Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Williams of Trafford and Lord Etherton

Lords Hansard - Part 1 & Report stage
Wednesday 2nd March 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, the provisions for an admissible asylum claim, where there is a connection —as defined in new Section 80B, which is to be inserted into the 2002 Act—are quite plainly contrary to the refugee convention and a breach of the UK’s obligations under it. In particular, the conditions in new Section 80C(4), which is where a claim could have been made to a third state—the claimant was present in a state eligible to receive and offer a safe space for him or her—and new Section 80C(5), where the claimant should have made a claim to a safe third state whether or not he or she had ever visited or been associated with it, are both plain breaches of the convention and find no place in its wording.

Condition 4 in new Section 80C is really another way of stating the coming directly from the country of persecution requirement in Clause 11 and Clause 36(1). On Monday this House rejected the Government’s interpretation of Article 31 of the convention in relation to that requirement, by rejecting Clause 11 as part of the Bill. With regard to condition 5 there is nothing whatever in the convention to justify rejecting as inadmissible a claim to asylum by a refugee as defined by the convention in the circumstances specified there. The only explanation, or example, given in the Explanatory Notes, is where the asylum seeker has close family members in the safe third country, whether or not there is another connection of any kind whatever.

Both these conditions are a rewriting of the convention and not a legitimate interpretation of it. The fact that Clause 15 provides, in new Section 80B of the 2002 Act, that a decision that a claim is not admissible because of an asylum seeker’s connection to a safe third state is not subject to a right of appeal, makes Clause 15 an all the more egregious breach of the convention. There is, in effect, no legal redress for the refugee if the Secretary of State has declared the asylum claim inadmissible under the proposed safe third state provisions.

Logically this leads to the conclusion that Clause 15 should be left out of the Bill. I am content, however, to support the alternative approach of the noble Lords, Lord Rosser and Lord Paddick, in Amendment 32, which is to fix a start date for the Clause 15 provisions if a formal returns agreement has been reached between the United Kingdom and a third state to which it is said the asylum seeker has a connection.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords for their contributions. I say at the outset that the Government have been consistent and clear about their belief that people who require international protection should claim asylum in the first safe country they reach, rather than make dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK to claim asylum here.

Inadmissibility processes, in particular the first safe country principle, are well established, both in the UK, through long-standing measures in the Immigration Rules, and internationally, including as part of the Common European Asylum System. For example, the procedures directive recognised at recital 22 that

“Member States should not be obliged to assess the substance of an application for international protection where a first country of asylum has granted the applicant refugee status or otherwise sufficient protection and the applicant will be readmitted to that country.”

An overriding objective of these processes is to prevent secondary movements by those who have already reached safety. By definition, that is not about denying safety to those who need it but about having rules which aim to reduce unnecessary travel across borders by those who are already safe.

Amendment 31 seeks to remove third-country inadmissibility powers from primary legislation altogether. It would weaken our ability to deploy inadmissibility processes appropriately and decisively within a strong legal framework, and with that, erode our ability to deter unsafe migration and focus our resources on those most in need of our help.

We are confident that the measures in Clause 15 are fair, appropriate and fully in line with our international obligations. The clause sets out the strict circumstances in which a person’s behaviour or circumstances could lead to inadmissibility action. It requires decision-makers to take account of exceptional mitigating factors that may apply when considering those circumstances. It sets out minimum criteria that must be met by any country before it can be regarded as a safe third country of return, including it being one where a person would not be at risk of persecution, would not experience a breach of Article 3 ECHR rights, and would not be sent to another place where they would be persecuted.

The primary protection afforded refugees under the refugee convention and its protocol is non-refoulement, including no onward refoulement. It is therefore clear that non-refoulement is the primary requirement of “safety”. The same is true for protection afforded under Article 3 of the ECHR. Furthermore, an individual may not meet the definition of refugee under the convention but still require protection. A state may still be safe for them where they will not be refouled, even though they are not a refugee. Therefore, our criteria for determining whether a country is safe, and for subsequently making a claim inadmissible, upholds the UK’s obligations under international law.

Nothing in Clause 15 requires extensive delay in processing inadmissibility decisions. It is right that we consider inadmissibility action and, where appropriate, seek the agreement of the relevant third country, or countries, for the person’s admission there. In some cases, particularly where we are reliant on case-by-case requests to partners, this may take some time, but we have not operated, and will not operate, the inadmissibility system in a way that puts someone in indefinite limbo, as the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, talked about—able to access neither the asylum system in the country of proposed removal nor the UK system. That would be contrary to the object and purpose of the refugee convention. Our existing processes, which Clause 15 strengthens, are clear that where return cannot be arranged within a reasonable period, the person’s claim would be admitted to the UK asylum system for substantive consideration. That ensures compatibility with the refugee convention.

