Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 6th January 2015 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The review process does not provide for that, but the consultation on the code of practice that governs the arrangements is open until 30 January, so there will be an opportunity for further representations to be made on the details of how the power would be used in the context of the code. That includes the details of the initial, immediate review by the senior officer and the 72-hour review by a further senior officer, followed by the submission of a report to the chief constable.

[Bob Stewart]

My children have three passports: French, Swiss and British. Is there any provision enabling someone whose British passport is taken away to be prevented from using another passport? I am sorry; that may be a silly question, and we may not be able to provide for such a power.

[James Brokenshire]

The Bill is, of course, a wider subject than the amendment, but my hon. Friend may wish to consult paragraph 1(7) of schedule 1, which defines a passport as

“a United Kingdom passport… a passport issued by or on behalf of the authorities of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom”,

or

“a document that can be used (in some or all circumstances) instead of a passport.”

Counter-Terrorism and Security Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 9th December 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

I appreciate the comments of my hon. Friend. As a member of the Intelligence and Security Committee, he will recognise the challenges. He is right to underline the significance and to reiterate what I said on Second Reading—that security and liberty should be mutually reinforcing. His point about it not being a zero sum game is well made.

The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson), who speaks for the Opposition, identified a list of 10 points, and I will do my best to respond to some of them. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell) underlined the role of sensitive categories of person and additional safeguards that may be provided in respect of them when we consider communications data and the ability of the police to request such data. As my right hon. Friend the Member for Berwick-upon-Tweed (Sir Alan Beith) pointed out, we are looking at metadata—who said what to whom, when and where—rather than the content.

It is clear from the contributions that we have heard that gaps in communications data capability have a serious impact on the ability of law enforcement and intelligence agencies to carry out their functions—the point that was made clearly by the right hon. Member for Knowsley (Mr Howarth) and the shadow Minister. One such gap is internet protocol address resolution. The Data Retention and Investigatory Powers Act 2014 maintained our lawful data retention regime. It did not create any additional powers, nor did it address any of the gaps in capability. To respond to the point made by the hon. Lady, we remain confident about the manner in which it did that in seeking to address the points raised by the European Court of Justice.

Clause 17 amends that Act—DRIPA—to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time. Every internet user is assigned an IP address to ensure that communications service providers know which data should go to which customer and route it accordingly. Addresses are sometimes assigned to a specific device, such as a broadband router located in a home or within the work environment, but they are usually shared between multiple users—hundreds or even thousands—and allocated automatically by the provider’s systems. Many providers currently have no business reason for keeping a log of who has used each address. It is therefore not always possible for law enforcement agencies accessing the data to identify who was using an IP address at any specific point in time.

The provision would ensure that these data are available to law enforcement. It would improve the ability of the police and other agencies to identify terror suspects who may be communicating with each other via the internet and plotting attacks. It would also help to identify and prosecute paedophiles, organised criminals, cyber-bullies and computer hackers, and to protect vulnerable people. For example, it could be used to identify a child who has threatened over social media to commit suicide. The IP address has direct relevance to all these issues and it is evidence that can be brought before the court. In the context of the previous debate, it is often instrumental in bringing prosecutions. Communications data are used in about 95% of all serious crime prosecutions, so they have a direct utility.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Just a question to the Minister—does this also apply to medical in confidence communication between, say, a doctor and a patient, and documents being intercepted, or am I totally out to lunch, as it were?

[James Brokenshire]

I am not sure that my hon. Friend would ever be out to lunch, particularly at 3.26 in the afternoon. I think he is talking about interception. The clause is about the connection, the metadata—about who communicated with whom—rather than the content of the communication. The hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington spoke specifically about interception and the way in which certain protected categories of individual may be affected. My hon. Friend highlights a specific point, but I will come on to communications data, DRIPA and the codes of practice, and the status of certain individuals in respect of requests that may be made for that information.

Amendment 5, as the hon. Lady explained when she moved it, seeks to limit the scope of the provision to the retention of data that is necessary to allow the identification of a user from a public internet protocol address. I am pleased to say that there is no difference of principle between us on this issue. It is important that this provision goes no further than necessary to ensure that communications service providers can be required to retain the data necessary to link the unique attributes of an internet connection to the person or device using it at any given time.

I can confirm that the provision is already limited in the way the Opposition propose. Subsection (3) defines the data to be retained as data that

“may be used to identify, or assist in indentifying, which internet protocol address, or other identifier, belongs to the sender or recipient of a communication”.

