Debates between Baroness Thornton and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood during the 2017-2019 Parliament

Fri 23rd Mar 2018
Conscientious Objection (Medical Activities) Bill [HL]
Lords Chamber

Committee: 1st sitting (Hansard): House of Lords

Conscientious Objection (Medical Activities) Bill [HL]

Debate between Baroness Thornton and Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood
Baroness Thornton Portrait Baroness Thornton
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That is the point, in a way, of the current situation: it allows people to disagree and to not have to participate in hands-on terminations.

Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood Portrait Lord Brown of Eaton-under-Heywood (CB)
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My Lords, I too support the amendment and the obvious corollary amendments later, which are designed to confine the conscience exemption to hands-on participation, as explained in the Supreme Court decision to which the noble Lord, Lord Steel of Aikwood, referred—the Doogan case, which came from Scotland. As amended in the proposed way, the Bill would precisely give effect to that unanimous decision of the Supreme Court. It was a single, convincing judgment from the noble and learned Baroness, Lady Hale, who is now, of course, the President of that court. That decision is the last and most authoritative word on the true interpretation of Section 4 of the 1967 Act, the conscientious objection clause, which has now stood for half a century.

Although an article by the noble Baroness, Lady O’Loan, in The House magazine published shortly before Second Reading suggested that the Doogan decision had in fact narrowed that statutory exemption and that therefore there should now be a wider interpretation in order to “re-establish” or “reaffirm” what Parliament enacted 50 years ago, that is not so. As I have no doubt the noble and learned Lord, Lord Mackay of Clashfern, would confirm, Doogan, on the law as it currently stands, was correctly decided and what this Bill now seeks to do, therefore, is to persuade Parliament to change the law and to give an altogether wider reach to the previous conscience clause than has hitherto been thought appropriate.