Healthcare (International Arrangements) Bill

Debate between Baroness Thornton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Report stage (Hansard): House of Lords
Tuesday 12th March 2019 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, as I should have done at the beginning of the first group, I thank the Minister for her help and courtesy in discussing this Bill and in engaging with Peers across the House to see how we should proceed with it. I echo the words of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, including his tribute to the Blackwood amendment in respect of Henry VIII powers. As the Minister will have appreciated and has recognised by her actions, there is a real concern about the use of delegated legislation to amend or revoke primary legislation and EU legislation.

Amendment 3 is intended to bring a constitutionally acceptable structure to the Bill. It will ensure that the powers of the Secretary of State can be exercised only within the context of regulations. I will start with a word or two about the other amendments in this group: Amendment 5, on the words “for example”, and government Amendments 6, 7 and 8, which limit the delegation of powers to public authorities.

As we have heard, Clause 2 contains the principal regulation-making powers. We had considerable debate, both at Second Reading and in Committee, about how unacceptably wide those powers are. The use of “for example” at the beginning of Clause 2(2) speaks volumes as to the disrespect shown in the Bill for the proper restriction of ministerial powers. The Delegated Powers Committee and the Constitution Committee have exposed how outrageously broad these powers are.

My amendment is directed at the absence of anything in the Bill that would limit the Secretary of State to exercising his Clause 1 powers only in accordance with regulations. One does not have to read far into the Bill to appreciate that, under Clause 1:

“The Secretary of State may make payments, and arrange for payments to be made, in respect of the cost of healthcare provided outside the United Kingdom”.


This is wholly without restriction. It is this glaring deficiency—the failure to tie the Secretary of State to the exercise of powers in accordance with limitations either in the statute or contained in regulations—that my amendment is intended to cure.

The Minister frankly and commendably, if I may say so, recognised on our first day in Committee that the effect of Clause 1, if not amended in the way I suggest, would be to enable the Secretary of State to make or arrange payments without any regulatory limitation. She justified this untrammelled power—which, frankly, I find frightening—on the basis of urgency. She said that the Bill was unlikely to secure Royal Assent before March, so regulations would not be laid before the summer. If there were no deal, she explained, Ministers might need to use the powers before then. She mentioned—again, frighteningly—sharing data as well as making healthcare payments before the Government had a chance to get regulations passed to deal with these matters “more transparently”, as she put it.

This clause alone, unamended, would justify this country ruling out a no-deal exit and ensuring that our leaving date is delayed. It is an extraordinary travesty of the notion of the United Kingdom Parliament taking back control that we are asked to pass a Bill which involves ceding to Ministers an entirely unconstrained power to pay money out across the world on the sole professed ground that the Government failed to introduce legislation in a timely way, and to permit Ministers to spend public money and make arrangements of great public importance without any parliamentary scrutiny or authorisation.

I turn briefly to the other amendments in the group. Many of us still take the view that their scope is breathtakingly and unacceptably wide. The Government’s proposal to limit possible delegation of the Secretary of State’s powers so that such powers may be conferred only on a public authority is of course welcome; so is the limited five-year sunsetting provision, to which we shall return later, but, taken together, they barely scratch the surface of the massive transfer of unrestrained power from the legislature to the Executive set out in Clause 2. Of course, the sunsetting clause should be more restrictive—at least as restrictive as proposed by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge. Again, we will come to that later.

It goes without saying that the ridiculous and offensive restriction-busting words “for example” should be removed, as proposed in Amendment 5. However, the only satisfactory way to restrict the Government’s power to what is necessary and acceptable is for the House of Commons to now accept the amendment we just passed restricting the use of the Bill to replicating the arrangements we have with the EU, the EEA and Switzerland. We hope that it does that.

This Government and future Governments must show more restraint and respect for the proper limits to the scope of delegated legislation. In the Bill, as in others to do with Brexit, they have not done that. It is to be hoped that they return to a wiser path in future.