As such, any data that cannot be used to identify, or assist in identifying, the user of an IP address are already outside the scope of the provision. A requirement to retain the data may be imposed only where it is necessary and proportionate to do so.

On the hon. Lady’s specific point about web logs, I can assure the Committee that the Bill is already tightly drafted. In particular, clause 17(3)(c) excludes so-called web logs. It provides for the retention of data relating to IP resolution, and only such data. Anything else is already beyond the scope of what the clause permits. Accordingly, although I entirely agree with the sentiment behind the amendment, I do not believe that it is necessary.

--- Later in debate ---

[James Brokenshire]

Part 4 and schedule 2 deal with aviation, maritime and rail security. For the benefit of the Committee, I will go through each of the provisions, listen to right hon. and hon. Members’ contributions and then respond to their questions. I welcome the right hon. Member for Delyn (Mr Hanson) to the Opposition Front Bench. He has taken a close interest in these issues.

Clause 18 provides a new legal basis for the operation of authority-to-carry schemes, which are commonly known as no-fly schemes. We have a scheme in place that relates to passengers being carried to the UK. The clause makes provision for a broader scheme that relates to individuals who are arriving or are expected to arrive in the UK, and individuals who are leaving or are expected to leave the UK.

Authority to carry is necessary to prevent the entry or return to the UK of foreign nationals who pose a terrorism-related threat and to mitigate the threat of an attack, primarily on aircraft. It is also necessary to disrupt the return to the UK, and prevent the departure from the UK, of British nationals who are subject to legal restrictions on their travel. Under the clause, any scheme must set out the carriers to which it applies and the classes of individuals a carrier may be refused authority to carry to or from the UK. Classes of individuals may be specified in a scheme only if it is necessary in the public interest. When travelling to the UK, that could include persons who are excluded or have been deported from the UK, individuals whose presence in the UK would not be conducive to the public good, and those who would otherwise be inadmissible to the UK. It may also include individuals subject to a temporary exclusion order under clause 2.

When travelling from the UK, carriers might be directed not to carry individuals subject to a TPIM or a post-custodial licence preventing travel following a conviction for a terrorism-related offence. The scheme may also include individuals who have had their passport cancelled or not issued on public interest grounds, or seized under powers in schedule 1. Any scheme must set out the process for carriers to request authority to carry, and state how that authority is granted or refused. That may include requirements for carriers to provide passenger information by a certain time before departure, or for carriers to be able to receive information that grants or refuses authority to carry in a way compatible with the Government’s border system.

We will work with carriers to resolve any compliance issues, but if a carrier fails to comply, clause 19 provides regulations to impose a civil penalty on those who breach a scheme. The new regulations set out how a penalty will be calculated, imposed and enforced, and must provide a means for carriers to object to a proposed penalty. The regulations are subject to the affirmative procedure, and the authority-to-carry scheme to which the regulations refer must be laid in Parliament at the same time.

Clause 20 makes provision for schedule 2 to the Bill. Part 1 of schedule 2 amends passenger, crew and service information relating to aircraft and ships, and may be extended to international trains through secondary legislation. Paragraphs 1(2) and 1(3) mean that a carrier may be required to be able to receive communications about information that it has provided to the border authorities in a way compatible with the Government’s border system. That might be a simple receipt, or an alert about errors in the format of the information.

Paragraphs 1(4) and 1(7) of schedule 2 allow the regulations to introduce requirements for advance information about persons on flights or voyages to and from the UK that do not operate to a published schedule—collectively referred to as “general aviation” and “general maritime.” The regulations will set out the classes of ships or aircraft to which they apply, the information required, the time by which it must be supplied, and how it is to be supplied. That will allow a much clearer picture of incoming and outgoing traffic and the identification of aircraft and ships that require close attention from the border authorities. Those paragraphs also provide for regulations to impose a civil penalty for a failure to comply with new requirements to provide information. The regulations may set out how a penalty will be calculated, administered and enforced, and make provision for an appeal.

[Bob Stewart]

The Minister has not mentioned this so far, although I assume he will come to it, but is it correct to say that if a carrier brings someone to this country whom we do not want to come, not only will it receive a civil penalty, it has a responsibility to take that person back to whence they came immediately?