Individuals will have an opportunity to explain their actions and circumstances prior to claiming asylum in the UK, and that explanation will be carefully considered in deciding whether an inadmissibility decision is appropriate. They will also be able to make representations on why any safe third state is not safe in their particular circumstances. Any decision to declare a claim inadmissible and remove an individual will be subject to the standard principles of public law, including rationality. The inadmissibility provisions are therefore compatible with the refugee convention. For these reasons, I do not agree with the amendment seeking to leave out the clause.

Turning to Amendments 32 and 86, as we have stated on previous occasions, the UK-EU joint political declaration made clear the UK’s intention to engage in bilateral discussions with the most concerned member states to discuss suitable practical arrangements on issues around asylum and illegal migration. We continue to do that with EU member states on these issues. We have been clear that formal agreements, though valuable, are not the only way in which an inadmissible asylum seeker may be accepted for removal by a safe third country. I think it is right to seek removals on a case-by-case basis where appropriate and, with the consent of the relevant country, make that removal. This approach has formed part of our inadmissibility process since the changes to the Immigration Rules in December 2020—and, until the Bill’s provisions come into force, we will continue to rely on the Immigration Rules.

The structure of case-by-case removal arrangements will not be uniform for each country of removal. A wide range of factors will still affect the formality and administration around such removals, not least the diverse organisational structures in place in the third country, the levels of centralised and decentralised decision-making, and other circumstances that may be specific to the individual. These arrangements will inevitably vary, but the framework in which cases are considered, within which third countries are assessed for safety and claimants are progressed to removal, will not. We have a clear and consistent approach to these fundamental and important issues, and we stand by our international obligations.

I do not agree that these provisions are unworkable without formal agreements in place. We aim to make the process work as a whole and to return people where appropriate. Where it becomes clear that an individual cannot be removed to a safe country, either because we do not have formal returns agreements in place or because a case-by-case removal cannot be agreed within a reasonable period, the individual’s asylum claim will be considered in the UK. To go back to the assertion made by the noble Lord, Lord Paddick, I say that this will ensure that we do not keep people in limbo, in accordance with our obligations under the refugee convention. I do not think this amendment is required and ask that it be withdrawn.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Williams of Trafford and Lord Etherton

Committee stage
Tuesday 8th February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I add my name to that of the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, in giving notice of my intention to exclude Clause 28 and Schedule 3 from the Bill. To move an asylum seeker to a detention or reception centre offshore while their claim is being assessed is wrong in principle, oppressive in practice, contrary to the 1951 convention and lacking sufficient safeguards under the Bill. Many speakers referred to Australia’s policy of offshore processing, as an example both of how awful it can be and, by one speaker, of a successful operation to deter unlawful immigration. It is worth putting a little flesh on the Australian experience.

In 2013, Amnesty International published a report, This Is Breaking People, highlighting a range of serious human rights concerns at the Manus Island, Papua New Guinea, immigration detention centre. In an update, Amnesty International reported that, in two days in February 2014,

“violence at the detention centre led to the death of … a 23-year-old Iranian man, and injuries to more than 62 asylum seekers (some reports suggest up to 147 were injured).”

It said in the report:

“There are credible claims that the asylum seekers … were attacked by private security guards, local police and possibly other contractors working at the centre. The response by security guards and local police to protests by asylum seekers was brutal and excessive.”


Amnesty’s report raised a number of concerns about living conditions, including overcrowding, cramped sleeping arrangements, exposure to the elements, as well as a lack of sufficient drinking water, sanitation, food and clothing. The update said:

“Since the violence on … February 2014, Papua New Guinean nationals no longer enter the compounds for catering or cleaning … Asylum seekers are delivered meals in take-away packs for self-distribution and also bear sole responsibility for cleaning the ablution blocks.”


At the time of Amnesty’s site visit in March 2014,

“ablution blocks in all compounds were dilapidated, dirty, mouldy, and”

some latrines were

“broken and without running water.”

Amnesty International expressed concern about the issue, saying:

“Australian and Papua New Guinean authorities are deliberately denying asylum seekers’ right to access lawyers and human rights organizations.”


In an article published by the Australian Institute of International Affairs in February 2017, it was said:

“LGBT asylum seekers are particularly vulnerable … and face significant disadvantages and dangers. In detention they experience discrimination, harassment and violence from other detainees and from members of staff. The detention environment has serious long-term effects on their mental and physical well-being.”


