fulfil their contract with the electorate.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

My Lords, I will add something to the wise words of my colleagues. To us, this is about the concentration of power in the hands of one person. The powers being given to new mayors are considerable and I understand them; to some extent, I agree with them—as a directly elected mayor for 16 years, of course, I would say that, wouldn’t I? I see the two roles as completely different: a role in national government is completely different from a local, regional role. There could be massive conflicts of interest, but the key thing is that this concentrates too much power. Conservative colleagues have talked about that, but then they are quite happy to let somebody do both jobs. To our mind, that is just not rational.

The key thing is that this creates more political opportunities for more people. It also encourages mayors. The key thing about a mayoralty is that the mayors can develop their own local, independent mandate, rather than being overshadowed by national party politics. They are very different and distinct and they could be in direct conflict with each other. That is why we absolutely believe in that separation of powers.

--- Later in debate ---

Moved by

[Baroness Thornhill]

91: Clause 18, page 22, line 7, at end insert—
“(3A) After subsection (13) insert—“(14) When making regulations under this section, the Secretary of State must have regard to the need to identify and minimise any conflict, overlap, or duplication between the functions of the Mayor and the functions of other authorities or public bodies.”” Member’s explanatory statement
This amendment requires the Secretary of State, when making regulations under section 30 of LURA 2023, to consider and minimise any potential conflict, overlap, or duplication between the Mayor’s functions and those of other authorities or public bodies.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

My Lords, in moving Amendment 91, I will speak also to Amendment 92. These amendments are the only ones in the group and concern mayoral powers and functions. Interestingly, I note that some of the wise and pertinent comments made by the noble Lords who are now not in their place regarding issues with London boroughs and the mayor, born of hard-lived experience, will apply in the new structures. So there are real lessons to be learned. I am hoping that my amendments might help avoid some of the issues raised in group 1.

The Bill, as we know, gives mayors significant new powers, and none of us underestimates what that means; hence our collective concerns. The Government clearly support mayoral ambitions as a means of fulfilling their political objectives, many of which we might all agree with. But power alone does not equal good devolution or good governance. Both depend on clarity about who does what, who decides what and who is ultimately accountable. The last thing mayors need are fuzzy boundaries if they are to do the job effectively, as I know from bitter experience. These amendments simply require the Secretary of State—let us not forget that a lot is going to be left to the Secretary of State—when making regulations or orders about mayoral functions to

“have regard to the need to identify and minimise any conflict, overlap, or duplication between the functions of the Mayor and the functions of other authorities or public bodies”.

Let us be clear, the new mayors will be involved in all of this and will, quite rightly, have their fingers in every pie. If they are to make a significant difference to the regions that need them most, and to the country as a whole, they will need to be doing that. But these powers, as we know, come with a new complex structure and therefore these amendments are necessary. They simply make sure that at some point when new powers are designed, someone asks a basic question: how is this going to work alongside what already exists?

--- Later in debate ---

[Baroness Taylor of Stevenage (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Baroness, Lady Thornhill, for her amendments on the role of mayors. Before I respond to these amendments, I want to clarify the rationale for Clause 18. The clause will extend an existing power of the Secretary of State to provide that certain general functions may be exercised solely by a mayor. The power currently exists in the Local Democracy, Economic Development and Construction Act 2009 and, as the noble Lord, Lord Jamieson, said, in the Levelling-up and Regeneration Act 2023. This clause will ensure that it can also apply to general functions conferred under any other regulation or Act of Parliament. The extension of this existing power reflects the broader range of routes through which functions may be conferred on strategic authorities and their mayors, once the current Bill becomes law.

Amendments 91 and 92 seek to amend this clause and prevent the potential for conflict, overlap or duplication between a mayor’s functions and those of other authorities or public bodies. As your Lordships will know, mayors of combined authorities or combined county authorities are not corporate entities in themselves. For that reason, all functions must be conferred on the underlying authority rather than directly on to the mayor. However, some functions may be designated as mayoral functions, as they are to be exercised only by the mayor. Where functions have been made mayoral, they typically relate to the management of day-to-day activities.

Key strategic decisions still require approval by the strategic authority constituent members. To give an example, all members will vote on which roads form part of a key route network, after which the mayor will be responsible for managing it. This will allow for swifter decision-making and more effective governance on day-to-day matters.

It will be important that all tiers of local government work together to benefit their communities. This is why principal local authorities will be embedded within the decision-making structures of strategic authorities as full constituent members. This will ensure that they play a central role in drawing up specific strategies and plans, such as local growth plans. Furthermore, before any new function is conferred on a strategic authority by regulations, the Secretary of State will be required to consult the constituent councils of any affected strategic authorities and any other person who exercises the function concerned. This will ensure that the views of those affected are properly considered.

I hope that, with these explanations, the noble Baroness will feel able to withdraw her amendment.

[Baroness Thornhill (LD)]

I absolutely accept that the new structures are complex and complicated. It is very easy to be seduced by the noble Baroness’s fluent explanation. My amendment was coming more from the perspective of practicalities, which was also borne out by the comments earlier that, in reality, there is overlap, with weakened scrutiny, unclear accountability and eroded public trust. I would like to feel that a lot of work was being done into what those are. We know it is probably happening, but it is all going to come later through SIs and secondary legislation. I wanted to make it absolutely clear, up front, that those overlaps and duplications will be considered, because they will be a source of conflict and friction going forward. It was interesting that the leaders of boroughs are saying that that is happening even 20 or however many years later. But, for the moment, I will withdraw my amendment.

Amendment 91 withdrawn.