[James Brokenshire]

As my hon. Friend will realise, provisions in the Bill overlap with other issues and provisions. He will be aware of sanctions that are already available and establish penalties for those who have no lawful authority to be in the UK, and of the checks that are obliged on people to ensure that appropriate visa or other requirements are in place. These measures build on that and there are established processes for the return of individuals who should not be here.

The new transport security provisions in part 2 of schedule 2 build on existing powers and enhance our ability to respond effectively to transport-related terrorism threats. They amend transport security legislation to strengthen existing powers and require certain security measures to be implemented before an operator may operate into the UK or, in the case of ships, a UK port. The schedule makes similar provisions for services in the aviation, maritime and rail transport industries.

The schedule inserts provisions into the respective aviation, rail and maritime statutes enabling faster collection of security related information from operators. It provides enabling powers to make regulations, imposing a wider range of methods for electronic service of security directions or requests for information, to ensure that security directions become effective in the shortest possible time. In addition, it inserts a power into the Aviation Security Act 1982 for the Secretary of State to make regulations to introduce civil sanctions for non-compliance by the aviation industry, with information requests or security directions subject to the affirmative procedure.

Prevention and Suppression of Terrorism

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Thursday 19th June 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

With the leave of the House, I hope to respond briefly to a number of points that have been raised in the debate this afternoon. I welcome the broad support that the order before the House has received on all sides, reflecting the cross-party focus on the security of this country and the desire to see that our citizens are protected appropriately. I recognise that and I recognise a number of the comments that have been made.

I wish to underline my commitment to observe the courtesies of the House in respect of the release of information to the Speaker and the Opposition, and to assure the House that it is my clear focus and intent that information is supplied appropriately to Members, and that details are provided to the Opposition at the same time as orders are laid. The hon. Member for Kingston upon Hull North (Diana Johnson) recognised that I responded promptly when I was made aware of her point of order on the Floor of the House earlier this week. I give that assurance to Mr Speaker and to right hon. and hon. Members because I take the processes and proceedings of the House extremely seriously, and it is important that we adhere to them. I assure the hon. Lady that no prior authorisation was given by Ministers or special advisers in relation to any of the matters to which she referred. We are still examining the facts and circumstances of the case that she drew to the attention of the House.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Will my hon. Friend confirm that he did not mean to say that a special adviser would give authority to anyone?

[James Brokenshire]

I do not know whether my hon. Friend heard the point that the hon. Lady made earlier. I was responding specifically to her point, which I have sought to address in correspondence as well.

On the substance of the orders, I welcome the support and the recognition that they fit into the broader approach and our strategy in confronting and combating those who seek to become involved in terrorism by virtue of their travel to Syria, the ongoing conflict in that arena, and the risk posed by foreign fighters. I have already spoken about the numbers that we believe have been involved, and there are foreign fighters across the EU as well who have travelled. A number of foreign fighters are involved in Syria and, as the crisis in Iraq extends further, they may transfer there.

On the point that the hon. Member for Ilford South (Mike Gapes) highlighted in respect of the situation in Iraq, he will have heard the comments of the Prime Minister and the Foreign Secretary over the past few days on this extremely serious situation. The UK supports the Iraqi Government in their fight against terrorism. We are taking action in three areas—promoting political unity among those who support a democratic Iraqi state and stability in the region, offering assistance where appropriate and possible, and alleviating humanitarian suffering. The Prime Minister made clear yesterday the additional funding that was being made available in respect of that last point.

We have made it clear that this action does not involve planning a military intervention by the UK. We are urging the Iraqi Government to take effective measures to organise their security forces and push ISIL back from the areas that it has occupied, while protecting civilian life, infrastructure and vital services. Any action by the Iraqi Government must include an inclusive approach to bring Iraqi leaders together.

Both the hon. Lady and the Chair of the Select Committee referred to Prevent, and to steps that we can take to prevent people from travelling and becoming involved in potential terrorist activity. I will make a number of brief points about that. The Government are giving key messages on not travelling to Syria. People who want to travel for humanitarian reasons risk coming into contact with terrorist organisations, given the parts of Syria that are controlled by extremist organisations. Although today’s debate has focused on the listed organisations, with much of the focus, understandably, on the operations of ISIL, it is important to underline that there are groups such as the al-Nusra Front and other extremist organisations that share the al-Qaeda narrative and the desire to create a global caliphate. People may come into contact with such groups, which have aspirations to attack the west. It is important to understand and recognise the diverse and dynamic threat from Syria, and to acknowledge the humanitarian support provided by this Government—£600 million—in the aid effort. It is important to reiterate, for those who wish to help for genuine humanitarian reasons, that the best way to do that is through the UK’s humanitarian aid agencies that are supporting that effort, recognising the importance that the UK Government place on providing significant financial aid to those in severe need as a consequence of displacement and the ongoing conflict in Syria.