From time to time, Ghana and Rwanda have been floated in the media as places to which asylum seekers in the UK might be transferred, although Ghana has officially denied any such possibility. The appropriateness or inappropriateness of such locations for LGBTIQ asylum seekers is manifest. In Ghana, same-sex sexual acts carry a potential sentence of up to 25 years. There is a current proposal to raise the minimum sentence to 10 years and to require conversion therapy. LGBTIQ people face homophobia, physical violence and psychological abuse.

In Rwanda, same-sex sexual relations are not unlawful, but there are no anti-discrimination laws relating to sexual orientation or gender identity, including in relation to housing, employment and access to government services, such as healthcare. A 2021 report on Rwanda by the Immigration and Refugee Board of Canada cites sources disclosing discrimination and stigma facing LGBTIQ people in religious and civil society, the media and business, harassment by the police and the use of indecency and vagrancy offences against transgender and gender-diverse people. The experience in the offshore detention centres I referred to in Australia and the position in Ghana and Rwanda show the inappropriateness of holding asylum seekers in offshore detention or reception centres.

In particular, the following are not answered in the Bill, the Explanatory Notes or any other guidance from the Government. First, how will asylum seekers have access to legal advisers with knowledge of the law and practice relating to UK asylum claims, assuming that they are being processed under UK law, which is complex and difficult? Secondly, legal aid and advice is available to refugees in the UK, but there is nothing to suggest that it will be available to refugees in offshore holding centres. Thirdly, and as has previously been pointed out, if conditions in the proposed offshore centre are so bad as to cause physical or mental harm to refugees, whether through physical conditions in the centre or—in the case of single women or LGBTIQ members, for example—because of discrimination, harassment, bullying and violence from staff or other asylum seekers, will they be able to have recourse or bring proceedings in the UK, or will they be restricted to such remedies as might be available in the foreign country?

Until these fundamental questions are answered and set out expressly in the legislation, there should be no question whatever of exporting refugees to offshore holding centres. To do so would be inconsistent with the spirit and the letter of the refugee convention and the UK’s own history of welcome to genuine asylum seekers over the centuries.

[The Minister of State, Home Office (Baroness Williams of Trafford) (Con)]

My Lords, I thank all noble Lords who have spoken to this group of amendments, and I thank my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate for tabling his Amendments 100, 101 and 102.

On the back of my noble friend’s point, it might be helpful to clarify the definitions of “asylum seeker”, “refugee” and “economic migrant.” An asylum seeker is a person, either in transit or awaiting a decision, seeking the protection of a state under the terms of the refugee convention. A refugee is a person who meets the definition of “refugee” in Article 1 of the refugee convention—they do not have to be recognised by a state to be a refugee—and so it follows that a “person with refugee status” is a person who meets the requirements under the UK Immigration Rules to be granted refugee status.

The term “economic migrant” is inexact. It may, of course, refer to a person who is using or looking to use economic routes, such as FBIS, to enter a state. However, there will be people who meet the definition of Article 1 of the refugee convention but are looking to enter the UK and choosing it over other countries purely for economic reasons. One of the objectives of the New Plan for Immigration is to ensure that the most vulnerable can be protected, which in turn means that those attempting to enter the UK for economic reasons should use the appropriate routes.

Changes within Clause 28 via Schedule 3 are one in a suite of critical measures designed to break the business model of people smugglers and are the first step in disincentivising unwanted behaviours—for example, by dissuading those who are considering risking their lives by making dangerous and unnecessary journeys to the UK in order to claim asylum. By working to establish overseas asylum processing, we are sending a clear message to those who are risking their lives and funding criminal gangs both here and abroad or abusing the asylum system elsewhere that this behaviour is not worth it. We must make it easier to ensure that such people are simply not allowed to remain in the UK.

It also might assist noble Lords—and indeed my noble friend Lord Kirkhope of Harrogate—to know that for nearly 20 years, it has been possible under UK law to remove individuals from the UK while their asylum claim is pending if a certificate is issued under Schedule 3 to the Asylum and Immigration (Treatment of Claimants, etc.) Act 2004, so this is not a new concept. What this measure does is amend our existing legal framework to make it easier to remove such individuals. I do not know which noble Lord asked this, but Schedule 3 also defines the term “safe third country”.

Nationality and Borders Bill

Debate between Baroness Williams of Trafford and Lord Etherton

Lords Hansard - Part 2 & Committee stage
Thursday 3rd February 2022 Lords Chamber

[Lord Etherton (CB)]

My Lords, I support the proposal from the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, to exclude Clause 15 from the Bill, for a wide variety of reasons.

