Tobacco and Vapes Bill

Debate between Earl Howe and Baroness Blake of Leeds

Committee stage
Monday 3rd November 2025 Grand Committee

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

My Lords, in responding to these comments from the noble Earl, Lord Howe, I am grateful for the opportunity to explain further the clauses relating to enforcement powers, which I think is what he is seeking from these amendments, and to look at the opposition from the noble Lord, Lord Kamall, that Clauses 35, 36, 129 and 30 stand part of the Bill.

Clause 35 provides a power for the Secretary of State in England or Welsh Ministers in Wales to carry out the investigation and enforcement of a particular case or a particular type of case instead of local authority trading standards. Similarly, Clause 36 provides a power for the Secretary of State and Welsh Ministers to take over the conduct of any legal proceedings relating to an offence under Part 1 or under any regulations made under Clauses 13 or 14 regarding the display of products or prices. Clauses 129 and 130 serve a similar purpose in relation to Part 6, which makes provisions on advertising and sponsorship. Clause 129 provides a power for the Secretary of State, Welsh Ministers, Scottish Ministers or the Department of Health in Northern Ireland to make a direction about the enforcement of the Part 6 provisions. Clause 130 provides a power for the appropriate national authority to take over the conduct of any legal proceedings within their respective jurisdictions relating to an offence under this part of the Bill.

These clauses replace and are based on existing legislation. Trading standards operate in all local authorities, and it is standard practice that they would undertake required local enforcement action and pursue legal proceedings. However—this is referring to the comments made by the noble Earl—these powers provide a useful safeguard for the unlikely situation in which a local authority is unable or unwilling to take enforcement in a particular case. These powers reflect the landscape in which tobacco control measures operate. Individual local authority trading standards departments might not have the resources or willingness to take enforcement action and legal proceedings in cases where this action involves or has significant implications for large multinational companies. In instances such as these, these powers may be used to ensure consistent, strong and effective enforcement.

The noble Earl raised the devolved Administrations. Health is a devolved matter and the Bill builds on the existing legal frameworks of all four of the nations. This means that there are some differences in the provisions between each nation. I think we have outlined how the accountability of these powers will be managed through the different existing arrangements.

The noble Earl also raised the specific matter of scrutiny. I hope I have covered the points throughout the comments that I have made.

I hope noble Lords are reassured that these are necessary clauses based on existing legislation. Together they ensure effective enforcement and therefore should stand part of this Bill.

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, the purpose of a clause stand part debate at this stage of the Bill is to ask some questions. There is no implication that the clause should be deleted. I simply wanted to ask those questions and to ensure that some answers are placed on the record, and I am very grateful to the Minister for doing just that.

I welcome her explanatory comments; it is right, in the light of what she said, that Ministers should have the tools they need to ensure effective enforcement where the public interest demands it. However, I remain concerned that the powers set out in these clauses are unqualified, and I would like to think about that further. I recognise that it is possible to conceive of circumstances where ministerial intervention might be justified—for example, where a case raises genuine national issues or where there has been a manifest failure to act for whatever reason. However, that is precisely why I felt some form of conditionality ought to be built into the legislation.

I appreciate that there is precedent for provisions of this kind, and I am grateful to the Minister for her explanation. Between now and Report, I will consider whether the Bill could be improved with the addition of some clear thresholds, safeguards or procedural tests. For now, I am content to move to the next group of amendments.

Mental Health Bill [HL]

Debate between Earl Howe and Baroness Blake of Leeds

Report stage
Monday 31st March 2025 Lords Chamber

[Earl Howe (Con)]

My Lords, the House will be grateful to the Minister for these government amendments, which, as the noble Baroness made clear, cover two principal policy issues. Accordingly, I have two sets of queries.

On the changes for the rules for authorising electroconvulsive therapy, I am sure it is not the Government’s intention in any way to water down the safeguards surrounding the administering of ECT. However, in relation to Amendments 16 and 17, taken together, can the Minister reassure me? The Bill, as modified by the proposed amendments, will posit that there could be circumstances in which a patient who has the capacity to consent to ECT but who has not consented to it could nevertheless find their refusal to treatment overridden by the decision of a single treating clinician. Even in a situation where the judgment of the clinician was that ECT was necessary to save the patient’s life, it seems to me a significant change from the current rule whereby the decision of a second opinion appointed doctor is required in all cases where it is proposed to administer ECT to a non-consenting patient who has the capacity to consent.

Amendment 17 makes it clear that the regulatory authority—the CQC, in other words—may give permission for ECT to be administered only on the say-so of a single doctor where a SOAD is not available and “exceptional circumstances” apply. I will not ask the Minister to define what “exceptional circumstances” might consist of, but it is to be assumed that a primary example of such circumstances might be when time was of the essence and no SOAD could be located soon enough to avoid exacerbating the risk of harm or death.

So my questions are, firstly, has this proposed change been prompted by a general awareness across the mental health sector that the availability of SOADs can frequently prove a problem in circumstances where urgent decisions are needed? In other words, to put it bluntly, are we being asked to change the law because of habitual shortcomings in NHS communication arrangements? I would be concerned if that were the case.