It is important to stress, too, that we are providing targeted messages through Prevent officers and the Prevent programme, highlighting the reasons why travel to Syria is not appropriate and the risks that it poses. Right hon. and hon. Members will no doubt have noted the comments from Deputy Assistant Commissioner Helen Ball of the Metropolitan police about the role of mothers and family members in extolling the right messages. There are a number of different strands to ensuring that we prevent travel, in addition to measures such as the use of port stops under schedule 7 of the Terrorism Act, the use of the royal prerogative to take passports away when the intent to become involved in terrorist activities is clear, and indeed the use of deprivation of citizenship—a topic recently debated in the House.

Yarl’s Wood Immigration Centre (Detainee Death)

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Monday 31st March 2014 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

It is right and proper that the ongoing police inquiry is pursued, and that the police should follow the evidence where it takes them. That is the right process. Clearly, we will support them in their ongoing investigations to ensure that they reach appropriate conclusions and, once they have finished their criminal investigations, that subsequent investigations are also concluded. I am certainly very clear that that needs to be pursued robustly and clearly to get to the facts of what has happened.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

All Members of the House are greatly saddened to hear about the death of a woman in Yarl’s Wood. Many of the people in Yarl’s Wood are likely to be victims of the criminal gangs who got them into this country illegally. What measures is my hon. Friend taking to try to identify and deal with those criminal gangs?

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Tuesday 29th November 2011 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

The Bill returns to the House after its consideration in the other place. It was subject to lengthy and detailed scrutiny here in the summer, with 10 sittings in Committee, a Report and a Third Reading, all of which were characterised by a high standard of debate.

Their lordships have now given the Bill the full benefit of their expertise, and I am pleased to say that its main provisions are largely as they left this House, reflecting an acceptance that, however unfortunate this might be, there are a small number of individuals involved in terrorism whom we cannot successfully prosecute or deport, and the measures in the Bill are needed to deal with such individuals.

The Bill returns from the other place subject to 11 Government amendments, which are largely minor and technical changes to clarify drafting and better to reflect the policy intention. I will briefly explain why we have made those amendments, dealing first with Lords amendments 1 to 10 before moving on to Lords amendment 11 and Opposition amendment (a).

Lords amendments 1 and 2 make a small but necessary change to clause 8. The clause provides that the court must, when granting permission to impose a terrorism prevention and investigation measure notice—a TPIM notice—at the outset of the process give directions for a directions hearing in relation to the automatic full review of the case. As the Bill was originally drafted, that directions hearing would have had to have taken place within seven days of the TPIM notice being served, unless the individual agreed to postpone it.

The programming of such hearings is, of course, a matter for the courts. It became clear that the original provision had unintentionally introduced a restriction on the discretion available to the courts to manage similar directions hearings in the control order context. We were therefore asked by Her Majesty’s Courts and Tribunal Service to make a change to the Bill in order to provide the courts with a degree of flexibility in that respect and to facilitate effective management of court time.

We have therefore amended clause 8 so that the court may programme the directions hearing later than seven days after service of the TPIM notice, if it so directs. Of course, the intention is that directions hearings will be listed within those seven days where possible, but when the court is unable to do so, for example over a holiday period, the amendment will give the court the discretion to list the hearing slightly later.

Clause 8 still ensures, at subsection (5), that directions given at the hearing must provide for the substantive review hearing to be held as soon as reasonably practicable.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

How much later might it be possible to review the decision? The period is one week to start off with, but could it amount to 28 days, three months, or will it be flexible, with the court having the jurisdiction to decide that issue as well?

[James Brokenshire]

It is the purpose of the amendment to give the court discretion, although a practice has been established through the jurisprudence on control orders which informs that process. It is therefore intended to provide the court with the flexibility, as I explained in my introductory remarks.

Terrorism Prevention and Investigation Measures Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Monday 5th September 2011 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

My hon. Friend the Member for Bedford (Richard Fuller) made some powerful and important points in his succinct contribution.