First, if a claim is deemed to be inadmissible but to satisfy the convention, that seems effectively to be saying that the person is not a refugee within the convention. That does not make sense. If they satisfy the definition of refugee within the convention, they have a claim. It can be dismissed, and then there will be a right of appeal. What cannot be said—which is effectively what is being said here—is “We’re not going to hear you at all, even though you are a refugee within the strict terms of the convention”. So I take issue with the very idea of inadmissibility with no right of recourse at all by way of an appeal.

Secondly, the terms of Section 80C to be inserted into the 2002 Act in relation to four and five seem completely contrary to both the wording and principle of the convention. My understanding of Clause 4 is that it is, in some way or other, intended to be made analogous to the Dublin III regulation.

There are a number of points to be made about that. First, we are no longer part of the EU or of the Dublin regulation. Perhaps more importantly, EU member states themselves have recognised that the Dublin regulation has failed. On 23 September 2020, the European Commission adopted what they called the New Pact on Migration and Asylum, following consultations with the European Parliament, member states and various stakeholders. The PR notice from the European Commission, which is available on the internet, states:

“The new pact recognises that no member state should shoulder a disproportionate responsibility and that all member states should contribute to solidarity on a constant basis.”


It has failed because the effect of the Dublin regulation, when strictly applied, means that certain states are overwhelmed with refugees because they are inevitably the first state on the way through to somewhere else. What is happening at the moment is that the Commission is proposing to replace the Dublin III regulation with a new regulation on asylum and migration management. So, frankly, there is no point in referring to the Dublin III regulation. It has failed in practice, and we should not be emulating it.

Furthermore, proposed Section 80C(4) is inconsistent with the terms of the convention itself. There is nothing in the convention, in Article 31 or anywhere else that makes this “connection” mean that a refugee claim would fail.

I have another point about condition 4, and I would welcome clarification from the Minister on it. The description that would render a connection with the state, and therefore the claim, inadmissible is exactly the same as the definition of arriving “directly” for the purposes of Clause 11. Clause 36 effectively amplifies Clause 11 and paragraph 1 of Article 31 of the convention. It says:

“A refugee is not to be taken to have come to the United Kingdom directly from a country where their life or freedom was threatened if, in coming from that country, they stopped in another country outside the United Kingdom, unless they can show that they could not reasonably be expected to have sought protection under the Refugee Convention in that country.”


On this particular approach, you are never going to get anywhere near Clause 11 because you will be knocked out under Clause 15—so I do not understand that contradiction. Once you fall within condition 3, which is the same as condition 4—which is the same as not arriving directly under the definition in Clause 36 —you are knocked out. So which is it—are you knocked out or do you still have some right under Clause 11, admittedly, to show that you could with good cause fall within either group 1 or even group 2? I am left confused by that.

Condition 5, on which the noble Lord, Lord Rosser, and others have eloquently spoken, provides

“that, in the claimant’s particular circumstances, it would have been reasonable to expect them to have made a relevant claim to the safe third State (instead of making a claim in the United Kingdom).”

Nothing in the Dublin regulations says that, even if they were to apply—and there is certainly nothing in the convention that would make such a condition apply to exclude a claim.

So I support the suggestion that Clause 15 should be excluded because, with respect, it seems to be a muddle in a whole series of different respects—legally, practically and in principle.

[Baroness Williams of Trafford (Con)]

My Lords, I thank noble Lords again for speaking to this group of amendments. I appreciate the thoughtful and well-meaning intent of Amendment 68, but we cannot accept it. The definition of “persecution” is well established and must be on the basis of a refugee convention reason—namely, race, religion, nationality, membership of a particular social group or political opinion. It is reiterated in Clause 30(1)(c) that persecution can be committed by

“any non-State actor”

where the state is

“unable or unwilling to provide reasonable protection”.

Given the level of protection afforded to EU nationals, through fundamental rights and freedoms, EU countries are inherently safe, and individuals are exceptionally unlikely to be at risk of persecution. If individuals experience discrimination, they can seek protection from within their country of nationality.

That said, the noble and learned Lord, Lord Etherton, might be comforted to have it confirmed that our processes already acknowledge that it may not be appropriate to apply inadmissibility to EU national claimants in exceptional circumstances. The list of exceptional circumstances included in the provisions is not exhaustive; it looks to protect individuals in the very rare circumstances that a member state is at risk of a serious breach or where there exists a serious and persistent breach of the values under the Treaty on European Union, including equality.