[Baroness Thornton]

I thank the noble Lord, Lord Marks, for his exposition, which saves me from exploring yet again the powers in the Bill. I shall speak to Amendment 5, which is a simple amendment but one that we think might be quite clever in its intent. It states that regulations under the Bill can be made only for specific purposes.

When the clause was debated in Committee, noble Lords discussed the nine regulation-making powers mentioned by the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, which brought comment from the DPPRC, about the widest possible scope. However, as drafted, Clause 2(2) appears to bestow infinite powers on the Secretary of State to make regulations by virtue of the seemingly innocuous phrase “for example”, which effectively grants the Secretary of State carte blanche to bring regulation forward outside the listed examples in relation to pretty much anything and everything. Just deleting those words will assist with the accountability that needs to be built into the Bill.

Amendment 5, which has the support of the noble and learned Lord, Lord Judge, and the noble Baroness, Lady Jolly, would ensure that regulations can be brought forward under the Act only for the purposes specified. We will, of course, support the Minister in the amendments she has tabled in this group—Amendments 6, 7 and 8 —and I think the combination of our amendment and hers significantly improves the Bill, so I hope she will accept it. I probably need to say that, unless there is a very good reason why she does not want it and why it should not be there, we will seek support from the House for this amendment.

Health and Social Care Bill

Debate between Baroness Thornton and Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames

Thursday 8th March 2012 Lords Chamber

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, this group of amendments is on the question of foundation trusts’ private income cap. All of us are agreed that the number of private patients and the amount of private income are important considerations for foundation trusts. The risks to the NHS of too much private income and private treatment in foundation trust hospitals are clear and perhaps do not need rehearsing at length. If too many beds in such hospitals are taken up with private patients, unless we are very careful, that may limit accessibility of those beds to NHS patients. The development of foundation trust hospitals with an unusually great proportion of private income may—again, unless we are very careful—threaten to undermine the commitment to reducing health inequalities that runs through the Bill. Emergence of “star hospitals” could threaten other hospitals in the region.

Finally, the threat of foundation hospitals being subject to EU competition law would have been greater if it were possible to have foundation trust hospitals a majority of whose income was private; that, at any rate, is our view. This is one of the principal reasons for the cap on caps, by which the principal purpose of foundation trust hospitals can only be fulfilled if more than half of foundation trusts’ income is NHS income. That is the so-called 49 per cent.

I say to the noble Baroness, Lady Thornton, that the only reason that that majority provision can be said to send the wrong message is that, sadly, some in her party have taken to the airwaves to say that there is a hidden agenda to the Bill by which the Government seek to make national health foundation trust hospitals have 49 per cent of their income from private patients. There is no such hidden agenda. Frankly, it has not been responsible politics to raise people’s fears by going around the country suggesting the contrary.

[Baroness Thornton]

Does the noble Lord think that it was necessary to put 49 per cent in the Bill? Why did the Government have to put a percentage in at all? Does he think that the communication issues, as it were, around this were handled very well?

[Lord Marks of Henley-on-Thames]

My Lords, on these Benches we take the view that it was sensible to include this provision. The advice that we have is that the risk of the application of competition law is reduced by ensuring that the majority of income for NHS foundation trust hospitals will always be for the purpose of treating NHS patients. It is not an absolute guarantee but it is a sensible risk-reduction exercise and it was put in for that purpose. There is no point in taking a risk unnecessarily. The communication problem has frankly been the result of the efforts of opponents of the Bill, partly in the party of the noble Baroness, in stressing the 49 per cent and suggesting that it is the purpose of the Bill, which, as I say, it is not.

That is not to say that private income in NHS foundation trusts is bad. The Labour Government recognised that throughout. In her speech, the noble Baroness herself very properly recognised it. Private income represents an opportunity for foundation trusts to attract innovation, to buy new and expensive equipment and to develop world-class centres of excellence. We recognise and applaud those features of private income. However, when tabling Amendment 220B, we were concerned that there should also be an individual arrangement for foundation trusts by which individual limits would be subject to agreement with Monitor.