As I think the right hon. Member for Salford and Eccles (Hazel Blears) accepted in her opening comments, we are revisiting a subject that we debated in detail in the Public Bill Committee, when amendments with the same effect were tabled by Opposition Members and the same arguments were made in support of them. As was made clear following the carefully considered counter-terrorism review, despite the aspersions that the right hon. Lady seeks to cast, the Government concluded that it should not routinely be possible under the TPIM system to require an individual to relocate, without consent, to another part of the UK.

The debate in Committee frequently turned to the question of balance—specifically, the balance between protection of individual liberty and security for the wider population. This is an area where there is a very careful balance to be struck, and where views on where the right balance is may differ. The previous Government took the view that compulsory relocation was necessary as one of a wide range of potential obligations under the control order provisions. Our conclusion, as we made clear in January, is that a more focused use of the restrictions available under the Bill, together with the significantly increased funding we are providing for covert investigation, will allow us to protect the public effectively without the need for this potentially very intrusive power to be routinely available. That is where our approach departs from the Opposition’s, and why we are seeking to strike a different balance from that marked out by them.

[Bob Stewart]

The Minister used the word “routinely”. Does he mean that this is something that does not normally happen, but could?

[James Brokenshire]

To be clear, when I say “routinely” I am talking about powers routinely available under the TPIM Bill, accepting that there is a draft Bill that we tabled last week, and the exceptional circumstances when those powers may be available, which we discussed earlier today. Of course, we will be able to use the robust powers in this Bill to disrupt an individual’s involvement in terrorism-related activity by, for example, requiring them to reside and stay overnight at a particular address in their locality, so that they can be easily monitored; requiring them to abide by other restrictions on their movements overnight; banning them from areas or places where they might meet extremist associates or conduct terrorism-related activities; prohibiting their association with individuals of concern and requiring prior notice of association with other individuals; requiring them to report regularly to a police station and to co-operate with electronic tagging; restricting and monitoring their financial activities; and limiting their communications to a small number of approved devices.

That is why I say clearly that the TPIM Bill provides robust measures to address the risks posed by such individuals, allied to the additional resources being provided to the police and the Security Service, and that that is the right package of measures to have in place. Indeed, as the House is aware, the director general of the Security Service has told the Home Secretary that he is content that the TPIM Bill provides an acceptable balance between the needs of national security and civil liberties, and that the overall package mitigates risk.

Police Reform and Social Responsibility Bill

Debate between Bob Stewart and James Brokenshire

Thursday 31st March 2011 Commons Chamber

[James Brokenshire]

This useful debate has given the House the opportunity to discuss an important issue. We made it clear when we introduced our proposals that it was right and proper that the House should have a proper say on the Bill’s provisions relating to Parliament square, and I believe that the House has had that say this afternoon.

There are clearly issues of agreement on both sides of the House. The right to protest is a cherished and important right that the Government seek to uphold, and it is a positive step forward if the Opposition Front-Bench team accept that fact and accept that the draconian approach that in many ways had become their hallmark was a wrong turn. I certainly welcome therefore the comments from the hon. Member for Gedling (Vernon Coaker) about scrapping SOCPA, which had a very chilling effect on the right to protest. That is why one of the fundamental effects of the Bill will be to scrap those provisions and to return to treating Parliament square the same, in many ways, as the rest of the country.

The question before us relates to the extent of the right to protest. I think that it has been accepted that it is not an exhaustive right or something that we can do to the nth degree, and that there are limits to the right to protest. In her evidence to the Bill Committee, Shami Chakrabati made that point very clearly. We are discussing the limits to and the extent of that right. We have to take a step back and say, “We have that right to protest, but what is the issue at hand?” The issue at hand is that the right to protest does not mean the right to permanent encampment. That is at the heart of what we are seeking to address and why the provisions in the Bill are structured in the way they are.

I hear those who say that it does not make any difference, that it is not a problem and that we should not be seeking to introduce changes in respect of Parliament square and the surrounding area that contrast with the rest of the country. However, I would make the point that the square has been fenced off for six months to allow remedial and repair work, and has therefore been unavailable, which has clearly affected not just people’s access to it, but the right to protest there. That is why it is important that we examine the issue, and why the proposals in the Bill reflect that approach.

[Bob Stewart (Beckenham) (Con)]

Is it not true that the vast majority of the public would think that any encampment outside Parliament should go? I have heard a lot of speeches this afternoon about why it should stay, but the vast majority of our public would say, “Get rid of it. It shouldn’t be there.”