Secondly, what guidance, if any, will the CQC formulate for itself to ensure that, when its decision is sought to temporarily waive the requirement for a SOAD, it will not do so just on the basis of a SOAD being unavailable? Will it also commit itself to a standard procedure whereby it will seek at least some background detail from the treating clinician of the case before him or her, such as the reasons why they consider that administering ECT to that particular patient carries particular urgency? In other words, can we be reassured that the treating clinician’s opinion will be subject to at least a modicum of testing and cross-questioning before the CQC issues the go-ahead for ECT to be administered? I hope so, because anything short of that could turn into a tick-box exercise.

The other government amendment on which I would appreciate further clarity is Amendment 26, which

“changes the process for appointing a nominated person”.

One of the changes proposed is that the various statements and signatures required for appointing the nominated person no longer have to be contained in the same instrument. The other is that the nominated person’s signature no longer has to be witnessed. I was grateful for the Minister’s explanation, but it implies that the written instrument that appoints the nominated person and is signed by the patient in the presence of a witness can be executed without the nominated person themselves being in the room, or indeed anywhere near. At the moment, the Bill says:

“The instrument appointing the nominated person must … contain a statement, signed by the nominated person in the presence of”


the same person who witnesses the signature of the patient.

I previously assumed that the reason for that provision was the responsibility that the Bill places on the witness—quite a serious responsibility—to ensure, as far as possible, that the nominated person, whoever they are, is a fit and proper person to act in that capacity. It would appear now, with this amendment, that there is no need for the witness even to clap eyes on the individual who is nominated. How can that be right? Without at least meeting the nominated person, how can any self-respecting witness certify, hand on heart, that, in the words of the Bill, they have

“no reason to think that the nominated person lacks capacity or competence to act as a nominated person,”

or that they have

“no reason to think that the nominated person is unsuitable to act as a nominated person”.

Are they simply meant to take the patient’s word for it?

This alteration in the wording raises all sorts of question marks in my mind, given the concerns expressed by noble Lords in Committee about misplaced loyalty towards a particular individual, a naivety on the part of a child or young person, or even some degree of psychological manipulation of a young person—for example, someone who makes it their business to set a child against their own parents.

In Committee, the Minister herself emphasised the need for the law to prevent exploitation and manipulation. While I did not at the time think that her response was completely reassuring, I saw it at least as an acknowledgement that the role of the witness could not be fulfilled properly without some sort of contact with the nominated person. Was I right or wrong on that? It would be helpful if the Minister could explain how my misgivings in this area, about the way in which the nominated person procedure comes to be implemented in practice, might be allayed.

[Baroness Blake of Leeds (Lab)]

My Lords, I thank the noble Lord, Lord Scriven, for his comments and express my thanks also for the many contributions made by noble Lords around the House.

The noble Earl, Lord Howe, asked some searching questions. I think the main thrust of his comments was to look for reassurance that due diligence will be gone into in all of the areas that he raises. I am not sure that I can answer every line in detail, but I want to reassure him in particular about the nominated person question, which I know has caused him enormous concern.

In addition to what I have said, I emphasise that there is no intention at all to water down the safeguard, and that Amendment 26 will make sure that patients get access to a nominated person quicker, along with all the rights and powers that entails, meaning that safeguards provided by the role will not be delayed. That is the crucial point that we have to factor in as to why these amendments are deemed necessary. As he quite rightly says, this is particularly important for patients and those who may be subject to out-of-area placements.

The change that we are bringing in is that the nominated person’s signature does not need to be witnessed in person. None of the safeguarding checks is changed in any way by this. In answer to the noble Lord’s concern, we would expect that, in the majority of cases, the witness will still meet the nominated person face to face. In exceptional circumstances, where this is not possible, we believe that it is better to be able to appoint a nominated person, subject to all the appropriate safeguarding checks, than to have to wait until a person can have their signature witnessed.

A second opinion doctor is not currently required for urgent and compulsory electroconvulsive therapy; this is new under the Bill. I need to emphasise this point. What the amendment does is sets out the exceptional circumstances where a second opinion appointed doctor—sorry, it is a bit of a mouthful—is not required. I hope that gives some clarification.

We have to make sure that these are all taken in the round. I reassure the noble Earl, Lord Howe, and noble Lords across the Chamber, that many of these are regarded to be due to exceptional circumstances, where time is of the essence.

As to whether some of these provisions are based on failure, it is from learned experience and bringing together everyone who has a view to make sure that everything we bring forward is in the best interests of the patient. That is the crucial thing. This is where the detailed work will be done under the code of practice, bringing together all the different parties in a measured way. It will take a few months to do this. That is critical, so that we can all be reassured that the processes are brought into play.

I can understand the concern about making sure that communication is there in situations of stress, but I believe that these amendments are designed to address this issue, with, as I have said, the patient’s interest absolutely in the forefront. There will be opportunities as the code of practice is put together for us to make sure that our endeavours are followed, bringing the best opinion together with the best interest of the patients.