[James Brokenshire]

The act of protest does not by default give individuals the right to erect permanent encampments in Parliament square or on the pavements outside it. That is the essence of what we are proposing. We want to protect the right to protest, but that does not mean that we endorse the permanent encampment that has arisen and that, in essence, has deprived others of access to that space.

I heard the points that the hon. Member for Gedling made about practicability and workability—in some ways he summarised the reasonable discussions and detailed debate that we had in Committee. However, we have had discussions with the Metropolitan police—he will be aware of the exchange of correspondence—and I have spoken to Assistant Commissioner Lynne Owens in recent days, in advance of this afternoon’s debate. One of the challenges has been about differences of ownership, between the Greater London authority and Westminster city council, and ensuring that the proper protocols are agreed. However, with those protocols in place, our strong belief is that our proposals are workable; otherwise we would not be bringing them before the House.

I hear the debate about the language and the drafting. The Government recognise that any new law will be robustly tested by determined individuals—indeed, that would be the case for any proposals. We have therefore sought to capture attempts to circumvent the legislation that have been raised with us by the police. However, that necessarily carries the potential of capturing others, which is why we have allowed some discretion, as it is important that the provisions should be used proportionately.

Let me turn to the amendments tabled by the hon. Member for Hayes and Harlington (John McDonnell). I suppose that the debate comes down to the context and this issue of a permanent encampment, which we think is so significant. As we have heard, Parliament square is a world heritage site, surrounded by important historic buildings such as Westminster abbey. Given its location opposite the Houses of Parliament and the limited space, we are seeking to balance the competing and legitimate needs of members of the public who come to the area as visitors or protesters, with those of Members of Parliament and others who need to be able to carry out their daily work and enjoy the space.

The Government are clear that no one particular person or group of persons should take over the area to the detriment of others. Encampments remaining on Parliament square in defiance of the byelaws have caused significant damage to the garden and the space, which has underlined the unworkability of the Serious Organised Crime and Police Act thus far. The encampments have required considerable remedial work by the Greater London authority, during which time nobody has been able to enjoy the unique space. In relation to the democracy village occupation, the courts found that Parliament square gardens were not a suitable area for any sort of encampment. More recently, the High Court has said:

“Parliament Square Gardens is not a suitable location for prolonged camping; such camping is incompatible with the function, lawful use and character”

of Parliament square gardens, and

“it is also inconsistent with the proper management of the area as a whole”.

The Government and, I think, most Members of this House and the other place would agree with the court’s findings.

Encampments prevent the public’s enjoyment of this unique location and deter people from visiting the area. They even deter and prevent others from protesting, although I have heard the points that have been made in that regard. Let me stress again that we are not seeking to prevent people from protesting on or around Parliament square. We are not seeking to put time limits on protests or to regulate them in that way.

The package of measures in part 3 is aimed at preventing encampments, at dealing with disruptive activity by anyone on Parliament square and at giving the police and authorised officers of the Greater London authority and Westminster city council powers to ensure that Parliament square can be enjoyed by all. So, for example, anyone who pitches a tent in the controlled area defined in the Bill may be directed to take it down. If they fail to comply with the direction, the tent may be seized and they may be charged with an offence.

I welcome the constructive debate that we had in Committee, during which Opposition Members recognised the problem with the current SOCPA provisions and acknowledged the need for new measures. We have heard this afternoon, however, that some of them do not agree with our proposals and continue to have issues. We have introduced a co-ordinated package of provisions that will link into byelaws to ensure that the issues of displacement that have been identified are addressed.

We have listened and reflected on what has been said, which is why the Government have tabled amendments 57 and 58, which deal with authorised officers using powers of force. We continue to believe that the right of authorised officers properly to manage and support the activities in Parliament square, and people’s enjoyment of the square, requires them to have the ability to give directions and to seize items, but not to use reasonable force, because that is the role of the police. That is why we have tabled amendments 57 and 58. They reflect the point that has been highlighted by my hon. Friend the Member for Cambridge (Dr Huppert) and others inside and outside the House. We believe that the package in the Bill strikes a proportionate balance.

We will continue our discussions with the police, with Westminster city council and with the Greater London authority on the management of Parliament square, and on any moves that might result in more co-ordinated ownership and management of the site. Fundamentally, we believe in the right to protest, but that right does not mean permanent encampments. The measures before the House are proportionate and appropriate, because they will enable those who want to protest to have their say outside the House while ensuring that that does not result in the permanent despoiling of Parliament square.